G.R. No.

169517 March 14, 2006

ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN and MALIYAWAO PAGAYOKAN, Petitioners,

vs.
BENEDICTO M. BALAJADIA, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is an original petition1 for contempt filed by petitioners Rogelio Tan, Norma Tan and Maliyawao Pagayokan against
respondent Benedicto Balajadia.

Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent filed a criminal case against them with the Office of the City of Prosecutor of Baguio
City for usurpation of authority, grave coercion and violation of city tax ordinance due to the alleged illegal collection of parking fees by
petitioners from respondent. In paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit, respondent asserted that he is a "practicing lawyer based in
Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City." 2 However, certifications issued by the
Office of the Bar Confidant3 and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines4 showed that respondent has never been admitted to the
Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners claim that respondent is liable for indirect contempt for misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.

In his Comment,5 respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit that he is a practicing lawyer was an
honest mistake. He claims that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the subject complaint-affidavit which was patterned after
Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit.6 It appears that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a complaint-affidavit against petitioners involving the
same subject matter.

Respondent claims that two complaint-affidavits were drafted by the same secretary; one for the May 5, 2005 parking incident at 10:00
o’clock in the morning and another for the parking incident on the same date but which occurred at 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
Respondent insists that the complaint-affidavit regarding the 1:00 o’clock parking incident correctly alleged that he is "a businessman
with office address at Room B-204, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City." 7 However, the complaint-affidavit regarding the
10:00 o’clock parking incident, which is the subject of the instant petition, erroneously referred to him as a practicing lawyer because
Atty. Aquino’s secretary copied verbatim paragraph 5 of Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit. Hence, it was inadvertently alleged that
respondent is a "practicing lawyer based in Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio
City," which statement referred to the person of Atty. Aquino and his law office address.

Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquino’s secretary, executed an affidavit8 admitting the mistake in the preparation of the complaint-affidavit.
Respondent alleged that he did not read the complaint-affidavit because he assumed that the two complaint-affidavits contained the
same allegations with respect to his occupation and office address. Respondent claims that he had no intention of misrepresenting
himself as a practicing lawyer.

In their Reply,9 petitioners reiterate that respondent should be made liable for indirect contempt for having made untruthful statements
in the complaint-affidavit and that he cannot shift the blame to Atty. Aquino’s secretary.

The sole issue for resolution is whether respondent is liable for indirect contempt.

Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity
given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a
person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

xxxx

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

x x x x.

In several cases,10 we have ruled that the unauthorized practice of law by assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without
authority constitutes indirect contempt which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. The liability for the unauthorized practice of
law under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is in the nature of criminal contempt and the acts are punished because they are
an affront to the dignity and authority of the court, and obstruct the orderly administration of justice. In determining liability for criminal
contempt, well-settled is the rule that intent is a necessary element, and no one can be punished unless the evidence makes it clear
that he intended to commit it.11
In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondent’s claim that he never intended to project himself as a lawyer to the
public. It was a clear inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty Aquino. The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the
circumstances that gave rise to the mistake in the drafting of the complaint-affidavit conforms to the documentary evidence on record.
Taken together, these circumstances show that the allegation in paragraph 5 of respondent’s complaint-affidavit was, indeed, the result
of inadvertence.

Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was the result of inadvertence and cannot, by
itself, establish intent as to make him liable for indirect contempt. In the cases where we found a party liable for the unauthorized
practice of law, the party was guilty of some overt act like signing court pleadings on behalf of his client; 12 appearing before court
hearings as an attorney;13 manifesting before the court that he will practice law despite being previously denied admission to the
bar;14 or deliberately attempting to practice law and holding out himself as an attorney through circulars with full knowledge that he is
not licensed to do so.15

In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent acted as an attorney or that he intended to practice law.
Consequently, he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt considering his lack of intent to illegally practice law.

However, while the evidence on record failed to prove respondent’s deliberate intent to misrepresent himself as an attorney and act as
such without authority, he is hereby warned to be more careful and circumspect in his future actions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Respondent is WARNED to be more careful and circumspect in his future actions.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioners,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS,
DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA
C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO,
MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T.
ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC.,
BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES
AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE
FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY.
ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the
ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its
interests.

In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable
financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central
Bank.1 It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related
interests totaling ₱172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and ₱0.505 million as uncollectible. 2 As a bailout, the Central
Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of ₱310 million.3 Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed
to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and
unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation.4 A public
bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning
bid.5 Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for
the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.

In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was to
establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan,
Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong,
Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo,
Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied
Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco
Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc.,
Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms,
Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents
Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio
Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.6 In connection therewith, the
PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of
their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.

Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others, the
writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG.7 After the filing of the parties’ comments, this Court referred the cases to
the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents
Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice
of law.

On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. with
the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 00058 and 0096-0099.9 The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza,
as then Solicitor General10 and counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened"
in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central
Bank’s officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANK’s liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection
with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent
Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005.11 It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent
Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that
respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General. 12 It
further ruled that respondent Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period
under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a
former public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with within
one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office. 13 The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling. 14

It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division to the Fifth Division.15 In its
resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent
Mendoza.16 It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that the arguments were the same in
substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was
denied in its resolution dated December 5, 2001.17

Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth
Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.18 The
PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from
accepting employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that
Central Bank could not waive the objection to respondent Mendoza’s appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil
Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.19

The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive
issue.

Substantive Issue

The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition
states: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which
he had intervened while in the said service."

I.A. The history of Rule 6.03

A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and other parts of Europe.
The early statements of standards did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source but
surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of
lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of
the litigation duties were at times intricate, including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a
duty to explore settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality,
reasonable fees and service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a
lawyer's practice.

The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ markedly from those in England. The
colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from
England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in
early America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many
regulations had the effect of setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive
standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and
post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees. 20

The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark ages" of legal ethics in the United States. By mid-century, American legal
reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York "Field Code,"
introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory duties became law in
several states in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George
Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal
ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century
laws and statutes, other than the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations – e.g., the "do no
falsehood" oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an
attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client
property. Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of
confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the
colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a
lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually
ushered a new era in American legal ethics.21

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their practice — the bar
association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the
two primary sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the bar association codes gave
detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures, however, the bar association codes
retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that
states adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar associations
themselves. Local bar associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth century.
In the late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again, picking up where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of
the new bar associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of
drafting substantive standards of conduct for their members.22

In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was
the model for several states’ codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics. 23

In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of public respect to
which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics.24

As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons. Among their concerns was
the "revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from private life and then
leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government
service."25 These concerns were classified as adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts." "Adverse-interest
conflicts" exist where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to
a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse. 26 On the
other hand, "congruent-interest representation conflicts" are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former
government lawyers.27 For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons, individual
amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and added thirteen new canons. 28 To deal with
problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for "adverse-interest conflicts"
and "congruent-interest representation conflicts."29 The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyer’s
largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could be
to the advantage of parties who might later become private practice clients. 30 Canon 36 provides, viz.:

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial
capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his retirement, accept
employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.

Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937,
respectively.31

In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. 32

By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more meaningful revision. In
1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the "adequacy and effectiveness" of the
ABA Canons. The committee recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to
distinguish between "the inspirational and the proscriptive" and were thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the
United States likewise observed that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of
lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their employment with the government.

The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility.33 The
basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules
of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere.34 In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b)35 became the applicable supplementary norm. The
drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House
of Delegates approved the Model Code.36
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-101(b)
and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the "restatement format," where the conduct standards were set-out in rules, with
comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give better guidance and clarity for enforcement "because the only
enforceable standards were the black letter Rules." The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the
emphasis on narrative discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the content of the black
letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of interests. 37 In
particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective
views of anxious clients as well as the norm’s indefinite nature. 38

In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions,
and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.39 Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals particularly with former government lawyers, and
provides, viz.:

Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in said service.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase "investigated and passed upon" with the word "intervened." It is, therefore,
properly applicable to both "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts."

The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse
interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil
Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there
exists a "congruent-interest conflict" sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.

I.B. The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of "matter" referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and
bounds of the "intervention" made by the former government lawyer on the "matter." The American Bar Association in its
Formal Opinion 342, defined "matter" as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular
situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations
or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.

Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which was the subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza while he was the
Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting the "matter" where he intervened as a
Solicitor General, viz:40

The PCGG’s Case for Atty. Mendoza’s Disqualification

The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the assailed Resolutions
dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The
PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the Central
Bank on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.

As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials of the Central Bank, namely,
then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel
Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano
and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977,
they had a conference with the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of
GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:

Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that the following procedure should be
taken:

1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation had been made since the
last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so
that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the general public.

2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the manner of its
liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and the
liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which had been taken and
praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it was shown that Atty. Mendoza was
furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the
bank’s liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:

The Board decided as follows:

...

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject memorandum of the Director, Department of
Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:

1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March 25, 1977,
containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;

2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;

3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March 24, 1977,
submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of insolvency of Genbank,
together with its attachments; and

4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying the assistance of the
Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is "advising
the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of
Manila." In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is
included within the concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No.
265, section 29, viz:

The provision reads in part:

SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. – Whenever, upon examination by the head of the appropriate supervising or examining
department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve
probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the
Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to
do business in the Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking or
finance, as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets
and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, but not limited
to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions.

...

If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if
the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank
shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying
the assistance of the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate
disputed claims against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual liabilities
of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement the liquidation plan approved
by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in
banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under
this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other
parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts
and assets of such institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board under this Section and the second
paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof that
the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central
Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing
proof that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or
judge of the court in which the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court.
The restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which
shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff
conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The
provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section
shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-
banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That this shall
not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or financial community.

The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this Section shall be vested
exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD
Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)

We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the "matter" contemplated by
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the
"drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law" are
acts which do not fall within the scope of the term "matter" and cannot disqualify.

Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent Mendoza falls within the definition of
matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which is the "matter" involved in Sp.
Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from the "matter" involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It
is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that
he did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself involved was in informing Central
Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related
to but is different from the subject "matter" in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the
stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the
liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized
Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by
the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the
liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the
dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to
respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a
matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the "intervention" contemplated by Rule 6.03. "Intervene" means, viz.:

1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or come in between points of time or
events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris,
where the same city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .)41

On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:

1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests of others.42

There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under the first interpretation, "intervene" includes
participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence. 43 Under the second interpretation,
"intervene" only includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. 44 We hold that this second
meaning is more appropriate to give to the word "intervention" under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its
history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as
innocuous such as "x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law."

In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former government lawyer
"should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while
in such office or employ." As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase "which he has investigated or passed upon" resulted in
unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition
extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the government service, had "substantial responsibility." The 1983 Model
Rules further constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that "a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with
a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee."

It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and substantial. We disagree.
For one, the petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the
then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent
proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination.
Moreover, we note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of
the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role of
the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a
proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of
government.

II

Balancing Policy Considerations

To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the
ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not
been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.

In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court took account of various policy
considerations to assure that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing
other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government recruitment of able
legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government to match compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that
government will be able to reverse that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to
recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher
income in private practice.45 Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government service would be too great for
most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years in
acquiring and cause the firm with which they become associated to be disqualified. 46 Indeed, "to make government service more difficult
to exit can only make it less appealing to enter."47

In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as
deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a
mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted "the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order
to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent," and observed that
the tactic was "so prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary." 48 Even the
United States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals’ description of disqualification motions as "a dangerous
game."49 In the case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of respondent
Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after PCGG has lost many legal
incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than
four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently
remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.50 At the very least, the circumstances under which the
motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner’s motive as highly suspect.

Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be caused by its
misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but
probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. 51 The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without
the benefit of the work done by the latter.52 The effects of this prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated
for it can result in denial of due process.

The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official independence of
lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan: "An individual who has the security of knowing he or she can find
private employment upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she believes them
to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of private employment does not enjoy
such freedom."53 He adds: "Any system that affects the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the
ability to quit inhibits official independence." 54 The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by
respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of
independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence
that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of the independence of the
Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.

No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the freedom to exercise his
profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law
firm.55 Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the possible
appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public
perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best 56 which can lead to untoward results.57 No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the
lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the
government-client and its attorneys which the canons seek to protect.58 Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been
rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct59 and some courts have abandoned per se disqualification based
on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government,
the witnesses in the case, and the public.60

It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who "switch sides." It is
claimed that "switching sides" carries the danger that former government employee may compromise confidential official
information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent
Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of
Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger
that confidential official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent "sides" to be
bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not
working against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in
liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central
Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al. There
is no switching of sides for no two sides are involved.

It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a government employee
might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in government service. 61 The example given by the proponents of this argument is
that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute
less vigorously.62 In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Committee in 1960: "The greatest public risks arising from post
employment conduct may well occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of
government policies."63 Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as "probably excessive." 64 He opines "x x x it is hard to imagine
that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last client – the government. Interviews
with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the ‘best’ government lawyers – the ones who were hardest to beat – not the least
qualified or least vigorous advocates."65 But again, this particular concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge
against respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents
Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above
cases.

Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the "excessive influence of former officials" or
their "clout."66 Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz: "Much of
what appears to be an employee’s influence may actually be the power or authority of his or her position, power that evaporates quickly
upon departure from government x x x." 67 More, he contends that the concern can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To
quote him further: "x x x The idea that, present officials make significant decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says
more about the present officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials
that does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in order to avoid
even the appearance of favoritism."68

III

The question of fairness

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively
to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor
General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was
made after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the
unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be
initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of
the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.

No cost.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.

PAREDES, J.:

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief
before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by
counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered
his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as
such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he
would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the
counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or
City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP
Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP
issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in
this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from
practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of
Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI
of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which
read:

The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party of the civil liability, the civil
action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the
case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.

Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City
Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that
he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San
Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos,
Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as
Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out,
the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil
action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace
Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.

WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the apprearance of
Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.

The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1äwphï1.ñët

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which we consider plausible, the fallacy
of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules),
which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in
private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private
prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute
private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98
N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice
of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of
his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of
Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with
costs against appellant..

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L- 24548 October 27, 1983

WENCESLAO VlNZONS TAN, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND
NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO, respondents-appelllees,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO RIVERA, THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND N ATURAL RESOURCES
JOSE Y. FELICIANO, respon dents-appellees,RAVAGO COMMERCIAL CO., JORGE LAO HAPPICK and ATANACIO
MALLARI, intervenors,

Camito V Pelianco Jr. for petitioner-appellant.

Solicitor General for respondent Director.

Estelito P. Mendoza for respondent Ravago Comm'l Co.

Anacleto Badoy for respondent Atanacio Mallari.

Mariano de Joya, Jr. for respondent Jorge Lao Happick, Jr.

MAKASIAR, J:

This is an appeal from the order dated January 20, 1965 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, in Civil Case No.
56813, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary prohibitory injunction (p. 2. rec.), which dismissed the petition
of petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan on the ground that it does not state a sufficient cause of action, and upon the
respondents-appellees' (Secretary of Agriculture and Natural resources and the Director of Forestry) motion to dismiss (p. 28, rec.).

Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for public bidding a certain tract of public forest land
situated in Olongapo, Zambales, provided tenders were received on or before May 22, 1961 (p. 15, CFI rec.). This public forest land,
consisting of 6,420 hectares, is located within the former U.S. Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was
turned over by the United States Government to the Philippine Government (P. 99, CFI rec.).

On May 5, 1961, petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan submitted his application in due form after paying the necessary fees and
posting tile required bond therefor. Nine other applicants submitted their offers before the deadline (p. 29, rec.).

Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having the area declared as a forest reserve or allow the same to be awarded to the
most qualified bidder. On June 7, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive to the Director of the Bureau of Forestry,
which read as follows:

It is desired that the area formerly covered by the Naval Reservation be made a forest reserve for watershed
purposes. Prepare and submit immediately a draft of a proclamation establishing the said area as a watershed forest
reserve for Olongapo, Zambales. It is also desired that the bids received by the Bureau of Forestry for the issuance of
the timber license in the area during the public bidding conducted last May 22, 1961 be rejected in order that the area
may be reserved as above stated. ...

(SGD.) CARLOS P.
GARCIA

(pp. 98, CFI rec.).

On August 3, 1961, Secretary Cesar M. Fortich of Agriculture and Natural Resources sustained the findings and re comendations of the
Director of Forestry who concluded that "it would be beneficial to the public interest if the area is made available for exploitation under
certain conditions," and

We quote:

Respectfully forwarded to the honorable, the Executive Secretary Malacanang. Manila inviting particular attention to
the comment and recommendation of the Director of Forestry in the proceeding in indorsement in which this Of fice
fully concurs.
 The observations of responsible forest officials are most revealing of their zeal to promote forest conservation and
watershed protection especially in Olongapo, Zambales area. In convincing fashion, they have demonstrated that to
declare the forest area involved as a forest reserve ratify than open it for timber exploitation under license and
regulation would do more harm than of to the public interest. To convert the area into a forest reserve without an
adequate forest protection force, would make of it a 'Free Zone and Logging Paradise,' to the ever 'Problem Loggers'
of Dinalupihan, Bataan . . . an open target of timber smugglers, kaingineros and other forms of forest vandals and
despoilers. On the other hand, to award the area, as planned, to a reputable and responsible licensee who shall
conduct logging operations therein under the selective logging method and who shall be obliged to employ a
sufficient number of forest guards to patrol and protect the forest consecration and watershed protection.

Worthy of mention is the fact that the Bureau of Forestry had already conducted a public bidding to determine the
most qualified bidder to whom the area advertised should be awarded. Needless to stress, the decision of the
Director of Forestry to dispose of the area thusly was arrived at after much thought and deliberation and after having
been convinced that to do so would not adversely affect the watershed in that sector. The result of the bidding only
have to be announced. To be sure, some of the participating bidders like Mr. Edgardo Pascual, went to much
expense in the hope of winning a virgin forest concession. To suddenly make a turn about of this decision without
strong justifiable grounds, would cause the Bureau of Forestry and this Office no end of embarrassment.

In view of the foregoing, it is earnestly urged that the Director of Forestry be allowed to proceed with the
announcement of the results of the bidding for the subject forest area (p. 13, CFI rec.).

The Office of the President in its 4th Indorsement dated February 2, 1962, signed by Atty. Juan Cancio, Acting Legal Officer,
"respectfully returned to the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources for appropriate action," the
papers subject of Forestry Notice No. 2087 which was referred to the Bureau of Forestry for decision (p. 14, CFI rec.).

Finally, of the ten persons who submitted proposed the area was awarded to herein petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, on
April 15, 1963 by the Bureau of Forestry (p. 17, CFI rec.). Against this award, bidders Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao
Happick filed motions for reconsideration which were denied by the Director of Forestry on December 6, 1963.

On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon — who succeeded Secretary Cesar M.
Fortich in office — issued General Memorandum Order No. 46, series of 1963, pertinent portions of which state:

xxx xxx xxx

SUBJECT: ... ... ...

(D)elegation of authority to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary timber licenses.

1. ... ... ...

2. The Director of Forestry is hereby authorized to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the area covered
thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (be the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not
exceeding 5,000 hectares each;

3. This Order shall take effect immediately (p. 267, CFI rec.).

Thereafter, Jose Y. Feliciano was appointed as Acting secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, replacing secretary Benjamin M.
Gozon. Upon assumption of office he Immediately promulgate on December 19, 19b3 General memorandum Order No. 60, revoking
the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry, under General Memorandum order No. 46, to grant ordinary timber licenses, which
order took effect on the same day, December 19, 1963. Pertinent portions of the said Order read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

SUBJECT: Revocation of General Memorandum Order No 46 dated May 30, 1963 —

1. In order to acquaint the undersigned with the volume and Nature of the work of the Department, the authority
delegated to the Director of forestry under General Memorandum Order No. 46, dated May 30, 1963, to grant (a) new
ordinary timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the extension
of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 3,000 hectares each is hereby revoked. Until further notice, the
issuance of' new licenses , including amendments thereto, shall be signed by the secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
 2. This Order shall take effect immediately and all other previous orders, directives, circulars, memoranda, rules and
regulations inconsistent with this Order are hereby revoked (p. 268, CFl rec.; Emphasis supplied).

On the same date that the above-quoted memorandum took effect, December 19, 1963, Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW)
dated April 22, 1963, in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry Estanislao R. Bernal
without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the license was released by the Office
of the Director of Forestry (p. 30, CFI rec.; p. 77, rec.). It was not signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as
required by Order No. 60 aforequoted.

On February 12, 1964, Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be
considered by tile Natural Resources praying that, pending resolution of the appeal filed by Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge
Lao Happick from the order of the Director of Forestry denying their motion for reconsideration, OTI No. 20-'64 in the name of
Wenceslao V. Tan be cancelled or revoked on the ground that the grant thereof was irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing
forestry laws, rules and regulations.

On March 9, 1964, acting on the said representation made by Ravago Commercial Company, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources promulgated an order declaring Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 issued in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, as
having been issued by the Director of Forestry without authority, and is therefore void ab initio. The dispositive portion of said order
reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office is of the opinion and so holds that O.T. License No. 20-'64 in the
name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan should be, as hereby it is, REVOKED AND DECLARED without force and effect
whatsoever from the issuance thereof.

The Director of Forestry is hereby directed to stop the logging operations of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, if there be any,
in the area in question and shall see to it that the appellee shall not introduce any further improvements thereon
pending the disposition of the appeals filed by Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge lao Happick in this case" (pp.
30-31, CFI rec.).

Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied the motion
in an Order dated March 25, 1964, wherein this paragraph appears:

In this connection, it has been observed by the Acting Director of Forestry in his 2nd indorsement of February 12,
1964, that the area in question composes of water basin overlooking Olongapo, including the proposed Olongapo
watershed Reservation; and that the United States as well as the Bureau of Forestry has earmarked this entire
watershed for a watershed pilot forest for experiment treatment Concerning erosion and water conservation and flood
control in relation to wise utilization of the forest, denudation, shifting cultivation, increase or decrease of crop harvest
of agricultural areas influenced by the watershed, etc. .... (pp. 3839, CFI rec.; p. 78, rec.).

On April 11, 1964, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, acting on the separate appeals filed by Jorge Lao Happick and
Ravago Commercial Company, from the order of the Director of Forestry dated April 15, 1963, awarding to Wenceslao Vinzons Tan the
area under Notive No. 2087, and rejecting the proposals of the other applicants covering the same area, promulgated an order
commenting that in view of the observations of the Director of Forestry just quoted, "to grant the area in question to any of the parties
herein, would undoubtedly adversely affect public interest which is paramount to private interests," and concluding that, "for this reason,
this Office is of the opinion and so holds, that without the necessity of discussing the appeals of the herein appellants, the said appeals
should be, as hereby they are, dismissed and this case is considered a closed matter insofar as this Office is concerned" (p. 78, rec.).

On April 18, 1964, on the basis of the denial of his motion for reconsideration by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
petitioner-appellant filed the instant case before tile court a quo (Court of First Instance, Manila), Special Civil Action No. 56813, a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary prohibitory injunction (pp. 1-12, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant claims
that the respondents-appellees "unlawfully, illegally whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily acted without or in excess of their
jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a valid and existing timber license without just cause, by denying
petitioner-appellant of the equal protection of the laws, by depriving him of his constitutional right to property without due process of law,
and in effect, by impairing the obligation of contracts" (P. 6, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant prayed for judgment making permanent the
writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents- appellees; declaring the orders of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources dated March 9, March 25, and April 11, 1964, as well as all his acts and those of the Director of Forestry implementing said
orders, and all the proceedings in connection therewith, null and void, unlawful and of no force and effect; ordering the Director of
Forestry to renew OTI No. 20-'64 upon expiration, and sentencing the respondents, jointly and severally, to pay the petitioner-appellant
the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.000) by way of pecuniary damage, One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
by way of moral and exemplary damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000-00) as attorney's fees and costs. The respondents-
appellees separately filed oppositions to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, Ravago Commercial Company, Jorge Lao,
Happick and Atanacio Mallari, presented petitions for intervention which were granted, and they too opposed the writ.

The Director of Forestry in his motion to dismiss dated April 24, 1964, alleges the following grounds: (1) that the court has no
jurisdiction; (2) that the respondents may not be sued without their consent; (3) that the petitioner has not exhausted all available
administrative remedies; (4) that the petition does not state a cause of action; and (5) that purely administrative and discretionary
functions of administrative officials may not be interfered with by the courts. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources joined
the motion to dismiss when in his answer of May 18, 1964, he avers the following special and affirmative defenses: (1) that the court
has no jurisdiction to entertain the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; (2) that the petitioner has no cause of action; (3) that
venue is improperly laid; (4) that the State is immune from suit without its consent; (5) that the court has no power to interfere in purely
administrative functions; and (6) that the cancellation of petitioner's license was dictated by public policy (pp. 172-177, rec.). Intervenors
also filed their respective answers in intervention with special and affirmative defenses (pp. 78-79, rec.). A hearing was held on the
petition for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction, wherein evidence was submitted by all the parties including the intervenors,
and extensive discussion was held both orally and in writing.

After the said hearing, on January 20, 1965, the court a quo, from the evidence received, resolved not only the question on the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction but also the motion to dismiss, declared that the petition did not state a sufficient cause of
action, and dismissed the same accordingly. To justify such action, the trial court, in its order dismissing the petition, stated that "the
court feels that the evidence presented and the extensive discussion on the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction should also be taken into consideration in resolving not only this question but also the motion to dismiss, because
there is no reason to believe that the parties will change their stand, arguments and evidence" (p. 478, CFI rec.). His motion for
reconsideration having been denied (p. 488, CFI rec.), petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan appealed directly to this Court.

Petitioner-appellant now comes before this Court, claiming that the trial court erred in:

(1) holding that the petition does not state a sufficient cause of action: and

(2) dismissing the petition [p.27,rec. ].

He argues that the sole issue in the present case is, whether or not the facts in the petition constitute a sufficient cause of action (p. 31,
rec.). Petitioner-appellant, in his brief, presented a lengthy discussion on the definition of the term cause of action wherein he
contended that the three essential elements thereon, — namely, the legal right of the plaintiff, the correlative obligation of the
defendants and the act or omission of the defendant in violation of that right — are satisfied in the averments of this petition (pp. 31-32,
rec.). He invoked the rule that when the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, such fact can be
determined only from the facts alleged in the complaint and from no other, and the court cannot consider other matters aliunde He
further invoked the rule that in a motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of cause of action, the facts alleged in the complaint are
deemed hypothetically admitted for the purpose of the motion (pp. 32-33, rec.).

A perusal of the records of the case shows that petitioner-appellant's contentions are untenable. As already observed, this case was
presented to the trial court upon a motion to dismiss for failure of the petition to state a claim upon which relief could be granted (Rule
16 [g], Revised Rules of Court), on the ground that the timber license relied upon by the petitioner- appellant in his petition was issued
by the Director of Forestry without authority and is therefore void ab initio. This motion supplanted the general demurrer in an action at
law and, as a rule admits, for the purpose of the motion, ail facts which are well pleaded however while the court must accept as true all
well pleaded facts, the motion does not admit allegations of which the court will take judicial notice are not true, nor does the rule apply
to legally impossible facts, nor to facts inadmissible in evidence, nor to facts which appear by record or document included in the
pleadings to be unfounded (Vol. 1, Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p. 505, citing cases).

It must be noted that there was a hearing held in the instant case wherein answers were interposed and evidence introduced. In the
course of the hearing, petitioner-appellant had the opportunity to introduce evidence in support of tile allegations iii his petition, which he
readily availed of. Consequently, he is estopped from invoking the rule that to determine the sufficiency of a cause of action on a motion
to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. If there were no hearing held, as in the case of Cohen vs. U.S.
CCA Minn 1942,129 F. 2d 733), "where the case was presented to District Court upon a motion to dismiss because of alleged failure of
complaint to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and no answer was interposed and no evidence introduced, the only facts
which the court could properly consider in passing upon the motion were those facts appearing in the complaint, supplemented be such
facts as the court judicially knew.

In Llanto vs. Ali Dimaporo, et al. (16 SCRA 601, March 31, 1966), this Court, thru Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, held that the trial court
can properly dismiss a complaint on a motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action even without a hearing, by taking into
consideration the discussion in said motion and the opposition thereto. Pertinent portion of said decision is hereby quoted:

Respondents moved to dismiss. Ground therefor is lack of cause of action. The Court below granted the motion,
dismissed the petition. The motion to reconsider failed. Offshoot is this appeal.

1. The threshold questions are these: Was the dismissal order issued without any hearing on the
motion to dismiss? Is it void?

WE go to the record. The motion to dismiss was filed on February 1, 1961 and set for hearing on February 10
following. On February 8, 1961 petitioner's counsel telegraphed the court, (r)equest postponement motion dismissal
till written opposition filed.' He did not appear at the scheduled hearing. But on March 4, 1961, he followed up his
 wire, with his written opposition to the motion to dismiss. Adverting to the 5-page motion to dismiss and the 6-page
opposition thereto, We find that the arguments pro and con on the question of the board's power to abolish
petitioner's position to discussed the problem said profusely cited authorities. The May 15, 1961 8-page court order
recited at length the said arguments and concluded that petitioner made no case.

One good reason for the statutory requirement of hearing on a motion as to enable the suitors to adduce evidence in
support of their opposing claims. But here the motion to dismiss is grounded on lack of cause of action. Existence of
a cause of action or lack of it is determined be a reference to the facts averred in the challenged pleading. The
question raised in the motion is purely one of law. This legal issue was fully discussed in said motion and the
opposition thereto. In this posture, oral arguments on the motion are reduced to an unnecessary ceremony and
should be overlooked. And, correctly so, because the other intendment of the law in requiring hearing on a motion,
i.e., 'to avoid surprises upon the opposite party and to give to the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the
motion,' has been sufficiently met. And then, courts do not exalt form over substance (Emphasis supplied).

Furthermore even if the complaint stated a valid cause of action, a motion to dismiss for- insufficiency of cause of action will be granted
if documentary evidence admitted by stipulation disclosing facts sufficient to defeat the claim enabled the court to go beyond disclosure
in the complaint (LOCALS No. 1470, No. 1469, and No. 1512 of the International Longshoremen's Association vs. Southern Pacific Co.,
6 Fed. Rules Service, p. 107; U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Dec. 7, 1952; 131 F. 2d 605). Thus, although the evidence of
the parties were presented on the question of granting or denying petitioner-appellant's application for a writ of preliminary injunction,
the trial court correctly applied said evidence in the resolution of the motion to dismiss. Moreover, in applying said evidence in the
resolution of the motion to dismiss, the trial court, in its order dismissing the petition, pointed out that, "there is no reason to believe that
the parties will change their stand, arguments and evidence" (p. 478, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant did not interpose any objection
thereto, nor presented new arguments in his motion for reconsideration (pp. 482-484, CFI rec.). This omission means conformity to said
observation, and a waiver of his right to object, estopping him from raising this question for the first time on appeal. " I question not
raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal" (Matienzo vs. Servidad, Sept. 10, 1981, 107 SCRA 276).

Moreover, petitioner-appellant cannot invoke the rule that, when the ground for asking dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of
action, its sufficiency must be determined only from the allegations in the complaint. "The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a
very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of
the rules is made, their aim would be defeated. Where the rules are merely secondary in importance are made to override the ends of
justice; the technical rules had been misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial right of a party, said rigid application cannot be
countenanced" (Vol. 1, Francisco, Civil Procedure, 2 ed., 1973, p. 157, citing cases).

What more can be of greater importance than the interest of the public at large, more particularly the welfare of the inhabitants of
Olongapo City and Zambales province, whose lives and properties are directly and immediately imperilled by forest denudation.

The area covered by petitioner-appellant's timber license practically comprises the entire Olongapo watershed (p. 265, CFI rec.). It is of
public knowledge that watersheds serves as a defense against soil erosion and guarantees the steady supply of water. As a matter of
general policy, the Philippine Constitution expressly mandated the conservation and proper utilization of natural resources, which
includes the country's watershed. Watersheds in the Philippines had been subjected to rampant abusive treatment due to various
unscientific and destructive land use practices. Once lush watersheds were wantonly deforested due to uncontrolled timber cutting by
licensed concessionaries and illegal loggers. This is one reason why, in paragraph 27.of the rules and regulations included in the
ordinary timber license it is stated:

The terms and conditions of this license are subject to change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that
this license may be made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests so require (Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.).

Considering the overriding public interest involved in the instant case, We therefore take judicial notice of the fact that, on April 30,
1964, the area covered by petitioner-appellant's timber license has been established as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve by
virtue of Executive Proclamation No. 238 by then President Diosdado Macapagal which in parts read as follows:

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1824 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, 1, Diosdado
Macapagal, President of the Philippines do hereby withdraw from entry, sale, or settlement and establish as
Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve for watershed, soil protection, and timber production purposes, subject to
private rights, if any there be, under the administration and control of the Director of Forestry, xx the following parcels
of land of the public domain situated in the municipality of Olongapo, province of Zambales, described in the Bureau
of Forestry map No. FR-132, to wit: ... ... (60 O.G. No. 23, 3198).

Petitioner-appellant relies on Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW) for his alleged right over the timber concession in question. He
argues thus: "The facts alleged in the petition show: (1) the legal right of the petitioner to log in the area covered by his timber license;
(2) the legal or corresponding obligation on the part of the respondents to give effect, recognize and respect the very timber license
they issued to the petitioner; and (3) the act of the respondents in arbitrarily revoking the timber license of the petitioner without giving
him his day in court and in preventing him from using and enjoying the timber license issued to him in the regular course of official
business" (p. 32, rec.).
In the light of petitioner-appellant's arguments, it is readily seen that the whole controversy hinges on the validity or invalidity of his
timber license.

WE fully concur with the findings of the trial court that petitioner- appellant's timber license was signed and released without authority by
then Acting Director Estanislao R. Bernal of Forestry, and is therefore void ab initio. WE hereby quote such findings:

In the first place, in general memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized
to grant a new ordinary timber license only where the area covered thereby was not more than 3,000 hectares; the
tract of public forest awarded to the petitioner contained 6,420 hectares (Exhs. 2-A and 2-B Ravago, embodied in
Annex B; Exh. B). The petitioner contends that only 1,756 hectares of the said area contain commercial and operable
forest; the authority given to the Director of Forestry to grant a new ordinary timber license of not more than 3,000
hectares does not state that the whole area should be commercial and operable forest. It should be taken into
consideration that the 1,756 hectares containing commercial and operable forest must have been distributed in the
whole area of 6,420 hectares. Besides the license states, 'Please see attached sketch and technical description,'
gives an area of 6,420 hectares and does not state what is the area covered of commmercial and operable forest
(Exh. Ravago Also Annex B of the petition, which was marked as Exhibit B, states:

Under Notice No. 2087, a tract of public forest containing 6,420 hectares located in Olongapo,
Zambales was declared available for timber utilization and development. Pursuant to this Notice,
there were received bid proposals from the following persons: ...

Wherefore, confirming the findings of said Committee, the area described in Notice No. 2087 shall be awarded, as it
is hereby awarded to Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, subject to the following conditions: ... ...

In the second place, at the time it was released to the petitioner, the Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority
to grant any license. The license was signed by the Acting Director of Forestry on December 19, 1963, and released
to the petitioner on January 6, 1964 (Exh. RavaGo The authority delegated to the Director of Forestry to grant a new
ordinary timber license was contained in general memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963. This was revoked
by general memorandum order No. 60, which was promulgated on December 19, 1963. In view thereof, the Director
of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964, and said license is therefore
void ab initio (pp. 479480, CFI rec.).

The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the impression that it was ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on which date
the authority of the Director of Forestry was revoked. But, what is of greatest importance is the date of the release or issuance, and not
the date of the signing of the license. While petitioner-appellant's timber license might have been signed on December 19, 1963 it was
released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release, no right is acquired by the licensee. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director
of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not acquired any
legal right under such void license. This is evident on the face of his petition as supplemented by its annexes which includes Ordinary
Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW). Thus, in the case of World Wide Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. vs. Macrohon, et al. (105 Phil. 250,
Feb. 28, 1959), this Court held that if from the face of the complaint, as supplemented by its annexes, plaintiff is not the owner, or
entitled to the properties it claims to have been levied upon and sold at public auction by the defendants and for which it now seeks
indemnity, the said complaint does not give plaintiff any right of action against the defendants. In the same case, this Court further held
that, in acting on a motion to dismiss, the court cannot separate the complaint from its annexes where it clearly appears that the claim
of the plaintiff to be the A owner of the properties in question is predicated on said annexes. Accordingly, petitioner-appellant's petition
must be dismissed due to lack of cause of action.

II

Petitioner-appellant, in his petition, alleged that he has exhausted all his administrative remedies to no avail as respondents-appellees
have failed, neglected, refused and continue to refuse to allow petitioner-appellant to continue operation in the area covered by his
timber license. He further alleged that he has neither recourse by way of appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law except thru this special civil action, as the last official act of the respondent-appellee Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources in declaring void the timber license referred to above after denying petitioner-appellant's motion for reconsideration,
is the last administrative act. Petitioner-appellant relies on the case of Demaisip vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. (106 Phil. 237, Sept.
24, 1959), wherein it was held that the failure of the plaintiff to appeal from the adverse decision of the Secretary to the President
cannot preclude the plaintiff from taking court action in view of the theory that the Secretary of a department is merely an alter-ego of
the President. The presumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the President unless the same is
disapproved by the latter (Villena vs. the Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451; p. 7, CFI rec.).

To this We cannot agree. Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to the President of the Philippines, who issued Executive Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the area from private
exploitation, and establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that the President has the power to review on
appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to
exhaust his administrative remedies. Thus, this Court, in the case of Calo vs. Fuertes (5 SCRA 399, 400, June 29, 1962), held that:
 At any rate, the appellant's contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is the alter ego of
the President and his acts or decisions are also those of the latter, he need not appeal from the decision or opinion of
the former to the latter, and that, such being the case, after he had appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of the Director of Lands he had exhausted the administrative
remedies, is untenable.

The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is tantamount to not appealing all thereto. Such
withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal to the President is the last step he should take in an administrative case.

In 1912, in the case of Lamb vs. Phipps (22 Phil. 491-92, July 22, 1912), this Court stressed the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, thus:

When a plain, adequate and speedy remedy is afforded by and within the executive department of the
government the courts will not interfere until at least that remedy has been exhausted. Jao Igco vs. Shuster, 10 Phil.
Rep. 448; Ekiu vs. U.S., 142 U.S. 651; U.S. vs. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161; U.S. vs. Ju Toy 198 U.S. 253; Chill Yow vs.
U.S., 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 201). The administrative remedies afforded by law must first be exhausted before resort can
be had to the courts, especially when the administrative remedies are by law exclusive and final. Some matters and
some questions are by law delegated entirely and absolutely to the discretion of particular branches of the executive
department of the government. When the law confers exclusive and final jurisdiction upon the executive department
of the government to dispose of particular questions, their judgments or the judgments of that particular department
are no more reviewable by the courts than the final judgment or decisions of the courts are subject to be reviewed
and modified by them" (emphasis supplied).

Moreover, this being a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must allege and prove that he has no other speedy and adequate
remedy (Diego vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., 54 Off. Gaz., No. 4, 956). In the case at bar, petitioner- appellant's speedy and
adequate remedy is an appeal to the President of the Philippines.

Accordingly, "it is settled to the point of being elementary that the only question involved n certiorari is jurisdiction, either want of
jurisdiction or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion shall warrant the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari when the
same is so grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law" FS Divinagracia Agro-Commercial Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 191 [April .1,
1981]). The foregoing is on the assumption that there is any irregularity, albeit there is none in the acts or omissions of the respondents-
appellees. certiorari is not a substitute for appeal as held time and again by this Court (People vs. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465), "it being
a time honored and well known principle that before seeking judicial redress, a party must first exhaust the administrative remedies
available" (Garcia vs. Teehankee, 27 SCRA 944, April 18, 1969).

Moreover, from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources complained of, petitioners had a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy by appealing therefrom to the Chief Executive. In other words, before filing the present action for certiorari in the court
below, they should have availed of this administrative remedy and their failure to do so must be deemed fatal to their case [Calo vs.
Fuertes, et al., G.R. No. L-16537, June 29,1962]. To place petitioners' case beyond the pale of this rule, they must show that their case
falls — which it does not — within the cases where, in accordance with our decisions, the aggrieved party need not exhaust
administrative remedies within his reach in the ordinary course of the law [Tapales vs. The President and the Board of Regents of the
U.P., G.R. No. L-17532, March 30, 1963; Mangubat vs. Osmena, G.R. No. L- 12837, April 30, 1959; Baguio vs. Hon. Jose Rodriguez,
G. R. No. L-11078, May 27, 1959; Pascual vs. Provincial Board, G.R. No. L-11959, Oct. 31, 1959; Marinduque Iron Mines, etc. vs.
Secretary of Public Works, G.R. No. L-15982, May 31, 1963; Alzate vs. Aldaba, G.R. No. L-14407, Feb. 29, 1960 and Demaisip vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L- 13000, Sept. 25, 1959] (Ganob vs. Ramas, 27 SCRA 1178, April 28, 1969).

III

Petitioner-appellant not only failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, but also failed to note that his action is a suit against the
State which, under the doctrine of State immunity from suit, cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to be sued Kawananakoa
vs. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349; Siren vs. U.S., 7 Wall. 152; Sec. 16, Art. XV, 1973 Constitution).

The respondents-appellees, in revoking the petitioner-appellant's timber license, were acting within the scope of their authority.
Petitioner-appellant contends that "this case is not a suit against the State but an application of a sound principle of law whereby
administrative decisions or actuations may be reviewed by the courts as a protection afforded the citizens against oppression" (p. 122,
CFI rec.). But, piercing the shard of his contention, We find that petitioner-appellant's action is just an attempt to circumvent the rule
establishing State exemption from suits. He cannot use that principle of law to profit at the expense and prejudice of the State and its
citizens. The promotion of public welfare and the protection of the inhabitants near the public forest are property, rights and interest of
the State. Accordingly, "the rule establishing State exeraiption from suits may not be circumvented by directing the action against the
officers of the State instead of against the State itself. In such cases the State's immunity may be validly invoked against the action as
long as it can be shown that the suit really affects the property, rights, or interests of the State and not merely those of the officer
nominally made party defendant" (SINCO, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 35; Salgado vs. Ramos, 64 Phil. 724; see also Angat River
Irrigation System vs. Angat River Workers' Union, G.R. No. L-10943-44, Dec. 28, 1957, 102 Phil. 789, 800-802; Mobil PhiL vs. Customs
Arrastre Service, 18 SCRA 1120, 1121-1125; Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of Printing Employees' Association, 1 SCRA 340, 341,
343).

Both the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Forestry acted in their capacity as officers of the State,
representatives of the sovereign authority discharging governmental powers. A private individual cannot issue a timber license.

Consequently, a favorable judgment for the petitioner-appellant would result in the government losing a substantial part of its timber
resources. This being the case, petitioner-appellant's action cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to be sued.

IV

Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still respondents-appellees can validly revoke his timber license.
As pointed out earlier, paragraph 27 of the rules and regulations included in the ordinary timber license states: "The terms and
conditions of this license are subject to change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license may be made to expire
at an earlier date, when public interests so require" (Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.). A timber license is an instrument by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this ceise

"A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal,
state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested
right; nor is it taxation" (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin 54 O.G. 7576). In the case of Pedro vs. Provincial Board of Rizal (56 Phil. 123), it was
held that:

A license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may not be
deprived without due process of law, but a mere privilege which may be revoked when public interests so require.

The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the proper exercise of police power
(Surigao Electric Co., Inc. vs. Municipality of Surigao, 24 SCRA 898, Aug. 30, 1968). The State has inherent power enabling it to
prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety, and welfare of society (Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, Oct. 24,1970).

As provided in the aforecited provision, timber licenses are subject to the authority of the Director of Forestry. The utilization and
disposition of forest resources is directly under the control and supervision of the Director of Forestry. However, "while Section 1831 of
the Revised Administrative Code provides that forest products shall be cut, gathered and removed from any forest only upon license
from the Director of Forestry, it is no less true that as a subordinate officer, the Director of Forestry is subject to the control of the
Department Head or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (See. 79[c], Rev. Adm. Code), who, therefore, may impose
reasonable regulations in the exercise of the powers of the subordinate officer" (Director of Forestry vs. Benedicto, 104 SCRA 309, May
5, 1981). The power of control of the Department Head over bureaus and offices includes the power to modify, reverse or set aside acts
of subordinate officials (Province of Pangasinan vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 30 SCRA 134, Oct. 31, 1969;
Montano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 144, 147-148). Accordingly, respondent-appellee Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
has the authority to revoke, on valid grounds, timber licenses issued by the Director of Forestry. There being supporting evidence, the
revocation of petitioner-appellant's timber license was a wise exercise of the power of the respondent- appellee (Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources) and therefore, valid.

Thus, "this Court had rigorously adhered to the principle of conserving forest resources, as corollary to which the alleged right to them
of private individuals or entities was meticulously inquired into and more often than not rejected. We do so again" (Director of Forestry
vs. Benedicto, supra). WE reiterate Our fidelity to the basic policy of conserving the national patrimony as ordained by the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, THE ORDER APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY .AFFIRMED IN TOTO. COSTS
AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLANT.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor.

The Facts

Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his estate. 1 Alfonso Lim is a
stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. 2

3
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc. until his
appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992. 4

Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber concessions from the government. The
Presidential Commission on Good Government sequestered it sometime in 1986, 5 and its operations ceased in 1997. 6

Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v.
Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal complaint"). 7 Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over
the management and control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause
from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. 8

Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. 9 He resolved the criminal
complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations 10 for violation of Article 288 11 in relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor Code
of the Philippines. 13

Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager
and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing,
investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. 14 Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing
of the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the complaint. 15

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government
prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January
and February 1995, 16 another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, 17 and P5,000 for the month of April 1996. 18

Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the
prohibition against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor.

Respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal
complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation. 19

Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat for more than five
years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to Taggat. 21 Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to
conduct the necessary preliminary investigation. 22 Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when
he performed his duty. 23 Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal
complaint 24 but instead complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation. 25
Respondent states that complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that respondent would exonerate her
from the charges filed as gleaned from complainant’s statement during the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:

xxx

Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didn’t think he would do it, Madam Witness?

A. Because he is supposed to be my father’s friend and he was working with my Dad and he was supposed to be trusted by my father.
And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x x. 26

Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat employees or complainant.
Respondent claims he was merely performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. 27 Respondent argues that
complainant failed to establish that respondent’s act was tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith. 28

Respondent denies complainant’s allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases, threatened and harassed Taggat employees.
Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of proof because complainant failed to mention the names of the employees or present
them for cross-examination. 29

Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer fees from complainant but claims
that it

was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. 30 Respondent contends that the fees were paid for his consultancy services
and not for representation. Respondent submits that consultation is not the same as representation and that rendering consultancy
services is not prohibited. 31 Respondent, in his Reply-Memorandum, states:

x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat without the respondent’s asking, intended as
token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer fees. These payments do not at all show or translate as a
specie of ‘conflict of interest’. Moreover, these consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the above-mentioned labor
complaints filed by former Taggat employees. 32

Respondent insists that complainant’s evidence failed to prove that when the criminal complaint was filed with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the retained counsel or legal consultant. 33

While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651 Informations against complainant
was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999. 34 Hence, the criminal
complaint was dismissed. 35

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas ("IBP Commissioner Abbas") heard
the case 36 and allowed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 37 Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas’ resignation, the case
was reassigned to Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner Funa"). 38

After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-
479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4 November 2004 adopting with modification 39 IBP Commissioner Funa’s Report and Recommendation
("Report") finding respondent guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating the prohibition
against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors recommended the imposition of a
penalty of three years suspension from the practice of law. The Report reads:

Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in deciding
I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will require the test of whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former
position of Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.

I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Annex "B" of Complaint).
Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having the "management and control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of
the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).

Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly handled the personnel and
labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related with the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent
undoubtedly dealt with and related with complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much
familiar with Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and personalities in that
case are very much familiar with Respondent.
A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the duty to "maintain inviolate the
client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented
him" (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)

Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any interest except justice. It should not
be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a former client with respect to matters that he previously handled for
that former client. In this case, matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations that he previously handled as Personnel
Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would
have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as
Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.

xxxx

While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S. No. 97-240 were of the years
1996 and 1997, the employees and management involved are the very personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager and
Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt with these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee
of the corporation and part of its management.

xxxx

As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein Complainant while being an Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had long been
settled. Government prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto
Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a legal consultant is a
practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts that are characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93
Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in or out of court, which required the application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and
calls for legal knowledge, training and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v.
Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).

Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.

As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and instigating the filing of criminal complaints, we find the
evidence insufficient.

Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating the
prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. 40

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B 41 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code").
However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against
unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").

Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official duties." 43 A government
lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting interests." 44 However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The
prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned is
given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship exists. 45 Moreover, considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty. 46

Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct." Unlawful conduct includes
violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to "engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized
by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions." 47

Complainant’s evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting interests

In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is
whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or
previous employment. 49 In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain
from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him. 50
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint filed
by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to
15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.

In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to prove that respondent used against
Taggat, his former client, any confidential information acquired through his previous employment. The only established participation
respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that basis
alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential information from his previous employment with complainant
or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.

The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he resolved as
government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyer’s
immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent
of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former
client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.

Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule
15.03 of the Code.

Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as –

x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give
notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." 51

"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public
as a lawyer. 52

Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat
from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and
retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal
knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of law."

Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working as a government prosecutor. Even
the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for "Retainer’s fee." 53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant,
respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.

However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional Responsibility unless the violations
also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to
investigate violations of RA 6713 – the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees – unless the acts
involved also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal
services while serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.

Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when respondent stated in his Demurrer to Evidence:

In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and indefinitely suspended or disbarred from the
practice of the law profession and his name removed from the Roll of Attorneys on the following grounds:

xxxx

54
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and in his dealings with the public.

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. 55
Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized private practice of profession is
suspension for six months and one day to one year. 56 We find this penalty appropriate for respondent’s violation in this case of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon
finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal record as an attorney,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008

WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot1 and the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate,
Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu2 and Antonio
Pastor3 of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated
against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila4 where the parties reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. 5 When the parties failed to arrive at
an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the
instant administrative complaint,6 claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he
stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong
barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the
barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of
the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were
not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal
assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent
the commission of a patent injustice against her.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. As there was no
factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position
papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. 7

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the conciliation proceedings and heard the
complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the
ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the
answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he intervened while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713:8

SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed
in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official ands
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
 CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)

For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one month with a stern
warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.9 This was adopted and approved by the IBP
Board of Governors.10

We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former Government Lawyers

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies
only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened while in said service."
In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service."

Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by
that provision.

Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice of Profession of Elective Local Government
Officials

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of
their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their
official functions." This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.

For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160 12 governs:

SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession
or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session
hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of which he
is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the
interest of the Government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local officials. As a special law with a definite
scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general
law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.13

Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following: the governor, the vice
governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of
the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for
municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for
barangays.

Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging
in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full
time service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal
mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular
sessions only at least once a week.14 Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any
occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization
from any other person or office for any of these purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are
expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is
made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.15 Since they are
excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because
they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month. 16

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have procured prior
permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.

A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To Practice Law Must Secure Prior Authority From The Head Of His
Department

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can
engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned. 17 Section 12, Rule XVIII
of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected
with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the
Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is
granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the
end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between
his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in
the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law
and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to
comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal
profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. 18 Every
lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. 19

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's oath 20 and/or for breach
of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a
lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of respondent Atty. Vicente G.
Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7481 April 24, 2012

LORENZO D. BRENNISEN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RAMON U. CONTAWI, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Lorenzo D. Brennisen against respondent Atty.
Ramon U. Contawi for deceit and gross misconduct in violation of his lawyer's oath.

The Facts

Complainant is the registered owner of a parcel of land located in San Dionisio, Parañaque City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 211762 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. Being a resident of the United States of America (USA), he
entrusted the administration of the subject property to respondent, together with the corresponding owner's duplicate title.

Unbeknownst to complainant, however, respondent, through a spurious Special Power of Attorney (SPA) 3 dated February 22, 1989,
mortgaged and subsequently sold the subject property to one Roberto Ho ("Ho"), as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale 4 dated
November 15, 2001. As a result, TCT No. 21176 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 1508145 issued in favor of Ho.

Thus, on April 16, 2007, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent for having violated his oath as a
lawyer, causing him damage and prejudice.

In his counter-affidavit,6 respondent denied any formal lawyer-client relationship between him and the complainant, claiming to have
merely extended his services for free. He also denied receiving money from the complainant for the purpose of paying the real estate
taxes on the property. Further, he averred that it was his former office assistants, a certain Boy Roque ("Roque") and one Danilo Diaz
("Diaz"), who offered the subject property to Ho as collateral for a loan. Nevertheless, respondent admitted to having confirmed the
spurious SPA in his favor already annotated at the back of TCT No. 21176 upon the prodding of Roque and Diaz, and because he was
also in need of money at that time. Hence, he signed the real estate mortgage and received his proportionate share of ₱130,000.00
from the proceeds of the loan, which he asserted to have fully settled.

Finally, respondent denied signing the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Ho and insisted that it was a forgery. Nonetheless, he sought
complainant's forgiveness and promised to repay the value of the subject property.

In the Resolution7 dated July 16, 2008, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.

The Action and Recommendation of the IBP

During the mandatory conference held on October 21, 2008, the parties stipulated on the following matters:

1. That complainant is the owner of a property covered by TCT No. 21176 (45228) of the Register of Deeds of Parañaque;

2. Respondent was in possession of the Owner's Duplicate Certificate of the property of the complainant;

3. The property of the complainant was mortgaged to a certain Roberto Ho;

4. The title to the property of complainant was cancelled in year 2000 and a new one, TCT No. 150814 was issued in favor of
Mr. Roberto Ho;

5. The Special Power of Attorney dated 24 February 1989 in favor of Atty. Ramon U. Contawi is spurious and was not signed
by complainant Lorenzo D. Brennisen;

6. That respondent received Php100,000.00 of the mortgage loan secured by the mortgagee on the aforementioned property
of complainant;

7. That respondent did not inform the complainant about the unauthorized mortgage and sale of his property;

8. That respondent has a loan obligation to Mr. Roberto Ho;

 9. That respondent has not yet filed any case against the person whom he claims to have falsified his signature;

10. That respondent did not notify the complainant that the owner's copy of TCT No. 21176 was stolen and was taken out from
his office.8

In its Report9 dated July 10, 2009, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), through Commissioner Eduardo V. De Mesa,
found that respondent had undeniably mortgaged and sold the property of his client without the latter's knowledge or consent, facilitated
by the use of a falsified SPA. Hence, in addition to his possible criminal liability for falsification, the IBP-CBD deduced that respondent
violated various provisions of the Canons of Professional Responsibility and accordingly recommended that he be disbarred and his
name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of Commissioner De Mesa through Resolution No.
XIX-2011-24810 as follows:

"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex 'A' and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of
falsification; making or using falsified documents; and for benefiting from the proceed[s] of his dishonest acts, Atty. Ramon U. Contawi
is hereby DISBARRED."

The Issue

The sole issue before the Court is whether respondent violated his lawyer's oath when he mortgaged and sold complainant's property,
which was entrusted to him, without the latter's consent.

The Court's Ruling

After a punctilious examination of the records, the Court concurs with the findings and recommendation of Commissioner De Mesa and
the IBP Board of Governors that respondent acted with deceit when, through the use of a falsified document, he effected the
unauthorized mortgage and sale of his client's property for his personal benefit.

Indisputably, respondent disposed of complainant's property without his knowledge or consent, and partook of the proceeds of the sale
for his own benefit. His contention that he merely accommodated the request of his then financially-incapacitated office assistants to
confirm the spurious SPA is flimsy and implausible, as he was fully aware that complainant's signature reflected thereon was forged. As
aptly opined by Commissioner De Mesa, the fraudulent transactions involving the subject property were effected using the owner's
duplicate title, which was in respondent's safekeeping and custody during complainant's absence.

Consequently, Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors correctly recommended his disbarment for violations of the
pertinent provisions of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

Canon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

Canon 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client which may come into his possession.

Canon 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from client.

Canon 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.

Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

In Sabayle v. Tandayag,11 the Court disbarred one of the respondent lawyers and ordered his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys
on the grounds of serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. The respondent lawyer knowingly participated in a false and
simulated transaction not only by notarizing a spurious Deed of Sale, but also – and even worse – sharing in the profits of the specious
transaction by acquiring half of the property subject of the Deed of Sale.

In Flores v. Chua,12 the Court disbarred the respondent lawyer for having deliberately made false representations that the vendor
appeared personally before him when he notarized a forged deed of sale. He was found guilty of grave misconduct.

In this case, respondent's established acts exhibited his unfitness and plain inability to discharge the bounden duties of a member of
the legal profession. He failed to prove himself worthy of the privilege to practice law and to live up to the exacting standards demanded
of the members of the bar. It bears to stress that "[t]he practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of
legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability." 13

Moreover, respondent's argument that there was no formal lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant will not serve to
mitigate his liability. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in a lawyer's private or professional capacity,
for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. 14 1âwphi1

With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court thus finds the penalty of disbarment proper in this case, as recommended by Commissioner
De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors. Section 27, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides:

"SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, xxx
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice xxx" (emphasis supplied)

The Court notes that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required.15 Having carefully scrutinized the records of this case, the Court
therefore finds that the standard of substantial evidence has been more than satisfied.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. RAMON U. CONTAWI, having clearly violated his lawyer's oath and the Canons of Professional
Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct, is DISBARRED and his name ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys.

Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's personal record as attorney.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5365 April 27, 2005

SPOUSES FRANKLIN and LOURDES OLBES, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE, Respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Constituting a serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility was the malevolent act of respondent, who filled up the
blank checks entrusted to him as security for a loan by writing on those checks amounts that had not been agreed upon at all, despite
his full knowledge that the loan they were meant to secure had already been paid.

The Case

Before us is a verified Petition1 for the disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre, filed by Spouses Franklin and Lourdes Olbes with the
Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. Petitioners charged respondent with willful and deliberate acts of dishonesty, falsification and
conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. After he had filed his Comment2 on the Petition, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay, held several hearings. During those
hearings, the last of which was held on May 12, 2003, 3 the parties were able to present their respective witnesses and documentary
evidence. After the filing of the parties' respective formal offers of evidence, as well as petitioners' Memorandum, 4 the case was
considered submitted for resolution. Subsequently, the commissioner rendered his Report and Recommendation dated January 30,
2004, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XV-2003-177 dated July 30, 2004.

The Facts

In their Petition, Spouses Olbes allege that they were government employees working at the Central Post Office, Manila; and that
Franklin was a letter carrier receiving a monthly salary of P6,700, and Lourdes, a mail sorter, P6,000.5

Through respondent, Lourdes renewed on July 1, 1999 her application for a loan from Rodela Loans, Inc., in the amount
of P10,000. As security for the loan, she issued and delivered to respondent five Philippine National Bank (PNB) blank checks (Nos.
0046241-45), which served as collateral for the approved loan as well as any other loans that might be obtained in the future. 6

On August 31, 1999, Lourdes paid respondent the amount of P14,874.37 corresponding to the loan plus surcharges, penalties and
interests, for which the latter issued a receipt,7 herein quoted as follows:

"August 31, 1999

Received the amount of P14,874.37 as payment of the loan of P10,000.00 taken earlier by Lourdes Olbes.

(Sgd.) Atty. Victor V. Deciembre

8-31-99
P10,000.00
PNB Check No. 46241 –8/15/99"8

Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up four (of the five) blank PNB Checks (Nos. 0046241, 0046242,
0046243 and 0046244) for the amount of P50,000 each, with different dates of maturity -- August 15, 1999, August 20, 1999, October
15, 1999 and November 15, 1999, respectively.9

On October 19, 1999, respondent filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal an Affidavit-Complaint against petitioners for
estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) 22. He alleged therein that on July 15, 1999, around one-thirty in the afternoon at Cainta,
Rizal, they personally approached him and requested that he immediately exchange with cash their postdated PNB Check Nos.
0046241 and 0046242 totaling P100,000.10

Several months after, or on January 20, 2000, respondent filed against petitioners another Affidavit-Complaint for estafa and violation of
BP 22. He stated, among others, that on the same day, July 15, 1999, around two o'clock in the afternoon at Quezon City, they again
approached him and requested that he exchange with cash PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and 0046244 totaling P100,000.11
Petitioners insisted that on the afternoon of July 15, 1999, they never went either to Cainta, Rizal, or to Quezon City to transact
business with respondent. Allegedly, they were in their office at the time, as shown by their Daily Time Records; so it would have been
physically impossible for them to transact business in Cainta, Rizal, and, after an interval of only thirty minutes, in Quezon City,
especially considering the heavy traffic conditions in those places.12

Petitioners averred that many of their office mates -- among them, Juanita Manaois, Honorata Acosta and Eugenia Mendoza -- had
suffered the same fate in their dealings with respondent.13

In his Comment,14 respondent denied petitioners' claims, which he called baseless and devoid of any truth and merit. Allegedly,
petitioners were the ones who had deceived him by not honoring their commitment regarding their July 15, 1999 transactions. Those
transactions, totaling P200,000, had allegedly been covered by their four PNB checks that were, however, subsequently dishonored
due to "ACCOUNT CLOSED." Thus, he filed criminal cases against them. He claimed that the checks had already been fully filled up
when petitioners signed them in his presence. He further claimed that he had given them the amounts of money indicated in the
checks, because his previous satisfactory transactions with them convinced him that they had the capacity to pay.

Moreover, respondent said that the loans were his private and personal transactions, which were not in any way connected with his
profession as a lawyer. The criminal cases against petitioners were allegedly private actions intended to vindicate his rights against
their deception and violation of their obligations. He maintained that his right to litigate should not be curtailed by this administrative
action.

Report of the Investigating Commissioner

In his Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two
years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The commissioner said that respondent's version of the facts was not credible. Commissioner Dulay rendered the following analysis
and evaluation of the evidence presented:

"In his affidavit-complaint x x x executed to support his complaint filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal
respondent stated that:

2. That last July 15, 1999, in the jurisdiction of Cainta, Rizal, both LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN A.
OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to immediately exchange with cash, right there and then, their
postdated checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their business venture.

"Again in his affidavit-complaint executed to support his complaint filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
respondent stated that:

2. That last July 15, 1999, at around 2PM, in the jurisdiction of Quezon City, M.M., both LOURDES E. OLBES
and FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to immediately exchange with cash, right there
and then, their postdated checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their business
venture.

"The above statements executed by respondent under oath are in direct contrast to his testimony before this Commission on
cross-examination during the May 12, 2003 hearing, thus:

ATTY PUNZALAN: (continuing)

Q. Based on these four (4) checks which you claimed the complainant issued to you, you filed two separate
criminal cases against them, one, in Pasig City and the other in Quezon City, is that correct?

A. Yes, Your Honor, because the checks were deposited at different banks.

Q. These four checks were accordingly issued to you by the complainants on July 15, 1999, is that correct?

A. I will consult my records, You Honor, because it's quite a long time. Yes, Your Honor, the first two checks is in
the morning and the next two checks is in the afternoon (sic).

COMM. DULAY:

Which are the first two checks?

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:

The first two checks covering check Nos. 46241 and 46242 in the morning. And Check No. 46243 and
46244 in the afternoon, Your Honor.

ATTY. PUNZALAN:

Q. Could you recall what particular time in the morning that these two checks with number 0046241 and 0046242
xxx have been issued to you?

A. I could not remember exactly but in the middle part of the morning around 9:30 to 10:00.

Q. This was issued to you in what particular place?

A. Here in my office at Garnet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.

Q. Is that your house?

A. No, it's not my house?

Q. What is that, is that your law office?

A. That is my retainer client.

Q. What is the name of that retainer client of yours?

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:

Your Honor, may I object because what is the materiality of the question?

ATTY. PUNZALAN:

That is very material. I am trying to test your credibility because according to you these checks have been
issued in Pasig in the place of your client on a retainer. That's why I am asking your client…

COMM. DULAY:

The name of the client is not material I think. It is enough that he said it was issued here in Pasig. What
building?

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:

AIC Corporate Center, Your Honor.

COMM. DULAY:

What is the materiality of knowing the name of his client's office?

ATTY. PUNZALAN:

Because, Your Honor, the materiality is to find out whether he is telling the truth. The place, Your Honor,
according to the respondent is his client. Now I am asking who is that client?

COMM. DULAY:

Your answer.

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:

A. It is AIC Realty Corporation at AIC Building.

 Q. And the same date likewise, the complainants in the afternoon issued PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and
0046244, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So would you want to tell this Honorable office that there were four checks issued in the place of your client in
Pasig City, two in the morning and two in the afternoon?

A. That is correct, sir.

"Respondent was clearly not being truthful in his narration of the transaction with the complainants. As between his version as
to when the four checks were given, we find the story of complainant[s] more credible. Respondent has blatantly distorted the
truth, insofar as the place where the transaction involving the four checks took place. Such distortion on a very material fact
would seriously cast doubt on his version of the transaction with complainants.

"Furthermore respondent's statements as to the time when the transactions took place are also obviously and glaringly
inconsistent and contradicts the written statements made before the public prosecutors. Thus further adding to the lack of
credibility of respondent's version of the transaction.

"Complainants' version that they issued blank checks to respondent as security for the payment of a loan of P10,000.00 plus
interest, and that respondent filled up the checks in amounts not agreed upon appears to be more credible. Complainants
herein are mere employees of the Central Post Office in Manila who had a previous loan of P10,000.00 from respondent and
which has since been paid x x x. Respondent does not deny the said transaction. This appears to be the only previous
transaction between the parties. In fact, complainants were even late in paying the loan when it fell due such that they had to
pay interest. That respondent would trust them once more by giving them another P200,000.00 allegedly to be used for a
business and immediately release the amounts under the circumstances described by respondent does not appear credible
given the background of the previous transaction and personal circumstances of complainants. That respondent who is a
lawyer would not even bother to ask from complainants a receipt for the money he has given, nor bother to verify and ask
them what businesses they would use the money for contributes further to the lack of credibility of respondent's
version. These circumstances really cast doubt as to the version of respondent with regard to the transaction. The resolution
of the public prosecutors notwithstanding we believe respondent is clearly lacking in honesty in dealing with the
complainants. Complainant Franklin Olbes had to be jailed as a result of respondent's filing of the criminal
cases. Parenthetically, we note that respondent has also filed similar cases against the co-employees of complainants in the
Central Post Office and respondent is facing similar complaints in the IBP for his actions." 15

The Court's Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of Commissioner Dulay, as approved and adopted by the IBP Board of
Governors. However, the penalty should be more severe than what the IBP recommended.

Respondent's Administrative Liability

Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. 16 It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only
learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral character.17 "A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is
clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and
justice, for which he [or she] has sworn to be a fearless crusader."18

By taking the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and
impartial administration of justice.19 Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach, in order to promote the public's faith in the legal profession. 20

The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following:

"Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

xxx xxx xxx

"Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

 "Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."

A high standard of excellence and ethics is expected and required of members of the bar. 21 Such conduct of nobility and uprightness
should remain with them, whether in their public or in their private lives. As officers of the courts and keepers of the public's faith, they
are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with
truth and honor.22

The oath that lawyers swear to likewise impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of good faith, fairness and
candor in their relationships with others. The oath is a sacred trust that must be upheld and kept inviolable at all times. Thus, lawyers
may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or in their private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to
continue to be officers of the court.23

In the present case, the IBP commissioner gave credence to the story of petitioners, who said that they had given five blank personal
checks to respondent at the Central Post Office in Manila as security for the P10,000 loan they had contracted. Found untrue and
unbelievable was respondent's assertion that they had filled up the checks and exchanged these with his cash at Quezon City and
Cainta, Rizal. After a careful review of the records, we find no reason to deviate from these findings.

Under the circumstances, there is no need to stretch one's imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion. Respondent does not deny
the P10,000 loan obtained from him by petitioners. According to Franklin Olbes' testimony on cross-examination, they asked
respondent for the blank checks after the loan had been paid. On the pretext that he was not able to bring the checks with him, 24 he
was not able to return them. He thus committed abominable dishonesty by abusing the confidence reposed in him by petitioners. It
was their high regard for him as a member of the bar that made them trust him with their blank checks.25

It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the
blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite respondent's full knowledge that the loan
supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted
to for his material gain.

And he did not stop there. Because the checks were dishonored upon presentment, respondent had the temerity to initiate unfounded
criminal suits against petitioners, thereby exhibiting his vile intent to have them punished and deprived of liberty for frustrating the
criminal duplicity he had wanted to foist on them. As a matter of fact, one of the petitioners (Franklin) was detained for three
months26 because of the Complaints. Respondent is clearly guilty of serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. He committed
an act indicative of moral depravity not expected from, and highly unbecoming, a member of the bar.

Good moral character is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. It is equally essential to observe this
norm meticulously during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege.27 Good moral character includes at least
common honesty.28 No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness and candor. 29 The rigorous ethics of
the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.30 Lawyers must be ministers of truth. Hence, they
must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith. 31

Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable;32 they reveal a basic
moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of
criminal laws.33

Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two
years from the practice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse
of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is loathsome.

In Eustaquio v. Rimorin,34 the forging of a special power of attorney (SPA) by the respondent to make it appear that he was authorized
to sell another's property, as well as his fraudulent and malicious inducement of Alicia Rubis to sign a Memorandum of Agreement to
give a semblance of legality to the SPA, were sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law for five years. Here, the conduct of
herein respondent is even worse. He used falsified checks as bases for maliciously indicting petitioners and thereby caused the
detention of one of them.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED from the practice of law effective immediately. Let copies of this
Decision be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is directed to append a copy to respondent's personal
record. Let another copy be furnished the National Office of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-22320 July 29, 1968

MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, petitioners,

vs.
HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents.

Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioners.

Isidro T. Almeda for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22, 1968, specifically directed against the following
observation therein made:

We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and
petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple
money judgment which has long become final and executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or
withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to
use them to subvert the very ends of justice.

Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by their counsel.".

The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the petitioners, while submitting to the judgment on the
merits, seek reconsideration of the decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their "professional conduct" and condemns them to
pay the treble costs adjudged against their clients.

At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. After mature deliberation and patient reprobing into the
records of the case, however, we are of the firmer conviction that the protracted litigation, alluded to in the above-quoted portion of our
decision, was designed to cause delay, and the active participation of the petitioners' counsels in this adventure is patent.

After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez' position with respect to the extent
of the levy, the subsequent proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected
to be overthrown by the courts but calculated to delay an execution long overdue.

Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of stock were conjugal property, why did they not adopt
this position from the very start, or, at the latest, in CA-G.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso Perez challenged the legality of the levy's
coverage, in order to end the litigation with reasonable dispatch? They chose, however, to attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion,
causing the postponement of the projected execution sale six times. More than eight years after the finality of the judgment have
passed, and the same has yet to be satisfied.

In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as represented by their counsels, sought the issuance of preliminary
injunctions to restrain the execution of the final judgment in civil case 39407 from courts which did not have jurisdiction and which
would, as expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer. For instance, after Damaso Perez bowed out temporarily from the scene
following the rendition of the aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his wife, Mercedez, Ruth Cobb-Perez, intruded into the
controversy and asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in connection with civil case
7532 which she filed with the said court, knowing fully well that the basic civil case 39407 was decided by the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge Lantin), which latter court was the proper forum for any action relative to the
execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960),
which held that courts of first instance have no power to restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on October 4, 1963 the
ex parte writ which he previously issued enjoining the respondent sheriff from carrying out the execution sale. It is clear, however, that
Mrs. Perez and her counsels, the movants, knew or ought to have known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not
have jurisdiction to issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall of the writ improvidently issued, on
September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ was actually lifted, filed in the basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of
execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as justification the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature
of Damaso Perez' judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still pending in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce any evidence in support of her aforesaid urgent motion, as in fact neither she
nor her counsels appeared during the scheduled hearing, prompting the respondent judge to issue the following order:

When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this morning for hearing, counsel for the movant did not
appear despite the fact that he had been duly notified of the motion for hearing. In view thereof the court assumes that he is
waiving his right to present evidence in support of his urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution. Said urgent motion is
therefore deemed submitted for resolution.
Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge Mencias on a disclaimer of jurisdiction (since the execution sought
to be enjoined was ordered by another tribunal), Mrs. Perez, now assisted by her husband who had staged a comeback, prayed for the
issuance of another injunction, this time from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila (not the same Branch which issued
the controverted writ of execution), in connection with civil case 7532, then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As most
probably anticipated anew by the Perez spouses and their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of Branch XXII, on November 8,
1963 denied the preliminary injunction sought, on the ground, among others, that he had no power to interfere by injunction with the
judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. On the very day the injunction was denied, Damaso Perez, as if
expecting the reversal from Judge Alikpala, was already prepared with another "remedy," as in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he
filed in the basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963, which denied his wife's
above-mentioned motion to recall the controverted writ of execution.

The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order of October 19, 1963, which in the first place Damaso
Perez could not legally do for he was not even a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone),
was merely an offer to replace the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as stockholders in the
Republic Bank.1 As a matter of fact, when the motion was set for hearing on December 21, 1963, the counsels for Damaso Perez
promised to produce the said cash dividends within five days, but the promise was never fulfilled. 2 Consequently, the respondent Judge
on January 4, 1964, denied the said motion for reconsideration.

The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly negates the avowal of the movants that "in none of
the various incidents in the case at bar has any particular counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the
enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407." From the chronology of antecedent events, the fact becomes inescapable that
the Perez spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of "remedies" projected to foil the lawful execution of a
simple money judgment. It is equally obvious that they foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to adopt, such
that even before, one remedy had been exhausted, they interposed another until the case reached this Court for the second time. 3
Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more than one member of this Court are persuaded that justice was practically waylaid.

The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532 and 55292 as the "proper remedy" when we
said that.

In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and regularity of which are unchallenged, but the levy
made by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is not the recall of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the
Sheriff from proceeding with the projected sale, in which action the conjugal nature of the levied stocks should be established
as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a permanent injunction, in the event of a successful claim. Incidentally, in the course
of the protracted litigation, the petitioners had already availed of this remedy in civil cases 7532 and 55292, only to abandon it
as they incessantly sought other, and often simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction of the judgment debt. (Emphasis
supplied) .

And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could not be branded as having been instituted for delay.

The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted statement must not be considered out of context. We said
that the petitioners incidentally had already availed of the suggested remedy only in the sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292
were apparently instituted to prove the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in question. We used the
word incidentally advisedly to show that in their incessant search for devices to thwart the controverted execution, they accidentally
stumbled on the suggested remedy. But the said civil cases were definitely not the "proper remedy" in so far as they sought the
issuance of writs of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch
XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 were filed respectively, for the said courts did not have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement
of the writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII) under the settled doctrines that Courts are without
power to restrain acts outside of their territorial jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction. 5 However, the recall and the denial of the writs of preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292 did not
amount to the termination or dismissal of the principal action in each case. Had the Perez spouses desired in earnest to continue with
the said cases they could have done so. But the fact is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532 when she instituted the
above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in the basic civil case 39407, anchored on the same grounds which she
advanced in the former case, until the said civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon her own motion. Anent civil case
55292, the Perez spouses virtually deserted the same when they instituted the herein petition for certiorari with urgent writ of
preliminary injunction based on the same grounds proffered in the said civil case — until the latter was also dismissed on March 20,
1964, with the consent of the parties because of the pendency then of the aforesaid petition for certiorari.

The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because petitioners' counsel happened to be more assertive ... a quality of
the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned."

A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended;
what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.

It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit
of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit,
rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's propensity to
litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.

The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case but the participation of each counsel was rather limited
implying that the decision of this Court ordering that "treble costs are assessed against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their
counsel" is not clear. The word "counsel" may be either singular or plural in construction, so that when we said "counsel" we meant
the counsels on record of the petitioners who were responsible for the inordinate delay in the execution of the final judgment in the
basic civil case 39407, after the Court of Appeals had rendered its aforementioned decision of November 15, 1962. And it is on record
that the movants are such counsels. Atty. Bolinas, upon his own admission, "entered his appearance in the case at bar about the time
the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil Case No. 39407," or about August 3, 1961 and
even prior to the Court of Appeals decision above-mentioned. Atty. Baizas claims that he "became petitioners' counsel only in October,
1963 when he filed, with Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case No. 55292 before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by the Hon.
Judge Alikpala although it appears on record that the urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed by Mrs. Perez in the basic civil case
39407 on September 3, 1963, was over the signature of one Ruby Zaida of the law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel for
Mrs. Perez. It is to be recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion discussed above, which, curiously enough, antedated by
at least one month the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in civil case 7532.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Our decision of May 22, 1968 is hereby modified in the sense that
Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and severally the treble costs assessed against the petitioners.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion C.J., voted for denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Fernando, J., took no part.
A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006

PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent") for serious misconduct and deliberate
violation of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code").

The Facts

In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification
of a public document4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who
notarized the Occupancy Agreement.

The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury5 against complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-
complaint, stated that:

5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized by me under the following
circumstances:

A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San
Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.

B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own real property in his name –
agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.

C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents that would guarantee recognition of
him being the actual owner of the property despite the transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.

D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stier’s free and undisturbed
use of the property for his residence and business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which
Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.6

Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier, being a foreign
national, is disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code.
Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying
out a dishonest scheme.

In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the disbarment case against him upon the instigation
of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan,7 because respondent refused to act as complainant’s witness in the criminal
case against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its
genuineness and due execution.

In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against
foreign ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law
for two years and the cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.

In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted, with modification, the Report and
recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for six months.
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the
Rules of Court.

On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent stated that he was already 76 years old and
would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his pending cases. He also said that his practice of law is his only means of
support for his family and his six minor children.

In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration because the IBP had no more jurisdiction on the
case as the matter had already been referred to the Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.

A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold
and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies
disciplinary action against the lawyer.10

By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real property. 11 Yet, in his motion for
reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however,
aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in complainant’s name. But respondent provided "some
safeguards" by preparing several documents,13 including the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stier’s recognition as the
actual owner of the property despite its transfer in complainant’s name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing
the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands 14 by preparing said documents.

Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized the
Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an
unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended.15

In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for three years for preparing an affidavit
that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re: Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the practice of
law for one year for preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be single again after nine years of separation and allowed them
to contract separately subsequent marriages.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal record as an attorney,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 137590 March 26, 2001

FLORENCE MALCAMPO-SIN, petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPP T. SIN, respondent.

PARDO, J.:

The Family Code emphasizes the permanent nature of marriage, hailing it as the foundation of the family.1 It is this inviolability which is
central to our traditional and religious concepts of morality and provides the very bedrock on which our society finds stability.2 Marriage
is immutable and when both spouses give their consent to enter it, their consent becomes irrevocable, unchanged even by their
independent wills.

However, this inviolability depends on whether the marriage exists and is valid. If it is void ab initio, the "permanence" of the union
becomes irrelevant, and the Court can step in to declare it so. Article 36 of the Family Code is the justification. 3 Where it applies and is
duly proven, a judicial declaration can free the parties from the rights, obligations, burdens and consequences stemming from their
marriage.

A declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code requires the application of procedural and substantive
guidelines. While compliance with these requirements mostly devolves upon petitioner, the State is likewise mandated to actively
intervene in the procedure. Should there be non-compliance by the State with its statutory duty, there is a need to remand the case to
the lower court for proper trial.

The Case

What is before the Court4 is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals5 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 158, Pasig City6 dismissing petitioner Florence Malcampo-Sin's (hereafter "Florence") petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage due to psychological incapacity for insufficiency of evidence.

The Facts

On January 4, 1987, after a two-year courtship and engagement, Florence and respondent Philipp T. Sin (hereafter "Philipp"), a
Portugese citizen, were married at St. Jude Catholic Parish in San Miguel, Manila. 7

On September 20, 1994, Florence filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City, a complaint for "declaration of nullity of
marriage" against Philipp.8 Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence.

On June 16, 1995, the trial court dismissed Florence's petition. 9

On December 19, 1995, Florence filed with the trial court a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. 10

After due proceedings, on April 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Cost
against the Appellant."11

On June 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.12

On January 19, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 13

Hence, this appeal.14

The Court's Ruling

We note that throughout the trial in the lower court, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jose Danilo C.
Jabson15 filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 16, 1994, stating that he found no collusion between the parties, 16 he
did not actively participate therein. Other than entering his appearance at certain hearings of the case, nothing more was heard from
him. Neither did the presiding Judge take any step to encourage the fiscal to contribute to the proceedings.

The Family Code mandates:

 "ARTICLE 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed (italics ours).

"In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of
judgment."

It can be argued that since the lower court dismissed the petition, the evil sought to be prevented (i.e., dissolution of the marriage) did
not come about, hence, the lack of participation of the State was cured. Not so. The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social
institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred
institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. This is made clear by the
following pronouncement:

"(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, 17 briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095 (italics ours)." 18

The records are bereft of any evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case not just at the trial level but on appeal
with the Court of Appeals as well. Other than the "manifestation" filed with the trial court on November 16, 1994, the State did not file
any pleading, motion or position paper, at any stage of the proceedings.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Erlinda Matias Dagdag,19 while we upheld the validity of the marriage, we nevertheless characterized
the decision of the trial court as "prematurely rendered" since the investigating prosecutor was not given an opportunity to present
controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. This stresses the importance of the participation of the State.

Having so ruled, we decline to rule on the factual disputes of the case, this being within the province of the trial court upon proper re-
trial.

Obiter Dictum

For purposes of re-trial, we guide the parties thus: In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,20 the guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36 of the Family Code are as follows (omitting guideline [8] in the enumeration as it was already earlier quoted):

"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The
Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.

"(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c)
sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically (sic) ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

"(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

"(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

"(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
 root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.

"(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

"(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts."

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51304,
promulgated on April 30, 1998 and the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City in Civil Case No. 3190, dated June
16, 1995.

Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for proper trial.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997

PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant,

vs.
SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:

In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the
legal profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967
and 1968. Before be could take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent and she had been
sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to many her.

The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June and July 1971. Respondent and complainant
were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as
escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with
respondent sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964. 1 It was after the child was
born, complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Their relationship
continued and respondent allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the
latter's birthdays. Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another woman.
Hence, this petition.

Upon complainant's motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses by deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974,
respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing complainant's failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello
seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by deposition. Complainant filed her comment required and that she
remains interested in the resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied respondent's motion to dismiss.

On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of abandonment filed by respondent on September
17, 1979.2 Respondent's third motion to dismiss was noted in the Court's Resolution dated September 15, 1982. 3 In 1988, respondent
repeated his request, citing his election as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active
participation in civic organizations and good standing in the community as well as the length of time this case has been pending as
reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer.4

On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an
unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer's oath upon payment of the required fees. 5

Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in response to complainant's opposition, resolved to
cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP's report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

We agree.

Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971 because of the charge of gross immorality made by complainant. To
recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his
promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations.

We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession.
His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but
the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained
of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree."6 It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community. 7

We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang8 quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess
no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so
unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born
out of wedlock.9
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently consensual. We do not find complainant's
assertions that she had been forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondent's girlfriend even after
she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations that she
was forced to have sexual congress with him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship
and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently
with another woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond
which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.

We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also
intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted
into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from being a
lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to
him.10 Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer's oath.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer
upon payment of the proper fees.

SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984

PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant,

vs.
GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent.

Roger Castuciano for complainant.

Roemo J. Callejo for respondent.

AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against her husband Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. on the ground of adultery or
grossly immoral conduct. He was admitted to the bar in 1968.

In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation, he became acquainted with
Natividad Estabillo who represented to him that she was a widow. They had carnal relations. He begot with her a son who was born on
November 27, 1972. He was named John Obusan (Exh. D). Generoso came to know that Natividad's marriage to Tony Garcia was
subsisting or undissolved.

Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972, Generoso, 33, married Preciosa, 37, in a civil ceremony. The marriage
was ratified in a religious ceremony held on December 30,1972 (Exh. C and C-1)

The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street, Tondo, Manila for more than one year. In the evening of April 13,
1974, when his wife was out of the house, lawyer Obusan asked permission from his mother-in-law to leave the house and take a
vacation in his hometown, Daet, Camarines Norte. Since then, he has never returned to the conjugal abode.

Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much patient investigation and surveillance, she discovered that he was
living and cohabiting with Natividad in an apartment located at 85-A Felix Manalo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. He had brought his car
to that place.

The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife was corroborated by Linda Delfin, their housemaid in 1974; Remedios
Bernal, a laundress, and Ernesto Bernal, a plumber, their neighbors staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street. The three executed the
affidavits, Exhibits A, B and F, which were confirmed by their testimonies.

Romegil Q. Magana, a pook leader, testified that Obusan introduced himself as the head of the family (25-30 tsn Nov. 26, 1976). His
name is at the head of the barangay list (Exh. E, G and H). Nieves Cacnio the owner of the apartment, came to know Obusan as Mr.
Estabillo. She Identified five photographs, Exhibits I to I-D where respondent Obusan appeared as the man wearing eyeglasses.

Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad was terminated when he married Preciosa. He admitted that from time to
time he went to 85-A Felix Manalo Street but only for the purpose of giving financial assistance to his son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer Rogelio
Panotes, the ninong of Jun-Jun, corroborated respondent's testimony.

He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the plumber. He claims that they were paid witnesses. He declared that he
did not live with Natividad. He resided with his sister at Cypress Village, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.

On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave the conjugal home because he could not endure the nagging of his
wife, their violent quarrels, her absences from the conjugal home (she allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta and San Andres Street) and her
interference with his professional obligations.

The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. He filed a complaint for disbarment against the respondent. Obusan
did not answer the complaint. He waived the presentation of additional evidence. His lawyer did not file any memorandum. After an
examination of the record, we find that the complainant has sustained the burden of proof. She has proven his abandonment of her and
his adulterous relations with a married woman separated from her own husband.

Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning one's wife
and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a married woman, fails within "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S.
959; Arciga vs. Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591).

Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. He
failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768).

WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.

FLORA QUINGWA complainant,
vs.
ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.

Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant.

Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent.

REGALA, J.:

On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross
immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense
averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former
Rules of Court.

The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were held by
the then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the complainant, assisted by her counsel, presented evidence both oral and
documentary. The respondent, as well as his counsel, cross-examined the complainant's witnesses. The respondent likewise testified.
He denied having sexual intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs.
A. Puno" appearing in the hotel register, and disowned Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.

After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging respondent with immorality. The complaint recites:

That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent Armando Puno were engaged to be
married, the said respondent invited the complainant to attend a movie but on their way the respondent told the complainant
that they take refreshment before going to the Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R. Hidalgo,
Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to complainant that
they go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway we are getting married; that with reluctance and a feeling of
doubt engendered by love of respondent and the respondent's promise of marriage, complainant acquiesced, and before they
entered the hotel room respondent registered and signed the registry book as 'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that after registering at
the hotel, respondent shoved complainant inside the room; that as soon as they were inside the room, someone locked the
door from outside and respondent proceeded to the bed and undressed himself; that complainant begged respondent not to
molest her but respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have promised to marry you'; and respondent, still noticing the
reluctance of complainant to his overtures of love, again assured complainant that 'you better give up. Anyway I promised that
I will marry you'; that thereupon respondent pulled complainant to the bed, removed her panty, and then placed himself on top
of her and held her hands to keep her flat on the bed; that when respondent was already on top of complainant the latter had
no other recourse but to submit to respondent's demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock until 7:00
o'clock that same evening when they left the hotel and proceeded to a birthday party together; that after the sexual act with
complainant on June 1, 1958, respondent repeatedly proposed to have some more but complainant refused telling that they
had better wait until they were married; that after their said sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling that she was already
on the family way, complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply with his promise of marriage but respondent refused
to comply; that on February 20, 1959, complainant gave birth to a child.

That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant through a promise of marriage which he did
not fulfill and has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute a conduct which shows that respondent is devoid of the highest
degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of and must be possessed by members of the Philippine Bar.

The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent.

A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he answered the complaint on June 9, 1962, again
denying that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that on the promise of marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual
intercourse with her. He, however, admitted that sometime in June, 1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until November,
1955, when they broke off, following a quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to practice law. Without stating in his answer
that he had the intention of introducing additional evidence, respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed.

This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the hearing Solicitor Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for the
complainant submitted the case for decision without oral argument. There was no appearance for the respondents.

Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to present additional evidence in his behalf is deemed a
waiver of the right to present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963), the evidence produced before the
Solicitor General in his investigation, where respondent had an opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the witnesses,
may now be considered by this Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court.
After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the complaint.

Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. She testified that respondent took her
to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. The hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr.
and Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M.

Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to Zamboanga City. When she learned
that respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a telegram sometime in August of that year telling him that she was in
trouble. Again she wrote him a letter in September and another one in October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant and
she requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she went to Zamboanga City in November, 1958, where she met the
respondent and asked him to comply with his promise to marry her.1äwphï1.ñët

Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant met in Zamboanga City in November,
1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letters was likewise admitted in respondent's letter to the complainant dated
November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which was duly identified by the respondent to be his.

Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital. This is supported by a certified
true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and a certificate of admission of complainant to the
Maternity and Children's Hospital issued by the medical records clerk of the hospital.

To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to the
respondent whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated by the testimony of Maria Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even
respondent's letter dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for money from the complainant.

The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the respondent himself failed to discredit complainant's
testimony.

In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred that he and complainant were sweethearts up to
November, 1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and were sweethearts in 1958 is established by the testimony of Fara Santos, a
witness of the complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and
respondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.)

Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a
desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. (Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December
17, 1966) .

One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule 138). If that
qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of
the practice and the exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567).
When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest
degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. Respondent denied that he took complainant to the Silver Moon
Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but he did not present evidence to show where he was on that date. In the
case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty he may not always
expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest
of easy things, he is hardly indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily
gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help
himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him.

With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in the
complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of
Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the
court over its officers can not be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing In re Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon
vs. de Leon Adm. Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53 O.G.
627). As a matter of fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138,
Rules of Court).
Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and
violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law
must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics:

... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because
deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of
the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice.

Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of
Attorneys.
A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963

JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.

BARRERA, J.:

In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston J.
Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her person in the manner described therein. Upon
requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his answer denying all the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not
disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.

On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the recommendation that the respondent "be permanently
removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as follows:

The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her foster mother, left her alone in their house
and went down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she" (complainant) was ironing clothes on the second
floor of the house the respondent entered and read a newspaper at her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with one hand
and with the other hand dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie down on the floor. She did not
shout for help because he threatened her and her family with death. He next undressed as she lay on the floor, then had
sexual intercourse with her after he removed her panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his fist to subdue her
resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned her not to report him to her foster parents, otherwise, he would kill her and
all the members of her family. She resumed ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she joined her
foster mother on the first floor of the house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she became pregnant and gave birth to a
baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).

She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the neighbors that she did not report the outrage to
anyone because of the threat made by the respondent; that she still frequented the respondent's house after August 5, 1959,
sometimes when he was alone, ran errands for him, cooked his coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on November 14,
1958, when respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with him in his house while her aunt Briccia Angeles left for
Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959).

The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of March 25 1960). He
testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil Service to follow up his appointment as
technical assistant in the office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the administrative case against
Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).

The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the complainant from January, 1957 to December, 1958,
when their clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant's foster parents, but to avoid criminal liability for seduction,
according to him, he limited himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue before she completed her eighteenth
birthday. They had their first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had reached eighteen, and the second one week
later, on May 18. The last intercourse took place before Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had sexual intercourse
about fifty times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his house whenever they had the opportunity. He intended to marry
her when she could legally contract marriage without her foster parents' intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because
we cannot ask permission to marry, for her foster parents will object and even my common-law wife, will object.' After the
discovery of their relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he confessed the affair to Briccia, explaining that he wanted
to have a child, something she (Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960).

xxx xxx xxx

FINDINGS AND COMMENT

There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant. The complainant claims she
surrendered to him under circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the undersigned are convinced that the sexual
intercourse was performed not once but repeatedly and with her consent. From her behaviour before and after the alleged
rape, she appears to have been more a sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage involving her honor ....

But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in conscience recommend respondent's exoneration.
The respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not long after she and her husband parted, and it is not
improbable that the spouses never reconciled because of him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after more than
fifteen years of adulterous relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia Angeles, could not bear a child,
he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, on June 2, 1959.
The seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and by means of promises of marriage which he knew he
could not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who forsook her husband so that he, respondent, could have all of her. He
 also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle and called him
'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years
old then), it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him.

The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he
is a person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar examinations to
be given on the first Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time as the Court may fix.."

But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself to be. From 1942 to the present, he has
continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a married
woman and that her marriage still subsists. This fact permanently disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and had it
been known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been permitted to take the bar examinations that year or
thereafter, or to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently disqualified from admission to the Philippine
Bar by reason of his adulterous relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the same misconduct should be sufficient
ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we recognize a double standard of morality, one for membership to the
Philippine Bar and another for disbarment from the office of a lawyer.

xxx xxx xxx

RECOMMENDATION

Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing, respondent Ariston J. Oblena be permanently
removed from his office as a lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys.

In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was
guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another complaint which he appended to his report, charging the
respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character; of
living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of
Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the legal business of others, and praying that
this Court render judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the respondent ... from his office as a lawyer and the cancellation of his
name from the roll of attorneys."

In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that "the complaint does not merit action", since the
causes of action in the said complaint are different and foreign from the original cause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks
the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for
additional evidence, the complaint be dismissed.

On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the additional evidence. Accordingly the case was set
for hearing of which the parties were duly notified. On September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum which
was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been proven; 2)
That no act of seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or fraudulent concealment was committed by the
respondent when he filed his petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally unfit to be a member of the bar.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court,
without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, who testified as follows:

... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent on December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna
(t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was
already married (to Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24).
Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she told
him she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's house, respondent courted
her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her if she was married and she told him 'we will talk about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She told
respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and respondent were already living together as 'husband and wife', in 1942(
t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to marry him, when they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left
Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but she did not go with her because she and respondent 'had already a good
understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti and went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because
respondent was already reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at
Iriga, she met her legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife, named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29).
She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent eventually agreed
that she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators,
March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, which request was also granted. The affidavit was
filed on December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, among others, the following:.

... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the complainant, because the latter was born on February
19, 1940, and his first sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958, when she was already above 18 years of age;
that he had been living with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he began courting
her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her love for her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery; that he courted
Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in
his house, who told him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that from said date (February
21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living together as common-law husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he
asked Briccia to marry him, but she confessed she was already married, and maybe her husband (Arines) was still living in
Iriga; that he could not then drive Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the place, nor could he urge her to join her
sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told Briccia to separate from him and to return to Iriga, and
urged her never to see him again; that contrary to his expectations, Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia
strongly insisted to live with him again, telling him that she cannot separate from him anymore, as he was ashamed; that
Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed not to molest them as in fact he (Arines) was already living
with another woman; that he had 'no choice but to live with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to take the bar
examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest intention to hide' from this Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a
married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did not state said fact in his petition, because he did not see in the form of the
petition being used in 1954 that the fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he thought and believed he was a man of
good moral character, and it was only from the Solicitor General that he first learned he was not so; and that he did not commit
perjury or fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court
Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962).

After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1) Respondent used his knowledge of the law to take advantage
by having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by committing immoral acts on her, he was free from any criminal
liability; and 2) Respondent committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after he became a
lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar
examinations, being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The
investigators also recommended that the respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
one year.

Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent, through his counsel of record, the case was set for
hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file his memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was granted
and the corresponding memorandum was duly filed.

It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations with the complainant several times, and as a
consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he likewise continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous
manner, from 1942 up to the present.

The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong the and the open cohabitation with Briccia
Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's disbarment.

It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations with the complainant and his open
cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is
true that the respondent has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the
disbarment proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer
may be disbarred. But it has already been held that this enumeration is not exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit
and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; it may be
exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be
exercised in any manner that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court
[1958 ed.] 698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that the legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of
its rule-making power) may provide that certain acts or conduct shall require disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and
rules merely regulate the power to disbar instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general powers of the
court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United
States, where from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a
good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its
loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for
which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417).
The tendency of the decisions of this Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any
misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His
pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not
to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared — and that he limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her
tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the niece of his common-law wife and that he
enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage
of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle),
undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), her
inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt
admission of his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral compunction for
his acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral
integrity expected of a member of the bar.

The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds for disbarment. This is a principle we
have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this Court quoted with approval the following portion of the decision
of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.

The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and
the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney be a person of good moral
character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would
seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an
attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not
connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied).

Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him
unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so would be — as the Solicitor
General puts it — recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment
from the office of the lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's
niece did not and do not disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring moral integrity as
an essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and character
degeneration of the members of the bar.

The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he admittedly committed fornication, this is no ground for
disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this
case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble
profession of the law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he continued his adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in that
she helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon
her after his admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an excuse for his moral dereliction. The means he
employed, as he stated, in order to extricate himself from the predicament he found himself in, by courting the complainant and
maintaining sexual relations with her makes his conduct more revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The noblest
means he could have employed was to have married the complainant as he was then free to do so. But to continue maintaining
adulterous relations with a married woman and simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's niece is moral
perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legal
profession. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, he may be removed therefrom
whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).

The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the present complaint against him for
seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses different from those originally charged in the complaint of January
14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:.

SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General.— Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no
sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a report to the Supreme Court containing his findings of
fact and conclusion, whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated unless the court orders differently.

SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. — If the Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to
proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his
investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of
the complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen days.

The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules requires the Solicitor General to charge in his
complaint the same offense charged in the complaint originally filed by the complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that
should the Solicitor General find sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint,
accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation. The Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case against the
respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation..

The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954 since according to his own
opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of good moral character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's
own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds
to objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not what he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice
Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished
from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where
he is known. As has been said, ante the standard of personal and professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to
practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744
B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent,
therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with
Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not render him a person of good
moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the
bar.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Reyes, J.B.L., and Dizon, JJ., took no part.