PEOPLE VS DOMINGO
one week had already passed since the incidents, and
Facts:
On or about the 29th day of March 2000, complainant
and her children were sleeping inside their house when
Domingo when she was awakened when the accused
entered their kitchen armed with a screwdriver and a
kitchen knife, appellant cut the cord of the mosquito net
and repeatedly stabbed her, using the six-inch
screwdriver, and hit her right arm three times. She
screamed and was heard by her sister-in-law, whose
house was contiguous to theirs. When her sister-in-law
asked her for the identity of the assailant, she
immediately identified herein appellant as "Doser," a
name by which he is known in the community. Appellant
was angered by her reply and said, "Anong Doser?" and
thereafter pulled a kitchen knife from his right side and
stabbed her on the stomach. When she tried to escape
from the room, four-year-old Marvin rushed towards
her. She then grabbed him and ran towards the gate.
However, before reaching the gate, she fell down and
appellant stabbed her right leg. The appellant then
proceeded to stab Marvin, hitting the latter twice on the
arm and twice on his left chest that caused his death.
After stabbing Marvin, appellant returned back to the
house, towards Raquel's two daughters Michelle and
Melissa. When Raquel pleaded that the appellant spare
her daughters' lives, he retorted: "Ngayon pa, nagawa ko
na." Melissa died because of the stab wounds that the
appellant inflicted on her; while Michelle, who was able
to hide under the papag merely sustained serious
physical injuries. The appellant also attacked two-year-
old Jeffer by striking him on the head with the
screwdriver, but the latter managed to run to the house
of Raquel's sister-in-law. Raquel got up and ran for help,
but the appellant followed her. Their neighbor, Ronaldo
Galvez, came to their rescue and tried to subdue the
appellant. Raquel, thereafter, lost consciousness. She
also relayed that she was later informed that a struggle
ensued between appellant and Galvez. Appellant
inflicted wounds on Galvez's upper left chest and arms,
after which Galvez was able to hit appellant with a piece
of wood, which rendered the latter unconscious.
Raquel, Melissa, Marvin, Jeffer, Galvez and the appellant
were taken to the hospital.
Five years passed, the defense counsel said that nine
days prior the commission of the crime, appellant
suffered sleeplessness, lack of appetite, and
nervousness. Occasionally, a voice would tell him to kill.
Appellant averred that when he regained his memory,
he was already detained. They submitted a psychiatric
evaluation, and psychological examination as evidence
that appellant suffered from Schizophrenia, a mental
disorder characterized by the presence of delusions and
or hallucinations, disorganized speech and behavior,
poor impulse control and low frustration tolerance. The
doctor could not find out when the appellant started to
suffer this illness, but the symptoms of Schizophrenia
which were manifested by the patient indicated that he
suffered from the illness six months before the Center
examined the appellant. The counsel of the appellant
raised the defense of insanity of the appellant.
Issue:
Is the defense of insanity valid?
Held:
No. Insanity exempts the accused only when the finding
of mental disorder refers to appellant’s state of mind
immediately before or at the very moment of the
commission of the crime. This was not the case in the
issue at bar, what was presented was proof of
appellant’s mental disorder that existed five years after
the incident, but not at the time the crimes were
committed. The RTC also considered it crucial that
appellant had the presence of mind to respond to
Raquel Indon’s pleas that her daughters be spared by
saying, “Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na.”
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence while committing the act; i.e., when the
accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of
power to discern, or there is total deprivation of
freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental
faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not
lost consciousness of his acts. Insanity is evinced by a
deranged and perverted condition of the mental
faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. An
insane person has no full and clear understanding of the
nature and consequences of his or her acts.
Even assuming that appellant's testimony is credible, his
sleeplessness, lack of appetite, nervousness and his
hearing imaginary voices, while suggestive of an
abnormal mental condition, cannot be equated with a
total deprivation of will or an absence of the power to
discern. Mere abnormality of mental faculties will not
exclude imputability. The popular conception of the
word "crazy" is used to describe a person or an act
unnatural or out of ordinary. Testimony that a person
acted in a crazy or deranged manner days before the
commission of the crime does not conclusively prove
that he is legally insane and will not grant him or her
absolution.
PEOPLE VS ALCABAO
Facts:The accused in this case was a minor who 11 years
old. The accused caught the offended party shooting his
mango fruit, thus, the minor hit the victim back with a
slingshot. The minor hit the victim’s eyes and uttered
the words “Putang ina mo, mabuti matikman mo” after
he committed the crime.
Issue: Whether or not the accused acted with
discernment
Ruling:
The accused acted with discernment. The perverted
character of the accused is a factual circumstance which
manifests that the minor acted with discernment.
LLAVE VS PEOPLE
Facts:
Debbielyn arrived home at past 6:00 p.m. She changed
her clothes and proceeded to her mother's store.
Marilou asked her daughter to bring home the container
with the unsold quail eggs. Debbielyn did as told and
went on her way. As she neared the vacant house, she
saw petitioner, who suddenly pulled her behind a pile of
hollow blocks which was in front of the vacant house.
There was a little light from the lamp post. She resisted
to no avail. Petitioner ordered her to lie down on the
cement. Petrified, she complied. He removed her shorts
and underwear then removed his own. He got on top of
her. She felt his penis being inserted into her vagina. He
kissed her. She felt pain and cried. She was sure there
were passersby on the street near the vacant house at
the time.
It was then that Teofisto came out of their house and
heard the girl's cries. He rushed to the place and saw
petitioner on top of Debbielyn, naked from the waist
down. Teofisto shouted at petitioner, and the latter fled
from the scene. Teofisto told Debbielyn to inform her
parents about what happened. She told her father
about the incident. Her parents later reported what
happened to the police authorities. Debbielyn told the
police that petitioner was a bad boy because he was a
rapist.
Petitioner testified and declared that he was a freshman
at the Pasay City South High School. He had been one of
the three outstanding students in grade school and
received awards such as Best in Mathematics.
Issue:
Was there discernment on the part of the accused?
Held:
Yes. Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that a person over nine years of age and under
fifteen is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted
with discernment. The basic reason behind the
exempting circumstance is complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is
an essential element of a felony either by dolus or by
culpa. Intelligence is the power necessary to determine
the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an
illicit act. [84] On the other hand, discernment is the
mental capacity to understand the difference between
right and wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove
that the accused acted with discernment by evidence of
physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only
before and during the commission of the act, but also
after and during the trial. The surrounding
circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew
what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such
circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime
and the minor's cunning and shrewdness.
In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical
fashion, dragged the resisting victim behind the pile of
hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure that
passersby would not be able to discover his dastardly
acts. When he was discovered by Teofisto Bucud who
shouted at him, the petitioner hastily fled from the
scene to escape arrest. Upon the prodding of his father
and her mother, he hid in his grandmother's house to
avoid being arrested by policemen and remained
thereat until barangay tanods arrived and took him into
custody.
The petitioner also testified that he had been an
outstanding grade school student and even received
awards. While in Grade I, he was the best in his class in
his academic subjects. He represented his class in a quiz
bee contest. At his the age of 12, he finished a computer
course.
JOSE VS PEOPLE
Facts:
November 14, 1995, P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro of the
Fourth Regional Narcotics Unit received an information
regarding a big time group of drug pushers from
Greenhills will deliver 100 grams of Shabu at Chowking
Restaurant located at Brgy. Real, Calamba, Laguna.
Police officers planned a buy-bust operation in which
they arrested Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose. The buy-
bust bundle of “money bills” and the shabu were
recovered. The two were brought to Camp Vicente Lim
for investigation and the shabu was brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination by P/Senior Inspector
Mary Jean Geronimo who testified that the specimen
was a second or low grade methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
Issue:
Is the exempting circumstance of minority present?
Held:
Yes. Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a
minor over nine years of age and under fifteen is
exempt from criminal liability if charged with a felony.
The law applies even if such minor is charged with a
crime defined and penalized by a special penal law. In
such case, it is the burden of the minor to prove his age
in order for him to be exempt from criminal liability.
The reason for the exemption is that a minor of such
age is presumed lacking the mental element of a crime –
the capacity to know what is wrong as distinguished
from what is right or to determine the morality of
human acts; wrong in the sense in which the term is
used in moral wrong.[9] However, such presumption is
rebuttable.[10] For a minor at such an age to be
criminally liable, the prosecution is burdened[11] to
prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or
circumstantial evidence, that he acted with
discernment, meaning that he knew what he was doing
and that it was wrong.[12] Such circumstantial evidence
may include the utterances of the minor; his overt acts
before, during and after the commission of the crime
relative thereto; the nature of the weapon used in the
commission of the crime; his attempt to silence a
witness; his disposal of evidence or his hiding the corpus
delicti.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner, who was
thirteen (13) years of age when the crime charged was
committed, acted with discernment relative to the sale
of shabu to the poseur-buyer. The only evidence of the
prosecution against the petitioner is that he was in a car
with his cousin, co-accused Sonny Zarraga, when the
latter inquired from the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Bonifacio
Guevarra, if he could afford to buy shabu. SPO1
Guevarra replied in the affirmative, after which the
accused Zarraga called the petitioner to bring out and
hand over the shabu wrapped in plastic and white soft
paper. The petitioner handed over the plastic
containing the shabu to accused Zarraga, who handed
the same to the poseur-buyer.
It was accused Zarraga who drove the car and
transacted with the poseur-buyer relative to the sale of
shabu. It was also accused Zarraga who received the
buy-money from the poseur-buyer. Aside from bringing
out and handing over the plastic bag to accused Zarraga,
the petitioner merely sat inside the car and had no
other participation whatsoever in the transaction
between the accused Zarraga and the poseur-buyer.
There is no evidence that the petitioner knew what was
inside the plastic and soft white paper before and at the
time he handed over the same to his cousin. Indeed,
the poseur-buyer did not bother to ask the petitioner
his age because he knew that pushers used young boys
in their transactions for illegal drugs.
US VS MARALIT
Facts:
While walking along in a road with a bundle of zacate,
Maximo Maralit, less than 15 years of age, passed along
Florentino Luistro, 15 years old, and ended with a fist
fight. They soon separated but Maralit ran to Florentino
quickly and stabbed him in the left side with a knife.
Maralit and his companion then ran away. The
witnesses and Florentino went home. Florentino died a
few days later as a result of the wound thus received.
Issue:
Is the exempting circumstance of minority present?
Held:
No. It is true, as counsel asserts, that it must appear
from the evidence that the accused acted with
knowledge of the nature of his acts and of the results
which would naturally follow therefrom; but to establish
that fact it is not necessary that some witness declare
directly and in words that he acted with such
knowledge. It is sufficient that, from the evidence as a
whole, it is a necessary inference that he so acted. The
trial court taking into consideration all of the facts and
circumstances presented by the record, together with
the appearance of the accused as he stood and testified
in court, drew the conclusion that he was of sufficient
intelligence and was sufficiently endowed with
judgment to know that the act which he committed was
wrong and that it was likely to produce death. In
pursuance of that conclusion the court made the finding
that the accused in committing the act complained of
acted with discernment.
PEOPLE VS CORTEZANO & CORTEZANO
Facts:
Early in the afternoon of May 6, 1990, Joel and Bernardo
ordered their niece Leah to sleep in their parents' room.
Leah protested because it was hot in that room. Joel
threatened to whip her if she refused. Leah had no
choice; she went to the room and slept. Leah suddenly
awoke when she sensed pressure on her arms and legs.
When she opened her eyes, she saw her uncles Joel and
Bernardo; they were holding her hands and feet as she
was being undressed. Leah struggled but was easily
overpowered by her uncles. She threatened to shout,
but she was told that nobody would hear her. Joel and
Bernardo wet her vagina with their saliva. Bernardo
then held her hands as Joel mounted her. Joel inserted
his penis into her vagina, while Bernardo stood by the
window to serve as a lookout. Leah felt something
slippery inside her vagina. After Joel dismounted,
Bernardo went on top of Leah and inserted his penis
into her vagina. It was Joel's turn to stand by the
window as a lookout. Leah once more felt something
slippery in her vagina. Bernardo then stood up.
Momentarily, Boyet Orcine arrived and inquired what
Joel and Bernardo were doing to Leah. Joel and
Bernardo ordered Boyet to rape Leah and threatened to
box him if he refused. Joel and Bernardo laughed as
Boyet was having his turn with Leah. Joel and Bernardo
then called Leah Lou and Lionel into the room, letting
them see their sister naked.
Joel and Bernardo threatened to kill her and the
members of the family if she told anyone about what
happened to her. Joel, Bernardo and Boyet left the room
together. Leah went out of the room and washed her
vagina.
Petrified, Leah did not reveal to her grandparents what
happened to her. After that first harrowing incident, Joel
and Bernardo subjected her to sexual abuse daily. After
every sexual intercourse they had with Leah, Joel and
Bernardo would threaten to kill her and her family if she
told anyone what they had been doing to her.
On June 10, 1990, Joel and Bernardo again ordered Leah
to go to her grandparents' room. She did as she was
told. Joel and Bernardo undressed her. Leah was told to
lie down, and Joel and Bernardo again wet her vagina
with their saliva. Joel then laid on top of her, holding her
hands and pinning her legs with his, as he inserted his
penis into her vagina. Bernardo stood by the window as
a lookout. Leah tried to fight Joel, but the latter was
enraged. She was about to shout, but Joel told her that
it would be futile to do so because their neighbors were
far away. Joel dismounted and Bernardo had his turn,
with Joel standing by the window to see if anyone was
coming. Joel and Bernardo again threatened to kill Leah
if she told anyone about the incident.
The next day, June 11, 1990, was Lionel's birthday.
Lourney arrived at Brgy. Azucena and brought her
children back to Caloocan City, in time for Leah's
enrollment at the Kalayaan Elementary School in Brgy.
Silang, Caloocan City. Because of the sexual abuse she
suffered at the hands of her uncles, Leah felt pain in her
lower abdomen (puson). Every now and then, she would
feel numbness on the left side of her body.
Issue:
Is there discernment?
Held:
Yes. The Court notes that the appellants were still
minors when they committed the offense. At the time,
Joel was 13 years and 6 months old, while Bernardo was
12 years and 4 months old. Nevertheless, they are not
exempt from criminal liability.
Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
Article 12. Circumstances, which exempt from liability. -
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
...
3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen,
unless he acted with discernment, in which case, such
minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the
provisions of Article 80 of this Code.
A minor who is over nine years old and under fifteen
years old at the time of the commission of the crimes is
exempt from criminal liability only when the said minor
acted without discernment. It is the burden of the
prosecution to prove that a minor acted with
discernment when he committed the crime charged. In
determining if such a minor acted with discernment, the
Court's pronouncement in Valentin v. Duqueña[34] is
instructive:
The discernment that constitutes an exception to the
exemption from criminal liability of a minor under
fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act
prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand
the difference between right and wrong, and such
capacity may be known and should be determined by
taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances
afforded by the records in each case, the very
appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment
and behavior of said minor, not only before and during
the commission of the act, but also after and even
during the trial.
In this case, the evidence on record shows beyond cavil
that the appellants acted with discernment when they
raped the victim, thus: (a) they wetted the victim's
vagina before they raped her; (b) one of them acted as a
lookout while the other was raping the victim; (c) they
threatened to kill the victim if she divulged to her
parents what they did to her; (d) they forced Boyet to
rape the victim; (e) they laughed as Boyet was raping
the victim; (f) they ordered Leah Lou and Lionel to look
at their sister naked after the appellants had raped her.
PEOPLE VS CAPISTRANO
Facts:
Alejo Enriquez Wong and Carmen Verdera testified that
the defendant was a so-called Yoin, which means an
armed soldier of the Japanese. Wearing a Japanese
military uniform, he rendered services to the Japanese
army as a guard of a Japanese garrison. To the same
effect, the witness Placer Canada testified.
The defendant argued at the trial court that there was
no evidence showing that he had been appointed a Yoin
or that he was a Makapili. While no written formal
appointment was introduced in evidence, yet it is clear
that he was engaged in the work of guarding the
Japanese garrison, armed with a gun and wearing a
Japanese uniform and taking part in the military drills of
the Japanese army.
At about 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 8, 1945,
the defendant with other Filipino members of the Yoin
and several Japanese soldiers, all armed, arrived near
the house of Carmen Verdera in barrio Malay,
Municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas (now
Quezon), and ordered the inmates therein to open the
door. The appellant and his companions entered the
house, raised the mosquito nets and ordered the
inmates to rise. The appellant and his companions tied
Graciano Fortuna, Carmen Verdera, Alejo Enriquez
Wong, Rufino Rivera, Maria Canada, Brisilio Canada,
Remedios Anastacio, Dolores Enriquez, Teodora Zamora,
Presentacion Anastacio, and Placer Canada with a rope
which was used as a clothesline. The intruders then
searched the premises and seized from Alejo Enriquez
Wong $1,000, U. S. currency, and P4,000, Philippine
currency. They took Graciano Fortuna and the other
inmates to the Japanese garrison at Lopez, Tayabas
(Quezon) and then to the Yoin garrison in the same
town. The motive for the raid was that Pedro Canada, a
brother of Placer, was a guerrilla lieutenant in Lopez and
Salvador Fortuna, son of Graciano, was a soldier in the
said organization. One night, during the detention of
Placer and her companions in the Yoin garrison, the
appellant attempted to sexually abuse Placer and her
girl companions, but when the women cried and the
Japanese came, the defendant escaped. Placer and her
companions were released after one month when they
paid to the Chief of the Yoin and the appellant the sum
of P2,500 in Japanese war notes. This charge was
testified to by the several victims.
Issue:
Is the exempting circumstance of minority present?
Held:
No. The accused was more than nine (9) but less than
fifteen (15) years of age at the time that he committed
the crime charged. However, the court which had the
opportunity to see and hear the accused at the trial
found that he acted with discernment. It should be
noted, furthermore, that he appeared as the leader or
commander of the raiding party. Although his minority
does not exempt him from criminal responsibility for the
reason that he acted with discernment, yet it may be
considered as a special mitigating circumstance lowering
the penalty by two (2) degrees.
ESTIOCA VS PEOPLE
Facts:
A number of persons were accused of conspiring and
robbing an elementary school. One of which is Boniao
who was 14 years old at the time of the commission of
the crime. They were found guilty by the lower court.
When the case was appealed to the CA, RA 9344 took
effect and Boniao was acquitted since he was a minor at
the time of the crime but without prejudice to his civil
liability. Custody was given to his parents.
Issue: Whether of not RA 9344 can retroact to Boniao’s
case
Held:
Yes, the reckoning point in considering minority is the
time of the commission of the crime. In this case,
Boniao is 14 years old hence exempted from criminal
liability without prejudice to his civil liability. Art 22 of
the RPC provides that penal laws may be given
retroactive effect if they are in favor of the accused.
SIERRA VS PEOPLE
Facts:
In August 2000, thirteen-year-old AAA[5] was playing
with her friend BBB in the second floor of her family's
house in Palatiw, Pasig. The petitioner arrived holding a
knife and told AAA and BBB that he wanted to play with
them. The petitioner then undressed
BBB and had sexual intercourse with her. Afterwards, he
turned to AAA, undressed her, and also had sexual
intercourse with her by inserting his male organ into
hers. The petitioner warned AAA not to tell anybody of
what they did.
AAA subsequently disclosed the incident to Elena
Gallano (her teacher) and to Dolores Mangantula (the
parent of a classmate), who both accompanied AAA to
the barangay office. AAA was later subjected to physical
examination that revealed a laceration on her hymen...
consistent with her claim of sexual abuse. On the basis
of the complaint and the physical findings, the
petitioner was charged with rape under the following
Information:
On or about August 5, 2000, in Pasig City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, a
minor, 15 years old, with lewd designs and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual...
intercourse with his (accused) sister, AAA, thirteen years
of age, against the latter's will and consent.
The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge and
raised the defenses of denial and alibi. He claimed that
he was selling cigarettes at the time of the alleged rape.
He also claimed that AAA only invented her story
because she bore him a grudge for the beatings he gave
her.
The parties' mother (CCC) supported the petitioner's
story; she also stated that AAA was a troublemaker.
Both CCC and son testified that the petitioner was
fifteen (15) years old when the alleged incident
happened.
The defense also presented BBB who denied that the
petitioner raped her; she confirmed the petitioner's
claim that AAA bore her brother a grudge.
On April 5, 2006, the RTC convicted the petitioner of
qualified rape
The petitioner elevated this RTC decision to the CA by
attacking AAA's credibility. He also invoked paragraph 1,
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006)[9] to exempt him from criminal liability
considering that he was... only 15 years old at the time
the crime was committed.
The CA nevertheless affirmed the petitioner's conviction
with modification as to penalty as follows
WHEREFORE, finding that the trial court did not err in
convicting Robert Sierra, the assailed Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that Robert Sierra has to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of RECLUSION
TEMPORAL MAXIMUM.
The award of damages are likewise affirmed.
In ruling that the petitioner was not exempt from
criminal liability, the CA held:
As to the penalty, We agree with the Office of the
Solicitor General that Robert is not exempt from liability.
First, it was not clearly established and proved by the
defense that Robert was 15 years old or below at the
time of the commission of the crime. It was...
incumbent for the defense to present Robert's birth
certificate if it was to invoke Section 64 of Republic Act
No. 9344.
The CA denied the petitioner's subsequent motion for
reconsideration; hence, the present petition.
Issues:
Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the
provisions of R.A. No. 9344 on the petitioner's
exemption from criminal liability;
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that it was
incumbent for the defense to present the petitioner's
birth certificate to invoke Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344
when the burden of proving his age lies with the
prosecution by express provisions of R.A. No. 9344; and
Whether or not the CA erred in applying the ruling in
Declarador v. Hon. Gubaton thereby denying the
petitioner the benefit of exemption from criminal
liability under R.A. No. 9344.
Ruling:
We grant the petition.
While the defense, on appeal, raises a new ground - i.e.,
exemption from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344 -
that implies an admission of guilt, this consideration in
no way swayed the conclusion we made above, as the
defense is entitled to present all alternative... defenses
available to it, even inconsistent ones. We note, too,
that the defense's claim of exemption from liability was
made for the first time in its appeal to the CA. While this
may initially imply an essential change of theory that is
usually disallowed on appeal for reasons... of fairness,...
no essential change is really involved as the claim for
exemption from liability is not incompatible with the
evidence submitted below and with the lower courts'
conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of the crime
charged. An exempting... circumstance, by its nature,
admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist, but the
accused is freed from criminal liability; in other words,
the accused committed a crime, but he cannot be held
criminally liable therefor because of an exemption
granted by law. In admitting... this type of defense on
appeal, we are not unmindful, too, that the appeal of a
criminal case (even one made under Rule 45) opens the
whole case for review, even on questions that the
parties did not raise.
By mandate of the Constitution, no less, we... are bound
to look into every circumstance and resolve every doubt
in favor of the accused.
It is with these considerations in mind and in obedience
to the direct and more specific commands of R.A. No.
9344 on how the cases of children in conflict with... the
law should be handled that we rule in this Rule 45
petition.
We find a review of the facts of the present case and of
the applicable law on exemption from liability
compelling because of the patent errors the CA
committed in these regards. Specifically, the CA's
findings of fact on the issues of age and minority,
premised on the supposed... absence of evidence, are
contradicted by the evidence on record; it also
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties that, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.
In tackling the issues of age and minority, we stress at
the outset that the ages of both the petitioner and the
complaining victim are material and are at issue. The
age of the petitioner is critical for purposes of his
entitlement to exemption from criminal liability under
R.A. No. 9344, while the age of the latter is material in
characterizing the crime committed and in considering
the resulting civil liability that R.A. No. 9344 does not
remove.
The CA seriously erred when it rejected testimonial
evidence showing that the petitioner was only 15 years
old at the time he committed the crime. Section 7 of
R.A. No. 9344 expressly states how the age of a child in
conflict with the law may be determined:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child
may be determined from the child's birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents.
In the absence of these documents, age may be based
on information from the child... himself/herself,
testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance
of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of
doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in
his/her favor.
In these cases, we gave evidentiary weight to
testimonial evidence on the accused's minority and age
upon the concurrence of the following conditions: (1)
the absence of any other satisfactory evidence such as
the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar
documents... that would prove the date of birth of the
accused; (2) the presence of testimony from accused
and/or a relative on the age and minority of the accused
at the time of the complained incident without any
objection on the part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of
any contrary... evidence showing that the accused's
and/or his relatives' testimonies are untrue.
All these conditions are present in this case. First, the
petitioner and CCC both testified regarding his minority
and age when the rape was committed.
Second, the records before us show that these pieces of
testimonial evidence were never... objected to by the
prosecution. And lastly, the prosecution did not present
any contrary evidence to prove that the petitioner was
above 15 years old when the crime was committed.
We also stress that the last paragraph of Section 7 of
R.A. No. 9344 provides that any doubt on the age of the
child must be resolved in his favor.
Civil Liability
The last paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344
provides that the accused shall continue to be civilly
liable despite his exemption from criminal liability;
hence, the petitioner is civilly liable to AAA despite his
exemption from criminal liability. The extent of his civil...
liability depends on the crime he would have been liable
for had he not been found to be exempt from criminal
liability.
The RTC and CA found, based on item (1) of Article 266-
B of the RPC, as amended, that the petitioner is guilty of
qualified rape because of his relationship with AAA
within the second civil degree of consanguinity and the
latter's minority.
Principles:
R.A. No. 9344 was enacted into law on April 28, 2006
and took effect on May 20, 2006. Its intent is to promote
and protect the rights of a child in conflict with the law
or a child at risk by providing a system that would
ensure that children are dealt with in a manner...
appropriate to their well-being through a variety of
disposition measures such as care, guidance and
supervision orders, counseling, probation, foster care,
education and vocational training programs and other
alternatives to institutional care.
In providing... exemption, the new law - as the old
paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 12 of the RPC did - presumes
that the minor offenders completely lack the
intelligence to distinguish right from wrong, so that their
acts are deemed involuntary ones for which they cannot
be held... accountable.
The current law also drew its changes from the principle
of restorative justice that it espouses; it considers the
ages 9 to 15 years as formative years and gives minors
of these ages a chance to right their wrong through
diversion and... intervention measures.
Burden of proof, under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules
on Evidence, refers to the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue in order to establish his or
her claim or defense. In a criminal case, the burden of
proof to establish the guilt of the accused... falls upon
the prosecution which has the duty to prove all the
essential ingredients of the crime. The prosecution
completes its case as soon as it has presented the
evidence it believes is sufficient to prove the required
elements. At this point, the burden of evidence shifts...
to the defense to disprove what the prosecution has
shown by evidence, or to prove by evidence the
circumstances showing that the accused did not commit
the crime charged or cannot otherwise be held liable
therefor. In the present case, the prosecution completed
its evidence and... had done everything that the law
requires it to do. The burden of evidence has now
shifted to the defense which now claims, by an
affirmative defense, that the accused, even if guilty,
should be exempt from criminal liability because of his
age when he committed the crime. The... defense,
therefore, not the prosecution, has the burden of
showing by evidence that the petitioner was 15 years
old or less when he committed the rape charged.
Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 9344
That the petitioner committed the rape before R.A. No.
9344 took effect and that he is no longer a minor (he
was already 20 years old when he took the stand) will
not bar him from enjoying the benefit of total
exemption that Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 grants.
Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of
children 15 years old and below, at the time of the
commission of the crime, shall immediately be
dismissed and the child shall be referred to the
appropriate local social welfare and development...
officers (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore, with
respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the
CICL, is not the CICL's age at the time of the
promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the time
of the commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of
R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has
been raised from 9 to 15 years old.
MADALI VS PEOPLE
Facts: Raymund, 14 years old, and Rodel Madali, 16
years old, along with Jojo Bernardino, were charged
with homicide for the killing of AAA of Romblon.
Jovencio, a cousin of the victim who witnessed the
killing, claims that on the night of April 13, 1999
Raymund and Rodel Madali, Bernardino, AAA and him
were gathered near the National high school up in the
hagdan-hagdan. Bernardino blindfolded AAA with a
handkerchief from Raymund. Bernardino gave the first
blow using a coconut frond, next by Raymund and when
AAA wobbled, Rodel punched him while wearing brass
knuckles. All Jovencio could muster was say “enough”
twice. Yet the three did not stop but instead hanged
AAA on the tree using the handkerchief and the dog
chain. Before leaving the area, Rodel threatened
Jovencio to not tell anyone or else he will be next. The
corpse of AAA was found a few days later. The body was
decomposing and stinking.
Jovencio filed an information against the three but
recanted it and refiled it again. After the final judgement
was pronounced, Bernardino filed for probation.
Raymund’s case on the other hand was dismissed due to
RA 9344 also known as Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act
of 2006 for being only 14 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense. Rodel’s case however, was
sustained but was suspended pursuant to RA 9344.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners should be exempted
from criminal liability.
Ruling: Yes, the petitioners should be exempted from
criminal liability by virtue of RA 9344.
Petitioners should be exempt from criminal liability due
to the provisions of RA 9344. Although it was only
passed on 2006, it can be applied to petitioners since
laws favorable to the accused can have retroactive
effect. Section 38 of the act also provides for the
automatic suspension of sentence. The exemptions
however, differ. Raymond’s case is dismissed for being
only 15 years old at the time of the commission of the
crime. Rodel’s case was sustained since he was 16 at the
time of the commission. His sentence was however
suspended. And since he acted with discernment, he
shall be under an intervention program.
ORTEGA VS PEOPLE
Facts:
Joemar Ortega was charged with the crime of Rape for
allegedly raping AAA. At the time of the incident,
Joemar was then about 13 years old while the victim
AAA was then about six years of age.
The families of Joemar and AAA were friends and
neighbors. According to AAA, Joemar raped her three
times. The first two incidents occurred when AAA and
her brother (BBB) was left in the care of Joemar's
mother (Luzviminda) for two nights since their mother
had to care for their other brother in the hospital. On
each of the two nights, Joemar raped AAA, once in the
sala and the second in the comfort room. AAA did not
tell her parents about her ordeal since Joemar
threatened to spank her.
The third incident occurred in the house of AAA. While
the rest of AAA's siblings were watching television,
Joemar dragged AAA to one of the rooms and
proceeded to undress and rape her. They were caught
by BBB who reported the incident to their mother.
AAA's mother confronted Joemar's mother regarding
what happened. They brought AAA to the doctor for
examination. The first doctor found no evidence of
molestation. A second doctor reported minor abrasions
on AAA's vagina.
Subsequently, an amicable settlement was reached
between the two families. Part of the settlement
required Joemar to depart from their house to avoid
contact with AAA. Joemar stayed with a certain priest in
the locality. However, a few months later, Joemar went
home for brief visits and in order to bring his dirty
clothes for laundry. This infuriated AAA's father and
confrontations occurred. AAA's parents went to the NBI
which assisted them in filing the three (3) counts of
rape. However, the prosecutor's office only filed the two
(2) instant case.
Joemar denied the allegations of rape and stated that
BBB just saw him and AAA dancing and hugging in a
playful act and got the wrong impression.
The lower court found Joemar guilty of the crime of
rape and sentenced him to prison. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction.
Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006 took effect on May 20, 2006 while
petitioner's case was pending before the Supreme
Court. The OSG posited that petitioner is no longer
covered by Section 64 of RA 9344 since as early as 1999,
petitioner was convicted by the RTC and the conviction
was affirmed by the CA in 2001. RA 9344 was passed
into law in 2006, and with the petitioner now
approximately 25 years old, he no longer qualifies as a
child as defined under the law.
Issue:
Whether or not the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006 (R.A. 9344) should be applied, in the resolution of
the case.
Held:
Section 6 of RA 9344 provides:
SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A
child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from
criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected
to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of
this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)
years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal
liability and be subjected to an intervention program,
unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which
case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established
does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides
that cases of children 15 years old and below, at the
time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately
be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the
appropriate local social welfare and development officer
(LSWDO).
What is controlling, therefore, with respect to the
exemption from criminal liability of the child in conflict
with the law (CICL), is not the CICL's age at the time of
the promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the
time of the commission of the offense. In short, by
virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal
irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.
The Court accords retroactive application to the
provisions of RA 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched
principle in criminal law - favorabilia sunt amplianda
adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to
the accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is
embodied in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. The
principle has been given expanded application in certain
instances involving special laws. RA 9344 should be no
exception.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of
the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 9344's
unambiguous language, coupled with clear lawmakers'
intent, is most favorable to herein petitioner. The simple
language of the law itself demonstrates the legislative
intent to favor the CICL
Petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime,
was only 13 years of age. Under RA 9344, he is
exempted from criminal liability. However, Section 6
thereof expressly provides that there is no concomitant
exemption from civil liability.
REMIENDO VS PEOPLE
Robert Remiendo vs. People of the Philippines
GR 184874 (October 9, 2009)
Facts:
Petitioner was a minor whose age is above15 but below
18 years old when he raped a minor when the latter was
left alone in her house. In violating the minor, he
threatened to kick the latter if she would shout for help.
Petitioner was convicted of rape but on appeal invoked
a suspension of sentence pursuant to RA 9344. By the
time he was convicted by the trial court and before the
case was elevated to the CA, he was already 22 years
old.
Issues:
Whether petitioner is exempt from criminal liability.
Whether petitioner is entitled to a suspension of
sentence under Sec. 38 and 40 of RA9344.
Held:
No. Since his age is above 15 and below18, the finding
of discernment is necessary to determine if he would be
exempt from criminal liability. In this case, his act of
waiting for the victim’s parents to leave the house
before defiling the latter and threatening to kick her if
she should shout prove that petitioner can differentiate
what is right and wrong.
Furthermore, Sec. 38 and 40, suspension of sentence,
can no longer be availed since by the time his sentence
was imposed by the trial court, he was already 22 years
old. Sec 40 provides that If the child in conflict with the
law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether
to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to
order execution of sentence, or to extend the
suspended sentence for a certain period or until the
child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.
PEOPLE VS HERMIE JACINTO
Facts:
Appellant Hermie Jacinto was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the rape of the then 5-year-old
victim. The crime was committed when appellant was
only 17; Judgment was rendered when appellant was
already 25.
Issue:
Whether or not, appellant may benefit from the
provisions of RA9344 regarding criminal liability of an
accused who was a minor during the commission of the
crime and the suspension of sentence of one who is no
longer a minor during the pronouncement of verdict.
Held:
The Court sustained the conviction of the appellant in
view of the straightforward testimony of the victim and
the inconsistencies of the testimonies of the defense
witnesses.
The Court did not exempt accused of his criminal
liability although he was only 17 during the commission
of the crime since, in view of the circumstances to which
accused committed the felony, it was proved that he
acted with discernment. (Sec 6, RA 9344). There was
showing that the accused understood the consequences
of his action.
Applying, the provision of RA 9346, the accused was
meted with reclusion perpetua instead of the death
penalty.
As to the civil liability of accused, his minority also had
no bearing to the decision of the Court, ordering
accused to pay the victim for damages.
However, the Court afforded the accused the benefit of
the suspension of his sentence provided in Section38 of
RA 9344, which made no distinction to an accused
found guilty of a capital offense. The Court stated that
what was important was the intent of the Act to uphold
the welfare of a child in conflict with the law. What was
to be considered was the fact that accused committed
the crime at a tender age.
The Court held that accused may be confined in an
agricultural camp or any training facility in accordance
with Sec 51 of RA 9344. The case was remanded to the
court of origin to take appropriate action in accordance
to the said provision.
HUBILLA VS PEOPLE
Facts:
Rosal Hubille was only 17 year, 4 months and 2 days old
when he killed Jayson Espinola with a knife. He was
charged with Homicide.
RTC - convicted him of homicide and imposed the
penalty of indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of
four years and one day of prision correcional as
minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor,
as maximum.
CA – Rosal’s sentence was modified in that he was
sentenced to six months and one day of prision
correctional as minimum, to six years and one day of
prision mayor, as maximum. The civil aspect was also
modified
On motion for reconsideration, the CA partially granted
the appeal and imposed on him the penalty of six
months and one day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor,
as maximum.
Issue:
WON the CA should have suspended Rosal’s sentence in
accordance with RA 9344; that he is entitled to
probation or suspension of sentence
Held:
Article 249 of the RPC prescribes the penalty of
reclusion temporal for homicide. His minority was a
privileged mitigating circumstance that lowered the
penalty to prision mayor.
In Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence should be within the penalty
next lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein,
was prision correccional. So the CA imposed the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six months
and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.
Petitioner insists that the maximum of his indeterminate
sentence should be reduced to only six years of prision
correccional to enable him to apply for probation under
PD 968.
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC - the restrictions on the personal
liberty of the child shall be limited to the minimum
Sec. 38 of RA 9344 which allows the suspension of the
sentence is available only until the child offender turns
21 years of age.
Since he is over 23 years of age at the time of his
conviction in the RTC, suspension was no longer
feasible. RA 9344 reveals that imprisonment of children
in conflict with the law is by no means prohibited.
Restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment:
(a) the detention or imprisonment is a disposition of last
resort, and
(b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for the
shortest appropriate period of time
Imprisonment was imposed on the petitioner as a last
recourse after holding him to be disqualified from
probation and from the suspension of his sentence, and
the term of his imprisonment was for the shortest
duration permitted by the law.
PEOPLE VS ROXAS
In exempting circumstance of minority under Section 6
of RA No. 9344, what is important is the chronological
age of the accused. If the actual age of the child is 15
years old or under, he is exempt from criminal liability.
In People vs. Roxas, G.R. No. 200793, June 04, 2014 - In
determining age for purposes of exemption from
criminal liability, Section 6 clearly refers to the age as
determined by the anniversary of one’s birth date, and
not the mental age.
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN VS
QUEZON CITY
Facts:
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors,
several local governments in Metro Manila started to
strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors
through police operations which were publicly known as
part of "Oplan Rody."
Among those local governments that implemented
curfew ordinances were respondents:
Petitioners, spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga
Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)- an association of young
adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just
society, in particular the protection of the rights and
welfare of the youth and minors - filed this present
petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the
void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth
by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of
minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the
right to liberty and the right to travel without
substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of their
natural and primary right in rearing the youth without
substantive due process.
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances:
(a) are unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the
right to liberty and the right to travel without
substantive due process;[16] and (b) fail to pass the
strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and
for employing means that bear no reasonable relation
to their purpose.
HELD:
In this regard, requiring the minor to perform
community service is a valid form of intervention
program that a local government (such as Navotas City
in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance
to promote the welfare of minors.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of
Manila is likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A
of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving
warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's
misdemeanor.
In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-
based programs and admonition are clearly not
penalties - as they are not punitive in nature - and are
generally less intrusive on the rights and conduct of the
minor. To be clear, their objectives are to formally
inform and educate the minor, and for the latter to
understand, what actions must be avoided so as to aid
him in his future conduct.
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand,
undeniably constitute penalties - as provided in our
various criminal and administrative laws and
jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended, evidently prohibits.
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew
Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict
scrutiny test - that is, that the State has sufficiently
shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety
and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities,
only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed the second
prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance
out of the three which provides for the least restrictive
means to achieve this interest.
In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for
adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely
exercise their fundamental rights during the prescribed
curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve
the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance,
i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian",
has also been construed to include parental permission
as a constructive form of accompaniment and hence, an
allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner
of enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the
local government unit. In fine, the Manila and Navotas
Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null
and void, while the Quezon City Ordinance is declared
as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this
Decision.
PEOPLE VS BANDIAN
FACTS:
At About 7 in the morning of January 31, 1936,
Valentine Aguilar, the apellant’s neighbor, saw the
appelant go to the thicket about four or five brazas from
her house, apparently to respond to a call of nature
because it was there that the people of the place used
to go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he then
again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes
stained with blood both in front and back, stagerring
and visibly showing signs of not being able to support
herself. He ran to her aid and having noted that she was
very weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up
to her house and placed her in her bed.
Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to her
house, what had happened to her, the appellant
answered that she was very dizzy. Not wishing to be
alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Aguilar
called Adriano Comcom who lived nearby to be there
and help him and the appellant. He asked Comcom to
take bamboo leaves to stop the hemhorrage which had
come upon the appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone
about five brazas when he saw the body of newborn
baby near a path adjoining the thicket where the
appellant had gone a few moments before. Comcom
informed Aguilar of it and the latter told him to bring
the body to the appellant’s house. Upon being askes
whether the babywhich was shown to her was hers or
not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.
In the afternoon of the said day, Dr. Emilio
Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary division went to
the appellant’s house and found her still lying in bed still
bleeding. In his opinion, the physician declared that the
appellant gave birth in her house, and afterwhich, he
threw the child into the thicket to kill it for the purpose
of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol,
with whom she was married to, because the child was
not his but with another man with whom she had
previously has amorous relations. Nepomuceno testified
that the appellant admitted killing her child.
ISSUE:
What was the crime committed by appellant?
RULING:
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant
, in causing her child’s death in one way or another, or in
abandoning it in the thicket, did so willfully, consciously,
or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it,
to expose it to death, because her affair with a former
lover, Luis Kirol took place three years before the
incident. The husband of the appellant testified at the
trial affirming the belief that the child was his.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be
punishable must be committed willfully and consciously,
or at least it must be the result of a voluntary, conscious
and free act or omission. Even in cases where said
crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the
person who commits them, under said circumstances,
must be in the full enjoyment of his mental facilities, or
must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may be
held liable.
The law exempts from criminal liability any person who
acts under the circumstances in which the appellant
acted in this case, by giving birth to a child in the thicket
and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or
any other cause than that she was overcome by severe
dizziness and extreme debility, with no fault or intention
on her part. She has in her favor the fourth and the
seventh exempting circumstances.
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts
and considerations, and granting that the appellant was
aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and
that she later failed to take her child therefrom, having
been so prevented by reason of causes entirely
independent of her will, it should be held that… under
such circumstances, appellant has the fourth and
seventh exempting circumstances of article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code in her favor.
PEOPLE VS FALLORINA
Facts:
At about 2:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Vincent
Jorojoro, an eleven-year old minor and the third child of
Vicente and Felicisima Jorojoro, residing at Sitio Militar,
Brgy. Bahay Toro, Project 8, Quezon City, asked
permission from his mother Felicisima if he could play
outside. She agreed. Together with his playmate
Whilcon “Buddha” Rodriguez, Vincent played with his
kite on top of the roof of an abandoned carinderia
beside the road.
Beside the carinderia was a basketball court, where a
fourteen-year old witness Ricardo Salvo and his three
friends, were playing basketball. Ricardo heard the
familiar sound of a motorcycle coming from the main
road across the basketball court. Cognizant to Ricardo of
the appellant, PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina, a Philippine
National Police (PNP) officer, detailed in the Traffic
Management Group (TMG), knew that he abhorred kids
playing on the roof, since one of his friends was
previously been scolded by the appellant before.
Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to come down favor of the accused since it was only after three days
from the roof. When PO3 Fallorina saw them, the that the appellant gave himself up and surrendered his
former stopped his motorcycle, he shouted and service firearm. And lastly, the court considered the
badmouthed at them. After hearing the shouts of the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of his
appellant, Whilcon rushed to jump off from the roof position by the accused.
while Vincent was lying on his stomach on the roof
On January 19, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment
flying his kite. When he heard the appellant’s shouts,
convicting the appellant-accused of murder, qualified by
Vincent stood up and looked at the latter. As soon as
treachery and aggravated by abuse of public position.
Vincent turned his back, ready to get down from the
The trial court did not appreciate in favor of the
roof, suddenly, the appellant pointed the .45 caliber
appellant the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
pistol towards the direction of Vincent and fired a shot.
surrender.
Vincent fell from the roof, lying prostrate near the canal
beside the abandoned carinderia and the basketball The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95,
court. found the accused PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
The appellant approached Vincent and carried the
murder defined and penalized by Article 248 of the RPC,
latter’s hapless body in a waiting tricycle and brought
as amended by the Republic Act No. 7659, and in view
him to the Quezon City General Hospital. Vincent was
of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
pronounced dead on arrival caused by a single gunshot
taking advantage by the accused of his public position
wound in the head.
(par. 1, Art. 14, RPC). Hence, the accused is hereby
Issues: ordered to indemnify the heirs of late Vincent Jorojoro,
Jr. the amounts of actual damages of P49,174.00 (paid
(a) Whether or not the appellant is exempt from
for funeral services); P50,000.00 for moral damages;
criminal liability?
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P50,000.00 as
death indemnity. The court a quo sentenced the
appellant to suffer the Death Penalty.
(b) Whether or not the appellant can offset the
aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public
position from a mitigating circumstance of his voluntary
surrender?

Held:

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) cites that the

basis for exemption from a criminal liability under
Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
is the complete absence of intent and negligence on the
part of the accused. For the accused to be guilty for a
felony, it must be committed either with criminal intent
or with fault or negligence.

Thusly, the elements of exempting circumstances are (1)

a person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care;
(3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and
(4) without any fault or intention of causing it.

In the case at bar, the Court a quo erred in inequitably

appreciating exculpatory and inculpatory facts and
circumstances which should have been considered in
favor of the accused. The court also failed to appreciate
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in