Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of

the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a

non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent
or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers
THIRD DIVISION that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the
public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz
[G.R. NO. 154207 : April 27, 2007] appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said
criminal case.
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner, v. ALBERTO MINA,
HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC
LAGUILLES, Respondents. denied permission for petitioner to appear as private
prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing
DECISION limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of
the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take
precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.3

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of

On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a
the Rules of Court, grounded on pure questions of law, with
Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the February
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution
1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student
dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court
Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding Section
(RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137,
34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the
which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.
against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45,
Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and the RTC's
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion
Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for
for Reconsideration.
Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued
by this Court.
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary
The antecedents:
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the
private respondent and the public respondent MeTC.
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed
before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain
prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats,
public respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding with Criminal
where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the
RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student,
issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of
justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of
Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is
one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for
civil indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a
private prosecutor is not legally tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion
for Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that nowhere does
the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil
aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated
June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance
of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or
friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a
member of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for
Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed a Second
Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC
seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the
said court, on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a
Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of
the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied
the petitioner's Second Motion for Reconsideration and his
Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the
RTC had already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner
before the MeTC.
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court,
the instant Petition and assigns the following errors:
I.
the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when
it resolved to deny the prayer for the writ of injunction of the
herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the
necessity of granting the writ;
II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION,
TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT
RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON
THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT,
FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH
THE LAW;
III.
THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN
ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF
THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE
ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;
IV.
THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE
LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE
CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND
BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730,
PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS
BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTC'S).4
This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons,
or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may
take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.5
Considering that this case involves the interpretation,
clarification, and implementation of Section 34, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19
governing law student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules
of Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the
Court takes cognizance of herein petition.
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student,
may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of
a party litigant.
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as
encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits
the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance
in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal
case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited
by the law school.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. - A law student
who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular
four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a
recognized law school's clinical legal education program
approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case
before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent
indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. - The appearance of the law student
authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision
and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all
pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be
filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in
behalf of the legal clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter
No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears
before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are
relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear
in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer.
Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of
a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid
of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal
or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as
an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a
member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar
Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to "In the court of a
municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138,
thus:8
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the Court of a
municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person, with
the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a
party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a
duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis
supplied)cralawlibrary
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his
Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on September 25, 2000.
No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the
Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in
these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34
of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance
of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is
expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions
when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party
litigant, may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34
of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been confused by the
fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his
entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used
by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private
prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule
138-A is not the basis for the petitioner's appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the
inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of
whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in
Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law
student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party
litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior
courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that,
by its very nature, no civil liability may flow from the crime
of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a
private prosecutor is not possible.
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had
been intended by the RTC. In denying the issuance of the
injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was
no claim for civil liability by the private complainant for
damages, and that the records of the case do not provide for
a claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner's
appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally
untenable.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except in
instances when no actual damage results from an offense,
such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy
country, and crime against popular representation.9 The
basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.10
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no
reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in
Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect
arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the
criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may
rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116,
Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED
to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal
Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct
control and supervision of the public prosecutor.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 176530 June 16, 2009
SPOUSES CONSTANTE AGBULOS AND ZENAIDA PADILLA
AGBULOS, Petitioners,
vs.
NICASIO GUTIERREZ, JOSEFA GUTIERREZ and ELENA G.
GARCIA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the review of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 6, 2007 in CA–
G.R. CV No. 83994 which set aside the dismissal of a complaint for
declaration of nullity of contract, cancellation of title, reconveyance
and damages.
The case stems from the following antecedents:
On October 16, 1997, respondents, Dr. Nicasio G. Gutierrez, Josefa
Gutierrez de Mendoza and Elena G. Garcia, through their counsel,
Atty. Adriano B. Magbitang, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, a complaint against petitioners, spouses
Constante Agbulos and Zenaida Padilla Agbulos, for declaration of
nullity of contract, cancellation of title, reconveyance and damages.
The complaint alleged that respondents inherited from their father,
Maximo Gutierrez, an eight-hectare parcel of land located in Callos,
Penaranda, Nueva Ecija, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. NT-123790 in the name of Maximo Gutierrez. Through fraud and
deceit, petitioners succeeded in making it appear that Maximo
Gutierrez executed a Deed of Sale on July 21, 1978 when, in truth, he
died on April 25, 1977. As a result, TCT No. NT-123790 was cancelled
and a new one, TCT No. NT-188664, was issued in the name of
petitioners. Based on the notation at the back of the certificate of title,
portions of the property were brought under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and awarded to Lorna Padilla,
Elenita Nuega and Suzette Nuega who were issued Certificates of
Land Ownership Award (CLOAs).
In their defense, petitioners averred that respondents were not the real
parties in interest, that the Deed of Sale was regularly executed before
a notary public, that they were possessors in good faith, and that the
action had prescribed.
On the day set for the presentation of the respondents’ (plaintiffs’)
evidence, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, assailing the
jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the case. Petitioners
contended that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB), not the RTC, had jurisdiction since the subject land was
covered by the CARP, and CLOAs had been awarded to tenants.
Respondents opposed the motion, arguing that the motion had been
filed beyond the period for filing an Answer, that the RTC had
jurisdiction over the case based on the allegations in the complaint,
and that the DARAB had no jurisdiction since the parties had no
tenancy relationship.
In an Order2 dated October 24, 2002, the RTC granted the petitioners’
motion and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC
held that the DARAB had jurisdiction, since the subject property was
under the CARP, some portions of it were covered by registered
CLOAs, and there was prima facie showing of tenancy. 3
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. On November 13,
2003, the RTC denied the motion.4
Atty. Magbitang filed a Notice of Appeal5 with the RTC, which gave
due course to the same.6 The records reveal that on December 15,
2003, respondent Elena G. Garcia wrote a letter to Judge Arturo M.
Bernardo, Acting Judge of RTC Gapan, Branch 87, stating that they
were surprised to receive a communication from the court informing
them that their notice of appeal was ready for disposition. She also
stated in the letter that there was no formal agreement with Atty.
Magbitang as to whether they would pursue an appeal with the CA,
because one of the plaintiffs was still in America.7
On February 6, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of
respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED
and the assailed Order dated October 24, 2002 issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 87, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the subject complaint is reinstated and
the records of the case is (sic) hereby remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings.1avvphi1
SO ORDERED.8
The CA concluded that the dispute between the parties was purely
civil, not agrarian, in nature. According to the CA, the allegations in the
complaint revealed that the principal relief sought was the nullification
of the purported deed of sale and reconveyance of the subject
property. It also noted that there was no tenurial, leasehold, or any
other agrarian relations between the parties.
Thus, this petition, raising the following issues for the resolution of this
Court:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing the appeal
despite the undisputed fact that Atty. Magbitang filed the
notice of appeal without respondents’ knowledge and
consent;
2. Whether or not the CA erred in giving due course to the
appeal despite the fact that Atty. Magbitang’s appellants’ brief
failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section
13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court regarding the contents of an
appellants’ brief; and
3. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the RTC
(Regional Trial Court), not the DARAB (Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board) or the PARAD/RARAD
(Provincial/Regional Agrarian Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator), has jurisdiction over respondents’ complaint.9
The CA did not err in giving due course to the appeal, on both
procedural and substantive grounds.
A lawyer who represents a client before the trial court is presumed to
represent such client before the appellate court. Section 22 of Rule
138 creates this presumption, thus:
SEC. 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent
client on appeal. — An attorney who appears de parte in a case before
a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on
appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance
in the appellate court.
A reading of respondent Elena Garcia’s letter to the RTC would show
that she did not actually withdraw Atty. Magbitang’s authority to
represent respondents in the case. The letter merely stated that there
was, as yet, no agreement that they would pursue an appeal.
In any case, an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be
ratified by the client either expressly or impliedly. Ratification retroacts
to the date of the lawyer’s first appearance and validates the action
taken by him.10 Implied ratification may take various forms, such as by
silence or acquiescence, or by acceptance and retention of benefits
flowing therefrom.11 Respondents’ silence or lack of remonstration
when the case was finally elevated to the CA means that they have
acquiesced to the filing of the appeal.
Moreover, a lawyer is mandated to "serve his client with competence
and diligence."12 Consequently, a lawyer is entreated not to neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him; otherwise, his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.13 In light of such mandate, Atty.
Magbitang’s act of filing the notice of appeal without waiting for her
clients to direct him to do so was understandable, if not commendable.
The CA was likewise correct in holding that the case is within the
jurisdiction of the RTC, not the DARAB.
For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be a
tenancy relationship between the parties. It is, therefore, essential to
establish all the indispensable elements of a tenancy relationship, to
wit: (1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural
land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.14
technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not to
suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from a rigid enforcement of
the rules may, thus, be allowed in order to attain this prime objective
for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the
existence of courts.16
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
Court of Appeals’ Decision dated February 6, 2007 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Basic is the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the

complaint.15 Respondents’ complaint did not contain any allegation
that would, even in the slightest, imply that there was a tenancy
relation between them and the petitioners. We are in full agreement
with the following findings of the CA on this point:

x x x A reading of the material averments of the complaint reveals that

the principal relief sought by plaintiffs-appellants is for the nullification
of the supposedly forged deed of sale which resulted in the issuance
of TCT No. NT-188664 covering their 8-hectare property as well as its
reconveyance, and not for the cancellation of CLOAs as claimed by
defendants-appellees. Moreover, the parties herein have no tenurial,
leasehold, or any other agrarian relations whatsoever that could have
brought this controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws.
Neither were the CLOA awardees impleaded as parties in this case
nor the latter’s entitlement thereto questioned. Hence, contrary to the
findings of the RTC, the herein dispute is purely civil and not agrarian
in nature falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial courts.

On the alleged deficiency of the appellants’ brief filed before the CA

by the respondents, suffice it to state that the requirements in Section
13, Rule 44 are intended to aid the appellate court in arriving at a just
and proper resolution of the case. Obviously, the CA found the
appellants’ brief sufficient in form and substance as the appellate court
was able to arrive at a just decision. We have repeatedly held that

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
January 10, 2018
A.C. No. 9000
TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Complainant
vs.
ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA, Respondent
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This case is an offshoot of the administrative Complaint 1 filed by
Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (complainant) against Atty. Haide V. Gumba
(respondent), and for which respondent was suspended from the
practice of law for six months. The issues now ripe for resolution arc:
a) whether respondent disobeyed a lawful order of the Court: by not
abiding by the order of her suspension; and b) whether respondent
deserves a stiffer penalty for such violation.
Factual Antecedents
According to complainant, in August 1999, respondent obtained from
him a ₱350,000.00 loan with 12% interest per annum. Incidental
thereto, respondent executed in favor of complainant an undated
Deed of Absolute Sale2 over a 105- square meter lot located in Naga
City, and covered by Transfor Certificate of Title No. 20553 under the
name of respondent's father, Nicasio Vista. Attached to said Deed was
a Special Power of Attorney4 (SPA) executed by respondent's parents
authorizing her to apply for a loan with a bank to be secured by the
subject property. Complainant and respondent purportedly agreed
that if the latter failed to pay the loan in or before August 2000,
complainant may register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Register
of Deeds (RD).5
Respondent failed to pay her loan when it fell due. And despite
repeated demands, she failed to settle her obligation. Complainant
attempted to register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the RD of Naga
City but to no avail because the aforesaid SPA only covered the
authority of respondent to mortgage the property to a bank, and not to
sell it.6
Complainant argued that if not for respondent's misrepresentation, he
would not have approved her loan. He added that respondent
committed dishonesty, and used her skill as a lawyer and her moral
ascendancy over him in securing the loan. Thus, he prayed that
respondent be sanctioned for her infraction.7
In his Commissioner's Report8 dated February 9, 2009; Commissioner
Jose I. de la Rama, Jr. (Commissioner de la Rama) faulted respondent
for failing to file an answer, and participate in the mandatory
conference, He further declared that the SPA specifically authorized
respondent to mortgage the property with a bank. He stressed that for
selling t.lie property, and not just mortgaging it to complainant, who
was not even a bank, respondent acted beyond her authority. Having
done so, she committed gross violation of the Lawyer's Oath as well
as Canon 1,9 Rule 1.01,10 and Canon 711 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As such, he recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one year.
In the Resolution No. XIX-2010-44612 dated August 28, 2010, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines - Board of Governors (IBP-BOG)
resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner de la Rama.
Action of the Supreme Court
Thereafter, the Court issued a Resolution13 dated October 5, 2011,
which sustained the findings and conclusion of the IBP. The Court
nonetheless found the reduction of the penalty proper, pursuant to its
sound judicial discretion and on the facts of the case. Accordingly, it
suspended respondent from the practice of law for six months,
effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely.
On March 14, 2012, the Court resolved to serve anew the October 5,
2011 Resolution upon respondent because its previous copy sent to
her was returned unserved.14 In its August 13, 2012 Resolution,15 the
Court considered .the October 5, 2011 Resolution to have been
served upon respondent after the March 14, 2012 Resolution was also
returned unserved. In the same resolution, the Court also denied with
finality respondent's motion for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011
Resolution.
Subsequently, Judge Margaret N. Armea (Judge Armea) of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Naga City, Branch 2 wrote1 a
letter16 inquiring from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
whether respondent could continue representing her clients and
appear in courts. She also asked the OCA if the decision
relating to respondent's suspension, which was downloaded from the
inten1et, constitutes sufficient notice to disqualify her to appear in
courts for the period of her suspension.
According to Judge Armea, her inquiry arose because respondent
represented a party in a case pending in her court; and, the counsel
of the opposing party called Judge Arrr1ea's attention regarding the
legal standing of respondent to appear as counsel. Judge Armea
added that respondent denied that she was suspended to practice law
since she (respondent) had not yet received a copy of the Court's
resolution on the matter.
In her Answer/Comment17 to the query of Judge Armea, respondent
countered that by reason of such downloaded decision, Judge Armea
and Executive Judge Pablo Cabillan Formaran III (Judge Formaran III)
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City disallowed her
appearance in their courts. She insisted that service of any pleading
or judgment cannot be made through the inte1net. She further claimed
that she had not received an authentic copy of the Court's. October 5,
2011 Resolution.
On January 22, 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) referred
the October 5, 2011 Resolution to the OCA for circulation to all
courts.18 In response, on January 30, 2013, the OCA issued OCA
Circular No. 14-201319 addressed to the courts.20 the Office of the
Chief State Prosecutor (CSP), Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), and the
IBP informing them of the October 5, 2011 and August 13, 2012
Resolutions of the Court.
IBP’s Report and Recommendation
Meanwhile, in its Notice of Resolution No XX-2013-35921 dated March
21, 2013, the IBP-BOG resolved to adopt and approve the Report and
Recommendation22 of Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero
(Comrnissioner Cachapero) to dismiss the complaint against
respondent. According to Commissioner Cachapero. there is no rule
allowing the service of judgements through the internet; and. Judge
Armea and Judge Formaran III acted ahead of time when they
implemented the suspension of respondent even before the actual
service upon her of the resolution concerning her suspension.
Statement and Report of the OBC
In its November 22, 2013 .Statement.23 the OBC stressed that
respondent received the August 13, 2012 Resolution (denying her
motion, for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011 Resolution) on
November 12, 2012 per Registry Return Receipt No. 53365. Thus, the
effectivity of respondent's suspension was from November 12, 2012
until May 12, 2013. The OBC also pointed out that suspension is not
automatically lifted by mere lapse of the period of suspension. It is
necessary that an order be issued by the Court lifting the suspension
to enable the concerned lawyer to resume practice of law.
The OBC further maintained in its November 27, 2013 Report 24 that
respondent has no authority to practice law and appear in court as
counsel during her suspension, and until such time that the Court has
lifted the order of her suspension. Thus, the OBC made these
recommendations:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully
recommended that:
1. Respondent be REQUIRED to file a sworn statement with motion to
lift order of her suspension, attaching therewith certifications from the
Office of the Executive Judge of the court where she practices [h]er
profession and IBP Local Chapter of which she is affiliated, that she
has ceased and desisted from the practice of law from 12 November
2012 to 12 May 2013, immediately: and 2. The IBP be REQUIRED to
EXPLAIN within 72 hours why they should not be sanctioned for
disciplinary action for issuing said Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-
359, dated 21 March 2013, purportedly dismissing this case for lack of
merit.25
On February 19, 2014, the Court noted26 the OBC Report, and
directed respondent to comply with the guidelines relating to the lifting
of the order of her suspension as enunciated in Maniago v.Atty. De
Dios.27
Upon the request of respondent, on December 2, 2014, the OBC
issued a Certification,28 which stated that respondent had been
ordered suspended from the practice of law for six months, and as of
the issuance of said certification, the order of her suspension had not
yet been lifted.
Complaint against the OCA, the OBC and Atty. Paraiso
On February 6, 2015, respondent filed with the RTC a verified
Complaint29 for nullity of clearance, damages, and preliminary
injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order against
the OCA, the OBC, and Atty. Nelson P. Paraiso (Atty. Paraiso). The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2015-0007.
Essentially, respondent accused the OCA and the OBC of suspending
her from the practice of law even if the administrative case against her
was still pending with the IBP. She likewise faulted the OBC for
requiring her to submit a clearance from its office before she resumes
her practice of law after the suspension. In turn, she argued that Atty.
Paraiso benefited from this supposed "bogus suspension" by publicly
announcing the disqualification of respondent to practice law.
In its Answer,30 the OCA argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
the action, which seeks reversal, modification or enjoinment of a
directive of the Court. The OCA also stressed that respondent should
raise such matter by filing a motion for reconsideration in the
administrative case, instead of filing a complaint with the RIC. It also
stated that the instance of OCA Circular No. 14-2013 was in
compliance with the Court's directive to inform all courts, the CSP, the
PAO, and the IBP of the suspension of respondent.
For its pmt, the OBC declared in a Report31 dated March 24, 2015 that
during and after the period of her suspension, without the same having
been lifted, respondent filed pleadings and appeared in courts in the
following cases:
x x x (l) Civil Case No. 2013-0106 (Romy Fay Gumba v. The City
Assessor of Naga City, et. al.), (2) Civil Case No. RTC 2006-0063
(Sps. Jaime M. Kalaw et. al. v. Fausto David, et al.), (3) Other Spec.
Proc. No. RTC 2012-0019 (Petition for Reconstitution of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 21128 of the Registry of Deeds of Naga City v.
Danilo O. Laborado).32
The OBC likewise confirmed that as of the time it issued the March 24,
2015 Report, the Court had not yet lifted the order of suspension
against respondent. The OBC opined that for failing to comply with the
order of her suspension, respondent deliberately refi1sed to obey a
lawful order of the Court. Thus, it recommended that a stiffer penalty
be imposed against respondent.
On June 4, 2015, the OBC reported that the RTC dismissed Civil Case
No. 2015-0007 for lack of jurisdiction, and pending resolution was
respondent's motion for reconsideration.33
Issue
Is respondent administratively liable for engaging in the practice of law
during the period of her suspension and prior to an order of the Court
lifting such suspension?
Our Ruling
Time and again, the Court reminds the bench and bar "that the
practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege [subject] to the
inherent regulatory power of the [Court],"34 It is a "privilege burdened
with conditions."35 As such, lawyers must comply with its 1igid
standards, which include mental fitness, maintenance of highest level
of morality, and full compliance with the rules of the legal profession.36
With regard to suspension to practice law, in Maniago v. Atty.
De Dios,37 The Court laid down the guidelines for the lifting of an order
of suspension, to wit:
l) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the
practice of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately
executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which
to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion
shall render the decision final and executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall
file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar
Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the practice
of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or
her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local
Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where
respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where
he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent's
compliance with the order of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer
tmder oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe
punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.38
Pursuant to these guidelines, in this case, the Court issued a
Resolution dated October 5, 2011 suspending respondent from the
practice of law for six months effective immediately. Respondent filed
her motion for reconsideration. And, on November 12, 2012, she
received the notice of the denial of such motion per Registry Return
Receipt No. 53365.
While, indeed, service of a judgment or resolution must be done only
personally or by registered mail,39 and that mere showing of a
downloaded copy of the October 5, 2011 Resolution to respondent is
not a valid service, the fact, however, that respondent was duly
informed of her suspension remains unrebutted. Again, as stated
above, she filed a motion for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011
Resolution, and the Court duly notified her of the denial of said motion.
It thus follows that respondent's six months suspension commenced
from the notice of the denial of her motion for reconsideration on
November 12, 2012 until May 12, 2013.
In lbana-Andrade v. Atty. Paita-Moya,40 despite having received the
Resolution anent her suspension, Atty. Paita-Moya continued to
practice law. She filed pleadings and she appeared as counsel in
courts. For which reason, the Court suspended her from the practice
of law for six months in addition to her initial one month suspension,
or a total of seven months.
Too, in Feliciano v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada,41 respondent therein, Atty.
Lozada, appeared and signed as counsel, for and in behalf of her
husband, during the period of her suspension from the practice of law.
For having done so, the Court ruled that she engaged in unauthorized
practice of law. The Court did not give weight to Atty. Lozada's defense
of good faith as she was very well aware that when she represented
her husband, she was still serving her suspension order. The Court
also noted that Atty. Lozada did not seek any clearance or clarification
from the Court if she can represent her husband in court. In this regard,
the Court suspended Atty. Lozada for six months for her willful
disobedience to a lawful order of the Court.
Similarly, in this case, the Court notified respondent of her suspension.
However, she continued to engage in the practice law by filing
pleadings and appearing as counsel in courts during the period of her
suspension.
It is common sense that when the Court orders the suspension of a
lawyer from the practice of law, the lawyer must desist from performing
all functions which require the application of legal knowledge witl1in
the period of his or her suspension.42 To stress, by practice of law, we
refer to "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. It
includes performing acts which are characteristic of the legal
profession, or rendering any kind of service which requires the use in
any degree of legal knowledge or skill.''43 In fine, it will amount to
unauthorized practice, and a violation of a lawful order of the Court if
a suspended lawyer engages in the practice of law during the
pendency of his or her suspension.44
As also stressed by the OBC in its March 24, 2015 Report, during and
even after the period of her suspension and without filing a sworn
statement for the lifting of her suspension, respondent signed
pleadings and appeared in courts as counsel. Clearly, such acts of
respondent are in violation of the order of her suspension to practice
law.
Moreover, the lifting of a suspension order is not automatic. It is
necessary that there is an order from the Court lifting the suspension
of a lawyer to practice law.1âwphi1 To note, in Maniago, the Court
explicitly stated that a suspended lawyer shall, upon the expiration of
one’s suspension, file a sworn statement with the Court, and that such
statement shall be considered proof of the lawyer's compliance 1Nith
the order of suspension.
In this case, on February 19, 2014, the Court directed respondent to
comply with the guidelines for the lifting of the suspension order
against her by filing a sworn statement on the matter. However,
respondent did not comply. Instead, she filed a complaint (Civil Case
No. 2015-0007) against the OCA, the OBC and a certain Atty. Paraiso
with the RTC. For having done so, respondent violated a lawful order
of the Court, that is, to comply with the guidelines for the lifting of the
order of suspension against her.
To recapitulate, respondent's violation of the lawful order of the Court
is two-fold: 1) she filed pleadings and appeared in court as counsel
during the period of her suspension, and prior to t1e lifting of such
order of her suspension: and 2) she did not comply with the Court's
directive for her to file a sworn statement in compliance with the
guidelines for the lifting of the suspension order.
Under Section 27,45 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from practice of law for willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, among other
grounds. Here, respondent willfully disobeyed the Court's lawful
orders by failing to comply with the order of her suspension, and to the
Court's directive to observe the guidelines for the lifting thereof.
Pursuant to prevailing Jurisprudence, the suspension for six (6)
months from the practice of law against respondent is in order.46
WIIEREFORE, Atty. Haide V. Gumba is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for an additional period of six (6) months (from her
original six (6) months suspension) and WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Haide V. Gumba is DIRECTED to infom1 the Court of the date of
her receipt of this Decision, to determine the reckoning point when her
suspension shall take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information
and guidance. 'The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to
append a copy of this Decision to the record of respondent as member
of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 82760 August 30, 1990
FELIMON MANANGAN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA VIZCAYA, BRANCH
28, respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
For abuse of Court processes, hopping from one forum to another,
filing a labyrinth of cases and pleadings, thwarting the smooth
prosecution of Criminal Case No. 639 against him for no less than
twelve (12) years, and for masquerading as Filemon Manangan when
his real name is Andres Culanag, petitioner has brought upon himself
the severest censure and a punishment for contempt. The Petition
for Certiorari he has filed likewise calls for dismissal.
The Petition, Amended Petition, and Second Amended Petition seek
the annulment of the entire proceedings in Criminal Case No. 639 of
respondent Court, including the Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by it,
dated 19 July 1979, "for being stale/functus officio." It is claimed, inter
alia, that respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in
making it appear that petitioner was duly tried and convicted when the
contrary was true, and that the Alias Warrant of Arrest was irregularly
issued because respondent Court had already accepted a property
bond.
In the Amended Petition, petitioner further alleges that respondent
Court had irregularly assumed jurisdiction as it is the Sandiganbayan
that has exclusive original jurisdiction over the case considering that
he was Legal Officer I of the Bureau of Lands, Region II, and that he
had supposedly committed the offense in relation to that office.
Piecing together the facts from the hodgepodge of quotations from the
Decisions in the different cases filed by petitioner, we recite the
relevant ones below.
On 7 November 1977, petitioner, representing himself as a lawyer,
was appointed Legal Officer I of the Bureau of Lands in Region II (p.
98, Rollo).
On 30 June 1978, Criminal Case No. 639 entitled "People v. Filemon
Manangan alias Andres Culanag" (Annex D, Petition, Rollo, UDK
3906, p. 20) was filed before the then Court of First Instance of Nueva
Vizcaya, First Judicial District, Bayombong, charging petitioner with
"Execution of Deeds by Intimidation" under Article 298 of the Revised
Penal Code (the Criminal Case, for short). Apparently, the Director of
Lands had given his imprimatur to the charge.
On the same date, an Order of Arrest was issued by then Judge
Gabriel Dunuan of respondent Court (Rollo, UDK 3906, p. 21).
On 18 April 1979, petitioner filed before this Court a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Writ of Preliminary
Injunction entitled "Filemon de Asis Manangan v. Court of First
Instance, et al.," in UDK No. 3906, assailing the jurisdiction of
respondent Court to try the criminal case and seeking to stay the Order
of Arrest of 30 June 1978. The petition was dismissed on 7 May 1979
for non-payment of legal fees (p. 99, Rollo).
On 10 and 18 July 1978, the dates set for preliminary investigation,
petitioner did not show up and, in fact, disappeared for about a year.
On 31 July 1978, a Second Amended Information was filed (Comment,
Solicitor General, p. 61, Rollo), this time Identifying the accused as
"Andres Culanag (alias Andres M. Culanag, Filemon Manangan Atty.
Filemon A. Manangan and Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan)."
On 8 July 1979, petitioner surfaced and, through counsel, posted a
bailbond with the Municipal Circuit Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga
del Sur (Resolution of the RTC, Nueva Vizcaya, 25 March 1983,
Annex B, Petition, p. 2).
On 19 July 1979, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was by Judge Gabriel
Dunuan. It is this Alias Warrant that is challenged herein.
On 12 September 1979, petitioner filed an ex-parte Motion to Dismiss
the Criminal Case, which was denied by respondent Court (see CA-
G.R. No. 11588-SP, p. 2).
Petitioner then resorted to a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 11588-SP entitled
"Filemon Manangan v. Director of Lands and CFI of Nueva Vizcaya."
The Petition sought to (1) nullify the decision of the Director of Lands,
dated 27 March 1980, finding petitioner guilty of extortion,
impersonation and abandonment of office and ordering his dismissal
from the service; and (2) "require respondent CFI of Nueva Ecija to
dismiss Criminal Case No. 639 pending in its Court." In a Decision,
promulgated on 27 February 1981, the Appellate Court dismissed the
Petition for "absolute lack of legal and factual basis" and holding,
among others, that "the non-withdrawal of the Information for
execution of deeds by intimidation . . . is not covered by mandamus"
(hereinafter, the German Decision). 1
On 30 October 1981, before respondent Court, a Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, ostensibly through counsel,
Atty. Benjamin Facun, asking that the Criminal Case be dismissed on
the ground that the accused had already died on 29 September 1971
such that respondent Court had not acquired jurisdiction over his
person. The Motion was denied.
On 22 February 1982, erroneously construing the German Decision
as a final judgment of conviction, respondent Court reset the
promulgation to 19 April 1982 and ordered the bondsmen to produce
the body of the accused on said date (Annex A, Petition). Realizing
the mistake, on 9 July 1982, respondent Court vacated said order and
ruled that "the warrant of arrest issued by this Court through Judge
Gabriel Dunuan on 19 July 1979, shall remain in full force and effect"
(Annex F, Petition).
On 25 June 1982, petitioner again resorted to the Court of Appeals in
another Petition for Certiorari (CA-G.R. No. SP-14428) filed by one
Atty. Benjamin Facun as counsel for petitioner, this time praying for
the annulment of the proceedings in the Criminal Case "on the ground
that the accused was already dead when the decision finding him
guilty of the crime . . . was rendered." The pleading alleged "that
petitioner is of age, Filipino, deceased, but has come to this Honorable
Court through counsel. . . ." In a Decision promulgated on 29
November 1982, Certiorari was denied for being devoid of merit
inasmuch as "there is nothing on record to show that such dismissal
had been sought before the decision was rendered" (briefly, the
Kapunan Decision). 2 (Actually, no judgment has been rendered by
respondent Court).
Unfazed by the adverse Kapunan Decision, the supposed heirs of the
accused, on 10 February 1983, filed a Manifestation before
respondent Court asking for the dismissal and termination of the
Criminal Case on the same ground that the accused had allegedly
died.
On 25 March 1983, Judge Quirino A. Catral of respondent Court
refused to declare the case closed and terminated inasmuch as the
accused was alive on 8 July 1979 when he posted his bailbond
(citing the Kapunan Decision) and reiterated that the "alias warrant
issued by the Court on July 19, 1979 which up to the present has not
yet been served upon the accused as in full force and effect."
For the third time, the case was elevated to the then Intermediate
Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. SP-00707, entitled "Heirs of the
Deceased Filemon Manangan v. Hon. Quirino A. Catral, etc." The
Petition sought to annul the Order of Judge Catral of 25 March 1983
denying the closure and termination of the Criminal Case.
On 28 May 1983, the then IAC, after quoting at length from the
Kapunan Decision and the Catral Order, dismissed the Petition
(hereinafter, the Aquino Decision) 3 holding, inter alia, that "whether or
not its denial of the motion to dismiss that case constitutes a grave
abuse of discretion, was already passed upon by this Court in CA-G.R.
No. SP-14428 (Kapunan Decision), hence, it is res adjudicata. It may
not be litigated anew, no matter what form the action for that purpose
may take."
On 28 June 1984, before the respondent Court, petitioner-accused
filed an Omnibus Motion with Motion for New Trial, which was denied
for lack of merit in the Order of 19 November 1984. In the same Order,
respondent Court ordered the case archived until such time that the
accused is brought to the Court.
On 19 June 1986, counsel for petitioner-accused filed a Motion to
Quash on the grounds that: "(1) the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused; and
(2) the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being
convicted of the offense charged."
It was at that stage of the case below, without awaiting disposition on
the Motion to Quash, that the present Petition was instituted.
The obvious conclusion from the recital of facts given is that the
Petition is without merit. Petitioner-accused had a pending Motion to
Quash before respondent Court and should have awaited resolution
thereon. He had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law and resort to this Petition is decidedly premature.
Contrary to petitioner's pretensions, the Alias Warrant of Arrest is
valid. Petitioner had evaded arrest by disappearing from the
jurisdiction of respondent Court. Neither is there any indication in the
records that the property bond, filed by petitioner-accused in the
Municipal Circuit Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, had been
accepted by respondent Court and petitioner discharged on the basis
thereof. The Alias Warrant is not "stale or functus officio," as alleged.
Unlike a warrant, which is valid for only ten (10) days from date (Rule
126, Sec. 9), a Warrant of Arrest remains valid until arrest is effected
or the Warrant lifted. Respondent Court, therefore, cannot be faulted
with grave abuse of discretion for holding that said Warrant is in full
force and effect.
Although there may have been some initial confusion on the part of
respondent Court arising from the Kapunan Decision, that was timely
rectified. In the final analysis, respondent Court has not made it appear
that petitioner-accused has already been arraigned and tried, let alone
convicted. No jeopardy has attached, as alleged. Again, therefore, no
grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to respondent Court.
Petitioner's argument in his Amended Petition and Second Amended
Petition that it is the Sandiganbayan that has exclusive jurisdiction
over the Criminal Case neither holds water considering that not only
is he ineligible for the position of Legal Officer I in the Bureau of Lands,
Region II, for not being a lawyer, but also because he was dismissed
from the service on 27 March 1980 by the Director of Lands, who found
him, with the approval of the Minister of Natural Resources, guilty of
extortion, impersonation and abandonment of office CA-G.R. No.
11588-SP, p. 2).
The foregoing conclusions could dispose of the case.
However, on 8 June 1989, the Solicitor General filed a
"Manifestation/Motion to Strike Out" the present petition for being
fictitious and that by reason thereof petitioner should be cited for
contempt of Court. The Solicitor General has also prayed that he be
excused from filing a Comment on petitioner's Second Amended
Petition, which we resolve to grant.
The Solicitor General maintains that a re-examination of the records
in the Criminal shows that:
a. Filemon A. Manangan is only an alias of Andres M.
Culanag, the person charged in Criminal Case No.
639;
b. Filemon A. Manangan was a lawyer from San
Marcelino, Zambales, who died on September 29,
1971 in the vicinity of his residence where he and his
driver died on the spot; and
c. [Andres M. Culanag] knew the real Filemon
Manangan and knowing about the latter's death,
assumed the name, qualifications and other personal
circumstances of Filemon Manangan. By means
thereof, he was able to pass himself off as a lawyer
 and to actually practice law, using even the Certificate
of Admission to the Philippine Bar of Filemon
Manangan which states that he was admitted to the
Bar on March 6, 1964. By this guise, [Andres M.
Culanag] succeeded in obtaining a position as legal
Officer I in the Bureau of Lands.
In opposition, petitioner maintains that he is not a fictitious person,
having been born out of the lawful wedlock of Segundino Manangan
and Felipa Asis; and that assuming that there is sufficient basis to
charge him for contempt, it will no longer prosper on the ground of
prescription.
Petitioner's posturings are completely bereft of basis. As the Solicitor
General had also disclosed in the German Decision, petitioner [Andres
Culanag] had, on 23 February 1977, filed Sp. Procs. No. 23 with the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, San Jose City Branch, for the
change of his name from Andres Culanag to Filemon Manangan. In
that petition, he claimed that his real name is Andres Culanag; that his
entire school records carry his name as Filemon Manangan: and that
he is the same person as Andres Culanag, the latter being his real
name. The imprisonment was carried to the extreme when, in
petitioner's Manifestation, dated 10 February 1983, before respondent
Court, his supposed heirs alleged that accused had died before the
filing of the Information on 29 September 1971, the exact date of death
of the real Filemon Manangan. More, petitioner also masquerades
under the name of Atty. Benjamin M. Facun in the several pleadings
filed in connection with the Criminal Case.
In the German Decision, it was additionally pointed out that petitioner
had also committed imprisonation when, representing himself as Atty.
Ross V. Pangilinan, he filed a petition with this Court praying that his
right to practice law be affirmed (Misc. Bar-I and Misc. Bar-2). In those
cases, we ruled that petitioner Filemon Manangan is "really Andres
Culanag, an impostor;" dismissed the petitions; and directed Andres
Culanag to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt
for filing the two false petitions (In re: Andres Culanag, September 30,
1971, 41 SCRA 26). He explained that "he thought this Court would
not discover that he is a poseur, for which reason he apologizes to the
Court promising that he would not commit the same act if he is
excused and given another chance." On 12 November 1971, after
finding his explanation unsatisfactory, we adjudged him guilty of
indirect contempt of Court under Rule 71, Section 3(e) of the Rules of
Court 4 and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for six (6) months.
Parenthetically, we also take judicial notice of Bar Matter No. 190,
entitled "In Re Andres Culanag alias Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan" and Bar
Matter No. 206, entitled "Eriberto H. Decena vs. Andres Culanag"
wherein, on 9 October 1984, this Court Resolved "to direct that
petitioner be subjected to mental examination by a doctor from the
National Mental Hospital" after noting that petitioner was suffering
from some kind of mental alienation. This mitigates somewhat
petitioner's present liability for contempt.
It is the height of chicanery, indeed, that despite the foregoing
antecedents, petitioner still has the gall to claim that he is, in truth and
in fact, Filemon Manangan. The evidence on hand, without need for
more, and with petitioner having been sufficiently heard, amply
establishes that petitioner Filemon Manangan, is an impostor. He is
guilty of continued fraudulent misrepresentation and highly improper
conduct tending directly to impede, obstruct, degrade, and make a
mockery of the administration of justice (Rule 71, Sec. 3 [d]).
While it may be that some pronouncements in the pertinent decisions
allude to Filemon Manangan and that Andres Culanag is just
an alias of Filemon Manangan, those statements actually refer to the
person of Andres Culanag and not to the real Filemon Manangan, long
since dead.
The action for contempt has not prescribed since it is apparent that
the contumacious acts continue to this day.
WHEREFORE, (1) the Petition, Amended Petition, and the Second
Amended Petition are hereby dismissed for utter lack of merit; (2)
petitioner is adjudged in contempt of Court, severely censured, and
sentenced to suffer three (3) months imprisonment, the same to be
served at the Provincial Jail of Nueva Vizcaya to ensure his
appearance during the trial of the subject criminal case; (3) respondent
Court is hereby directed to retrieve Criminal Case No. 639 from its
archives and to proceed to its determination with deliberate dispatch;
(4) all Courts are directed not to recognize any person representing
himself as Filemon Manangan, Atty. Filemon Manangan, or Atty.
Benjamin M. Facun; and (5) petitioner's real name is declared to be
Andres Culanag.

Treble costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
[ A.C. No. 11131, March 13, 2019 ]
DENNIS M. MAGUSARA, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. LOUIE
A. RASTICA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
This is a disbarment complaint[1] filed by Dennis M. Magusara
(complainant) on March 1, 2011 before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP-CBD)
charging Atty. Louie A. Rastica (respondent) of violating Section
20(d), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[2]
The Facts
On November 14, 2007, Yap-Siton Law Office filed a formal
complaint before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on
behalf of its client Ramie P. Fabillar (Ramie), charging complainant
of committing an election offense punishable under Section 261,
paragraph (e) of the Omnibus Election Code.[3] Attached to the
formal complaint are Ramie's ComplaintAffidavit,[4] his medical
certificate,[5] a police blotter,[6] and Wilson Fabillar's (Wilson)
affidavit.[7] Ramie's complaint-affidavit and Wilson's affidavit were
subscribed and sworn to before respondent. On February 10, 2008,
Ramie filed an Affidavit of Desistance[8] before the COMELEC,
claiming that he was surprised to find that there was a complaint for
election offense against complainant supposedly filed by him. He
narrated that he thought that what he signed was a complaint for
grave coercion against complainant. Since the contents of the
complaint-affidavit prepared by respondent were not translated to
him in the local dialect, he did not understand its meaning when he
signed the same. According to complainant, this alleged act of
respondent violated Section 20(d),[9] Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
To support the present complaint, complainant attached several
documents which appear to be pleadings and supporting documents
he submitted before the IBP Negros Oriental Chapter in relation to a
2008 disbarment complaint he filed against respondent. Among
these documents are: (1) two affidavits[10] executed by Wilson dated
December 7, 2007 and August 5, 2008, respectively, showing
different signatures appearing above his name; (2) a
manifestation[11] dated February 21, 2011 where complainant
reiterated his allegations in the 2008 disbarment complaint and
accused IBP Negros Oriental Chapter of causing delay in the
proceedings for releasing the resolution only after two years and six
months from the filing of the complaint; and (3) two
documents[12] allegedly notarized by respondent despite the
expiration of his notarial commission.
In his answer,[13] respondent maintains that the allegations are
baseless and the present complaint should be dismissed outright for
lack of a certification of non-forum shopping. He claims that the
present complaint was instituted by complainant as revenge for
having been defeated by respondent's mother in the election for
barangay chairperson. Respondent pointed out that the facts stated
in the complaint-affidavit are similar to those which are declared in
the police and barangay blotters attached therein, and to the
complaint-affidavit[14] filed before the Provincial Prosecutor's Office
charging complainant of grave coercion. Aside from these, the facts
and circumstances attested to by Ramie in his complaint-affidavit for
the election offense were corroborated by Wilson's affidavit, which
was subscribed and sworn to before Prosecutor Violeta Baldado.
Moreover, Ramie graduated from high school and worked in Metro
Manila. His education and work experience show that he is capable
of managing his affairs; thus, he cannot disavow knowledge and
understanding of the contents of his complaint-affidavit in the
election offense. Lastly, the divergence in the affidavits of desistance
Ramie executed shows the influence and deceitful intentions of
complainant. In the affidavit of desistance dated February 4, 2008
Ramie filed in the grave coercion case, he said that he was "doubtful
of [his] actuations that [he was] also a paredelicto and that being
neighbor and friend, [he] absolutely withdraw the case."[15] On the
other hand, in the affidavit of desistance dated February 10, 2008
Ramie filed before the COMELEC, the reason he gave for desisting
was "I was only made to sign the Complaint-Affidavit and the same
was not translated to me, and the person who prepared the [same] is
the son of Brgy. Chairman Lorna Rastica, Atty. Louie Rastica and the
same was not translated x x x in local dialect so as I can
understand."[16] As clarification, he presented an affidavit executed
by Ramie on August 5, 2008 where the latter stated that he fully
understood the contents of the complaint-affidavit for the election
offense.[17]
On June 22, 2011, complainant filed his preliminary conference brief,
where aside from violation of Section 20(d), Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, he included as issue the alleged notarization of respondent
without authority.[18]
On September 9, 2011, complainant filed before the IBP-CBD a
verified complaint "in compliance" with the order of the Investigation
Commissioner during the August 19, 2011 hearing. In this verified
complaint, complainant accused respondent of violating notarial
laws and rules. Notably, the description of the two documents
allegedly notarized without authority is similar to the two documents
presented in the 2008 disbarment complaint filed before the IBP
Negros Oriental Chapter.[19]
During the scheduled clarificatory hearing, only respondent
appeared.[20] Both parties failed to submit position papers.
In his Report and Recommendation dated November 14, 2012,
Investigating Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero (Commissioner
Cachapero) recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
respondent for lack of merit. He noted that Ramie graduated from
high school, where the English language is the medium of
instruction. As such, he "must have been equipped with the basic
learning of the said language and must have fair understanding of the
same whether written or spoken."[21] It is, thus, incredible that he was
aware of the contents of the complaint-affidavit in the grave coercion
case he executed and filed which is written in the English language,
yet not have any knowledge of the contents of a similar complaint for
election offense he filed against complainant. Further, Ramie in his
affidavit[22] dated August 5, 2008 has already clarified that he
understood the contents of the complaint-affidavit for election
offense. There is, thus, no sufficient evidence showing respondent's
supposed breach of his ethical duties.[23] No discussion was made
regarding the alleged notarization of documents without authority.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
recommendation to dismiss the complaint in Resolution No. XX-
2013-250.[24] Complainant, however, filed a motion for
reconsideration, alleging that the IBP Board of Governors erred in
not taking into consideration the fact that respondent engaged in
notarial practice without authority.[25]
On May 3, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No.
XXI-2014-245[26] where it resolved to grant complainant's motion for
reconsideration. The Board of Governors found that respondent
notarized two documents prior to the approval of his notarial
commission. Accordingly, it disqualified respondent from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and
ordered the revocation of his notarial commission, if existing.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.[27] He claims that he
was not given the chance to be heard and defend himself because: (1)
the issue on the notarization of documents without authority was not
part of the original complaint; and (2) no investigation was ever held
to give him an opportunity to verify the authenticity of the alleged
documents notarized without authority.[28]
The Court's Ruling
We do not agree with the IBP Board of Governors.
At the outset, we note, through complainant's own submissions, that
he filed two complaints against respondent. The first is the 2008
disbarment complaint for violation of the rules on notarial practice
filed before the IBP Negros Oriental Chapter. The second is the
present complaint for violation of Section 20(d), Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court filed before the IBP-CBD.
We agree with Commissioner Cachapero's finding that there was no
substantial evidence to prove that respondent violated Section 20(d),
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Respondent's narration of facts and
the documentary evidence he presented, especially the affidavit of
Ramie clarifying that he understood the contents of the subject
complaint-affidavit, substantiated his claim of innocence.
We also agree with the Commissioner Cachapero in exluding the
allegation that respondent engaged in notarial practice despite the
expiration of his notarial commission in his resolution of the
complaint. A review of complainant's pleadings shows that this issue,
along with the documents submitted to support the charge
(specifically the compromise agreement between the Municipal
Treasurer of Bindoy, Negros Oriental and Felix Villanueva, Jr. and
the verification executed by Kristie Marie E. Fernandez),[29] were
already subject of an earlier investigation by the IBP Negros Oriental
Chapter. The records also show that the IBP-CBD did not order the
consolidation of these two complaints. From these, it is apparent that
the inclusion of the additional issue (i.e., notarizing documents
without authority) in resolving this complaint would result in a
situation where two separate complaints are filed against respondent
by the same complainant concerning the same offense based on the
same set of facts.
There is forum shopping when two or more actions or proceedings
involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition. [30] To include this
additional ground in the present complaint would constitute forum
shopping as the same is similar to complainant's cause of action in
the 2008 disbarment complaint he filed against respondent.
Therefore, we find that the IBP Board of Governors erred when it
took into consideration the additional ground, which, to repeat, is
identical to the charge in an earlier disbarment complaint.
In essence, we find that respondent was able to refute complainant's
claim that he violated Section 20(d), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
The additional charge of violating notarial rules, on the other hand, is
already subject of an earlier disbarment proceeding. Consequently,
there is no basis to impose disciplinary action against respondent at
this time. The proceedings in the 2008 disbarment complaint filed
before the IBP Negros Oriental Chapter against respondent should be
allowed to run its course to determine the latter's culpability as to the
charge that he notarized documents without authority. This will also
prevent the situation of two or more courts or agencies rendering
conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the same issue[31] and
ensure that the proceedings for the disbarment and discipline of
attorneys are followed. The procedures outlined by Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court are meant to ensure that the innocents are spared
from wrongful condemnation and that only the guilty are meted their
just due. Obviously, these requirements cannot be taken lightly.[32]
The Court will exercise its disciplinary power only after observing
due process and upon showing of lawyer's administrative guilt by
clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. This norm is aimed at
preserving the integrity and reputation of the Law Profession, and at
shielding lawyers, in general, due to their being officers themselves of
the Court.[33] Further, filing multiple petitions or complaints
constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade the
administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial
procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened
dockets of the courts.[34]
The public must be reminded that lawyers are professionals bound to
observe and follow the strictest ethical canons. Subjecting them to
frivolous, unfounded, and vexatious charges of misconduct and
misbehavior will cause not only disservice to the ideals of justice, but
a disregard of the Constitution and the laws to which all lawyers vow
their enduring fealty.[35]
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XXI-2014-245 dated May 3, 2014 of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors is SET
ASIDE. The complaint filed against Atty. Louie A. Rastica is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, C. J., (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Gesmundo,
and Carandang, JJ., concur.