Free Action and Free Will

Mind Association
Free Action and Free Will

Author(s): Gary Watson
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 96, No. 382 (Apr., 1987), pp. 145-172
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
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FreeActionandFreeWill
GARY WATSON
StateoftheArtseries.
Thisarticleis thethirdofourcommissioned
I Self-determination
(i) Two featuresoffreedom.One old-fashionedway of classifyingcon-
ceptionsoffreeagencyis to distinguishbetween'libertyofindifference' and
'libertyof spontaneity'.This classificationis unobjectionableas a way of
bringingout importantlydifferentemphases in differentwriters.It is
seriouslymisleading,however,if it is meant to isolate competingcon-
ceptionsoffreedom.For whatthesetwolabels signifyare interpretations of
two different featuresof freedomthatmust be capturedin any reasonable
conception-namely,self-determination (or autonomy)and theavailability
ofalternative possibilities.Anyadequate notionoffreeagencymustprovide
forpossibilityand autonomyin somesense,and, in myview,thetraditional
conceptionsthatare stilltakenseriouslyweremeantto do so.1
Even classicalcompatibilismmade room,or triedto makeroom,forboth.
Its basic tenet,thatfreedomis dependenceofactionupon thewill,provides
a way of interpretingboth features.Alternativepossibilitiesare to be
identifiedrelativelyand counterfactually, by whatis possiblerelativeto the
subject's will. And the relevantdependencyrelationdefinesthe relevant
notionofself-determination; theselfis thewill.Hence self-determination is
determination by the will.2
1 Bernard Williamssaysthatclassicalcompatibilism opposedfreedom toconstraint, nottonecessity.
Of course,compatibilism holds thatfreedomis not opposedto necessityin the sense in which
determinism impliesnecessity. AndHobbesinparticular tookpainstostressthis.Butthatdoesnotmean
thatfreedom doesnotconflict withnecessity inanysense.Lockedidopposefreedom (butnotvoluntary
action)tonecessity: 'Wherever ... thepowertoactorforbear according tothedirection ofthought[that
is,liberty][iswanting], therenecessity takesplace'(II. 2I. I3).
I confinemyremarks in thisessayto the'moderns'.One could arguethatthesetwofeatures of
freedom werepresent in a rudimentary forminAristotle's discussion ofthevoluntary in Nicomachean
Ethics,III. 5. Therehe thinks ofthevoluntary as thatwhichhasitsorigin'in' theagent,in contrast to
actingunderconstraint 'to whichthepersoncontributes nothing'.('A humanbeingoriginates hisown
actions... as hefathers hisownchildren', I I I3bI8.) Butthevoluntary alsoinvolves a kindofdualpower:
C.. . whenactingis up to us, so is notacting'(III 3b6),thatmaybringin theelementofalternative
possibility.Thoughhe had muchto sayaboutnecessity, Aristotledid nothavea developednotionof
determinism or of freedom, perhapsbecausehe did notfacethekindof threatthatwas posed by
seventeenth-century science.(Fora libertarian seeSorabji,anda replybyFine.)For
readingofAristotle,
themedievals, generalissuesaboutfreedom wereposedbydivineforeknowledge.
To givean overview ofthemedievalandancientscenesis beyond,notthescopeofthisessay,butthe
erudition ofitsauthor.
2 Locke'sconcern toprovidefora notionofself-determination is explicit:'.. everymanis putunder
a necessity,byhisconstitution as anintelligent being,tobe determined inwilling byhisownthought and

146 Gary Watson
The real dispute, then and now, is not whetherfreedomis to be

understoodexclusivelyin termsof one featureratherthan another.The
disputeis over the interpretation of and relationsamong them.Compati-
bilismhas been criticizedfromthestartforitscharacterization ofbothself-
determinationand alternativepossibilities.Typically,libertarians3focus
theirattentionupon thecompatibilisttreatment ofthelatter,althoughtheir
criticismsbear upon the otherfeatureas well. On the otherhand, while
contemporary versionsof compatibilismdifferfromtheirpredecessorsin
the details of theirtreatmentof alternativepossibilities,these treatments
usually exhibit the classical structure.Their chief quarrel with older
versionsconcernstheotherelement;theychargetheclassicalaccountswith
inadequate conceptionsof self-determination. Their own versionof self-
determinationthen dictates the details of their version of alternative
possibilities.That whichfigures,in theiraccountof self-determination, as
thefactoron whichfreeagencydepends(desireor preference in theclassical
versions,somethingmore complex on later accounts) is that relativeto
whichalternativepossibilitiesare to be defined.
On a libertarianaccount,the structualrelationsamongtheseelementsis
not as straightforward. Historically,I think, the main inspirationof
libertarianismis an understandingof self-determination that is incom-
patible withdeterminism;roughly,determinismmeans determinationby
somethingotherthan the self,and hence heteronomy.This construalof
autonomythus dictates an indeterministicinterpretationof alternative
possibilities. Libertarianismcan also begin with an interpretationof
alternativepossibilitiesthatis incompatiblewiththe kind of necessitation
implied by determinism.In eithercase, the central problem for liber-
tarianismhas been thatitsinterpretation ofthefeaturesdo notcoherewith
one another-for example,thatitsinterpretation ofalternativepossibilities
of if
(freedom indifference,youlike)threatensto precludethesatisfaction of
the conditionof self-determination. For if,in a givencase, you mighthave
acted otherwise,givenall the factsobtainingat the time,includingall the
factsabout yourself,thereseems to be no roomforthe idea thatyou made
the difference, forthe idea of self-determination. Hence the problematic
judgment whatis bestforhimto do, else he wouldbe underthedetermination of someotherthan

himself,whichis wantofliberty.' (II. 2I. 48) It is alsoimplicitin Hobbes:'Libertyis theabsenceofall
theimpediments toactionthatarenotcontained inthenatureandintrinsical qualityoftheagent'(p. 47).
Whatis 'intrinsical'
totheselfcannotbeanimpediment totheself,andactiondetermined therebyis self-
determined.
3 To opposecompatibilism tolibertarianism is somewhat terminologically
inapt.We needa termthat
standsto'compatibilism'as 'libertarianism'standsto'incompatibilism'. To indicatewhatI taketobethe
basicinspirationofcompatibilism, theidea thatfreedom can be characterized
in termsof(potential)
changes(deterministic or not)in naturalobjects,I wouldpropose'naturalism'-except thattermis
alreadyusedin so manydifferent senses.Libertarians mightwellprotest thatthisproposalinsinuates
thatthereis something unnatural aboutlibertarian freedom.Then again,beforethe termbecame
usage,'naturalists'
established might haveprotested that'libertarianism'
insinuates
thatitsdetractors do
notbelievein liberty.

FreeActionandFreeWill I 47
appeal to a specialkirndofagent-causationf,
t,hatlokth
mustanadzcannot be -A
featureof the world.4The problemforlibertarianism, then,is to providea
coherentinterpretation of theseconditionstakentogether.
I wantto approachthe contemporary literatureby askinghow different
viewsoffreeagencyunitethetwofeaturesoffreedomin a singleconception.
I shall begin by discussingcontemporarycompatibilistaccounts of self-
determination.
(ii) Self-determination and hierarchical

motivation. Classical compatibilists
conceivedof freeagencyin termsof externalimpedimentsto the subject's
'will'. One prominentproblem withclassical workis its neglectof more
'internal'impediments.This neglectis due in part to the thinnessof the
notionofwill.Howevermuch one's behaviourmaydepend on one's will
conceivedas one's effective desireor preference-one's behaviourmaystill
seem against,or at least independentof, one's will in a more important
sense. Compulsive and addictive behaviour is hardly an instance of
autonomy.
The mostprevalentcurrentresponseto thissortofproblemsis to appeal
to hierarchicalmotivation.The mostinfluential essayofthissortis byHarry
Frankfurt(see Frankfurt(2)). Frankfurtstresses that the problem of
freedomof will is afterall a problem about the will, whereas classical
compatibilismsucceeds onlyin discussingproblemsabout freeaction.The
problemof freedomof will arises onlyforbeingsof a certainmotivational
complexity,who are capable of caringabout what desires move them to
action. Second-ordervolitions,as Frankfurtcalls them,are desires that
particularfirst-orderdesires be effectivein action (be one's will, in
Frankfurt's technicalsense). Freedomofwill,then,is freedom'to willwhat
[one] wantsto will,or to have thewill[one] wants'(ibid., p. go). Freedomof
willis exercised'in securingtheconformity of[one's] willto [one's] second-
ordervolitions'(ibid., p. go).
It is easy to see how the hierarchicalaccount can be used to enrich
classical compatibilism'sconstrualof self-determination. The selfis to be
understoodin terms of higher-ordervolitions;freedomis construedin
termsof a dependencyrelationbetweenone's first-order desiresand one's
higher-order volitions.Alternativepossibilitiesare thendefinedrelativeto
4 Kant was,of course,verymuchaliveto theseproblems. But Kant was notan agent-causation
theorist in thesenseofChisholmandTaylor.(See PartIII, below.)Agent-causation is thought ofas a
formofcausationin nature.For Kant,theproblemis thatwe arecommitted toan accountofnaturein
whichthereis no roomforagent-causation. Like the compatibilists,
he thoughtthatfreedomis
compatible withnatureas a deterministicsystemofeventsand changes.Like libertarians, he thought
thatfreedom cannotbe characterizedin termsofdeterministicchangesamongnaturalobjects.Thatis,
herejected 'naturalism'
(inthesenseofnote3) as a 'wretchedsubterfuge',
givingus merely the'freedom
ofa turnspit'. Hencetheantinomy requiresus tothinkofourselvesas beingswhotranscend nature.
Thatitis notdeterminism as suchthatis threatening
tofreeagency,
butsomething else,'mechanism',
or'objectivism' or(in anothersense)'naturalism',see NagelandC. Taylor;alsoAlbritton andWatson
I regret
((0), Introduction). thatI haven'ttimetoexplorethisquestionfurther here.

148 Gary Watson
higher-ordervolitions.As before,the account of alternativepossibilities

fallsout of the accountof self-determination.
(That is not to say thatthe satisfactionofthe latterconditionentailsthe
satisfactionof the former,but onlythatthereis a generalconnection.In a
case of 'over-determination'of one's first-orderdesire, both by one's
higher-ordervolition and by, say, a severe compulsion or phobia, the
connectionwillnothold. That desire(to takethedrugs)would be one's will
even if one had a contraryhigher-ordervolition,and even if it were not
compulsive. In this kind of case, Frankfurtthinksthe agent is morally
responsibleeven thoughshe could nothave done otherwise.She acts freely
even thoughshe could not have been otherwisemotivated.)5
Hierarchicalaccountsdo a betterjob withcompulsionand phobias than
do the classical conceptions;but, as accounts of self-determination, they
remainseriouslydefectivein at leasttwoways.6The firstproblemconcerns
the source of one's higher-order volitions.For all thisaccounttellsus, the
person's higher-orderpreferencemay be the result of brainwashing,or
severe conditioningof the kind which is plainly incompatible with
autonomy.This is of coursea standardproblemforcompatibilismand the
hierarchicalversionmerelymovesit up a level. I shall returnto it later.
The seconddeficiency is less obvious;itconcernsthenotionof'identifica-
tion'thatis at workin Frankfurt's theory.This notionis relevantto freedom
in the followingway. Somethingcan be intelligibly seen as an impediment
onlyif it is seen as in some way externalto the self;'externality'does not
mean outsidethe body. The Hobbesean accountcan be extendedthisfar,
but it thinks of desire as delineatingthe bounds of the self, thereby
overlookingthefactthatdesirecan itselfbe seen as impedimental.This fact
requires a richer conception of the self than classical compatibilism
provides.
Hierarchicalaccounts can be understoodas responsesto this problem.
The boundariesoftheselfarenotcoterminouswithdesire,butare drawnby
I See Frankfurt (i); andalso vanInwagen (2), andFischer(i), forcriticaldiscussions.

I shouldsayFrankfurt's ownattitude towardcompatibilism is notexactlyclear.Thereis a wayof
reading thecondition thata personbe 'freeeithertomakethatdesirehiswillortomakesomeotherfirst-
orderdesirehiswillinstead'in a waythatis notcapturedbythedependency analysis,
andhe nowhere
explicitlysaysthatthatanalysisis sufficient as wellas necessaryforfreewill.Andhealsosaysthatitis a
'vexedquestion'whatitmeanstosaythatsomeone'couldhavedoneotherwise thantoconstitute hiswill
as he did' ((2), p. 94), suggesting thatthedependency analysisis notsufficient.He does saythathis
conception offreewill'appearstobe neutral withregardtotheproblem ofdeterminism'(p. 95),butitis
notclearwhether he means'neutralwithregardtodeterminism' or'neutralwithregardtothequestion
ofwhether determinism is compatible withfreewill'.Forhegoesontoconsider'theproposition thatis
determined, ineluctably and by forcesbeyondtheircontrol,thatcertainpeoplehavefreewill,and
othersdo not'(ibid.,p. 95). But thequestionofcompatibilism is notwhether thepossessionoffree
willcanbe determined butwhether itsexercisecan.His discussion ofChisholm, however,doesseemto
expressanallegiance tocompatibilism. In anycase,itisnotclearthatFrankfurt isa 'conditionalist'
inthe
sensediscussedin PartII below.
6 See Dworkin (i), Holstrom, Lehrer(4), Neely,Shatz,Thalberg,and D. Zimmerman, forvarious
formulations andcriticisms ofhierarchicalaccounts.

FreeActionandFreeWill 149
higher-order volitions.What it is to regarda desire as externalis to have

a contraryhigher-ordervolition concerningit. When one's conduct is
dominatedbythisstandpoint,one has trueself-determination. But just as it
is possibleto regardone's appetitesas external,so it is possibleto regarda
given higher-ordervolition.This may not be thoughtto be a problem,
because a higher-order volitioncan be so regarded,it mightbe said, only
fromthe standpointof a yethigher-order volition.It is the highest-order
volitionthatis decisive.
The problemwiththis responseis not thatthereis a regressiveascent
up the hierarchy,or that people are not that complex, but simplythat
higher-ordervolitionsare just, afterall, desires,and nothingabout their
level gives themany special authoritywithrespectto externality.If they
have that authoritytheyare givenit by somethingelse. To have signifi-
cance, the hierarchymust be groundedin somethingelse that precludes
externality.
and evaluation.In the past, I believedthatthe notionof

(iii) Identification
an evaluationalstandpointcould do this job; that the hierarchymust be
groundedin the subject's evaluations,or conceptionof the good, and this
notionwould sufficeto definetherelevant(necessarilyinternal)standpoint.
To be alienatedfromone's conductor desiresis to see themas unworthyor
in some otherway bad. What gives the appeal to higher-ordervolitions
whateverplausibilityit has is thathigher-order volitionscharacteristically
are groundedin one's conceptionof a worthwhileway to live. When and
onlywhen higher-order volitionsare so groundedare theyany more than
meredesires.
To dissociateoneselffrom theendsandprinciples
thatconstitute
one'sevaluational
system is todisclaimorrepudiate them,andanyendsandprinciples so disclaimed
(self-deceptionaside)ceasetobe constitutive
ofone'sevaluational
system.One can
dissociateoneselffromone setofendsor principles onlyfromthestandpoint of
another suchsetthatonedoesnotdisclaim.(Watson(i), p. io6).
The explanatorilyprior notion,then, is that of evaluation,ratherthan
higher-orderdesire. Only evaluations can give one reasons to oppose
desires,and when and only when agents' behaviourexpresses
first-order
theirevaluationsaretheysourcesand 'authors'of(because they'authorized')
theirbehaviour.7
7 Frankfurt identifies
higher-order volitions
withevaluationsin(2), p. 89,n. 6. Thus hemaybe seen
thereas acceptingthe evaluationalaccountof identification and offering a particularanalysisof
evaluation.
In (4), Frankfurt writes:'As fora person'ssecond-ordervolitionsthemselves, itis impossible forhim
to be a passivebystander to them. . . They constitutehis activity-i.e.his beingactiveratherthan
passive-and thequestionofwhether ornothe identifies
himself withthemcannotarise.It makesno
sensetoaskwhether someoneidentifies himselfwithhisidentification ofhimself . . .' (p. I2I). Myview,
then,is this.Ifsecond-order arejustdesireswiththespecified
volitions content,thisis a falseaccountof
identification.If theyarenot,iftheyaresuchdesiresplussomething else,thenthehierarchical account

150 GaryWatson
In 'Free Agency' I wished to reject a Humean conceptionof desire,

reason, and evaluation that was common to the hierarchicalview and
classicalcompatibilism:valuingcannotbe reducedto desiring(at anylevel).
While I stillwishto maintaina non-Humeanview,it now seemsto me that
the picturepresentedthereis altogethertoo rationalistic.For one thing,it
conflatesvaluing with judging good. Notoriously,judging good has no
invariableconnectionwithmotivation,and one can fail to 'identify'with
one's evaluationaljudgements.One can in an importantsense failto value
what one judges valuable. But even if this conflationis rectifiedby
construingvaluingas caringabout somethingbecause (in as much as) it is
deemed to be valuable, what one values in a particularcase may not be
sanctionedby a more generalevaluationalstandpointthat one would be
preparedto accept.Whenitcomesrightdownto it,I mightfully'embrace'a
courseofactionI do notjudge best;itmaynotbe thoughtbest,but is fun,or
thrilling;one lovesdoingit,and it's too bad it's notalso thebestthingto do,
but one goes forit withoutcompunction.Perhaps in such a case one must
see thisthrillingthingas good,mustvalue it;but,again,one needn'tsee itas
expressingor even conformingto a general standpointone would be
preparedto defend.One maythinkit is afterall rathermindless,or vulgar,
or demeaning,but when it comes down to it, one is not (as) interestedin
that.
Call suchcases,ifyoulike,perversecases. The pointis thatperversecases
are plainlyneithercases of compulsionnor weaknessof will.8There is no
estrangement here. One's will is fullybehindwhatone does.9 Of course,a
person's evaluational systemmightbe definedjust in termsof what that
persondoes, withoutregret,whenit comes rightdownto it,but thatwould
be to giveup on the explanationof identification by evaluation.Justas the
hierarchicalaccountendsup presupposingratherthanexplainingthenotion
of identification,evaluationwould now do no explanatorywork.
We are leftwitha ratherelusivenotionof identification and therebyan
has notafterall givenus an accountofidentification; moreover, thereis no reasonto thinkthatsuch

identification is necessarily higher-order.
In (5), Frankfurt appearstoacknowledge theinadequacies ofthehierarchical view.
8 I recognized thispointinWatson(2), p. 327,n. 3, butI failedtofaceup tothedifficulties itcreates
forthedichotomy implicitin'FreeAgency':thateither one'sactionsexpressone'sevaluational system or
theydo notexpressthe'self'.
9 A further difficulty thatmustbe facedconcernstheinterpretation ofintentional actionin casesof
compulsion andweakness ofwill.To ensurethatsuchagentsarecorrectly saidto be actingcontrary to
theirwills,onehastosaythattheydo not'endorse'theirownactions.Buttotheextent towhichthisisso,
it maybe harderto see thebehaviour in questionas intentionalat all. It beginsto looklikea case of
automatism inwhichtheagent'swillis bypassedaltogether. In whatsenseis itintentional? If oneviews
intentions as Davidsonseesthem(see(3)), as evaluations, theproblem is particularlyacute.Forthenthe
agentwillbe actingin accordance withherorhisjudgement ofwhatis mostdesirable.Combining the
evaluational accountof intention withtheendorsement viewresultsin a case of splitmind,or will,
something thatlooksverydifferent fromweakness ofwill.(One problemwithDavidson'streatment of
'incontinence' in(i) is thatitcountstheperverse
caseas weakness ofwill.)See Bratman fordiscussionof
Davidsonon intention.

FreeActionandFreeWill I5I
elusivenotionofself-determination.
10The pictureofidentification
as some
kindof bruteself-assertion
seems totallyunsatisfactory,
but I have no idea
whatan illuminatingaccountmightbe.11
(iv) Brave New Worldcases. Difficultieswiththe conceptof identification

are everyone'sproblem; theyhave no particularbearing on the issue of
compatibilism.But the other,more conspicuousproblemwe noted with
hierarchicalaccountsdoes seemto revealan inherentdifficulty fortheentire
spectrumofcompatibilisttheories.Again,thisis theproblemoftheorigins
ofone's 'will', howeverthatis to be understood.These theoriessaynothing
to rule out the possibilitythatone's evaluations,or higher-order volitions
(or brute acts of identification) are merelythe productsof conditioning,
manipulation,or brainwashing.The conditionsoffreeagencysuggestedby
thesetheoriescould be satisfiedby citizensoftheBrave New World.While
thesetheoriesmayhave made some headwaywiththeproblemsofcompul-
sions and the like, the problemsposed by these cases require a different
treatmentaltogether.Despite significant differencesamong them,I shall,
forthe sake of brevity,call theseBrave New World cases.
One questionis whetherfurther conditionscan be placed on freeagency
thatwillplausiblyexplainBrave New Worldcases and also be acceptableto
compatibilism.On one natural diagnosis of the problem, those further
conditionsclearlywill not be. What is threateningin Brave New World
cases, it appears,is thatthe citizenshave no controlover their'identifica-
tions'. And they have no controlover this because those are caused by
conditionsover which theyhave no control.But that is universallyso if
determinism is true.
Two responsesto such cases can be foundin theliterature.One response
is to locate the problemin the interpersonalfeaturesof the cases, features
whichare not,ofcourse,involvedin all deterministic explanations.What is
crucialto the cases, it is said, is thatthe individualsare manipulatedand
coerced. The incompatibilist'smistake is to confuse causation with
constraint.As A. J. Ayerputs it, 'It is not whenmyactionhas anycause at
all, but onlywhenit has a special sortof cause thatit is reckonednot to be
free.'12And herewhatis special is causationby humanagents.
So we have two explanationsof the cases: (a) theyinvolvedeterministic
explanationsoftheindividual'schoices,decisionsor values;(b) theyinvolve
causationby otheragentsor institutions.Explanation(b) is surelya poor
one. In thecase ofexternalconstraints, we don't thinkthathumanoriginis
relevantin itself.My freedomto dance is equallyimpairedwhethermylegs
are paralysedby organicdiseaseor shackledbyhumanhands.13 Whatneeds
10
See Piperforan interesting
discussion
ofthisissue.
" Perhapsa lookat thenotionof identificationas it figures
in psychoanalyticwritingwouldbe
helpful;
although mycursoryreadingoftheliterature
suggeststhatthenotionthereis in needofmuch
explanationas well.
12
Ayer,p. 2I. 13
ThispointiswellmadebyKane.

152 Gary Watson
explanationis thattheBrave New Worldindividualsare impairedin certain

ways.It is a mistaketo thinkthatit matterswhetherthisimpairmenthas a
naturalor humanorigin.In fact,since compatibilistsare committedto the
possibilitythat completelydeterministicprocesses are compatible with
unimpairedfree agency, they are committedto the irrelevanceof this
distinction.For conceivablyanysuch processcould be initiatedbya human
or super-humanagent.
For some philosophers,this commitmentis sufficient to refutecom-
patibilism.For whatitamountsto,theysuppose,is acceptingthepossibility
thatfreeagentsare underthe controlof a 'demonicneurologist'.
Considerthefrequently discussedcase of thedemonicneurologist whodirectly
manipulates a person'sbrainto induceall his desires,beliefs,and decisions.
(Fischer(i), p. 37.)
But itis crucialto ask whatis beingimaginedhere,and whethertheshockto
ourintuitionsis notinducedbyirrelevant featuresofthecase. Does itmatter
howthe'demonicneurologist'goes abouthis business?We shouldreflecton
Daniel Dennett's parodyof thisexample:
Considerthe infrequently discussedcase of the eloquentphilosopherwho
indirectly
manipulates a person'sbrainby bombarding his ears withwordsof
ravishing
clarity anda hostofpersuasively
presented
reasons,thereby inducing
all
hisdesires,beliefsanddecisions.
Or:
caseofthewell-informed
thedelightful truthful
oraclewhoindirectly a
manipulates
person'sbrainbybombarding hisearswithlucidandaccuratewarnings,madeall
bythecitationofall theevidencein theirfavorand a frank
themoreirresistible
accountoftheentireevidence-gatheringoperation.
(Dennett,p. 64.)
Dennett'spointsuggeststhesecondcompatibilistresponse.The subjectsin
theBrave New Worldcases lackfreedomnotbecause theirdecisionscan be
deterministicallyexplained,nor because theyare caused by humanagents,
but because theirevaluationaland volitionaland othercognitivefaculties
have been impairedin certainways.The crucialthingabout theirsituation
is thattheyare incapableofeffectively envisagingor seeingthesignificance
ofcertainalternatives, ofreflecting
on themselvesand on theoriginsoftheir
motivations,of comprehendingor respondingto relevanttheoreticaland
evaluationalcriteria.14
The themeof reflectiveevaluationhas been particularlystressedin the
writingsofStuartHampshire.15 To some extent,we do have thecapacityto
standback fromour attachmentsand decisions,and to reconsiderthemin
Forsomerelevant
14
discussion,seeDworkin(2), GertandDuggin,Glover,Greenspan,andYoung
(i)and(2).
15 'It is thispower[ofreflection] . . . whentheyspeakofthekindof
to whichmenare referring
freedom whichonlyhumanbeings... enjoy,andwhichtheycanstilldevelopandexploit.'(Hampshire
(4),p. 8i). See alsoHampshire(i) and(3).

Free Actionand Free Will 153
view of a fullerknowledgeof theircauses and influences.This is not to be

picturedmerelyas ascending a hierarchy,of affirming the last order of
desire.The reflectivestandpointextendshorizontally to
as wellas vertically,
see what can be sustained in the light of fuller information.Certain
information, ofthekindfamiliarto psychoanalytic theory,orofthekindthat
is conspicuous to observers in Brave New World cases, debunks our
ordinaryunderstandingof ourselves,or implies certainimpairmentsof
practicalthoughtand desire.
These pointsare relevantto freedombecause theyare relevantto self-
determinationand control. It is part of our idea of autonomythat the
fundamental determinants of our behaviourare ones thatwe could endorse
withoutdelusion.Furthermore, reflective
evaluationis nota practicallyidle
standpoint,but bears upon control.The exerciseof thiscapacitycan affect
the determinantsof one's behaviour. For the recognitionthat some
attachment is anchoredin anxiety,say,can alteritsmotivationalefficacy and
affectthe characterof one's identifications.
The compatibilists'thesis,then,is thatthereis no reasonto suppose that
the presence of delusion or impairmentof this sort is implied by
deterministic explanationsas such. On thispointtheyseem to right.They
also hold of course thatdeterministic explanationsentailnothingelse that
conflictswithfreedom.Whetherare rightabout thisis the topic ofPart II.
II Alternative
possibilities
... judgethenwhata pretty kindoflibertyitiswhichismaintained
byT. H., sucha
liberty as is in littlechildrenbeforetheyhavetheuse ofreason,beforetheycan
consultordeliberate ofanything.Is thisnota childish andsucha liberty
liberty; as
is in brutebeasts?(BishopBramhall, p. 43.)
Hobbes,Locke,Hume,Moore,Schlick,Ayer,Stevenson,anda hostofothershave
donewhatcanbe done,oroughtevertohavebeenneeded,toremovetheconfusions
thatcanmakedeterminism seemtofrustrate
freedom.
(Davidson(2), p. 63.)
(v) Theambiguity of'can'. The discussionofthelastsectionwas devotedto
the followingreasoning:our viewsabout Brave New World cases, and the
like, commitus to criteriafor freedomthat could not be satisfiedin a
deterministic world.Because it focusesupon ourintuitionsabout particular
cases, this mightbe called a 'bottom-up'argumentforincompatibilism.
Whatevertheplausibilityofthisbottom-upargument, top-downarguments
whichdeduce incompatibilism fromgeneralprinciplespresentedas self-
evident-have seemed to many verycompelling.These argumentshave
centredon the interpretation of the conditionof alternativepossibilities.
In thispart,I shall reviewthesearguments.
As I notedearlier,the compatibilisttreatment ofalternativepossibilities
usuallyis a consequenceof its view of self-determination.Once autonomy
is characterizedin termsofthenotionoftherelevantnotionoftheself(and

154 Gary Watson
this is refinedto meet the Brave New World cases), then alternative
possibilitiesare definedby whatis dependenton the self,thatis, upon the
will. The resultis some kindof conditionalaccountof 'can'. 16
Two points about such accounts are obvious fromthe outset. First,
compatibilismwill insistthatthereare different notionsof possibility(or
differentsenses of 'possibility'),and that the notion picked out by a
conditionalaccount is the one relevantto freeagency.The second point
is that a conditionalanalysiscannot (withoutvicious regress)be applied
to the relevantnotion of 'will', so that in an importantsense, no com-
patibilistaccountof 'freewill can be given.I will turnto the second point
lateron.
If determinism is true,thenclearly,in somesense,thereareno alternative
possibilities.Relativeto the laws of natureand antecedentconditions,it is
notpossiblethatone does anythingbut whatone does. Compatibilistsmust
dismiss this sense as irrelevantto freeagency,and oftentheyclaim that
incompatibilist argumentstradeon ambiguitiesof 'can' or 'possible'.
Some philosophersregardtheseclaimsto ambiguityas ad hoc,as having
no forceindependentof some programmeto make determinismsafe for
human freedom.But this claim should be acknowledgedfromthe start.
Conditionaliststake themselvesto be givingan account of such ordinary
contextsas 'S is able to walkout oftheroom'.Such a sentencemightindeed
be trueeven thoughthereis no possibilitythatS will do so. For example,
supposeS has no interest, concern,orreasonto walkoutoftheroom.In that
case, it may well be truethatthereis no possibilitythatS will do so, even
thoughS is perfectly able to do so. This pointdoes not ofcoursesupporta
conditionalanalysis,but it does permitus to ask whetherthesensein which
determinism entailstheabsence of alternativepossibilitiesis a sense thatis
relevantto the interpretation of such sentences.
Furthermore, the exampleshowsthatthe ordinarynotionofabilityis in
some way relativeto attributionsof desireor will. It is simplya misuse of
'able to' to say: 'S is unable to leave theroombecause he doesn'twantto (or
has no reason to).' This gives some initial plausibilityto the idea that
attributions ofabilitiesand powersofactionareindependentofattributions
of 'will'.17
One can be drawn to a conditionalanalysis,not out of adherenceto a
programme,but because it can seemto accommodatethesepoints.Further,
the notionpicked out by a conditionalanalysisis arguablyof considerable
practicaland ethicalinterest.If to learnabout whatsomeoneis able to do is
to learn about what depends upon the person's will, then to learn that
someone was able to do what was leftundone will be to learn something
about the person'sactual will.
16 Not all compatibilists
areconditionalists. changeshismind
See Lehrer(i) and(3): he apparently
in (4); andDavidson(2).
17 See Chapteri ofHampshire (2).

(vi) The consequenceargument.Before turning to some criticismsof

conditionalanalyses,I wantto considerwhatseemsto be themostpowerful,
top-downargumentfor incompatibilism.For it has been said that this
argumentis sound even ifconditionalismis correct.This argumentis well
put by Petervan Inwagen:
Ifdeterminism is true,thenouractsaretheconsequences ofthelawsofnatureand
eventsintheremotepast.Butitis notup tous whatwenton beforewewereborn,
andneitherisitup tous whatthelawsofnatureare.Therefore, theconsequences of
thesethings(including ourpresentacts)arenotup tous. (Van Inwagen(5), p. i6.)
The Consequence Argument,as van Inwagencalls it,can be formulatedin
termsof 'able to' in the followingway. Suppose you are movingyourleft
handat themoment.If determinism is true,thatyourhand is moving(M) is
entailedbythelaws ofnature(L) togetherwitha statementoftheconditions
ofnaturepriorto yourexistence(P). You are unable to changethepast;you
are unable to breakthe laws of nature;thereforeyou are unable (and never
have been able) to avoid the factthatyourhand is movingat the moment.
It will be convenientto set out the premisesin thisway.
(I) (L&P)-?M
(2) If((L & P) -> M), and you can falsify'M', thenyou can falsify'(L &P)'
'L'
(3) You cannotfalsify
(4) You cannot 'P'
falsify
(5) Thereforeyou cannotfalsify'M'
From thisit clearlyfollowsthatyouare unable to refrainfrommovingyour
hand.18
This argumentis superiorto traditionaltop-downargumentsin several
respects. Traditional formulationsoftenrely upon the identificationof
determinism withthedoctrinethateveryeventor stateofaffairs is caused by
some set of antecedenteventsor statesof affairs.But it is not obvious that
causation itself involves the kind of necessitationthat is required for
incompatibilism.Ayer, for example, thinks of causation in terms of
'invariablefactualcorrelation'(p. 22). The argumentforincompatibilism
cannoteven get startedwiththisconceptionof determinism, since nothing
willfollowfromsuch correlationsabout whatis possible.The same goes for
formulations in termsofcomplete(in principle)predictability. There is no
reasonto thinkwe can't (ratherthansimplydon't) falsifyinvariablefactual
correlationsor true predictions.In the presentargument,this defectis
remediedby thenotionofa law ofnature.This notionis admittedlypoorly
understood,but whateverelse is trueof laws of nature,propositionswhich
laws express(unlikemerecorrelations)are notaccessibleto humanagency.
The same goes forpropositionsabout the past.
18 Forrecent
formulations
oftheConsequenceArgument,
see Ginet(I), (2), and(3), andLamb;and
alsovanInwagen(I).

I56 GaryWatson
Secondly,forthe same reason,the presentargumentseems to obviate

disputesabouttheconditionalanalysis;forevenon thataccount,itseems(or
had better seem),youare able neitherto breaka law ofnaturenorto alterthe
past.
Thirdly,the presentargumentmakes minimalassumptionsabout the
scope of determinism.All thatit requiresis physicaldeterminism. It should
thus disturb those philosopherswho are inclined to say that physical
determinismhas nothingto do withfreedombecause it has nothingto do
with action.19Even if laws of nature have nothingto say about people
movingtheirhands, as distinctfromhands moving,the conclusionof this
argument,generalized,is that we are powerlesswith regardto any facts
involvingthe movementsof our bodies. Surely the room leftforfreedom
would be distressingly small.
Nonetheless,recentworkhas cast seriousdoubt on the soundnessofthis
typeof argument.It has been arguedby David Lewis and othersthatthe
alleged consequencesof physicaldeterminism-thatone is able to refrain
frommovingone's hand onlyifone is able eitherto falsifylaws ofnatureor
true propositionsabout the past-is susceptibleto both a strongerand a
weakerreading,and that,as Lewis puts it, 'it is the strongversionthatis
incredibleand the weak versionthatis the consequence' (p. I13).20
What is incredibleis that you can do somethingthat falsifiesa law of
nature,or thatcauses a law of natureto be falsified;or thatyou can initiate
a causal sequence that alters the past. But these are not consequences
of physicaldeterminismtogetherwith the premisethat you are able to
refrainfromM. What is a consequence is the weakerclaim that you are
able to do somethingsuch that,if you did it, some propositionexpressed
by an actual law of nature,or by a descriptionof the actual past, would be
falsified.
Let's saythatan eventfalsifies a proposition,p, justin case, necessarily,if
thateventoccurs,p is false.
The strongversionofbeingable to falsifya proposition,then,is this:S is
able to falsifyp ifand onlyifS is able to do somethingsuch that,ifS does it,
p is falsifiedeitherby S's act or by somethingcaused by S's act.
The weak versionis this:S is able to falsify p just in case S is able to do
somethingsuch thatifS did it,p would be falsified.
Premise(2) iS obviously trueontheweakversion.Ifp-- q, thenanything
I do thatis sufficient to falsifyq will be sufficient p. Thus if I am
to falsify
able to do somethingthatfalsifiesq, I am able to do somethingthatfalsifies
p. But thisdoes not entailthatI have incrediblecausal powers. It implies
onlythatcertain(non-causal,'backtracking')counterfactuals are true,such
in
that the 'world' in which I refrained frommovingmy hand, the set of
'9 Forexample,MeldenandKenny;seeWarnockon thispoint.
20 his owncritiqueto theclaimaboutlaws.In additionto Lewis,mypresentation
Lewis confines
dependsalsoon Fischer(2) and(3); see also FoleyandLehrer(4).

propositionsexpressedby 'L & P' weredifferent. In thatworld,you do not

violatea law of natureor affectthe past.
If (2) is readin thestrongway,whatreasonis thereto suppose ittrue?On
a conditional analysis of 'can', where the conditionalsare understood
causally,(2) will not be true.For suppose thatifyou wereto willto refrain
frommovingyourhand, yourhand would, as a consequence,remainstill.
The factthatthe movementof yourhand is so dependentdoes not entail
thatL orP, ortheentailmentrelationexpressedin (i), is causallydependent
on yourwill. The evaluationof the consequence argumentis afterall not
independentof issues about conditionalism.
It may be urgedthatif (2) is not trueon a conditionalanalysis,thenso
muchtheworseforthataccount.None theless,on thestrongreading,itcan
hardlybe said that(2) is self-evident, as it would be on the weak reading.
Therefore,thereis room forthe reasonable suspicionthat the argument
tradeson thesedifferent readings.Further,some recentworkoffersgeneral
reasonsfordoubtingprinciplesofthe typethat(2) instantiates.21
totheconditional
(vii) Objections analysis:(a) Lehrer'sargument.
Let us turn
to criticismsof the conditional analyses themselves. In the current
one findstwogeneraltypesofcriticism.The firsttypeis, as faras
literature,
I know,new. It is due to Keith Lehrer (i). It seems to me unsound. The
second type captures objectionsthat have long been made against such
analyses,and, thoughit is inconclusive,it succeeds in raisingdeep issues
about the notionof freewill. I beginwiththe first.
A conditionalanalysishas the form:
(i) If C, thenS willM.
Lehrer claims that,for any such analysis,the followingwill be logically
possible:
(2) If not-C,thenS cannotM.
This claim is based on the considerationthat (i) is meant to be a causal
conditional,and causes are logicallyindependentof effects.But suppose:
(3) C doesnotobtain.
Then:(4) S cannotM.
So (i) cannotentail:(5) S can M.
G. E. M. Anscombe agrees with Lehrer. Alvin Goldman and Donald
Davidson disagree. Goldman (i) argues that if Lehrer's reasoningwere
sound,no dispositionalanalysisofsolubilitycould be correct.Since it is not
obviousthatsuch analysesare correct,thispointis inconclusive.Davidson
says:
responsetoLehreris simplythatifoneanalysessolubility
The correct bya causal
21 See Slote(2).

I58 GaryWatson
one can't consistently
conditional, allow thatwhatcauses dissolvingis also a
necessary
condition
ofsolubility,
sinceinthatcasetheonlysolublethings
wouldbe
dissolved.22
That is: ifone analysesabilitiesin thisway,all abilitieswould be exercised.

But does thattellagainsttheanalysisor againsttheadmissionof (2)? Lehrer
would say the former.
Lehrerillustrateshis contentionin thisway.
Supposethatunknown to myself, in mybrain,
a smallobjecthas beenimplanted
andthatwhenthebuttonis pushedbya demonicbeingwhoimplanted thisobject,I
becometemporarily
paralyzedandunabletoact.Mynotchoosing toperformanact
mightcausethebuttonto be pushedand thereby renderme unableto act. ((i),
P. 44.)
One of Anscombe's examplesis this: 'They will let you be burnton your
husband's funeralpyre,but onlyif you choose' ((2), p. i68). In the same
vein,we mightimaginea 'demonicbeing' who secretlylocksall yourdoors
wheneveryou are not tryingto open them,but unlocksthemthe moment
beforeyou make an attempt.Such constraints!
These examplesshouldarouseoursuspicionsabouttheargument.Such a
demonic being (hereafterDB) may suceed in falsifying your beliefsthat
certainnecessaryconditionsofyourprospectiveconductare present.But if
DB supposes thathe has therebydeluded you about yourabilitiesto move
yourhand (or open the door), theillusionis his.
It is naturalto suppose thatmyabilityto move myhand depends upon
thepresenceof certainneuralconnections,N. ClearlyN mayfailto obtain
even when it is true that if I willed to move my hand, I would do so
(intentionally).For DB mightdestroyor reconstitutethose connections
dependingon whatI will.Lehrer's pointcan be put in thisway:ifthereare
internalphysicalconditionsnecessaryforthe abilityto move my hand (as
theresurelyare),thenitis logicallypossibleforthoseconditionsto be absent
whenthe conditionalstatementis true.Thus the truthof thisstatementis
not sufficient forthe ability.
But I claimthatno conditionthatis dependentin thiswayupon thewill
could be a necessaryconditionoftheabilityto movemyhand. Is thisa priori
physiology?When N is absent,we may suppose,the hand is paralysed.To
saythatI am able to movemyhand whileN is absentis to saythatI am able
to move my hand whileparalysed!My claim is thatthe notionof paralysis
cannotbe understoodindependentlyof whatreliablydepends on the will.
Althoughmy moving my hand is causally dependent on N, where the
presenceofN is reliablyensuredbymywillingto movemyhand,itsabsence
is nota necessaryconditionofmyability.Whatis necessaryformyabilityis
thatN depend on mywill.
Nor is it the case thatduringthe timeN does not obtain,I am unable to
22
Davidson(2), noteto p. 70, addedin 1977.

movemyhand.For throughout thatinterval,itis truethatwhetherornotN

obtainsdependsupon mywill.To be sure: it can't be the case that(I move
my hand and N not obtain). And thatis one readingof 'I can't move my
hand whileN does notobtain'.But thatis notthe'can't' of'is able to', as we
have alreadyseen; furthermore, on thatreading,theinferenceto step (4) is
fallacious.
My objectiontotheargumentis notdue to a question-begging assumption
of the correctnessof conditionalism,but to a considerationof examples.
Suppose my abilityto call up the local pizza parlourdepends (as it surely
does) upon the existenceof certaintelephonecircuits(TC). Suppose that
DB is a telephonetechnician,who has access notonlyto myphonelinesbut
to mymind,and destroysTC wheneverI don't chooseto call,but restoresit
immediatelywheneverI do. Surely,it mightbe thought,I am unable to
phone the parlourwhile TC is destroyed.To thinkotherwiseis to think
I can makephone calls whenthe equipmentdoesn't work!
In both cases, it is clear that,ratherthan disablingme, DB has merely
added a causal complexityto myability.(Of course,he couldhave disabled
me by not restoringTC (or N), but he didn't. That factthat I am in his
controlin this way may be a cause forresentment-he has no business
playingaroundwithmyneuralor telephoneconnections-but ifhe doesn't
exercisethatcontrol,he doesn't disable me.)
It is worthasking(see Dennett) what role is played by the assumption
thattheinterfering agentis demonic.Imagineinsteada guardianangel(GA).
The phonecompanyhas deactivatedTC because I haven'tpaid mybill. GA
activatesTC onlywhen I wishto phone out. The factsare thesame: I shall
succeed in callingout onlyif TC is on. But thatdoes not show that TC's
beingon is a necessaryconditionofmyabilityto do so. For whetheror not
TC is on is (thanksto GA) undermycontrol.When the phone systemwas
less automated, it was actually rather like that. Another agent, upon
'divining'my intentionsfromcertainsignalsat a switchboard,thereupon
activatedcertainswitches.
As it is withringingup the pizza parlour,so it is withmovingmyhand.
When C is a necessaryconditionof one's doing M, C is not a necessary
conditionofone's beingable to M ifthepresenceofC is reliablydependent
on one's will. A fortioriforthe case where C is willing.That may be a
causally necessaryconditionof one's doing M, but it cannot be such a
conditionof one's being able to M. As theseexamplesshow,thatmuch is
ensuredby theconceptof 'is able to'.
totheconditional
(viii) Objections analysis:(b) Chisholm's
argument.One gets
a differentargumentwhenitis supposedthatI am somehowpreventedfrom
willing. This supposition is pivotal to Roderick Chisholm's argument
against conditionalanalyses. At least since Bishop Bramhall replied to
Hobbes, conditionalanalyseshave seemed inadequate because theyseem

I6o Gary Watson
endemicallyincapableof givingsignificance to questionsabout freedomof

the will. This pointcould be developedin two different ways. It could be
grantedthatfreedomof actionis adequatelycapturedby some conditional
analysis,butthatfreedomofwillis not;and whatwe wantis not(merely)the
formerbut (mainly)the latter.Alternatively, it could be arguedthatsince
theconditionalanalysisis inadequateforfreedomofwill,itis inadequatefor
freedomof action.That is the thrustof Chisholm'sargument.
ChisholmarguesthatthepropositionthatS would have acted otherwise
if S had willed to act otherwisedoes not entail that S could have acted
otherwiseunlessS could have willedotherwise.For suppose thatS cannot
choose otherwiseand thatshe will do otherwiseonly if she chooses to do
otherwise.Then it followsthatS cannotdo otherwise.These suppositions
areconsistentwiththeconditionalanalysis;thusthatanalysisdoes notentail
thatS could have done otherwise(Chisholm(i)).
As Davidson pointsout, this argumentshows 'that the antecedentof a
causal conditionalthatattemptsto analyse"can" or "could" or "freeto"
mustnot contain,as its dominantverb,a verbof action,or any verbwhich
makessense ofthequestion,Can someonedo it?' ((2), p. 68.) It showsthat
whattheconditionalists areafter,and mustbe after,is a notionofabilitythat
is exercised only in intentionalaction. Any conditionalanalysis whose
antecedentemploysa verbof intentionalactionwill thus fail.By the same
token,Chisholm's objection will not hold against a conditionalanalysis
whoseverbis nota verbofintentionalaction.For theargumentcan thenbe
blockedat the premise:'S cannotv'. For thatpremisewill eithermake no
sense,or involvea different notionof 'cannot'.23
As faras it goes,thispointseemsright;but it does notgo farenough.For
the very thing that protects the analysis-namely, restrictingit to
intentionalaction-guarantees that it is too narrowto answer to many
philosophers'concernsabout freeagency,thoseconcernsthatare naturally
expressedas concernsaboutfreewill.Davidson concedesas much:'I do not
want to suggestthatthe natureof an agent's beliefsand desires,and the
questionhow he acquiredthem,areirrelevant to questionsofhow freehe,or
his actions,are. But these questionsare on a different and more sophisti-
cated levelfromthatof our presentdiscussion.'24It is preciselythesemore
'sophisticated' questions that Hobbes, and some other compatibilists,
dismisswhentheydismisstalkof freewill as 'absurd speech'.
The partiesto thisdisputeare both partlyrightand partlywrong.Both
partieshave tended,in different ways,to conflatequestionsoffreewilland
23
See Aunefora similarpoint.Reidanticipates
Chisholm'sargument: '. . . tosaythatwhatdepends
uponthewillis ina man'spower,butthewillisnotinhispower,is tosaythattheendisinhispower,but
themeansnecessary tothatendarenotinhispower,whichis a contradiction' (p. 329). The mistakeis to
thinkthatwillingsomething is a means.
is intensionwiththepassagequotedfromDavidsonatthebeginning
24 This concession ofthisPart.
Have the'hosts'ofwriters Davidsonmentions reallydoneall thatis neededto deal withthesemore
'sophisticated'
questions? Manydo notevenraisethem.

Free Actionand Free Will I 6i
freeaction.Incompatibilistshave done so by insistingthatwithoutfreewill

freedomat all. In thatrespecttheyare wrong.They
thereis no significant
are wrongto dismiss the notion picked out by conditionalistsas a mere
contrivancein the serviceof a compatibilistprogramme.For thatnotionis
(one of) ournotion(s).Clingingto thisinsight,conditionalistshave rightly
resistedtheattemptedcollapse.But conditionalists havegonewrongin their
characteristicclaim that that notionis the only significantone, and that
libertarianworriesabout free will can be dismissed as confusions.The
incompatibilistsshould concede this notion,for one can be a libertarian
about free will and a conditionalistabout abilityto act. For theirpart,
conditionalistsshould concede, as Davidson has, thatthereare questions
about freeagencythatcannotbe put in theseterms.
What thesequestionsare is the topic of Part III.
andfreewill
III Libertarianism
(ix) 'Free will? Both in ordinarylanguage and in currentphilosophical
literature,the use of the phrase 'free will' is a curious one. In common
parlance,the phraseis eitherencumberedwitha lot of nonsenselearnedat
Sunday School, or irrelevantto traditionalconcerns.As an exampleofthe
former,I happened to share a table some time ago with a high-ranking
officialof the Orange County (California)Republican Party.During the
conversation,his companionbemoaned her unsuccessfulcampaignto get
the City Council of Santa Ana to take action to amelioratethe plightof
homelesspeople in thatcity.With a sense of bewildermentand exaspera-
tion,she notedthatthe Cityhad been willingto fundsheltersfordogs and
catswhileit did nothingforpeople. The partyofficial was untroubled.'The
difference',he said, 'is thatpeople have freewill.' If freewillcan explainand
justifythe myriadplagues and miseriesthatmarkhuman history,thereby
justifying God's waysto mortals,surelyit can handle a bit ofdestitutionin
Santa Ana, California.
Ordinarylanguagehas moreinnocentusages.We speakof'actingofone's
own free will' in connectionwith coercion. If someone shows up for
inductionintothearmyonlyto avoid a jail term,thatis a paradigminstance
ofnotactingofone's own freewill.But thisusage has littleifanyconnection
withtraditionalconcernsfor freewill. What happens in these paradigm
cases is notthatthepersonhas no options,butthatcertainoptionsare made
prohibitivelyexpensive.But we do not speak of restrictionson freewill
whensuchcostsareconsequencesofnatural,ratherthanhuman,forces.It is
doubtfulthatthesourceofthecostshouldmatterto thequestionoffreewill.
So it is doubtfulthatone can findin theseordinarylocutionsa serioususe
forthe phrase'freewill'.25
25 (3) on coercion.
Butsee Slote(i) andFrankfurt

I62 GaryWatson
Turning to the currentphilosophicalliterature,one mightexpect the

phraseto springmost readilyto the lips of libertarianphilosophers,as it
once did. But, currently,the most common practice,by both parties,is
eitherto ignorethetermor to defineit in termsofability(or possibility)to
act, as though the word 'will' had no particularimportance.(See van
Inwagen(i) and (5), and RichardTaylor: 'The questionwhethermen have
"free will" is reallyonly the question whethermen ever act freely.No
specialconceptofthewillis in anywayneededto understandthatquestion'
(p. 264).)
This usage is curious,I say,because, despiteit,no one thinksthatbeing
unable to travelto distantgalaxiesis a restriction
on freewill;or conversely,
that the greaterabilities of Superman in these respectscorrespondto a
greaterfreedomof will. This anomalymay be explained in part by the
preoccupationofmuch ofthisliteraturewithdeterminism.If determinism
is incompatiblewithalternativepossibilitiesgenerally,theremayseemto be
littlereasonto discussthe specificcase ofalternativesforthewill. Perhaps,
as well,thereis a prevalentdistrustof talkabout the will at all.
Is there,then, a distinctivequestion about freewill? And what is it?
Notoriously,Hobbes denied that thereis any such question. Along with
many compatibilists,I had supposed that what made Hobbes's answer
notoriouswas thesuperficiality ofhisconceptionofimpediments;for,again,
thatconceptionoverlookedthefactthatone can findone's own desiresand
emotionsas impediments.It is easy to suppose thatthis neglectexplains
whya Hobbesean approachcan accountat mostforfreedomofaction,and
notforfreedomofwill;foritis easyto thinkthatfreewillcan be explainedin
termsof the absence of thesemore 'internal'obstacles.But thisthoughtis
mistakenin an importantway.26
To see this,recallthe pointin Part I thatthisHobbesean superficiality
can also be construedas a superficialityaboutthewill.One could satisfythe
Hobbesean criteriaand still be acting contraryto one's will. Hence, we
concluded,we shouldnotthinkofthewillin termsofappetiteand desire.It
follows,however,that the recognitionof such 'internal'impedimentsas
crudercompatibilismoverlookedwill not help us formulatea distinctive
questionoffreewill.For, howeverinternal,theseobstaclesare stillobstacles
in virtueoftheir(potentially)gettingin the wayof implementing one's will.
Therefore,howeverinternalin otherrespects,theyare stillexternalto the
will. They are impedimentsin virtueoftheirlimitationson the capacityto
effectone's will. In this respect,theirstatusis no differentfromboulders
and chains.They are notthemselvesconstraintson willing;theyaffectyour
abilityto getwhatyouwill,butnotyourwillingofit. It is onlythislastpoint
thatraisesa distinctivequestionabout freewill.
The questionabout freewillis a question,as Bramhallput it,about 'the
26 It wasAlbritton's
paperthatfirst
mademesee thispoint.

electivepower of the rationalwill' (p. 42); that is, the power of rational
beings to will one way ratherthan another,as alternativespresentthem-
selves.27No subtle discussionof internalobstacles will help us with this
question (thoughit will help us to understandthe relevantnotionof the
will). Even Frankfurt'sdiscussion,whichis unusual among compatibilist
writingin itsinsistenceon distinguishing freedomofactionfromfreedomof
will, is unhelpfulhere. For if we set aside his technicalnotionof will as
effective desire (which is afterall thoroughlyHobbesean), and
first-order
thinkof the will as one's higher-ordermotivations,then we can say that
Frankfurtgives us a betterunderstandingthan Hobbes of the efficacy of
will,but not of its freedom.
At the end of Part II, I suggested that it is a mistake for the in-
compatibiliststo deny that the conditionalistssucceed in identifyinga
notionthat is importantin our practice,and does not depend upon this
distinctnotionoffreedom.That denialdetractsattentionfromwhatto them
mustbe themostimportantissue: whatthispoweris, and whetherwe have
it. They can granta distinctnotionoffreedomof actionand stillinsistthat
that is not all the freedomwe want, or the most importantfreedom.
Freedomofactionis importantenough,theymaygrant,buttheywantto tie
what is special about human beings to this furtherpower; that is what
underwritesthe sense of human dignity.(Note Bramhall'sumbrageat the
Hobbesean picturein the passage quoted at the beginningofthispart;that
pictureis not merelywrongbut demeaning.)
It is far fromobvious what this furtherpower is. What is obvious,
however,is that,whateverit is, it is not somethingwhichcan be captured
by an impedimentmodel. It is this fact about it, I suspect, that leads
such an otherwiseuncartesianphilosopheras Rogers Albrittonto endorse
Descartes's view thatwe enjoyperfectfreedomofwill.28This breathtaking
opinionis widespreadamongdefendersoffreewill,eventhoughitis hardto
27
Cp. Reid:'Bytheliberty ofa moralagent,I understand a poweroverthedeterminations ofhisown
will'(p. 323). See Kane fortheinsistence on separating questionsoffreewillfromquestionsoffree
action.
28 This thought restson a consideration we havealreadyseen:that,whilethereare all too many
obstaclestoimplementing oreffecting ourwills,therecanbe no obstacletowillingitself.In thissense,
thewillcannotbe blocked.(CompareO'Shaughnessy: 'thewillitself
cannotbe paralysed',vol.2, p. 42.)
The truth behindthisthought is I thinkthis.The conceptofwilling is suchthatthereis nosuchthingas
failing towill;willingis necessarily successful.Butan obstacleis suchthatitblocksthepathtosuccess.
In thecaseofwilling, thereisnopath.Ratherwilling is 'goingforsomething', onthepath.There
starting
is roomforan obstaclebetweenwillinganditsobject,butno obstacletowillingitself.
Whether onethinks thistobetrue,trivially, becausewilling justistrying(andAlbritton saysthatthere
mightbe nothing to it),it does notfollowthatone cannotbe prevented fromwilling, notbyhaving
obstaclesplacedinthepath,butbyhavingone'swillpushedas itweretowardonepathoranother. So it
mightseemin casesofbrainwashing or hypnotism. Albritton findstheidea of unfreedom ofthewill
'inconceivable',and suspectshe couldhandleanyexamplestothecontrary; butitis significantthathe
doesnotconsider theseexamples.Perhapshewouldsayinsuchcasesthewillis notforcedbutbypassed
(as in hisexamplesofautomatism). But I don'tsee why.
ThomasReiddisagrees withthepurists. He findsthatfreewillis 'impaired orlost'byvicioushabits,
melancholy, madness,divineintervention ... (p. 326).

I64 Gary Watson
understand(as Albrittonhimselfemphasizes)how a realpowerin theworld

could be unlimited.Bernard Williams also notes that,on the traditional
conception,freewill is supposed to be an all or nothingaffair.And Aurel
Kolnai pointsoutthatthenotionin questionis notthenotionofa virtue,but
a presuppositionof both virtueand vice (which are consequences of the
exerciseof thispower). Unlike whatwe can say of self-control, we do not
say: 'So-and-so is a personof surpassingfreedomof will.' It is something
thatcomes simplywithconsciousnessand the possessionof a rationalwill.
Nor is it simplya matterof responsivenessto considerationsof practical
reason,since it is in virtueof freewill thatwe can rejectas well as comply
withitsdictates.(Hence manyoftheconsiderationswe mentionedearlierin
connectionwithBrave New World cases are not directlyrelevantto this
notion.)
If freewillmeansthecapacityto act irrationally, some willsay,it is nota
powerso muchas a liability,and itis farfromclearthatwe shouldwantit; it
seemsinsteada weaknessthatwe would be well rid of. Now, some ofus do
notwantit,perhaps.But whetheritis a sourceofdignityor dread(and why
notboth?),perhapswe haveitjustthesame. In anycase,manyofus havethe
notion.
As fordignity,it is arguablethatmoralconceptionsof a seriousKantian
bentrequirepowerswhichanswerto thisdescription.If we have a use for
theidea thatwhatis morallysignificant about people is thattheyare 'ends-
in-themselves',wherethatis interpreted to mean thatwe have the capacity
to define('set') and pursue our own ends, thenmoralsignificance seems to
requirea seriousnotionof freewill.
(xi) Vagariesoflibertarianism. That libertarianconceptionsof freeagency

are obscureis news to no one.29Ratherthan simplyrepeatingthatcharge
here,I wantinsteadto explorewhythatobscurityseems ineliminable,and
to locate it withinthe scheme I introducedat the beginning.What is the
characteristic libertarianconceptionofthetwofeaturesoffreedomwe have
been discussing?
To be a libertarianis to interpret the conditionofalternativepossibilities
indeterministically. Different varietiesoflibertarianism
resultfromdifferent
ways of relatingthis conditionto that of self-determination. One variety
stemsfromthe thoughtthatin a deterministic worldthereis no room for
(true) self-determination. If the will is the product of culture and
physiology, thenthereis no roomfortheidea thattheagentis theauthorof
his or her will. On this account, the interpretation of the conditionof
alternativepossibilities(the negativecondition)resultsfromtheinterpreta-
tionofself-determination. The problemforthisaccountis to makesense of
29
See Broad,and also Bonjour,Goldman(2), Nagel,and Thalberg(i). For a partialdefenseof
'immanent causation',
see vanInwagen(3).

FreeActionandFreeWill I65
the positive conditionwithoutmetaphysicalextravagance.This type is

representedby agent-causationtheories.
Anothervarietytreatsthe indeterministic interpretation of alternative
possibilities as independent of the feature of self-determination, and
attemptsto interpret thelatterin metaphysically innocentways.In theend
thistypeoflibertarianism leavesitobscurehowtheadditionofthatnegative
conditionto themetaphysically innocentconditioncan be thesourceofthe
special value thatlibertariansare after,or how bothcould add up a positive
notionofpower.It appears,then,thatthatvalueand thatkindofcontrolcan
be securedonlyat the cost of metaphysicalextravagance.
Let me explainthispointin connectionwithan importantessaybyDavid
Wiggins. Wiggins argues for the indeterministic interpretation of alter-
nativepossibilitieson modal grounds(theConsequenceArgument).Noting
(as all agree)thatmereindetermination is insufficient
forascriptionsof free
agencyorresponsibility, he suggeststhatall thatis neededin additionis that
our biographiesunfold'non-deterministically but intelligibly'in termsof
our purposes, ends, and choices, that our behaviour be 'coherent and
intelligiblein the low-leveltermsof practicaldeliberation'.
. . . maybeall wereallyneedtoimagineorconceiveis a worldin which(a) thereis
somemacroscopic indeterminacy foundedin microscopic and (b)
indeterminacy,
an appreciable numberofthefreeactionsorpoliciesordeliberations ofindividual
agents,although theyarenotevenin principle hypothetico-deductively
derivable
fromantecedentconditions, can be such as to persuadeus to fittheminto
meaningful sequences.(p. 52.)
This interpretationof the positive condition seems insufficient. If the
condition of self-determination-namely,on this interpretation, teleo-
logical intelligibility-isnot by itselfsufficient forthe especiallyvaluable
formofpower,thentheadditionofindetermination willnotbringthatvalue
back in. If we knowof two agents,A and B, thatboth theirbehaviouris
teleologicallyintelligible,and so on, thenit is incredibleto suppose thatthe
additionalinformation thatdeterminismholds in A's worldbut not in B's
conferssome special value or dignityto B's life.For it impliesno special
powersforB. In whateverwayA is supposed to be powerless,B is as well,if
thatis the onlydifference betweenthem.
The onlyway to meetthisdifficulty, it would seem,is to strengthen the
conditionof self-determination. But no strengthening of that condition
whichis itselfcompatiblewithdeterminism willdo. Hence, thestructureof
an adequate libertarianaccountoffreedommustbe such thatthecondition
ofself-determination itselfentailsindeterminism. And thentheburdenwill
be to providean intelligibleinterpretation of thatcondition.30
(As for condition (a), does it matter how much macroscopic
30
This conditionwouldbe metby Wiggins'saccountif teleological
intelligibility
itselfrequired
indetermination.
See Watson(3), 'Introduction'.

I66 GaryWatson
indeterminacywe have?Is our freedomin directproportionto theextentof

this indeterminacy,
or is just a bit of it sufficient
forall the freedomwe
want?)
(xii) Theprerogativesofprimemoversunmoved.This structuralconditionis
satisfiedby agent-causationtheories.These theoriesare responsesto the
familiardilemma:mereindetermination seems to conflictwithfreeagency
and responsibility
because no one is responsiblefor'random' events;and
pre-determination also conflictswiththesethingsforfamiliarreasons.To
avoid thisdilemma,RoderickChisholmsays,'we mustmakesomewhatfar-
reachingassumptionsabout the selfand the agent'((I), p. 24), namelythat
wehavea prerogative
whichsomewouldattribute onlytoGod: eachofus,whenwe
act,is a primemoverunmoved.In doingwhatwe do, we causecertaineventsto
happen,andnothing-orno one-causes us to causethoseeventstohappen.((i),
p. 32.)
Hence: 'in one verystrictsense oftheterm,therecan be no scienceofman'
(ibid., p. 33).
To be a free and responsibleagent, I must, in acting on a purpose,
determinewhatpurpose,ifany,I act on (thatis,mywill),and thatprecludes
pre-determination by events and states of affairs.That, at least, is the
impressionone getsfromChisholm'searlierwork.His laterworksuggestsa
different line. The remarksquoted above-'In doingwhatwe do, we cause
certaineventsto happen,and nothing. .. causes us to cause thoseeventsto
happen'-can be interpreted in two differentways.Agent-causationcould
be identifiedwiththe relationindicatedin the firstpart of the sentence
personscausingcertaineventsto happen-whereas a second,independent
conditionis expressedby the second. That would be to say that agent-
causationdoes not itselfimplyindetermination.
This viewhas been explicitlyadoptedbyRichardTaylor,whothinksthat
an irreduciblenotion of agent-causationis involved in the veryidea of
acting.Actioninvolvesa relationbetweenan individualand an eventsuch
thattheindividualcauses theevent.To say,then,thatI movedmyhand is
to saythatI caused myhand to move. And thiscannotbe understoodsolely
in termsof event-causation.For 'if I caused somethingto happen, this
would seem to entail that it is false that any event,process,or state not
identicalwithmyselfshould be the cause of it' (p. i i I).
Taylor hastensto add thatmoreis needed forfreeaction.That I moved
myhand entailsthatthemotionofmyhand cannotbe completelyexplained
by antecedenteventsand statesof affairs.But thatfactis consistentwith
pre-determination, Taylor says,forI mightbe caused to move myhand
thatis, caused to cause myhandto move-by antecedentcircumstancesand
events. So while action itselfimplies event-indetermination, it does not
implythatthe actionitselfis undetermined.I am a freeagentjust in case I
was not caused to cause myarmto move.

The rootsofthisidea ofagent-causation aredifferent fromtherootsofthe

idea firstintroduced.Both requirea break in event-causation(or at least
event-necessitation-seeAnscombe (i)). But this idea derives fromthe
thoughtthatifI move myhand,no eventscan (completely)cause myhand
to move(since I am notidenticalwithanysetofsuchevents).The otheridea
comes insteadfroma problemabout freedomand autonomy.If the former
forthe latter,thenall actionwould be freeaction,and
idea were sufficient
spiders,iftheyare agentsat all, would have to be freeagents.(Might we be
primemoverswithoutbeingprimemoversunmoved?)
Chisholm seems to run these two notions togetherin the following
passage:
. . . ifthosebeliefsanddesiresin theparticular in whichhe happenedto
situation
havefoundhimself causedhimtodo justwhatit wasthatwe sayhe did do,then,
sincethey causedit,hewasunabletodo anything otherthanjustwhatitwasthathe
did do. It makesno difference whetherthe cause of the deed was internalor
external; ifthecausewas somestateor eventforwhichthemanhimself was not
responsible, thenhe wasnotresponsible forwhatwehavebeenmistakenly calling
his act. ((I), p. 25.)
On Taylor's view,thispassage confusesthe question of whethersomeone
acts (thatis, is a cause ofsomething)withthequestionofwhethersomeone
acted in freedom(thatis, was caused to act). And on any view,we wantto
distinguishbetweenactionand freeaction;we wantto allow forthe agency
ofspiders.It is ofcoursebaffling how instancesofagent-causationcould be
necessitatedby eventsand statesofaffairs,31 but thatis just a special case of
the general problem of how agent-causescan interactwith events at all
(withoutdoingso via changeswithinthe agent). If we could make sense of
the idea of agentsdetermining events,we could make sense of thembeing
determinedby them.
My purpose here is not to call attentionto these mysteries,which are
again no news to anyone, but to press the question about the relation
between the two featuresof freedomon a libertarianaccount. If the
condition of alternativepossibilitiesis held to be independent of the
condition of self-determination, then the account seems bound to fail.
Whetheragent-causationis definedin termsofthelatterconditionalone (as
Taylor does it) or in termsofthe conjunctionof independentconditionsof
indeterminacy and self-determination, the resultingview will not accom-
modatethe intuitionsthatmotivatethe account.
Considerspiders.As we normallythinkofthem,spidersare agents.Their
legs do not merelymove; theymove theirlegs in certainways,say, in the
pursuitofa fly(see Frankfurt (6)). Howevertheiragencyis to be analysed,it
is ridiculousto suppose thatspiderswould be freeagentsmerelyon account
31
Cp. M. Zimmerman: 'Supposethatdeterminism is true.On sucha supposition
itwouldseemthat
anyspecialtypeofcausationthatmightbe effectedbyagentswouldbe whollysuperfluous andhenceit
wouldseemthatthereis no reasonto believethatsuchcausationevertakesplace'(p. 21 I).

I68 GaryWatson
of satisfyingthe indeterminacy condition.(And forall we know,theydo

satisfythiscondition.)What (else) thenis lacking?
Chisholmconnectsagent-causationwiththe concept(s)of 'undertaking'
or 'endeavoring'. Agent-causationoccurs when an individual causally
contributesto something.That occurs if the individual'sundertakingto
do somethingcontributescausallyto something.But it also occurs merely
if an individualundertakessomething.For Chisholmstipulatesthat'If a
person undertakessomething,then he contributescausally to his under-
takingthatsomething'((2), p. 205), thoughnot in thiscase byundertaking
somethingelse.
Is a spideran agent-cause?Perhaps 'it lackstheequipmentnecessaryfor
undertakingor endeavoring'(p. 201, said of 'sub-atomic particles',not
spiders).No doubt'undertaking'and 'endeavoring'seemnotquite theright
wordsforspiders.But we do thinkofspidersas trying to getto a fly.And I
thinkthatwherea seriousnotionofactionis applicable,so is thatoftrying. 32
And the 'concept in question', Chisholmsays,'is sometimesexpressedby
means of the word "trying"' (ibid., p. 201).
So mightspidersbe agent-causesin Chisholm'ssense?Perhapswe findit
absurdto thinkthatspiderscausallycontributeto their'tryings'.But evenif
theydid, that is not sufficient forfreeagency.Free agency requires,for
Chisholm, that the agent be 'free to undertake' what the agent does
undertake,and thismeansthat'thereare no sufficient causal conditions'for
undertakingsomethingor not (ibid., p. 202). Perhaps spidersfail(ever) to
meetthiscondition.
I am quite preparedto entertainthe thoughtthat we mightbe wrong
about spiders,to entertainthethoughtthatspidersare freeagents.Afterall,
quite generallyour ordinaryconceptions of the other animals are ill-
founded.And I don't knowwhetherspidersmeetthisconditionor not. (I
doubt whethereven entomologistsknowthis.)But whatI am notprepared
to entertainis the claim that indetermination would sufficeto make the
exercise of such agency as spiders enjoy free agency. If the difference
betweenan agent-causein the narrower(Taylorean) sense, and a prime
moverunmoved,is thatthe latter'smovingsare undetermined,then this
difference will not itselfbe a differencein the agents' powers.This is the
old problemagain.
Ordinarilywe thinkthatfreeagency(and 'having a choice') requiresa
psychologicalcomplexityof the kind that the spider is not presumed to
possess.Whatis required is atleast,inBramhall's phrase,the'rational will'.
Whilethespidermovesitslimbsabouthereand there,and guidesthose
movements,it has no choicewhether to guidethem.Having
and whither
such a choice requiresbeing a chooser,and thatrequirescertaincognitive
32 On seeO'Shaughnessy,
'trying', andHornsby.O'Shaughnessy withthe'will'.One of
linkstrying
themoreegregious omissionsofthepresent ofthenotionofthewill,as
essayis itslackofanexamination
explanation.
wellas ofthegeneraltopicofteleological

capacities,at a minimum,the capacityto entertain,and be presentedwith,

alternativesfor selection. This much is neutral with respect to liber-
tarianism.The distinctivelylibertarianthoughtis that I must have the
power to determinewhich,among the alternativesI have the capacityto
entertain,I shall will (undertake,tryfor,. . .). All thatis clear about this
poweris thatitcannotbe securedmerelybytheindeterminist interpretation
of alternativepossibilities.
Libertarianismis obscure.But as Wigginssuggests,thatchargemaybe as
mucha chargeagainstsome centralfeaturesofour self-conception as it is a
chargeagainstthe philosophiesthatgo by thisname.
(xii) Conclusion.Althoughthe termsof the debate have been considerably

sharpened,itis fairto saythatthebasic issue betweenHobbes and Bramhall
stilllives (if you call thatliving).That is discouraging,but not altogether
surprising.The issue intersectswith issues about the mind, about
explanation,about naturalism,about morality;and controversyin these
areas is controversy about a properand defensibleself-image.It is hard to
saywherethisargumentwillgo, or evenwhereitshouldgo. Yet throughthe
dustofthreecenturiesofdebate,I thinkI discernsome writingon thewall:
thatifno amountor kindofcognitiveand volitionalcapacityand complexity
thatcould obtainin a deterministic worldwill sufficeforfreeagency,then
simplyadding the requirementof indetermination will not sufficeeither.
That means thateitherfreeagencyis ineffable,freeagency(or some sig-
nificantpartof our conceptionof freeagency)is illusory,or compatibilism
is true.Take yourpick (if you can).33
DepartmentofPhilosophy GARY WATSON

University
ofCalifornia
Irvine
California
927I7
U.S.A.
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Free Action and Free Will

This content downloaded from 193.255.248.150 on Sun, 18 Jan 2015 11:13:02 AM

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The real dispute, then and now, is not whetherfreedomis to be

judgment whatis bestforhimto do, else he wouldbe underthedetermination of someotherthan

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(ii) Self-determination and hierarchical

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higher-ordervolitions.As before,the account of alternativepossibilities

I See Frankfurt (i); andalso vanInwagen (2), andFischer(i), forcriticaldiscussions.

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higher-order volitions.What it is to regarda desire as externalis to have

and evaluation.In the past, I believedthatthe notionof

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In 'Free Agency' I wished to reject a Humean conceptionof desire,

has notafterall givenus an accountofidentification; moreover, thereis no reasonto thinkthatsuch

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(iv) Brave New Worldcases. Difficultieswiththe conceptof identification

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explanationis thattheBrave New Worldindividualsare impairedin certain

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view of a fullerknowledgeof theircauses and influences.This is not to be

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(vi) The consequenceargument.Before turning to some criticismsof

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Secondly,forthe same reason,the presentargumentseems to obviate

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propositionsexpressedby 'L & P' weredifferent. In thatworld,you do not

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That is: ifone analysesabilitiesin thisway,all abilitieswould be exercised.

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movemyhand.For throughout thatinterval,itis truethatwhetherornotN

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endemicallyincapableof givingsignificance to questionsabout freedomof

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freeaction.Incompatibilistshave done so by insistingthatwithoutfreewill

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Turning to the currentphilosophicalliterature,one mightexpect the

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understand(as Albrittonhimselfemphasizes)how a realpowerin theworld

(xi) Vagariesoflibertarianism. That libertarianconceptionsof freeagency

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the positive conditionwithoutmetaphysicalextravagance.This type is

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indeterminacywe have?Is our freedomin directproportionto theextentof

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The rootsofthisidea ofagent-causation aredifferent fromtherootsofthe

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of satisfyingthe indeterminacy condition.(And forall we know,theydo

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capacities,at a minimum,the capacityto entertain,and be presentedwith,

(xii) Conclusion.Althoughthe termsof the debate have been considerably

DepartmentofPhilosophy GARY WATSON

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- (4), 'Two KindsofExplanation',

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Watson,G. (3), FreeWill,OxfordUniversityPress,I982.

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