Zweerde - Recent Developments in Soviet Historiography of Philosophy

EVERT VAN DER ZWEERDE
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
SOVIET HISTORIOGRAPHY OF P H I L O S O P H Y
INTRODUCTION
Before starting this survey of recent developments in Soviet historiogra-

phy of philosophy (in Russian istoriko-filosofskaja nauka, abridged as
IFN in what follows), a few terminological distinctions are required.
'History of philosophy' is a term with a twofold meaning: it means the
historical development of philosophy, what Soviet authors have dubbed
istoriko-filosofskij process, and it means an academic discipline, the
study of that process, in Soviet terminology: istoriko-filosofskaja nauka.
Within this discipline, we should make a further distinction between
mere description (empirical historiography of philosophy) and philo-
sophical interpretation (philosophical historiography of philosophy) of
historical material, which together form what I will name "historiogra-
phical practice," in order to distinguish it from theory of the history of
philosophy. The latter in its turn can be distinguished into its purely
philosophical (general theory about philosophy as a historical phe-
nomenon), and its methodological, didactical, and historical aspects.
§1. S O M E R E C E N T PUBLICATIONS
After a boom in "philosophical sovietology" in the years following the

20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956, Western interest in Soviet phi-
losophy had slowly but steadily declined during the "years of stagna-
tion. ''2 In the meantime, however, many things have changed in Soviet
philosophy. Of course, the perestrojka in Soviet philosophy affects IFN,
too. The present situation in IFN is in part a clear break with the past,
but was also in part prepared during a long prehistory. From this
perspective, I will discuss some recent developments in IFN, a branch
of Soviet philosophy that is quantitatively important, and very inter-
esting, since the way Soviet philosophers deal with the history of
philosophy reflects their conception of philosophy as such, shows their
Studies in Soviet Thought 39: 1--53, 1990.

© 1990 KluwerAcademic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
2 EVERT VAN DER ZWEERDE
level of professionalism, and will strongly influence future Soviet

philosophy. 3
Let us, in this paragraph, first of all see how IFN is immediately
affected by the changing political climate in the USSR.
(i) Most notable is the appearance of a new regular publication: the
Istoriko-Filosofskij Egegodnik (History of philosophy yearbook,
abridged as IFE~ in what follows). It appeared for the first time in
1986, and although its appearance is independent of the political
changes that have occurred over the last few years, it marks, both by its
very existence and by its contents, the transition to a new phase in IFN.
By now, three volumes have appeared, each of which shows that Soviet
historians of philosophy today have access to primary sources and to
many scholarly works from other, including Western, countries, and
know how to distinguish between presentation, textual analysis, his-
torical and philosophical interpretation. 4
An important function of these IFE~ is the publication of primary
sources. 5 Evidently, IFN is considerably promoted by the general
relaxation of political control over publications. Over the last three
years we find many texts in the philosophical journals and in the 1FE£
that would have been unthinkable, say, five years ago. Also, new
translations of Western philosophical works have appeared or are
under way, 6 as well as new editions of classical authors, v Very recently,
VF started the publication of F. Nietzsche's Jenseits yon Gut und B~se. 8
The editorial note typically justifies the appearance of this text by
pointing to its historical importance:
Although, contrary to the sub-title of the book Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche's
doctrine is not "the philosophy of the future," acquaintance with it is essential to
anyone, who is trying to understand the course of developmentof European philosophy
in our century.9
And the editor of the text, A. V. Mikhajlov, opens his well-informed

and neutral, if not positive introduction by stating that "for decades, our
science has hardly known a quiet, balanced academic attitude towards
Nietzsche, a suitable scientific approach of his heritage, "1° and con-
cludes by saying that "Beyond Good and Evil occupies a particular
place in Nietzsche's works, viz., on the threshold of his concluding,
intensive period, and this allows us to presume that it can serve as a
SOVIET HISTORIOGRAPHY OF PHILOSOPHY 3
convenient introduction to the whole range of ideas and notions of

Nietzsche for those who had, for decades, no opportunity to read his
texts (and there are, no doubt, many such readers)." 11
In this context it is important to note that publications in the philo-
sophical journals as a rule reach a far larger and more general public
than do separate editions; 12 books usually appear in smaller numbers,
and are, moreover, accessible in libraries only to those people who are
entitled to study them, i.e., specialists in the field, akademiki etc., not
just any student. Another thing to note is that since publishing houses,
like other enterprises, are now supposed to be financially self-support-
ing [khozras(~t], they are forced to indeed sell the books they issue, and
thus to some extent to respond to public demand. In this sense
economic perestrojka touches philosophy too.
(ii) A direct effect of glasnost' is the publication of texts by Soviet
philosophers that could not be published before 13 or created problems
when they were. A clear example of the first category is an article by
the "reasonable and well-informed Marxist ''14 t~. V. II'enkov (t1979),
that was published in the USA in 1967,15 but could not be published in
the USSR because of its "anti-Marxist" nature. This text, "Marks i
zapadnyj mir," was intended for a symposium at Notre Dame Univer-
sity, to which II'enkov had been invited. As the editor of the text in VF,
where it is now published in Russian for the first time, ~6has it:
t~. V. IL'enkov did not go to the symposium, since, as is stipulated in the Preface to the
book, "he was in hospital." 17To put it plainly, "they didn't let him go." ~
Evidently, II'enkov's sin consisted in engaging in independent philo-

sophical thought which is Marxist, but indeed "anti-Soviet," inasmuch
as "Soviet" is identical with the actual [NB: 1965] state of affairs in the
USSR, including its ideological apologetics. Stressing the Western
background and the internationalism of Marxism, "this ideologico-
theoretical extract of 'Western culture'," and calling Lenin a "son of the
West, ''19 II'enkov opposes official "Soviet patriotism," which is more
often than not badly disguised Great-Russian nationalism and uses
Marxist theory as an autonomous means to criticize not only capitalism
but also the "negative phenomena" of Soviet society:
And those negative phenomena, that anti-communist propaganda in the West is

zealously inflating until the present day, did not arise from the ideas of communism. On
the contrary, they are (...) wholly explicable as results of the "refraction" of those ideas
through the prism (...) of the "remnants of the past," as we name them.
(Between brackets we observe that these are "remnants" not of capitalism, but
rather of pre-bourgeois, pre-capitalist forms of reglementation of life, that had a
particularly lasting force of tradition in pre-revolutionary Russia).2°
By simply restating such classical Marxist notions as the gradual

disappearance of the state (and its replacement by self-government 2~),
of money, and of formal justice] 2 Ii'enkov shows that Soviet society still
has a long way to go. Although he himself is convinced of the historical
inevitability of Communist society, 23 it is clear that statements like the
following could only be condemned as "anti-Marxist" by the Soviet
government of the day:
These nightmares [those depicted in Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, and George
Orwell's 1984, EvdZ] (...) do not scare us. We understand these tendencies as our
yesterday,although not yet completelyoutlived.24
An example of the second category is Ju. N. Davydov's Etika ljubvi i

metafizika svoevolja (The ethics of love and the metaphysics of self-
will). 25 It was published for the first time in 1982 by the Komsomol
publishing house Molodaja gvardija, in 50,000 copies. It raised a
scandal for its unorthodox and un-Marxist renewal of the moral views
of Tolstoj and Dostoevskij, presenting them as the best means to save
Russian (i.e., not Soviet) youth. The book was severely criticized in
Kommunist by R. Petropavlovskij, 26 as was Molodaja Gvardija for
publishing it, "the like of which, we may venture, will not soon happen
again," 27 as Scanlan commented in 1985.
However (an indication of the rapidity of change), the book has just
been republished, again by Molodaja Gvardija, 2~ this time in 65,000
copies, 29 at the price of 80 kopecks, which is very little for a hardcover-
book even in the USSR. 3° The book, though not anti-Marxist, is
completely non-Marxist: Davydov sharply opposes the moral views of
Tolstoj and Dostoevskij to the nihilism of Western philosophers like
Nietzsche or Schopenhauer, and, in a modern variety, Sartre and
Camus. He interprets perestrojka as primarily a moral renaissance, and
regards the "ethics of love" developed by Tolstoj and Dostoevskij as the
right ideological basis for this renaissance. 3~ The moral tradition of
Russian literature was kept alive, according to Davydov, by the so-

called dereven~6iki ("village-writers": V. Astaf'ev, V. Rasputin, ~.
Ajtmatov and others), 32 who were well aware of the moral sense of the
so-called "problems of socialism." 33
Observing that since the 20th Congress of the CPSU two currents in
Russian intellectual life, viz., the tradition of morality on the one hand,
and a tradition of liberal-minded "a-moral progressivism" on the other,
had become opposed to one another, Davydov sides with the first, the
side that in his view goes hand in hand with perestrojka, 34 and against
the second:
As we see, a "progressivism" that does not care about morality, and an apology for an
"Art," that is so high above morality that it can no longer be distinguished from
pornography [here, Davydov explicitly refers to Nabokov's Lolita, a book, the publica-
tion of which in the USSR is advocated by many progressive Soviet intellectuals, EvdZ],
these are things, to put it mildly, of one and the same order. 35
The title of the epilogue, "Nravstvennoe vozro~denie i sud'by Rossii"

(Moral rebirth and the fortunes of Russia), makes it clear that Davydov
places his work in the tradition of Russian, not of Marxist or Soviet
thought, and that his main concern is with the fate of the Russian
people. As far as I know, no reactions to his book have yet appeared in
the USSR -- it will be interesting to see whether criticism is directed
against its non-Marxist, or against its non-Soviet, i.e., Russian, perhaps
even nationalist, character. 36 Davydov himself seems to evade this
accusation by pointing out that, although Russian literature, Russian
culture, and the Russian nation were called to express this "ethics of
love," this does not imply that the Russian people have an exclusive
right to this morality, or that they are morally superior: the content of
the "ethics of love" is not exclusively or specifically Russian, but
human. 37 In this respect, Davydov can, and explicitly does, take up
the new trend in Soviet ideology that stresses the humanist nature
of Marxism and makes universal human values prevail over class
interests. 3s
(iii) As the republication of the book by Davydov already indicates,
there is, under the conditions of perestrojka, a changing attitude
towards the Russian (idealist) philosophical tradition: many formerly
unacceptable philosophers are published again. 39 Perhaps the same
goes for non-Russian traditions, but so far there are no clear signs of a
revival in this respect: a greater autonomy of the various non-Russian

nations would inevitably lead to the re-establishment of national
philosophical traditions, the more so since before perestrojka the
periphery already was more autonomous than the RSFSR. The tension
between the national character of Russian philosophy and the inter-
nationalist pretension of Marxism is evident. In so far as Soviet
unionism is a form of Russian imperialism, this tension touches the very
heart of the Soviet system; for this reason alone, we have every reason
to be attentive to developments in this field.
(iv) Finally: the completion, by A. F. Loser (1893--1988), shortly
before his death, of his monumental 8-volume Istorija anti~noj &tetiki
(The history of classical aesthetics). The first volume was completed in
1941, but could not appear until 1963; 4o volume 7 was published in
1988 in two books, the 2000 (!) typewritten pages of the concluding
eighth volume, Itogi tysja(eletnego razvitija (The results of a thousand-
year development) are being prepared for publication. 41 This work is
highly praised by Soviet historians of philosophy and the author's
merits were officially recognized in 1986, when he was awarded the
State Prize of the USSR for the first 6 volumes. 42 During his life, Losev
refused to have his works translated, but perhaps at present, as an
earlier controversial work like Filosofija imeni (The philosophy of
name) is planned for publication in a 40,000 copy edition, 43 the
situation is changing. In that case, the philosophical public at large
would at last be in a position to judge whether the work of this
"patriarch" of Soviet classical philology and aesthetics 44 is indeed
"unparalleled in world literature," as Scanlan has it.45 Its actual value, of
course, can only be judged by his colleagues, i.e., by specialists in the
field. In any case, his importance within Soviet philosophy seems to be
unparalleled. 46
These changes are remarkable and positive. In the field of the theory
of the history of philosophy, however, change is very slow in coming. If
we look at the publications of this and last year, we find hardly
anything. In the first IFE~ (1986), the editors announced:
In the Istoriko-filosofskij e£egodnik it is intended first of all to develop a discussion of

the theoretical and methodological problems of the history of philosophy as a science.47
However, in none of the three issues that have appeared so far, do

we find any theoretical or methodological contribution. And the same

applies to the two leading Soviet philosophical journals. In their review
of the two first IFE~, Ljubutin and Percev complain:
Perestrojka in philosophy, i.e., the surmounting of vulgarization and schematism, of a

simplistic comprehension of the tenets of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, in a word,
the return to dialectical-materialist philosophy in all its complexity and the height of its
theoretical thought, demands most of all also an attitude towards the scientific history
of philosophy as a most complex science. But this is inconceivable without a qualitative
break in the field of the theory and methodology of research into the history of
philosophy.
What can the E~egodnik offer its reader in this respect? So far, there is no special
rubric "Problems of the theory and methodology of history of philosophy as a science."
In spite of the persuasiveness and actuality of some other materials, that include
theoretical and methodological ideas, there is still a shortcoming in fundamental
articles, dedicated to these ideas only. 4~
This is not to' say that there is no development in the field of theory
of the history of philosophy. A round-table discussion was held about
the methodology of the historiography of ancient Russian p h i l o s o p h y ; 49
T. I. Ojzerman, the dominant figure in the field, has restated the core of
his theory of the history of philosophy; 5° and in 1986, a large
conference was held in Moscow about the methodological and "world-
view" [mirovozzrenkeskie]problems of the history of philosophy. 5
Still, Ljubutin and Percev are basically right in their judgment:
historiographical practice is blossoming, as the IFE~ show, while at the
same time the theory of the history of philosophy appears to be
"stagnant." In order to understand this situation, and before we turn to
the contents of the publications just mentioned, we have to concentrate
upon the place and functions of IFN within the framework of Soviet
philosophy as a whole.
§2. B A C K G R O U N D OFIFN AS A
QUASI-INDEPENDENT DISCIPLINE
IFN occupies a particular place in Soviet philosophy. On the one hand

it is remote from ideological battles and changing official doctrines.
What could be more "ideologically neutral" and remote from present-
day philosophical controversy than purely historiographical studies?
And indeed we find studies by Soviet historians of philosophy, of which
it is very difficult to say in what sense they may be called Marxist or

Marxist-Leninist at all: they could have been written, it seems, by any
scholar, east or west. 5~ At the same time, no field in Soviet philosophy
is as closely related as IFN to the ideological defense of Marxist-
Leninist philosophy as a whole. In this paragraph, I will sketch
the background of IFN, especially in relation to "classical" Marxism-
Leninism.
All philosophical trends and schools relate, one way or another, to
the history of philosophy. They do so either by claiming a fresh start, as
opposed to all previous philosophy, or by presenting themselves as the
true continuation of one or more strands or lines within the history of
philosophy; sometimes they do both. Engels, when formulating the
"historical self-awareness" of the philosophy of Marx, presented it as
the end of philosophy in the traditional (speculative) meaning of the
term, and as the synthesis of three major elements of European intellec-
tual history: German idealist philosophy, French utopian socialism and
British political economy. 53 Also, Engels perceived two main trends in
the history of philosophy, idealism and materialism, and two fundamen-
tally opposed methods, metaphysics and dialectics, both of these
oppositions being related to what Engels thought was the fundamental
question of philosophy. 54 This idea was further elaborated by Lenin,
who, in his Materializm i ~mpiriokriticizm, stressed the opposition
between materialism and idealism, 55 but in his Filosofskie tetrady
showed himself impressed by Hegelian dialectics, as applied to the
history of philosophy. And, commenting on Hegel's Wissenschafi der
Logik, Lenin almost identified idealism and materialism:
It is remarkable, that the whole chapter about "the absolute idea" hardly says a word
about god . . . . and moreover -this NB-, hardly contains anything specificallyidealistic,
but has as its main subject dialectical method. Result and r6sum~, the final word and
the essence of the logic of Hegel is the dialectical method -- this is most remarkable.
And also this: in this most idealistic work by Hegel there is the least idealism, the most
materialism. "Contradictory,"but a matter of fact.~6
The collected writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin, serving as a

reservoir of reliable and legitimizing quotations, offer a number of
possible attitudes to the history of philosophy, which has, for Soviet
philosophers, created room for different approaches. They range from
the philosophical approach present in Lenin's Filos@kie tetrady to the

struggle between materialism and idealism presented in Engels' Ludwig
Feuerbach and Lenin's Materializm i Ompiriokriticizm and to the
reductionism that can be based upon Marx' famous statement in the
preface to Zur Kritik der politischen Okonomie:
Die Produktionsweise des materiellen Lebens bedingt den sozialen, politischen und
geistigen Lebensprozef3iiberhaupt. Es ist nicht das BewuBtsein der Menschen, dab ihr
Sein, sondern umgekehrtihr gesellschaftlichesSein, dag ihr BewuBtseinbestimmt.57
One of the tasks that Soviet Marxist-Leninist philosophy has set for
itself, especially since the resurgence of professional philosophy in the
USSR after World War II, was to rewrite the history of philosophy
from a Marxist-Leninist point of view as well as to work out a theory of
the history of philosophy as a process. Although the klassiki marksizma-
leninizma wrote a few works on the history of philosophy, 5s they did
not write a global history of philosophy, nor have they left behind an
elaborate theory about the history of philosophy, or a clear method-
ology. Soviet philosophers have been left with a couple of loose
remarks, a number of classical tenets that evidently bear on the history
of philosophy, and the approach that is implicit in the few works that
the klassiki did write about the history of philosophy.
The task therefore could not consist in the deduction of a theory of
the history of philosophy from the works of the klassiki and the
subsequent application of that theory to historical material. Rather it
consisted in developing a theory which provides a theoretical basis for
historiographical practice as it actually exists, while at the same time
offering a defensible historical self-justification of Marxist-Leninist
philosophy as the superior outcome of the historical development of
philosophy.
Already in Aleksandrov's Istorija zapadnoevropejskoj filosofii we
find a formula, that later has become an ubiquitous incantation, accord-
ing to which the historical development of philosophy, as one of the
forms of social consciousness, is determined by "social being" only in
the final analysis [v kone6nom s~k'te].59 For the time being, Soviet
historians of philosophy generally seem to stick to a less final analysis.
The reason for this is in the first place that it is difficult to write the
history of philosophy in a reductionist manner -- it is both easier
]0 EVERT VAN DER Z W E E R D E
and philosophically more interesting to describe the subsequent phi-

losophical doctrines and add to this a general picture of the social,
political, scientific etc. circumstances under which a philosopher
worked. Secondly, and more important, a reductionist approach would
be incompatible both with the educational function of IFN and with the
role and pretension of Soviet philosophy itself. As we know, Marxism-
Leninism itself is presented by Soviet ideologists and philosophers as a
product of philosophical, rather than social, development, and the first
is conceived as a condition of the latter: ever since Lenin the crucial
role of having the right ideas, the right mirovozzrenie, and the right
dialectical method, has been stressed. 6°
Philosophy is thus, in the Soviet context, seen as a cause rather than
as an effect of social progress, technical development, etc. Whether or
not this conception is true to the facts, the point is that the way Soviet
Marxism-Leninism presents itself has to be compatible with the role
and the extent of independence ascribed to philosophy by historians of
philosophy: next to the final-analysis-statement we usually find some
statement on the relative independence [otnositel'naja samostojatelnost]
of philosophy. 61 It is this thesis of the relative independence of
philosophy that has entitled Soviet historians of philosophy to treat
philosophy as having a history of its own, and the study of this history
as philosophically, not just historically, relevant. Soviet theory of the
history of philosophy thus stands between Soviet philosophy as it is
ideologically defended, i.e., as the true, partisan and scientific theo-
retical foundation of Marxist-Leninist ideology, on the one hand, and
the historiography of philosophy as it is actually practiced by Soviet
specialists in that field, on the other hand.
Further, Soviet historiography of philosophy carries the burden of
the thesis, developed by Engels, and polemically employed by Lenin in
his Materializm i l~mpiriokriticizm, about the division of all philosophy
into two "camps," idealism and materialism. Lenin, who associated
these philosophical camps with political parties, and denied the possi-
bility of a politically neutral position, a "centre party in philosophy, ''62
served as the chief authority of the vehement philosophical "party-
mindedness" [partijnost'] demanded during the ~danovggina.
The fact of the matter simply is that the orthodox dichotomization of
the history of philosophy into two camps, whatever its use may have
been in the days of Marx, Engels and Lenin, certainly cannot serve as a
basis to write an account of the history of philosophy as a whole. This is
not to say, of course, that the opposition idealism-materialism is void of
any meaning. However, as the six-volume Istorija filosofii, published in
1957-- 1965,63 clearly shows, the results of an attempt to write a history
of philosophy from this point of view, itself historically determined, is
inevitably one-sided and, above all, artificial. This is precisely the
reason why so many professional Soviet historians of philosophy use
the opposition only in a "ritual" and indeed schematic manner, paying
mere lip service to orthodoxy.
§3. T H E T A S K S O F I F N
Against the background sketched in §2, we can discern five different

tasks that IFN is supposed to fulfil.
(i) Contemporary Soviet philosophy seeks its historical foundation in
a philosophical revolution that supposedly took place around 1850: the
formation of dialectical and historical materialism. At that point, the
historical development of philosophy came, in a substantial sense, to an
end: dialectical materialism was the final victory of materialism -- the
line of Democritus, as it is often called -- over idealism -- the line of
Plato --, and at the same time it was the synthesis of all previous history
of philosophy. The reinforcement of this historical foundation is one of
the major tasks of IFN, and it is accomplished in two ways: by inter-
preting the development of philosophy before Marx as the prehistory of
diamat and histomat, and by proving the superiority of Marxist (Marxist-
Leninist) philosophy over post-Marxist (non-Marxist or falsely-Marxist)
philosophy. This endeavour is basically dogmatic, in the sense that the
result is a priori given: the superiority of Marxism-Leninism over
any other philosophy is not to be discovered, but to be shown and
defended.
Fortunately, however, this is not the only task of IFN. It performs yet
two other functions:
(ii) One is technical training in philosophy: the increased profes-
sionalism of Soviet philosophers that Western commentators have often
pointed to is to a large extent due to a growing familiarity with the
historical heritage of philosophy, with respect both to the formal
aspects of philosophical reasoning and to the contents of past philo-

sophical discussion.64
(iii) Another important function is the transmission of recent devel-
opments in non-Marx&t philosophy: in this sense IFN serves the
assimilation by Soviet philosophy of the results of, e.g., Western
philosophy of language or philosophy of science,c~5 In order to serve
these two goals in a proper way, Soviet historians of philosophy have
been forced to present these "foreign philosophical fruits" in an
objective manner, i.e., to distinguish clearly between presentation,
interpretation, and comment. This accounts for the notable growth of
the number of serious discussions of non-Marxist philosophy that we
recently find in Soviet publications, and also for the significant number
of translations of Western, "bourgeois philosophical," texts, especially
from such disciplines as logic, philosophy of science, or philosophy of
language.66 Even if the commentary is sometimes primitive or dogmatic,
and even if the interpretation often is not very illuminating to Western
historians of philosophy, still this fact is of utmost importance, and a
condition for further creative development of Soviet philosophy.
Thus, we can discern two extremes in Soviet IFN: on the one hand
the historical foundation of dialectical and historical materialism as the
superior outcome of the historical development of philosophy, in the
service of official ideology, and on the other hand pure historiography,
in the service of formal training and the opening up for Soviet
philosophy of contemporary non-Marxist philosophy. However, these
two functions are indeed at the extreme of IFN. In order to get a more
complete idea, we turn our attention to two central tasks of IFN, closely
related both to each other and to the very nature of Soviet philosophy.
The first of these is the elaboration of a general, Marxist-Leninist theory
of the history of philosophy. The other is the attempt to write a history
of philosophy that offers a serious and objective account of history of
philosophy and at the same time is compatible with historical materi-
alism.
(iv) The main objective of Soviet theory of the history of philosophy
is to account for and to unite the different functions of IFN. This
theory, in its most elaborate, and generally recognized form,67 can
be found in a work by A. S. Bogomolov and T. I. Ojzerman, Osnovy
teorii istoriko-filosofskogo processa and in three further books by

Ojzerman. 68
Whatever may be the political use of the dichotomization of the
history of philosophy into two camps, it clearly does not provide an
adequate set of instruments for historians of philosophy. A main
objective of the theory developed by Bogomolov, Ojzerman and others
is to make this basic dogma into a workable theoretical basis of actual
historiographical practice. As Ojzerman assured me, in an interview in
1986, the basic question should, in his opinion, be regarded within its
historical context, and in fact he attempts such a historical relativization
in his theoretical works. ~9
In a recent article, TM Ojzerman further amends the two-camps notion.
He observes that the subject of the two fundamental tendencies is
hardly dealt with in Soviet philosophical literature, attributing this
"deficit" to a "simplified understanding of the substance of the istoriko-
filosofski] process. ''7J Ojzerman tells us that the actual plurality of
philosophical doctrines is not a matter of "anarchy of philosophical
systems," as Dilthey had it, but forms a complex process of differentia-
tion, divergence, integration, polarization, and, finally, of a radical
polarization, the "inevitable and integral expression of which is the
antithesis of materialism and idealism:" 72
Thus, the innumerable multitude of philosophical doctrines (...) in the final analysis [v
konednom sg~te] reduces itself objectively to fundamental antipodes, materialism and
idealism.73
All these complex processes are "materially conditioned," but this

does not nullify their "relative independence, the significance of which is
constantly growing in the course of world history [italics mine,
E v d Z ] . ''74 Ojzerman's anti-reductionism, implicit in these remarks,
becomes manifest in his attack on "vulgar sociologism," which is, in his
opinion, present whenever the distinction is disregarded between a
philosopher's work and the socio-economical conditions and class
interest that find expression in that w o r k . 75 Ojzerman rejects the idea
that, in the course of the history of philosophy, materialism was always
right and idealism always wrong, pointing to a number of instances
where idealism actually was right against materialism, 76 and also denies
14 EVERTVAN DER ZWEERDE
that idealists were always and everywhere "the ideologists of reac-

tionary classes, and only the materialists expressed the interests of the
revolutionary classes," 77 again giving some examples. 78
He thus arrives at a new definition of philosophy:
Philosophy is the unity of social consciousness (the expression of social being) and
research-activity, the subject of which is not only social, but natural reality as well, not
only being, but also knowledge, logical process, etc. 79
It is this definition that enables Ojzerman to make a distinction

between the ideological function of philosophy and its scientific value:
philosophy is more than just an instument in class struggle, it is "the
self-consciousness of a historically determined epoch. ''s° Seeking sup-
port in Lenin, Engels, and Gorbachev, Ojzerman declares that
Marxism by its very nature is the firmest negation of dogmatism, "doctrinaire attitude"
[doktrinerstvo], and of blind attachment to the past. 8~
And our task, the task of the historians of philosophy, consists first of all in going along
this true road, shown by V.I. Lenin. 82
The concluding statement makes it very clear, in my opinion, that

articles like this have a "strategical" rather than a scientific function:
they warrant the elbow-room of Soviet historians of philosophy to
study the history of philosophy proper, in its historical context, and in a
non-reductionist manner.
(v) Turning from theory to practice, i.e., to Soviet historiography of
philosophy, we arrive at the practical realization of this notion of
philosophy as "self-consciousness of a historical epoch." We come
across literally the same definition in a collective work, highly appre-
ciated by Soviet specialists, s3 Filosofija ~pokhi rannykh bur~uaznykh
revoljucij, 84 where Ojzerman opens the introduction with a quotation
from Marx:
Philosophy, according to the well-known expression by Marx, is the spiritual quintes-

sence of its time. s5
and continues with a paraphrase:
In other words, sociologically understood, philosophy is the self-consciousness of a

historical epoch, which in a new way reveals its cultural and historical meaning. 86
SOVIET HISTORIOGRAPHY OF PHILOSOPHY ]5
Now, Marx indeed wrote that

jede wahre Philosophie(ist) die geistigeQuintessenzihrer Zeit (...).87
but, in the first place, Ojzerman ignores the fact that Marx speaks of
true philosophy, and it is only in doing so that he can interpret Marx as
saying that philosophy as such, sociologically interpreted, is the self-
consciousness [samosoznanie, Selbsbewufltsein] of a historical epoch.
Moreover, Marx wrote this sentence at a time when he was still a
young-Hegelian philosopher, ss as Ojzerman himself states in Formiro-
vanie filosofii marksizma, s9
I do not intend to criticize Ojzerman for abusing Marx for his own
ends, nor am I trying to find out whether he is a true Marxist or not. He
uses the statement by Marx to drive home the Marxist-Leninist nature
of the approach actually present in the book as a whole; in this sense he
is an orthodox Marxist-Leninist. Similar quotations are often taken
from Lenin's Filosofslde tetrady. 90 They serve as a strategic manoeuvre
to show that what one is doing is acceptable within the overall frame-
work of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Soviet philosophers are both
forced and able to do this, and in this sense the theory elaborated by
Ojzerman and others indeed functions as the link, and at the same time
the buffer between the official "system" of Soviet philosophy and
professional historiography of philosophy.
The general tendency of the book is quite adequately covered by
Ojzerman's definition of philosophy as self-consciousness of its epoch:
the contributors try to interpret philosophical theories as conscious
assimilations of and rational answers to problems of a social, scientific
and religious nature, i.e., problems facing not just individual philoso-
phers, but society as a whole. This may not sound revolutionary, but it
is important to note that any attempt to reduce philosophy to political,
social or economic conditions is hereby excluded. A good specimen of
this approach is present in the works on 17th-century philosophy of
man by N.V. Motrogilova. 91
It seems clear to me that the definition of philosophy as "spiritual
quintessence of its time" is Hegelian rather than Marxist, and in any
case requires further qualification to be compatible with the classical
Marxist notion of philosophy as a reflection and expression of class-
struggle. Ojzerman can indeed be regarded as a Hegelian. He rejects of
16 E V E R T VAN DER Z W E E R D E
course Hegel's pan-logicism and absolute idealism, but nonetheless

states that
dialectical materialism, which offered the most thorough, integral critique of Hegel's
dialectical idealism, continues -- of course, from an opposite conception of the world Is
protivopolo~nykh mirovozzren(eskikh pozicij] -- the main line projected by Hegel of
the investigation of philosophy as a phenomenon of world history, that is, in a dialec-
tical way, as a single phenomenon [kak dialektideski edinogo vsemirno-istorideskogo
fenomena].92
A c c o r d i n g to Ojzerman, Hegel, who defined p h i l o s o p h y as "epoch,

u n d e r s t o o d in ideas, ''93 was closer to an understanding of the subject
matter of p h i l o s o p h y "than those c o m r a d e s of ours who, c o n t r a r y to the
actual d e v e l o p m e n t of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, seek to limit the
subject of philosophical investigation strictly to one domain, theme, or
p r o b l e m , whichever it be. T M T h e s e c o m r a d e s reduce the subject of
philosophy to the fundamental question of p h i l o s o p h y (the osnovnoj
vopros), to h u m a n existence, or to "the most general laws of m o v e -
ment." A c c o r d i n g to O j z e r m a n , the subject matter of philosophy is the
historically changing totality of non-philosophical p h e n o m e n a :
Philosophy (...) does not study philosophical processes, which do not exist in nature,
but the forms of generality that belong to nature and society. (...) (T)he subject of
philosophy is the totality of nonphilosophical phenomena, which totality moreover
changes in the course of history. (...) Therefore we can say that philosophy, as the self-
consciousness of a historical epoch, takes as its subject the most important, epochal
questionsY -~
This Hegelian position is d o m i n a n t in IFN, but it is not without

opposition. R e p o r t i n g on the 1986 conference, M. A. Kissel' writes that
the question of the applicability of the Hegelian scheme of the history of ideas occupied
quite a large place in the discussion of the first section Ithe section about modern
western philosophy, that is, EvdZ] of the conference.
Of course, nobody was defending a Hegelian model of the historical process of
philosophy in its literal sense: its organic flaws are too noticeable, and especially the
principal flaw -- the pretension of a monopoly on philosophical truth, which already
includes everything really substantial in the philosophical heritageY ~'
All participants in the discussion agreed that the "linear a r r a n g e m e n t

of philosophical doctrines," p r o p o s e d by Hegel, "unwittingly i m p o v e r -
ishes the substance of the historical process of philosophy. ''97 H o w e v e r ,
" m o r e powerful stances were expressed as well, p r o v o k i n g contro-
versy. ''~ One of these was a "culturological approach," advocated by

M. S. Glazman, in which the history of philosophy should be con-
structed like the history of art; philosophy "ought to be investigated first
of all as a cultural phenomenon (...), not as the process of develop-
ment of specific scientific knowledge. ''99 As Kissel' comments, such a
culturological approach may explain the role that certain ideas play
within a historical epoch, but does not touch upon the epistemic
significance, the truth or falsity of those ideas.~°°
It is significant that in Ojzerman Hegel's conception of the history of
philosophy forms the point of departure, and is a main target of
criticism at the same time, but this is not surprising. In the first place,
historically, Hegel's philosophy was a, if not the, main source of
Marxism. In the second place, more importantly, a philosophy that
claims to be (i) the adequate self-consciousness of its own epoch, (ii)
the highest stage in the historical, dialectical development of philosophy
so far, and (iii) a philosophical system, inevitably, in my opinion,
develops a conception of the history of philosophy that comes close to
the one developed by Hegel. For this reason, the discussion among
Soviet historians of philosophy on precisely this issue is more than a
dispute among specialists: it directly affects the conception of Soviet
philosophy as a system. And concrete research into the history of
classical German philosophy, as well as -- in the next instance -- of
Marxism itself, seems to be the means by which Soviet philosophy can
develop a more differentiated, less unitary and dogmatic conception of
its own nature. This, I think, is the significance of, for example, the
remark made by I~. Ju. Solov'ev:
1~. Ju. Solov'ev, in his speech, remarked that our out-dated habit to regard all new
philosophy in relation to Hegel as its sole apex, is successfully overcome in recent
studies dedicated to Fichte, Schelling, and, especially, Kant. Of course, Hegel did not at
all "preserve" [snirnaet, ~ German hebt auf] the philosophy of Kant. On the contrary,
in the present historical situation of philosophy many aspects of Kant's work are closer
to us, than is Hegel. ml
It will be most interesting to see if and how this discussion will go on

in years to come. If Soviet historiography of philosophy will prove to be
more interesting than it seemed to be before, we should realize that it is
not a deus ex machina, but has a long history of preparation. In this
sense, it is not to be seen as a result of perestrojka or glasnost'. Rather,
18 E V E R T VAN DER Z W E E R D E
for a period of about 20 years (approx. 1965--1985) Soviet historians

of philosophy have done their work in a quiet way, concentrating on
presentation and analysis of past and contemporary philosophical
positions instead of employing these positions in philosophical endeav-
ours of their own. Further, they were obliged to state the orthodox
nature of their studies by quoting the klassiki. This citatni6estvo
sufficed to prevent serious attention from most of their Western
colleagues. Finally, when Soviet historians of philosophy were allowed
to attend international conferences, or had their texts translated into a
Western language, usually the least interesting scholars and texts were
elected to represent IFN. Only recently (but before the beginning of
perestrojka) this situation has changed, e.g., with the translation of the
philosophical biographies by A. V. Gulyga, a rather unorthodox
philosopher, and with the publication, in 1986, of a collection of
articles, some of which had appeared in Russian 10 years earlier. 1°2 The
image that Western scholars could obtain was thus largely a mis-
representation of the real situation in IFN.
Apart from specialist studies in most fields of the history of philoso-
phy, 1°3 IFN has accomplished another important condition for its
further development: the presence of Russian translations of most
classical philosophical texts. Sometimes pre-revolutionary editions of,
e.g., Nietzsche or Schopenhauer are still used, but by and large the
philosophical heritage is accessible in Soviet editions. 1°4 Also, a surpris-
ingly large number of contemporary Western philosophical works is
translated into Russian.
Finally, probably the most ambitious project at present in Soviet
philosophy is the edition of a 10-volume Vsemirnaja istorija filosofii
(Global History of Philosophy). It is planned as successor to the
6-volume Istorija filosofii, a work that has been subject to criticism in
and outside the Soviet Union. 1°5 A 10-volume work, encompassing the
historical development of philosophy on a world-scale, was announced
as early as 1969. ~°6 In 1986, M. A. Kissel', who at that time had just
moved from Leningrad State University (LGU) to the IF AN SSSR,
informed me that they were still planning this edition. And Ojzerman
informs us that "fundamental research work" on the new Vsemirnaja
istori]a filosofii will be started in the present 5-year plan (1986--1990);
this work will be done by the IF AN SSSR, but employees of other
research institutes and a number of institutes of higher education

[VUZy] will participate in it. 1°7 Naturally, while starting the work on its
successor, Soviet historians of philosophy are trying to determine the
pros and cons of the old Istorijafilosofii.
The Marxist conception of the world's history as one (dialectical)
process, connected to the thesis that philosophy is "in the final analysis"
determined by "social being," i.e., by human society in its historical
development, necessarily leads to the conception of the history of
philosophy as being one dialectical process, too, and, given the claim of
dialectical materialism to be a philosophical system in the classical
sense of that term, naturally produces the intention to write this
history. 1°8
In his contribution to the 1986 conference, Ojzerman fully recog-
nizes the shortcomings of lstorija filosofii, this "first attempt at an
exploration of the historical development of philosophy as a world-
historical process. ''1°9 In the first place, many fields of the history of
philosophy had not yet been sufficiently studied by Soviet specialists,
and of six volumes only two were dedicated to the history of pre-
Marxian philosophy:
I suppose that the authors of those sectionslm had a one-sided understanding of the
well-known tenet about the revolutionary overturn that Marxism accomplished in
philosophy,underestimatingthe significanceof its historicalcontinuity.~
Ojzerman is right to assert that this shortcoming is now basically

surmounted, as far as professional IFN is concerned. However, in
official ideology, this tenet seems to have a much longer life, as
Fedoseev demonstrates.~ ~2
The other shortcoming consists in the many blanks in the treatment
of post-Marxian "bourgeois" philosophy. Here, Ojzerman is correct to
say that lots of work has been done in the meantime.~ 13
Next, Ojzerman sums up five merits of Istorija filosofii, since "it
would be a serious mistake to understimate the positive sides of the six-
volume Istorija filosofii. ''114 These merits are (i) a systematic critique of
eurocentrism, 115 (ii) the study of the philosophical thought of "forgotten
regions" like Latin America and Eastern Europe, (iii) the systematic
investigation of the history of Russian philosophy and of that of the
other peoples of the USSR, (iv) the systematic investigation of the
interaction of philosophy and natural science, and (v) the fundamental,

systematic investigation of the history of Marxist-Leninist philosophy.
And Ojzerman concludes:
Thus a sober appreciation of the six-volume Istorija filosofii permits us to conclude
that, in spite of its serious shortcomings, this was a scientific pioneering work, the
detailed analysis of which is bound to help derive instructive conclusions, which are
most necessary to ensure a high scientific level of the new fundamental study --
Vsernirnaja istorija filosofii.116
Ojzerman merely sums up the 'material preconditions' of the new

edition and gives, for instance, no comment on the way bourgeois
philosophy was studied (although the very epithet "bourgeois" already
is a way of treating it). This is not surprising, since it is precisely at this
point that Soviet historians of philosophy are divided. As Ojzerman
puts it:
It should be fully realized that for the creation of such a fundamental work, which has
no analogue in world literature, not only the mastery of the whole diversity of historical
(philosophical) material is necessary, but also the elaboration of a theory of the
historical process of philosophy, and of methodological principles of investigation (...).
It is necessary to realize fully (...) the presence of many problems that have remained
unsolved, as well as the presence of an, in my opinion, excessive dissent in questions that
have been sufficiently cleared up by Marxism-Leninism and by the whole course of the
philosophical development of mankind.~ I7[italics mine, EvdZ]
§4. P E R E S T R O J K A IN IFN
It is important to note that the sophisticated, Hegelian theory of the

history of philosophy advocated by Ojzerman, and the corresponding
practical, historiographical work, were a result of the development of
IFN during the years of stagnation, not of perestrojka. The increasing
openness of the past few years merely shows more clearly than before
the extent to which the elastic framework of Marxist-Leninist philoso-
phy has been stretched. This development, though not depending on
perestrofka, has received a new momentum and a new significance as a
result of it. In this paragraph, I will discuss the significance of philo-
sophical perestrojka for IFN.
Perestrojka is a revolution from above and from below at the same
time, as Mr. Gorbachev likes to put it. Ils This basically is true: the
initiative comes from above, in response to the demands from below,
trying to stimulate and at the same time direct and control them. This
applies to philosophy as well. However, the interests of the CPSU, of

professional philosophers, and of the philosophically interested public
are not necessarily the same. In the various and very lively discussions
that currently take place ~9 it is not difficult to discern these three
approaches. The CPSU, through its ideological spokesmen, the "party-
philosophers," demands a filosofija perestrojki, a theoretical under-
pinning of new policy: although in a new apron, philosophy is still
treated as ancilla ideologiae. The professional philosophers first of all
demand a perestrojka filosofii, a reform of Soviet philosophy as an
academic discipline: better working conditions, less ideological control,
less obligation to be, whatever one says, Marxist-Leninist, more possi-
bilities to publish and to meet foreign colleagues. In so far as they want
to improve their public image and lose the reputation of being mere
apologists for the social and political status quo, their interests coincide
with those of the philosophical public at large, that wants to be better
informed, and above all wants to see professional philosophers discuss
the actual problems of Soviet society, as many of them seem ready to
do. To the extent that they all demand a break with the "stagnant
philosophy" that dominated before, all these interests work together,
but their intended goals do not coincide.
As during the "destalinization," the CPSU has to distance itself from
its own past; naturally, it is not Marxism-Leninism as such that is held
responsible for the "stagnation" in Soviet philosophy:
Marx, Engels and Lenin, in elaborating the philosophy of dialectical materialism, in no

way tried to press it into the Procrustean bed of rigid schemes. Our times urgently
demand a return to the original traditions of Marxism-Leninism, an opening of the
revolutionary potential for reform of dialectics? 2o
Basically, it is Stalin and the intellectual culture founded by him and

his followers, that is to blame:
The idea of the link of philosophy with real life sometimes is expressed in the following
way: it is said that every period has its corresponding philosophy. There is a profound
sense in these words. We may say that to the worn-out period of stagnation in our
social life corresponded its own, dogmatic philosophy of stagnation. Paradoxically,
materialist dialectics, in which Marx, Engels, and Lenin saw an arm for the critical and
revolutionary transformation of society, came out as justification and apologetics of the
existing, far from ideal state of affairs, a role which is not its own. It was used not so
much to discover, as to efface the contradictions of actual life. L2~
In order to move forward, our philosophy has to remove those phenomena, which have
accumulated during the years when philosophy existed under conditions that are
abnormal and of little use for creativity.122
So, Soviet philosophy receives orders to improve itself. But perestrofka

in Soviet philosophy is not just a matter of changing political leadership
and ideological directives: it also involves a changing of philosophical
generations. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that at the moment the
leading positions in Soviet philosophy are taken over by people who
received their professional and intellectual formation during the
"Khrushchev thaw" and, while staying within the framework of legal,
officially approved philosophy, turned into professional, academic
specialists, preferring -- for obvious reasons -- to do research in history
of philosophy, preparing new generations of scholars, and waiting for
their time to come. 123 The impetus of the 20th congress faded out, 124
but the philosophers who started working in the late fifties and early
sixties continued their work as well as they could:
In the so-called times of stagnation philosophical thought did not die out in our country
and intensive creative work secretly went on. But on the surface -- in teaching, in
educational and popularized literature -- dogmatism was flourishing.~25
At the 1986 conference mentioned before, the consequences of the

27th Congress of the CPSU for research in history of philosophy were
discussed. 126 The most general, and therefore most instructive as to the
political line and the intended effects of perestrojka are the introduction
and the first part of the book entitled Marksistsko-leninskafa istoriko-
filosofskaja nauka segodnja, with contributions by such authorities as P.
N. Fedoseev, T. I. Ojzerman, and V. V. Mgvenieradze.
Stressing the importance of strengthening the relation between
research into the history of philosophy and "the actual problems of the
social development of the world," t27 the editors state that:
A high duty of the historians of philosophy is the active participation in the radical
perestrojka of the socio-economical and cultural life of the country as a whole, the
working out of practical recommendations and serious scientific generalizations,
directed towards surmounting present serious shortcomings in ideological and politico-
educational work.~ 28
Mgvenieradze, in his opening article, "The 27th Congress of the

CPSU and the philosophical investigation of the historical process,"

formulates as a main task for philosophers "the philosophical guaran-
teeing of a successful practical realization of the ideas of uskorenie and
perestrojka." 129
Reminding his colleagues that philosophy "is a political profes-
sion, ''~3° M~venieradze opposes the idea of "purely philosophical"
studies:
Willy-nilly the setting off of philosophy from politics has been tolerated. Until the
present day one can hear the opinion that, as they say, some philosophers were so
"pure" that they did not have any political views at all. And sometimes this "purity" is
taken as an example to be followed. This road leads directly to scholasticism and
"doktrinerstvo" (...).l 31
Rightly observing that "from one congress [of the CPSU, EvdZ] to
another we philosophers have been criticized for scholasticism and
remoteness from life," 132 M~venieradze claims the umpteenth activation
of the philosophical front:
We should finally be able to learn from the criticism and reorganize ourselves. ~33
As far as historians of philosophy are concerned, this amounts to the

following demand:
We must radically reform our work in order to advance substantially the "world-view"
[mirovozzren(eskafa] role of the history of philosophy, to enrich significantly the
methodology of research into the history of philosophy.134
Despite his resolute phrasing, M~venieradze does not really make

clear what the practical consequences of this philosophical perestrojka
for historians of philosophy are. One thing however is made very clear:
in his opinion, Soviet historians of philosophy do not pay enough
attention to the struggle between materialism and idealism, simplifying
it, not "understanding dialectically the very dialectics of the history of
philosophy. ''135 With this M~venieradze means roughly the same as
Ojzerman: the historical process of philosophy is more complex than
the equations materialism - progressive -- true & idealism = reac-
tionary = false allow for. 136 Making the opposition more complex or
"dialectical," however, is not likely to make things any better. On the
contrary, it makes things worse, once more forcing Soviet scholars to
develop a "scholasticism" serving no other purpose than to assure their
allegiance to a Marxist-Leninist conception of the history of philosophy.

This, I think, is why Soviet historians of philosophy have tended to
engage in detailed, neutral and "pure" historiography of philosophy,
which in turn has led to the accusation, "from congress to congress," of
scholasticism and remoteness from life. This is not a matter of ideo-
logical disloyalty: it just is difficult, if not impossible, to write a history
of philosophy starting from one, prescribed dichotomy.
The Marxist-Leninist account of the history of philosophy should in
the first place be truthful, says M~venieradze:
The classics of Marxist philosophy were not afraid of the truth (...). (...) Only what is
veracious can be partisan.~37
A "half-truthful account" [polupravdivoe izobra~enie] of the history

of philosophy leads to
the rise, especially, but not only, among the youth, of an unhealthy [sic!, EvdZ],
i.e., uncritical, interest in religion and mysticism, in philosophical idealists such as,
e.g., Schopenhauer or Nietzsche, Berdjaev or VI. Solov'~v, contemporary Western
philosophers.l-~s
Another lamentable effect of the same situation in IFN is what

M~venieradze calls a "peculiar paradox": the number of specialists on
individual philosophers and schools is growing, but at the same time the
number of "professional historians of philosophy," i.e., scholars who
study "the actual and concrete objective regularities of the historical
process of philosophy" is declining.~3L~
P. N. Fedoseev displays his orthodoxy in a surprisingly "classical"
demonstration of the superiority of Marxism, the "natural product of
the world-wide historical development of philosophy, its highest
achievement." L40The determination of "social consciousness" by "social
being," the struggle between the two camps, and the assimilation by
Marxist philosophy of everything valuable in the cultural and intellec-
tual heritage of mankind, are dug up once more. ~4~ Also, the impor-
tance of the struggle against idealism and bourgeois philosophy is
stressed:
The struggle of these tendencies -- materialism and idealism -- goes on today on an

international scale, clearly demonstrating the "party-mindedness" Ipartifnosf] of phi-
losophy, not only with respect to the humanities, but also with respect to natural
science. (...)
Marxist party-mindedness in philosophy stands for the consecutive carrying through

of the materialist line and intransigence towards idealist fabrications and wanderings.~42
Coming, finally, to the consequences for historians of philosophy,

these are fairly general and abstract:
The historians of philosophy are faced with important and responsible tasks both in the
further deepening of the scientific methodology of research into the history of phi-
losophy and in the field of the enrichment of the "scientific-philosophical world-view"
[nau(no-filosofskoe mirovozzrenie], the struggle against bourgeois ideology, and the
education of conscious and active builders of communism. Our historians of philosophy
must make an adequate contribution to the solving of the majestic tasks that the 27th
Congress of the CPSU has set before us.143
These statements are so general and traditional that it is hardly to be

expected that any Soviet historian of philosophy will attempt to derive
from them practical guide-lines for his daily scholarly work.
These texts were published in 1988, but the conference was held in
1986. And although two years may not be a very long period, they
form a significant lapse of time when political circumstances and the
working-conditions of philosophers change as rapidly as they appar-
ently do in the Soviet Union at the moment. To get an idea of these
working-conditions, it is probably more instructive to look at the
criticism that is coming "from the field," now that glasnost' gives Soviet
philosophers more room to speak out. This criticism is of a quite
different nature than the criticism "from above" by people like
Fedoseev and M~venieradze: it is both more practical and more
philosophical, and less ideological.
Soviet philosophers complain about a number of things. Most
relevant for our subject are the following:
(i) There was no (or: insufficient) room for "pure," i.e., "non-
partisan" studies of the history of philosophy: in their review of the first
two IFE~, Ljubutin and Percev remark:
The moment has come to speak out in defence of "pure" investigations into the history
of philosophy, which form a considerable part [dolju] of the materials in the
E~egodniki.144
And, a few lines above, they criticize the status that was hitherto
assigned to IFN:
In those recent days, when the role of "ancilla" to contemporary philosophy was still
simply assigned to history of philosophy as a science, she became accustomed to feel in

constant debt. A distinctive guilt complex arose in her, ( . . . ) The history of philosophy
got used to being ( . . . ) an "applied" science. The idea of a proper value of research into
the history of philosophy was even more audacious than the idea of a proper value of
philosophical research as such. This idea was almost as enormous as the assertion of
the possibility of "art p o u r l'art." ~45
In this connection one should remember that "pure" historiography

is often a means to present the historian's own philosophical positions
in a safe way. The actual complexity of Soviet attitudes towards the
history of philosophy is adequately illustrated by the judgments of the
philosophy of Nietzsche, that range from the warning, by an orthodox
Marxist-Leninist like Mgvenieradze, against an unhealthy interest in
Nietzsche (see above), through the very negative judgment of
Nietzsche's amoralism and nihilism by Davydov (see above, § 1) from a
philosophical position (the defence of a moral absolute in the vein of
Dostoevskij and Tolstoj) that is totally different from Mgvenieradze's,
to the much more positive evaluation of Mikhajlov in his "purely
historical" introduction to Nietzsche's Jenseits yon Gut und B6se:
( . . . ) Nietzsche himself was perfectly aware of his decadence ( . . . ) but he also knew that
he was a decadent who is getting over his own decadence, just as he was a nihilist who
is surmounting and criticizing nihilism. ~46
(ii) There are not enough possibilities to publish: one reader of VF,
for example, complains ~47 about there being only one Soviet philo-
sophical journal (apparently forgetting FN, V MGU, and the new
journal published in Kiev ~48). Comparing this situation with the appear-
ance of "about 150" philosophical journals in the USA, he contends
that "ethicists, aestheticians, logicians, historians of philosophy ought to
have journals of their own." 149 For the sake of perestrojka, popular
philosophical journals are very much needed, and Soviet readers also
should obtain direct access to foreign philosophy:
In an open atmosphere, offering the possibility to check the truthfulness of argumenta-

tion through direct acquaintance, and not through re-telling and selective quotation, to
which we have got so used. 150
(iii) The Soviet philosophical community was largely cut off from the
philosophical community of the world as a whole:
SOVIET H I S T O R I O G R A P H Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 27
Speaking about the interrelation of Marxism with other trends of 20th century phi-
losophy, it is important to emphasize the following. Marxism indisputably is the most
influential philosophy of our time, as was remarked more than once by many repre-
sentatives of bourgeois philosophy as well. If, however, we are honest, it is impossible
to deny that some tendencies of non-Marxist philosophy have contributed to the
comprehension of the diverse and in many respects unique experience that has fallen to
the lot of mankind in this century. Therefore, a position of self-isolation of our
philosophy from the development of all the other contemporary philosophical trends
and tendencies is not the best way.~5~
For a long period our discussion of non-Marxist philosophy was reduced to ascer-
taining its crisis and decline; with this we lost sight of many new phenomena and
processes which are typical for its present stage.152
I n a reflection o n the r e c e n t W o r l d Congress of P h i l o s o p h y in

Brighton, the editors of VF show themselves satisfied with the n e w way
Soviet p h i l o s o p h e r s f u n c t i o n o n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l scene: t53 the recogni-
tion of R u s s i a n as an official language of the congress, the fact that the
Filosofskoe Obg(estvo S S S R (Philosophical A s s o c i a t i o n of the U S S R )
has b e c o m e a m e m b e r of the FISP, finally the fact that the next
congress will b e held in M o s c o w in 1 993, are p r e s e n t e d as effects of a
n e w a p p r o a c h b y the Soviet philosophical authorities. B e t w e e n the
lines, it is n o t h a r d to d i s c e r n a sharp criticism of the past in this
respect:
The Soviet delegation was made up of 102 people. Unlike former delegations, the
delegation to the 18th congress included representatives of all generations of Soviet
philosophers, working in various fields of knowledge [italics mine, EvdZ]. ~54
The broad participation of Soviet philosophers in the work of the World philosophical
congress, the numerous meetings and discussions with foreign philosophers are a new
phenomenon in the philosophical life of our country, and we hope that this will
positively influence philosophical investigations in the USSR [italics mine, EvdZ].J55
Today in a practical manner the question has come up about the necessity to overcome
the isolation from the general context of contemporary philosophy. Here the vulgar
idea that after the rise of Marxism all bourgeois philosophy becomes utterly reactionary
has played its negative role. For this reason the acquaintance of the public with the
philosophy of the rest of the world came to an end about fifty years ago. J56
The congress as a whole showed a sharply increasing interest of the international

philosophical community in philosophy in the USSR. (...) Also, the prestige of Soviet
philosophical thought improved.157
W e also find sharp criticism of "the b u r e a u c r a t s who " m a n a g e d " o u r

lively contacts with foreign scholars" in a recent text by N. V.

Motrogilova, that I will discuss in the next paragraph.
§5. S O M E C O N C R E T E RESULTS OF PERESTROJKA

IN T H E F I E L D O F I F N
Although it is still too early to say which direction the perestrojka of

Soviet philosophy will take and what will be its final outcome, it is quite
possible to point to some concrete results that can be ascribed to it
already. In this paragraph, I will briefly describe these results, again
concentrating on IFN.
(i) A new textbook in philosophy: an essential component of the
reform of Soviet philosophy is the elaboration of a new program of
philosophical instruction at universities and other VUZy. Philosophy
teachers are undergoing refreshment courses, and a new ugebnik,
Vvedenie v filosofiju (Introduction to philosophy) ~5~ is projected to
replace the old Osnovy marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii (Principles of
Marxist-Leninist philosophy) j59 and has been submitted for discussion
in the philosophical journals.
The first chapter of Vvedenie v filosofij'u, "Filosofija," written by M.
S. Kozlova, j('° formulates a much more open concept of philosophy
than did the corresponding chapter of the Osnovy, "Filosofija, eft
predmet i mesto sredi drugikh nauk" (Philosophy, its subject and place
among the other sciences). Whereas the latter was almost exclusively
derived from the klassiki in an apodictic and dogmatic manner, the new
version turns to Aristotle, Kant and Marx for an answer "to the com-
plicated question "what is philosophy?"." ~'~ Defending, in a footnote,
this return to pre-Marxian philosophers, Kozlova gives a plain criticism
of "stagnant philosophy":
Somebody will perhaps object: why make a detour into history? Isn't it better to turn
directly to our own days? After all, it is the mature stage of development that allows us
to understand the essence of particular phenomena, rather than earlier, not fully
formulated stages. This is indeed true. But the later stage is not always the more mature
one. And such is precisely the case here. The point is that the greatest models [obrazcy]
of classical philosophical thought have not yet been surpassed. Moreover, our time in
many respects demands their renaissance. The unfavorable historical circumstances of
the development of our society over the course of many years had a negative influence
on the situation in philosophy. The '~unmasking" of Soviet philosophers, the destruction
of cadres, persecution, repression, the perversion in their essence of the views of the
great philosophers of the past, selective reading, dogmatization of the works of the
founders of Marxist thought, coupling thought to changing political states of affairs --
all these things have driven philosophy into a lamentable state, in which it is still in
many respects enmired, notwithstanding an entire series of talented, valuable works,
carried out by our specialists, and already potentially suited to the revival of our
national philosophy.16~
A s r e g a r d s t h e n o t o r i o u s f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y , the
osnovno] vopros, t h e w i n d has c h a n g e d as well. I n t h e Osnovy we find
this q u e s t i o n n o t o n l y p r e s e n t e d as d i v i d i n g all p h i l o s o p h e r s i n t o two
large g r o u p s , " c a m p s , " b u t also answered:
However diverse philosophical doctrines may be, they all, manifestly or not, have as
their theoretical point of departure the question about the relation of consciousness to
being, of the spiritual to the material.~6-~
A consistent scientific solution of the fundamental question of philosophy was given by
MarxismJ 64
All the various philosophical tendencies and trends in the final analysis either side with
materialism or with idealism.~65
The philosophers, Engels wrote, were divided into two large camps, corresponding to
how they answered this question.~('6
In the Vvedenie, we c o m e a c r o s s the s a m e q u e s t i o n :
The most fundamental question of all, especially of more recent philosophy, Engels
emphasized, is the question of the relation of thought to being. (...)
Depending on how philosophers conceived this correlation, what they took as
primary, as determining, they formed two opposing tendencies. 167
So far, this q u i t e t r a d i t i o n a l . B u t in w h a t follows a n e s s e n t i a l m o v e is

m a d e : t h e f u n d a m e n t a l n a t u r e of this q u e s t i o n is n o t e v i d e n t , b u t has to
be argued for.
It is no secret, that the majority of philosophers in the past and the present did and do
not consider as their main objective the resolution of precisely this question. (...)
Unwittingly you start thinking: is it possible to regard as fundamental a question that
is not even formulated by the majority of philosophers? Perhaps it is introduced post
factum in order to classify philosophical tendencies and positions? In a word, the
particular place in philosophy of the question about the relation of the spiritual to the
material, in contradistinction to other highly important questions, is not evident, it has
to be elucidated and theoretically underpinned.168
One thing at least is clear: the question about the relation of consciousness and being
does not rank with the numerous concrete philosophical questions, it is of another
nature. Perhaps, after all it is not so much a question, as rather a general tendency, or
orientation of philosophical thought. It is important to understand that the polarity
"material-spiritual," "objective-subjective" enters all philosophical reflections, forms a
kind of "nerve-centre" of every philosophical question, whether philosophers are aware
of it or not. 169
This, in my opinion, is not mere word play: it really makes a

difference whether you postulate a fundamental question, which, in
order to make sense, should be answerable, or a fundamental polarity,
that is given and plays a role in concrete philosophical questions.
If the basic question already is a mix of an ontological (the relation-
ship between two substances, the material and the spiritual) and an
epistemological question (the relationship between subject and object,
being and consciousness), Kozlova here adds a metaphysical question,
viz., the question about the relationship between man and the world. As
a matter of fact, her stress on precisely this question, as well as the
general stress on humanism as the core of Marxism in the rest of the
Vvedenie, strongly suggest that this question has received fundamental
status.
Relying on Marx] 7° and, as the editors of Vvedenie v filosofiju
indicate, on the work tacitly done by Soviet philosophers since the
sixties, t71 Kozlova presents the "world-man"-relation as the essence of
philosophy. She distinguishes three fundamental types of relations
between man and the world: practical, epistemic [poznavatel'nye] and
valuative [cennostnye]. Illustrating this first of all with Kant's well-
known three questions, 172 and then with a discussion of Marx' stress on
the social role of philosophy, 173 its embeddedness in culture as a whole
etc., she briefly depicts the general outlines of a new, humanist Marxism
as perceived in the USSR today.
These further elaborations need not bother us here. As regards the
history of philosophy and the way it is treated in philosophical instruc-
tion, two changes are important. The first is the fact that the authors of
the Vvedenie turn to philosophers other than the klassiki for a founda-
tion of philosophy. The second is the shift from this fundamental
question, forever answered by dialectical materialism, to a general
orientation and polarity, which is rather the central focus of philo-
sophical problems. This considerable weakening of a classical tenet is

most important, the more so if we realize that this is what students are
taught, and to a large extent determines their future conception of
philosophy.
Equally important is the fact that the presentation of Marxist-
Leninist philosophy as a final (though developing) true doctrine, is
dropped:
All along in this book, the authors have tried to show that Marxism is not at all a
finished doctrine [zakon6ennoe ugenie], in which answers to any question that arises or
may arise in the future would be given beforehand; on the contrary, Marxist philosophy
is an open, developing system. Its development is its very way of existence. It does not
just possess the capacity to develop in reaction to changes that take place in the world;
it develops by virtue of an intrinsic necessity, and precisely this enables it not to be
limited to the recording of those changes, but to serve as a kind of compass that helps
to pave the way into the future? 74
No fixed answers are to be expected from this u(ebnik, on the

contrary, students are invited to think independently:
The century of reasonable and humane mankind is ahead of us. And this means a
genuine Renaissance of real humanism and, consequently, of philosophy as its "philo-
sophical basis" [mirovozzren6eskajaosnova].
( . . . ) Therefore, this textbook is only an invitation to arduous independent work, an
introduction into the sphere of problems of this ancient, but eternally young science
about the essence of the world and of man in it. Philosophy elevates man, it will
eternally affirm this striving forward and upward! ~75
(ii) Another evident effect of philosophical perestrojka so far is the

changing attitude towards the history of philosophy that we find in the
projected Vvedenie v filosofi]u. The editors clearly try to learn from the
past: not only does this new u(ebnik count many more pages on the
history of philosophy, t76 there is also a quite different attitude towards
both pre-Marxian and bourgeois post-Marxian thought. "The beginning
of dialectical materialism" is still heralded as the "great revolutionary
overturn of philosophy" (the title of Chapter IV), but at the same time
students are told that "practice shows that the fact that we proceed
from the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism does not make us the
possessors of truth in the last instance in any question." L77
Although this may be no surprise for Western philosophers, even
Marxists, it is a surprise that the handbook, intended for use in virtually
all VUZy, explicitly tells this to future Soviet intellectuals. There also is
a break with the well-established tradition -- Osnovy yields ample
evidence in this respect -- to acquaint students with the positions of
past philosophers only through the commentaries by Marx, Engels and
Lenin: the authors of the Vvedenie have compiled a reader of original
philosophical texts to be used along with the handbook itself.~78
(iii) More specifically, we find a clearly different treatment of
contemporary non-Marxist philosophy:
Under these conditions Marxist humanism, and the new political thought based on it,
take upon themselves the defence and affirmation of values common to all mankind
[obY(e&love(eskie cennosti]. In its turn this requires in many respects a new approach
to the interaction of the philosophy of Marxism with other trends of contemporary
philosophy.l 7,~
This different treatment of what used to be called "contemporary

bourgeois philosophy" is not only manifest in the new u(ebnik. The
most immediate sign in this respect is a general change in terminology:
traditionally, contemporary Western philosophy (or, generally, post-
Marxist non-Marxist philosophy) was dealt with under the heading of
kritika sovremennoj bur~uaznoj filosofii ( i sociologii). In IFE~ '86 we
find instead: sovremennaja burguaznaja filosofi]a ''~° ("contemporary
bourgeois philosophy," without kritika, that is), and in IFE~ '87 and '88
this has become zapadnaja filosofija X X veka ("20th-century Western
philosophy"). In VF we come across equally neutral headings as
filosofiya za rube~om is1 ("foreign philosophy") and mirovoe filosofskoe i
kul'turnoe nasledie: istorija i sovremennost q82 ("philosophical and
cultural heritage of the world: past and present"). There still is room for
a heading like idejnaja bor'ba ("ideological struggle"), but here we find
articles about fascism, neo-nazism and the like.
A change in terminology, naturally, is not per se an indication of a
change in attitude: it may also indicate the recognition of a situation
already accomplished; or it may be mere pretence. These doubts,
however, disappear, once we take a closer look at what Soviet philoso-
phers say about "bourgeois" philosophy today. As an example, I will
discuss a round-table conference on phenomenology, the results of
which were published in VF.~'~3
This publication consists of the authorized materials of a conference
held to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the death of Edmund
SOVIET H I S T O R I O G R A P H Y OF PHILOSOPHY 33
Husserl, the participants of which included, to cite two familiar names,

N. V. Motro~ilova and M. K. Mamarda~vili. The opening statement is
by Motrogilova, who begins by calling Husserl "one of the classics of
20th-century philosophy," 184 to which she adds:
I am not by accident saying: one of the classics of 20th-century philosophy, instead of

classic of "contemporary bourgeois philosophy," as was usual. I assume that phe-
nomenology is common property [obs~'geedostojanie] of contemporary philosophy. And
not only Husserl (...) is a classic of the 20th century. Some other philosophers that
emerged from the phenomenological school and then became independent philosophers
may also be counted among the classical thinkers of our century: M. Heidegger, N.
Hartmann, M. Scheler, M. Merleau-Ponty, J-P. Sartre and, possibly, other philoso-
phers. 185
These remarks are a surprise to anyone who knows the ideologically

charged meaning of the qualification klassik in Soviet philosophy. Also,
the definition of phenomenology as " c o m m o n property of 20th-century
philosophy" implicitly denies the fundamental gap that used to separate
Marxist-Leninist and bourgeois philosophy.
After criticizing the fact that there are hardly any recent Soviet
studies on, or translations of, c o n t e m p o r a r y phenomenological thought,
and complaining about "the opposition and restraint from the side of
the bureaucrats who "managed" our lively contacts with foreign scho-
lars," l SC, she discusses some recent developments in phenomenology.
H e r general attitude is sympathetic, and she concentrates on those
topics - - such as intersubjectivity, ~s7 and the mind-body problem Is8
- - that do not, in her opinion, receive due attention from Soviet
philosophers.
She concludes by stressing the importance of contacts between
Soviet philosophers and foreign phenomenologists and criticizing those
people - - without naming anybody (!) - - who used to frustrate an
objective and vigorous analysis of phenomenology: 1~9
Nowadays, we can honestly and justifiably study phenomenology, too, one of the most
outstanding philosophical phenomena of the 20th century. Of course, this has to be a
critical and independent exploration.~9~l
The absence of Marxist-Leninist rhetoric 19E in this text gains impor-

tance, once we realize that Prof. Motrogilova is at present chairman of
the D e p a r t m e n t of History of Philosophy of the IF A N SSSR, i.e., the
person responsible for most research in the history of phi10sophy.

Again, a change in terminology does not necessarily imply a change in
thought. As a matter of fact, I think that it is rather terminology which
is finally being adapted to already existing actual practice. However, if
the obligation to offer a Marxist-Leninist critique or a dialectical-
materialist analysis fades, this may indeed give more room for "in-
dependent and critical research." The statement by Motro~ilova just
paraphrased makes it very clear that for a number of years Soviet
historians of philosophy have not been doing what they thought
necessary, as is also manifest from other discussions in VF.
For another recent example, we turn to an article by N.S. Julina in
IFE£ '87, "Popper i nemeckaja klassi6eskaja filosofija," 192 in which she
defends the thesis that Popper's attitude towards the two major figures
in classical German philosophy, Kant and Hegel, is not in line with the
actual relation of his philosophy to theirs. 193 Following Popper's
philosophical development from his falsificationism via evolutionism to
his three-world metaphysics, she tries to show that Hegelian elements
came more and more to the fore, despite Popper's explicit praise for
Kant and loathing for Hegel.
She compares the Popperian "tetradic scheme"
Problem 1 --, Tentative theory --, Error elimination -,
Problem 2
with the Hegelian "triadic scheme"
Thesis --' Antithesis --, Synthesis
and "World 3" with "objektiver Geist" in order to show that Popper
comes much closer to Hegel than he himself is willing to acknowl-
edge. 194 For example, Popper compares his "World 3" and Plato's
"world of ideas," noting the analogy, but also significant differences. As
Julina rightly observes, the fact that "World 3" evolves through the
elimination of false theories, whereas Plato's "world of ideas" is eternal
and static, brings it much closer indeed to "objective Spirit" in the
Hegelian sense. ~95 Finally, she observes that Popper ended up creating
a philosophical and metaphysical system. 196 The main difference with
the Hegelian system, in her opinion, is not to be found in the idea or
structure of their systems:
Both Hegel and Popper inflate in an idealist manner the objective fact that a consider-
able part of the "thought material" of an individual person is drawn from the reservoir
of social consciousness, of culture, which is the result of the historical creativity of
many generations of people.197
The main difference lies in the material upon which they based their
philosophical systems: the natural sciences in the case of Popper, the
humanities (and cultural life in general) in the case of Hegel. The chief
error both of Hegel and Popper consists, according to Julina, precisely
in their narrow conception of the "soil" [po(va] from which philosophy
grows: either natural sciences or humanities. And she concludes by
saying that
both Popper and Hegel typically underestimate the communicative, critical, integrative
and translative function of philosophy in culture. This function in particular consists in
the approbation, comparison, evaluation and synthesis of various types of knowledge
and understanding, of different pictures of the world, drawn in the language of natural
science, humanities, art and common sense [obydennoe soznanie]. Meanwhile, it is
precisely in the realization of this function, and not in the absolutization of either
science or of forms of spiritual activity that pertain to the humanities, that the function
of philosophy as a world-view[mirovozzren(eskajafunkcijafilosofii] is implemented?98
This text is first of all representative of many Soviet studies of

contemporary philosophy: Julina clearly knows what she is talking
about, she uses original sources in English ~99 and gives an objective
account of Popper's philosophy. In the second place, dialectical materi-
alism is present only as a broad background: Julina criticizes Popper
for hypostasizing "in an idealist manner" his "World 3," a criticism that
would be shared, I think, by many Western philosophers; 2°° on the
other hand, she praises him for his evolutionist approach to theories,
for his search for the logic of the development of science etc., which she
interprets as dialectical development, although it is not recognized as
such by Popper, and again one does not have to be a diamat(ik to
appreciate this point. These two elements are not new. They are present
as well in a text by the same author, published in 1983 (i.e., during the
high-tide of"stagnation"), "Problemy soznanija i real'nosti v fizikalistskom
materializme i biologicistskoj koncepcii Poppera." 20J
Two other elements, however, are new. One is the positive attitude
towards this bourgeois philosopher which is made explicit in Julina's
remark that The Open Society and Its Enemies should be left out of
account, because:
One must appreciate a serious philosopher, in which category l reckon Popper, by his
strong and mature works, not by his weak ones. -~°z
As a matter of fact, The Open Society and Its Enemies has indeed
often served as an easy target for Soviet authors? °3
Another new element is the use Julina makes of her discussion of
Hegel and Popper to stress the social function that philosophy should
fulfil. It is not so clear what the remarks just quoted about this have to
do with either Hegel or Popper, but it is very clear what they have to
do with the way philosophy functions in Soviet society today: it is not in
a position to fulfil the function it should fulfil.
(iv) Perhaps as important for the further development of Soviet
philosophy is a return to Marx that is manifest in some recent publica-
tions. Not only are earlier, controversial publications by Soviet Marxists
published again or for the first time, as we have seen above, we also
find some attempts either to distance Marx from "deformed" or
"barracks socialism," by which terms the pre-perestrojka state of affairs
in the USSR is meant, 2°4 or to use the views of Marx (or Engels) for a
critical analysis of a social phenomenon like bureaucracy, 2°5 or a
political one like Stalin's rule. 2°6
Soviet social and political philosophy used to be the dullest part of
Soviet philosophy, for obvious reasons. As a matter of fact, the a priori
declared unity of Marxism-Leninism can be regarded as the main
obstacle to a creative development of Soviet philosophy. This unity is
the only dogma, bearing on Soviet philosophy, that has made it into the
new edition of the political programme of the CPSU. It seems probable
that it will be the last dogma to be dropped. 2°7
Notwithstanding this -- politically based -- limitation, more room
may come for really "creative Soviet Marxism," next to the tradi-
tional and orthodox "continuously developing philosophy of Marxism-
Leninism." Recognition of the fact that the works of the klassiki are
necessarily historically determined, do not form a unity in the strict
sense, and for these reasons alone cannot be regarded as an eternal and
final truth, seems to be an absolute precondition for the free develop-
ment of philosophical thought and thus for the critical function that it
may fulfil within Soviet society.
§6. CONCLUSION
I have noted a number of remarkable changes in IFN. First of all the

"catching up" in several fields and a greater accessibility of primary
sources. Secondly, a change in what students are taught about philoso-
phy and its history. In the third place, a shift in the approach to what
used to be labelled bourgeois philosophy. And, finally, a beginning,
however cautious it may be, of original, creative thought in the Marxist
tradition. At the same time, I have found little change in the field of
theory and methodology of the history of philosophy. Is there a reason
for the circumstance that precisely in this field there seem to be no new
developments? One reason may be that Soviet historians of philosophy
are primarily occupied, at least temporarily, with "digging up the past."
This may be true to some extent.
The main and decisive reason, however, seems to me to be that
Soviet historians of philosophy are somehow at a loss at this point. If
the theory of the history of philosophy, especially in its "mainstream-
formulation" by Ojzerman and Bogomolov, forms both link and buffer
between IFN as a quasi-independent discipline, on one hand, and
Soviet philosophy as a supposed system, on the other hand, and if this
theory has been stretched to its limits in the course of the last decade,
as I have tried to show, then this is indeed a most vulnerable spot. If the
theory of the history of philosophy forms the link between Marxist-
Leninist philosophy as a system and Soviet historiography of philoso-
phy as a professional discipline, then the explanation for the absence of
theoretical or methodological publications at the moment may be found
in an uncertainty as to the future status of IFN. Of course, this explana-
tion is highly speculative, the more so since it is a hypothetical explana-
tion of the non-occurrence of a phenomenon, not of its occurrence. But
it seems to be supported by the publications discussed here.
As we have seen, the "purity" of philosophical research was severely
attacked by M~venieradze in his opening speech at the 1986 confer-
ence. We may perceive a positive shift towards humanism and away
from international class struggle, but still there is partijnost' in the sense
of service to, and, consequently, supervision by ideology. The general
tendency of semi-official statements by Fedoseev and Ojzerman, as well
as the rejection of separate disciplines within Soviet philosophy that we
encounter in the prospekt of the new u(ebnik, Vvedenie v filosofiju,
seem to point in the same direction. At this stage, it seems to me, the
future status of IFN is still unclear, or, in other words, the tension
between on the one hand, professional, "ideologically neutral" research
in the history of philosophy and on the other hand, Soviet philosophy
as the theoretical basis and indeed ancilla of Marxist-Leninist ideology,
though in a new, humanist and more humane form, remains undecided.
Whether the perestrojka of Soviet philosophy will continue its course
is an open question. The answer depends on many factors, most of
which are not of a philosophical nature. But I think that, regardless of
changing circumstances there have been, and there are, long-term
developments that fulfil some of the necessary conditions for the
creative and free development of philosophy in the USSR.
What is at stake in this period of philosophical perestrojka, as far as
IFN is concerned, is the establishment of IFN not as a "relatively
independent discipline" within the framework of Marxist-Leninist
philosophy, but as a self-supporting, i.e., really independent, discipline
next to it. I think that the necessary preconditions for this establishment
are largely fulfilled: they already were fulfilled before perestrojka, and
do not depend on it. I also believe that the majority of Soviet historians
of philosophy are waiting to take this step. The three subsequent IFEi
are clear proof both of the capacity and the willingness of Soviet
historians of philosophy to engage in "pure" philosophical research.
As to the assessment of the adequacy and originality of concrete
work by Soviet historians of philosophy, this becomes increasingly
difficult as IFN becomes more "professional." As a matter of fact the
publications of many Soviet scholars can only be aptly evaluated and
judged by their colleagues. This fact is recognized by Soviet philoso-
phers too:
The contributions under the headings "History of West-European philosophy,"

"Western philosophy of the 20th century" are quite diverse. (...) Moreover, some of
them can only be fully evaluated by real specialists. 2°8
To estimate the value of an article on, for example, Descartes, we

need a Western historian of philosophy who (i) knows Russian, (ii) is a
specialist in Descartes, and (iii) has a clear understanding of the general
setting of Soviet philosophy. Of course, translations would be of great
help, but up to now they are very rare. 2°9
One perceives in present-day IFN a strong tension, if not contradic-
tion, between on one hand a professional historiography of philosophy

of considerable level, and on the other hand stress on the unity of
Marxism-Leninism, of the significance of the "fundamental question of
philosophy," the importance of the partijnost'-principle and the urgency
of the struggle against bourgeois ideology. Professional historians of
philosophy demand more opportunities to meet their foreign colleagues
and speak out in defence of "pure" historiography, which they indeed
exercise to a large extent.
This actual situation is, I think, due first of all to the internal develop-
ment of IFN over many years as a semi-autonomous discipline in
combination with the -- in the last resort political -- requirement to
stay, at least formally, within the framework of Marxist-Leninist phi-
losophy. During the last few years, these tendencies have coincided with
a period of openness and relaxation of ideological control, and have
therefore come into view more clearly than before (of course this is not
mere coincidence: similar processes have occurred in other fields of
Soviet philosophy, science, and culture at large).
Marxist-Leninist philosophy, we have always been told, is developing
continuously, due to scientific progress and the changes of the world in
general and socialist society in particular. In my opinion, the pivotal
question, as far as the future development of Soviet philosophy is
concerned, is whether this philosophy will still be obliged, whichever
direction its development actually takes and however diverse it be-
comes, to remain, or rather pretend to remain, a "unified Marxist-
Leninist doctrine." If it is, we Western students of Soviet academic
philosophy, will still have to peel off the ideological phrasing in order to
find the philosophical core. This philosophy will not be in a position to
exercise a critical function within Soviet society, but only an apologetic
one. Soviet philosphers will be obliged to employ more and more
complicated "scholasticism" in order to say something new.
If, however, Soviet philosophy finally drops its claim to be the
highest achievement of the historical development of philosophy, to be
on the right path, set down by Lenin, and to be a unified, continu-
ously developing system, and the like, in that case we might be
surprised by the intellectual vigour of many Soviet philosophers and
should be prepared to see historians of philosophy turn into philoso-
phers in their own right. 21°
Hegel, trying to understand why philosophy started in classical
Greece, said that "in history, philosophy comes into being only there
where, and in as far as free constitutions develop. ''2~1 I personally
believe that we should be reluctant automatically to identify a free
constitution with the Western world, and the Soviet system with com-
plete lack of freedom. Moreover, genuine philosophy can exist within a
society that is free to a certain extent only, and Hegel's statement
should be interpreted in this vein too: Prussia in his day was not a really
free constitution either. The Soviet-Union today is a state that, when it
curtails freedom of thought, is violating a principle that it officially
recognizes. As far as philosophy itself is concerned, I think that it can
be creative only if it is free in the sense of being determined by its o w n
criteria, free to develop according to its o w n logic, eventually into
something else than it was before, i.e., in the case of Marxism-Leninism,
into non-Marxist-Leninist philosophy. And, as philosophy itself
changes, so does its perception of its own past, the philosophical
interpretation of its history. In this sense, we may totally agree with
M.A. Kissel' when he writes that "the movement of philosophy can not
be halted," and that, "consequently, the very perspective, from which
the historical retrospective is carried out, is in due course subject to
necessary changes, but the aspiration to evaluate the philosophical
heritage from the viewpoint of its significance for the present remains
unchangeable." 2J2
NOTES
J These distinctions are mine, but they can be found in Western and Soviet literature
alike. For a brief exposition of Soviet terminology see Z. A. Kamenskij, "Istorija filosofii
kak istoriografija i kak nauka," in VF 1984, N ° 11, pp. 113--125. Western authors
often, but not always, distinguish equally well between the theoretical and the practical
aspect of historiography of philosophy as do their Soviet colleagues.
2 There is hardly any Western literature about the development of Soviet historiogra-
phy of philosophy: apart from small paragraphs in general books on Soviet philosophy I
know of only a few titles:
-- K. G. Ballestrem, "Soviet Historiography of Philosophy," in SST 3 (1963), pp.
107--120;
-- J. M. Bochefiski, "History of Soviet History of Philosophy," in SST 5 (1965), pp.
311--313;
-- M. L. Rybarczyk, Sowietische Historiographie der Philosophic [Diss., Fribourg,
1975];
J. P. Scanlan's Marxism in the USSR A Critical Survey of Current Soviet Thought,

Ithaca & London, Cornell UP, 1985, the most complete Western source on "stagnant"
Soviet philosophy, does not contain a chapter on IFN.
3 The conclusion of M. L. Rybarczyk ("Man mug jedoch abschlieBend feststellen, dab
die sowjetische Historiographic der Philosophic den lebendigsten Teil innerhalb der
sowjetischen Philosophic darstellt und daft ihre weitere Entwicklung nicht ohne
Riickwirkungen auf diese bleiben wird" [M. L. Rybarczyk, Sowjetische Historiographic
der Philosophic [Diss., Fribourg, 1975], p. 9f, italics mine, EvdZ]) has already proved
to be right, and there is ample ground to repeat this thesis today.
4 For a detailed discussion of the first IFE~ see my "Discussion review of Istoriko-
filosofskij e~egodnik 1986," in SST 37 (1989), pp. 27--35.
5 On the average, 25% of the pages of the first three IFE~ were dedicated to the
publication of sources in the Russian original or in translation.
6 K. G. Jung, "Razli~ie vosto6nogo i zapadnogo my~lenija," in FN 1988, N ° 10, pp.
92--103; G. Ba~ljar, Novyj racionalizm, Moskva, Progress, 1987; Kn.-G. Gadamer,
lstina i metod (fragmenty), in FN 1987, N ° 6, pp. 97--105; G. Frege, ~riftponjatij, in:
Metody logi6eskikh issledovanij, Tbilisi, Mecniereba, 1987, pp. 83--151; K. Levi-Stross,
Strukturnaja antropologija, Moskva, Nauka, 1985; J. Khejzinga (J. Huizinga), Osen'
srednevekov~a, Moskva, Nauka ("Pamjatniki istori~eskoj mysli"), 1988; K. G. Jung, "Ob
arkhetipakh kollektivnogo bessoznatel'nogo," in VF 1988, N ° 1, pp. 133--150; Z.
Frejd, °'Budu~6ee odnoj illjuzii," in VF 1988, N ° 8, pp. 132--160; V. Dil'tej, "Nabroski
k kritike istori~eskogo razuma," in VF 1988, N ° 4, pp. 135--152; E. Gusserl, "Krizis
evropejskoj ~elove6estva i filosofija," in VF 1986, N ° 3, pp. 101--116; D. Luka6,
Molodoj Geger i problemy kapitalistideskogo ob~(estva, Moskva, Nauka, 198? (an-
nounced in 1FE~ '86, p. 303); idem, Svoeobrazie Osteti(eskogo, Moskva, Progress, 1986;
Dz. Margolis, Li(nost' i soznanie. Perspektivy nereduktivnogo materializma, Moskva,
Progress, 1986; E. Fromm, lmet' ili byt'?, Moskva, Progress, 1986; L. Gr6kh6m,
Nauka, filosofi]a i (elove(eskoe povedenie v Sovetskom Sojuze, Moskva, Politlzdat,
1990; Heidegger, whose philosophy is perhaps the most severe attack on historicist
optimism is handled with special care: a translation of Sein und Zeit is under way, but
seems to meet with some difficulties; a short text by Heidegger was published in IFE~
'86 (M. Khajdegger, "U~enie Platona ob istine," in IFE~ '86, pp. 255--275 (translation
by T. V. Vasil'eva, introduction by A. L. Dobrokhotov); a Russian translation of
Wittgenstein's Philosophische Untersuchungen is under way; his Tractatus logico-
philosophicus was translated in 1958.
7 F° V. J° Selling, So~inenija v 2-kh tomakh, Moskva, Mysl' ("Filosofskoe nasledie," T.
102), 1987; Platon, Dialogi (translated and annotated by A. F. Losev and A. A. Takho-
Godi), Moskva, Mysl' ("Filosofskoe nasledie"), 1986; D. Lokk, So(ienija v 3-kh
tomakh, Moskva, Mysl' ("Filosofskoe nasledie"), 1988; Erazm Rotterdamskij, Filo-
sofskie proizvedenija, Moskva, Nauka ("Pamjatniki filosofskoj mysli"), 1986; T. Gobbs,
So6inenija v 2-kh tomakh, Moskva, Mysl' ("Filosofskoe nasledie"), 1988.
8 "Po tu storonu dobra i zla," in VF 1989, N ° 5,122--149.
9 "Ot redakcii," in VF 1989, N ° 5, p. 113.
J0 A.V. Mikhajlov, "Predislovie k publikacii," in VF 1989, N ° 5, p° 113.
i 1 0 p . cit.,p. 122.
~2 Voprosyfilosofii currently is printed in 26,000 (1988, N ° 11) to 52,000 (1989, N °
2) copies, Filosofskie nauki in 8224 copies (1989, N ° 3).
13 For instance, the philosophical works of Nikolaj Bukharin, recently (21/VI/1988)

rehabilitated.
14 L. Chernyak, review of J. P. Scardan, Marxism in the USSR. A Critical Survey of
Current Soviet Thought, in SST 33 (1987), p. 83.
15 t~. V. II'enkov, "From the Marxist-Leninist Point of View," in: N. Lobkowicz (ed.),
Marx and the Western World, Notre Dame (Ind.), Notre Dame UP, 1967, pp. 391--
407.
16 ]~. V. II'enkov, "Marks i zapadnyj mir," in VF 1988, N ° 10, pp. 99--112.
~7 N. Lobkowicz (ed.), Marx and the Western World, Notre Dame (Ind.), Notre Dame
UP, 1967, p. XII.
18 A.G. Novokhat'ko, "Predislovie k publikacii," in VF 1988, N ° 10, p. 98.
19 ]~. V. II'enkov, "Marks i zapadnyj mir," in VF 1988, N O10, p. 101.
20 Ibid.; in the English version p. 394; quotations from the Russian original.
21 Cf. op. cit., p. 109.
2z Cf. o13. cit., p. 107.
23 Cf. op. cit.,p. 111f.
24 Op. cit., p. 108; p. 403 in the English version.
25 Davydov was one of the workers at the Institut Istorii Iskusstv in Moscow who were
reprimanded in 1967/8 for supporting A. Ginzburg and I. Galanskov (cf. Scanlan, op.
cir., p. 313). At present he is head of a department at the Institut Sociologi6eskikh
Issledovanij AN SSSR (cf. "NaZi avtory," in VF 1988, N ° 3, where Davydov published a
sharply critical article on Soviet philosophical culture, "Razdum'ja o filosofskoj
kul'ture" (pp. 57--70)).
26 R. Petropavlovskij, "Po povodu odnoj knigi," in Kommunist 1983, N ° 8, pp. 102--
114.
27 j.p. Scanlan, op. cir., p. 278.
28 Ju. N. Davydov, t~tika ljubvi i metafizika svoevolja. Problemy nravstvennoj filosofii,
Moskva, Molodaja gvardija, (1982) 19892 (2-e, dop. i pererab, izdanie).
29 It was announced in a 50,000 copy-edition.
3o Prices often seem to be employed as a means to stimulate or curb the sale of
particular books; e.g., the 2-vohime edition of selected works by V.S. Solov'ev costs 20
Roubles, while other editions in the same series, "Filosofskoe nasledie," cost signifi-
cantly less (the 2-volume edition of Th. Hobbes a mere 5,60 Rouble, for instance).
However, people are willing to pay much higher prices at the black market for the
books they really want, and the Solov'ev edition was published in 30,000 copies.
Another plausible explanation is that publishing houses, like any enterprise, are subject
to Khozras~&, and expect to be able to sell this edition at such a price.
31 Cf. Ju.N. Davydov, op. cit., p. 4 ; cf. also op. cit., p. 12.
32 Cf. op. cit., pp. 291ff.
33 Cf. Ol). cit., p. 4f.
34 Cf. op. cit., pp. 4ft.
J 5 0 p . cit., p. 8.
36 After all, the "village-writers," who, according to Davydov, are the true continuators
of the moral philosophy of Tolstoj and Dostoevskij, are often associated with Russian
nationalism and even with the neo-fascist organization PAMJA T.
37 Cf. Ju. N. Davydov, op. cit., pp. 286ff.
38 Cf. M. S. Gorbachev, Perestrojka i novoe my~lenie dlja nage] strany i dlja vsego mira,
Moskva, Politizdat, 1987, pp. 148ff.
39 G. G. gpet, "Teatr kak iskusstvo," in VF 1988, n ° 11, pp. 77--92; P. A. Florenskij,

"Avtoreferat," in VF 1988, N ° 12, pp. 113--119; S. L. Frank, "Pugkin ob otnogenii
me2du Rossiej i Evropoj," in VF 1988, N ° 10, pp. 146--155; V. S. Solov'ev, Sodinenija
v 2-kh tomakh, Moskva, Mysl' ("Filosofskoe nasledie'), 1988; idem, "Istori~eskie dela
filosofii," in VF 1988, N ° 8, pp. 118--125; Also, 1989 saw a new edition of the well-
known Soviet standard work Russkaja filosofija IX--XIX vv (Russian philosophy of the
9th--19th century) by A. A. Galaktionov and P. F. Nikandrov, Leningrad, Izd. Leningr.
Un-ta, (1970) 1989). The new edition was delayed twice, in 1979 and in 1985 (ef. p. 4
of the work itself). The tira~ is small (10,000 copies) and when I purchased it in
Leningrad, it was sold under the counter, a clear indication of public interest.
4o Cf. A. F. Losev, lstorija antidnoj Ostetiki, Tom VII, Kn. 1, p. 3, Moskva, Iskusstvo,
1988.
41 Cf. A. A. Takho-Godi, in FN 1988, N ° 10, p. 67.
42 And in 1984 he received the Order of the Red Banner of Labour for his work as a
professor at the leading pedagogical institute of the USSR, the Moskovskij Ordena
Lenina i Ordena Trudovogo Krasnogo Znameni Gosudartsvennyj Pedagogi6eskij
Institut im. V. I. Lenina, in Moscow, where he was appointed in 1942 (cf. "Beseda s
professorom A. F. Losevym," in VF 1984, N O 1, p. 144, and Yearbook USSR '86,
Moscow, Novosti, 1986, p. 182).
43 A. F. Losev, Filosofija imeni, Moskva, Nau6.-popul. Izd-vo Mosk. un-ta, 1990.
44 Cf. "Nekrolog Aleksej F~dorovi6 Losev," in VF 1988, N O9. p. 172, the interview by
V. V. Erofeev, "V tvor6eskoj masterskoj," in Voprosy Literatury 1985, N ° 10, p. 206,
and J. P. Seanlan, "A. F. Losev and the Rebirth of Soviet Aesthetics after Stalin," in: J.
J. O'Rourke e.a. (eds.), Contemporary Marxism, Dordrecbt, Reidel, 1984, p. 221.
45 Cf. J. P. Scanlan, op. cit., p. 330: "The monumental studies of A. F. Losev in the
history of thought -- especially of aesthetic thought -- are unparalleled in world
literature"; cf. also the statement by Losevs widow, A. A. Takho-Godi, that "the work
by A. F. Losev in creating a history of classical aesthetics has no analogue in the world's
scientific practice, and its merit will be valued by more than one generation of grateful
readers" (FN 1988, N ° 10, p. 67).
46 "A number of generations of Soviet scholars in the field of classical history,
philology and philosophy will proudly regard themselves as pupils of A. F. Losev" ("...
Imja est' ~izn'... ," in FN 1988, N ° 10, p. 67).
47 IFEi '86, p. 295.
48 K. N. Ljubutin, A. V. Percev, review of IFE~ '86 and IFEg '87, in VF 1988, N O 11,
p. 169.
49 "Problemy izu6enija istorii russkoj filosofii i kul'tury. Materialy <<kruglogo stola>~," in
VF 1988, N ° 9, pp. 92--161.
50 T. I. Ojzerman, "Istoriko-filosofskij process: k kharakteristike bor'by me~du materi-
alizmom i idealizmom," in FN 1988, N ° 7, pp. 31 --41.
5~ About 400 Soviet historians of philosophy, representing virtually all research
centres of the AN and of most VUZy, took part in this conference; the proceedings
were published in 1988; V. V. Mgvenieradze (otv. red.), Metodologigeskie i miro-
vozzrendeskieproblemy istoriifilosofii, Moskva, Nauka, 1988.
52 I am thinking of such titles as O. E. Nesterova, "Istoriko-filosofskie predposylki
u6enija Avgustina o sootno~enii vremeni i ve6nosti," in N. V. Motro~ilova (ed.),
Istoriko-filosofskij e~egodnik '86, Moskva, Nauka, 1986, pp. 35--48; P. P. Gajdenko,
"O filosofsko-teoreti6eskikh predposylkakh mekhaniki Galileja," ibid. pp. 69--83; A. V.
Semugkin, "~Zagadka~ t~mpedokla," in IFE~ '88, pp. 22--37; A. A. 12anygev, "Problema

cennostnogo i celevogo edinstva kul'tury v idealizme A. gopengauera," in IFE£ '88, pp.
135--150; or, to mention a translated article: S. S. Averincev, "Die Symbolik des friihen
Mittelalters; zu einem Problemkreis," in N. V. Motro~ilova (Hrsg.), Studien zur
Geschichte der westlichen Philosophie. Elf Arbeiten jiingerer sowjetischer Autoren,
Frankfurt/M, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986, pp. 72--104.
53 Cf. F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen
Philosophie, MEW, Bd. 21, pp. 259--307.
54 Cf. Engels, MEW, Bd. 21, p. 274; "Je nachdem diese Frage so oder so beantwortet
wurde, spalteten sich die Philosophen in zwei groBe Lager" (op. cit., p. 275). Cf. also
Lenin in Materializm i Empiriokriticizm: "Behind the heap of new terminological
contrivances, behind the Gelehrten-scholasticism we always found, without exception,
two fundamental lines, two principal tendencies in the solution of philosophical
problems. Whether to take as primary nature, matter, the physical, the outer world --
and to regard as secondary consciousness, mind, s e n s a t i o n . . . , the mental and the like,
that is the radical question which as a matter of fact continues to divide the philoso-
phers into two big camps", V. I. Lenin, PSS, Tom 18, p. 356.
55 Cf. V. I. Lenin, op. cit., p. 361.
56 V. I. Lenin, Filosofskie tetrady, "Konspekt "Nanki logiki" Gegelja," in: PSS, Tom 29,
p.215.
57 K. Marx, Zur Kritik derpolitischen Okonomie, in: ME W, Bd. 13, p. 8f.
5s Beginning with Marx' dissertation on Democritus and Epicurus, through Engels'
Ludwig Feuerbach to Lenin's Filosofskie tetrady, esp. the sections on works on the
history of philosophy by Hegel and Feuerbach.
59 Cf. G. F. Aleksandrov, Istorija zapadnoevropejskoj filosofi# kurs lekcij, progitannykh
v Vysgejpartijnoj gkole pri CK VKP (b), Moskva, 1945, pp. 5--8, passim.
60 Again, cf. G. F. Aleksandrov, op. cit., p. 5, 9.
6~ Cf. M. L. Rybarczyk, op. cit., p. 6: "Die Entwicklung der sowjetischen Geschichts-
philosophie [here, "Philosophiegeschichte" is meant, EvdZ] der letzten Jahrzehnte ist
vom Kampf um den Vorrang zweier allgemeiner soziologischer GesetzmfiBigkeiten
gepriigt, n~rnlich der GesetzmiiBigkeit der Bedingtheit der Entwicklung der Philosophie
von der Entwicklung des 6konomischen Lebens der Gesellschaft, durch den Wechsel
der materiellen Produktionsweise, und der Gesetzm/iBigkeit v o n d e r relativen Selbst-
stfindigkeit der Entwicklung der Philosophie. Bisher war die erste eindeutig dominier-
end; gegenw~rtig scheint sich das Verh/iltnis zugunsten der zweiten verschoben zu
haben, und jede weitere Entwicklung wird wohl in dieser Richtung gehen miissen".
62 Cf. Lenin, op. cit.,p. 361.
63 M. A. Dynnik e.a. (eds.), Istorifa filosofii v gesti tomakh, Moskva, Izd. AN SSSR,
1957--1965.
64 This function is usually (e.g., Vvedenie vfilosofiju, "Predislovie," in FN 1988, N ° 11,
p. 96) defended by quoting Engels: "Das theoretische Denken ist aber nur der Anlage
nach eine angebore Eigenschaft. Diese Anlage muB entwickelt, ausgebildet werden, und
fiir diese Ausbildung gibt es bis jetzt kein andres Mittel als das Studium der bisherigen
Philosophic", F. Engels, Dialektik der Natur, "Alte Vorrede zum "[Anti-]D/ihring".
Uber die Dialektik", MEW, Bd. 20, p. 330.
65 Cf. I. S. Vdovina, N. S. Julina, Z. A. Zaritovskaja, "Sovremennaja zapadnoevropejs-
kaja i amerikanskaja filosofija" in: V. V. Mgvenierazde (otv. red.) i. dr., Metodologi6eskie
i mirovozzrengeskie problemy istoriifilosofii, Moskva, Nauka, 1988, p. 186.
66 Texts by C. Levi-Strauss, M. Foucault, T. Kuhn, I. Lakatos, P. Feyerabend, L.

Wittgenstein, S. Toulmin, M. Polanyi, K. R. Popper, J. Hintikka, A. Church, R Carnap,
and other were translated into Russian.
67 Cf. e . g . M . A . Kissel', "Zapadnoevropejskaja i amerikanskaja filosofija novogo
vremeni," in: V. V. M~venierazde, op. cit., p. 171.
6s A. S. Bogomolov, T. I. Ojzerman, Osnovy teorii istoriko-filosofskogo processa,
Moskva, Nauka, 1983 (this book was translated into English in 1986: A. S. Bogomolov,
T. I. Ojzerman, Principles of the Theory of the Historical Process in Philosophy,
Moscow, Progress, 1986), T. I. Ojzerman, Problerny istoriko-filosofskoj nauki, Moskva,
Mysl', (1969) 19822, id., Glavnyefilosofskie napravlenija, Moskva, Mysl', (1971) 19842,
and id., Dialekti~eskij rnaterializrn i istorija filosofii, Moskva, Mysl', 1979 (the books by
Ojzerman appeared in German translation in the GDR).
69 Cf., e.g., T. I. Ojzerman, "Istorija filosofii," in: L. F. ll'i6ev e.a. (eds.), Filosofskij
Enciklopedi(eskij Slovar', Moskva, Izdatel'stvo Sovetskaja Enciklopedija, 1983, p. 232:
....Philosophy, Hegel maintained, is a developing system, and so is the history of
philosophy (...)'. (...). The philosopher did not apply this" principle to his own system,
(...). This anti-historicist view was caused by his idealism" [italics mine, EvdZ].
70 "Istoriko-filosofskij process: k kharakteristike bor'by me2du materializmom i idealiz-
morn" in FN, 1988, N ° 7, pp. 31--41; this article is almost identical to the second part
of the lecture Ojzerman delivered at the 1986 conference, published in: V. V.
M~venierazde, op. cit., pp. 44--70.
71 Op. cit.,p. 31.
72 Op. cit., p. 32.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid,
75 Cf. op. cit., p. 39.

76 Cf. op. cit., pp. 33ff. For instance, Plato was right in criticizing early materialists for
not recognizing other than corporeal reality.
77 Op. cit.,p. 37.
78 E.g., as Ojzerman points out, J.-J. Rousseau was an idealist, whose philosophy,
however, was the most revolutionary of his time, expressing the interests of those below
(op. cit., p. 38).
v9 0p. cit.,p. 39.
80 Ibid.
~10p. cit., p. 40.
82 Op, cit., p. 41.
83 Cf. reviews by V. Sinkaruk, in Kornrnunist 1985, N ° 1, pp. 113--1t5, A. Kh.

Gorfunkel', in FN 1984, N ° 4, pp. 174--176, L.A. Kalinnikov, ibid., pp. 176--178, and
L. N. Mitrokhin, in VF 1985, N ° 3, pp. 154--161, and also A. I. Abramov e.a.,
"Problemy istoriko-filosofskikh issledovanij," in VF 1986, p. 36f; cf. also M. A. Kissel',
"Zapadnoevropejskaja i amerikanskaja filosofija novogo vremeni," in: V. V. M~venier-
azde, op.cit., p. 181: "And indeed, this book is in many respects remarkable and by
means of it, it is possible to judge the present level of Marxist investigation of the
history of philosophy, about what has been achieved and about what remains to be
done".
84 T. I. Ojzerman e.a. (eds.), Filosofija ~pokhi rannykh bur~uaznykh revoljucij, Moskva,
Nauka, 19 8 3; "epoch of early bourgeois revolutions" refers to 16-- 17th century.
~ Op. cit., p. 5.
86 Ibid.
57 K. Marx, MEW, Bd. 1, p. 97.
85 At least I found it only in an article in the Rheinische Zeitung of 1842.
59 T. I. Ojzerman, Formirovanie filosofi'i marksizma (The evolution of the philosophy
of Marxism, Moskva, Nauka, 19742); I used the German translation: Die Entstehung
der marxistischen Philosophie, Berlin (DDR), Dietz Verlag, 1980, p. 140: here the same
statement is paraphrased, in a context where Ojzerman regards Marx, and rightly so I
think, as a philosophical idealist and a "revolutionary democrat."
90 For instance, from his "Konspekt knigi Gegelja "Lekcii po istorii filosofii.... (V. I.
Lenin, PSS, Tom 29, pp. 219--278).
91 "U6enie o 6eloveke v filosofii 6pokhi rannykh bur~uaznykh revoljucij," in T. I.
Ojzerman e.a. (eds.), Filosofija ~pokhi rannykh bur~uaznykh revoljucij, pp. 481--575,
and idem, "Orientacii novoj li6nosti i ikh vyra~enie v filosofii ~eloveka XVII stoletija,"
in I/~Ei '86, pp. 84--103; for a discussion of the second text, see my "Discussion review
of Istoriko-filosofskijeiegodnik1986," in SST 337 (1989), pp. 27--35.
92 T. I. Ojzerman, "Vsemirnaja istorija filosofii: metodologi6eskie problemy," in: V. V.
Mgvenieradze, op. cir., p. 49.
93 "l~pokha, ponjataja v mysljakh" ("die Philosophie (ist) ihre Zeit in Gedanken erfal3t,"
Hegel, Theorie Werkausgabe, Suhrkamp Verlag, Bd 7, p. 12.)
94 I. Ojzerman, op. cit., p. 53.
95 Op. cit., p. 54.
96 M.A. Kissel', op. cit.,p. 172
~7 0p. cir., p. 174.
95 Ibid.
99 Ibid. (quotation by Kissel').
Joo Ibid.
1ol Op. cit., p. 176.
~02 N. V. Motro~ilova (Hrsg.), Studien zur Geschichte der westlichen Philosophie. Elf
Arbeiten fiingerer sowjetischer Autoren, Frankfurt/M., Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986; for a
comprehensive discussion of this book see my Rezensionsbeitrag, to appear this year in
Zeitschrift ~'r philosophische Forschung (Heft 43/4).
~03 I cannot present here all material concerning the growth of Soviet historiography of
philosophy. Rybarczyk has summed up a large number of relevant titles (up to 1970). I
plan to prepare a survey of IFN in the near future myself. For the time being, the best
aid is of course the current Bibliography of Soviet philosophy in SST.
~04 For example, Ojzerman proudly points to the fact that the collected works of
Aristotle in the USSR were printed in an edition of 220,000 copies, which, according
to him, is more than all other complete Aristotle-editions taken together (Cf. T. I.
Ojzerman, "Vsemirnaja istorija filosofii: metodologi6eskie problemy," in: V. V.
M~venierazde, op. cit., p. 49). Whether this is true or not, in any case the achievements
of Soviet publishing houses is indeed impressive in this respect, as is the Soviet public,
devouring these classical texts. By now, most classical philosophical texts are available
in Russian translation (cf. for a survey: "Sto tomov ~Filosofskogo nasledija>~: nekotorye
itogi i po~elanija," in FN 1987, N ° 4, pp. 17--109).
toe Cf. K. G. Ballestrem, "Soviet Historiography of Philosophy," in SST 3 (1963), pp.
107--120; for some Soviet titles, see Rybarczyk, op. cir., p. 148, n. 19--22. More than
once, the shortcomings of lstorija filosofii were discussed at conferences and symposia
in the USSR (cf. T. I. Ojzerman, "Vsemirnaja istorija filosofii: metodologifieskie

problemy," in: V. V. M~venierazde, op. cit., p. 51).
~06 By M. T. Iov~uk, one of the leading Soviet historians of philosophy, in FN 1969, N °
5, p. 47 (Cf. M. L. Rybarczyk, op. cit., p. 151).
~07 T. I. Ojzerman, "Vsemirnaja istorija filosofii: metodologi6eskie problemy," in: V. V.
M~venieradze, op. cit., p. 51.
10s Cf. op. cit., p. 44 and 49.
J09 Op. cit., p. 50.
~ Ojzerman himself was one of the members of the editorial board of Istorija filosofii,
but only from the third volume onward, not of the volumes he discusses here.
~Jl T. L Ojzerman, op. cit., p. 50.
~12 Cf. P. N. Fedoseev, "Glavnye filosofskie napravlenija: istorija i sovremennost'," in
V. V. M~venierazde, op. cit., p. 34: "The beginning of a qualitatively new epoch in the
history of societal thought ["obg(estvennafa mysl'"], a revolution in the spiritual
development of mankind as such was the rise of Marxism". Fedoseev, whose
philosophical career started as early as 1936, of course represents the old days, the
days of Brezhnev and Stalin, and perhaps Soviet philosophers are merely tolerating 80
- year old P&r Nikolaevi~. Still, it is remarkable that philosophical perestrojka hardly
-
has personal consequences: people who disappeared come to the fore again (Davydov,
Bibler, Mamarda~vili and others), but establishment-members like Fedoseev are not
removed.
113 Cf. T. I. Ojzerman, op. tit., p. 51.
l l4 Ibid.
l J5 This feature was remarked as "interesting" by J. M. Bochefiski, in: E. Laszlo (ed.),
Philosophy in the Soviet Union. A Survey of the Mid-Sixties, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1967,
p. 4.
t t6 T.I. Ojzerman, op. cit., p. 53.
117 Ibid.
LI~ Cf. M. S. Gorbachev, Perestrojka i novoe my~lenie dlja nasOj strany i dlja vsego
mira, Moskva, Politizdat, 1987, passim.
~ 9 See for instance the extended Anketa, organized by VF in 1988.
~20 I. T. Frolov (ruk. avt. koll-va) i. dr., Vvedenie vfilosofiju, "Predislovie," in VF 1988,
N ° 9, p. 15.
121 Op. cit.,p. 14.
122 I. T. Frolov, V. S. Stepin, V. A. Lektorskij, V. Z. Kelle, "O zamysle knigi ~<Vvedenie
v filosofiju>>," in VF 1988, N ° 9,p. 5.
123 E.g, the contributors to the collection of articles that appeared in West-Germany in
1986 (N. V. Motro~ilova, (Hrsg.), Studien zur Geschichte der westlichen Philosophie.
Elf Arbeiten j~ingerer sowjetischer Autoren, op. cit.), all started working as professionals
after Stalin's death, most of them after 1956/7, and at the same time represent the best
the USSR has to offer in the field of the history of philosophy. Also, in the introduction
to this collection the editor, N. V. Motro~ilova, points to the fact that these scholars
were formed by unorthodox Soviet philosophers like M. M. Bakhtin, A. F. Losev, V. F.
Asmus and K. S. Bakradze (p. 14f).
1~4 "Unmasking the Stalin cult, condemning the mass repressions, the 20th congress
created a new political atmosphere and gave impetus to the development of creative
activity in the field of philosophy. Though timidly and gradually, but all the same with
growing force philosophers started to experience themselves not just as commentators

and propagandists, but also as scholars, capable of doing their bit in its development.
On the wave of the 20th congress interesting elaborations appeared in our philosophi-
cal literature, problems became wider and richer ["stala ras~irjat'sja i obogo~(at'sja
problematika'], scholarly works began to be published. Philosophical thought was
noticeably animated in our country. In the years following the 20th congress a
significant move forward took place in different fields of philosophy. But for all that,
the impulse in the sphere of spiritual life, given by the 20th congress did not intensify,
but gradually faded. This can be explained by the fact that it was not only not
henceforth supported the way it should have been, but, on the contrary, much was done
to weaken its influence, to liquidate enthusiasm, to shut off the possibility of fruitful
work, to put them aside and establish dogmatic quiet and blessing" (I. T. Frolov, V. S.
Stepin, V. A. Lektorskij, V. Z. Kelle, "O zamysle knigi ~Vvedenie v filosofiju~," in VF
1988, N° 9, p. 4).
125 Op. cit.,p. 3.
J26 Of course, the Party Congress did not discuss at length the state of affairs in IFN.
As a matter of fact, only a few passages in the report by Mr. Gorbachev and a few lines
in the new Party program directly concern philosophy, or rather the social sciences in
general (of which philosophy, in the Soviet conception, is one): cf. Materialy XXVII
S"ezda KPSS, Moskva, Izd. Polit. Lit-ry, 1986, Doklad general'nogo sekretarja CK
KPSS tovarid(a M. S. Gorbageva, gl. l, §3: "Ukrepljat' svjaz' ideologii s ~izn'ju,
oboga~6at' dukhovnyj mir 6eloveka," pp. 84ff, and Programma KPSS, Novaja redakcija,
II, 5: "Idejno-vospitatel'naja rabota, obrazovanie, nauka i kul'tura," pp. 163--168.
127 V.V. M~venierazde, op. cit., p. 4f.
12s Op. cit.,p. 5.
~z~ V. V. M~venierazde, "XXVII s'ezd KPSS i filosofskoe issledovanie istori6eskogo
processa," in V. V. Mgvenierazde, op. cit., p. 9.
i.~o Op. cit., p. 15.
131 Op. cit., p. 14.
I.~2 0p. cit., p. 14.
I.~.~ Op. cit., p. 14.
13~ Op. cit., p. 11.
135 Op. cit.,p. 11.
J36 "The artificial weakening or not mentioning of idealism not only does not serve the
strengthening of, but, on the contrary depreciates the true role of materialist philoso-
phy, which as a matter of fact in uncompromising, intricate and unyielding struggle
gained the victory over idealism and religious and mystical views. However, this was
not a road of continuous victory. There have been defeats as well, when idealism gained
the upper hand" (V. V. Mgvenierazde, op. cit., p. 12).
I.~7 0p. cit.,p. 12.
l)a Op. cit.,p. 12.
139 Cf. op. cit, p. 13.
~4cJ p. N. Fedoseev, "Glavnye filosofskie napravlenija: istorija i sovremennost'," in V. V.
M~venierazde, op. cit., p. 30.
HI "K. Marx and F: Engels (...) were the first to demonstrate that philosophy (...) is
in the final analysis conditioned by the structure of social life. (...), they discovered the
most important regularity of the development of philosophy -- the struggle between
materialism and idealism, which in the final analysis reflects the interests and aspira-
tions of the various classes of society" [italics mine, EvdZ] (Op. cit., p. 31), and "This
materialism [i.e., dialectical and historical materialism, EvdZ], V. I. Lenin stressed,
assimilated and reshaped everything valuable in the more than two thousand years of
experience in the development of human culture" (ibid., p. 29.).
L42 Op. cit., p. 38.
J43 Op. cit., p. 43.
t44 K. N. Ljubutin, A. V. Percev, review of IFEg '86 and 1FE~ '87, in VF 1988, N" 11,
pp. 168ff.
145 Op. cit.,p. 169.
146 A.V. Mikhajlov, "Predislovie k publikacii," in VF 1989, N" 5, p. 144.
147 V.V. Glin~ikov, "Bol'ge filosofskikh ~urnalov," in VF 1989, N ° 3, p. 159f.
14~ Since January 1989, a new journal, Filosofskaja i sociologideskafa mysl', appears
monthly in Kiev; it is published in Ukrainian and Russian, and replaces Filosofskaja
dumka, which appeared in Ukrainian only.
14,) g . V . Glin~ikov, op. cit., p. 159.
15o Op. cit., p. 160.
151 Vvedenie vfilosofiju, "Predislovie," in VF 1988, N ° 9, p. 16.
152 Op. cit., p. 17.
ts.~ Cf. "Vsemirnyj filosofskij kongress," in VF 1989, N L'2, p. 17f.
154 Op. cit.,p. 17.
ts.s Op. cit.,p. 18.
L56 I. T. Frolov, V. S. Stepin, V. A. Lektorskij, V. Z. Kelle, "O zamysle knigi ~Vvedenie
v filosofiju~>," in VF 1988, N ° 9, p. 5.
157 "Vsemirnyj filosofskij kongress," in VF 1989, N ° 2, p. 18.
15s I. T. Frolov (ruk. avt. koll.-va) i. dr., Vvedenie v filosofiju; udebnik dlja vuzov,
Moskva, Politizdat, 1989; 500,000 copies. So far, this book is still in the prospekt-
phase: the "predislovie," "zaklju6enie" and "oglavlenie" appeared in VF 1988, N ° 9. pp.
12--27; "predislovie" and "oglavlenie" as well appeared in FN 1988, N ° 11, pp. 95--
102, the first chapter was published in FN 1989, N ° 2, pp. 64--82 and N ° 3, pp. 71--
86; in FN 1989, N ° 4, pp. 65--79, the first part of chapter VII, "Materija" was
published -- further parts of the book will follow; a first collection of readers' reactions
was printed in VF 1989, N ° 3, pp. 155--159. This Vvedenie is not the only new
textbook: V. Makharova (ed.), Marksistsko-leninskaja filosofifa. Ugebnoe posobie dlja
vuzov, Moskva, Vysgaja gkola, 1989 was announced in Novye Knigi 1988--21, p. 27.
159 F. V. Konstantinov (ruk. avt. koll-va) i. dr., Osnovy marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii;
ugebnik dlja vuzov, Moskva, Izd. polit, lit. --ry, 19826 (updated to include the results of
the 26th congress of the CPSU; 600,000 copies). The first edition of this u(ebnik
appeared in 1985, a fourth, revised edition in 1978. An English translation appeared in
1982: The Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Moscow, Progress Publishers.
160 Published in FN 1989, N ° 2, pp. 64--82 and N ° 3, pp. 71--86. M. S. Kozlova is
known for her study on Wittgenstein, Filosofija i jazyk, Moskva, Nauka, 1972, a book
which is often mentioned by Soviet historians of philosophy when asked to name a
good study (cf. N. V. Motro~ilova (Hrsg.), Studien zur Geschichte der westlichen
Philosophic. Elf Arbeiten jiingerer sowjetischer Autoren, op. cit., "Einf/ihrung," p. 18
and 27).
L61 Cf. Vvedenie v filosofiju, "Glava I, Filosofija," in FN 1989, N ° 2, p. 76, and:
"Perhaps the first to approximate the essence of the matter was the great German
philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724--1804). A new, fundamental meaning is contained
in the understanding of the essence of the destiny of philosophy, worked out by Karl
Marx (1818--1883) on the basis of the materialist conception of society that he had
uncovered. Leaning on the views of these thinkers [i.e., not of Engels or Lenin, EvdZ],
we will try to introduce you to that special field of knowledge, ideas, problems, that is
named philosophy." (ibid.)
162 Op. cit.,p. 82, n. l l .
163 F.W. Konstantinov, op. cit., p. 8.
J64 Op. cit., p. 9.
165 Ibid.
166 1bid.
167 Vvedenie vfilosofiju, "Glava I, Filosofija," in FN 1989, N ° 2, p. 78.
~68 Ibid.
~69 Op. cit., p. 78f.
170 Op. cir., p. 79.
~7~ "Since the beginning of the sixties a good deal of investigation about the problem of
man has been carried out in our philosophy. And although those who dedicated
themselves to this question were not infrequently accused of abstract humanism, or of
subjectivism, or of "biologism," or of any other sin, on the whole it is precisely thanks
to these investigations that the turn to what we may call the humanist insight of Marx,
Engels, and Lenin, has appeared" (I. T. Frolov (ruk. avt. koll-va) i. dr., Vvedenie v
filosofiju, "Zakljurenie," in VF 1988, N ° 9, p. 23f.).
t7z Vvedenie vfilosofiju, "Glava I, Filosofija," in FN 1989, N ° 2, p. 79ff.
173 T h i s return to Marx is remarkable: as Western commentators showed, and as is
indeed evident from the Osnovy and other "official" texts, Marx had actually become
the least important of the tree klassiki.
174 Vvedenie vfilosofiju, "Zakljurenie," in VF 1988, N o 9, p.18.
175 Op. cit, p. 24.
176 The Osnovy comprised a few pages about the "theoretical sources of dialectical and
historical materialism" (pp. 27--30) and a chapter on "Contemporary bourgeois
philosophy" (pp. 398--423), part of the section 'Kritika sovremennoj bur~uaznoj
filosofii i sociologii'. The new Vvedenie will comprise a chapter on 'The origin and the
historical forms of philosophy,' ending with German idealism and Russian philosophy,
and another on 'Twentieth-century non-Marxist philosophy'.
177 I. T. Frolov (ruk. avt. koll-va) i. dr., Vvedenie vfilosofifu, "Predislovie," in VF 1988,
N ° 9, p. 17.
178 Kniga dlja 6tenija po filosofii, Moskva, Politizdat, 1990 (cf. I. T. Frolov, op. c#.,
p. 17).
179 I.T. Frolov, op. cit., p. 16.
180 The same in FN, 1988, N o 12, p.123 ("Ukazatel' statej, opublikovannykh v ~urnale
v 1988 g.").
~sJ Cf. VF 1988, N ° 12, p. 168. ("Ukazatel' statej, pome~rennykh v ~urnale ~(Voprosy
filosofib> za 1988 god").
~s2 Cf. op. cit., p. 167.
~s3 N. V. Motro~ilova, in: "Fenomenologija i e6 rol' v sovremennoj filosofii (Materialy
~kruglogo stola~>),"in VF 1988, N ° 12, pp. 43--84.
184 Op. cit., p. 43.
~85 Op. cit., p. 43f

L86 Op. cit., p. 45.
187 Cf. op. cit., p. 46.
~s8 Cf. op. cir., p. 48.
~89 Cf. op. cit., p. 48f.
190 Op. cir., p. 49.
tgt The very word is lacking: she once speaks about Marxist philosophy, but generally
employs "our" or "Soviet" to denote her own philosophical provenance.
192 N. S. Julina, "Popper i nemeckaja klassi~eskaja filosofija," in IFEi '87, pp. 139--
150.
193 Cf. op, cit.,p. 139.
194 Popper himself made this comparison (K. R. Popper, Objective Knowledge, Oxford,
Oxford UP, (1972) 19792, p. 197), as Julina observes (op. cit, p. 144). One may doubt
whether the difference lies in the triadic versus tetradic nature of the two schemes (also,
one may well question the use of the terms thesis-antithesis-synthesis as a way to
describe Hegelian dialectics. These terms are Popper's; Julina does not amend them), if
we realize that "antithesis" means not something opposing the thesis, but an opposition
of two things, from which something else, viz., a new "thesis" arises, which in turn is a
new "thesis," much like Problem 2 in Popper's scheme is a new Problem, which again
gives rise to a new opposition of TT' and EE'; the similarity between the two schemes
therefore is even greater than Popper or Julina recognize.
~95 Cf. op. cit., p. 146.
196 Cf. op. cit., p. 149. This development in Popper's philosophy was already indicated
in 1959, when he, in his introduction to the English edition of The Logic of Scientific
Discovery, stated that there was at least one genuine philosophical problem, viz., "the
problem of cosmology: the problem of understanding the world -- including ourselves,
and our knowledge, as part of the worM" (K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific
Discovery, London, Hutchinson (1959) 1972, p. 15; italics in the original).
E~7 N.S. Julina, op. cit., p. 146.
19s Op, cit.,p. 150.
199 As far as I know, only one Soviet translatin of Popper has appeared: K. R. Popper,
Logika i rost naurnogo znanija: izbrannye raboty, Moskva, (Nauka?), 1983, which con-
tains a considerable part (about 200 closely printed pages) of the Logic of Scientific
Discovery, chapters 1, 3 and 10 of Conjectures and Refutations, chapters 3 and 6 of
Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach, and some other texts.
2o0 It is another question whether the Marxist-Leninist concept of "social conscious-
ness" is much more satisfying, but it is true that the ontological status of "World 3" --
where and how does it exist? -- is far from clear.
201 In N. S. Julina, V. A. Lektorskij (eds.), Problemy i protivore(ija bur~uaznojfilosofii
60--70-kh godov X X veka, Moskva, Nauka, 1983, pp. 87--132. It is illuminating to
compare this specialists' study by Julina (edition: 4100 copies) with a more popular
(30,000 copies) publication of the same year, I. S. Narskij's Sovremennaja burguaznaja
filosofija: dva vedugdikh tegenija nadala 80-kh godov X X veka, Moskva, Mysl', 1983, in
which a sharp "criticism" of Popper is offered: his thesis of the incommensurability of
various stages in the development of knowledge was pointed, Narskij tells us, against
dialectical materialism (p. 38), and the point of his "critical rationalism" was "to
dissociate himself from materialism and dialectics,.., and at the same time to conceal
his own irrationalism and agnosticism" (p. 40).
202 N.S. Julina, op. cit.,p. 139.

203 Cf. for instance B. N. Bessonov (ed.), "Kriti(eskij racionalizm": filosofija i politika,
Moskva, Mysl', 1981, and the pamphlet by Narskij mentioned above.
204 A. P. Butenko, "Vinoven li Karl Marks v <~kazarmennom socializme~?," in FN
1989, N ° 4, pp. 17--26.
205 V. P. Makarenko, "Analiz social'noj prirody bjurokratii v rabotakh K. Marksa
1844--1851 gg.," in IFEg '88, pp. 5--21.
2o6 A. P. Butenko, "O social'no-klassovoj prirode stalinskoj vlasti," in VF 1989, N" 3,
pp. 65--78.
2o7 "Marxism-Leninism is a unified revolutionary doctrine. The party that was founded
by the great Lenin became the living incarnation of the conjunction of scientific
socialism and labour movement, of the indissoluble unity of theory and practice. She
has been, is, and will be the party of Marxism-Leninism, a party of revolutionary
action", (Programma KPSS, Novaja redakcija: "Vvedenie," in: Materialy XXVll S"ezda
KPSS, Moskva, Politizdat, 1986, p. 122).
20s K. N. Ljubutin, A. V. Percev, review of IFE~ '86 and 1FE~ '87, in VF 1988, N~' 11,
p. 169.
209 N. V. Motro~ilova (hrsg.), Studien zur Geschichte der westlichen Philosophic. Elf
Arbeiten jiingerer sowjetischer Autoren, op. cit. (translations of separately published
articles and parts of books); A. V. Gulyga, Immanuel Kant, Frankfurt/M, (Insel
Verlag) Suhrkamp Verlag, (1981) 19852, and idem, Emmanuel Kant, une vie, Paris,
Aubier, 1981 (translations of A. V. Gulyga, Kant, Moskva, Molodaja gvardija, (1977)
19812); idem, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Frankfurt/M, R6derberg Verlag, 1981
(translation of A. V. Gulyga, Geger); idem, Schelling, 1989 (translation of A. V.
Gulyga, ~elling, Moskva, 1984); A. S. Bogomolov, T. I. Ojzerman, Principles of the
Theory of the Historical Process in Philosophy, Moscow, Progress, 1986 (translation of
A. S. Bogomolov, T. I. Ojzerman, Osnovy teorii istoriko-filosofskogo processa, Moskva,
Nauka, 1983); V. A. Lektorsky, Subject, Object, Cognition, Moscow, Progress, 1984
(translation of V. A. Lektorskij, Sub"ekt, ob'ekt, poznanie, Moskva, Nauka, 1980);
contributions by Soviet historians of philosophy appeared in the Hegel-Jahrbiicher,
edited by W. R. Beyer, in M. Buhr, T. 1. Oiserman (Hrsg.), Revolution der Denkart oder
Denkart der Revolution: Beitra'ge zur Philosophic Immanuel Kants, Berlin (DDR),
Akademie-Verlag, 1976, and in D. Henrich (Hrsg.), Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik,
Formation und Rekonstruktion (Ver6ffentlichungen der Intemationalen Hegel-Ver-
einigung, Band 16), Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 1986 (the same collection appeared in the
USSR: N. V. Motro~ilova, T. I. Ojzerman (otv. red.), Filosofifa Gegelfa: problemy
dialektiki, Moskva, Nauka, 1987).
210 In his short contribution [in VF 1988, N ° 1, p. 122], P. V. Tulaev, an "amateur-
philosopher" from Moscow, mentions five philosophers that, in his opinion, should be
published more often than they are; four of these are historians of philosophy: A. F.
Losev, A. V. Gulyga, P. P. Gajdenko and N. V. Motro~ilova (the fifth is Ju. N.
Davydov). To this list one should at least add 1~. Ju. Solov'ev, A. L. Dobrokhotov and
M. K. Mamarda~vili: all three of them primarily historians of philosophy, but they will
appear as "tiefschiiffende Selbstdenker" as soon as this becomes attainable (the
expression "tiefschfirfende Selbstdenker" ["in-depth independent thinders"] comes from
N. V. Motro~ilova, "Einleitung," in: N. V. Motro~ilova (Hrsg.), Studien zur Geschichte
der westlichen Philosophic. Elf Arbeiten jiingerer sowjetischer Autoren op. cit., p. 25.
211 G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen iiber die Geschichte der Philosophie, "Einleitung',

Heidelberger Niederschrift, in: Theorie Werkausgabe,Frankfurt/M, Suhrkamp Verlag,
Band 18, p. 117."
212 M. A. Kissel', "Zapadnoevropejskaja i amerikanskaja filosofija novogo vremeni," in:
V. V. M~venierazde, op. cit., p. 176.
Department of Philosophy
The University of Nijmegen
Thomas van Aquinostraat 3
Postbus 9108
6500 HK Nijmegen
The Netherlands

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EVERT VAN DER ZWEERDE

Before starting this survey of recent developments in Soviet historiogra-

After a boom in "philosophical sovietology" in the years following the

Studies in Soviet Thought 39: 1--53, 1990.

level of professionalism, and will strongly influence future Soviet

And the editor of the text, A. V. Mikhajlov, opens his well-informed

convenient introduction to the whole range of ideas and notions of

Evidently, II'enkov's sin consisted in engaging in independent philo-

And those negative phenomena, that anti-communist propaganda in the West is

By simply restating such classical Marxist notions as the gradual

An example of the second category is Ju. N. Davydov's Etika ljubvi i

Russian literature was kept alive, according to Davydov, by the so-

The title of the epilogue, "Nravstvennoe vozro~denie i sud'by Rossii"

revival in this respect: a greater autonomy of the various non-Russian

In the Istoriko-filosofskij e£egodnik it is intended first of all to develop a discussion of

However, in none of the three issues that have appeared so far, do

we find any theoretical or methodological contribution. And the same

Perestrojka in philosophy, i.e., the surmounting of vulgarization and schematism, of a

IFN occupies a particular place in Soviet philosophy. On the one hand

it is very difficult to say in what sense they may be called Marxist or

The collected writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin, serving as a

the philosophical approach present in Lenin's Filos@kie tetrady to the

and philosophically more interesting to describe the subsequent phi-

Against the background sketched in §2, we can discern five different

aspects of philosophical reasoning and to the contents of past philo-

teorii istoriko-filosofskogo processa and in three further books by

All these complex processes are "materially conditioned," but this

that idealists were always and everywhere "the ideologists of reac-

It is this definition that enables Ojzerman to make a distinction

The concluding statement makes it very clear, in my opinion, that

Philosophy, according to the well-known expression by Marx, is the spiritual quintes-

and continues with a paraphrase:

In other words, sociologically understood, philosophy is the self-consciousness of a

Now, Marx indeed wrote that

course Hegel's pan-logicism and absolute idealism, but nonetheless

A c c o r d i n g to Ojzerman, Hegel, who defined p h i l o s o p h y as "epoch,

This Hegelian position is d o m i n a n t in IFN, but it is not without

All participants in the discussion agreed that the "linear a r r a n g e m e n t

versy. ''~ One of these was a "culturological approach," advocated by

It will be most interesting to see if and how this discussion will go on

for a period of about 20 years (approx. 1965--1985) Soviet historians

research institutes and a number of institutes of higher education

Ojzerman is right to assert that this shortcoming is now basically

interaction of philosophy and natural science, and (v) the fundamental,

Ojzerman merely sums up the 'material preconditions' of the new

It is important to note that the sophisticated, Hegelian theory of the

applies to philosophy as well. However, the interests of the CPSU, of

Marx, Engels and Lenin, in elaborating the philosophy of dialectical materialism, in no

Basically, it is Stalin and the intellectual culture founded by him and

So, Soviet philosophy receives orders to improve itself. But perestrofka

At the 1986 conference mentioned before, the consequences of the

Mgvenieradze, in his opening article, "The 27th Congress of the

CPSU and the philosophical investigation of the historical process,"

As far as historians of philosophy are concerned, this amounts to the

Despite his resolute phrasing, M~venieradze does not really make

allegiance to a Marxist-Leninist conception of the history of philosophy.

A "half-truthful account" [polupravdivoe izobra~enie] of the history

Another lamentable effect of the same situation in IFN is what

The struggle of these tendencies -- materialism and idealism -- goes on today on an

Marxist party-mindedness in philosophy stands for the consecutive carrying through

Coming, finally, to the consequences for historians of philosophy,

These statements are so general and traditional that it is hardly to be

simply assigned to history of philosophy as a science, she became accustomed to feel in