G.R. No.

L-49705-09 February 8, 1979 The instant proceedings are sequels of Our decision in
G.R. No. L- 48097, wherein Tomatic Aratuc et al. sought
TOMATIC ARATUC, SERGIO TOCAO, CISCOLARIO the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by
DIAZ, FRED TAMULA, MANGONTAWAR GURO and respondent dent Board in Cotabato city and in which
BONIFACIO LEGASPI, petitioners, canvass, the returns in 1966 out of a total of 4,107 voting
vs. centers in the whole region had already been canvassed
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS​, REGIONAL showing partial results as follows:
BOARD OF CANVASSERS for Region XII (Central
Mindanao), ABDULLAH DIMAPORO, JESUS AMPARO, NAMES OF CANDIDATES
ANACLETO BADOY, et al., respondents.
NO. OF VOTES
Nos. L-49717-21 February 8,1979.
1. Roldan, Ernesto (KB)
LINANG MANDANGAN, petitioner,
vs. 225,674
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE REGIONAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS for Region XII, and 2. Valdez, Estanislao (KBL)
ERNESTO ROLDAN, respondents.
217,789
L-49705-09 — Lino M. Patajo for petitioners.
3. Dimporo, Abdullah (KBL)
Estanislao A. Fernandez for private respondents.
199,244
L-49717-21 — Estanislao A. Fernandez for petitioner.
4. Tocao, Sergio (KB)
Lino M. Patajo for private respondent.
199,062
Office of the Solicitor General, for Public respondents.
5. Badoy, Anacleto (KBL)

BARREDO, J.: 198,966

Petition in G. R. Nos. L-49705-09 for certiorari with 6. Amparo, Jesus (KBL)

restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by six (6)
independent candidates for representatives to tile Interim 184,764
Batasang Pambansa who had joined together under the
banner of the Kunsensiya ng Bayan which, however, was 7. Pangandaman, Sambolayan (KBL)
not registered as a political party or group under the 1976
Election Code, P.D. No. 1296, namely Tomatic Aratuc, 183,646
Sorgio Tocao, Ciscolario Diaz, Fred Tamula,
Mangontawar Guro and Bonifacio Legaspi her referred to 8. Sinsuat, Datu Blah (KBL)
as petitioners, to review the decision of the respondent
Commission on Election (Comelec) resolving their appeal 182,457
from the Of the respondent Regional Board of
Canvasses for Region XII regarding the canvass of the 9. Baga, Tomas (KBL)
results of the election in said region for representatives to
the I.B.P. held on April 7, 1978. Similar petition in G.R. 171,656
Nos. L49717-21, for certiorari with restraining order and
preliminary injunction filed by Linang Mandangan, abo a 10. Aratuc, Tomatic (KB)
candidate for representative in the same election in that
region, to review the decision of the Comelec declaring 165,795
respondent Ernesto Roldan as entitled to be proclaimed
as one of the eight winners in said election. 11. Mandangan, Linang(KB)
165,032
12. Diaz, Ciscolario (KB)
159,977
13. Tamalu, Fred (KB)
153,734
14. Legaspi Bonifacio (KB)
148,200
15. Guro, Mangontawar (KB)
139,386
16. Loma, Nemesio (KB)
107,455
17. Macapeges, Malamama (Independent)
101,350
(Votes Of the independent candidates who actually were
not in contention omitted)" (Page 6, Record,
L-49705-09.)
A supervening panel headed by Commissioner of
Elections, Hon- Venancio S. Duque, had conducted of
the complaints of the petitioners therein of alleged
irregularities in the election records in all the voting
centers in the whole province of Lanao del Sur, the whole
City of Marawi, eight (8) towns of Lanao del Norte,
namely, Baloi, Karomatan, Matungao, Munai, Nunungan,
Pantao Ragat, Tagoloan and Tangcal, seven (7) towns in
Maguindanao, namely, Barrira, Datu Piang, Dinaig,
Matanog Parang, South Upi and Upi, ten (10) towns in
North Cotabato, namely, Carmen, Kabacan, Kidapwan,
Magpet, Matalam Midsayap, Pigcawayan, Pikit, Pres.
Roxas and Tulonan, and eleven (11) towns in Sultan
Kudarat, namely, Bagumbayan, Columbia Don Mariano
Marcos, Esperanza, Isulan, Kalamansig, Lebak, Lutayan,
Palimbang, President Quirino and Tacurong, by reason
for which, petitioners had asked that the returns from
said voting centers be excluded from the canvass. Before
the start of the hearings, the canvass was suspended but
after the supervisory panel presented its report, on May
15, 1978, the Comelec lifted its order of suspension and
directed the resumption of the canvass to be done in
Manila. This order was the one assailed in this Court. We
issued a restraining order.
After hearing the parties, the Court allowed the
resumption of the canvass but issued the following
guidelines to be observed thereat:
1. That the resumption of said canvass shall be held in
the Comelec main office in Manila starting not later than
June 1, 1978;
2. That in preparation therefor, respondent Commission
on Elections shall see to it that all the material election
paragraph corresponding to all the voting center involved
in Election Nos. 78-8, 78-9, 78-10, 78-11 and 78-12 are
taken to its main office in Manila, more particularly, the
ballot boxes, with the contents, used during the said
elections, the books of voters or records of voting and the
lists or records of registered voters, on or before May 31,
1978;
3. That as soon as the corresponding records are
available, petitioners and their counsel shall be allowed
to examine the same under such security measures as
the respondent Board may determine, except the
contents of the ballot boxes which shall be opened only
upon orders of either the respondent Board or
respondent Commission, after the need therefor has
become evident, the purpose of such examination being
to enable petitioners, and their counsel to expeditiously
determine which of them they would wish to be
scrutinized and passed upon by the Board as supporting
their charges of election frauds and anomalies,
petitioners and their counsel being admonished in this
connection, that no dilatory tactics should be in by them
and that only such records substantial objections should
be offered by them for the scrutiny by the Board;
4. That none of the election returns reffered to in the
petition herein shall be canvassed without first giving the
herein petitioners ample opportunity to make their
specific objections thereto, if they have any, and to show
sufficient basis for the rejection of any of the returns, and,
in this connection, the respondent Regional Board of
Canvassers should give due consideration to the points
raised in the memorandum filed by said petitioners with
the Commission on Election in the above cases dated
April 26, 1978;
5. That should it appear to the board upon summary
scrutiny of the records to be offered by petitioners
indication that in the voting center actually held and/or
that election returns were prepared either before the day
of the election returns or at any other time, without regard
thereto or that there has been massive substitution of
voters, or that ballots and/or returns were prepared by
the same groups of persons or individuals or outside of
the voting centers, the Board should exclude the
corresponding returns from the canvass;
6. That appeals to the commission on Election of the
Board may be made only after all the returns in question
in all the above, the above five cases shall have been
passed upon by the Board and, accordingly, no
proclamation made until after the Commission shall have
finally resolved the appeal without prejudice to recourse
to this court, if warranted as provided by the Code and
the Constitution, giving the parties reasonable time
therefor;
print experts who had examined the voting records and
lists of voters in 878 voting centers, out of 2,700 which
they specified in their complaints or petitions in Election
Cases 78-8, 78-9, 78-10, 78-11 and 7812 in the
Comelec. In regard to 501 voting centers, the records cf.
which, consisting of the voters lists and voting records
were not available- and could not be brought to Manila,
petitions asked that the results therein be completely
excluded from the canvass. On July 11, 1978,
respondent Board terminated its canvass and declared
the result of the voting to be as follows:
NAME OF CANDIDATE

7. That the copies of the election returns found in the VOTES OBTAIN
corresponding ballot boxes shall be the one used in the
canvass; VALDEZ, Estanislao

8. That the canvass shall be conducted with utmost 436,069

dispatch, to the end that a proclamation, if feasible, may
be made not later than June 10, 1978; thus, the canvass DIMAPORO, Abdullah
may be terminated as soon as it is evident that the
possible number of votes in the still uncanvassed returns 429,351
with no longer affect the general results of the elections
here in controversy; PANGANDAMAN, Sambolayan

9. That respondent Commission shall promulgate such 406,106

other directive not inconsistent with this resolution y
necessary to expedite the proceedings herein SINSUAT, Blah
contemplated and to accomplish the purposes herein
intended. (Pp. 8-9, Record. 403,445

On June 1, 1978, upon proper motion, said guidelines AMPARO, Jesus

were modified:
399,997
... in the sense that the ballot boxes for the voting centers
just referred to need not be taken to Manila, EXCEPT MANDANGAN, Linang
those of the particular voting centers as to which the
petitioners have the right to demand that the 387,025
corresponding ballot boxes be opened in order that the
votes therein may be counted because said ballots unlike BAGA, Tomas
the election returns, have not been tampered with or
substituted, which instances the results of the counting 386,393
shall be specified and made known by petitioners to the
Regional Board of Canvassers not later than June 3, BADOY,Anacleto
1978; it being understood, that for the purposes of the
canvass, the petitioners shall not be allowed to invoke 374,933
any objection not already alleged in or comprehend
within the allegations in their complaint in the election ROLDAN, Ernesto
cases above- mentioned. (Page 8, Id.)
275,141
Thus respondent Board proceeded with the canvass,
with the herein petitioners presenting objections, most of TOCAO, Sergio
them supported by the report of handwriting and finger
239,914
ARATUC, Tomatic
205,829
GURO, Mangontawar
190,489
DIAZ, Ciscolario
190,077
TAMULA, Fred
180,280
LEGASPI, Bonifacio
174,396
MACAPEGES, Malamana
160,271
(Pp. 11-12, Record.)
Without loss of time, the petitioners brought the
resolution of respondent Board to the Comelec. Hearing
was held on April 25, 1978, after which , the case was
declared submitted for decision. However, on August
30,1978, the Comelec issued a resolution stating inter
alia that :
In order to enable the Commission to decide the appeal
properly :
a. It will have to go deeper into the examination of the
voting records and registration records and in the case of
voting centers whose voting and registration records
which have not yet been submitted for the Commission to
decide to open the ballot boxes; and
b. To interview and get statements under oath of
impartial and disinterested persons from the area to
determine whether actual voting took place on April 7,
1978, as well as those of the military authorities in the
areas affects (Page 12). Record, L-49705-09 .)
On December 11, 1978, the Comelec required the
parties "to file their respective written comments on the
reports they shall periodically receive from the
NBI-Comelec team of finger-print and signature experts
within the inextendible period of seven (7) days from their
receipt thereof". According to counsel for Aratuc, et al.,
"Petitioners submitted their various comments on the
report 4, the principal gist of which was that it would
appear uniformly in all the reports submitted by the
Comelec-NBI experts that the registered voters were not
the ones who voted as shown by the fact that the
thumbprints appearing in Form 1 were different from the
thumbprints of the voters in Form 5. " But the Comelec
denied a motion of petitioners asking that the ballot
boxes corresponding to the voting centers the record of
which are not available be opened and that a date be set
when the statements of witnesses referred to in the
August 30, 1978 resolution would be taken, on the
ground that in its opinion, it was no longer necessary to
proceed with such opening of ballot boxes and taking of
statements.
For his part, counsel for petitioner M in G.R. No.
L-49717-21 filed with Comelec on December 19,1978 a
Memorandum. To quote from the petition:
On December 19, 1978, the KBL, through counsel, filed a
Memorandum for the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL)
Candidates on the Comelec's Resolution of December
11, 1978, a xerox copy of which is attached hereto and
made a part hereof as Annex 2, wherein they discussed
the following topics: (I) Brief History of the President
Case; (II) Summary of Our Position and Submission
Before the Honorable commission; and (III) KBL's Appeal
Ad Cautelam. And the fourth topic, because of its
relevance to the case now before this Honorable Court,
we hereby quote for ready reference:
IV
OUR POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE
ESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE
COMMISSION OF DECEMBER 11, 1978
We respectfully submit that the Resolution of this case by
this Honorable Commission should be limited to the
precincts and municipalities involved in the KB'S
Petitions in Cases Nos. 78-8 to 78-12, on which evidence
had been submitted by the parties, and on which the KB
submitted the reports of their handwriting-print.
Furthermore, it should be limited by the appeal of the KB.
For under the Supreme Court Resolution of May 23,
1978, original jurisdiction was given to the Board, with
appeal to this Honorable Commission-Considerations of
other matters beyond these would be, in our humble
opinion, without jurisdiction. 271,473

For the present, we beg to inform this Honorable PANGANDAMAN, Sambolayan

Commission that we stand by the reports and findings of
the COMELEC/NBI experts as submitted by them to the 271,393
Regional Board of Canvassers and as confirmed by the
said Regional Board of Canvassers in its Resolution of SINSUAT, Blah
July 11, 1978, giving the 8 KBL candidates the majorities
we have already above mentioned. The Board did more 269,905
than make a summary scrutiny of the records' required
by the Supreme Court Resolution, Guideline No. 5, of ROLDAN, Ernesto
May 23, 1978. Hence, if for lack of material time we
cannot file any Memorandum within the non-extendible 268,287
period of seven (7) days, we would just stand by said
COMELEC/NBI experts' reports to the Regional Board, MANDANGAN, Linang
as confirmed by the Board (subject to our appeal ad
cautelam). 251,226

The COMELEC sent to the parties copies of the reports TACAO, Sergio
of the NBI-COMELEC experts. For lack of material time
due to the voluminous reports and number of voting 229,124
centers involved, the Christmas holidays, and our
impression that the COMELEC will exercise only its DIAZ, Ciscolario
appellate jurisdiction, specially as per resolution of this
Honorable Court of May 23, 1978 (in G.R. No. L-48097), 187,986
we, the KBL, did not comment any more on said reports.
(Pp. 5-6, Record, L-49717-21.) ARATUC, Tomatic

On January 13, 1979, the Comelec rendered its 183,316

resolution being assailed in these cases, declaring the
final result of the canvass to be as follows: LEGASPI, Bonifacio

CANDIDATES 178,564

VOTES TAMULA, Fred

VALDEZ, Estanislao 177,270

319,514 GURO, Mangontawar

DIMAPORO, Abdullah 163,449

289.751 LOMA, Nemesio

AMPARO, Jesus 129,450

286,180 (Page 14, Record, L-49705-09.)

BADOY, Anacleto

285,985 It is alleged in the Aratuc petition that:

BAGA, Tomas
The Comelec committee grave abuse of dicretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction:
1. In not pursuing further the examination of the
registration records and voting records from the other
voting centers questioned by petitioners after it found
proof of massive substitute voting in all of the voting
records and registration records examined by Comelec
and NBI experts;
2. In including in the canvass returns from the voting
centers whose book of voters and voting records could
not be recovered by the Commission in spite of its
repeated efforts to retrieve said records;
3. In not excluding from the canvass returns from voting
centers showing a very high percentage of voting and in
not considering that high percentage of voting, coupled
with massive substitution of voters is proof of
manufacturing of election returns;
4. In denying petitioners' petition for the opening of the
ballot boxes from voting centers whose records are not
available for examination to determine whether or not
there had been voting in said voting centers;
5. In not Identifying the ballot boxes that had no padlocks
and especially those that were found to be empty while
they were shipped to Manila pursuant to the directive of
the Commission in compliance with the guidelines of this
Honorable Court;
6. In not excluding from the canvass returns where the
results of examination of the voting records and
registration records show that the thumbprints of the
voters in CE Form 5 did not correspond to those of the
registered voters as shown in CE Form 1;
7. In giving more credence to the affidavits of chairmen
and members of the voting centers, municipal treasurers
and other election officials in the voting centers where
irregularities had been committed and not giving
credence to the affidavits of watchers of petitioners;
8. In not including among those questioned before the
Board by petitioners those included among the returns
questioned by them in their Memorandum filed with the
Commission on April 26, 1978, which Memorandum was
attached as Annex 'I' to their petition filed with this
Honorable Court G.R. No. L-48097 and which the
Supreme Court said in its Guidelines should be
considered by the Board in the course of the canvass
(Guidelines No. 4). (Pp. 15-16, Record, Id.)
On the other hand, the Mandangan petition submits that
the Comelec comitted the following errors:
1. In erroneously applying the earlier case of Diaz vs.
Commission on Elections (November 29, 1971; 42 SCRA
426), and particularly the highly restrictive criterion that
when the votes obtained by the candidates with the
highest number of votes exceed the total number of
highest possible valid votes, the COMELEC ruled to
exclude from the canvass the election return reflecting
such rests, under which the COMELEC excluded 1,004
election returns, involving around 100,000 votes, 95 % of
which are for KBL candidates, particularly the petitioner
Linang Mandangan, and which rule is so patently unfair,
unjust and oppressive.
2. In not holding that the real doctrine in the Diaz Case is
not the total exclusion of election returns simply because
the total number of votes exceed the total number of
highest possible valid votes, but 'even if all the votes cast
by persons Identified as registered voters were added to
the votes cast by persons who can not be definitely
ascertained as registered or not, and granting, ad
arguendo, that all of them voted for respondent Daoas,
still the resulting total is much below the number of votes
credited to the latter in returns for Sagada, 'and that 'of
the 2,188 ballots cast in Sagada, nearly one-half (1,012)
were cast by persons definitely Identified as not
registered therein or still more than 40 % of substitute
voting which was the rule followed in the later case of
Bashier/Basman (Diaz Case, November 19,1971,42
SCRA 426,432).
3. In not applying the rule and formula in the later case of
Bashier and Basman vs. Commission on Election
(February 24, 1972, 43 SCRA 238) which was the one
followed by the Regional Board of Canvassers, to wit:
In Basman vs Comelec (L-33728, Feb. 24, 1972) the
Supreme Court upheld the Supreme Court upheld the
ruling of the Commission setting the standard of 40 %
excess votes to justify the exclusion of election returns.
In line with the above ruling, the Board of Canvassers
may likewise set aside election returns with 40 %
substitute votes. Likewise, where excess voting occured
and the excess was such as to destroy the presumption
of innocent mistake, the returns was excluded.
(COMELEC'S Resolution, Annex I hereof, p. 22), which
this Honorable Court must have meant when its
Resolution of May 23, 1978 (G.R. No. 7), it referred to
"massive substitution of voters.
4. In examining, through the NBI/COMELEC experts, the
records in more than 878 voting centers examined by the
KB experts and passed upon by the Regional Board of
Canvassers which was all that was within its appellate
jurisdiction is examination of more election records to
make a total of 1,085 voting centers (COMELEC'S
Resolution, Annex 1 hereof, p. 100), being beyond its
jurisdiction and a denial of due process as far as the
KBL, particularly the petitioner Mandangan, were
concerned because they were informed of it only on
December, 1978, long after the case has been submitted
for decision in September, 1978; and the statement that
the KBL acquiesced to the same is absolutely without
foundation.
5. In excluding election returns from areas where the
conditions of peace and order were allegedly unsettled or
where there was a military operation going on
immediately before and during election and where the
voter turn out was high (90 % to 100 %), and where the
people had been asked to evacuate, as a ruling without
jurisdiction and in violation of due process because no
evidence was at all submitted by the parties before the
Regional Board of Canvasssers. (Pp. 23-25, Record,
L-47917-21.)
Now before discussing the merits of the foregoing
contentions, it is necessary to clarify first the nature and
extent of the Supreme Court's power of review in the
premises. The Aratuc petition is expressly predicated on
the ground that respondent Comelec "committed grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction" in
eight specifications. On the other hand, the Mandangan
petition raises pure questions of law and jurisdiction. In
other words, both petitions invoked the Court's certiorari
jurisdiction, not its appellate authority of review.
This is as it should be. While under the Constitution of
1935, "the decisions, orders and rulings of the
Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme
Court" (Sec. 2, first paragraph, Article X) and pursuant to
the Rules of Court, the petition for "certiorari or review"
shall be on the ground that the Commission "has decided
a question of substance not theretofore determined by
the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a way not in
accord with law or the applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court" (Sec. 3. Rule 43), and such provisions
refer not only to election contests but even to
pre-proclamation proceedings, the 1973 Constitution
provides somewhat differently thus: "Any decision, order
or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof" (Section 11,
Article XII c), even as it ordains that the Commission
shall "be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all members of the
National Assembly and elective provincial and city
official" (Section 2(2).)
Correspondingly, the ElectionCode of 1978, which is the
first legislative constructionof the pertinent constitutional
provisions, makes the Commission also the "sole judge
of all pre-proclamation controversies" and further
provides that "any of its decisions, orders or rulings (in
such contoversies) shall be final and executory", just as
in election contests, "the decision of the Commission
shall be final, and executory and inappealable." (Section
193)
It is at once evident from these constitutional and
statutory modifications that there is a definite tendency to
enhance and invigorate the role of the Commission on
Elections as the independent constitutinal body charged
with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and honest
elections. The framers of the new Constitution must be
presumed ot have definite knowledge of what it means to
make the decisions, orders and rulings of the
Commission "subject to review by the Supreme Court".
And since instead of maintaining that provision intact, it
ordained that the Commission's actuations be instead
"brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari", We cannot
insist that there was no intent to change the nature of the
remedy, considering that the limited scope of certiorari,
compared to a review, is well known in remedial law.
Withal, as already stated, the legislative construction of
the modified peritinent constitutional provision is to the
effect that the actuations of the Commission are final,
executory and even inappealable. While such
construction does not exclude the general certiorari
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court which inheres in it as
the final guardian of the Constitution, particularly, of its
imperious due process mandate, it correspondingly
narrows down the scope and extent of the inquiry the
Court is supposed to undertake to what is strictly the
office of certiorari as distinguished from review. We are
of the considered opinion that the statutory modifications
are consistent with the apparent new constitional intent.
Indeed, it is obvious that to say that actuations of the
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari technically connotes something less than
saying that the same "shall be subject to review by the
Supreme Court", when it comes to the measure of the
Court's reviewing authority or prerogative in the
premises.
A review includes digging into the merits and unearthing
errors of judgment, while certiorari deals exclusively with
grave abuse of discretion, which may not exist even
when the decision is otherwise erroneous. certiorari
implies an indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness
and caprice, an omission to weight pertinent
considerations, a decision arrived at without rational
deliberation. While the effecdts of an error of judgment
may not differ from that of an indiscretion, as a matter of
policy, there are matters taht by their nature ought to be
left for final determination to the sound discretion of
certain officers or entities, reserving it to the Supreme
Court to insure the faithful observance of due process
only in cases of patent arbitrariness.
Such, to Our mind, is the constitutional scheme relative
to the Commission on Elections. Conceived by the
charter as the effective instrument to preserve the
sanctity of popular suffrage, endowed with independence
and all the needed concommittant powers, it is but proper
that the Court should accord the greatest measure of
presumption of regularity to its course of action and
choice of means in performing its duties, to the end that it
may achieve its designed place in the democratic fabric
of our government. Ideally, its members should be free
from all suspicions of partisan inclinations, but the fact
that actually some of them have had stints in the arena of
politics should not, unless the contrary is shown, serve
as basis for denying to its actuations the respect and
consideration that the Constitution contemplates should
be accorded to it, in the same manner that the Supreme
Court itself which from time to time may have members
drawn from the political ranks or even from military is at
all times deemed insulated from every degree or form of
external pressure and influence as well as improper
internal motivations that could arise from such
background or orientation.
We hold, therefore that under the existing constitution
and statutory provisions, the certiorari jurisdiction of the
Court over orders, and decisions of the Comelec is not
as broad as it used to be and should be confined to
instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
patent and substantial denial of due process.
Accordingly, it is in this light that We the opposing
contentions of the parties in this cases.
THE MANDANGAN CASE
Being more simple in Our view, We shall deal with the
petition in G.R. No. L-49717-21 first.
The errors assigned in this petition boil down to two main
propositions, namely, (1) that it was an error of law on
the part of respondent Comelec to have applied to the
extant circumstances hereof the ruling of this Court in
Diaz vs. Comelec 42 SCRA 426 instead of that of
Bashier vs. Comelec 43 SCRA 238; and (2) that
respondent Comelec exceeded its jurisdiction and denied
due process to petitioner Mandangan in extending its
inquiry beyond the election records of "the 878 voting
centers examined by the KB experts and passed upon by
the Regional Board of Canvassers" and in excluding from
the canvass the returns showing 90 to 100 % voting,
from voting centers where military operations were by the
Army to be going on, to the extent that said voting
centers had to be transferred to the poblaciones the
same being by evidence.
Anent the first proposition, it must be made clear that the
Diaz and Bashier rulings are not mutually exclusive of
each other, each being an outgrowth of the basic
rationale of statistical improbability laid down in
Lagumbay vs. Comelec and , 16 SCRA 175. Whether
they be apply together or separately or which of them be
applied depends on the situation on hand. In the factual
milieu of the instant case as found by the Comelec, We
see no cogent reason, and petitioner has not shown any,
why returns in voting centers showing that the votes of
the candidate obtaining highest number of votes of the
candidate obtaining the highest number of votes exceeds
the highest possible number of valid votes cast therein
should not be deemed as spurious and manufactured
just because the total number of excess votes in said
voting centers were not more than 40 %. Surely, this is
not the occasion, consider the historical antecedents
relative to the highly questionable manner in which
elections have been bad in the past in the provinces
herein involved, of which the Court has judicial notice as
attested by its numerous decisions in cases involving
practically every such election, of the Court to move a
whit back from the standards it has enunciated in those
decisions.
In regard to the jurisdictional and due process points
raised by herein petitioner, it is of decisive importance to
bear in mind that under Section 168 of the Revised
Election Code of 1978, "the Commission (on Elections)
shall have direct control and supervision on over the
board of canvassers" and that relatedly, Section 175 of
the same Code provides that it "shall be the sole judge of
all pre-proclamation controversies." While nominally, the
procedure of bringing to the Commission objections to
the actuations of boards of canvassers has been quite
loosely referred to in certain quarters, even by the
Commission and by this Court, such as in the guidelines
of May 23,1978 quoted earlier in this opinion, as an
appeal, the fact of the matter is that the authority of the
Commission in reviewing such actuations does not spring
from any appellate jurisdiction conferred by any specific
provision of law, for there is none such provision
anywhere in the Election Code, but from the plenary
prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to
it by the above-quoted provisions of Section 168. And in
administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to
need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or
office having supervision and control over another may
do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to
have done.
Consequently, anything said in Lucman vs. Dimaporo, 33
SCRA 387, cited by petitioner, to the contrary
notwithstanding, We cannot fault respondent Comelec for
its having extended its inquiry beyond that undertaken by
the Board of Canvass On the contrary, it must be stated
that Comelec correctly and commendably asserted its
statutory authority born of its envisaged constitutional
duties vis-a-vis the preservation of the purity of elections
and electoral processes and p in doing what petitioner it
should not have done. Incidentally, it cannot be said that
Comelec went further than even what Aratuc et al. have
asked, since said complaints had impugned from the
outset not only the returns from the 878 voting centers
examined by their experts but all those mentioned in their
complaints in the election cases filed originally with the
Comelec enumerated in the opening statements hereof,
hence respondent Comelec had that much field to work
on.
The same principle should apply in respect to the ruling
of the Commission regarding the voting centers affected
by military operations. It took cognizance of the fact, not
considered by the board of canvass, that said voting
centers had been transferred to the poblaciones. And, if
only for purposes of pre-proclamation proceedings, We
are persuaded it did not constitute a denial of due
process for the Commission to have taken into account,
without the need or presentation of evidence by the
parties, a matter so publicly notorious as the unsettled
situation of peace and order in localities in the provinces
herein involved that their may perhaps be taken judicial
notice of, the same being capable of unquestionable
demonstration. (See 1, Rule 129)
In this connection, We may as well perhaps, say here as
later that regrettably We cannot, however, go along with
the view, expressed in the dissent of our respected Chief
Justice, that from the fact that some of the voting centers
had been transferred to the poblaciones there is already
sufficient basis for Us to rule that the Commission should
have also subjected all the returns from the other voting
centers of the some municipalities, if not provinces, to the
same degree of scrutiny as in the former. The majority of
the Court feels that had the Commission done so, it
would have fallen into the error by petitioner Mandangan
about denial of due process, for it is relatively unsafe to
draw adverse conclusions as to the exact conditions of
peace and order in those other voting centers without at
list some prima facie evidence to rely on considering that
there is no allegation, much less any showing at all that
the voting centers in question are so close to those
excluded by the Comelec on as to warrant the
inescapable conclusion that the relevant circumstances
by the Comelec as obtaining in the latter were Identical to
those in the former.
Premises considered the petition in G.R. Nos.
L-49717-21 is hereby dismiss for lack of merit.
THE ARATUC ET AL. PETITION
Of the eight errors assigned by herein petitioners earlier
adverted to, the seventh and the sight do not require any
extended disquisition. As to the issue of whether the
elections in the voting centers concerned were held on
April 7, 1978, the date designated by law, or earlier, to
which the seventh alleged error is addressed, We note
that apparently petitioners are not seriously pressing on it
anymore, as evidenced by the complete absence of any
reference thereto during the oral argument of their
counsel and the practically cavalier discussion thereof in
the petition. In any event, We are satisfied from a careful
review of the analysis by the Comelec in its resolution
now before Us that it took pains to consider as
meticulously as the nature of the evidence presented by
both parties would permit all the contentions of
petitioners relative to the weight that should be given to
such evidence. The detailed discussion of said evidence
is contained in not less than nineteen pages (pp. 70-89)
of the resolution. In these premises, We are not prepared
to hold that Comelec acted wantonly and arbitrarily in
drawing its conclusions adverse to petitioners' position. If
errors there are in any of those conclusions, they are
errors of judgment which are not reviewable in certiorari,
so long as they are founded on substantial evidence.
As to eighth assigned error. the thrust of respondents,
comment is that the results in the voting centers
mentioned in this assignment of error had already been
canvassed at the regional canvass center in Cotabato
City. Again, We cannot say that in sustaining the board of
canvassers in this regard, Comelec gravely abused its
discretion, if only because in the guidelines set by this
Court, what appears to have been referred to is, rightly or
wrongly, the resumption only of the canvass, which does
not necessarily include the setting aside and repetition of
the canvass already made in Cotabato City.
The second and fourth assignments of error concern the TOTAL
voting centers the corresponding voters' record (C.E.
Form 1) and record of voting, (C.E. Form 5) of which EXCLUDED
have never been brought to Manila because they, were
not available The is not clear as to how many are these INCLUDED
voting centers. According to petitioners they are 501, but
in the Comelec resolution in question, the number Lanao del Norte
mentioned is only 408, and this number is directly
challenged in the petition. Under the second assignment, 30
it is contended that the Comelec gravely abused its
discretion in including in the canvass the election returns —
from these voting centers and, somewhat alternatively, it
is alleged as fourth assignment that the petitioners 30
motion for the opening of the ballot boxes pertaining to
said voting centers was arbitraly denied by respondent Lanao del Sur
Comelec.
342
The resolution under scrutiny explains the situation that
confronted the Commission in regard to the 408 voting 137
centers reffered to as follows :
205
The Commission had the option of excluding from the
canvass the election returns under category. By deciding Maguindanao
to exclude, the Commission would be summarily
disenfranchising the voters registered in the voting 21
centers affected without any basis. The Commission
could also order the inclusion in the canvass of these 1
elections returns under the injunction of the Supreme
Court that extremes caution must be exercised in 20
rejecting returns unless these are palpably irregular. The
Commission chose to give prima facie validity to the North Cotabato
election returns mentioned and uphold the votes cast by
the voters in those areas. The Commission held the view 7
that the failure of some election officials to comply with
Commission orders(to submit the records) should not 1
parties to such official disobedience. In the case of Lino
Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208, the Supreme Court 6
ruled that when voters have honestly cast their ballots,
the same should not be nullified because the officers Sultan Kudarat
appointed under the law to direct the election and guard
the purity of the ballot have not complied with their duty. 12
(cited in Laurel on Elections, p. 24)
2
On page 14 of the comment of the Solicitor General,
however, it is stated that: 10

At all events, the returns corresponding to these voting totals -----

centers were examined by the Comelec and 141 of such
returns were excluded, as follows: 412

SUMMARY 141

PROVINCE 271
(Page 301, Record.)
This assertion has not been denied by petitioners.
Thus, it appears that precisely use of the absence or
unavailability of the CE Forms 1 and 5 corresponding to
the more than 400 voting centers concerned in our
present discussion the Comelec examined the returns
from said voting centers to determine their
trustworthiness by scrutinizing the purported relevant
data appearing on their faces, believing that such was
the next best thing that could be done to avoid total
disenfranchisement of the voters in all of them On the
Other hand, Petitioners' insist that the right thing to do
was to order the opening of the ballot boxes involved.
In connection with such opposing contentions, Comelec's
explanation in its resolution is:
... The commission had it seen fit to so order, could have
directed the opening of the ballot boxes. But the
Commission did not see the necessity of going to such
length in a that was in nature and decided that there was
sufficient bases for the revolution of the appeal. That the
Commission has discretion to determine when the ballot
boxes should be opened is implicit in the guidelines set
by the Supreme Court which states that '. . . the ballot
bones [which] shall be opened only upon orders of either
the respondent Board or respondent Commission, after
the need therefor has become evident ... ' (guideline No.
3; emphasissupplied). Furthermore, the Court on June 1,
1978, amended the guidelines that the "ballot boxes for
the voting centers ... need not be taken to Manila
EXCEPT those of the centers as to which the petitioners
have the right to demand that the corresponding ballot
boxes be opened ... provided that the voting centers
concerned shall be specified and made known by
petitioners to the Regional Board of Canvassers not later
than June 3,1978 ... ' (Emphasis supplied). The KB,
candidates did not take advantage of the option granted
them under these guidelines.( Pp 106-107, Record.)
Considering that Comelec, if it had wished to do so, had
the facilities to Identify on its own the voting centers
without CE Forms I and 5, thereby precluding the need
for the petitioners having to specify them, and under the
circumstances the need for opening the ballot boxes in
question should have appeared to it to be quite apparent,
it may be contended that Comelec would have done
greater service to the public interest had it proceeded to
order such opening, as it had announced it had thoughts
of doing in its resolution of August 30, 1978. On the other
hand, We cannot really blame the Commission too much,
since the exacting tenor of the guidelines issued by Us
left it with very little elbow room, so to speak, to use its
own discretion independently of what We had ordered.
What could have saved matters altogether would have
been a timely move on the part of petitioners on or before
June 3, 1978, as contemplated in Our resolution. After all
come to think of it, that the possible outcome of the
opening of the ballot boxes would favor the petitioners
was not a certainty — the contents them could
conceivably boomerang against them, such as, for
example, if the ballots therein had been found to be
regular and preponderantly for their opponents. Having in
mind that significantly, petitioners filed their motion for
only on January 9, 1979, practically on the eve of the
promulgation of the resolution, We hold that by having
adhered to Our guidelines of June 1, 1978, Comelec
certainly cannot be held to be guilty of having gravely
abused its discretion, in examining and passing on the
returns from the voting centers reffered to in the second
and fourth assignments of error in the canvass or in
denying petitioners' motion for the of the ballot boxes
concerned.
The first, third and sixth assignment of involve related
matters and maybe discussed together. They all deal
with the inclusion in or exclusion from the canvass of
returns on the basis of the percentage of voting in
specified voting centers and the corresponding findings
of the Comelec on the extent of substitute voting therein
as indicated by the result of either the technical
examination by experts of the signatures and
thumb-prints of the voters threat.
To begin with, petitioners' complaint that the Comelec did
not examine and study 1,694 of the records in an the
2,775 voting centers questioned by them is hardly
accurate. To be more exact, the Commission excluded a
total of 1,267 returns coming under four categories
namely: 1,001 under the Diaz, supra, ruling, 79 because
of 90-100 % turnout of voters despite military operations,
105 palpably manufactured owe and 82 returns excluded
by the board of canvass on other grounds. Thus, 45.45
% of the of the petitioners were sustained by the
Comelec. In contrast, in the board of canvassers, only
453 returns were excluded. The board was reversed as
to 6 of these, and 821 returns were excluded by Comelec
over and above those excluded by the board. In other
words, the Comelec almost doubled the exclusions by
the board.
Petitioners would give the impression by their third
assignment of error that Comelec refused to consider
high percentage of voting, coupled with mass substitute
voting, as proof that the pertinent returns had been
manufactured. That such was not the case is already
shown in the above specifications. To add more, it can
be gleaned from the resolution that in t to the 1,065
voting centers in Lanao del Sur and Marawi City where a
high percentage of voting appeared, the returns from the
867 voting centers were excluded by the Comelec and
only 198 were included a ratio of roughly 78 % to 22 %.
The following tabulation drawn from the figures in the
resolution shows how the Comelec went over those
returns center by center and acted on them individually:
 Calanoga 23 21 21 0
90% — 100% VOTING
s
MARAWI CITY AND LANAO DEL SUR
Ditsaan-R 42 39 38 1
NO. OF V/C THAT V/C WITH 90% to 100%
amain
MUNICIPALITIES FUNCTIONED VOTING

No. of Exclude Include Ganassi 39 38 23 15

V/C d d

Lumba 64 63 47 16
Bayabao
Marawi 151 112 107 5
City
Lumbatan 30 28 17 11

Bacolod 28 28 27 1
Grande
Lumbaya 37 33 28 5
nague
Balabaga 53 53 49 4
n Madalum 14 13 6 7

Balindong 22 22 15 7
Madamba 20 20 5 15

Bayang 29 20 13 7
Maguing 57 55 53 2

Binidayan 37 33 29 4
Malabang 59 47 5 42

Buadipos 41 10 10 0
o Bunton Marantao 79 63 41 22

Bubong 24 23 21 2 Marugong 37 35 32 3

Bumbaran 21 (All Masiu 27 26 24 2

exclude
d)
Pagayaw 15 13 9 4
Butig 35 33 32 1 an
Piagapo 39 39 36 3

Poona-Ba 44 44 42 2
yabao

Pualas 23 20 20 0

Saguiaran 36 32 21 11

Sultan 35 31 31 0
Gumande
r

Tamparan 24 21 15 6

Taraka 31 31 31 0

Tubaran 23 19 19 0

TOTALS:
Marawi &

Lanao del 1,218 1,065 867 198

Sur
We are convinced, apart from presuming regularity in the
performance of its duties, that there is enough showing in
the record that it did examine and study the returns and
pertinent records corresponding to all the 2775 voting
centers subject of petitioners' complaints below. In one
part of its resolution the Comelec states:
The Commission as earlier stated examined on its own
the Books of Voters (Comelec Form No. 1) and the
Voters Rewards Comelec Form No. 5) to determine for
itself which of these elections form needed further
examination by the COMELEC-NBI experts. The
Commission, aware of the nature of this pre-proclamation
controversy, believes that it can decide, using common
sense and perception, whether the election forms in
controversy needed further examination by the experts
based on the presence or absence of patent signs of
irregularity. (Pp. 137-138, Record.)
In the face of this categorical assertion of fact of the
Commission, the bare charge of petitioners that the
records pertaining to the 1,694 voting centers assailed by
them should not create any ripple of serious doubt. As
We view this point under discussion, what is more
factually accurate is that those records complained of
were not examined with the aid of experts and that
Comelec passed upon the returns concerned "using
common sense and perception only." And there is
nothing basically objectionable in this. The defunct
Presidential Senate and House Electoral Tribunals
examine passed upon and voided millions of votes in
several national elections without the assistance of
experts and "using" only common sense and perception".
No one ever raised any eyebrows about such procedure.
Withal, what we discern from the resolution is that
Comelec preliminary screened the records and whatever
it could not properly pass upon by "using common sense
and perception" it left to the experts to work on. We might
disagree with he Comelec as to which voting center
should be excluded or included, were We to go over the
same records Ourselves, but still a case of grave abuse
of discretion would not come out, considering that
Comelec cannot be said to have acted whimsically or
capriciously or without any rational basis, particularly if it
is considered that in many respects and from the very
nature of our respective functions, becoming candor
would dictate to Us to concede that the Commission is in
a better position to appreciate and assess the vital
circumstances closely and accurately. By and large,
therefore, the first, third and sixth assignments of error of
the petitioners are not well taken.
The fifth assignment of error is in Our view moot and
academic. The Identification of the ballot boxes in
defective condition, in some instances open and
allegedly empty, is at best of secondary import because,
as already discussed, the records related thereto were
after all examined, studied and passed upon. If at all,
deeper inquiry into this point would be of real value in an
electoral protest.
CONCLUSION
Before closing, it may not be amiss to state here that the
Court had initially agreed to dispose of the cases in a
minute resolution, without prejudice to an extended or
reasoned out opinion later, so that the Court's decision
may be known earlier. Considering, however, that no less
than the Honorable Chief Justice has expressed
misgivings as to the propriety of yielding to the
conclusions of respondent Commission because in his
view there are strong considerations warranting farther
meticulous inquiry of what he deems to be earmarks of
seemingly traditional faults in the manner elections are
held in the municipalities and provinces herein involved,
and he is joined in this pose by two other distinguished
colleagues of Ours, the majority opted to ask for more
time to put down at least some of the important
considerations that impelled Us to see the matters in
dispute the other way, just as the minority bidded for the
opportunity to record their points of view. In this manner,
all concerned will perhaps have ample basis to place
their respective reactions in proper perspective.
In this connection, the majority feels it is but meet to
advert to the following portion of the ratiocination of
respondent Board of Canvassers adopted by respondent
Commission with approval in its resolution under
question:
First of all this Board was guided by the legal doctrine
that canvassing boards must exercise "extreme caution"
in rejecting returns and they may do so only when the
returns are palpably irregular. A conclusion that an
election return is obviously manufactured or false and
consequently should be disregarded in the canvass must
be approached with extreme caution, and only upon the
most convincing proof. Any plausible explanation one
which is acceptable to a reasonable man in the light of
experience and of the probabilities of the situation,
should suffice to avoid outright nullification, with the
resulting t of those who exercised their right of suffrage.
(Anni vs. Isquierdo et at L-35918, Jude 28,1974; Villavon
v. Comelec L-32008, August 31,1970; Tagoranao v.
Comelec 22 SCRA 978). In the absence of strong
evidence establishing the spuriousness of the return, the
basis rule of their being accorded prima facie status as
bona fide reports of the results of the count of the votes
for canvassing and proclamation purposes must be Aquino and Abad Santos, Jr., took no part.
applied, without prejudice to the question being tried on
the merits with the presentation of evidence, testimonial
and real in the corresponding electoral protest. (Bashier
vs. Comelec L-33692, 33699, 33728, 43 SCRA 238,
February 24, 1972). The decisive factor is that where it
has been duly de ed after investigation and examination
of the voting and registration records hat actual voting
and election by the registered voters had taken place in
the questioned voting centers, the election returns cannot
be disregarded and excluded with the resting
disenfranchisement of the voters, but must be accorded
prima facie status as bona fide reports of the results of
the voting for canvassing and registration purposes.
Where the grievances relied upon is the commission of
irregularities and violation of the Election Law the proper
remedy is election protest. (Anni vs. Isquierdo et al.
Supra). (P. 69, Record, L-49705-09).

The writer of this opinion has taken care to personally

check on the citations to be doubly sure they were not
taken out of context, considering that most, if not all of
them arose from similar situations in the very venues of
the actual milieu of the instant cases, and We are
satisfied they do fit our chosen posture. More importantly,
they actually came from the pens of different members of
the Court, already retired or still with Us, distinguished by
their perspicacity and their perceptive prowess. In the
context of the constitutional and legislative intent
expounded at the outset of this opinion and evident in the
modifications of the duties and responsibilities of the
Commission on Elections vis-a-vis the matters that have
concerned Us herein, particularly the elevation of the
Commission as the "sole judge of pre-proclamation
controversies" as well as of all electoral contests, We find
the afore-quoted doctrines compelling as they reveal
through the clouds of existing jurisprudence the pole star
by which the future should be guided in delineating and
circumscribing separate spheres of action of the
Commission as it functions in its equally important dual
role just indicated bearing as they do on the purity and
sanctity of elections in this country.

In conclusion, the Court finds insufficient merit in the

petition to warrant its being given due course. Petition
dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs. Justices
Fernando, Antonio and Guerrero who are presently on
official missions abroad voted for such dismissal.

Fernando, Antonio, Concepcion Jr., Santos Fernandez,

and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J. took no part.

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 95203-05 : December 18, 1990.]

192 SCRA 363

SENATOR ERNESTO MACEDA, Petitioner, vs.

ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD (ERB); MARCELO N.
FERNANDO, ALEJANDRO B. AFURONG; REX V.
TANTIONGCO; and OSCAR E. ALA, in their collective
official capacities as Chairman and Members of the
Board (ERB), respectively; CATALINO MACARAIG, in
his quadruple official capacities as Executive Secretary,
Chairman of Philippine National Oil Company; Office of
the Energy Affairs, and with MANUEL ESTRELLA, in
their respective official capacities as Chairman and
President of the Petron Corporation; PILIPINAS SHELL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION; with CESAR
BUENAVENTURA and REY GAMBOA as chairman and
President, respectively; CALTEX PHILIPPINES with
FRANCIS ABLAN, President and Chief Executive Officer;
and the Presidents of Philippine Petroleum Dealer's
Association, Caltex Dealer's Co., Petron Dealer's Asso.,
Shell Dealer's Asso. of the Phil., Liquefied Petroleum
Gas Institute of the Phils., any and all concerned
gasoline and petrol dealers or stations; and such other
persons, officials, and parties, acting for and on their
behalf; or in representation of and/or under their
authority, Respondents.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 95203-05 : December 18, 1990.]
192 SCRA 363
SENATOR ERNESTO MACEDA, Petitioner, vs.
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD (ERB);​ MARCELO N.
FERNANDO, ALEJANDRO B. AFURONG; REX V.
TANTIONGCO; and OSCAR E. ALA, in their collective
official capacities as Chairman and Members of the
Board (ERB), respectively; CATALINO MACARAIG, in
his quadruple official capacities as Executive Secretary,
Chairman of Philippine National Oil Company; Office of
the Energy Affairs, and with MANUEL ESTRELLA, in
their respective official capacities as Chairman and
President of the Petron Corporation; PILIPINAS SHELL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION; with CESAR
BUENAVENTURA and REY GAMBOA as chairman and
President, respectively; CALTEX PHILIPPINES with
FRANCIS ABLAN, President and Chief Executive Officer;
and the Presidents of Philippine Petroleum Dealer's
Association, Caltex Dealer's Co., Petron Dealer's Asso.,
Shell Dealer's Asso. of the Phil., Liquefied Petroleum
Gas Institute of the Phils., any and all concerned
gasoline and petrol dealers or stations; and such other
persons, officials, and parties, acting for and on their
behalf; or in representation of and/or under their
authority, Respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 95119-21 : December 18, 1990.]
192 SCRA 363
OLIVER O. LOZANO, Petitioner, vs. ENERGY
REGULATORY BOARD (ERB), PILIPINAS SHELL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, CALTEX (PHIL.), INC.,
and PETRON CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioners pray for injunctive relief, to stop the
Energy Regulatory Board (Board hereinafter) from
implementing its Order, dated September 21, 1990,
mandating a provisional increase in the prices of
petroleum and petroleum products, as follows:
PRODUCTS IN PESOS PER LITER
OPSF
Premium Gasoline 1.7700
Regular Gasoline 1.7700
Avturbo 1.8664
Kerosene 1.2400
Diesel Oil 1.2400
Fuel Oil 1.4900
Feedstock 1.4900
LPG 0.8487
Asphalts 2.7160
Thinners 1.7121 1
It appears that on September 10, 1990, Caltex
(Philippines), Inc., Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation,
and Petron Corporation proferred separate applications
with the Board for permission to increase the wholesale
posted prices of petroleum products, as follows:
Caltex P3.2697 per liter
Shell 2.0338 per liter
Petron 2.00 per liter 2
and meanwhile, for provisional authority to increase
temporarily such wholesale posted prices pending further
proceedings.:-cralaw
On September 21, 1990, the Board, in a joint (on three
applications) Order granted provisional relief as follows:
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, and pursuant
to Section 8 of Executive Order No. 172, this Board
hereby grants herein applicants' prayer for provisional
relief and, accordingly, authorizes said applicants a
weighted average provisional increase of ONE PESO
AND FORTY-TWO CENTAVOS (P1.42) per liter in the
wholesale posted prices of their various petroleum
products enumerated below, refined and/or marketed by
them locally. 3
The petitioners submit that the above Order had been
issued with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack
of jurisdiction, and correctible by Certiorari.
The petitioner, Senator Ernesto Maceda, 4 also submits
that the same was issued without proper notice and
hearing in violation of Section 3, paragraph (e), of
Executive Order No. 172; that the Board, in decreeing an
increase, had created a new source for the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund (OPSF), or otherwise that it had levied
a tax, a power vested in the legislature, and/or that it had
"re-collected", by an act of taxation, ad valorem taxes on
oil which Republic Act No. 6965 had abolished.
The petitioner, Atty. Oliver Lozano, 5 likewise argues that
the Board's Order was issued without notice and hearing,
and hence, without due process of law.
The intervenor, the Trade Union of the Philippines and
Allied Services (TUPAS/FSM)-W.F.T.U., 6 argues on the
other hand, that the increase cannot be allowed since the
respondents oil companies had not exhausted their
existing oil stock which they had bought at old prices and
that they cannot be allowed to charge new rates for stock
purchased at such lower rates.
The Court set the cases (in G.R. Nos. 95203-05) for
hearing on October 25, 1990, in which Senator Maceda
and his counsel, Atty. Alexander Padilla, argued. The
Solicitor General, on behalf of the Board, also presented
his arguments, together with Board Commissioner Rex
Tantiangco. Attys. Federico Alikpala, Jr. and Joselia
Poblador represented the oil firms (Petron and Caltex,
respectively).
The parties were thereafter required to submit their
memorandums after which, the Court considered the
cases submitted for resolution.
On November 20, 1990, the Court ordered these cases
consolidated.
On November 27, 1990, we gave due course to both
petitions.
The Court finds no merit in these petitions.
Senator Maceda and Atty. Lozano, in questioning the
lack of a hearing, have overlooked the provisions of
Section 8 of Executive Order No. 172, which we quote:
"SECTION 8. Authority to Grant Provisional Relief . —
The Board may, upon the filing of an application, petition
or complaint or at any stage thereafter and without prior
hearing, on the basis of supporting papers duly verified
or authenticated, grant provisional relief on motion of a
party in the case or on its own initiative, without prejudice
to a final decision after hearing, should the Board find
that the pleadings, together with such affidavits,
documents and other evidence which may be submitted
in support of the motion, substantially support the
provisional order: Provided, That the Board shall
immediately schedule and conduct a hearing thereon
within thirty (30) days thereafter, upon publication and
notice to all affected parties.: nad
As the Order itself indicates, the authority for provisional
increase falls within the above provision.
There is no merit in the Senator's contention that the
"applicable" provision is Section 3, paragraph (e) of the
Executive Order, which we quote:
(e) Whenever the Board has determined that there is a
shortage of any petroleum product, or when public
interest so requires, it may take such steps as it may
consider necessary, including the temporary adjustment
of the levels of prices of petroleum products and the
payment to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund created under
Presidential Decree No. 1956 by persons or entities
engaged in the petroleum industry of such amounts as
may be determined by the Board, which will enable the
importer to recover its cost of importation.
What must be stressed is that while under Executive
Order No. 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not
preclude the Board from ordering, ex parte, a provisional
increase, as it did here, subject to its final disposition of
whether or not: (1) to make it permanent; (2) to reduce or
increase it further; or (3) to deny the application. Section
37 paragraph (e) is akin to a temporary restraining order
or a writ of preliminary attachment issued by the courts,
which are given ex parte, and which are subject to the
resolution of the main case.
Section 3, paragraph (e) and Section 8 do not negate
each other, or otherwise, operate exclusively of the other,
in that the Board may resort to one but not to both at the
same time. Section 3(e) outlines the jurisdiction of the
Board and the grounds for which it may decree a price
adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and
hearing. Pending that, however, it may order, under
Section 8, an authority to increase provisionally, without
need of a hearing, subject to the final outcome of the
proceeding. The Board, of course, is not prevented from
conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional authority
— which is of course, the better procedure — however, it
cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one. As
we held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v.
Energy Regulatory Board. 7
In the light of Section 8 quoted above, public respondent
Board need not even have conducted formal hearings in
these cases prior to issuance of its Order of 14 August
1987 granting a provisional increase of prices. The
Board, upon its own discretion and on the basis of
documents and evidence submitted by private
respondents, could have issued an order granting
provisional relief immediately upon filing by private
respondents of their respective applications. In this
respect, the Court considers the evidence presented by
private respondents in support of their applications —
i.e., evidence showing that importation costs of
petroleum products had gone up; that the peso had
depreciated in value; and that the Oil Price Stabilization
Fund (OPSF) had by then been depleted — as
substantial and hence constitutive of at least prima facie
basis for issuance by the Board of a provisional relief
order granting an increase in the prices of petroleum
products. 8
We do not therefore find the challenged action of the
Board to have been done in violation of the due process
clause. The petitioners may contest however, the
applications at the hearings proper.
Senator Maceda's attack on the Order in question on
premises that it constitutes an act of taxation or that it
negates the effects of Republic Act No. 6965, cannot
prosper. Republic Act No. 6965 operated to lower taxes
on petroleum and petroleum products by imposing
specific taxes rather than ad valorem taxes thereon; it is,
not, however, an insurance against an "oil hike",
whenever warranted, or is it a price control mechanism
on petroleum and petroleum products. The statute had
possibly forestalled a larger hike, but it operated no
more.: nad
The Board Order authorizing the proceeds generated by
the increase to be deposited to the OPSF is not an act of
taxation. It is authorized by Presidential Decree No.
1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137, as
follows:
SECTION 8. There is hereby created a Trust Account in
the books of accounts of the Ministry of Energy to be
designated as Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) for the
purpose of minimizing frequent price changes brought
about by exchange rate adjustments and/or changes in
world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum
products. The Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) may
be sourced from any of the following:
a) Any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax
or customs duty imposed on petroleum products subject
to tax under this Decree arising from exchange rate
adjustment, as may be determined by the Minister of
Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy;
b) Any increase in the tax collection as a result of the
lifting of tax exemptions of government corporations, as
may be determined by the Minister of Finance in
consultation with the Board of Energy;
c) Any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum
products to augment the resources of the Fund through
an appropriate Order that may be issued by the Board of
Energy requiring payment by persons or companies
engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing
and/or marketing petroleum products;
d) Any resulting peso cost differentials in case the actual
peso costs paid by oil companies in the importation of
crude oil and petroleum products is less than the peso
costs computed using the reference foreign exchange
rates as fixed by the Board of Energy.
Anent claims that oil companies cannot charge new
prices for oil purchased at old rates, suffice it to say that
the increase in question was not prompted alone by the
increase in world oil prices arising from tension in the
Persian Gulf. What the Court gathers from the pleadings
as well as events of which it takes judicial notice, is that:
(1) as of June 30, 1990, the OPSF has incurred a deficit
of P6.1 Billion; (2) the exchange rate has fallen to P28.00
to $1.00; (3) the country's balance of payments is
expected to reach $1 Billion; (4) our trade deficit is at
$2.855 Billion as of the first nine months of the year.
Evidently, authorities have been unable to collect enough
taxes necessary to replenish the OPSF as provided by
Presidential Decree No. 1956, and hence, there was no
available alternative but to hike existing prices.
The OPSF, as the Court held in the aforecited CACP
cases, must not be understood to be a funding designed
to guarantee oil firms' profits although as a subsidy, or a
trust account, the Court has no doubt that oil firms make
money from it. As we held there, however, the OPSF was
established precisely to protect the consuming public
from the erratic movement of oil prices and to preclude
oil companies from taking advantage of fluctuations
occurring every so often. As a buffer mechanism, it
stabilizes domestic prices by bringing about a uniform
rate rather than leaving pricing to the caprices of the
market.

In all likelihood, therefore, an oil hike would have

probably been imminent, with or without trouble in the
Gulf, although trouble would have probably aggravated
it.: nad

The Court is not to be understood as having prejudged

the justness of an oil price increase amid the above
premises. What the Court is saying is that it thinks that
based thereon, the Government has made out a prima
facie case to justify the provisional increase in question.
Let the Court therefore make clear that these findings are
not final; the burden, however, is on the petitioners'
shoulders to demonstrate the fact that the present
economic picture does not warrant a permanent
increase.

There is no doubt that the increase in oil prices in

question (not to mention another one impending, which
the Court understands has been under consideration by
policy-makers) spells hard(er) times for the Filipino
people. The Court can not, however, debate the wisdom
of policy or the logic behind it (unless it is otherwise
arbitrary), not because the Court agrees with policy, but
because the Court is not the suitable forum for debate. It
is a question best judged by the political leadership which
after all, determines policy, and ultimately, by the
electorate, that stands to be better for it or worse off,
either in the short or long run.

At this point, the Court shares the indignation of the

people over the conspiracy of events and regrets its own
powerlessness, if by this Decision it has been powerless.
The constitutional scheme of things has simply left it with
no choice.

In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed

by the respondent Board in issuing its questioned Order.

WHEREFORE, these petitions are DISMISSED. No

costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr ., Cruz, Gancayco, Bidin, Griño

Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera and Padilla, JJ., no part.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 1051 May 19, 1903
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
FRED L. DORR, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
F. G. Waite for appellants.
Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
LADD, J.:
The defendants have been convicted upon a complaint
charging them with the offense of writing, publishing, and
circulating a scurrilous libel against the Government of
the United States and the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands. The complaint is based upon section 8
of Act No. 292 of the Commission, which is as follows:
Every person who shall utter seditious words or
speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels
against the Government of the United States or the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, or which
tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing
his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal or
meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or
incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir
up the people against the lawful authorities, or to disturb
the peace of the community, the safety and order of the
Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil
practices, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two
thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding two
years, or both, in the discretion of the court.
The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the
issue of the "Manila Freedom" of April 6, 1902, under the
caption of "A few hard facts."
The Attorney-General in his brief indicates the following
passages of the article as those upon which he relies to
sustain the conviction:
Sidney Adamson, in a late letter in "Leslie's Weekly," has
the following to say of the action of the Civil Commission
in appointing rascally natives to important Government
positions:
"It is a strong thing to say, but nevertheless true, that the
Civil Commission, through its ex-insurgent office holders,
and by its continual disregard for the records of natives
obtained during the military rule of the Islands, has, in its
distribution of offices, constituted a protectorate over a
set of men who should be in jail or deported. . . .
[Reference is then made to the appointment of one
Tecson as justice of the peace.] This is the kind of foolish
work that the Commission is doing all over the Islands,
reinstating insurgents and rogues and turning down the
men who have during the struggle, at the risk of their
lives, aided the Americans."
xxx xxx xxx
There is no doubt but that the Filipino office holders of
the Islands are in a good many instances rascals.
xxx xxx xxx
The commission has exalted to the highest positions in
the Islands Filipinos who are alleged to be notoriously
corrupt and rascally, and men of no personal character.
xxx xxx xxx
Editor Valdez, of "Miau," made serious charges against
two of the native Commissioners — charges against
Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, which, if true, would brand
the man as a coward and a rascal, and with what result?
. . . [Reference is then made to the prosecution and
conviction of Valdez for libel "under a law which specifies
that the greater the truth the greater the libel."] Is it the
desire of the people of the United States that the natives
against whom these charges have been made (which, if
true, absolutely vilify their personal characters) be
permitted to retain their seats on the Civil Commission,
the executive body of the Philippine Government, without
an investigation?
xxx xxx xxx
It is a notorious fact that many branches of the
Government organized by the Civil Commission are
rotten and corrupt. The fiscal system, upon which life,
liberty, and justice depends, is admitted by the
Attorney-General himself to be most unsatisfactory. It is a
fact that the Philippine judiciary is far from being what it
should. Neither fiscals nor judges can be persuaded to
convict insurgents when they wish to protect them.
xxx xxx xxx
Now we hear all sorts of reports as to rottenness existing
in the province [of Tayabas], and especially the northern
end of it; it is said that it is impossible to secure the
conviction of lawbreakers and outlaws by the native
justices, or a prosecution by the native fiscals.
xxx xxx xxx
The long and short of it is that Americans will not stand
for an arbitrary government, especially when evidences
of carpetbagging and rumors of graft are too thick to be
pleasant.
We do not understand that it is claimed that the
defendants succeeded in establishing at the trial the truth
of any of the foregoing statements. The only question
which we have considered is whether their publication
constitutes an offense under section 8 of Act No. 292,
above cited.
Several allied offenses or modes of committing the same
offense are defined in that section, viz: (1) The uttering of
seditious words or speeches; (2) the writing, publishing,
or circulating of scurrilous libels against the Government
of the United States or the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands; (3) the writing, publishing, or
circulating of libels which tend to disturb or obstruct any
lawful officer in executing his office; (4) or which tend to
instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful
purposes; (5) or which suggest or incite rebellious
conspiracies or riots; (6) or which tend to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the
peace of the community, the safety and order of the
Government; (7) knowingly concealing such evil
practices.
The complaint appears to be framed upon the theory that
a writing, in order to be punishable as a libel under this
section, must be of a scurrilous nature and directed
against the Government of the United States or the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, and must,
in addition, tend to some one of the results enumerated
in the section. The article in question is described in the
complaint as "a scurrilous libel against the Government
of the United States and the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands, which tends to obstruct the lawful
officers of the United States and the Insular Government
of the Philippine Islands in the execution of their offices,
and which tends to instigate others to cabal and meet
together for unlawful purposes, and which suggests and
incites rebellious conspiracies, and which tends to stir up
the people against the lawful authorities, and which
disturbs the safety and order of the Government of the
United States and the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands." But it is "a well-settled rule in
considering indictments that where an offense may be
committed in any of several different modes, and the
offense, in any particular instance, is alleged to have
been committed in two or more modes specified, it is
sufficient to prove the offense committed in any one of
them, provided that it be such as to constitute the
substantive offense" (Com. vs. Kneeland, 20 Pick.,
Mass., 206, 215), and the defendants may, therefore, be
convicted if any one of the substantive charges into
which the complaint may be separated has been made
out.
We are all, however, agreed upon the proposition that
the article in question has no appreciable tendency to
"disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his
office," or to "instigate" any person or class of persons "to
cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes," or to
"suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots," or to
"stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to
disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order
of the Government." All these various tendencies, which
are described in section 8 of Act No. 292, each one of
which is made an element of a certain form of libel, may
be characterized in general terms as seditious
tendencies. This is recognized in the description of the
offenses punished by this section, which is found in the
title of the act, where they are defined as the crimes of
the "seditious utterances, whether written or spoken."
Excluding from consideration the offense of publishing
"scurrilous libels against the Government of the United
States or the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands," which may conceivably stand on a somewhat
different footing, the offenses punished by this section all
consist in inciting, orally or in writing, to acts of disloyalty
or disobedience to the lawfully constituted authorities in
these Islands. And while the article in question, which is,
in the main, a virulent attack against the policy of the Civil
Commission in appointing natives to office, may have
had the effect of exciting among certain classes
dissatisfaction with the Commission and its measures,
we are unable to discover anything in it which can be
regarded as having a tendency to produce anything like
what may be called disaffection, or, in other words, a
state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain
loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws. There
can be no conviction, therefore, for any of the offenses
described in the section on which the complaint is based,
unless it is for the offense of publishing a scurrilous libel
against the Government of the of the United States or the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands.
Can the article be regarded as embraced within the
description of "scurrilous libels against the Government
of the United States or the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands?" In the determination of this question
we have encountered great difficulty, by reason of the
almost entire lack of American precedents which might
serve as a guide in the construction of the law. There
are, indeed, numerous English decisions, most of them
of the eighteenth century, on the subject of libelous
attacks upon the "Government, the constitution, or the
law generally," attacks upon the Houses of Parliament,
the Cabinet, the Established Church, and other
governmental organisms, but these decisions are not
now accessible to us, and, if they were, they were made
under such different conditions from those which prevail
at the present day, and are founded upon theories of
government so foreign to those which have inspired the
legislation of which the enactment in question forms a
part, that they would probably afford but little light in the
present inquiry. In England, in the latter part of the
eighteenth century, any "written censure upon public
men for their conduct as such," as well as any written
censure "upon the laws or upon the institutions of the
country," would probably have been regarded as a libel
upon the Government. (2 Stephen, History of the
Criminal Law of England, 348.) This has ceased to be the
law in England, and it is doubtful whether it was ever the
common law of any American State. "It is true that there
are ancient dicta to the effect that any publication tending
to "possess the people with an ill opinion of the
Government" is a seditious libel ( per Holt, C. J., in R. vs.
Tuchin, 1704, 5 St. Tr., 532, and Ellenborough, C. J., in
R. vs. Cobbett, 1804, 29 How. St. Tr., 49), but no one
would accept that doctrine now. Unless the words used
directly tend to foment riot or rebellion or otherwise to
disturb the peace and tranquility of the Kingdom, the
utmost latitude is allowed in the discussion of all public
affairs." (11 Enc. of the Laws of England, 450.) Judge
Cooley says (Const. Lim., 528): "The English common
law rule which made libels on the constitution or the
government indictable, as it was administered by the
courts, seems to us unsuited to the condition and
circumstances of the people of America, and therefore
never to have been adopted in the several States."
We find no decisions construing the Tennessee statute
(Code, sec. 6663), which is apparently the only existing
American statute of a similar character to that in
question, and from which much of the phraseology of
then latter appears to have been taken, though with
some essential modifications.
The important question is to determine what is meant in
section 8 of Act No. 292 by the expression "the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands." Does it mean in a
general and abstract sense the existing laws and
institutions of the Islands, or does it mean the aggregate
of the individuals by whom the government of the Islands
is, for the time being, administered? Either sense would
doubtless be admissible.
We understand, in modern political science, . . . by the
term government, that institution or aggregate of
institutions by which an independent society makes and
carries out those rules of action which are unnecessary
to enable men to live in a social state, or which are
imposed upon the people forming that society by those
who possess the power or authority of prescribing them.
Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a
society. By "dministration, again, we understand in
modern times, and especially in more or less free
countries, the aggregate of those persons in whose
hands the reins of government are for the time being (the
chief ministers or heads of departments)." (Bouvier, Law
Dictionary, 891.) But the writer adds that the terms
"government" and "administration" are not always used in
their strictness, and that "government" is often used for
"administration."
In the act of Congress of July 14, 1798, commonly known
as the "Sedition Act," it is made an offense to "write,
print, utter, or published," or to "knowingly and willingly
assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering, or publishing any
false, scandalous, and malicious writing or writings
against the Government of the United States, or either
House of the Congress of the United States, or the
President of the United States, with intent to defame the
said Government, or either House of the said Congress,
or the said President, or to bring them, or either of them,
into contempt or disrepute, or to excite against them or
either or any of them the hatred of the good people of the
United States," etc. The term "government" would appear
to be used here in the abstract sense of the existing
political system, as distinguished from the concrete
organisms of the Government — the Houses of
Congress and the Executive — which are also specially
mentioned.
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that this is the
sense in which the term is used in the enactment under
consideration.
It may be said that there can be no such thing as a
scurrilous libel, or any sort of a libel, upon an abstraction
like the Government in the sense of the laws and
institutions of a country, but we think an answer to this
suggestion is that the expression "scurrilous libel" is not
used in section 8 of Act No. 292 in the sense in which it
is used in the general libel law (Act No. 277) — that is, in
the sense of written defamation of individuals — but in
the wider sense, in which it is applied in the common law
to blasphemous, obscene, or seditious publications in
which there may be no element of defamation whatever.
"The word 'libel' as popularly used, seems to mean only
defamatory words; but words written, if obscene,
blasphemous, or seditious, are technically called libels,
and the publication of them is, by the law of England, an
indictable offense." (Bradlaugh vs. The Queen, 3 Q. B.
D., 607, 627, per Bramwell L. J. See Com. vs. Kneeland,
20 Pick., 206, 211.)
While libels upon forms of government, unconnected with
defamation of individuals, must in the nature of things be
of uncommon occurrence, the offense is by no means an
imaginary one. An instance of a prosecution for an
offense essentially of this nature is Republica vs. Dennie,
4 Yeates (Pa.), 267, where the defendant was indicted
"as a factious and seditious person of a wicked mind and
unquiet and turbulent disposition and conversation,
seditiously, maliciously, and willfully intending, as much
as in him lay, to bring into contempt and hatred the
independence of the United States, the constitution of
this Commonwealth and of the United States, to excite
popular discontent and dissatisfaction against the
scheme of polity instituted, and upon trial in the said
United States and in the said Commonwealth, to molest,
disturb, and destroy the peace and tranquility of the said
United States and of the said Commonwealth, to
condemn the principles of the Revolution, and revile,
depreciate, and scandalize the characters of the
Revolutionary patriots and statesmen, to endanger,
subvert, and totally destroy the republican constitutions
and free governments of the said United States and this
Commonwealth, to involve the said United States and
this Commonwealth in civil war, desolation, and anarchy,
and to procure by art and force a radical change and
alteration in the principles and forms of the said
constitutions and governments, without the free will,
wish, and concurrence of the people of the said United
States and this Commonwealth, respectively," the charge
being that "to fulfill, perfect, and bring to effect his
wicked, seditious, and detestable intentions aforesaid he
. . . falsely, maliciously, factiously, and seditiously did
make, compose, write, and publish the following libel, to
wit; 'A democracy is scarcely tolerable at any period of
national history. Its omens are always sinister and its
powers are unpropitious. With all the lights or experience
blazing before our eyes, it is impossible not to discover
the futility of this form of government. It was weak and
wicked at Athens, it was bad in Sparta, and worse in
Rome. It has been tried in France and terminated in
despotism. it was tried in England and rejected with the
utmost loathing and abhorrence. It is on its trial here and
its issue will be civil war, desolation, and anarchy. No
wise man but discerns its imperfections; no good man
but shudders at its miseries; no honest man but
proclaims its fraud, and no brave man but draws his
sword against its force. The institution of a scheme of
polity so radically contemptible and vicious is a
memorable example of what the villainy of some men
can devise, the folly of others receive, and both establish,
in despite of reason, reflection, and sensation.'"
An attack upon the lawfully established system of civil
government in the Philippine Islands, like that which
Dennie was accused of making upon the republican form
of government lawfully established in the United States
and in the State of Pennsylvania would, we think, if
couched in scandalous language, constitute the precise
offense described in section 8 of Act No. 292 as a
scurrilous libel against the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands.
Defamation of individuals, whether holding official
positions or not, and whether directed to their public
conduct or to their private life, may always be adequately
punished under the general libel law. Defamation of the
Civil Commission as an aggregation, it being "a body of
persons definite and small enough for its individual
members to be recognized as such" (Stephen, Digest of
the Criminal Law, art. 277), as well as defamation of any
of the individual members of the Commission or of the
Civil Governor, either in his public capacity or as a
private individual, may be so punished. The general libel
law enacted by the Commission was in force when Act
No. 292, was passed. There was no occasion for any
further legislation on the subject of libels against the
individuals by whom the Insular Government is
administered — against the Insular Government in the
sense of the aggregate of such individuals. There was
occasion for stringent legislation against seditious words
or libels, and that is the main if not the sole purpose of
the section under consideration. It is not unreasonable to
suppose that the Commission, in enacting this section,
may have conceived of attacks of a malignant or
scurrilous nature upon the existing political system of the
United States, or the political system established in these
Islands by the authority of the United States, as
necessarily of a seditious tendency, but it is not so
reasonable to suppose that they conceived of attacks
upon the personnel of the government as necessarily
tending to sedition. Had this been their view it seems
probable that they would, like the framers of the Sedition
Act of 1798, have expressly and specifically mentioned
the various public officials and collegiate governmental
bodies defamation of which they meant to punish as
sedition.
The article in question contains no attack upon the
governmental system of the United States, and it is quite
apparent that, though grossly abusive as respects both
the Commission as a body and some of its individual
members, it contains no attack upon the governmental
system by which the authority of the United States is
enforced in these Islands. The form of government by a
Civil Commission and a Civil Governor is not assailed. It
is the character of the men who are intrusted with the
administration of the government that the writer is
seeking to bring into disrepute by impugning the purity of
their motives, their public integrity, and their private
morals, and the wisdom of their policy. The publication of
the article, therefore, no seditious tendency being
apparent, constitutes no offense under Act No. 292,
section 8.

The judgment of conviction is reversed and the

defendants are acquitted, with costs de oficio.

Arellano, C.J. Torres, Willard and Mapa, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 86695. September 3, 1992.]
MARIA ELENA MALAGA, doing business under the
name B.E. CONSTRUCTION; JOSIELEEN NAJARRO,
doing business under the name BEST BUILT
CONSTRUCTION; JOSE N. OCCEÑA, doing business
under the name THE FIRM OF JOSE N. OCCEÑA; and
the ILOILO BUILDERS CORPORATION, Petitioners, v.
MANUEL R. PENACHOS, JR​., ALFREDO MATANGGA,
ENRICO TICAR AND TERESITA VILLANUEVA, in their
respective capacities as Chairman and Members of the
Pre-qualification Bids and Awards Committee
(PBAC)-BENIGNO PANISTANTE, in his capacity as
President of Iloilo State College of Fisheries, as well as in
their respective personal capacities; and HON.
LODRIGIO L. LEBAQUIN, Respondents.
Salas, Villareal & Velasco, for Petitioners.
Virgilio A. Sindico for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; GOVERNMENT
INSTRUMENTALITY, DEFINED. — The 1987
Administrative Code defines a government
instrumentality as follows: Instrumentality refers to any
agency of the National Government, not integrated within
the department framework, vested with special functions
or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies,
chartered institutions, and government-owned or
controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory
Provisions).
2. ID.; CHARTERED INSTITUTION; DEFINED;
APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — The 1987
Administrative Code describes a chartered institution
thus: Chartered institution — refers to any agency
organized or operating under a special charter, and
vested by law with functions relating to specific
constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes
the state universities and colleges, and the monetary
authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory
Provisions). It is clear from the above definitions that
ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered
by P.D. 1818. There are also indications in its charter
that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was
created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries
development policy of the State, a priority program of the
government to effect the socio-economic life of the
nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the
state college with its accounts and expenses to be
audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly
authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and
offices of the National Government are authorized to loan
or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state
college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and
even the services of such employees as can be spared
without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an
additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of
the funds of the National Treasury and it was also
decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance of
the state college would henceforth be included in the
General Appropriations Law. (Presidential Decree No.
1523)
3. ID.; PROHIBITION OF ANY COURT FROM ISSUING
INJUNCTION IN CASES INVOLVING
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS OF GOVERNMENT
(P.D. 1818); POWER OF THE COURTS TO RESTRAIN
APPLICATION. — In the case of Datiles and Co. v.
Sucaldito, (186 SCRA 704) this Court interpreted a
similar prohibition contained in P.D. 605, the law after
which P.D. 1818 was patterned. It was there declared
that the prohibition pertained to the issuance of
injunctions or restraining orders by courts against
administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the
exercise of discretion in technical cases. The Court
observed that to allow the courts to judge these matters
would disturb the smooth functioning of the
administrative machinery. Justice Teodoro Padilla made
it clear, however, that on issues definitely outside of this
dimension and involving questions of law, courts could
not be prevented by P.D. No. 605 from exercising their
power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts. We see
no reason why the above ruling should not apply to P.D.
1818. There are at least two irregularities committed by
PBAC that justified injunction of the bidding and the
award of the project.
4. ID.; POLICIES AND GUIDELINES PRESCRIBED
FOR GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE (PD 1594);
RULES IMPLEMENTING THEREOF, NOT
SUFFICIENTLY COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. —
Under the Rules Implementing P.D. 1594, prescribing
policies and guidelines for government infrastructure
contracts, PBAC shall provide prospective bidders with
the Notice to Pre-qualification and other relevant
information regarding the proposed work. Prospective
contractors shall be required to file their ARC-Contractors
Confidential Application for Registration & Classifications
& the PRE-C2 Confidential Pre-qualification Statement
for the Project (prior to the amendment of the rules, this
was referred to as Pre-C1) not later than the deadline set
in the published Invitation to Bid, after which date no
PRE-C2 shall be submitted and received. Invitations to
Bid shall be advertised for at least three times within a
reasonable period but in no case less than two weeks in
at least two newspapers of general circulations. (IB 13
1.2-19, Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D.
1594 as amended) PBAC advertised the pre-qualification
deadline as December 2, 1988, without stating the hour
thereof, and announced that the opening of bids would
be at 3 o’clock in the afternoon of December 12, 1988.
This scheduled was changed and a notice of such
change was merely posted at the ISCOF bulletin board.
The notice advanced the cut-off time for the submission
of pre-qualification documents to 10 o’clock in the
morning of December 2, 1988, and the opening of bids to
1 o’clock in the afternoon of December 12, 1988. The
new schedule caused the pre-disqualification of the
petitioners as recorded in the minutes of the PBAC
meeting held on December 6, 1988. While it may be true
that there were fourteen contractors who were
pre-qualified despite the change in schedule, this fact did
not cure the defect of the irregular notice. Notably, the
petitioners were disqualified because they failed to meet
the new deadline and not because of their expired
licenses. (B.E. & Best Built’s licenses were valid until
June 30, 1989. [Ex. P & O respectively: both were
marked on December 28, 1988]) We have held that
where the law requires a previous advertisement before
government contracts can be awarded, non-compliance
with the requirement will, as a general rule, render the
same void and of no effect. (Caltex Phil. v. Delgado
Bros., 96 Phil. 368) The fact that an invitation for bids has
been communicated to a number of possible bidders is
not necessarily sufficient to establish compliance with the
requirements of the law if it is shown that other possible
bidders have not been similarly notified.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. —
The purpose of the rules implementing P.D. 1594 is to
secure competitive bidding and to prevent favoritism,
collusion and fraud in the award of these contracts to the
detriment of the public. This purpose was defeated by the
irregularities committed by PBAC. It has been held that
the three principles in public bidding are the offer to the
public, an opportunity for competition and a basis for
exact comparison of bids. A regulation of the matter
which excludes any of these factors destroys the
distinctive character of the system and thwarts the
purpose of its adoption. (Hannan v. Board of Education,
25 Okla. 372) In the case at bar, it was the lack of proper
notice regarding the pre-qualification requirement and the
bidding that caused the elimination of petitioners B.E.
and Best Built. It was not because of their expired
licenses, as private respondents now claim. Moreover,
the plans and specifications which are the contractors’
guide to an intelligent bid, were not issued on time, thus
defeating the guaranty that contractors be placed on
equal footing when they submit their bids. The purpose of
competitive bidding is negated if some contractors are
informed ahead of their rivals of the plans and
specifications that are to be the subject of their bids.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF NON-COMPLIANCE
THEREOF. — It has been held in a long line of cases
that a contract granted without the competitive bidding
required by law is void, and the party to whom it is
awarded cannot benefit from it. It has not been shown
that the irregularities committed by PBAC were induced
by or participated in by any of the contractors. Hence,
liability shall attach only to the private respondents for the
prejudice sustained by the petitioners as a result of the
anomalies described above.
7. CIVIL LAW; NOMINAL DAMAGES; AWARD
THEREOF, WHEN AVAILABLE. — As there is no
evidence of the actual loss suffered by the petitioners,
compensatory damage may not be awarded to them.
Moral damages do not appear to be due either. Even so,
the Court cannot close its eyes to the evident bad faith
that characterized the conduct of the private
respondents, including the irregularities in the
announcement of the bidding and their efforts to
persuade the ISCOF president to award the project after
two days from receipt of the restraining order and before
they moved to lift such order. For such questionable acts,
they are liable in nominal damages at least in
accordance with Article 2221 of the Civil Code, which
states: Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in
order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated
or invaded by the defendant may be vindicated or,
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. These damages are
to be assessed against the private respondents in the
amount of P10,000.00 each, to be paid separately for
each of petitioners B.E. Construction and Best Built
Construction.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
This controversy involves the extent and applicability of
P.D. 1818, which prohibits any court from issuing
injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects of
the government.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
The facts are not disputed.
The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (henceforth ISCOF)
through its Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee
(henceforth PBAC) caused the publication in the
November 25, 26, 28, 1988 issues of the Western
Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of
the Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice
announced that the last day for the submission of
pre-qualification requirements (PRE C-1) ** was
December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received
and opened on December 12, 1988, 3 o’clock in the
afternoon. 1
Petitioners Maria Elena Malaga and Josieleen Najarro,
respectively doing business under the name of the B.E.
Construction and Best Built Construction, submitted their
pre-qualification documents at two o’clock in the
afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Jose Occeña
submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All
three of them were not allowed to participate in the
bidding because their documents were considered late,
having been submitted after the cut-off time of ten o’clock
in the morning of December 2, 1988.
On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint
with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo against the
chairman and members of PBAC in their official and
personal capacities. The plaintiffs claimed that although
they had submitted their PRE-C1 on time, the PBAC
refused without just cause to accept them. As a result,
they were not included in the list of pre-qualified bidders,
could not secure the needed plans and other documents,
and were unable to participate in the scheduled bidding.
In their prayer, they sought the resetting of the December
12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their PRE-C1
documents. They also asked that if the bidding had
already been conducted, the defendants be directed not
to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.
On the same date, Judge Lodrigio L. Lebaquin issued a
restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the
bidding and awarding the project. 2
On December 16, 1988, the defendants filed a motion to
lift the restraining order on the ground that the Court was
prohibited from issued restraining orders, preliminary
injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions by P.D.
1818.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The decree reads pertinently as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary
injunction, or preliminary infrastructure project, or a
mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource
development project of the government, or any public
utility operated by the government, including among
others public utilities for the transport of the goods and
commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to
prohibit any person or persons, entity or government
official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution
or implementation of any such project, or the operation of
such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity
necessary for such execution, implementation or
operation.
The movants also contended that the question of the
propriety of a preliminary injunction had become moot
and academic because the restraining order was
received late, at 2 o’clock in the afternoon of December
12, 1988, after the bidding had been conducted and
closed at eleven thirty in the morning of that date.
In their opposition of the motion, the plaintiffs argued
against the applicability of P.D. 1818, pointing out that
while ISCOF was a state college, it had its own charter
and separate existence and was not part of the national
government or of any local political subdivision. Even if
P.D. 1818 were applicable, the prohibition presumed a
valid and legal government project, not one tainted with
anomalies like the project at bar.
They also cited Filipinas Marble Corp. v. IAC, 3 where
the Court allowed the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction despite a similar prohibition found in P.D. 385.
The Court therein stated that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
The government, however, is bound by basic principles
of fairness and decency under the due process clauses
of the Bill of Rights. P.D. 385 was never meant to protect
officials of government-lending institutions who take over
the management of a borrower corporation, lead that
corporation to bankruptcy through mismanagement or
misappropriation of its funds, and who, after ruining it,
use the mandatory provisions of the decree to avoid the
consequences of their misleads (p. 188, Emphasis
supplied).
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining
order and denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It
declared that the building sought to be construed at the
ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government
falling within the coverage of P.D. 1818. Even if it were
not, the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction would still fail because the sheriff’s return
showed that PBAC was served a copy of the restraining
order after the bidding sought to be restrained had
already been held. Furthermore, the members of the
PBAC could not be restrained from awarding the project
because the authority to do so was lodged in the
President of the ISCOF, who was not a party to the case.
4 are all government officials under Section 7 of P.D. 1523
In the petition now before us, it is reiterated that P.D.
1818 does not cover the ISCOF because of its separate
and distinct corporate personality. It is also stressed
again that the prohibition under P.D. 1818 could not
apply to the present controversy because the project was
vitiated with irregularities, to wit:chanrobles.com : virtual
law library
1. The invitation to bid as published fixed the deadline of
submission of pre-qualification document on December
2, 1988 without indicating any time, yet after 10:00
o’clock of the given late, the PBAC already refused to
accept petitioners’ documents.
2. The time and date of bidding was published as
December 12, 1988 at 3:00 p.m. yet it was held at 10:00
o’clock in the morning.
3. Private respondents, for the purpose of inviting bidders
to participate, issued a mimeographed "Invitation to Bid"
form, which by law (P.D. 1594 and Implementing Rules,
Exh. B-1) is to contain the particulars of the project
subject of bidding for the purpose of.
(i) enabling bidders to make an intelligent and accurate
bids;
(ii) for PBAC to have a uniform basis for evaluating the
bids;
(iii) to prevent collusion between a bidder and the PBAC,
by opening to all the particulars of a project.
Additionally, the Invitation to Bid prepared by the
respondents and the Itemized Bill of Quantities therein
were left blank. 5 And although the project in question
was a "Construction," the private respondents used an
Invitation to Bid form for "Materials." 6
The petitioners also point out that the validity of the writ
of preliminary injunction had not yet become moot and
academic because even if the bids had been opened
before the restraining order was issued, the project itself
had not yet been awarded. The ISCOF president was not
an indispensable party because the signing of the award
was merely a ministerial function which he could perform
only upon the recommendation of the Award Committee.
At any rate, the complaint had already been duly
amended to include him as a party defendant.
In their Comment, the private respondents maintain that
since the members of the board of trustees of the ISCOF
and since the operations and maintenance of the ISCOF
are provided for in the General Appropriations Law, it is
should be considered a government institution whose
infrastructure project is covered by P.D. 1818.
Regarding the schedule for pre-qualification, the private
respondents insist that PBAC posted on the ISCOF
bulletin board an announcement that the deadline for the
submission of pre-qualifications documents was at 10
o’clock of December 2, 1988, and the opening of bids
would be held at 1 o’clock in the afternoon of December
12, 1988. As of ten o’clock in the morning of December
2, 1988, B.E. construction and Best Built construction
had filed only their letters of intent. At two o’clock in the
afternoon, B.E., and Best Built filed through their
common representative, Nenette Garuello, their
pre-qualification documents which were admitted but
stamped "submitted late." The petitioners were informed
of their disqualification on the same date, and the
disqualification became final on December 6, 1988.
Having failed to take immediate action to compel PBAC
to pre-qualify them despite their notice of disqualification,
they cannot now come to this Court to question the
binding proper in which they had not participated.
In the petitioners’ Reply, they raise as an additional
irregularity the violation of the rule that where the
estimate project cost is from P1M to P5M, the issuance
of plans, specifications and proposal book forms should
made thirty days before the date of bidding. 7 They point
out that these forms were issued only on December 2,
1988, and not at the latest on November 12, 1988, the
beginning of the 30-day period prior to the scheduled
bidding.
In their Rejoinder, the private respondents aver that the
documents of B.E. and Best Built were received although
filed late and were reviewed by the Award Committee,
which discovered that the contractors had expired
licenses. B.E.’s temporary certificate of Renewal of
Contractor’s License was valid only until September 30,
1988, while Best Built’s license was valid only up to June
30, 1988.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties in
light of their testimonial and documentary evidence and
the applicable laws and jurisprudence. It finds for the
petitioners.
The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government
instrumentality as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by
law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and
government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5)
Introductory Provisions).
The same Code describes a chartered institution
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Chartered institution — refers to any agency organized or
operating under a special charter, and vested by law with
functions relating to specific constitutional policies or
objectives. This term includes the state universities and
colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2
(12) Introductory Provisions).
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a
chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D.
1818.
There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a
government instrumentality. First, it was created in
pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy
of the State, a priority program of the government of
effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the
Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines also be the
ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts
and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit
or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of
bureaus and offices of the National Government are
authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the
president of the state college, such apparatus,
equipment, or supplies and even the services of such
employees as can be spared without serious detriment to
public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had
been appropriated out of the funds of the National
Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the
funds and maintenance of the state college would
henceforth be included in the General Appropriations
Law. 8
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF
is covered by the prohibition in the said decree.
In the case of Datiles and Co. v. Sucaldito, 9 this Court
interpreted a similar prohibition contained in P.D. 605,
the law after which P.D. 1818 was patterned. It was there
declared that the prohibition pertained to the issuance of
injunctions or restraining orders by courts against
administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the
exercise of discretion in technical cases. The Court
observed that to allow the courts to judge these matters
would disturb the smooth functioning of the
administrative machinery. Justice Teodoro Padilla made
it clear, however, that on issues definitely outside of this
dimension and involving questions of law, courts could
not be prevented by P.D. No. 605 from exercising their
power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
We see no reason why the above ruling should not apply
to P.D. 1818.
There are at least two irregularities committed by PBAC
that justified injunction of the bidding and the award of
the project.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
First, PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1
and the opening of bids and then changed these
deadlines without prior notice to prospective participants.
Under the Rules Implementing P.D. 1594, prescribing
policies and guidelines for government infrastructure
contracts, PBAC shall provide prospective bidders with
the Notice of Pre-qualification and other relevant
information regarding the proposed work. Prospective
contractors shall be required to file their ARC-Contractors
Confidential Application for Registration & Classifications
& the PRE-C2 Confidential Pre-qualification Statement
for the Project (prior to the amendment of the rules, this
was referred to as PRE-C1) not later than the deadline
set in the published Invitation to Bid, after which date no
PRE-C2 shall be submitted and received. Invitations to
Bid shall be advertised for at least three times within a
reasonable period but in no case less than two weeks in
at least two newspapers of general circulations. 10
PBAC advertised the pre-qualification deadline as
December 2, 1988, without stating the hour thereof, and
announced that the opening of bids would be at 3 o’clock
in the afternoon of December 12, 1988. This schedule
was changed and a notice of such change was merely
posted at the ISCOF bulletin board. The notice advanced
the cut-off time for the submission of pre-qualification
documents to 10 o’clock in the morning of December 2,
1988, and the opening of bids to 1 o’clock in the
afternoon of December 12, 1988.
The new schedule caused the pre-disqualification of the
petitioners as recorded in the minutes of the PBAC
meeting held on December 6, 1988. While it may be true
that there were fourteen contractors who were
pre-qualified despite the change in schedule, this fact did
not cure the defect of the irregular notice. Notably, the
petitioners were disqualified because they failed to meet
the new deadline and not because of their expired
licenses. ***
We have held that where the law requires a previous
advertisement before government contracts can be
awarded, non-compliance with the requirement will, as a
general rule, render the same void and of no effect 11
The facts that an invitation for bids has been
communicated to a number of possible bidders is not
necessarily sufficient to establish compliance with the
requirements of the law if it is shown that other public
bidders have not been similarly notified. 12
Second, PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified
applicants the plans, specifications and proposal book
forms for the project to be bid thirty days before the date
of bidding if the estimate project cost was between P1M
and P5M. PBAC has not denied that these forms were
issued only on December 2, 1988, or only ten days
before the bidding scheduled for December 12, 1988. At
the very latest, PBAC should have issued them on
November 12, 1988, or 30 days before the scheduled
bidding.
It is apparent that the present controversy did not arise
from the discretionary acts of the administrative body nor
does it involve merely technical matters. What is involved
here is non-compliance with the procedural rules on
bidding which required strict observance. The purpose of
the rules implementing P.D. 1594 is to secure
competitive bidding and to prevent favoritism, collusion
and fraud in the award of these contracts to the detriment
of the public. This purpose was defeated by the
irregularities committed by PBAC.chanrobles law library :
red
It has been held that the three principles in public bidding
are the offer to the public, an opportunity for competition
and a basis for exact comparison of bids. A regulation of
the matter which excludes any of these factors destroys
the distinctive character of the system and thwarts and
purpose of its adoption. 13
In the case at bar, it was the lack of proper notice
regarding the pre-qualification requirement and the
bidding that caused the elimination of petitioners B.E.
and Best Built. It was not because of their expired
licenses, as private respondents now claim. Moreover,
the plans and specifications which are the contractors’
guide to an intelligent bid, were not issued on time, thus
defeating the guaranty that contractors be placed on
equal footing when they submit their bids. The purpose of
competitive bidding is negated if some contractors are
informed ahead of their rivals of the plans and
specifications that are to be the subject of their bids.
P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial
scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative
agencies such as the anomalies above described.
Hence, the challenged restraining order was not
improperly issued by the respondent judge and the writ of
preliminary injunction should not have been denied. We
note from Annex Q of the private respondent’s
memorandum, however, that the subject project has
already been "100% completed as to the Engineering
Standard." This fait accompli has made the petition for a
writ of preliminary injunction moot and academic.
We come now to the liabilities of the private respondents.
It has been held in a long line of cases that a contract
granted without the competitive bidding required by law is
void, and the party to whom it is awarded cannot benefit
from it. 14 It has not been shown that the irregularities
committed by PBAC were induced by or participated in
by any of the contractors. Hence, liability shall attach only
to the private respondents for the prejudice sustained by
the petitioners as a result of the anomalies described
above.
As there is no evidence of the actual loss suffered by the
petitioners, compensatory damage may not be awarded
to them. Moral damages do not appear to be due either.
Even so, the Court cannot close its eyes to the evident
bad faith that characterized the conduct of the private
respondents, including the irregularities in the
announcement of the bidding and their efforts to
persuade the ISCOF president to award the project after
two days from receipt of the restraining order and before
they moved to lift such order. For such questionable acts,
they are liable in nominal damages at least in
accordance with Article 2221 of the Civil Code, which
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order
that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant may be vindicated or,
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

These damages are to assessed against the private

respondents in the amount of P10,000.00 each, to be
paid separately for each of petitioners B.E. Construction
and Best Built Construction. The other petitioner, Occeña
Builders, is not entitled to relief because it admittedly
submitted its pre-qualification documents on December
5, 1988, or three days after the deadline.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: a)

upholding the restraining order dated December 12,
1988, as not covered by the prohibition in P.D. 1818; b)
ordering the chairman and the members of the PBAC
board of trustees, namely Manuel R. Penachos, Jr.,
Alfredo Matangga, Enrico Ticar, and Teresita Villanueva,
to each pay separately to petitioners Maria Elena Malaga
and Josieleen Najarro nominal damages P10,000.00
each; and c) removing the said chairman and members
from the PBAC board of trustees, or whoever among
them is still incumbent therein, for their malfeasance in
office. Costs against PBAC.

Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Office of the

Ombudsman.

SO ORDERED.

Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 97149 March 31, 1992
FIDENCIO Y. BEJA, SR., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE REINERIO O.
REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department
of Transportation and Communications; COMMODORE
ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as General
Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority;
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
BOARD; and JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his
capacity as Chairman of the Administrative Action Board,
DOTC, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition for certiorari questions the jurisdiction
of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) and/or its Administrative Action
Board (AAB) over administrative cases involving
personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager
of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), an agency
attached to the said Department.
Petitioner Fidencio Y. Beja, Sr. 1 was first employed by
the PPA as arrastre supervisor in 1975. He became
Assistant Port Operations Officer in 1976 and Port
Operations Officer in 1977. In February 1988, as a result
of the reorganization of the PPA, he was appointed
Terminal Supervisor.
On October 21, 1988, the PPA General Manager,
Rogelio A. Dayan, filed Administrative Case No.
11-04-88 against petitioner Beja and Hernando G.
Villaluz for grave dishonesty, grave misconduct, willful
violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Beja and Villaluz allegedly erroneously assessed storage
fees resulting in the loss of P38,150.77 on the part of the
PPA. Consequently, they were preventively suspended
for the charges. After a preliminary investigation
conducted by the district attorney for Region X,
Administrative Case No. 11-04-88 was "considered
closed for lack of merit."
On December 13, 1988, another charge sheet, docketed
as Administrative Case No. 12-01-88, was filed against
Beja by the PPA General Manager also for dishonesty,
grave misconduct, violation of reasonable office rules
and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service and for being notoriously undesirable. The
charge consisted of six (6) different specifications of
administrative offenses including fraud against the PPA
in the total amount of P218,000.00. Beja was also placed
under preventive suspension pursuant to Sec. 41 of P.D.
No. 807.
The case was redocketed as Administrative Case No.
PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the PPA general
manager indorsed it to the AAB for "appropriate action."
At the scheduled hearing, Beja asked for continuance on
the ground that he needed time to study the charges
against him. The AAB proceeded to hear the case and
gave Beja an opportunity to present evidence. However,
on February 20, 1989, Beja filed a petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court
of Misamis Oriental. 2 Two days later, he filed with the
AAB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing
of Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on
account of the pendency of the certiorari proceeding
before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued
with the hearing of the administrative case.
Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari
case below and proceeded to file before this Court a
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order. The case was docketed as
G.R. No. 87352 captioned "Fidencio Y. Beja v. Hon.
Reinerio 0. Reyes, etc., et al." In the en banc resolution
of March 30, 1989, this Court referred the case to the
Court of Appeals for "appropriate action." 3 G.R. No.
87352 was docketed in the Court of Appeals as CA-G.R.
SP No. 17270.
Meanwhile, a decision was rendered by the AAB in
Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-049-89. Its dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, adjudging
the following, namely:
a) That respondents Geronimo Beja, Jr. and Hernando
Villaluz are exonerated from the charge against them;
b) That respondent Fidencio Y. Beja be dismissed from
the service;
c) That his leave credits and retirement benefits are
declared forfeited;
d) That he be disqualified from re-employment in the
government service;
e) That his eligibility is recommended to be cancelled.
Pasig, Metro Manila, February 28, 1989.

On December 10, 1990, after appropriate proceedings,
the Court of Appeals also rendered a decision 4 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 17270 dismissing the petition for
certiorari for lack of merit. Hence, Beja elevated the case
back to this Court through an "appeal by certiorari with
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order."
We find the pleadings filed in this case to be sufficient
bases for arriving at a decision and hence, the filing of
memoranda has been dispensed with.
In his petition, Beja assails the Court of Appeals for
having "decided questions of substance in a way
probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
decisions" of this Court. 5 Specifically, Beja contends
that the Court of Appeals failed to declare that: (a) he
was denied due process; (b) the PPA general manager
has no power to issue a preventive suspension order
without the necessary approval of the PPA board of
directors; (c) the PPA general manager has no power to
refer the administrative case filed against him to the
DOTC-AAB, and (d) the DOTC Secretary, the Chairman
of the DOTC-AAB and DOTC-AAB itself as an
adjudicatory body, have no jurisdiction to try the
administrative case against him. Simply put, Beja
challenges the legality of the preventive suspension and
the jurisdiction of the DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB to
initiate and hear administrative cases against PPA
personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager.
Petitioner anchors his contention that the PPA general
manager cannot subject him to a preventive suspension
on the following provision of Sec. 8, Art. V of Presidential
Decree No. 857 reorganizing the PPA:
(d) the General Manager shall, subject to the approval of
the Board, appoint and remove personnel below the rank
of Assistant General Manager. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner contends that under this provision, the PPA
Board of Directors and not the PPA General Manager is
the "proper disciplining authority. 6
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the
petitioner erroneously equates "preventive suspension"
as a remedial measure with "suspension" as a penalty for
administrative dereliction. The imposition of preventive
suspension on a government employee charged with an
administrative offense is subject to the following provision
of the Civil Service Law, P.D. No. 807:
Sec. 41. Preventive Suspension. — The proper
disciplining authority may preventively suspend any
subordinate officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if the charge against such
officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty,
or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is
guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from
the service.
Imposed during the pendency of an administrative
investigation, preventive suspension is not a penalty in
itself. It is merely a measure of precaution so that the
employee who is charged may be separated, for obvious
reasons, from the scene of his alleged misfeasance while
the same is being investigated. 7 Thus, preventive
suspension is distinct from the administrative penalty of
removal from office such as the one mentioned in Sec.
8(d) of P.D. No 857. While the former may be imposed
on a respondent during the investigation of the charges
against him, the latter is the penalty which may only be
meted upon him at the termination of the investigation or
the final disposition of the case.
The PPA general manager is the disciplining authority
who may, by himself and without the approval of the PPA
Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an
administrative case to preventive suspension. His
disciplinary powers are sanctioned, not only by Sec. 8 of
P.D. No. 857 aforequoted, but also by Sec. 37 of P.D.
No. 807 granting heads of agencies the "jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary
actions against officers and employees" in the PPA.
Parenthetically, the period of preventive suspension is
limited. It may be lifted even if the disciplining authority
has not finally decided the administrative case provided
the ninety-day period from the effectivity of the preventive
suspension has been exhausted. The employee
concerned may then be reinstated. 8 However, the said
ninety-day period may be interrupted. Section 42 of P.D.
No. 807 also mandates that any fault, negligence or
petition of a suspended employee may not be considered
in the computation of the said period. Thus, when a
suspended employee obtains from a court of justice a
restraining order or a preliminary injunction inhibiting
proceedings in an administrative case, the lifespan of
such court order should be excluded in the reckoning of
the permissible period of the preventive suspension. 9
With respect to the issue of whether or not the DOTC
Secretary and/or the AAB may initiate and hear
administrative cases against PPA Personnel below the
rank of Assistant General Manager, the Court qualifiedly
rules in favor of petitioner.
The PPA was created through P.D. No. 505 dated July
11, 1974. Under that Law, the corporate powers of the
PPA were vested in a governing Board of Directors
known as the Philippine Port Authority Council. Sec. 5(i)
of the same decree gave the Council the power "to
appoint, discipline and remove, and determine the
composition of the technical staff of the Authority and
other personnel."
On December 23, 1975, P.D. No. 505 was substituted by
P.D. No. 857, See. 4(a) thereof created the Philippine
Ports Authority which would be "attached" to the then
Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communication. When Executive Order No. 125 dated
January 30, 1987 reorganizing the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications was issued, the
PPA retained its "attached" status. 10 Even Executive
Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987
classified the PPA as an agency "attached" to the
Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC). Sec. 24 of Book IV, Title XV, Chapter 6 of the
same Code provides that the agencies attached to the
DOTC "shall continue to operate and function in
accordance with the respective charters or laws creating
them, except when they conflict with this Code."
Attachment of an agency to a Department is one of the
three administrative relationships mentioned in Book IV,
Chapter 7 of the Administrative Code of 1987, the other
two being supervision and control and administrative
supervision. "Attachment" is defined in Sec. 38 thereof as
follows:
(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral
relationship between the Department or its equivalent
and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of
policy and program coordination. The coordination shall
be accomplished by having the department represented
in the governing board of the attached agency or
corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or
without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter;
having the attached corporation or agency comply with a
system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the
progress of programs and projects; and having the
department or its equivalent provide general policies
through its representative in the board, which shall serve
as the framework for the internal policies of the attached
corporation or agency;
(b) Matters of day-to-day administration or all those
pertaining to internal operations shall he left to the
discretion or judgment of the executive officer of the
agency or corporation. In the event that the Secretary
and the head of the board or the attached agency or
corporation strongly disagree on the interpretation and
application of policies, and the Secretary is unable to
resolve the disagreement, he shall bring the matter to the
President for resolution and direction;
(c) Government-owned or controlled corporations
attached to a department shall submit to the Secretary
concerned their audited financial statements within sixty
(60) days after the close of the fiscal year; and
(d) Pending submission of the required financial
statements, the corporation shall continue to operate on
the basis of the preceding year's budget until the
financial statements shall have been submitted. Should
any government-owned or controlled corporation incur an
operation deficit at the close of its fiscal year, it shall be
subject to administrative supervision of the department;
and the corporation's operating and capital budget shall
be subject to the department's examination, review,
modification and approval. (emphasis supplied.)
An attached agency has a larger measure of
independence from the Department to which it is
attached than one which is under departmental
supervision and control or administrative supervision.
This is borne out by the "lateral relationship" between the
Department and the attached agency. The attachment is
merely for "policy and program coordination." With
respect to administrative matters, the independence of
an attached agency from Departmental control and
supervision is further reinforced by the fact that even an
agency under a Department's administrative supervision
is free from Departmental interference with respect to
appointments and other personnel actions "in
accordance with the decentralization of personnel
functions" under the Administrative Code of 1987. 11
Moreover, the Administrative Code explicitly provides
that Chapter 8 of Book IV on supervision and control
shall not apply to chartered institutions attached to a
Department. 12
Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that with respect to
the management of personnel, an attached agency is, to
a certain extent, free from Departmental interference and
control. This is more explicitly shown by P.D. No. 857
which provides:
Sec. 8. Management and Staff. — a) The President shall,
upon the recommendation of the Board, appoint the
General Manager and the Assistant General Managers.
(b) All other officials and employees of the Authority shall
be selected and appointed on the basis of merit and
fitness based on a comprehensive and progressive merit
system to be established by the Authority immediately
upon its organization and consistent with Civil Service
rules and regulations. The recruitment, transfer,
promotion, and dismissal of all personnel of the Authority,
including temporary workers, shall be governed by such
merit system.
(c) The General Manager shall, subject to the approval of
the Board, determine the staffing pattern and the number
of personnel of the Authority, define their duties and
responsibilities, and fix their salaries and emoluments.
For professional and technical positions, the General
Manager shall recommend salaries and emoluments that
are comparable to those of similar positions in other
government-owned corporations, the provisions of
existing rules and regulations on wage and position
classification notwithstanding.
(d) The General Manager shall, subject to the approval
by the Board, appoint and remove personnel below the
rank of Assistant General Manager.
xxx xxx xxx
(emphasis supplied.)
Although the foregoing section does not expressly
provide for a mechanism for an administrative
investigation of personnel, by vesting the power to
remove erring employees on the General Manager, with
the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, the law
impliedly grants said officials the power to investigate its
personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may
be charged with an administrative offense. During such
investigation, the PPA General Manager, as earlier
stated, may subject the employee concerned to
preventive suspension. The investigation should be
conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in
Sec. 38 of P.D. No. 807. 13 Only after gathering
sufficient facts may the PPA General Manager impose
the proper penalty in accordance with law. It is the latter
action which requires the approval of the PPA Board of
Directors. 14
From an adverse decision of the PPA General Manager
and the Board of Directors, the employee concerned may
elevate the matter to the Department Head or Secretary.
Otherwise, he may appeal directly to the Civil Service
Commission. The permissive recourse to the Department
Secretary is sanctioned by the Civil Service Law (P.D.
No. 807) under the following provisions:
Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. — (a) The Commission
shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension
for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer,
removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be
filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen
against a government official or employee in which case
it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any
department or agency or official or group of officials to
conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation
shall be submitted to the Commission with
recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other
action to be taken.
(b) The heads of departments, agencies and
instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities
shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction. The decisions shall be
final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not
more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding
thirty days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a
bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission,
the same may be initially appealed to the department and
finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same
shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in
which case the same shall be executory only after
confirmation by the department head.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the complaint
by the PPA General Manager to the AAB was premature.
The PPA General Manager should have first conducted
an investigation, made the proper recommendation for
the imposable penalty and sought its approval by the
PPA Board of Directors. It was discretionary on the part
of the herein petitioner to elevate the case to the then
DOTC Secretary Reyes. Only then could the AAB take
jurisdiction of the case.
The AAB, which was created during the tenure of
Secretary Reyes under Office Order No. 88-318 dated
July 1, 1988, was designed to act, decide and
recommend to him "all cases of administrative
malfeasance, irregularities, grafts and acts of corruption
in the Department." Composed of a Chairman and two
(2) members, the AAB came into being pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 25 issued by the President on
May 25, 1987. 15 Its special nature as a quasi-judicial
administrative body notwithstanding, the AAB is not
exempt from the observance of due process in its
proceedings. 16 We are not satisfied that it did so in this
case the respondents protestation that petitioner waived
his right to be heard notwithstanding. It should be
observed that petitioner was precisely questioning the
AAB's jurisdiction when it sought judicial recourse.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

AFFIRMED insofar as it upholds the power of the PPA
General Manager to subject petitioner to preventive
suspension and REVERSED insofar as it validates the
jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on
Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and rules
that due process has been accorded the petitioner.

The AAB decision in said case is hereby declared NULL

and VOID and the case in REMANDED to the PPA
whose General Manager shall conduct with dispatch its
reinvestigation.

The preventive suspension of petitioner shall continue

unless after a determination of its duration, it is found that
he had served the total of ninety (90) days in which case
he shall be reinstated immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,

Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,
Davide, Jr. and Nocon JJ., concur.

Padilla and Bellosillo, JJ., took no part.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995
AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION​, HON. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR. & HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR.,
respondents.
PUNO, J.:
The power of the Civil Service Commission to abolish the
Career Executive Service Board is challenged in this
petition for certiorari and prohibition.
First the facts. Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the
Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a
Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO
rank on August 2, 1993, she was given a CES eligibility.
On September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the
President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive
Service Board. 1
All was not to turn well for petitioner. On October 1, 1993,
respondent Civil Service Commission2 passed
Resolution No. 93-4359, viz:
RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359
WHEREAS, Section 1(1) of Article IX-B provides that
Civil Service shall be administered by the Civil Service
Commission, . . .;
WHEREAS, Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution provides that "The Civil Service
Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
government, is mandated to establish a career service
and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency,
integrity, responsiveness, progresiveness and courtesy in
the civil service, . . .";
WHEREAS, Section 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 grants the Commission
the power, among others, to administer and enforce the
constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit
system for all levels and ranks in the Civil Service;
WHEREAS, Section 7, Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 Provides, among others,
that The Career Service shall be characterized by (1)
entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as
far as practicable by competitive examination, or based
highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for
advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security
of tenure;
WHEREAS, Section 8 (c), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of
the administrative Code of 1987 provides that "The third
level shall cover Positions in the Career Executive
Service";
WHEREAS, the Commission recognizes the imperative
need to consolidate, integrate and unify the
administration of all levels of positions in the career
service.
WHEREAS, the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle
A. Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 confers on
the Commission the power and authority to effect
changes in its organization as the need arises.
WHEREAS, Section 5, Article IX-A of the Constitution
provides that the Civil Service Commission shall enjoy
fiscal autonomy and the necessary implications thereof;
NOW THEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
Civil Service Commission hereby resolves to streamline
reorganize and effect changes in its organizational
structure. Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service
Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career
Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission.
Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties
and equipment of the Career Executive Service Board
shall now form part of the Office for Career Executive
Service.
The above resolution became an impediment. to the
appointment of petitioner as Civil Service Officer, Rank
IV. In a letter to petitioner, dated June 7, 1994, the
Honorable Antonio T. Carpio, Chief Presidential legal
Counsel, stated:
xxx xxx xxx
On 1 October 1993 the Civil Service Commission issued
CSC Resolution No. 93-4359 which abolished the Career
Executive Service Board.
Several legal issues have arisen as a result of the
issuance of CSC Resolution No. 93-4359, including
whether the Civil Service Commission has authority to
abolish the Career Executive Service Board. Because
these issues remain unresolved, the Office of the
President has refrained from considering appointments of
career service eligibles to career executive ranks.
xxx xxx xxx

You may, however, bring a case before the appropriate
court to settle the legal issues arising from issuance by
the Civil Service Commission of CSC Resolution No.
93-4359, for guidance of all concerned.
Thank You.
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as
the Career Executive Service Board which recommended
her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed
the petition at bench to annul, among others, resolution
No. 93-4359. The petition is anchored on the following
arguments:
A.
IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
RESPONDENT COMMISSION USURPED THE
LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT
ABOLISHED THE CESB, AN OFFICE CREATED BY
LAW, THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF CSC:
RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359;
B.
ALSO IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
RESPONDENT CSC USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE
FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT ILLEGALLY
AUTHORIZED THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEY,
THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF CSC RESOLUTION
NO. 93-4359.
Required to file its Comment, the Solicitor General
agreed with the contentions of petitioner. Respondent
Commission, however, chose to defend its ground. It
posited the following position:
ARGUMENTS FOR PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC
I. THE INSTANT PETITION STATES NO CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC.
II. THE RECOMMENDATION SUBMITTED TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR APPOINTMENT TO A CESO RANK
OF PETITIONER EUGENIO WAS A VALID ACT OF
THE CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD OF THE
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND IT DOES NOT
HAVE ANY DEFECT.
III. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IS ESTOPPED
FROM QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF THE
RECOMMENDATION OF THE CESB IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER EUGENIO SINCE THE PRESIDENT HAS
PREVIOUSLY APPOINTED TO CESO RANK FOUR (4)
OFFICIALS SIMILARLY SITUATED AS SAID
PETITIONER. FURTHERMORE, LACK OF MEMBERS
TO CONSTITUTE A QUORUM. ASSUMING THERE
WAS NO QUORUM, IS NOT THE FAULT OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION BUT OF
THE PRESIDENT WHO HAS THE POWER TO
APPOINT THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CESB.
IV. THE INTEGRATION OF THE CESB INTO THE
COMMISSION IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW (Sec. 12 (1),
Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of
the 1987). THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE HAD ALREADY
BEEN SETTLED WHEN THE HONORABLE COURT
DISMISSED THE PETITION FILED BY THE
HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, NAMELY: SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR.,
RENATO V. DIAZ, AND MANUEL M. GARCIA IN G.R.
NO. 114380. THE AFOREMENTIONED PETITIONERS
ALSO QUESTIONED THE INTEGRATION OF THE
CESB WITH THE COMMISSION.
We find merit in the petition.3
The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service
Board (CESB) was created in the Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 19744 which adopted the
Integrated Plan. Article IV, Chapter I, Part of the III of the
said Plan provides:
Article IV — Career Executive Service
1. A Career Executive Service is created to form a
continuing pool of well-selected and development
oriented career administrators who shall provide
competent and faithful service.
2. A Career Executive Service hereinafter referred to in
this Chapter as the Board, is created to serve as the
governing body of the Career Executive Service. The
Board shall consist of the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission as presiding officer, the Executive Secretary
and the Commissioner of the Budget as ex-officio
members and two other members from the private sector
and/or the academic community who are familiar with the
principles and methods of personnel administration.
xxx xxx xxx
5. The Board shall promulgate rules, standards and
procedures on the selection, classification, compensation
and career development of members of the Career
Executive Service. The Board shall set up the
organization and operation of the service. (Emphasis
supplied)
It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was
created by law, it can only be abolished by the
legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings
that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily
a legislative function. As aptly summed up in AM JUR 2d
on Public Officers and
Employees, 5 viz:
Except for such offices as are created by the
Constitution, the creation of public offices is primarily a
legislative function. In so far as the legislative power in
this respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions,
it supreme, and the legislature may decide for itself what
offices are suitable, necessary, or convenient. When in
the exigencies of government it is necessary to create
and define duties, the legislative department has the
discretion to determine whether additional offices shall be
created, or whether these duties shall be attached to and
become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office
created by the legislature is wholly within the power of
that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the
office and the powers and duties of the incumbent, and if
it sees fit, abolish the office.
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted
any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the
contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from
1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the
operation of CESB. Respondent Commission, however,
invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V
of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its
power to abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. — Each office of the
Commission shall be headed by a Director with at least
one Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as
are necessary independent constitutional body, the
Commission may effect changes in the organization as
the need arises.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor
General, Section 17 must be read together with Section
16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under
the respondent Commission, viz:
Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. — The Commission
shall have the following offices:
(1) The Office of the Executive Director headed by an
Executive Director, with a Deputy Executive Director
shall implement policies, standards, rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission; coordinate the
programs of the offices of the Commission and render
periodic reports on their operations, and perform such
other functions as may be assigned by the Commission.
(2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a
Chairman and two (2) members shall have the following
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The Office of Legal Affairs shall provide the Chairman
with legal advice and assistance; render counselling
services; undertake legal studies and researches;
prepare opinions and ruling in the interpretation and
application of the Civil Service law, rules and regulations;
prosecute violations of such law, rules and regulations;
and represent the Commission before any court or
tribunal.
(4) The Office of Planning and Management shall
formulate development plans, programs and projects;
undertake research and studies on the different aspects
of public personnel management; administer
management improvement programs; and provide fiscal
and budgetary services.
(5) The Central Administrative Office shall provide the
Commission with personnel, financial, logistics and other
basic support services.
(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records shall
formulate and implement policies, standards, rules and
regulations pertaining to personnel records maintenance,
security, control and disposal; provide storage and
extension services; and provide and maintain library
services.
(7) The Office of Position Classification and
Compensation shall formulate and implement policies,
standards, rules and regulations relative to the
administration of position classification and
compensation.
(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and
Placement shall provide leadership and assistance in
developing and implementing the overall Commission
programs relating to recruitment, execution and
placement, and formulate policies, standards, rules and
regulations for the proper implementation of the
Commission's examination and placement programs.
(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards shall
provide leadership and assistance in the formulation and
evaluation of personnel systems and standards relative
to performance appraisal, merit promotion, and employee
incentive benefit and awards.
(10) The Office of Human Resource Development shall
provide leadership and assistance in the development
and retention of qualified and efficient work force in the
Civil Service; formulate standards for training and staff
development; administer service-wide scholarship
programs; develop training literature and materials;
coordinate and integrate all training activities and
evaluate training programs.
(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit shall
develop policies, standards, rules and regulations for the
effective conduct or inspection and audit personnel and
personnel management programs and the exercise of
delegated authority; provide technical and advisory
services to Civil Service Regional Offices and
government agencies in the implementation of their
personnel programs and evaluation systems.
(12) The Office of Personnel Relations shall provide
leadership and assistance in the development and
implementation of policies, standards, rules and
regulations in the accreditation of employee associations
or organizations and in the adjustment and settlement of
employee grievances and management of employee
disputes.
(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs shall formulate and
implement policies, standards, rules and regulations
governing corporate officials and employees in the areas
of recruitment, examination, placement, career
development, merit and awards systems, position
classification and compensation, performing appraisal,
employee welfare and benefit, discipline and other
aspects of personnel management on the basis of
comparable industry practices.
(14) The Office of Retirement Administration shall be
responsible for the enforcement of the constitutional and
statutory provisions, relative to retirement and the
regulation for the effective implementation of the
retirement of government officials and employees.
(15) The Regional and Field Offices. — The Commission
shall have not less than thirteen (13) Regional offices
each to be headed by a Director, and such field offices
as may be needed, each to be headed by an official with
at least the rank of an Assistant Director.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that
respondent Commission's power to reorganize is limited
to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16,
supra. From its inception, the CESB was intended to be
an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to
respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the
Reorganization Committee "the CESB shall be
autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of
building up executive manpower in the government with
a broad and positive outlook." 6 The essential
autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its
attachment to respondent Commission. By said
attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control
of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative
Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally
inter-related government agency to another is to attain
"policy and program coordination." This is clearly etched
out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited
Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral
relationship between the department or its equivalent and
attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy
and program coordination. The coordination may be
accomplished by having the department represented in
the governing board of the attached agency or
corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or
without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter;
having the attached corporation or agency comply with a
system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the
progress of programs and projects; and having the
department or its equivalent provide general policies
through its representative in the board, which shall serve
as the framework for the internal policies of the attached
corporation or agency.
Respondent Commission also relies on the case of
Datumanong, et al., vs. Civil Service Commission, G. R.
No. 114380 where the petition assailing the abolition of
the CESB was dismissed for lack of cause of action.
Suffice to state that the reliance is misplaced considering
that the cited case was dismissed for lack of standing of
the petitioner, hence, the lack of cause of action.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and
Resolution No. 93-4359 of the respondent Commission is
hereby annulled and set aside. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug,
Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner,
vs.
ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK
EMPLOYEES and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in her
capacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
From a submission agreement of the Luzon
Development Bank (LDB) and the Association of Luzon
Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an
arbitration case to resolve the following issue:
Whether or not the company has violated the Collective
Bargaining Agreement provision and the Memorandum of
Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion.
At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of
their respective Position Papers on December 1-15,
1994. Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary
Arbitrator, received ALDBE's Position Paper on January
18, 1995. LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its
Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary
Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995
no Position Paper had been filed by LDB.
On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the
Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has
not adhered to the Collective Bargaining Agreement
provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on
promotion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking
to set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and
to prohibit her from enforcing the same.
In labor law context, arbitration is the reference of a labor
dispute to an impartial third person for determination on
the basis of evidence and arguments presented by such
parties who have bound themselves to accept the
decision of the arbitrator as final and binding.
Arbitration may be classified, on the basis of the
obligation on which it is based, as either compulsory or
voluntary.
Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties
to a dispute are compelled by the government to forego
their right to strike and are compelled to accept the
resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third
party.1 The essence of arbitration remains since a
resolution of a dispute is arrived at by resort to a
disinterested third party whose decision is final and
binding on the parties, but in compulsory arbitration, such
a third party is normally appointed by the government.
Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, referral of
a dispute by the parties is made, pursuant to a voluntary
arbitration clause in their collective agreement, to an
impartial third person for a final and binding resolution.2
Ideally, arbitration awards are supposed to be complied
with by both parties without delay, such that once an
award has been rendered by an arbitrator, nothing is left
to be done by both parties but to comply with the same.
After all, they are presumed to have freely chosen
arbitration as the mode of settlement for that particular
dispute. Pursuant thereto, they have chosen a mutually
acceptable arbitrator who shall hear and decide their
case. Above all, they have mutually agreed to de bound
by said arbitrator's decision.
In the Philippine context, the parties to a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) are required to include
therein provisions for a machinery for the resolution of
grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the CBA or company personnel
policies.3 For this purpose, parties to a CBA shall name
and designate therein a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of
arbitrators, or include a procedure for their selection,
preferably from those accredited by the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Article 261 of
the Labor Code accordingly provides for exclusive
original jurisdiction of such voluntary arbitrator or panel of
arbitrators over (1) the interpretation or implementation of
the CBA and (2) the interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies. Article 262 authorizes them,
but only upon agreement of the parties, to exercise
jurisdiction over other labor disputes.
On the other hand, a labor arbiter under Article 217 of the
Labor Code has jurisdiction over the following
enumerated cases:
. . . (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the
Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar
days after the submission of the case by the parties for
decision without extension, even in the absence of
stenographic notes, the following cases involving all
workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;

2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those
cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of
pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages arising from the employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this
Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes
and lockouts;
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social
Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other
claims, arising from employer-employee relations,
including those of persons in domestic or household
service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied
with a claim for reinstatement.
xxx xxx xxx
It will thus be noted that the jurisdiction conferred by law
on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is
quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the
labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for that matter.4
The state of our present law relating to voluntary
arbitration provides that "(t)he award or decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator . . . shall be final and executory after
ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the
award or decision by the parties,"5 while the "(d)ecision,
awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or
both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of
such decisions, awards, or orders."6 Hence, while there
is an express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor
arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an
appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.
Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a
voluntary arbitrator is, more often than not, elevated to
the Supreme Court itself on a petition for certiorari,7 in
effect equating the voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC or
the Court of Appeals. In the view of the Court, this is
illogical and imposes an unnecessary burden upon it.
In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al.,8 on the
settled premise that the judgments of courts and awards
of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some
definite time, this Court ruled that the awards of voluntary
arbitrators determine the rights of parties; hence, their
decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a
court. In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et
al.,9 this Court ruled that "a voluntary arbitrator by the
nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity."
Under these rulings, it follows that the voluntary
arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in
law the status of a quasi-judicial agency but independent
of, and apart from, the NLRC since his decisions are not
appealable to the latter.10
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7902, provides that the Court of Appeals shall
exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service
Commission, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions
of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph
of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
xxx xxx xxx
Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the
panel of voluntary arbitrators may not strictly be
considered as a quasi-judicial agency, board or
commission, still both he and the panel are
comprehended within the concept of a "quasi-judicial
instrumentality." It may even be stated that it was to meet
the very situation presented by the quasi-judicial
functions of the voluntary arbitrators here, as well as the
subsequent arbitrator/arbitral tribunal operating under the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission,11 that the
broader term "instrumentalities" was purposely included
in the above-quoted provision.
An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or
agency.12 Thus, the terms governmental "agency" or
"instrumentality" are synonymous in the sense that either
of them is a means by which a government acts, or by
which a certain government act or function is
performed.13 The word "instrumentality," with respect to
a state, contemplates an authority to which the state
delegates governmental power for the performance of a
state function.14 An individual person, like an
administrator or executor, is a judicial instrumentality in
the settling of an estate,15 in the same manner that a
sub-agent appointed by a bankruptcy court is an
instrumentality of the court,16 and a trustee in
bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is an instrumentality
of the state.17
The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function
pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him
under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he
falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term
"instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.
The fact that his functions and powers are provided for in
the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions
to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality
as contemplated therein. It will be noted that, although
the Employees Compensation Commission is also
provided for in the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which
is the forerunner of the present Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95, laid down the procedure for the
appealability of its decisions to the Court of Appeals
under the foregoing rationalization, and this was later
adopted by Republic Act No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of
B.P. 129.
made, apply to the court having jurisdiction for an order
confirming the award and the court must grant such order
unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected.19
In effect, this equates the award or decision of the
voluntary arbitrator with that of the regional trial court.
Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award
or decision, the Court of Appeals must be deemed to
have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court. As
a matter of policy, this Court shall henceforth remand to
the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for proper
disposition.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to REFER this case
to the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Feliciano, J., concurs in the result.
Narvasa, C.J. and Melo, J. are on leave.

A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator

or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to
the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined
in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like
those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and
commissions enumerated therein.

This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the

original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform
procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all
quasi-judicial entities18 not expressly excepted from the
coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either the Constitution
or another statute. Nor will it run counter to the legislative
intendment that decisions of the NLRC be reviewable
directly by the Supreme Court since, precisely, the cases
within the adjudicative competence of the voluntary
arbitrator are excluded from the jurisdiction of the NLRC
or the labor arbiter.

In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under

Section 22 of Republic Act No. 876, also known as the
Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special
proceeding of which the court specified in the contract or
submission, or if none be specified, the Regional Trial
Court for the province or city in which one of the parties
resides or is doing business, or in which the arbitration is
held, shall have jurisdiction. A party to the controversy
may, at any time within one (1) month after an award is
G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch
II of the City Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA,
JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO,
JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN,
JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON
AGUILA, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO
TANTUICO, Chairman, Commission on Audit, and
RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice, Respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing
upon the validity of any executive or legislative act in an
appropriate cases, has to resolve the crucial issue of the
constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled
"An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes." The task of judicial
review, aptly characterized as exacting and delicate, is
never more so than when a conceded legislative power,
that of judicial reorganization, 1 may possibly collide with
the time-honored principle of the independence of the
judiciary 2 as protected and safeguarded by this
constitutional provision: "The Members of the Supreme
Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office during
good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years
or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office. The Supreme Court shall have the power to
discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at
least eight Members, order their dismissal." 3 For the
assailed legislation mandates that Justices and judges of
inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal
circuit courts, except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless
appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act,
would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is
the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners
justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged that
thereby the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution has been ignored and disregarded,
That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding,
erroneously entitled Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or
for Prohibition 4 considered by this Court as an action for
prohibited petition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister
of the Budget, respondent Chairman of the Commission
on Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking
any action implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Petitioners 5 sought to bolster their claim by imputing
lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as
an undue delegation of legislative power to the President
his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of
the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the
determination of the date when the reorganization shall
be deemed completed. In the very comprehensive and
scholarly Answer of Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, 6 it was pointed out that there is no valid
justification for the attack on the constitutionality of this
statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power vested
in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary,
the allegations of absence of good faith as well as the
attack on the independence of the judiciary being
unwarranted and devoid of any support in law. A
Supplemental Answer was likewise filed on October 8,
1981, followed by a Reply of petitioners on October 13.
After the hearing in the morning and afternoon of October
15, in which not only petitioners and respondents were
heard through counsel but also the amici curiae, 7 and
thereafter submission of the minutes of the proceeding
on the debate on Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this petition
was deemed submitted for decision.
The importance of the crucial question raised called for
intensive and rigorous study of all the legal aspects of the
case. After such exhaustive deliberation in several
sessions, the exchange of views being supplemented by
memoranda from the members of the Court, it is our
opinion and so hold that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not
unconstitutional.
1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners
is easily resolved. As far as Judge de la Llana is
concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth
in Justice Laurel's opinion in People v. Vera. 8 Thus:
"The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns
the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement." 9 The other petitioners as members of the
bar and officers of the court cannot be considered as
devoid of "any personal and substantial interest" on the
matter. There is relevance to this excerpt from a separate
opinion in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections: 10
"Then there is the attack on the standing of petitioners,
as vindicating at most what they consider a public right
and not protecting their rights as individuals. This is to
conjure the specter of the public right dogma as an
inhibition to parties intent on keeping public officials
staying on the path of constitutionalism. As was so well
put by Jaffe: 'The protection of private rights is an
essential constituent of public interest and, conversely,
without a well-ordered state there could be no
enforcement of private rights. Private and public interests
are, both in substantive and procedural sense, aspects of
the totality of the legal order.' Moreover, petitioners have
convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers,
their standing to sue has been amply demonstrated.
There would be a retreat from the liberal approach
followed in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works,
foreshadowed by the very decision of People v. Vera
where the doctrine was first fully discussed, if we act
differently now. I do not think we are prepared to take
that step. Respondents, however, would hark back to the
American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v.
Frothingham with their claim that what petitioners
possess 'is an interest which is shared in common by
other people and is comparatively so minute and
indeterminate as to afford any basis and assurance that
the judicial process can act on it.' That is to speak in the
language of a bygone era even in the United States. For
as Chief Justice Warren clearly pointed out in the later
case of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set up if not
breached has definitely been lowered." 11
2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body
in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to
demonstrate lack of good faith does manifest violence to
the facts. Petitioners should have exercised greater care
in informing themselves as to its antecedents. They had
laid themselves open to the accusation of reckless
disregard for the truth, On August 7, 1980, a Presidential
Committee on Judicial Reorganization was organized. 12
This Executive Order was later amended by Executive
Order No. 619-A., dated September 5 of that year. It
clearly specified the task assigned to it: "1. The
Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization of
the Judiciary which shall be submitted within seventy (70)
days from August 7, 1980 to provide the President
sufficient options for the reorganization of the entire
Judiciary which shall embrace all lower courts, including
the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the
City and Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but
excluding the Sandigan Bayan." 13 On October 17,
1980, a Report was submitted by such Committee on
Judicial Reorganization. It began with this paragraph:
"The Committee on Judicial Reorganization has the
honor to submit the following Report. It expresses at the
outset its appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to
study ways and means for what today is a basic and
urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of the
judicial system. There are problems, both grave and
pressing, that call for remedial measures. The felt
necessities of the time, to borrow a phrase from Holmes,
admit of no delay, for if no step be taken and at the
earliest opportunity, it is not too much to say that the
people's faith in the administration of justice could be
shaken. It is imperative that there be a greater efficiency
in the disposition of cases and that litigants, especially
those of modest means — much more so, the poorest
and the humblest — can vindicate their rights in an
expeditious and inexpensive manner. The rectitude and
the fairness in the way the courts operate must be
manifest to all members of the community and
particularly to those whose interests are affected by the
exercise of their functions. It is to that task that the
Committee addresses itself and hopes that the plans
submitted could be a starting point for an institutional
reform in the Philippine judiciary. The experience of the
Supreme Court, which since 1973 has been empowered
to supervise inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals to
the municipal courts, has proven that reliance on
improved court management as well as training of judges
for more efficient administration does not suffice. I hence,
to repeat, there is need for a major reform in the judicial
so stem it is worth noting that it will be the first of its kind
since the Judiciary Act became effective on June 16,
1901." 14 I t went to say: "I t does not admit of doubt that
the last two decades of this century are likely to be
attended with problems of even greater complexity and
delicacy. New social interests are pressing for
recognition in the courts. Groups long inarticulate,
primarily those economically underprivileged, have found
legal spokesmen and are asserting grievances previously
ignored. Fortunately, the judicially has not proved
inattentive. Its task has thus become even more
formidable. For so much grist is added to the mills of
justice. Moreover, they are likewise to be quite novel.
The need for an innovative approach is thus apparent.
The national leadership, as is well-known, has been
constantly on the search for solutions that will prove to be
both acceptable and satisfactory. Only thus may there be
continued national progress." 15 After which comes: "To
be less abstract, the thrust is on development. That has
been repeatedly stressed — and rightly so. All efforts are
geared to its realization. Nor, unlike in the past, was it to
b "considered as simply the movement towards
economic progress and growth measured in terms of
sustained increases in per capita income and Gross
National Product (GNP). 16 For the New Society, its
implication goes further than economic advance,
extending to "the sharing, or more appropriately, the
democratization of social and economic opportunities,
the substantiation of the true meaning of social justice."
17 This process of modernization and change compels
the government to extend its field of activity and its scope
of operations. The efforts towards reducing the gap
between the wealthy and the poor elements in the nation
call for more regulatory legislation. That way the social
justice and protection to labor mandates of the
Constitution could be effectively implemented." 18 There
is likelihood then "that some measures deemed inimical
by interests adversely affected would be challenged in
court on grounds of validity. Even if the question does not
go that far, suits may be filed concerning their
interpretation and application. ... There could be pleas for
injunction or restraining orders. Lack of success of such
moves would not, even so, result in their prompt final
disposition. Thus delay in the execution of the policies
embodied in law could thus be reasonably expected.
That is not conducive to progress in development." 19
For, as mentioned in such Report, equally of vital
concern is the problem of clogged dockets, which "as is
well known, is one of the utmost gravity. Notwithstanding
the most determined efforts exerted by the Supreme
Court, through the leadership of both retired Chief Justice
Querube Makalintal and the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, from the time supervision of the courts was
vested in it under the 1973 Constitution, the trend
towards more and more cases has continued." 20 It is
understandable why. With the accelerated economic
development, the growth of population, the increasing
urbanization, and other similar factors, the judiciary is
called upon much oftener to resolve controversies. Thus
confronted with what appears to be a crisis situation that
calls for a remedy, the Batasang Pambansa had no
choice. It had to act, before the ailment became even
worse. Time was of the essence, and yet it did not
hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent
of its coverage before enacting Batas Pambansa Blg.
129.
3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for
"institutional reforms," characterized in the Report as
"both pressing and urgent." 21 It is worth noting, likewise,
as therein pointed out, that a major reorganization of
such scope, if it were to take place, would be the most
thorough after four generations. 22 The reference was to
the basic Judiciary Act generations . enacted in June of
1901, 23 amended in a significant way, only twice
previous to the Commonwealth. There was, of course,
the creation of the Court of Appeals in 1935, originally
composed "of a Presiding Judge and ten appellate
Judges, who shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly, 24 It could "sit
en banc, but it may sit in two divisions, one of six and
another of five Judges, to transact business, and the two
divisions may sit at the same time." 25 Two years after
the establishment of independence of the Republic of the
Philippines, the Judiciary Act of 1948 26 was passed. It
continued the existing system of regular inferior courts,
namely, the Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance,
27 the Municipal Courts, at present the City Courts, and
the Justice of the Peace Courts, now the Municipal
Circuit Courts and Municipal Courts. The membership of
the Court of Appeals has been continuously increased.
28 Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be
forty-five members, a Presiding Justice and forty-four
Associate Justices, with fifteen divisions. 29 Special
courts were likewise created. The first was the Court of
Tax Appeals in 1954, 30 next came the Court of Agrarian
Relations in 1955, 31 and then in the same year a Court
of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations for Manila in
1955, 32 subsequently followed by the creation of two
other such courts for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966. 33
In 1967, Circuit Criminal Courts were established, with
the Judges having the same qualifications, rank,
compensation, and privileges as judges of Courts of First
Instance. 34
4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No.
42, which later became the basis of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, was introduced. After setting forth the
background as above narrated, its Explanatory Note
continues: "Pursuant to the President's instructions, this
proposed legislation has been drafted in accordance with
the guidelines of that report with particular attention to
certain objectives of the reorganization, to wit, the
attainment of more efficiency in disposal of cases, a
reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures
which do not tend to the proper meeting out of justice. In
consultation with, and upon a consensus of, the
governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it
was felt that some options set forth in the Report be not
availed of. Instead of the proposal to confine the
jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate court merely to
appellate adjudication, the preference has been opted to
increase rather than diminish its jurisdiction in order to
enable it to effectively assist the Supreme Court. This
preference has been translated into one of the
innovations in the proposed Bill." 35 In accordance with
the parliamentary procedure, the Bill was sponsored by
the Chairman of the Committee on Justice, Human
Rights and Good Government to which it was referred.
Thereafter, Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by
such Committee to the Batasang Pambansa
recommending the approval with some amendments. In
the sponsorship speech of Minister Ricardo C. Puno,
there was reference to the Presidential Committee on
Judicial Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17, 1980, the
Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization
submitted its report to the President which contained the
'Proposed Guidelines for Judicial Reorganization.'
Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted substantially in
accordance with the options presented by these
guidelines. Some options set forth in the aforesaid report
were not availed of upon consultation with and upon
consensus of the government and parliamentary
leadership. Moreover, some amendments to the bill were
adopted by the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and
Good Government, to which The bill was referred,
following the public hearings on the bill held in December
of 1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the
distinguished members of the bench and the bar who
had submitted written proposals, suggestions, and
position papers on the bill upon the invitation of the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government." 36 Stress was laid by the sponsor that the
enactment of such Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in the
attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases.
Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice
dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary
consequence of the easing of the court's dockets.
Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the bill,
together with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the
revision of the rules of procedure, are designated to suit
the court system to the exigencies of the present day
Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable
future." 37 it may be observed that the volume containing
the minutes of the proceedings of the Batasang
Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted to its
discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable
time and effort as well as exhaustive study before the act
was signed by the President on August 14, 1981. With
such a background, it becomes quite manifest how
lacking in factual basis is the allegation that its enactment
is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What appears
undoubted and undeniable is the good faith that
characterized its enactment from its inception to the
affixing of the Presidential signature.
5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the
abolition of an office within the competence of a
legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no
infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v.
Primicias, Jr. 38 reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this
point urged by respondents, to be without merit. No
removal or separation of petitioners from the service is
here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their
offices. This is a legal issue that is for the Courts to
decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of
offices is neither removal nor separation of the
incumbents. ... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the
incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold
office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to
the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the
abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal
removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to
be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith." 39
The above excerpt was quoted with approval in
Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial Governor, 40 two earlier
cases enunciating a similar doctrine having preceded it.
41 As with the offices in the other branches of the
government, so it is with the judiciary. The test remains
whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is
conspicuously present in the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition
becomes even more apparent. The concurring opinion of
Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la Costa 42 cannot be
any clearer. This is a quo warranto proceeding filed by
petitioner, claiming that he, and not respondent, was
entitled to he office of judge of the Fifth Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila. There was a Judicial
Reorganization Act in 1936, 43 a year after the
inauguration of the Commonwealth, amending the
Administrative Code to organize courts of original
jurisdiction known as the Courts of First Instance Prior to
such statute, petitioner was the incumbent of such
branch. Thereafter, he received an ad interim
appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial District,
under the new legislation. Unfortunately for him, the
Commission on Appointments of then National Assembly
disapproved the same, with respondent being appointed
in his place. He contested the validity of the Act insofar
as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his position
This Court did not rule squarely on the matter. His
petition was dismissed on the ground of estoppel.
Nonetheless, the separate concurrence of Justice Laurel
in the result reached, to repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain
terms the standard of good faith to preclude any doubt as
to the abolition of an inferior court, with due recognition of
the security of tenure guarantee. Thus: " I am of the
opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it
reorganizes, among other judicial districts, the Ninth
Judicial District, and establishes an entirely new district
comprising Manila and the provinces of Rizal and
Palawan, is valid and constitutional. This conclusion
flows from the fundamental proposition that the
legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme
Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or
otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and
commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution
vests in the National Assembly the power to define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts, subject to certain limitations in the case of the
Supreme Court. It is admitted that section 9 of the same
article of the Constitution provides for the security of
tenure of all the judges. The principles embodied in these
two sections of the same article of the Constitution must
be coordinated and harmonized. A mere enunciation of a
principle will not decide actual cases and controversies of
every sort. (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York, 198
U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed; 937)" 44 justice Laurel continued: "I
am not insensible to the argument that the National
Assembly may abuse its power and move deliberately to
defeat the constitutional provision guaranteeing security
of tenure to all judges, But, is this the case? One need
not share the view of Story, Miller and Tucker on the one
hand, or the opinion of Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on
the other, to realize that the application of a legal or
constitutional principle is necessarily factual and
circumstantial and that fixity of principle is the rigidity of
the dead and the unprogressive. I do say, and
emphatically, however, that cases may arise where the
violation of the constitutional provision regarding security
of tenure is palpable and plain, and that legislative power
of reorganization may be sought to cloak an
unconstitutional and evil purpose. When a case of that
kind arises, it will be the time to make the hammer fall
and heavily. But not until then. I am satisfied that, as to
the particular point here discussed, the purpose was the
fulfillment of what was considered a great public need by
the legislative department and that Commonwealth Act
No. 145 was not enacted purposely to affect adversely
the tenure of judges or of any particular judge. Under
these circumstances, I am for sustaining the power of the
legislative department under the Constitution. To be sure,
there was greater necessity for reorganization
consequent upon the establishment of the new
government than at the time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007
were approved by the defunct Philippine Legislature, and
although in the case of these two Acts there was an
express provision providing for the vacation by the
judges of their offices whereas in the case of
Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by its
silence, this doubt should be resolved in favor of the valid
exercise of the legislative power." 45
6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the
above-cited opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta,
reference was made to Act No. 2347 46 on the
reorganization of the Courts of First Instance and to Act
No. 4007 47 on the reorganization of all branches of the
government, including the courts of first instance. In both
of them, the then Courts of First Instance were replaced
by new courts with the same appellation. As Justice
Laurel pointed out, there was no question as to the fact
of abolition. He was equally categorical as to
Commonwealth Act No. 145, where also the system of
the courts of first instance was provided for expressly. It
was pointed out by Justice Laurel that the mere creation
of an entirely new district of the same court is valid and
constitutional. such conclusion flowing "from the
fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish
courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may
reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby
necessitating new appointments and commissions." 48
The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate
court, 49 regional trial courts, 50 metropolitan trial courts
of the national capital region, 51 and other metropolitan
trial courts, 52 municipal trial courts in cities, 53 as well
as in municipalities, 54 and municipal circuit trial courts.
55 There is even less reason then to doubt the fact that
existing inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang
Pambansa, the establishment of such new inferior courts
was the appropriate response to the grave and urgent
problems that pressed for solution. Certainly, there could
be differences of opinion as to the appropriate remedy.
The choice, however, was for the Batasan to make, not
for this Court, which deals only with the question of
power. It bears mentioning that in Brillo v. Eñage 56 this
Court, in an unanimous opinion penned by the late
Justice Diokno, citing Zandueta v. De la Costa, ruled: "La
segunda question que el recurrrido plantea es que la
Carta de Tacloban ha abolido el puesto. Si efectivamente
ha sido abolido el cargo, entonces ha quedado
extinguido el derecho de recurente a ocuparlo y a cobrar
el salario correspodiente. Mc Culley vs. State, 46 LRA,
567. El derecho de un juez de desempenarlo hasta los
70 años de edad o se incapacite no priva al Congreso de
su facultad de abolir, fusionar o reorganizar juzgados no
constitucionales." 57 Nonetheless, such well-established
principle was not held applicable to the situation there
obtaining, the Charter of Tacloban City creating a city
court in place of the former justice of the peace court.
Thus: "Pero en el caso de autos el Juzgado de Tacloban
no ha sido abolido. Solo se le ha cambiado el nombre
con el cambio de forma del gobierno local." 58 The
present case is anything but that. Petitioners did not and
could not prove that the challenged statute was not within
the bounds of legislative authority.
7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The
implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, concededly
a task incumbent on the Executive, may give rise,
however, to questions affecting a judiciary that should be
kept independent. The all-embracing scope of the
assailed legislation as far as all inferior courts from the
Courts of Appeals to municipal courts are concerned,
with the exception solely of the Sandiganbayan and the
Court of Tax Appeals 59 gave rise, and understandably
so, to misgivings as to its effect on such cherished Ideal.
The first paragraph of the section on the transitory
provision reads: "The provisions of this Act shall be
immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive
Order to be issued by the President. The Court of
Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal
Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the
Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the
Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall
continue to function as presently constituted and
organized, until the completion of the reorganization
provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon
such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed
automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall
cease to hold the office." 60 There is all the more reason
then why this Court has no choice but to inquire further
into the allegation by petitioners that the security of
tenure provision, an assurance of a judiciary free from
extraneous influences, is thereby reduced to a barren
form of words. The amended Constitution adheres even
more clearly to the long-established tradition of a strong
executive that antedated the 1935 Charter. As noted in
the work of former Vice-Governor Hayden, a noted
political scientist, President Claro M. Recto of the 1934
Convention, in his closing address, in stressing such a
concept, categorically spoke of providing "an executive
power which, subject to the fiscalization of the Assembly,
and of public opinion, will not only know how to govern,
but will actually govern, with a firm and steady hand,
unembarrassed by vexatious interferences by other
departments, or by unholy alliances with this and that
social group." 61 The above excerpt was cited with
approval by Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil. 62 Moreover,
under the 1981 Amendments, it may be affirmed that
once again the principle of separation of powers, to quote
from the same jurist as ponente in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 "obtains not through express provision
but by actual division." 64 The president, under Article
VII, shall be the head of state and chief executive of the
Republic of the Philippines." 65 Moreover, it is equally
therein expressly provided that all the powers he
possessed under the 1935 Constitution are once again
vested in him unless the Batasang Pambansa provides
otherwise." 66 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution speaks
categorically: "The Executive power shall be vested in a
President of the Philippines." 67 As originally framed, the
1973 Constitution created the position of President as the
"symbolic head of state." 68 In addition, there was a
provision for a Prime Minister as the head of government
exercising the executive power with the assistance of the
Cabinet 69 Clearly, a modified parliamentary system was
established. In the light of the 1981 amendments though,
this Court in Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister
of Labor 70 could state: "The adoption of certain aspects
of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution
does not alter its essentially presidential character." 71
The retention, however, of the position of the Prime
Minister with the Cabinet, a majority of the members of
which shall come from the regional representatives of the
Batasang Pambansa and the creation of an Executive
Committee composed of the Prime Minister as Chairman
and not more than fourteen other members at least half
of whom shall be members of the Batasang Pambansa,
clearly indicate the evolving nature of the system of
government that is now operative. 72 What is equally
apparent is that the strongest ties bind the executive and
legislative departments. It is likewise undeniable that the
Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact
whatever legislation may be necessary to carry out
national policy as usually formulated in a caucus of the
majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun v.
Labang 73 it was stressed that with the provision
transferring to the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need "to
preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary,
especially so at present, where to all intents and
purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and
the legislative branches." 74
8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the
abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the
security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and
judges under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution.
There was a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. It
did not, however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal
the power to supervise administratively inferior courts. 75
Moreover, this Court is em powered "to discipline judges
of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight
members, order their dismissal." 76 Thus it possesses
the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary
Act, it was the President who was vested with such
power. 77 Removal is, of course, to be distinguished
from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office.
There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the
abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal,
there is an office with an occupant who would thereby
lose his position. It is in that sense that from the
standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of
security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the
incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one
of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists
between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be
a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the
assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance
with accepted principles of constitutional construction
that as far as incumbent justices and judges are
concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be
accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be
entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the
basic principle that this Court does not render advisory
opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the
case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to
the action taken by either of the two departments. Even
then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case
where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there
any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant
positions created by the reorganization. That remains in
the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs.
There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested
ways of judicial power, Rather what is sought to be
achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any
plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the
conceded power of reorganizing tulle inferior courts, the
power of removal of the present incumbents vested in
this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged
Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint,
even one not readily discernidble except to those
predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a
construction would be in accordance with the basic
principle that in the choice of alternatives between one
which would save and another which would invalidate a
statute, the former is to be preferred. 78 There is an
obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution
enters into and forms part of every act to avoid any
constitutional taint must be applied Nuñez v.
Sandiganbayan, 79 promulgated last January, has this
relevant excerpt: "It is true that other Sections of the
Decree could have been so worded as to avoid any
constitutional objection. As of now, however, no ruling is
called for. The view is given expression in the concurring
and dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar that in such a
case to save the Decree from the direct fate of invalidity,
they must be construed in such a way as to preclude any
possible erosion on the powers vested in this Court by
the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be
committed. It commends itself for approval." 80 Nor
would such a step be unprecedented. The Presidential
Decree constituting Municipal Courts into Municipal
Circuit Courts, specifically provides: "The Supreme Court
shall carry out the provisions of this Decree through
implementing orders, on a province-to-province basis."
81 It is true there is no such provision in this Act, but the
spirit that informs it should not be ignored in the
Executive Order contemplated under its Section 44. 82
Thus Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most
rigorous test of constitutionality. 83
9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this
Court is called upon to reconcile or harmonize
constitutional provisions. To be specific, the Batasang
Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to
reorganize inferior courts and in the process to abolish
existing ones. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the
termination of office of their occupants, as a necessary
consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable
from the practical standpoint from removal, a power that
is now vested in this Tribunal. It is of the essence of
constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is
precluded from acting within the boundaries of its
conceded competence. That is why it has long been
well-settled under the constitutional system we have
adopted that this Court cannot, whenever appropriate,
avoid the task of reconciliation. As Justice Laurel put it so
well in the previously cited Angara decision, while in the
main, "the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes
and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the
legislative and the judicial departments of the
government, the overlapping and interlacing of functions
and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one
leaves off and the other begins." 84 It is well to recall
another classic utterance from the same jurist, even
more emphatic in its affirmation of such a view, moreover
buttressed by one of those insights for which Holmes
was so famous "The classical separation of government
powers, whether viewed in the light of the political
philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Motesquieu or of the
postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a
relative theory of government. There is more truism and
actuality in interdependence than in independence and
separation of powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes
in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down 'with
mathematical precision and divide the branches into
water-tight compartments' not only because 'the great
ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide
fields of black and white but also because 'even the more
specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra
shading gradually from one extreme to the other.'" 85
This too from Justice Tuazon, likewise expressing with
force and clarity why the need for reconciliation or
balancing is well-nigh unavodiable under the
fundamental principle of separation of powers: "The
constitutional structure is a complicated system, and
overlappings of governmental functions are recognized,
unavoidable, and inherent necessities of governmental
coordination." 86 In the same way that the academe has
noted the existence in constitutional litigation of right
versus right, there are instances, and this is one of them,
where, without this attempt at harmonizing the provisions
in question, there could be a case of power against
power. That we should avoid.
10. There are other objections raised but they pose no
difficulty. Petitioners would characterize as an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President the grant
of authority to fix the compensation and the allowances
of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more
careful reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 ought to have cautioned them against raising such
an issue. The language of the statute is quite clear. The
questioned provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate
Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan
Trial Judges, municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such receive such
compensation and allowances as may be authorized by
the President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of
Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597."
87 The existence of a standard is thus clear. The basic
postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is
that it is the legislative body which is entrusted with the
competence to make laws and to alter and repeal them,
the test being the completeness of the statue in all its
terms and provisions when enacted. As pointed out in
Edu v. Ericta: 88 "To avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at
the very least that the legislature itself determines
matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be
hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy,
marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies
the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to
be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose
may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the
above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and
regulations. The standard may be either express or
implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy
and purpose of the act considered as a whole." 89 The
undeniably strong links that bind the executive and
legislative departments under the amended Constitution
assure that the framing of policies as well as their
implementation can be accomplished with unity,
promptitude, and efficiency. There is accuracy, therefore,
to this observation in the Free Telephone Workers Union
decision: "There is accordingly more receptivity to laws
leaving to administrative and executive agencies the
adoption of such means as may be necessary to
effectuate a valid legislative purpose. It is worth noting
that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as
early as 1947, could speak of delegation as the 'dynamo
of modern government.'" 90 He warned against a
"restrictive approach" which could be "a deterrent factor
to much-needed legislation." 91 Further on this point
from the same opinion" "The spectre of the
non-delegation concept need not haunt, therefore, party
caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative chambers." 92
Another objection based on the absence in the statue of
what petitioners refer to as a "definite time frame
limitation" is equally bereft of merit. They ignore the
categorical language of this provision: "The Supreme
Court shall submit to the President, within thirty (30) days
from the date of the effectivity of this act, a staffing
pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act
which shall be the basis of the implementing order to be
issued by the President in accordance with the
immediately succeeding section." 93 The first sentence
of the next section is even more categorical: "The
provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in
accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the
President." 94 Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to
argue that the President is insensible to his constitutional
duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 95
In the meanwhile, the existing inferior courts affected
continue functioning as before, "until the completion of
the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the
President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall
be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents
thereof shall cease to hold office." 96 There is no
ambiguity. The incumbents of the courts thus
automatically abolished "shall cease to hold office." No
fear need be entertained by incumbents whose length of
service, quality of performance, and clean record justify
their being named anew, 97 in legal contemplation
without any interruption in the continuity of their service.
98 It is equally reasonable to assume that from the ranks
of lawyers, either in the government service, private
practice, or law professors will come the new appointees.
In the event that in certain cases a little more time is
necessary in the appraisal of whether or not certain
incumbents deserve reappointment, it is not from their
standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a
reaffirmation of the good faith that will characterize its
implementation by the Executive. There is pertinence to
this observation of Justice Holmes that even acceptance
of the generalization that courts ordinarily should not
supply omissions in a law, a generalization qualified as
earlier shown by the principle that to save a statute that
could be done, "there is no canon against using common
sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously
mean." 99 Where then is the unconstitutional flaw
11. On the morning of the hearing of this petition on
September 8, 1981, petitioners sought to have the writer
of this opinion and Justices Ramon C. Aquino and
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera disqualified because the
first-named was the chairman and the other two,
members of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization.
At the hearing, the motion was denied. It was made clear
then and there that not one of the three members of the
Court had any hand in the framing or in the discussion of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not consulted.
They did not testify. The challenged legislation is entirely
the product of the efforts of the legislative body. 100
Their work was limited, as set forth in the Executive
Order, to submitting alternative plan for reorganization.
That is more in the nature of scholarly studies. That the
undertook. There could be no possible objection to such
activity. Ever since 1973, this Tribunal has had
administrative supervision over interior courts. It has had
the opportunity to inform itself as to the way judicial
business is conducted and how it may be improved.
Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, it is the recollection
of the writer of this opinion that either the then Chairman
or members of the Committee on Justice of the then
Senate of the Philippines 101 consulted members of the
Court in drafting proposed legislation affecting the
judiciary. It is not inappropriate to cite this excerpt from
an article in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: "In the
twentieth century the Chief Justice of the United States
has played a leading part in judicial reform. A variety of
conditions have been responsible for the development of
this role, and foremost among them has been the
creation of explicit institutional structures designed to
facilitate reform." 102 Also: "Thus the Chief Justice
cannot avoid exposure to and direct involvement in
judicial reform at the federal level and, to the extent
issues of judicial federalism arise, at the state level as
well." 103
12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional
regime that it is the people who are endowed with rights,
to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it
does through public officials, it has to grant them either
expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they
exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic.
The Constitution does not speak in the language of
ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." 104 That is
more than a moral adjuration It is a legal imperative. The
law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so
to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill his
responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint
that the security of tenure provision to assure judicial
independence is to be viewed. It is an added guarantee
that justices and judges can administer justice
undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward
consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely
to be inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and
the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting
influence of base or unworthy motives. The
independence of which they are assured is impressed
with a significance transcending that of a purely personal
right. As thus viewed, it is not solely for their welfare. The
challenged legislation Thus subject d to the most
rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lack of due care
and circumspection, it allow the erosion of that Ideal so
firmly embedded in the national consciousness There is
this farther thought to consider. independence in thought
and action necessarily is rooted in one's mind and heart.
As emphasized by former Chief Justice Paras in Ocampo
v. Secretary of Justice, 105 there is no surer guarantee
of judicial independence than the God-given character
and fitness of those appointed to the Bench. The judges
may be guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during good
behavior, but if they are of such stuff as allows them to
be subservient to one administration after another, or to
cater to the wishes of one litigant after another, the
independence of the judiciary will be nothing more than a
myth or an empty Ideal. Our judges, we are confident,
can be of the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in spite of
the power of Congress — we do not say unlimited but as
herein exercised — to reorganize inferior courts." 106
That is to recall one of the greatest Common Law jurists,
who at the cost of his office made clear that he would not
just blindly obey the King's order but "will do what
becomes [him] as a judge." So it was pointed out in the
first leading case stressing the independence of the
judiciary, Borromeo v. Mariano, 107 The ponencia of
Justice Malcolm Identified good judges with "men who
have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge
their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to
perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside
influence, and who are independent and self-respecting
human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to
the other two departments of government." 108 There is
no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 would be attended with
deleterious consequences to the administration of justice.
It does not follow that the abolition in good faith of the
existing inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and
the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones
will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge
with independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the
trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less
than good faith will attend the exercise be of the
appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be
denied that an independent and efficient judiciary is
something to the credit of any administration. Well and
truly has it been said that the fundamental principle of
separation of powers assumes, and justifiably so, that the
three departments are as one in their determination to
pursue the Ideals and aspirations and to fulfilling the
hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the
Constitution. There is wisdom as well as validity to this
pronouncement of Justice Malcolm in Manila Electric Co.
v. Pasay Transportation Company, 109 a decision
promulgated almost half a century ago: "Just as the
Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights,
should not sanction usurpations by any other department
or the government, so should it as strictly confine its own
sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by
implication conferred on it by the Organic Act." 110 To
that basic postulate underlying our constitutional system,
this Court remains committed.
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown, this petition
is dismissed. No costs.
Makasiar and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., concur in the result.

G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS​, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO,
Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON.
MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan
and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN,
respondents.
Alberto N. Hidalgo and Ma. Teresa T. Oledan for
petitioner.
The City Legal Officer & Chief, Law Department for
Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. and the City Government of
Caloocan.
ROMERO, J.:
The clash between the responsibility of the City
Government of Caloocan to dispose off the 350 tons of
garbage it collects daily and the growing concern and
sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of the residents
of Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where
these tons of garbage are dumped everyday is the hub of
this controversy elevated by the protagonists to the
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) for
adjudication.
The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed
with this Court by Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA for short) docketed as G.R.
No. 107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et
al. In the Resolution of November 10, 1992, this Court
referred G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate disposition. Docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP
No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision1
promulgated on January 29, 1993 ruled that the LLDA
has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist
order enjoining the dumping of garbage in Barangay
Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA now
seeks, in this petition, a review of the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.
On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of
Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint2 with the Laguna
Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the
operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in
Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its
harmful effects on the health of the residents and the
possibility of pollution of the water content of the
surrounding area.
On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site
investigation, monitoring and test sampling of the
leachate3 that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby
creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River. The LLDA
Legal and Technical personnel found that the City
Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open
dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as
required under Presidential Decree No. 1586,4 and
clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No.
4850,5 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 and
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.6
After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991,
the LLDA, acting on the complaint of Task Force
Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water collected from
the leachate and the receiving streams could
considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving
waters since it indicates the presence of bacteria, other
than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample
during collection or handling.7 On December 5, 1991, the
LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order8 ordering the
City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila
Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to
completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form
or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin
dumpsite.
The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City
Government of Caloocan. However, sometime in August
1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a
meeting held in July 1992 among the City Government of
Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin
Dumpsite and LLDA at the Office of Environmental
Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed
to settle the problem.
After an investigation by its team of legal and technical
personnel on August 14, 1992, the LLDA issued another
order reiterating the December 5, 1991, order and issued
an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City
Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping
operations at the Camarin area.
On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance
of the Philippine National Police, enforced its Alias Cease
and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage
dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being
utilized as a dumpsite.
Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration
earlier filed on September 17, 1992 with the LLDA, the
City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City an action for the declaration of
nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the
issuance of writ of injunction, docketed as Civil Case No.
C-15598. In its complaint, the City Government of
Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority
empowered to promote the health and safety and
enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a
balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction.9
On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its
cease and desist order. Subsequently, the case was
raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of
Caloocan which, at the time, was presided over by Judge
Manuel Jn. Serapio of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
127, the pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding
judge.
The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion
to dismiss on the ground, among others, that under
Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution
Control Law, the cease and desist order issued by it
which is the subject matter of the complaint is reviewable
both upon the law and the facts of the case by the Court
of Appeals and not by the Regional Trial Court. 10
On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued
an order consolidating Civil Case No. C-15598 with Civil
Case No. C-15580, an earlier case filed by the Task
Force Camarin Dumpsite entitled "Fr. John Moran, et al.
vs. Hon. Macario Asistio." The LLDA, however,
maintained during the trial that the foregoing cases,
being independent of each other, should have been
treated separately.
On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after
hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the consolidated
cases an order11 denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and
granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for
and on its behalf, from enforcing or implementing its
cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff City of
Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin
dumpsite during the pendency of this case and/or until
further orders of the court.
On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for
restraining order with the Supreme Court, docketed as
G.R. No. 107542, seeking to nullify the aforesaid order
dated October 16, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 127 of Caloocan City denying its motion to
dismiss.
The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution12
on November 10, 1992 referring the case to the Court of
Appeals for proper disposition and at the same time,
without giving due course to the petition, required the
respondents to comment on the petition and file the
same with the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from
notice. In the meantime, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order, effective immediately and continuing
until further orders from it, ordering the respondents: (1)
Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City to cease and
desist from exercising jurisdiction over the case for
declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order issued
by the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA); and
(2) City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government
of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its
garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City.
Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor
Macario A. Asistio, Jr. filed on November 12, 1992 a
motion for reconsideration and/or to quash/recall the
temporary restraining order and an urgent motion for
reconsideration alleging that ". . . in view of the
calamitous situation that would arise if the respondent
city government fails to collect 350 tons of garbage daily
for lack of dumpsite (i)t is therefore, imperative that the
issue be resolved with dispatch or with sufficient leeway
to allow the respondents to find alternative solutions to
this garbage problem."
On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution13
directing the Court of Appeals to immediately set the
case for hearing for the purpose of determining whether
or not the temporary restraining order issued by the
Court should be lifted and what conditions, if any, may be
required if it is to be so lifted or whether the restraining
order should be maintained or converted into a
preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on
November 27, 1992, at 10:00 in the morning at the
Hearing Room, 3rd Floor, New Building, Court of
Appeals.14 After the oral argument, a conference was
set on December 8, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning
where the Mayor of Caloocan City, the General Manager
of LLDA, the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized
representative and the Secretary of DILG or his duly
authorized representative were required to appear.
It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until
December 15, 1992 to finish its study and review of
respondent's technical plan with respect to the dumping
of its garbage and in the event of a rejection of
respondent's technical plan or a failure of settlement, the
parties will submit within 10 days from notice their
respective memoranda on the merits of the case, after
which the petition shall be deemed submitted for
resolution.15 Notwithstanding such efforts, the parties
failed to settle the dispute.
On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision holding that: (1) the Regional Trial Court has no
jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action
for annulment of LLDA's cease and desist order,
including the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction in relation thereto, since
appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9, par.
(3), of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna
Lake Development Authority has no power and authority
to issue a cease and desist order under its enabling law,
Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and
Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No.
15598 and the preliminary injunction issued in the said
case was set aside; the cease and desist order of LLDA
was likewise set aside and the temporary restraining
order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the
City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from
dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City was lifted, subject, however, to
the condition that any future dumping of garbage in said
area, shall be in conformity with the procedure and
protective works contained in the proposal attached to
the records of this case and found on pages 152-160 of
the Rollo, which was thereby adopted by reference and
made an integral part of the decision, until the
corresponding restraining and/or injunctive relief is
granted by the proper Court upon LLDA's institution of
the necessary legal proceedings.
Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the
instant petition for review on certiorari, now docketed as
G.R. No. 110120, with prayer that the temporary
restraining order lifted by the Court of Appeals be
re-issued until after final determination by this Court of
the issue on the proper interpretation of the powers and
authority of the LLDA under its enabling law.
On July, 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order16 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan
and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and
desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, effective as of this
date and containing until otherwise ordered by the Court.
It is significant to note that while both parties in this case
agree on the need to protect the environment and to
maintain the ecological balance of the surrounding areas
of the Camarin open dumpsite, the question as to which
agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter
remains highly open to question.
The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within
its power, as a local government unit, pursuant to the
general welfare provision of the Local Government Code,
17 to determine the effects of the operation of the
dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see that such
balance is maintained. On the basis of said contention, it
questioned, from the inception of the dispute before the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the power and
authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and desist order
enjoining the dumping of garbage in the Barangay
Camarin over which the City Government of Caloocan
has territorial jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of
Caloocan on the theory that Section 7 of Presidential
Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution
Control law, authorizing the defunct National Pollution
Control Commission to issue an ex-parte cease and
desist order was not incorporated in Presidential Decree
No. 813 nor in Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4,
par. (d), of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, the
LLDA is instead required "to institute the necessary legal
proceeding against any person who shall commence to
implement or continue implementation of any project,
plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region without
previous clearance from the Authority."
The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the
abovementioned ruling of the Court of Appeals,
contending that, as an administrative agency which was
granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers and
functions by Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory
laws, Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983, it is invested with the power and
authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to
Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of Executive Order
No. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus:
Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority
shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with
the provisions of this Executive Order and its
implementing rules and regulations only after proper
notice and hearing.
(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and
the time within which such discontinuance must be
accomplished.
(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions
as it may determine to be reasonable, for the prevention
and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage,
industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of
sewage works and industrial disposal system or parts
thereof.
(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also
revoke, suspend or modify any permit issued under this
Order whenever the same is necessary to prevent or
abate pollution.
(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of
appropriate government agencies or instrumentalities for
the purpose of enforcing this Executive Order and its
implementing rules and regulations and the orders and
decisions of the Authority.
The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately
suppressed and totally disregarded the above provisions
of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, which
granted administrative quasi-judicial functions to LLDA
on pollution abatement cases.
In light of the relevant environmental protection laws
cited which are applicable in this case, and the
corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of government
agencies implementing these laws, the resolution of the
issue of whether or not the LLDA has the authority and
power to issue an order which, in its nature and effect
was injunctive, necessarily requires a determination of
the threshold question: Does the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, under its Charter and its
amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the
complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open
dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City
Government of Caloocan which is allegedly endangering
the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein
and the sanitation and quality of the water in the area
brought about by exposure to pollution caused by such
open garbage dumpsite?
The matter of determining whether there is such pollution
of the environment that requires control, if not prohibition,
of the operation of a business establishment is
essentially addressed to the Environmental Management
Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section
16 of Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987,18 has
assumed the powers and functions of the defunct
National Pollution Control Commission created under
Republic Act No. 3931. Under said Executive Order, a
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of
the DENR Secretary now assumes the powers and
functions of the National Pollution Control Commission
with respect to adjudication of pollution cases. 19
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases
generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB), except in cases where the special law provides
for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard
that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is
specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and
its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the
declared national policy20 of promoting and accelerating
the development and balanced growth of the Laguna
Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and
Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay,
Quezon and Caloocan21 with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and control,
preservation of the quality of human life and ecological
systems, and the prevention of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a
broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue
of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to
protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from
the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the
discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In
carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the
LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and
approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects
proposed by local government offices/agencies within the
region, public corporations, and private persons or
enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects
are related to those of the LLDA for the development of
the region. 22
In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force
Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its
letter-complaint before the LLDA, the latter's jurisdiction
under its charter was validly invoked by complainant on
the basis of its allegation that the open dumpsite project
of the City Government of Caloocan in Barangay
Camarin was undertaken without a clearance from the
LLDA, as required under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic
Act. No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and
Executive Order No. 927. While there is also an
allegation that the said project was without an
Environmental Compliance Certificate from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR,
the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case was
recognized by the Environmental Management Bureau of
the DENR when the latter acted as intermediary at the
meeting among the representatives of the City
Government of Caloocan, Task Force Camarin Dumpsite
and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to discuss the
possibility of
re-opening the open dumpsite.
Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry
then narrows down to the following issue: Does the LLDA
have the power and authority to issue a "cease and
desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in
this case, enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala
Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.
The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring
the City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its
garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the
LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act No.
4850, as amended, and other relevant environment
laws,23 cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise
by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms,
Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the
LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the
discontinuance or pollution."24 (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make
whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its
jurisdiction.
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the
power "to issue and ex-parte cease and desist order" in a
language, as suggested by the City Government of
Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct
National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7
of P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in
P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However,
it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion
that there is a denial of the power to issue the order in
question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders
requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is expressly
and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease
and desist order" were not expressly conferred by law,
there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule
granting such authority need not necessarily be
express.25 While it is a fundamental rule that an
administrative agency has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule
that an administrative agency has also such powers as
are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express
powers.26 In the exercise, therefore, of its express
powers under its charter as a regulatory and
quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the
Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a
"cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise,
it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution
Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et al.,27 the
Court ruled that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB)
has the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist
order when there is prima facie evidence of an
establishment exceeding the allowable standards set by
the anti-pollution laws of the country. The ponente,
Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, declared:
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law
and regulations in situations like that here presented
precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of
pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other
inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait
until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or
propriety of such orders has run its full course, including
multiple and sequential appeals such as those which
Solar has taken, which of course may take several years.
The relevant pollution control statute and implementing
regulations were enacted and promulgated in the
exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the
safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the
public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life,
commonly designated as the police power. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests like those
here involved, through the exercise of police power. . . .
The immediate response to the demands of "the
necessities of protecting vital public interests" gives
vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987
Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary
The State shall protect and advance the right of the restraining order issued by the Court on July 19, 1993
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City
the rhythm and harmony of nature. Government of Caloocan from dumping their garbage at
the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City is
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it hereby made permanent.
carries the correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but
in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to SO ORDERED.
protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them."28 It is to be Feliciano, Bidin, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.
borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma
Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health
as a fundamental human right. 29

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by

the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure under the
circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its
power and authority under its charter and its amendatory
laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA
been complied with by the City Government of Caloocan
as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would
have been necessary.

The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as

amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA the
means of directly enforcing such orders, has provided
under its Section 4 (d) the power to institute "necessary
legal proceeding against any person who shall
commence to implement or continue implementation of
any project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay
region without previous clearance from the LLDA."

Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA

with sufficiently broad powers in the regulation of all
projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether by
the government or the private sector, insofar as the
implementation of these projects is concerned. It was
meant to deal with cases which might possibly arise
where decisions or orders issued pursuant to the
exercise of such broad powers may not be obeyed,
resulting in the thwarting of its laudabe objective. To
meet such contingencies, then the writs of mandamus
and injunction which are beyond the power of the LLDA
to issue, may be sought from the proper courts.

Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution

laws in the Laguna Lake region and its surrounding
provinces, cities and towns are concerned, the Court will
not dwell further on the related issues raised which are
more appropriately addressed to an administrative
agency with the special knowledge and expertise of the
LLDA.
G.R. No. L-75697
VALENTIN TIO doing business under the name and
style of OMI ENTERPRISES, petitioner,
vs.
VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD​, MINISTER OF
FINANCE, METRO MANILA COMMISSION, CITY
MAYOR and CITY TREASURER OF MANILA,
respondents.
Nelson Y. Ng for petitioner.
The City Legal Officer for respondents City Mayor and
City Treasurer.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by
petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of
other videogram operators adversely affected. It assails
the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987
entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory
Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the
videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred to as the
BOARD). The Decree was promulgated on October 5,
1985 and took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days
after completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.
On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of
the abovementioned decree, Presidential Decree No.
1994 amended the National Internal Revenue Code
providing, inter alia:
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on
each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback,
regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos;
Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank
video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.
On October 23, 1986, the Greater Manila Theaters
Association, Integrated Movie Producers, Importers and
Distributors Association of the Philippines, and Philippine
Motion Pictures Producers Association, hereinafter
collectively referred to as the Intervenors, were permitted
by the Court to intervene in the case, over petitioner's
opposition, upon the allegations that intervention was
necessary for the complete protection of their rights and
that their "survival and very existence is threatened by
the unregulated proliferation of film piracy." The
Intervenors were thereafter allowed to file their Comment
in Intervention.
The rationale behind the enactment of the DECREE, is
set out in its preambular clauses as follows:
1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated
circulation of videograms including, among others,
videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical
improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced
the operations of moviehouses and theaters, and have
caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at
least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the
collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and
other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses
estimated at P450 Million annually in government
revenues;
2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments collectively
earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales
and disposition of videograms, and such earnings have
not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the
Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each
year;
3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram
establishments have also affected the viability of the
movie industry, particularly the more than 1,200 movie
houses and theaters throughout the country, and
occasioned industry-wide displacement and
unemployment due to the shutdown of numerous
moviehouses and theaters;
4. "WHEREAS, in order to ensure national economic
recovery, it is imperative for the Government to create an
environment conducive to growth and development of all
business industries, including the movie industry which
has an accumulated investment of about P3 Billion;
5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of
videogram establishments will not only alleviate the dire
financial condition of the movie industry upon which more
than 75,000 families and 500,000 workers depend for
their livelihood, but also provide an additional source of
revenue for the Government, and at the same time
rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of
videograms;
6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing of
obscene videogram features constitutes a clear and
present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of
the youth, and impairs the mandate of the Constitution
for the State to support the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character and
promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being;
7. WHEREAS, civic-minded citizens and groups have
called for remedial measures to curb these blatant
malpractices which have flaunted our censorship and
copyright laws;
8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies
corroding the moral values of the people and betraying
the national economic recovery program, bold
emergency measures must be adopted with dispatch; ...
(Numbering of paragraphs supplied).
Petitioner's attack on the constitutionality of the DECREE
rests on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the
gross receipts payable to the local government is a
RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject
matter thereof;
2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive
and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution;
3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by
the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by
Amendment No. 6;
4. There is undue delegation of power and authority;
5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and
6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it
were a nuisance, which it is not.
We shall consider the foregoing objections in seriatim.
1. The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof" 1 is sufficiently complied with if the title
be comprehensive enough to include the general
purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not
necessary that the title express each and every end that
the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is
satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are
germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or
as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject and title. 2 An act having a single general
subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long
as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such
subject by providing for the method and means of
carrying out the general object." 3 The rule also is that
the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill
should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or
impede the power of legislation. 4 It should be given
practical rather than technical construction. 5
Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention
that the tax provision of the DECREE is a rider is without
merit. That section reads, inter alia:
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of
Videograms. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to
the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty
percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the
case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a
videogram containing a reproduction of any motion
picture or audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the
proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the
province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall acrrue to
the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED,
That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared
equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan
Manila Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the
general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of
the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory
Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not
inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and
title. As a tool for regulation 6 it is simply one of the
regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout
the DECREE. The express purpose of the DECREE to
include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate
and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of
videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5, supra.
Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in
presenting the measure. The title of the DECREE, which
is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is
comprehensive enough to include the purposes
expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its
provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those
objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the
body of the DECREE. 7
2. Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax
imposed is harsh and oppressive, confiscatory, and in
restraint of trade. However, it is beyond serious question
that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it
regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the
activities taxed. 8 The power to impose taxes is one so
unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the
courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any
restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the
discretion of the authority which exercises it. 9 In
imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents.
This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous
and oppressive taxation. 10
The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory
but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization
that earnings of videogram establishments of around
P600 million per annum have not been subjected to tax,
thereby depriving the Government of an additional
source of revenue. It is an end-user tax, imposed on
retailers for every videogram they make available for
public viewing. It is similar to the 30% amusement tax
imposed or borne by the movie industry which the
theater-owners pay to the government, but which is
passed on to the entire cost of the admission ticket, thus
shifting the tax burden on the buying or the viewing
public. It is a tax that is imposed uniformly on all
videogram operators.
The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was
imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the
video industry, particularly because of the rampant film
piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights,
and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And
while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect
the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the
motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax
was to favor one industry over another. 11
It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to
select the subjects of taxation, and it has been
repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a
singling out of one particular class for taxation or
exemption infringe no constitutional limitation". 12
Taxation has been made the implement of the state's
police power.13
At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to
the taxing legislature.
3. Petitioner argues that there was no legal nor factual
basis for the promulgation of the DECREE by the former
President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution providing that "whenever in the judgment of
the President ... , there exists a grave emergency or a
threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim
Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly
fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any
reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he
may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary
decrees, orders, or letters of instructions, which shall
form part of the law of the land."
In refutation, the Intervenors and the Solicitor General's
Office aver that the 8th "whereas" clause sufficiently
summarizes the justification in that grave emergencies
corroding the moral values of the people and betraying
the national economic recovery program necessitated
bold emergency measures to be adopted with dispatch.
Whatever the reasons "in the judgment" of the then
President, considering that the issue of the validity of the
exercise of legislative power under the said Amendment
still pends resolution in several other cases, we reserve
resolution of the question raised at the proper time.
4. Neither can it be successfully argued that the
DECREE contains an undue delegation of legislative
power. The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of
authority to the BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance of
other agencies and units of the government and
deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or
personnel of such agencies and units to perform
enforcement functions for the Board" is not a delegation
of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of
authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement,
and implementation. "The true distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be
done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." 14
Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority
of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed
and limited period" with the deputized agencies
concerned being "subject to the direction and control of
the BOARD." That the grant of such authority might be
the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize
the DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality
occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate
remedy in law.
5. The DECREE is not violative of the ex post facto
principle. An ex post facto law is, among other
categories, one which "alters the legal rules of evidence,
and authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense." It is petitioner's position that
Section 15 of the DECREE in providing that:
All videogram establishments in the Philippines are
hereby given a period of forty-five (45) days after the
effectivity of this Decree within which to register with and
secure a permit from the BOARD to engage in the
videogram business and to register with the BOARD all
their inventories of videograms, including videotapes,
discs, cassettes or other technical improvements or
variations thereof, before they could be sold, leased, or
otherwise disposed of. Thereafter any videogram found
in the possession of any person engaged in the
videogram business without the required proof of
registration by the BOARD, shall be prima facie evidence
of violation of the Decree, whether the possession of
such videogram be for private showing and/or public
exhibition.
raises immediately a prima facie evidence of violation of
the DECREE when the required proof of registration of
any videogram cannot be presented and thus partakes of
the nature of an ex post facto law.
The argument is untenable. As this Court held in the
recent case of Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 15
... it is now well settled that "there is no constitutional
objection to the passage of a law providing that the
presumption of innocence may be overcome by a
contrary presumption founded upon the experience of
human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be
sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence"
(People vs. Mingoa 92 Phil. 856 [1953] at 858-59, citing 1
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS, 639-641). And the "legislature may enact
that when certain facts have been proved that they shall
be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of
the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there
be a rational connection between the facts proved and
the ultimate facts presumed so that the inference of the
one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and
arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two
in common experience". 16
Applied to the challenged provision, there is no question
that there is a rational connection between the fact
proved, which is non-registration, and the ultimate fact
presumed which is violation of the DECREE, besides the
fact that the prima facie presumption of violation of the
DECREE attaches only after a forty-five-day period
counted from its effectivity and is, therefore, neither
retrospective in character.
6. We do not share petitioner's fears that the video
industry is being over-regulated and being eased out of
existence as if it were a nuisance. Being a relatively new
industry, the need for its regulation was apparent. While
the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the
moribund movie industry, there is no question that public
welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the
unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the
erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought
about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed
video tapes containing pornographic films and films with
brutally violent sequences; and losses in government
revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to
mention the fact that the activities of video
establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment
of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required
to engage in business. 17
The enactment of the Decree since April 10, 1986 has
not brought about the "demise" of the video industry. On
the contrary, video establishments are seen to have
proliferated in many places notwithstanding the 30% tax
imposed.
In the last analysis, what petitioner basically questions is
the necessity, wisdom and expediency of the DECREE.
These considerations, however, are primarily and
exclusively a matter of legislative concern.
Only congressional power or competence, not the
wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for
declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The
principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely
allocated the respective authority of each department
and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There
would then be intrusion not allowable under the
Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a
coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own.
If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to
be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which
rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to
maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and
prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged
provision likewise insofar as there may be objections,
even if valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot be
sustained. 18
In fine, petitioner has not overcome the presumption of
validity which attaches to a challenged statute. We find
no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify
us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as
unconstitutional and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (C.J.), Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant.
Williams & Ferrier for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
JOHNS, J.:
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature
passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the
monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice,
and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating
the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of
State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations
therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose,"
the material provisions of which are as follows:
Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized,
whenever, for any cause, conditions arise resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to
issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of
State, temporary rules and emergency measures for
carrying out the purpose of this Act, to wit:
(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and
speculation in, palay, rice or corn.
(b) To establish and maintain a government control of the
distribution or sale of the commodities referred to or have
such distribution or sale made by the Government itself.
(c) To fix, from time to time the quantities of palay rice, or
corn that a company or individual may acquire, and the
maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may
demand.
(d) . . .
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful to destroy, limit, prevent or in
any other manner obstruct the production or milling of
palay, rice or corn for the purpose of raising the prices
thereof; to corner or hoard said products as defined in
section three of this Act; . . .
Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or
hoarding of palay, rice or corn within the meaning of this
Act, but does not specify the price of rice or define any
basic for fixing the price.
SEC. 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act
or of the regulations, orders and decrees promulgated in
accordance therewith shall be punished by a fine of not
more than five thousands pesos, or by imprisonment for
not more than two years, or both, in the discretion of the
court: Provided, That in the case of companies or
corporations the manager or administrator shall be
criminally liable.
SEC. 7. At any time that the Governor-General, with the
consent of the Council of State, shall consider that the
public interest requires the application of the provisions
of this Act, he shall so declare by proclamation, and any
provisions of other laws inconsistent herewith shall from
then on be temporarily suspended.
Upon the cessation of the reasons for which such
proclamation was issued, the Governor-General, with the
consent of the Council of State, shall declare the
application of this Act to have likewise terminated, and all
laws temporarily suspended by virtue of the same shall
again take effect, but such termination shall not prevent
the prosecution of any proceedings or cause begun prior
to such termination, nor the filing of any proceedings for
an offense committed during the period covered by the
Governor-General's proclamation.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a
proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the
defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of
rice at an excessive price as follows:
The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of
Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the
Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in relation with
the provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act No. 2868,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city
of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Ang Tang Ho,
voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad,
one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P.80),
which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive
Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines,
dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the authority of
section 1 of Act No. 2868. Contrary to law.
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and
sentenced to five months' imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming
that the lower court erred in finding Executive Order No.
53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the
accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing
the sentence.
The official records show that the Act was to take effect
on its approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919; that
the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st
of August, 1919; and that the law was first published on
the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself
was first published on the 20th of August, 1919.
The question here involves an analysis and construction
of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the
Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be
sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of
State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate
temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying
out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the
promulgation of temporary rules and emergency
measures is left to the discretion of the
Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake
to specify or define under what conditions or for what
reasons the Governor-General shall issue the
proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any
cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any
cause" to the discretion of the Governor-General. The
Act also says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting
in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn."
The Legislature does not specify or define what is "an
extraordinary rise." That is also left to the discretion of
the Governor-General. The Act also says that the
Governor-General, "with the consent of the Council of
State," is authorized to issue and promulgate "temporary
rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of this Act." It does not specify or define what is
a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long
such temporary rules or emergency measures shall
remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect.
That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any
manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but
has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the
Governor-General to say what is or what is not "a cause,"
and what is or what is not "an extraordinary rise in the
price of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule or an
emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of
the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and
the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the
minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer
who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is
a criminal. There may not have been any cause, and the
price may not have been extraordinary, and there may
not have been an emergency, but, if the
Governor-General found the existence of such facts and
issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher
price, the seller commits a crime.
By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the
Constitution of the United States all powers are vested in
the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of
the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to
execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law.
The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe
the law, the Executive has no authority to make or
construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power to
make or execute the law. Subject to the Constitution
only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own
jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say when
any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional.
Assuming, without deciding, that the Legislature itself has
the power to fix the price at which rice is to be sold, can it
delegate that power to another, and, if so, was that
power legally delegated by Act No. 2868? In other words,
does the Act delegate legislative power to the
Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all Legislative
power is vested in the Legislature, and the power
conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated to the Governor-General, or any one else. The
Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to
enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and
within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize
the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to
carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself
created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is
valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not
define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act
remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing
of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act
is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional
and void.
The Supreme Court of the United States in what is
known as the Granger Cases (94 U.S., 183-187; 24 L.
ed., 94), first laid down the rule:
Railroad companies are engaged in a public employment
affecting the public interest and, under the decision in
Munn vs. Ill., ante, 77, are subject to legislative control as
to their rates of fare and freight unless protected by their
charters.
The Illinois statute of Mar. 23, 1874, to establish
reasonable maximum rates of charges for the
transportation of freights and passengers on the different
railroads of the State is not void as being repugnant to
the Constitution of the United States or to that of the
State.
It was there for the first time held in substance that a
railroad was a public utility, and that, being a public utility,
the State had power to establish reasonable maximum
freight and passenger rates. This was followed by the
State of Minnesota in enacting a similar law, providing
for, and empowering, a railroad commission to hear and
determine what was a just and reasonable rate. The
constitutionality of this law was attacked and upheld by
the Supreme Court of Minnesota in a learned and
exhaustive opinion by Justice Mitchell, in the case of
State vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul ry. Co. (38
Minn., 281), in which the court held:
Regulations of railway tariffs — Conclusiveness of
commission's tariffs. — Under Laws 1887, c. 10, sec. 8,
the determination of the railroad and warehouse
commission as to what are equal and reasonable fares
and rates for the transportation of persons and property
by a railway company is conclusive, and, in proceedings
by mandamus to compel compliance with the tariff of
rates recommended and published by them, no issue can
be raised or inquiry had on that question.
Same — constitution — Delegation of power to
commission. — The authority thus given to the
commission to determine, in the exercise of their
discretion and judgement, what are equal and
reasonable rates, is not a delegation of legislative power.
It will be noted that the law creating the railroad
commission expressly provides —
That all charges by any common carrier for the
transportation of passengers and property shall be equal
and reasonable.
With that as a basis for the law, power is then given to
the railroad commission to investigate all the facts, to
hear and determine what is a just and reasonable rate.
Even then that law does not make the violation of the
order of the commission a crime. The only remedy is a
civil proceeding. It was there held —
That the legislative itself has the power to regulate
railroad charges is now too well settled to require either
argument or citation of authority.
The difference between the power to say what the law
shall be, and the power to adopt rules and regulations, or
to investigate and determine the facts, in order to carry
into effect a law already passed, is apparent. The true
distinction is between the delegation of power to make
the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be, and the conferring an authority or
discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the
law.
The legislature enacts that all freights rates and
passenger fares should be just and reasonable. It had
the undoubted power to fix these rates at whatever it
deemed equal and reasonable.
They have not delegated to the commission any authority
or discretion as to what the law shall be, — which would
not be allowable, — but have merely conferred upon it an
authority and discretion, to be exercised in the execution
of the law, and under and in pursuance of it, which is
entirely permissible. The legislature itself has passed
upon the expediency of the law, and what is shall be. The
commission is intrusted with no authority or discretion
upon these questions. It can neither make nor unmake a
single provision of law. It is merely charged with the
administration of the law, and with no other power.
The delegation of legislative power was before the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Dowling vs. Lancoshire
Ins. Co. (92 Wis., 63). The opinion says:
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power
to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion
as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and
in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
latter no valid objection can be made."
The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely
and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so
that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to
take the place of all others, without the determination of
the insurance commissioner in respect to maters
involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could
not be delegated, and without which the act could not
possibly be put in use as an act in confirmity to which all
fire insurance policies were required to be issued.
The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law
must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it
leaves the legislative branch of the government, and
nothing must be left to the judgement of the electors or
other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in
form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti,
but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact
or event.
The delegation of legislative power was before the
Supreme Court in United States vs. Grimaud (220 U.S.,
506; 55 L. ed., 563), where it was held that the rules and
regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture as to a
trespass on government land in a forest reserve were
valid constitutional. The Act there provided that the
Secretary of Agriculture ". . . may make such rules and
regulations and establish such service as will insure the
object of such reservations; namely, to regulate their
occupancy and use, and to preserve the forests thereon
from destruction; and any violation of the provisions of
this act or such rules and regulations shall be punished, .
. ."
The brief of the United States Solicitor-General says:
In refusing permits to use a forest reservation for stock
grazing, except upon stated terms or in stated ways, the
Secretary of Agriculture merely assert and enforces the
proprietary right of the United States over land which it
owns. The regulation of the Secretary, therefore, is not
an exercise of legislative, or even of administrative,
power; but is an ordinary and legitimate refusal of the
landowner's authorized agent to allow person having no
right in the land to use it as they will. The right of
proprietary control is altogether different from
governmental authority.
The opinion says:
From the beginning of the government, various acts have
been passed conferring upon executive officers power to
make rules and regulations, — not for the government of
their departments, but for administering the laws which
did govern. None of these statutes could confer
legislative power. But when Congress had legislated
power. But when Congress had legislated and indicated
its will, it could give to those who were to act under such
general provisions "power to fill up the details" by the
establishment of administrative rules and regulations, the
violation of which could be punished by fine or
imprisonment fixed by Congress, or by penalties fixed by
Congress, or measured by the injury done.
That "Congress cannot delegate legislative power is a
principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity
and maintenance of the system of government ordained
by the Constitution."
If, after the passage of the act and the promulgation of
the rule, the defendants drove and grazed their sheep
upon the reserve, in violation of the regulations, they
were making an unlawful use of the government's
property. In doing so they thereby made themselves
liable to the penalty imposed by Congress.
The subjects as to which the Secretary can regulate are
defined. The lands are set apart as a forest reserve. He
is required to make provisions to protect them from
depredations and from harmful uses. He is authorized 'to
regulate the occupancy and use and to preserve the
forests from destruction.' A violation of reasonable rules
regulating the use and occupancy of the property is
made a crime, not by the Secretary, but by Congress."
The above are leading cases in the United States on the
question of delegating legislative power. It will be noted
that in the "Granger Cases," it was held that a railroad
company was a public corporation, and that a railroad
was a public utility, and that, for such reasons, the
legislature had the power to fix and determine just and
reasonable rates for freight and passengers.
The Minnesota case held that, so long as the rates were
just and reasonable, the legislature could delegate the
power to ascertain the facts and determine from the facts
what were just and reasonable rates,. and that in vesting
the commission with such power was not a delegation of
legislative power.
The Wisconsin case was a civil action founded upon a
"Wisconsin standard policy of fire insurance," and the
court held that "the act, . . . wholly fails to provide
definitely and clearly what the standard policy should
contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy
required to take the place of all others, without the
determination of the insurance commissioner in respect
to matters involving the exercise of a legislative
discretion that could not be delegated."
The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra
dealt with rules and regulations which were promulgated
by the Secretary of Agriculture for Government land in
the forest reserve.
These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a
law, and that it cannot delegate it legislative authority.
The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a
delegation of legislative power is pointed out and clearly
defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:
That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by
the legislature to any other department of the
government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental
principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity
and maintenance of the system of government
established by the constitution.
Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is
complete in and of itself, it may be provided that it shall
become operative only upon some certain act or event,
or, in like manner, that its operation shall be suspended.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law,
but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine
some fact or state of things upon which the law makes,
or intends to make, its own action to depend.
The Village of Little Chute enacted an ordinance which
provides:
All saloons in said village shall be closed at 11 o'clock
P.M. each day and remain closed until 5 o'clock on the
following morning, unless by special permission of the
president.
Construing it in 136 Wis., 526; 128 A. S. R., 1100,1 the
Supreme Court of that State says:
We regard the ordinance as void for two reasons; First,
because it attempts to confer arbitrary power upon an
executive officer, and allows him, in executing the
ordinance, to make unjust and groundless
discriminations among persons similarly situated;
second, because the power to regulate saloons is a
law-making power vested in the village board, which
cannot be delegated. A legislative body cannot delegate
to a mere administrative officer power to make a law, but
it can make a law with provisions that it shall go into
effect or be suspended in its operations upon the
ascertainment of a fact or state of facts by an
administrative officer or board. In the present case the
ordinance by its terms gives power to the president to
decide arbitrary, and in the exercise of his own
discretion, when a saloon shall close. This is an attempt
to vest legislative discretion in him, and cannot be
sustained.
The legal principle involved there is squarely in point
here.
It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No.
2868, and before any rules and regulations were
promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice
could sell it at any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and
that he would not commit a crime, because there would
be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any
price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence
of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any
price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant
committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General
issued the proclamation. There was no act of the
Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and
without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to
a crime.
The Executive order2 provides:
(5) The maximum selling price of palay, rice or corn is
hereby fixed, for the time being as follows:
In Manila —
Palay at P6.75 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 29 centavos per
ganta.
Rice at P15 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 63 centavos per
ganta.
Corn at P8 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 34 centavos per
ganta.
In the provinces producing palay, rice and corn, the
maximum price shall be the Manila price less the cost of
transportation from the source of supply and necessary
handling expenses to the place of sale, to be determined
by the provincial treasurers or their deputies.
In provinces, obtaining their supplies from Manila or other
producing provinces, the maximum price shall be the
authorized price at the place of supply or the Manila price
as the case may be, plus the transportation cost, from
the place of supply and the necessary handling
expenses, to the place of sale, to be determined by the
provincial treasurers or their deputies.
(6) Provincial treasurers and their deputies are hereby
directed to communicate with, and execute all
instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce
and Industry, for the most effective and proper
enforcement of the above regulations in their respective
localities.
The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the
maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may
demand." The law is a general law and not a local or
special law.
The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in
Manila and other and different prices in other and
different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and
delegates the power to determine the other and different
prices to provincial treasurers and their deputies. Here,
then, you would have a delegation of legislative power to
the Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that
power to provincial treasurers and their deputies, who
"are hereby directed to communicate with, and execute
all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce
and Industry, for the most effective and proper
enforcement of the above regulations in their respective
localities." The issuance of the proclamation by the
Governor-General was the exercise of the delegation of a
delegated power, and was even a sub delegation of that
power.
Assuming that it is valid, Act No. 2868 is a general law
and does not authorize the Governor-General to fix one
price of rice in Manila and another price in Iloilo. It only
purports to authorize him to fix the price of rice in the
Philippine Islands under a law, which is General and
uniform, and not local or special. Under the terms of the
law, the price of rice fixed in the proclamation must be
the same all over the Islands. There cannot be one price
at Manila and another at Iloilo. Again, it is a mater of
common knowledge, and of which this court will take
judicial notice, that there are many kinds of rice with
different and corresponding market values, and that there
is a wide range in the price, which varies with the grade
and quality. Act No. 2868 makes no distinction in price
for the grade or quality of the rice, and the proclamation,
upon which the defendant was tried and convicted, fixes
the selling price of rice in Manila "at P15 per sack of 57½
kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta," and is uniform as to all
grades of rice, and says nothing about grade or quality.
Again, it will be noted that the law is confined to palay,
rice and corn. They are products of the Philippine
Islands. Hemp, tobacco, coconut, chickens, eggs, and
many other things are also products. Any law which
single out palay, rice or corn from the numerous other
products of the Islands is not general or uniform, but is a
local or special law. If such a law is valid, then by the
same principle, the Governor-General could be
authorized by proclamation to fix the price of meat, eggs,
chickens, coconut, hemp, and tobacco, or any other
product of the Islands. In the very nature of things, all of
that class of laws should be general and uniform.
Otherwise, there would be an unjust discrimination of
property rights, which, under the law, must be equal and
inform. Act No. 2868 is nothing more than a floating law,
which, in the discretion and by a proclamation of the
Governor-General, makes it a floating crime to sell rice at
a price in excess of the proclamation, without regard to
grade or quality.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the
proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes
the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to
sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it
to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say
what was and what was not "any cause" for enforcing the
act, and what was and what was not "an extraordinary
rise in the price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain
undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should
be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say
whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when,
and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long
it should be enforced, and when the law should be
suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define
what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise
in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify or
define the conditions upon which the proclamation should
be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime
was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at
all, because the Governor-General issued the
proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say
anything about the different grades or qualities of rice,
and the defendant is charged with the sale "of one ganta
of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a
price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53."
We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868,
in so far as it undertakes to authorized the
Governor-General in his discretion to issue a
proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the
sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make
the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is
unconstitutional and void.
It may be urged that there was an extraordinary rise in
the price of rice and profiteering, which worked a severe
hardship on the poorer classes, and that an emergency
existed, but the question here presented is the
constitutionality of a particular portion of a statute, and
none of such matters is an argument for, or against, its
constitutionality.
The Constitution is something solid, permanent an
substantial. Its stability protects the life, liberty and
property rights of the rich and the poor alike, and that
protection ought not to change with the wind or any
emergency condition. The fundamental question involved
in this case is the right of the people of the Philippine
Islands to be and live under a republican form of
government. We make the broad statement that no state
or nation, living under republican form of government,
under the terms and conditions specified in Act No. 2868,
has ever enacted a law delegating the power to any one,
to fix the price at which rice should be sold. That power
can never be delegated under a republican form of
government.
In the fixing of the price at which the defendant should
sell his rice, the law was not dealing with government
property. It was dealing with private property and private
rights, which are sacred under the Constitution. If this law price of rice and make it a crime to sell it at a higher
should be sustained, upon the same principle and for the price, and which holds that portions of the Act
same reason, the Legislature could authorize the unconstitutional. It does not decide or undertake to
Governor-General to fix the price of every product or construe the constitutionality of any of the remaining
commodity in the Philippine Islands, and empower him to portions of the Act.
make it a crime to sell any product at any other or
different price. The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the
defendant discharged. So ordered.
It may be said that this was a war measure, and that for
such reason the provision of the Constitution should be Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
suspended. But the Stubborn fact remains that at all Romualdez, J., concurs in the result.
times the judicial power was in full force and effect, and
that while that power was in force and effect, such a
provision of the Constitution could not be, and was not,
suspended even in times of war. It may be claimed that
during the war, the United States Government undertook
to, and did, fix the price at which wheat and flour should
be bought and sold, and that is true. There, the United
States had declared war, and at the time was at war with
other nations, and it was a war measure, but it is also
true that in doing so, and as a part of the same act, the
United States commandeered all the wheat and flour,
and took possession of it, either actual or constructive,
and the government itself became the owner of the
wheat and flour, and fixed the price to be paid for it. That
is not this case. Here the rice sold was the personal and
private property of the defendant, who sold it to one of
his customers. The government had not bought and did
not claim to own the rice, or have any interest in it, and at
the time of the alleged sale, it was the personal, private
property of the defendant. It may be that the law was
passed in the interest of the public, but the members of
this court have taken on solemn oath to uphold and
defend the Constitution, and it ought not to be construed
to meet the changing winds or emergency conditions.
Again, we say that no state or nation under a republican
form of government ever enacted a law authorizing any
executive, under the conditions states, to fix the price at
which a price person would sell his own rice, and make
the broad statement that no decision of any court, on
principle or by analogy, will ever be found which sustains
the constitutionality of the particular portion of Act No.
2868 here in question. By the terms of the Organic Act,
subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to
legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the
Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the
people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question here
involved, the authority of the Governor-General to fix the
maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold
in the manner power in violation of the organic law.

This opinion is confined to the particular question here

involved, which is the right of the Governor-General,
upon the terms and conditions stated in the Act, to fix the
YNOT V. IAC | POWERS OF ADMINITRATIVE
AGENCIES
G.R. No. 74457, 148 SCRA 659, March 20, 1987
Petitioner: Restituto Ynot
Respondents: Intermediate Appellate Court, The Station
Commander, Integrated National Police, Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo and the Regional Director, Bureau of Animal
Industry, Region IV, Iloilo City
Doctrine: The conferment on the administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of separation
of powers.
Law Applicable: EO No. 626-A
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby
amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of
age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef
shall be transported from one province to another. The
carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this
Executive Order as amended shall be subject to
confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as
the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos.
Summary
EO 626-A is unconstitutional because:
The EO is an invalid exercise of police power as the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and,
worse, is unduly oppressive.
Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his
defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the
power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers.
Invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in
the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
FACTS:
Pres. Marcos issued EO 626-A to strengthen EO 626,
which prohibits the interprovincial movement of
carabaos.
Ynot transported 6 carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by the
police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. Ynot
sued for recovery, and the Iloilo’s RTC issued a writ of
replevin.
After considering the merits of the case, the court
sustained the confiscation. The court also declined to
rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as
raise by the petitioner, for 1) lack of authority and 2) EO’s
presumed validity. (Later affirmed by IAC)
ISSUE: Whether EO 626-A is constitutional. – NO.
RULING:
EO 626-A did not pass the lawful means test. (Sufficient
Standard Test)
To strengthen the original measure, EO 626-A imposes
an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but
on their movement, providing that “no carabao regardless
of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no
carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another.” The object of the prohibition escapes us. The
reasonable connection between the means employed
and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing.
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial
transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere,
with no less difficulty in one province than in another.
Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not
prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving
them to another province will make it easier to kill them
there.
The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or
carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the
executive authorities, usually the police only.
In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because
the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be
imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the
accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no
such trial is prescribed, and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the police and
declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the
government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily
confiscated by the police station commander, were
returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a
complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his
failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial
court. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the
petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus
denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair
play.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of
time or action calling for the petitioner’s peremptory
treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical
per se as to require their instant destruction. There
certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by
the executive order should not have been proved first in
a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the
rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, EO
626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should
have been pronounced not by the police only but by a
court of justice, which alone would have had the authority
to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and
conviction of the accused.
The phrase “may see fit” is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with
perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even
corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard
and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers must observe when they
make their distribution.
OTHER ISSUES
Constitutionality is not always presumed.
while it is true that laws are presumed to be
constitutional, that presumption is not by any means
conclusive and in fact may be rebutted if there be a clear
showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare
them so, then “will be the time to make the hammer fall,
and heavily,” to recall Justice Laurel’s trenchant warning.
Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of
least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality
of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they
should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the
abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, and
so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
EO 626-A is really a presidential decree that promulgates
a new rule instead of implementing an existing law.
EO 626-A was issued not for the purpose of taking care
that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise
of the President’s legislative authority under Amendment
No. 6. (whenever in his judgment there existed a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever
the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on
any matter that in his judgment required immediate
action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue
decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have
the force and effect of law)
In this case, there is no showing of any exigency to justify
the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the
petitioner has reason to question the validity of the
executive order.
Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds
was supposed to have been made by the President “in
his judgment, ” a phrase that will lead to protracted
discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve
resolution of this matter until a more appropriate
occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the
more fundamental question of due process.
History of Due Process Clause
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so
it would remain also conveniently resilient.
This was felt necessary because due process is not, like
some provisions of the fundamental law, an “iron rule”
laying down an implacable and immutable command for
all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best
virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due
process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to
every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as
the changing times and circumstances may require
No Due Process in this case.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice
and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be
dispensed with because they are intended as a
safeguard against official arbitrariness.
We have consistently declared that every person, faced
by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to “the law
of the land,” which Daniel Webster described almost two
hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College
Case, as “the law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after
trial.”
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative
in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of
admitted exceptions.
Police Power, as an exception for due process
The protection of the general welfare is the particular
function of the police power which both restraints and is
restrained by due process.
EO 622-A as an exercise of Police Power
The original measure was issued for the reason, as
expressed in one of its Whereases, that “present
conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes
be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who
rely on them for energy needs.”
We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In
the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased
dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of
burden, the government would have been remiss,
indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and preserve
them.
What constitute a valid exercise of police power

To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in

behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and second,
that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals (US v. Toribio)
HOWEVER, the police station commander who
confiscated the petitioner’s carabaos is not liable in
damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance
with its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively
valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the
police, to enforce it.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby

declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is
ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.
G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965
EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
Zulueta, Gonzales, Paculdo and Associates for
petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964
the President of the Philippines, purporting to act
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and
126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities
enumerated in the margin.1 Soon after the date last
mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner
Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines
and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil
action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction,
against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as
his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
executive orders and/or any disbursement by said
municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and
void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been
impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that
the present action is premature and that not all proper
parties — referring to the officials of the new political
subdivisions in question — have been impleaded.
Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities
adversely affected by the aforementioned executive
orders — because the latter have taken away from the
former the barrios composing the new political
subdivisions — intervened in the case. Moreover,
Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and Emma
Quisumbing-Fernando were allowed to and did appear
as amici curiae.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No.
2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered
nor their names changed except under the provisions of
this Act or by Act of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same
Section 3:
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act
shall come under the provisions hereof.
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas
affected, a new barrio may be created or the name of an
existing one may be changed by the provincial board of
the province, upon recommendation of the council of the
municipality or municipalities in which the proposed
barrio is stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal
council shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at
least two-thirds of the entire membership of the said
council: Provided, however, That no new barrio may be
created if its population is less than five hundred
persons.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No.
2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or
their boundaries altered nor their names changed"
except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding
provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters
in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the
council of the municipality or municipalities in which the
proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner argues,
accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot
even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which
is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities?"
Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory
that a new municipality can be created without creating
new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the
jurisdiction of the new municipality. This theory
overlooks, however, the main import of the petitioner's
argument, which is that the statutory denial of the
presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a
negation of the bigger power to create municipalities,
each of which consists of several barrios. The cogency
and force of this argument is too obvious to be denied or
even questioned. Founded upon logic and experience, it
cannot be offset except by a clear manifestation of the
intent of Congress to the contrary, and no such
manifestation, subsequent to the passage of Republic
Act No. 2379, has been brought to our attention.
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code, upon which the disputed executive orders are
based, provides:
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may
by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of
any province, subprovince, municipality, [township]
municipal district, or other political subdivision, and
increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may
divide any province into one or more subprovinces,
separate any political division other than a province, into
such portions as may be required, merge any of such
subdivisions or portions with another, name any new
subdivision so created, and may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein
as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the
authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of
the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the
boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined
or any province is to be divided into one or more
subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General)
President of the Philippines in accordance herewith
makes necessary a change of the territory under the
jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial
officer, the (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the
head of the Department having executive control of such
officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers
affected and assign such officers to the new districts so
formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in
pursuance of the foregoing authority, an equitable
distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions
thereby affected shall be made in such manner as may
be recommended by the (Insular Auditor) Auditor
General and approved by the (Governor-General)
President of the Philippines.
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to
create municipalities under this section does not amount
to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon
Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan
(36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled it. Such
claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the
creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of
territory — from an already existing municipality
(Cardona) to another municipality (Binañgonan), likewise,
existing at the time of and prior to said transfer (See
Gov't of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs.
Municipality, of Binañgonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) —
in consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant to
Act No. 1748, of the common boundaries of two
municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix
such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle
conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities,
may partake of an administrative nature — involving, as it
does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect
the law creating said municipalities — the authority to
create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in
nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a
legislative function" (State ex rel. Higgins vs. Aicklen, 119
S. 425, January 2, 1959) or "solely and exclusively the
exercise of legislative power" (Udall vs. Severn, May 29,
1938, 79 P. 2d 347-349). As the Supreme Court of
Washington has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs. Stewart,
February 13, 1890, 23 Pac. 405, 409), "municipal
corporations are purely the creatures of statutes."
Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of
the Government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate2 — and (b)
fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable — to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions.2a
Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the
delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy,
which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the
delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority.2b Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon
himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also —
and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures
inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act
of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of
powers and the system of checks and balances, and,
consequently, undermining the very foundation of our
Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not
meet these well settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the
enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to
be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither
does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the
evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do
not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first
sentence of Section 68, the President:
... may change the seat of the government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare
may require.
It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause,
that the phrase "as the public welfare may require"
qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted,
but only the place to which the seat of the government
may be transferred. This fact becomes more apparent
when we consider that said Section 68 was originally
Section 1 of Act No. 1748,3 which provided that,
"whenever in the judgment of the Governor-General the
public welfare requires, he may, by executive order,"
effect the changes enumerated therein (as in said section
68), including the change of the seat of the government
"to such place ... as the public interest requires." The
opening statement of said Section 1 of Act No. 1748 —
which was not included in Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code — governed the time at which, or
the conditions under which, the powers therein conferred
could be exercised; whereas the last part of the first
sentence of said section referred exclusively to the place
to which the seat of the government was to be
transferred.
At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as
the case at bar is concerned, even if we assumed that
the phrase "as the public welfare may require," in said
Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is true
that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People
vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld
"public welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as
sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority
to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these
cases — as all judicial pronouncements — must be
construed in relation to the specific facts and issues
involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute
precedents and have no binding effect.4 The law
construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the
Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the
power to issue rules and regulations to promote safe
transit upon national roads and streets. Upon the other
hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the
Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and
cancel certificates or permits for the sale of speculative
securities. Both cases involved grants to administrative
officers of powers related to the exercise of their
administrative functions, calling for the determination of
questions of fact.
Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section
68. As above indicated, the creation of municipalities, is
not an administrative function, but one which is
essentially and eminently legislative in character. The
question of whether or not "public interest" demands the
exercise of such power is not one of fact. it is "purely a
legislative question "(Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway
vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-313,
315-318), or a political question (Udall vs. Severn, 79 P.
2d. 347-349). As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has
aptly characterized it, "the question as to whether
incorporation is for the best interest of the community in
any case is emphatically a question of public policy and
statecraft" (In re Village of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W.
1033, 1035-1037).
For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as
constituting undue delegation of legislative powers, state
laws granting the judicial department, the power to
determine whether certain territories should be annexed
to a particular municipality (Udall vs. Severn, supra,
258-359); or vesting in a Commission the right to
determine the plan and frame of government of proposed
villages and what functions shall be exercised by the
same, although the powers and functions of the village
are specifically limited by statute (In re Municipal
Charters, 86 Atl. 307-308); or conferring upon courts the
authority to declare a given town or village incorporated,
and designate its metes and bounds, upon petition of a
majority of the taxable inhabitants thereof, setting forth
the area desired to be included in such village (Territory
ex rel Kelly vs. Stewart, 23 Pac. 405-409); or authorizing
the territory of a town, containing a given area and
population, to be incorporated as a town, on certain steps
being taken by the inhabitants thereof and on certain
determination by a court and subsequent vote of the
inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar as the court is
allowed to determine whether the lands embraced in the
petition "ought justly" to be included in the village, and
whether the interest of the inhabitants will be promoted
by such incorporation, and to enlarge and diminish the
boundaries of the proposed village "as justice may
require" (In re Villages of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W.
1035-1037); or creating a Municipal Board of Control
which shall determine whether or not the laying out,
construction or operation of a toll road is in the "public
interest" and whether the requirements of the law had
been complied with, in which case the board shall enter
an order creating a municipal corporation and fixing the
name of the same (Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs.
Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310).
Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by
Congress to the President is concerned, the case of
Schechter Poultry Corporation vs. U.S. (79 L. Ed. 1570)
is quite relevant to the one at bar. The Schechter case
involved the constitutionality of Section 3 of the National
Industrial Recovery Act authorizing the President of the
United States to approve "codes of fair competition"
submitted to him by one or more trade or industrial
associations or corporations which "impose no
inequitable restrictions on admission to membership
therein and are truly representative," provided that such
codes are not designed "to promote monopolies or to
eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not
operate to discriminate against them, and will tend to
effectuate the policy" of said Act. The Federal Supreme
Court held:
To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of
the Recovery Act is without precedent. It supplies no
standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not
undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to
particular states of fact determined by appropriate
administrative procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of
conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe
them. For that legislative undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no
standards, aside from the statement of the general aims
of rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in
Sec. 1. In view of the scope of that broad declaration,
and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed,
the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing
codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of
trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually
unfettered. We think that the code making authority thus
conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power.
If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in
the President a discretion that is "virtually unfettered."
and, consequently, tantamount to a delegation of
legislative power, it is obvious that "public welfare," which
has even a broader connotation, leads to the same
result. In fact, if the validity of the delegation of powers
made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer
be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority
to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may
be required by public welfare or public interest. Such
grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the
powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would
bring about a total collapse of the democratic system
established by our Constitution, which it is the special
duty and privilege of this Court to uphold.
It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in
question were issued after the legislative bills for the
creation of the municipalities involved in this case had
failed to pass Congress. A better proof of the fact that the
issuance of said executive orders entails the exercise of
purely legislative functions can hardly be given.
Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law
ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right
of the President to interfere in the exercise of such
discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This
power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive,
insofar as local governments are concerned. With
respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to
wield no more authority than that of checking whether
said local governments or the officers thereof perform
their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence,
the President cannot interfere with local governments, so
long as the same or its officers act Within the scope of
their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the
municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it
had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law,
although he may see to it that the corresponding
provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action
therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an
ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its
jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He
may not even suspend an elective official of a regular
municipality or take any disciplinary action against him,
except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding
provincial board.5
Upon the other hand if the President could create a
municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its
officials, by creating a new municipality and including
therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides,
for his office would thereby become vacant.6 Thus, by
merely brandishing the power to create a new
municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he
could compel local officials to submit to his dictation,
thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of
control denied to him by the Constitution.
Then, also, the power of control of the President over
executive departments, bureaus or offices implies no
more than the authority to assume directly the functions
thereof or to interfere in the exercise of discretion by its
officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the
authority either to abolish an executive department or
bureau, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the
alleged power of the President to create municipal
corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by
him of an authority even greater than that of control
which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or
offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with
the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of
giving the President less power over local governments
than that vested in him over the executive departments,
bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the
exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over
municipal corporations than that which he has over said
executive departments, bureaus or offices.
In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of
legislative powers, as it certainly does, said Section 68,
as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on
March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the
subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which
is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory
enactment.7
respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit
any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
Executive Orders or any disbursement by the
municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera
and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.

There are only two (2) other points left for consideration,
namely, respondent's claim (a) that "not all the proper
parties" — referring to the officers of the newly created
municipalities — "have been impleaded in this case," and
(b) that "the present petition is premature."

As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records

do not show, and the parties do not claim, that the
officers of any of said municipalities have been appointed
or elected and assumed office. At any rate, the Solicitor
General, who has appeared on behalf of respondent
Auditor General, is the officer authorized by law "to act
and represent the Government of the Philippines, its
offices and agents, in any official investigation,
proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer"
(Section 1661, Revised Administrative Code), and, in
connection with the creation of the aforementioned
municipalities, which involves a political, not proprietary,
function, said local officials, if any, are mere agents or
representatives of the national government. Their interest
in the case at bar has, accordingly, been, in effect, duly
represented.8

With respect to the second point, respondent alleges that

he has not as yet acted on any of the executive order &
in question and has not intimated how he would act in
connection therewith. It is, however, a matter of common,
public knowledge, subject to judicial cognizance, that the
President has, for many years, issued executive orders
creating municipal corporations and that the same have
been organized and in actual operation, thus indicating,
without peradventure of doubt, that the expenditures
incidental thereto have been sanctioned, approved or
passed in audit by the General Auditing Office and its
officials. There is no reason to believe, therefore, that
respondent would adopt a different policy as regards the
new municipalities involved in this case, in the absence
of an allegation to such effect, and none has been made
by him.

WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are

hereby declared null and void ab initio and the