CASE BRIEFS
International Court of Justice. Even though Nicaragua (P)
Nicaragua v. United States
Citation. I.C.J. 1984 I.C.J. 39
Brief Fact Summary. Nicaragua (P) brought a suit against
the United States (D) on the ground that the United States
(D) was responsible for illegal military and paramilitary
activities in and against Nicaragua. The jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice to entertain the case as well as
the admissibility of Nicaragua’s (P) application to the I.C.J.
was challenged by the United States (D).
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Nicaragua (P) brought a suit
against the United States (D) on the ground that the United
States (D) was responsible for illegal military and
paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. The
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to entertain
the case as well as the admissibility of Nicaragua’s (P)
application to the I.C.J. was challenged by the United States
(D).
Facts. The United States (D) challenged the jurisdiction of
the I.C.J when it was held responsible for illegal military and
paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (P) in the suit
the plaintiff brought against the defendant in 1984. Though a
declaration accepting the mandatory jurisdiction of the Court
was deposited by the United States (D) in a 1946, it tried to
justify the declaration in a 1984 notification by referring to the
1946 declaration and stating in part that the declaration
“shall not apply to disputes with any Central American
State….”
Apart from maintaining the ground that the I.C.J lacked
jurisdiction, the States (D) also argued that Nicaragua (P)
failed to deposit a similar declaration to the Court. On the
other hand, Nicaragua (P) based its argument on its reliance
on the 1946 declaration made by the United states (D) due
to the fact that it was a “state accepting the same obligation”
as the United States (D) when it filed charges in the I.C.J.
against the United States (D). Also, the plaintiff intent to
submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J. was
pointed out by the valid declaration it made in 1929 with the
I.C.J’s predecessor, which was the Permanent Court of
International Justice, even though Nicaragua had failed to
deposit it with that court. The admissibility of Nicaragua’s (P)
application to the I.C.J. was also challenged by the United
States (D).
Issue. (1) Is the jurisdiction to entertain a dispute between
two states, if they both accept the Court’s jurisdiction, within
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice?
(2) Where no grounds exist to exclude the application of a
state, is the application of such a state to the International
Court of Justice admissible?
Held. (1) Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a
dispute between two states if each of the States accepted
the Court’s jurisdiction is within the jurisdiction of the
declaration of 1929 was not deposited with the Permanent
Court, because of the potential effect it had that it would last
for many years, it was valid.
Thus, it maintained its effect when Nicaragua became a
party to the Statute of the I.C.J because the declaration was
made unconditionally and was valid for an unlimited period.
The intention of the current drafters of the current Statute
was to maintain the greatest possible continuity between it
and the Permanent Court. Thus, when Nicaragua (P)
accepted the Statute, this would have been deemed that the
plaintiff had given its consent to the transfer of its declaration
to the I.C.J.
(2) Yes. When no grounds exist to exclude the application of
a state, the application of such a state to the International
Court of Justice is admissible. The five grounds upon which
the United States (D) challenged the admissibility of
Nicaragua’s (P) application were that the plaintiff failed
because there is no “indispensable parties” rule when it
could not bring forth necessary parties, Nicaragua’s (P)
request of the Court to consider the possibility of a threat to
peace which is the exclusive province of the Security
Council, failed due to the fact that I.C.J. can exercise
jurisdiction which is concurrent with that of the Security
Council, that the I.C.J. is unable to deal with situations
involving ongoing armed conflict and that there is nothing
compelling the I.C.J. to decline to consider one aspect of a
dispute just because the dispute has other aspects due to
the fact that the case is incompatible with the Contadora
process to which Nicaragua (P) is a party.
Discussion. Although the questions of jurisdiction and
admissibility are primarily based on the principle that the
I.C.J. has only as much power as that agreed to by the
parties, these can be quite complicated. The 1946
declaration of the United States and the 1929 declaration of
Nicaragua was the main focus of the case on declaration
and each of these declarations pointed out the respective
parties’ intent as it related to the I.C.J’s jurisdiction.
Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland) Iceland (D) argument was not reached by the Court in this
case, however, but rather dealt with the jurisdictional issues.

Citation. I.C.J., 1973 I.C.J. 3

Brief Fact Summary. Because some circumstances

changed, Iceland (D) claimed that a fishing treaty it had with
the United Kingdom (P) was no longer applicable.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. In order that a change of

circumstances may give rise to the premise calling for the
termination of a treaty, it is necessary that it has resulted in a
radical transformation of the extent of the obligations still to
be performed.

Facts. Iceland’s (D) claim to a 12-mile fisheries limit was

recognized by the United Kingdom (P) in 1961 in return for
Iceland’s (D) agreement that any dispute concerning
Icelandic fisheries jurisdiction beyond the 12-mile limit be
referred to the International Court of Justice. An application
was filed before the I.C.J. when Iceland (D) proposed to
extend its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction from 12 to 50 miles
around its shores in 1972. By postulating that changes in
circumstances since the 12-mile limit was now generally
recognized was the ground upon which Iceland (D) stood to
argue that the agreement was no longer valid. Iceland (D)
also asserted that there would be a failure of consideration
for the 1961 agreement.

Issue. In order that a change of circumstances may give rise

to a ground for invoking the termination of a treaty, is it
necessary that it has resulted in a radical transformation of
the extent of the obligation still to be performed?

Held. Yes. In order that a change of circumstances may give

rise to the premise calling for the termination of a treaty, it is
necessary that it has resulted in a radical transformation of
the extent of the obligations still to be performed.
The change of circumstances alleged by Iceland (D) cannot
be said to have transformed radically the extent of the
jurisdictional obligation that was imposed in the 1961
Exchange of Notes.

Discussion. Recourse to the I.C.J. in the event of a dispute

was the original agreement between the parties. The
economy of Iceland (D) is dependent on fishing. The merit of
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)
Citation. 1997 I.C.J. 7, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 162 (1998)

Brief Fact Summary. Hungary (P) claimed that

Czechoslovakia (D) violated the provisions of a treaty when it
appropriated the waters of the Danube River to construct a
dam.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Watercourse states shall

participate in the use, development and protection of an
international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable
manner.

Facts. In 1977, Hungary (P) and Czechoslovakia (D) signed

a Treaty for the construction of dams and other projects
along the Danube River that bordered both nations.
Czechoslovakia (D) began work on damming the river in its
territory when Hungary (P) stopped working on the project
and negotiation could not resolve the matter which led
Hungary (P) to terminate the Treaty. Hungary (P) based its
action on the fact that the damming of the river had been
agreed to only on the ground of a joint operation and sharing
of benefits associated with the project, to which
Czechoslovakia (D) had unlawfully unilaterally assumed
control of a shared resource.
Issue. Shall watercourse states participate in the use,
development and protection of an international watercourse
in an equitable and reasonable manner?

Held. Yes. Watercourse states shall participate in the use,

development and protection of an international watercourse
in an equitable and reasonable manner. Hungary (P) was
deprived of its rights to an equitable and reasonable share of
the natural resources of the Danube by Czechoslovakia (D)
and also failed to respect the proportionality that is required
by international law. Cooperative administration must be
reestablished by the parties of what remains of the project.

Discussion. The Court’s decision was that the joint regime

must be restored. In order to achieve most of the Treaty’s
objectives, common utilization of shared water resources
was necessary. Hence, the defendant was not authorized to
proceed without the plaintiff’s consent.
Tinoco Claims Arbitration (Great Britain v. Costa Rica) not outweighed by the evidence of non-recognition. This
implies that valid contracts may be formed by unrecognized
Citation. 1 U.N. Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 369 (1923) government.

Brief Fact Summary. The Tinoco regime, which was the

former government of Costa Rica, was alleged by Great
Britain to have granted oil concession to a British company
that had to be honored by the present regime.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A government need not conform to

a previous constitution if the government had established
itself and maintained a peaceful de facto administration and
non-recognition of the government by other government
does not destroy the de facto status of the government.

Facts. The Tinoco regime that had seized power in Costa

Rica by coup was not recognized by Great Britain and the
United States. When the regime was removed, the new
government nullified all Tinoco’c contract including an oil
concession to a British company. The claim of Great Britain
(P) was that the contract could not be repudiated because
the Tinoco government was the only government in
existence at the time of the contract was signed. This view
was not shared by Costa Rica (D) who claimed that Great
Britain (P) was estopped from enforcing the contract by its
non-recognition of the Tinoco regime. The matter was sent
for arbitration.

Issue. Does a government need to conform to a previous

constitution if the government had established itself and
maintained a peaceful de facto administration and does
non-recognition of the government by other government
destroy the de facto status of the government?

Held. (Taft, C.J., Arb). No. A government need not conform

to a previous constitution if the government had established
itself and maintained a peaceful de facto administration and
non-recognition of the government by other government
does not destroy the de facto status of the government. The
non-recognition of the Tinoco regime by Great Britain did not
dispute the de facto existence of that regime. There is no
estoppel since the successor government had not been led
by British non-recognition to change its position.

Discussion. Estoppel was not found by the arbitrator. The

evidence of the de facto status of the Tinoco’s regime was
WALTER UPRIGHT v. MERCURY BUSINESS MACHINES
Facts:
- Plaintiff sues as the assignee of a trade acceptance drawn
on and accepted by defendant Mercury in payment for
business typewriters sold and delivered to it by Polygraph
Export GmbH.
- Defendant's counsel had been advised that Polygraph was
a state-controlled enterprise of the so-called German
Democratic Republic. But it appears that it not a West
German corporation but rather an East German corporation
Defendant argues that:
- Plaintiff lacked capacity to sue since German Democratic
Republic was not recognized by the US Government.
- It is an instrumentality of the government
- Upright, as its assignee, has no greater right to maintain
the action than his assignor
TC
- Defendant's defense was valid;
- An unrecognized government could not sue
- The assignment to Upright violated public policy and barred
him from suing on the obligation
The Case:
Can unrecognized governments, or entities created by them,
their representatives, or their assignees sue in domestic
courts, specifically on matters of private rights?
policy. The defendant, however, had not alleged that its
transactions with the East German Corporation was illegal or
violative of public policy.
2. No.
It was stated that the typewriters had been "shipped openly
and passed regularly through US Customs", defendant was
obviously hard put to find a policy that forbade suit or
recovery against him if the transaction was both permitted
and facilitated by the federal government, without alleging
such policy, however, he could not prevail.
Polygraph GmbH is situated in the Soviet Sector of Berlin
and is a state controlled enterprise of the so-called German
Democratic Republic (GDR). Its main office is in East Berlin.
The De Facto Principle
The Parties:
The Plaintiff, Walter Upright, is an American citizen and
resident of New York, suing before the Supreme Court of
New York
He is an assignee for value of a trade acceptance drawn on
and accepted by defendant, a New York corporation.
Defendant, Mercury Business Machines, is a New York
Corporation which accepted and drew trade acceptance in
favor of plaintiff Walter Upright.
Polygraph GmBH is situated in the Soviet sector of Berlin
and is a state-controlled enterprise of the so-called German
Democratic Republic (GDR). Its main office is in East Berlin.

Diplomatic Nonrecognition
The motion seeks for the dismissal of this complaint on the
grounds that the court does not have jurisdiction of the
subject matter of the action and/or plaintiff does not have
legal capacity to sue

Issues:
Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that Upright
could not sue based solely on unrecognition; or whether or
not plaintiff could bring a suit against the defendant;
Whether or not the transaction entered into was illegal or
violative of public policy

The Ruling:
1. Yes.

The political decision not to recognize a government does

not deprive it of a juridically cognizable de facto existence.
Since nonrecognition itself neither prevents private
transactions nor bars the courts from considering them, such
transactions are unenforceable only if they violate a public
Kuroda v. Jalandoni​, G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949
DECISION
(En Banc)
MORAN, C.J.:
I. THE FACTS
Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the
Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during the
Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine
Military Commission of war crimes. He questioned the
constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National War
Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the trial of accused
war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a
signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and
Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he is
charged of crimes not based on law, national and
international.
because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and
signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the
rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions
form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted
principals of international law. In facts these rules and
principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the
United State and Japan who were signatories to the two
Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form part of
the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a
signatory to the conventions embodying them for our
Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in
its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and
principle of international law as contained in treaties to which
our government may have been or shall be a signatory.

II. THE ISSUES

Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and
constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]

YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.

Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that –

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of

international law of the present day including the Hague
Convention the Geneva Convention and significant
precedents of international jurisprudence established by the
United Nation all those person military or civilian who have
been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of
aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses
consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws
and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held
accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and
enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the
Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally
accepted and policies of international law which are part of
the our Constitution.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has

no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation
of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention

Human Rights Law Case Digest: ​Mejoff V. Director Of
Prisons (1951)
G.R. No. L-4254 September 26, 1951
Lessons Applicable: characteristics of human rights,
constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of
liberty without due process of law,
Laws Applicable: Bill of Rights
FACTS:
Boris Mejoff, an alien of Russian descent who was brought
to this country from Shanghai as a secret operative by the
Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these Islands.
(The petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not unlawful;
he was brought by the armed and belligerent forces of a de
facto government whose decrees were law furing the
occupation.)
He was arrested on March 18, 1948 as a Japanese spy, by
U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps. and later there was
an order for his release.
But on April 5, 1948, the Board of Commissioners of
Immigration declared that Mejoff had entered the Philippines
illegally in 1944 and ordered that he be deported on the first
available transportation to Russia.
He was transferred to Cebu Provincial Jail and then Bilibid
Prison at Muntinlupa on October, 1948.
He then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on the basis
that too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus - denied
Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid
was promulgated, the Government has not found way and
means of removing the petitioner out of the country, and
none are in sight, although it should be said in justice to the
deportation authorities, it was through no fault of theirs that
no ship or country would take the petitioner.
This is his 2nd petition for writ of habeas corpus
ISSUE: W/N the writ of habeas corpus should be granted
since he was detained longer than a reasonable time
HELD: YES. writ will issue commanding the respondents to
release the petitioner from custody upon these terms: The
petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the
immigration authorities or their agents in such form and
manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep
peace and be available when the Government is ready to
deport him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the
question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court
or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for decision in case
of abuse. He shall also put up a bond for the above purpose
in the amount of P5,000 with sufficient surety or sureties,
which bond the Commissioner of Immigration is authorized
to exact by section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of
asylum therein even if they are "stateless," which the
petitioner claims to be.
The protection against deprivation of liberty without due
process of law and except for crimes committed against the
laws of the land is not limited to Philippine citizens but
extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of
nationality.
Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines
"adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and approved by
the General Assembly of the United Nations of which the
Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December
10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other
fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were
proclaimed. It was there resolved that "All human beings are
born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that
"Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in
this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status"
(Art. 2): that "Every one has the right to an effective remedy
by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law"
(Art. 8); that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest,
detention or exile" (Art. 9); etc.
petitioner's unduly prolonged detention would be
unwarranted by law and the Constitution, if the only purpose
of the detention be to eliminate a danger that is by no means
actual, present, or uncontrollable
Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but
unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in this
country and so fraught with danger of excesses and injustice
that I am loath to resort it, even as a discretionary judicial
technique to supplement conviction of such offenses as
those of which defendants stand convicted.
If that case is not comparable with ours on the issues
presented, its underlying principle is of universal application.
As already noted, not only are there no charges pending
against the petitioner, but the prospects of bringing any
against him are slim and remote.