Missing:

228

230

232

235

236

239

243

256

257

261

268
226.

Miranda v Arizona; 384 US 436

FACTS:

The Supreme Court of the United consolidated four separate cases with issues regarding the
admissibility of evidence obtained during police interrogations. In each of these cases, the defendant,
while in police custody, was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a
room in which he was cut off from the outside world. None of the defendants was given a full and
effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all four cases, the
questioning elicited oral admissions, and, in three of them, signed statements as well, which were
admitted at their trials. All defendants were convicted, and all convictions were affirmed on appeal.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the government is required to inform the arrested defendants of their constitutional
rights against self-incrimination before they interrogate the defendants.

RULING:

YES. The government needs to notify arrested individuals of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights,
specifically: their right to remain silent; an explanation that anything they say could be used against
them in court; their right to counsel; and their right to have counsel appointed to represent them if
necessary. Without this notification, anything admitted by an arrestee in an interrogation will not be
admissible in court.
227.

People v Judge Ayson; G.R. No. 85215; 07 Jul 1989; 175 SCRA 216

FACTS:

Felipe Ramos, a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), was charged with estafa for
irregularities in the sale of plane tickets. Respondent judge admitted all evidentiary and testamentary
evidence offered against Ramos except for the latter’s handwritten note expressing his willingness to
settle the irregularities alleged against him as well as his statement during an administrative
investigation where he admitted to the offense.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not respondent judge is correct in not admitting the note and statement in evidence.

RULING:

NO. Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation prior to and during the
administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had
a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play. He had voluntarily answered questions posed to
him on the first day of the administrative investigation and agreed that the proceedings should be
recorded. The note that he sent to his superiors offering to compromise his liability in the alleged
irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part.

Petition is GRANTED. Respondent judge ordered to ADMIT IN EVIDENCE the note and statement.
228.

People v. de la Cruz G.R. No. 118866-68, September 17, 1997

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/sep1997/118866_68.htm
229.

Navallo v Sandiganbayan 234 SCRA 177 (1994)

Facts: Petitioner is the collecting and disbursing officer of Numancia National Vocational School found to
have misappropriated public funds for private benefit after a COA audit. He failed to restitute the
amount despite COA demands. A warrant of arrest was issued but petitioner pleaded not guilty and
invokes his right to custodial investigation since during the COA audit and actual cash count he was
made to sign the certification on the fund shortage in the absence of a counsel. He further contends that
the shortage of funds was due to the assurance of certain Macasemo to settle his unliquidated cash
advance and his failure to do so resulted to the fund shortage.

Issue: Whether or not the right to counsel be invoked during the COA audit

Held: No, the right to counsel could not be invoked during the COA audit since the procedure is not
within the ambit of “custodial investigation.” A person may be subject to malversation of funds even in
the absence of direct proof of misappropriation as long as there is evidence of fund shortage which the
petitioner failed to explain with convincing justification.
230.

People v. Paynor, 261 SCRA 615

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/sept1996/116222.htm
231.

People v Hassan; G.R. No. L-68969; 22 Jan 1988; 157 SCRA 261

FACTS:

Accused-appellant, an illiterate 15-year-old pushcart cargador, was accused of murder. During the
investigation of the case, the investigating officer brought Hassan to the sole eyewitness for
identification. Accused-appellant was later convicted of murder based on the testimony of said
eyewitness.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the rights of the accused was violated.

RULING:

YES. The accused-appellant was presented alone – not in a police lineup – and unaccompanied by a
counsel to the eyewitness, in the funeral parlor, and in the presence of the grieving relatives of the
victim. Such procedure is as tainted as an uncounselled confession and thus falls within the same ambit
of the constitutionally entrenched protection.

Decision is REVERSED and accused Hassan is ACQUITTED.

232.

People v. Layuso, 175 SCRA 47

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/jul1989/gr_l69210_1989.html
233.

People v Enanoria; G.R. No. 92957; 08 Jun 1992; 209 SCRA 577

FACTS:

Prior to the filing of an information, accused-appellant had already executed two statements – one ante-
mortem – admitting his involvement in the same kidnapping case. After the information was filed, he
executed a supplementary statement, despite having been apprised of his constitutional rights, relating
in more detail his participation in the crime.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not accused-appellant’s right to counsel was violated.

RULING:

NO. It is already beyond dispute that he was actively assisted by a lawyer in the person of Atty. Jocom.
The latter’s presence adequately fulfilled the constitutional requirement. It must be reiterated at this
point that the right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused
to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth. Verily, whether it is an extrajudicial statement or testimony in open court,
the purpose is always the ascertainment of truth.

Accused-appellant is CONVICTED of the separate crimes of kidnapping for ransom and murder.
234.

Gamboa v Cruz; G.R. No. L-56291; 27 Jun 1988; 162 SCRA 642

FACTS:

Petitioner was arrested without warrant, booked and detained for vagrancy and was later arraigned for
robbery. After prosecution offered its evidence and rested its case, petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit
instead of presenting his defense. The motion was denied.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not petitioner was denied his rights to counsel and to due process.

RULING:

NO. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer
starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the
respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel
to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of
the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense. The police lineup in the case at
bar was not part of the custodial inquest; hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to
counsel. Petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of due process, as he was duly represented by a
member of the Bar. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to
substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after
the prosecution had rested its case.

Petition is DISMISSED.
235.

People v. Hatton, 210 SCRA 11

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1992/jun1992/gr_85043_1992.html
236.

People v. Buntan, 221 SCRA 421

http://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c79c4
237.

People v Bolanos; G.R. No. 101808; 03 Jul 1992; 211 SCRA 262

FACTS:

Accused-appellant was apprehended in connection with a murder case. When asked by the policemen
while in the vehicle on the way to the police station, he admitted to killing the deceased.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the extrajudicial admission is admissible in evidence.

RULING:

NO. Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the
Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have been
informed of his Constitutional rights.

Accused-appellant is ACQUITTED.
238.

PEOPLE VS. BANDULA [232 SCRA 566; G.R. NO. 89223; 27 MAY 1994]

Facts: Six armed men barged into the compound of Polo Coconut Plantation in Tanjay, Negros Oriental.
The armed men were identified by Security Guard, including accused. Salva and Pastrano, security
guards were hogtied and accused proceeded to the Atty. Garay, counsel of plantation. They ransacked
the place and took with them money and other valuables. Atty. Garay was killed. Accused-appellant is
charged with robbery with homicide along with 3 others who were acquitted for insufficiency of
evidence. Appellant was convicted.

Now, appellant argues that the extrajudicial confessions he and accused Dionanao executed suffer from
constitutional infirmities, hence, inadmissible in evidence considering that they were extracted under
duress and intimidation, and were merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney who, by the
nature of his position, was not entirely an independent counsel nor counsel of their choice.
Consequently, without the extrajudicial confessions, the prosecution is left without sufficient evidence
to convict him of the crime charged.

Issue: Whether or Not extrajudicial confessions of appellant is admissible as evidence against him.

Held: No. When accused-appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigated immediately after
their arrest, they had no counsel present. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial
investigation with respect to accused Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect to appellant Bandula.
And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of
Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that violence was used against the accused. Certainly,
these are blatant violations of the Constitution which mandates in

Sec. 12, Art. III. Irregularities present include:

1. The investigators did not inform the accused of their right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel, preferably of their own choice, even before attempting to elicit statements that
would incriminate them.

2. Investigators continuously disregard the repeated requests of the accused for medical assistance.
Reason for Accused Sedigo’s "black eye" which even

Pat. Baldejera admitted is not established, as well as Bandula’s fractured rib.

3. Counsel must be independent. He cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel
of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused.
239.

People v. Januaryio, 267 SCRA 608

Waka waka eh eh.

240.

People v Barasina; G.R. No. 109993; 21 Jan 1994; 229 SCRA 450

FACTS:

Appellant was charged with murder. Having stated his desire to have a lawyer before giving his
statement, Atty. Abelardo Torres was fetched to act as counsel of the accused during the investigation.
Said counsel was present when appellant made and signed his written statement.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not appellant’s statement may not be admitted in evidence for having been made without
the presence of a counsel of his own choice.

RULING:

NO. Art. III, Sec. 12[1] of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer
by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent
attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial
investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of
the interrogation by simply selecting lawyer who for one reason or another, is not available to protect
his interest.

Petition is DISMISSED.
241.

People v Dimaano; G.R. No. 95231; 15 Jun 1992; 209 SCRA 819

FACTS:

Accused-appellants were arrested in connection with a robbery with homicide incident at a subdivision.
They were presented unassisted by a counsel to the private complainant and her witnesses in a police
line-up.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not accused-appelants’ right to counsel was violated during the confrontation.

RULING:

NO. When the appellants were identified by the complainants at the police line-up, the former had not
yet been held to answer for the criminal offense for which they have been charged and convicted. The
police could not have, therefore, violated their right to counsel as the confrontation between the state
and them had not yet begun. A police line-up is not part of the custodial inquest, hence, the appellants
were not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel.

Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with modification.

242.

People v de Guzman; G.R. Nos. 98321-24; 30 Jun 1993; 224 SCRA 93

FACTS:

Equipped with search warrants, combined Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police elements
searched several houses on the basis of intelligence reports about the presence of armed men who
were suspected to have pulled an ambush. No firearm was found but 10 suspects were picked up and
later presented in a police lineup to witnesses who positively identified them. All were prosecuted for
three counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder, but only appellant was found guilty.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not appellant may assail the validity of his arrest without a warrant.

RULING:

NO. It bears emphasis that accused-appellant, together with his co-accused, pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment. Appellant is, thus, estopped from questioning te legality of his arrest. Any irregularity
attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial
court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial.

Appealed decision is AFFIRMED with modifications with respect to the civil indemnity to be paid to the
heirs of each victim who died.
243.

People v. Lamsing, 248 SCRA 471

Isa pa to.
244.

People v Hassan; G.R. No. L-68969; 22 Jan 1988; 157 SCRA 261

FACTS:

Accused-appellant, an illiterate 15-year-old pushcart cargador, was accused of murder. During the
investigation of the case, the investigating officer brought Hassan to the sole eyewitness for
identification. Accused-appellant was later convicted of murder based on the testimony of said
eyewitness.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the rights of the accused was violated.

RULING:

YES. The accused-appellant was presented alone – not in a police lineup – and unaccompanied by a
counsel to the eyewitness, in the funeral parlor, and in the presence of the grieving relatives of the
victim. Such procedure is as tainted as an uncounselled confession and thus falls within the same ambit
of the constitutionally entrenched protection.

Decision is REVERSED and accused Hassan is ACQUITTED.

245.

People v Lucero; G.R. No. 97936; 29 May 1995; 244 SCRA 425

FACTS:

Appellant was among those charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. Atty. Diosdado Peralta,
acting as his counsel during the investigation, conferred with the appellant and apprised the latter of his
constitutional rights. When the investigator started asking the preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to
attend the wake of his friend, Capt. Emilio Dacanay, at Fort Bonifacio. He gave word that in case of need,
he could be reached at his residence. The resulting extrajudicial statement, already signed by the
appellant, was later presented to Atty. Peralta who examined the same and explained to Lucero its legal
implications. After confirming with appellant that the statements were given voluntarily, the counsel
signed the document.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not petitioner was denied the right to counsel.

RULING:

YES. When the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel but
effective and vigilant counsel. Appellant received no effective counseling from Atty. Peralta. At the
crucial point when the interrogation was just starting, Atty. Peralta left appellant to attend the wake of a
friend. At that critical stage, appellant gave his uncounselled extrajudicial confession.

Conviction is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

246.

People v Espanola; G.R. No. 119308; 18 Apr 1997; 271 SCRA 689

FACTS:

Appellants were identified in a police lineup as suspects in an investigation. Appellant Paquingan

manifested his intention to confess after the information for rape with homicide was filed. Not having a
counsel of his own choice, he was provided with the services of Atty. Leo Cahanap, a city legal officer,
and Atty. Susan Echavez. Appellant Paquingan confessed but refused to sign the stenographic notes. His
sworn statement was transcribed but only the two lawyers signed.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not appellant was entitled to the right to counsel after an information for rape with
homicide had already been filed.

RULING:

NO. The right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be considered “critical stages” in
the criminal process. Custodial interrogation before or after charges have been filed and non-custodial
interrogations after the accused has been formally charged are considered to be critical pretrial stages.
The investigation after Paquingan has been formally charged with the crime of rape with homicide, is a
critical pretrial stage during which the right to counsel applies. The right to counsel means right to
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.

Assailed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

247.

People v Nicandro; G.R. No. 59378; 11 Feb 1986; 141 SCRA 289

FACTS:

After the complaints and reports involving the illegal sale of prohibited drugs were verified, an
entrapment operation was organized which yielded to the arrest of accused-appellant. Upon being
investigated and after having been duly apprised of her constitutional rights, appellant orally admitted
having sold the four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarettes and the ownership of the marijuana flowering tops
taken from her pocket, but refused to reduce her confession to writing.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not accused-appellant was sufficiently informed of her constitutional rights.

RULING:

NO. When the Constitution requires a person under investigation “to be informed” of his right to remain
silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information
rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a
rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under
investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell
the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms,
e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly
understands. In other words, the right of a person under interrogation “to be informed” implies a
correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective
communication that results in understanding what is conveyed.
248.

People v Canela; G.R. No. 97086; 08 May 1992; 208 SCRA 842

FACTS:

Appellant was arrested in a buy bust operation. Upon arrival at the NarCom headquarters, he conferred
with an agent, then was later interrogated as to the identities of the persons who escaped the agents
during the buy bust operation.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the appellant was properly informed of his constitutional rights.

RULING:

NO. There is no showing that accused-appellant was properly informed of his constitutional rights. Not
only did Sgt. Atienza not inform him of his rights, he also failed to explain said rights to him. He simply
made the accused read the same. Making the accused-appellant read his constitutional rights is not
enough. The prosecution must show that accused-appellant understood what he read, and that he
understood the consequences of his waiver.

Decision appealed from is REVERSED and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED.

(Nachura, 228) – Making the accused read his constitutional rights is simply not enough. The
prosecution must show that the accused understood what he read, and that he understood the
consequences of his waiver.
249.

People v Agustin; G.R. No. 110290; 25 Jan 1995; 240 SCRA 541

FACTS:

Appellant was among those charged with murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder. Despite
asking for his uncle who is a lawyer to assist him, he was given a different counsel who interviewed him
in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the only language he understands. Moreover, the counsel
provided him was an associate of the private prosecutor. He later signed his sworn statement

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not accused-appellant was properly informed of his constitutional rights.

RULING:

NO. The right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates “the transmission
of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle.” It is not enough for the investigator to merely repeat to the person under
investigation his rights, the former must also explain the effects of such provision in practical terms. The
right to be informed carries with it a correlative obligation on the part of the investigator to explain, and
contemplates effective communication which results in the subject understanding what is conveyed.
Since it is comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree of explanation required will
necessarily vary and depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances
of the person undergoing the investigation.

Challenged RTC judgment is REVERSED and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED.

250.

People v Bolanos; G.R. No. 101808; 03 Jul 1992; 211 SCRA 262

FACTS:

Accused-appellant was apprehended in connection with a murder case. When asked by the policemen
while in the vehicle on the way to the police station, he admitted to killing the deceased.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the extrajudicial admission is admissible in evidence.

RULING:

NO. Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the
Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have been
informed of his Constitutional rights.

Accused-appellant is ACQUITTED.
251.

People v de la Cruz; G.R. Nos. 91865-66 and 92439-40; 06 Jul 1993; 224 SCRA 506

FACTS:

Accused-appellant was apprehended on the strength of information given by his father of appellant
having confessed to killing and burying his common-law wife. At the police station, appellant
volunteered the information and led the police authorities to the said place where they dug the ground
in the presence of residents thereat and recovered eight bones.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not accused-appellant’s declarations were inadmissible for having been taken without the
assistance of counsel.

RULING:

YES. The accused’s so-called admission, given after his arrest and during his custodial investigation, was
obtained in total disregard of his rights as guaranteed by the Constitution. The accused was not
informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel, and that if he cannot afford to have the counsel of
his choice, he would be provided with one. There is no evidence at all to indicate that he decided to
waive such right. And even if he did waive it, no written waiver, executed in the presence of counsel,
was identified or offered in evidence.

Accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of homicide.

252.

People v Bonola; G.R. No. 116394; 19 Jun 1997; 274 SCRA 238

FACTS:

Accused-appellant was arrested in connection with an information for robbery with homicide. He was
interrogated until he verbally admitted his participation in the crime.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not appellant’s extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence.

RULING:

NO. When the accused is not assisted by counsel, his statement, in contemplation of the law, becomes
“involuntary” even if it were otherwise voluntary, in a technical sense. A waiver of the constitutional
right to counsel shall not be valid when the waiver is made without the presence and assistance of
counsel. It is not material that appellant’s confession came in verbal form. The Constitution does not
distinguish between verbal and non-verbal confessions. So long as they are uncounseled, they are
inadmissible in evidence. What is sought to be avoided is “the evil of extorting from the very mouth of
the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to
prosecute and thereafter convict him.”

Decision of the lower court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accussed-appellant is ACQUITTED.
253.

People v Andan; G.R. No. 116437; 03 Mar 1997; 269 SCRA 95

FACTS:

Accused-appellant and two other suspects were rounded up in connection with a rape with homicide
case. In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant’s own wife
and son, appellant confessed his guilt, disclosed how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show them
the place where he hid her bags. The confession was captured on videotape.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not accused-appellant’s extrajudicial oral confession unassisted by a counsel is admissible in

evidence.

RULING:

YES. The constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement,
not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant
orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. Appellant’s confession to the mayor was not made in response to any
interrogation by the latter. His confessions to the media were made in response to questions by news
reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer.

Decision of the lower court is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant is CONVICTED of the special complex crime
of rape with homicide.
254.

People v Judge Ayson; G.R. No. 85215; 07 Jul 1989; 175 SCRA 216

FACTS:

Felipe Ramos, a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), was charged with estafa for
irregularities in the sale of plane tickets. Respondent judge admitted all evidentiary and testamentary
evidence offered against Ramos except for the latter’s handwritten note expressing his willingness to
settle the irregularities alleged against him as well as his statement during an administrative
investigation where he admitted to the offense.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not respondent judge is correct in not admitting the note and statement in evidence.

RULING:

NO. Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation prior to and during the
administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had
a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play. He had voluntarily answered questions posed to
him on the first day of the administrative investigation and agreed that the proceedings should be
recorded. The note that he sent to his superiors offering to compromise his liability in the alleged
irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part.

Petition is GRANTED. Respondent judge ordered to ADMIT IN EVIDENCE the note and statement.
255.

Magtoto v. manguera, 63 SCRA 4, March 3, 1975

FACTS:

Petitioner Clemente Magtoto contended that the confession obtained from a person under investigation
for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is
inadmissible in evidence in accordance with Article 6, section 20 of 1973 Philippine Constitution.
Petitioner Magtoto stressed that since Article 6, section 20 of 1973 Philippine Constitution favor the
accused it should be given retroactive effect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 6, section 20 of 1973 Philippine Constitution should be given retrospective effect

HELD:

Supreme Court holds that Article 6, section 20 of 1973 Philippine Constitution should be given a
prospective and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence and)
to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New
Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against the
accused, if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented
after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave
the accused the right to be so informed before that date.
256.

People v. Tunday, 157 SCRA 529

Wala.
257.

People v. Quijano, 197 SCRA 761

Wala rin.
258.

People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465

FACTS:

The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He had be endetained and
interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently maintained his innocence.
There was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously, something drastic had to be done. A
confession was absolutely necessary. So the investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him
physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be
obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his
face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner could not take any more. His body could no
longer endure the pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been broken. He
admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they
prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be
a reenactment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused was informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel,
and that any statement he might make could be used against him.

RULING:

Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law
that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be
several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language
known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he
understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate
with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had
been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had executed the
salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of
right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed
reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations
of his rights.
259.

Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222, October 16, 1996

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with hijacking a Delivery Truck of the Bureau of Post along MacArthur Highway
in Meycauayan, Bulacan, together with ten others, in that on May 3, 1982, the accused, two of whom
were armed with guns, stopped the Delivery Truck at gunpoint, and then robbed and carried away the
truck with them, including Social Security System Medicare Checks and Vouchers, Social Security System
Pension Checks and Vouchers Treasury Warrants, and several Mail Matters from abroad worth
P253,728.29 belonging to US Government Pensionados, SSS Pensionados, SSS Medicare Beneficiaries
and Private Individuals.

Based on a signed confession, the Sandiganbayan, on June 18, 1987, convicted petitioner and his
cohorts as co-principals for the violation of Section 2 (e), in relation to Section 3 (b) of Presidential
Decree No. 532, or Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974.

ISSUES:

1. Whether an extra-judicial confession executed by the accused without the presence of his lawyer, is
admissible in evidence against him – YES

2. Whether statements of accused obtained through torture, duress, maltreatment and intimidation are
illegal and inadmissible – NO

RULING:

1. Extra-judicial confession executed by the accused without the presence of his lawyer, are admissible
in evidence against the petitioner under the 1973 Constitution, but is no longer the case in the 1987
constitution.

The petitioner’s extra-judicial confession executed by the accused without the presence of his lawyer, is
admissible in evidence against the petitioner because it falls under Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973
Constitution, which did not contain the right against an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel
which is provided under paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution as it had been
obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973, and
even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the accused the right to be so
informed before that date. The latter provision cannot be applied retroactively because while Article 22
of the Revised Penal Code provides that “penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor
the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal,” what is being construed here is a
constitutional provision specifically contained in the Bill of Rights which is not a penal statute.
Nor is the petitioner protected by the Morales and Galit rulings, that the right to counsel may be waived
but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel, because he executed his
extrajudicial confession and his waiver to the right to counsel on May 30, 1982 unlike in People vs. Sison
where the extrajudicial confession was executed after April 26, 1983 . It is in accordance with Article 8 of
the Civil Code, “judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of
the legal system of the Philippines,” and Article 4 of the same Code, “laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided.”

The petitioner’s affidavit of May 30, 1982 waiving the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code was made voluntarily and intelligently, categorically and definitively, and rested on clear evidence.
Sgt. Arsenio Carlos, investigating officer, testified that he told the petitioner of his right to counsel, even
in waiving that right. The petitioner did not even inform Sgt. Carlos that his father-in-law was a lawyer
nor did he invoke his right to counsel.

The petitioner could not have been ignorant of his rights as an accused because he was a fourth year
criminology student and a topnotch student in the police basic course as well as having been in the
police force since 1978, with stints at the investigation division or the detective bureau, so he was
knowledgeable on the matter of extrajudicial confessions.

2. Accused’s extrajudicial confession was admissible because there was no proof of torture, duress,
maltreatment and intimidation.

There was no evidence of physical injuries upon his person, according to the medical report. When he
was presented before Judge Mariano Mendieta of the municipal court in Meycauayan, he waived his
right to present evidence instead of challenging his confession on account of the torture allegedly
inflicted upon him. An examination of his signatures in the different documents on record bearing the
same discloses an evenness of lines and strokes in his penmanship which is markedly consistent in his
certification, extrajudicial confession and waiver of detention. Therefore, his extrajudicial confession is
presumed to have been voluntarily made, as there was no conclusive evidence showing that petitioner’s
consent had been vitiated.

The question of whether petitioner was indeed subjected to torture or maltreatment is a factual
question addressed primarily to trial courts, the findings of which are binding on the Supreme Court
whose function is principally to review only of questions of law as in section 2 of rule 45. The respondent
Court performed its duty in evaluating the evidence.
260.

People vs. Jara 144 SCRA 516, 30 September 1986

FACTS:

There were no extrajudicial confessions admitted in evidence. But circumstantial evidence was
presented to support a verdict of conviction that Jara was the mastermind of the killing of his wife and
the latter’s friend: 1.), Jara resented his wife for having a relationship with a girl, the other one who was
killed. 2.) At the canteen where they work, whenever Jara committed even the slightest mistakes, his
wife scolded and cursed him. 3.) One of the waitresses observed that Jara shed no tears and his face did
not show any indication of sorrow when he saw the lifeless body of his wife. 4.) the hammer used in the
killing is an instrument with which Jara is familiar. 5.) During the investigation at the scene of the crime,
blood stains were found splattered in the trousers and shirt worn by accused Jara. His eyeglasses were
also smeared with blood. When asked to explain the presence of said blood stains, accused Jara told the
police that before he learned about the killing, he was with his stepdaughter Minerva Jimenez in the
public market dressing chickens.

ISSUE:

Whether or not such evidences are sufficient to overturn the presumption of innocence in favor of Jara.

RULING:

Yes. No general rule has been formulated as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice
for any case, but that matters not. For all that is required is that the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent
and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances constitute an unbroken
chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the guilt of the Jara beyond
reasonable doubt. Mere denials of the accused as to his participation in the crime are only self-serving
negative evidence which cannot outweigh circumstantial evidence clearly establishing his active
participation in the crime.
261.

People v. Taruc, 157 SCRA 178

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/feb2009/185202.htm
262.

People v Fabro; G.R. No. 95089; 11 Aug 1997; 85 SCAD 466

FACTS:

In an information, accused-appellant and four other suspects were charged with murder. After being
interrogated and grilled for two hours, he was requested to sign a document which turned out to be is
extrajudicial confession/admission.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not accused-appellant’s confession is inadmissible in evidence for being violative of the
Constitution.

RULING:

NO. There was sufficient showing that accused-appellant was apprised of his constitutional rights to be
silent and to counsel during the interrogation but he waived the same in the presence of his counsel.
With such waiver, accused-appellant’s extrajudicial confession is deemed to have been made freely and
voluntarily.

Assailed decision is AFFIRMED with a slight modification.

263.

People vs. Eglipa, 174 SCRA 1, June 5, 1989

Facts:

Guillermo Eglipa and Rudy Valiente were jointly accused for the killing of Ricardo Gardeleza, a Minister
of the Iglesia ni Kristo, in Barrio Talaba, on August 16, 1982. Information was filed by 3rd Assistant
Provincial Fiscal of Cavite with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite at Bacoor on the December of 1982. On
January 27, 1987, Rudy Valiente was released in due course after his acquittal by the Decision of the trial
court. Gerson Samson was the prosecution sole testimony in proving the appellant’s involvement but
was not given credence due to his testimonies’ inconsistencies. However, the trial court convicted the
appellant guilty on the basis of his two separate extra-judicial confessions, both made without the
presence of legal counsel, at the Bacoor Police Station on August 17, 1982, and at the Criminal
Investigation Service, Camp Crame, Quezon City on September 10, 1982. Hence, the appellant appealed
on the Supreme Court and raised on the sole issue of the admissibility of his two extra-judicial
confessions. The trial court noted that both of the extra-judicial confessions was made without the
presence of counsel but it considered that the confessions were made on the year of 1982, before the
doctrine about the inadmissibility of statements as evidence when no legal counsel is around was
made(April 23, 1983; Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 538). However, in other cases where this court
was confronted regarding the same issue of admissibility, they declared it inadmissible. In addition, the
appellant was able to prove that on executing both extra-judicial confessions, he was forced and under
duress.

ISSUE: WON a statement without the presence of a legal counsel admissible even before the doctrine of
"inadmissibility of statements as evidence when no legal counsel is around" was promulgated?

RULING:

The trial court noted that both of the extra-judicial confessions was made without the presence of
counsel but it considered that the confessions were made on the year of 1982, before the doctrine
about the inadmissibility of statements as evidence when no legal counsel is around was made(April 23,
1983; Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 538). However, in other cases where this court was confronted
regarding the same issue of admissibility, they declared it inadmissible. In addition, the appellant was
able to prove that on executing both extra-judicial confessions, he was forced and under duress.

Considering the premises, and finding no other evidence to sustain appellant’s conviction, the court
acquits appellant Guillermo Eglipa on the ground of reasonable doubt.
264.

People v Basay, 219 SCRA 404

FACTS: Jaime Ramirez and Teodoro Basay were accused of killing four (4) people and burned their house
after. Both accused signed a Joint waiver, but was disregarded by the court because when they signed a
joint waiver, they were not represented by a counsel. Basay was Acquitted, however, Jaime Ramirez was
sentenced with life imprisonment because the court admitted in evidence the so-called extra-judicial
confession of jaime Ramirez as part of the res gestate the alleged statement of Bombie Toting (victim) to
the police constabulary SGt. Tabanao. Jaime Ramirez is a farmer, he only finished Grade II and that he
doesn’t know how to read. He, however, understands the Cebuano dialect. The referred sworn
statement in English was taken on March 7, 1986 and subscribed and sworn to only on March 14, 1986
before Judge Teopisto Calumpang.

ISSUE: W/N the constitutional right of the accused to counsel and to remain silent during custodial
investigation were violated.

RULING: The SC declared in People v Nicandro that one’s right to be informed of the right to remain
silent and to counsel contemplates the “Transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle”. Thus it is not enough for
the interrogator to merely repeat to theperson under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution; the former must also explain the effects of such provision in practical terms.
The rights “to be informed” carries with it a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator
to explain, and contemplates effective communication which results in the subjects understanding of
what is conveyed.
265.

People v Alicando; G.R. No. 117487; 02 Dec 1995; 251 SCRA 293

FACTS:

Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of a four-year old girl. He was arrested and
during the interrogation, he verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of a counsel. On the basis
of his uncounseled verbal confession, the police came to know where to find the evidence to support a
case against him. He pleaded guilty during the arraignment and was tried, convicted then sentenced to
death.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the evidence obtained through appellant’s uncounseled verbal confession may be
admitted in evidence.

RULING:

NO. These are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered as a result of the uncounseled confession
illegally extracted by the police from the appellant. Once the primary source (the “tree”) is shown to
have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the “fruit”) derived from it is also
inadmissible. Evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because
the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.

Assailed decision convicting appellant and sentencing him to death is ANNULED and SET ASIDE, and the
case remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings.
266.

People v. de Guzman, 194 SCRA 601

May kasame siya na name na case. Nasa 242. Pero iba ang SCRA nila. In cases gusto niyo completuhin
ang notebook niyo.
267.

People v Wong Chuen Ming; G.R. Nos. 112801-11; 12 Apr 1996; 256 SCRA 182

FACTS:

Accused-appellants and several others were charged with unlawfully transporting shabu into the
country after thirty (30) boxes containing the prohibited drug were found among their baggage upon
their arrival from Hongkong. They were ordered to sign on the masking tape placed on the said boxes.
There were brought to Camp Crame where they were made to identify the signatures on the boxes and
affix their signatures again.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags containing shabu
are admissible in evidence.

RULING:

NO. By affixing their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic bags, the accused in
effect made a tacit admission of the crime charged for mere possession of shabu is punished by law.
These signatures of accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession. They are,
therefore, inadmissible as evidence for any admission wrung from the accused in violation of their
constitutional rights is inadmissible against them.

Decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED. Accused are ACQUITTED and their immediate release
ORDERED.
268.

People v. Bernardino, 193 SCRA 448

Wala na naman.
269.

People v de Lara; G.R. No. 94953; 05 Sep 1994; 236 SCRA 291

FACTS:

Appellant was arrested in a buy-bust operation. During the investigation, he was apprised of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. When asked to give a written
statement, he refused to do so pending arrival of his lawyer. However, he was still forced to sign the
photocopy of the marked twenty-peso bill, Receipt of Property Seized, and the Booking and Information
Sheet which were all presented and admitted in evidence. He was subsequently convicted and
sentenced to life imprisonment.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the documents were admissible in evidence.

RULING:

NO. The documents are inadmissible in evidence for the reason that there was no showing that
appellant was assisted by counsel during his custodial interrogation nor his waiver of his right to a
counsel was put into writing.

Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification.

270.

People v Luvendino; G.R. No. 69971; 03 Jul 1992; 211 SCRA 36

FACTS:

Appellant and two others were charged with the crime of rape with murder. A re-enactment of how the
crime was committed was staged promptly upon his apprehension and even prior to his formal
investigation at the police station. He pleaded not guilty during the arraignment, was tried, convicted
and sentenced to death.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the re-enactment may be admitted in evidence.

RULING:

NO. It is not clear from the record that before the re-enactment was staged by Luvendino, he had been
informed of his constitutional rights including, specifically, his right to counsel and that he had waived
such right before proceeding with the demonstration.

Decision of the trial court is MODIFIED, sentencing appellant to only life imprisonment.
271.

People v Linsangan; G.R. No. 88589; 16 Apr 1991; 195 SCRA 784

FACTS:

Appellant was charged with the illegal sale of a prohibited drug. After he was apprehended in a buy-bust
operation, he was frisked and retrieved from him were the marked money used during the operation
which he was asked to sign. He was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not his rights to counsel, to remain silent and not to incriminate himself were violated while
under custodial investigation.

RULING:

NO. Although he was not assisted by counsel when he initialed the P10-bills that the police found tucked
in his waist, his right against self-incrimination was not violated for his possession of the marked bills did
not constitute a crime; the subject of the prosecution was his act of selling marijuana cigarettes

Appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

272.

People v Dy 158 SCRA 111 (1988)

Facts: Accused is the owner of Benny’s Bar at Boracay Island and was sentenced with murder before the
trial court for shooting a Swiss national in his bar. The accused contends the court erred in admitting the
presentation of the prosecution of evidence that he came to a police officer and made a confession on
the crime and informed said officer where to find the gun he used, a statement the accused denied to
have done. They assail its admissibility to the court on the grounds that such statement was not made in
writing and is in violation of the due process required in custodial investigation.

Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution be admissible to warrant guilt of the
accused.

Held: In view of the documentary evidence on record the defense lost its credibility before the court. An
oral confession made by the accused to the officer and telling him the gun is in his bar which he wants to
surrender can be held admissible in court as evidence against him. This is because such confession was
made unsolicited by the police officer and the accused was not under investigation when he made the
oral confession. Therefore there is no need to invoke compliance of the proper procedure in a custodial
investigation at the case at bar. The rule on RES GESTAE is applicable where a witness who heard the
confession is competent to satisfy the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. An oral
confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substance. Thus the
oral confession made by the accused outside the ambit of custodial investigation can be admissible in
court and was given due credence to warrant the judgment of the accused being guilty of the crime.