G.R. No.
81567 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO
DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS
V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.
RESOLUTION
Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions,
seeking reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for
brevity) which dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive part:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No.
85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby
ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the
decision did not rule — as many misunderstood it to do — that mere suspicion that one is
Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without
warrant. Moreover, the decision merely applied long existing laws to the factual situations
obtaining in the several petitions. Among these laws are the outlawing the Communist Party
of the Philippines (CPP) similar organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt
with shortly). It is elementary, in this connection, if these laws no longer reflect the thinking
or sentiment of the people, it is Congress as the elected representative of the people — not
the Court — that should repeal, change or modify them.
In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:
1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests
made without warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court,
particularly Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests
violated the constitutional rights of the persons arrested;
2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile
3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons
arrested as to their membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New
People's Army, and their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and
subversive documents found in their possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch as
those confessions do not comply with the requirements on admissibility of
extrajudicial admissions;
4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;
5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.
The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of the special proceedings of habeas
corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention, so that if detention is illegal, the
detainee may be ordered forthwit released.
In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the
Court before rendering decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned
arrests without warrant were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in
accordance with law, would follow that the detention resulting from such arrests also in
accordance with law.
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or
authority to arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized
by law. The law expressly allowing arrests without warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can
be conducted.
In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the
said Rule 113, which read:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No.
81567) without warrant is justified it can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5
Rule 113, he (Dural) was committing an offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested
for being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where
1
membership penalized, 7 and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine
of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8 a continuing offense, thus:
The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance
(sic) on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under
Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses
which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially
involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. . . .
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle
for the overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a
subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest,
confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day
before his arrest, without warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM
policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as
part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given
another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents
or representatives of organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion
(or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common"
offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission,
subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition
of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing
organized government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting
officers of his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as
supported by actual facts that will be shown hereafter.
Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of the Umil
case, that the arrest of Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, which requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrest without warrant: first, that the
person to be arrested has just committed an offense, and second, that the arresting peace
officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested is the one who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers
to arrests without warrant, based on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting
officer or private person.
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be
based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part
of the peace officers making the arrest.
These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St.
Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which
was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted
to the said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed that the
wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered
two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock
noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on
the same information, the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as
"Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan,
Laguna. 12
Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA
member ("sparrow unit") was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is
deemed reasonable and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by
circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the said
hospital. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first — the day before, or on 31
January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by
five (5) "sparrows" including Dural; second — a wounded person listed in the hospital records
as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot
wound; third — as the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address
entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Rolando
Dural.
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their
immediate attention and action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in
their motion for reconsideration, 13 believe that the confidential information of the arresting
officers to the effect that Dural was then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital was actually
received from the attending doctor and hospital management in compliance with the
directives of the law, 14 and, therefore, came from reliable sources.
As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith
by the officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested
Dural are deemed to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers
are presumed to regularly perform their official duties. The records show that the arresting
officers did not appear to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear
2
that the arrest, without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without
warrant, an information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in
authority was filed against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case
No. C-30112). He was thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro
custody of the arresting officers). On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged
and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before
this Court in G.R. No. 84921.
As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their
arrests, without warrant, are also justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants
issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or
ammunition in their persons. They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto which justified
their outright arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests without
warrant, informations were filed in court against said petitioners, thereby placing them
within judicial custody and disposition. Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition
fo habeas corpus by announcing to this Court during the hearing of these petitions that he
had chosen to remain in detention in the custody of the authorities.
More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:
1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former
NPA about the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain
house occupied by one Renato Constantine, located in the Villaluz Compound,
Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila was being used as their
safehouse; that in view of this information, the said house was placed under
military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant duly
issued by court, a search of the house was conducted; that when Renato
Constantine was then confronted he could not produce any permit to possess the
firearms, ammunitions, radio and other communications equipment, and he
admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP. 16
2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato
Constantino in the evening of 12 August 1988, and admitted that he was an NPA
courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantine and other members of
the rebel group.
3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest
of Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of
Roque; 17 that, at the time of her arrest, the military agents found subversive
documents and live ammunitions, and she admitted then that the documents
belonged to her. 18
4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without
warrant on 13 August 1988, when they arrived at the said house of Renato
Constantine in the evening of said date; that when the agents frisked them,
subversive documents, and loaded guns were found in the latter's possession but
failing to show a permit to possess them. 19
5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived
(on 12 May 1988) at the premises ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was
believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject of a search
warrant duly issued by the court. At the time of her arrest without warrant the
agents of the PC-Intelligence and Investigation found ammunitions and subversive
documents in the car of Ocaya. 20
It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that
the reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the
information given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato
Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their
operations, with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato Constantine
and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of
Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents
that the information they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were
probably guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to
effect the search of the Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a person
named Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and
found in his possession were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at
the time of their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or
subversive documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in
the CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified by their
former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances,
the corresponding informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. The records
also show that, as in the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant made by the military
agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to
have been ill-motivated or irregularly performed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the
afore-named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent
an can say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and
made any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause
for disciplinary action against the peace officers involved. For, one of the duties of law
enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of executive and
3
judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the
alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21 An arrest is
therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is
without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is
founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities.
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons
arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not
evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace
officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an
arrest without warrant. 23
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them.
Under the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even
if the arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are
not liable. 24 But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers
can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages under Article 32 of the
Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.
In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the
basis of the attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22
November 1988, at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila,
Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other things:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona.27
and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National
Press Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of
jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November 1988. 28 Espiritu was arrested without warrant,
not for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for uttering the above-quoted language
which, in the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.
Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as
falling within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the
right to insist, during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to
free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority
of the peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were
uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom,
which obviously becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor
of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court
has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.
Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic.
For Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace
officers did not appear. Because of this development, the defense asked the court a quo at
the resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No.
88-68385) has been provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988,
Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at
about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in
the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions
during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the
police agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29 Although the killing
of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was
made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under Section 5(b) of Rule
113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that
Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be
made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse
of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight.
As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without
warrant of Nazareno noted several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as
follows:
. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an
information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two (2) others, with the
killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila. The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No. 731. On 7 January 1989,
Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied by the trial
court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier
filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court. On
13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of
Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas
corpus, retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian,
Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and
thereafter resolve the petition. At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February
1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a
resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso
Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed
against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which liad taken
cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said
Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against
him).
This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the
corresponding informations against them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and
4
Nazareno were based on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They of, as the records show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. More than
complied with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or the allure of popularity or palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be
whimsical arrests. Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been right.
convicted by the court a quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has
appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are
date ( CA-G.R. No. still undocketed). Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 DENIED. This denial is FINAL.
ignored the contitution requisiteds for admissibility of an extrajudicial admission.
SO ORDERED.
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that he was an NPA courier.
On the other hand, in the case of Amelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed
firearms, ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession during her arrest,
belonged to her.

The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their
membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms,
ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by
the records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon which the
arresting officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e.
that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in
compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the
other hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon
which their warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of determining the guilt or
innocence of persons arrested without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus.
It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.

As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be
abandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same,
particularly ln the light of prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still
directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important
is that everv arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding.
This Court. will promptly look into — and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the
same — the legality of the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of
Rule 113, Rules of Court, as elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall
forthwith be ordered released; but if such conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be
made to languish in his detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be
either acquitted or convicted, with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.

A Final Word

This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party
member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the
suspect. The Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these
petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set
forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress,
are probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis
5
G.R. No. 106922 April 20, 2001
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS and
EULOGIO MANANQUIL, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 66, Regional Trial Court of Makati and JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals and
Resolution2 dated June 29, 1992 and August 27, 1992 respectively which affirmed
the Order3 dated October 8, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
66, in Civil Case No. 90-2327 denying petitioners' motion to dismiss as well as the
Order4 dated January 6, 1992 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
After the unsuccessful December 1989 coup d' etat, the Department of Justice, then
headed by petitioner Franklin Drilon, referred to the Special Composite Team of
Prosecutors (Team of Prosecutors, for brevity), composed of co-petitioners Aurelio C.
Trampe, Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Eulogio Mananquil, a letter-complaint from the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI, for brevity) requesting for the investigation of
private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile for his alleged participation in the said coup
attempt.
Finding sufficient basis to continue the inquiry, the Team of Prosecutors issued a
subpoena to private respondent with an order to submit his counter-affidavit to the
letter-complaint. Instead of filing his counter-affidavit, private respondent filed a
Petition for Summary Dismissal of the charge against him. He also filed an urgent
motion praying that he be given a notice of at least five (5) days before the filing of
any information against him to enable him to take the appropriate legal action. At the
same time, private respondent sent "cautionary letters" to all judges in Quezon City,
Manila, Makati and Pasay City requesting that he be apprised of any information
which may be filed against him and that he be given the opportunity to personally
witness the raffle of the case against him. Said notice also appeared in several
newspapers of general circulation.
On February 27, 1990, the Team of Prosecutors filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City on Information charging private respondent with the complex crime of
rebellion with murder and frustrated murder. The Team of Prosecutors likewise filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City an Information charging, among others,
private respondent with the offense of obstruction of justice for harboring an alleged
felon under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Private respondent was later arrested and
detained overnight at the NBI headquarters in Taft Avenue, Manila, and, on the
following day, transferred to a detention room at Camp Karingal in Quezon City. The
lawyers of private respondent also discovered that the information against the latter
was first filed on February 21, 1990, but was subsequently withdrawn for re-filing on
February 27, 1990. After a petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed before this
Court entitled Enrile v. Salazar5, we granted private respondent's provisional liberty
upon posting of a cash bond.
On June 5, 1990, in the same case of Enrile v. Salazar, we ordered the modification
of the Information before the RTC of Quezon City to simple rebellion only in
consonance with our ruling in People v. Hernandez6. On September 13, 1990,
in Enrile v. Amin,7 this Court ruled that the filing of a separate information for
obstruction of justice also violated the Hernandez doctrine and accordingly ordered
the quashal of the said information.
As a consequence of our said Order dated September 13, 1990, private respondent
on August 20, 1990 filed a Complaint for damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-
2327, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City while the rebellion case was still
pending litigation. Private respondent's complaint impleaded as defendants herein
petitioners, then Solicitor General Francisco Chavez and Judge Jaime Salazar. The
complaint basically accuses the petitioners of bad faith in filing the information for
rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder. Thus, the complaint alleges:
2.5 The so-called "preliminary investigation" of the charge against plaintiff
was railroaded from the very start. Plaintiff's pleas and motions asking for
strict compliance with the rules of procedure and the norms of fairness and
justice were either ignored or summarily denied by the investigating panel.
Plaintiff, in utter frustration, filed a petition for summary dismissal of the
charge and, anticipating the denial of that as well, also filed an urgent motion
to be given at least five (5) days notice to enable him to take the appropriate
legal action, before the filing of any information against him.
xxx
3.1 All of the defendants, in and by all their actuations in connection with the
information for rebellion "complexed" … individually, collectively, and with
unity of purposes and intentions, illegally and unjustly caused, directed and
prolonged plaintiff's arrest and detention without bail, through the expediency
of disregarding the Hernandez doctrine prohibiting the complexing of
rebellion with other crimes.
In and by all their aforementioned actuations, all of the defendants
individually, collectively and with unity of purposes and intentions–
(a) wilfully, manifestly and maliciously obstructed, defeated,
violated, impeded and impaired plaintiff's constitutional and legal
right to due process, right to be secure in his person against
unreasonable and unwarranted arrest, and right to bail, as
6
 enshrined in Sections 1, 2 and 13 of Article 14(1) of the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution;
(b) grossly abused their rights and violated their duties as citizens,
as members of the legal profession, and as public officers;
(c) willfully acted in contravention of the basic standards of good
faith and justice; and
(d) willfully acted in a manner contrary to law, morals and public
policy
- all causing great suffering and injury to plaintiff.
3.2 Defendants Chavez, Drilon, Trampe, Abesamis and Mananquil
knowingly, manifestly and maliciously abused and exceeded their duties and
authority as public officials in charge of the enforcement and prosecution of
laws, as well as violated the tenets of good faith and justice in human
relations, by directly and actively advocating and indulging in what these
defendants had publicly admitted and described to be a "legal
experimentation" consisting in the knowing disregard and defiance of the
well-established Hernandez doctrine.
Defendant Drilon and his co-defendants Trampe, Abesamis and Mananquil,
being the head and members, respectively, of the Department of Justice, by
their above-alleged actuations, violated their principal responsibility, as legal
counsel and prosecutors, to administer the criminal justice system in
accordance with the established and accepted laws and processes.
Defendant Drilon, being the Secretary of Justice having supervision, control
and direction over the actuations of co-defendants Trampe, Abesamis and
Mananquil violated the tenets of good faith and justice in human relations
and abused his official duties and authority, by, among others, expressly
instigating, authorizing, ordering and causing the filing of the information for
rebellion "complexed" against the plaintiff.
xxx
3.3. Defendants Drilon, Trampe, Abesamis and Mananquil filed or cased the
filing of the information for rebellion "complexed" with manifest bad faith,
deception and duplicity, all in violation of the tenets of good faith and justice
in human relations and in gross abuse of their duties and authority as public
prosecutors "to see that justice is done." (Canon 6, Rule 6.01, Lawyers'
Code of Professional Responsibility).
More particularly, these defendants originally filed or caused the filing of the
information … on 21 February 1990 but, for some mysterious reason, the
information was subsequently withdrawn. The initial filing and withdrawal of
the information – defendant Chavez admitted these facts during the
Supreme Court hearing on 6 March 1990 – were done in total secrecy and
without the knowledge of plaintiff who learned of this incident only after his
arrest on 27 February 1990.
Likewise, on or about 27 February 1990, these defendants deliberately
misled plaintiff and his lawyers and induced them to believe that the charge
of rebellion "complexed" was set to be filed against the plaintiff in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. While plaintiff's attention was diverted to the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, these defendants surreptitiously filed or
caused the filing of main information for rebellion "complexed" in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
All of the above-named defendants' actuations were meant to conceal from
the public in general and the plaintiff and his counsel in particular, the filing
of the information and to prevent plaintiff and his lawyers from witnessing the
raffle and from questioning the irregularity of the assignment, the validity of
the information, the authority of the court to issue the warrant of arrest, the
obvious lack of probable cause, and, finally, to prevent plaintiff from posting
bail.
xxx
3.5 The defendants' unfounded and malicious persecution of plaintiff,
calculated to malign the person and reputation of the plaintiff, a duly elected
Senator of the country, has caused and continues to cause plaintiff extreme
suffering, mental anguish, moral shock and social humiliation, …
3.6 The reckless and wanton conduct of the defendants who, as public
officials, are supposed to be the guardians of the democratic institutions and
civil liberties of citizens, in charging, taking cognizance of, and defending a
non-existing crime, and in causing the harassment and persecution of the
plaintiff, should be strongly condemned…8
xxx
On October 9, 1990, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure of the
Complaint to state a cause of action. They claimed that there was no allegation of any
actionable wrong constituting a violation of any of the legal rights of private
respondent. In addition, they put up the defense of good faith and immunity from suit,
to wit:
7
 THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
DEFENDANTS IN THAT:
(A) THE FILING OF THE INFORMATION AGAINST PLAINTIFF FOR THE
CRIME OF REBELLION WITH MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER
WAS INITIATED IN THE HONEST BELIEF THAT IT COULD BE
SUSTAINED UNDER THE FIRST PART OF ARTICLE 48 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE; and
(B) DEFENDANTS, ACTING IN GOOD FAITH, WITHOUT MALICE AND
WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THEIR AUTHORITY, CANNOT BE HELD
PERSONALLY LIABLE BY WAY OF DAMAGES FOR ANY ALLEGED
INURY SUFFERED BY PLAINTIFF.9
On October 8, 1991, respondent trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to
Dismiss and requiring petitioners to file their answer and to present evidence in
support of their defenses in a full-blown trial inasmuch as the defense of good faith
and immunity from suit does not appear to be indubitable.10 Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner Trampe, in his own behalf and in his own
behalf and in behalf of his co-petitioners, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court alleging that the respondent court committed grave abuse
of discretion in denying their motion to dismiss. On June 29, 1992, respondent
appellate court dismissed the petition and the subsequent motion for reconsideration
ruling, thus:
We cannot perceive how respondent court could have acted with grave
abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss. Before respondent
court were two diametrically opposed contentions. Which to believe,
respondent court is at a loss. Hence, respondent court had no alternative but
to be circumspect in acting upon the motion to dismiss. This respondent
court accomplished by requiring petitioners to file their answer where they
can raise the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action as an
affirmative defense. Indeed the better alternative would be to conduct a full
blown trial during which the parties could present their respective evidences
to prove their respective cause of action/defense.11
Hence, this instant petition.
In view of the appointment of petitioner Trampe to the judiciary, petitioner Abesamis
filed a manifestation stating that he would act as counsel for his own behalf and in
behalf of his co-petitioners. In a Resolution dated March 8, 1993, we granted the
Manifestation of petitioner Abesamis to substitute for petitioner Trampe as counsel for
himself and his co-petitioners. Respondent did not file a motion for reconsideration.
Meanwhile, on February 12, 1993, or almost three (3) years after the filing of the
complaint for damages against petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Makati
dismissed with finality the rebellion charges against private respondent12 .
In their Memorandum,13 petitioners raise the following assignment of errors:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT BY HOLDING
THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY THE
PETITIONERS AND THAT IN ANY EVENT, THE DENIAL OF A MOTION
TO DISMISS IS NOT SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY CERTIORARI.
II
PETITIONER TRAMPE ACTED CORRECTLY IN REPRESENTING AND
APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE OTHER PETITIONERS IN THE
INSTANT PETITION. MOREOVER, BY HIS LONG SILENCE AND
INACTION, PRIVATE RESPONDENT CANNOT NOW QUESTION THE
PERSONALITY OF PETITIONER TRAMPE TO REPRESENT AND
APPEAR ON BEHALF OF THE OTHER PETITIONERS HEREIN.
Before ruling on the substance of the petition, let us first deal with the legal
personalities of petitioners Trampe and Abesamis to represent themselves and the
rest of the petitioners in the case at bar. Private respondent avers that Trampe's
representation is a nullity for the reason that under the Revised Administrative Code,
it is not the function of the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor to represent its
prosecutors in suits that may be filed against them. Private respondent likewise
argues that Trampe and Abesamis are prohibited from acting as private counsels for
their co-petitioners inasmuch as it violates Republic Act No. 6713, the "Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees."
It must be noted that petitioner Abesamis filed a Manifestation14 before this Court
asking that he be permitted to replace petitioner Trampe as counsel for the petitioners
in view of Trampe's appointment to the judiciary. No opposition thereto was filed by
private respondent. Thus, we granted the manifestation of petitioner Abesamis to
substitute for Trampe as counsel for and in behalf of himself and his co-petitioners.
There being no motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent, said resolution
has become final. Private respondent did not dispute the legal personality of petitioner
Trampe to represent himself and his co-petitioners in his Comment15 filed before the
Court of Appeals. Private respondent belatedly raised this contention in his
opposition16 to the motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's decision.
Accordingly, private respondent is estopped and legally barred from questioning the
8
representation of petitioners Trampe and later, Abesamis to act as counsel for
themselves and their co-petitioners in this case.
Going now to the crux of the petition, petitioners contend that the complaint sets forth
no cause of action against them. They allege good faith, regularity in the performance
of official duties and lack of ultimate facts constituting an actionable wrong. On the
other hand, private respondent argues that a cause of action has been sufficiently
pleaded and that the defenses of good faith and performance of official duties are
best disposed in a judicial hearing. Private respondent likewise maintains that the
defense of good faith is irrelevant for the reason that the petitioners are sued under
Article 32 of the New Civil Code where the defense of good faith is irrelevant.
We find merit in the petition.
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another.17 A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in
favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of
the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.18
The remedy of a party whenever the complaint does not allege a cause of action is to
set up this defense in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. A motion to dismiss on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the
truth of the facts alleged therein. However, the hypothetical admission is limited to the
"relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly
deductible therefrom. The admission does not extend to conclusion or interpretations
of law; nor does it cover allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial
notice."19 In De Dios v. Bristol Laboratories (Phils.), Inc., 20 this Court was more
particular in explaining that:
xxx. For the purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the
truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. The admission, however, is limited
only to all material and relevant facts which are well pleaded in the
complaint. Thus, it had been ruled that a demurrer admits only such matters
of fact as are sufficiently pleaded; that the demurrer does not admit the truth
of mere epithets charging fraud; nor allegations of legal conclusions; nor an
erroneous statement of law. The admission of the truth of material and
relevant facts well pleaded does not extend to render a demurrer an
admission of inferences or conclusions drawn therefrom, even if alleged in
the pleading ; nor mere influences or conclusions from facts not stated; nor
conclusions of law; nor matters of evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant
matter. xxx.
The main question in the instant petition is whether the allegations in the complaint
sufficiently plead a cause of action to hold the petitioners liable for damages.
According to the complaint, the petitioners violated private respondent's constitutional
rights for knowingly and maliciously filing a legally non-existent offense and for
depriving him of his right to be notified of the filing of the case against him. Inasmuch
as private respondent seeks to hold the petitioners accountable for the damage he
has suffered as a result of the case filed against him, his suit against the petitioners is
one for malicious prosecution. In Drilon v. Court of Appeals,21 where the facts in said
case are basically the same as in the instant case,22 we also labeled the complaint
filed by complainant Homobono Adaza as one for malicious prosecution. It is defined
as an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil
suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable
cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of
the defendant therein. The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force,
regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury.23 The statutory bases for a civil
action for damages for malicious prosecution are found in the provisions of the New
Civil Code on Human Relations and on damages particularly Articles 19, 20, 21, 26,
29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219(8).24 A
Complaint for malicious prosecution states a cause of action if it alleges: 1) that the
defendant was himself the prosecutor or that at least he instigated the prosecution; 2)
that the prosecution finally terminated in the plaintiff's acquittal; 3) that in bringing the
action the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and, 4) that the prosecutor was
actuated by malice, i.e., by improper and sinister motives.25
We have no reason to depart from our ruling in the said Drilon case. It is our view and
we hold that private respondent's complaint fails to state a cause of action to hold the
petitioners liable for malicious prosecution.
First, the complaint for damages was filed long before private respondent's acquittal
in the rebellion charge thereby rendering the subject action premature. At the time the
complaint was filed, the criminal action against private respondent has not yet ended.
That the criminal case eventually resulted in private respondent's acquittal during the
pendency of the civil case for damages is of no moment inasmuch as the latter should
be filed only after the accused is acquitted in the criminal case. To allow private
respondent to file a complaint, for damages based on malicious prosecution, before
his acquittal would stifle the prosecution of criminal cases by the mere expediency of
filing damage suits against the prosecutors.
The complaint for damages cannot be based on the dismissal of the separate charge
for violation of P.D. No. 1829 inasmuch as the complaint does not contain any
allegation to that effect. The complaint actually limits the claim for damages based on
the filing of the rebellion charge against the petitioners. Hence, it cannot be sustained
based on the dismissal of the case for violation of P.D. No. 1829.
Second, there are no factual allegations in the complaint that can support a finding
that malice and bad faith motivated the petitioners in filing the information against
private respondent. Allegations of bad faith, malice and other related words without
ultimate facts to support the same are mere conclusions of law that are not deemed
9
admitted in a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action. From our reading of the
complaint, we find no ultimate facts to buttress these conclusions of law. In Drilon, this
Court held that;
Lack of cause of action, as a ground for a motion to dismiss…must appear
on the face of the complaint itself, meaning that it must be determined from
the allegations of the complaint and from none other. The infirmity of the
complaint in this regard is only too obvious to have escaped respondent
judge's attention. Paragraph 14 of the complaint which states:
14. The malicious prosecution, nay persecution, of plaintiff for a
non-existent crime had severely injured and besmirched plaintiff's
name and reputation and forever stigmatized his stature as a public
figure, thereby causing him extreme physical suffering, serious
anxiety, mental anguish, moral shock and social humiliation."
is a mere conclusion of law and is not an averment or allegation of ultimate
facts. It does not, therefore, aid in any wise the complaint in setting forth a
valid cause of action against the petitioners.
The allegations of bad faith and malice in the complaint are based on the ground that
the petitioners knowingly and allegedly maliciously filed the information for an offense
that does not exist in the statute books. But as we have ruled in Drilon:
In the case under consideration, the decision of the Special Team of
Prosecutors to file the information for rebellion with murder and frustrated
murder against respondent Adaza, among others, cannot be dismissed as
the mere product of whim or caprice on the part of the prosecutors who
conducted the preliminary investigation… While it is true that the petitioners
were fully aware of the prevailing jurisprudence enunciated in People v.
Hernandez, which proscribes the complexing of murder and other common
crimes with rebellion, petitioners were of the honest conviction that
the Hernandez Case can be differentiated from the present case. The
petitioners thus argued:
"Of course we are aware of the ruling in People v. Hernandez, 99
Phil 515, which held that common crimes like murder, arson, etc.,
are absorbed by rebellion. However, the Hernandez case is
different from the present case before us. In the Hernandez case,
the common crimes of murder, arson, etc. were found by the fiscal
to have been committed as a necessary means to commit rebellion,
or in furtherance thereof. Thus, the fiscal filed an information for
rebellion alleging those common crimes as a necessary means of
committing the offense charged under the second part of Article 48,
RPC.
We, however, find no occasion to apply the Hernandez ruling since
as intimated above, the crimes of murder and frustrated murder in
this case were absolutely unnecessary to commit rebellion although
they were the natural consequences of the unlawful bombing.
Hence, the applicable provision is the first part of Article 48 of the
RPC."
While the Supreme Court in the case of Enrile v. Salazar, addressing the
issue of whether or not the Hernandez doctrine is still good law, in a 10-3
vote, did not sustain the position espoused by the herein petitioners on the
matter, three justices felt the need to re-study the Hernandez ruling in light of
present-day developments, among whom was then Chief Justice Marcelo
Fernan…
Apparently, not even the Supreme Court then was of one mind in debunking
the theory being advanced by the petitioners in this case, some of whom
were also the petitioners in the Enrile case.
A doubtful or difficult question of law may become the basis of good faith
and, in this regard, the law always accords to public officials the presumption
of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duties. [Tatad v.
Garcia, Jr., 243 SCRA 436, 463 (1995)] Any person who seeks to establish
otherwise has the burden of proving bad faith or ill-motive. Here, since the
petitioners were of the honest conviction that there was probable cause to
hold respondent Adaza for trial for the crime of rebellion with murder and
frustrated murder, and since Adaza himself, through counsel, did not allege
in his complaint lack of probable cause, we find that the petitioners cannot
be held liable for malicious prosecution. Needless to say, probable cause
was not wanting in the institution of Criminal Case No. Q-90-11855 against
Adaza.
As to the requirement that the prosecutor must be impelled by malice in
bringing the unfounded action, suffice it to state that the presence of
probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice.
(Albenson Enterprises Corp., supra.) At the risk of being repetitious, it is
evident in this case that petitioners were not motivated by malicious intent or
by a sinister design to unduly harass private respondent, but only by a well-
founded belief that respondent Adaza can be held for trial for the crime
alleged in the information.
All told, the complaint, dated July 11, 1990, filed by Adaza before Branch
100 of the Regional Trial Court against the petitioners does not allege facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action for malicious prosecution. xxx
xxx
10
As a result, these general allegations do not help private respondent's action against
petitioners. It is well settled that one cannot be held liable for allegedly maliciously
instituting a prosecution where there is probable cause. Otherwise stated, a suit for
malicious prosecution will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried
on without probable cause. The reason for this rule is that it would be a very great
discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of
suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their indictment miscarried.26
On the issue of whether the petitioners should be held accountable for knowingly filing
a non-existent offense, this Court has definitely ruled in Enrile v. Salazar that:
The plaint of petitioner's (herein private respondent) counsel that he is
charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while
technically correct in so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be
complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereon, must
therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context
of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime
defined and punished by the Revised Penal code: simple rebellion.27
Accordingly, despite its defect, the information filed by petitioners remained valid
inasmuch as it nevertheless charges an offense against the herein private
respondent.
With respect to private respondent's second basis for the charge of malicious
prosecution, that is, he was denied by the petitioners the right to be notified before the
criminal information against him, his complaint alleges that:
xxx
More particularly, these defendants originally filed or caused the filing of the
information …on 21 February 1990 but, for some mysterious reason, the
information was subsequently withdrawn. The initial filing and withdrawal of
the information – defendant Chavez admitted these facts during the
Supreme Court hearing on 6 March 1990 – were done in total secrecy and
without the knowledge of plaintiff who learned of this incident only after his
arrest on 27 February 1990.
Likewise, on or about 27 February 1990, these defendants deliberately
misled plaintiff and his lawyers and induced them to believe that the charge
of rebellion "complexed" was set to be filed against the plaintiff in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. While plaintiff's attention was diverted to the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, these defendants surreptitiously filed or
caused the filing of the main information for rebellion "complexed" in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.28
However, we hold that the said allegations still fail to maintain a cause of action
against the petitioners. To reiterate, a cause of action exists if the following elements
are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever
law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation
of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages.29 In the case at bar, we fail to see any right of the private respondent
supposedly violated by the petitioners. Nowhere in the statute books is a prospective
accused given the right to be notified beforehand of the filing of an information against
him. Likewise, the withdrawal of the information and the subsequent re-filing of the
same do not constitute an actionable wrong inasmuch as the filing or re-filing of an
information lies within the discretion of the prosecutor who must act independently of
the affected parties.
Private respondent claims that an appeal or an original action for certiorari is not the
proper remedy for a defendant whose motion to dismiss has been denied by the trial
court for the reason that the order does not terminate the proceedings, nor finally
dispose of the contentions of the parties. In its decision affirming the trial court's
denial of the motion to dismiss, the appellate court sustained this contention.
However, as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the rule admits of an exception.
Thus, where the denial of the motion to dismiss by the trial court was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as in the case at
bar, the aggrieved party may assail the order of denial on certiorari.30 A wide breadth
of discretion is granted in certiorari proceedings in the interest of substantial justice
and to prevent a substantial wrong.31 In the Drilon case, we also held that the denial
by the trial court of the motion to dismiss of herein petitioners based on the same
grounds as in the instant petition constituted grave abuse of discretion for the reason
that "this (private respondent's baseless action) would unjustly compel the petitioners
to needlessly go through a protracted trial and thereby unduly burden the court with
one more futile and inconsequential case."32 The appellate court therefore erred in
not ruling that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion when the latter
refused to dismiss the case as against herein petitioners, notwithstanding the obvious
insufficiency of the complaint against them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 29, 1992 of
respondent Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated August 27, 1992 which affirmed
the Orders of the Respondent Regional trial Court of Makati City, dated October 8,
1991 and January 6, 1992 are hereby NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. The respondent
Regional Trial Court of Makati is hereby ordered to take no further action in Civil Case
No. 90-2327 except to dismiss the same.
SO ORDERED
11