1. Luz vs. People, G.R. No.

197788, February 29, 2012

***READ!!! Meron na to sa Searches and Seizures
2. Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, October 3, 1991
FACTS:

Military agents received confidential information that a certain man, Ronnie Javellon, believed to be one
of the five NPA sparrows who recently murdered two Capcom mobile patrols was being treated in St.
Agnes Hospital, for having gunshot wounds.

Later on, it was found out that Ronnie Javellon is a fictitious name and that his real name is Rolando
Dural (verified as one of the sparrows of the NPA).

Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons.

Meanwhile, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM
mobile patrols.

In this 8 consolidated cases, it assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by the military on the
petitioners; that a mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid
ground for his arrest without warrant.

ISSUE:

WON (whether on not) the warrantless arrest is valid

HELD:

YES. The arrest without warrant is justified because it is within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113,
Dural was committing an offense, when arrested because he was arrested for being a member of the
New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized and for subversion which,
like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, a continuing offense.

Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the
overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be or became less of a subversive, FOR
PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital.

Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without a warrant, at the
St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two
(2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there
and then.

Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents
or representatives of the organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or
insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e.
adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are
anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and
violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing an organized government is attained.

Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his
membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts
mentioned in this case.

With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named
persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple, and Ocaya), no prudent man can say that it
would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That would
have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace
officers involved.

For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of
executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the
alleged violation of the law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21 An arrest is
therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without
limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an
overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set
forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of
committing the crime for which they were arrested. Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the
reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest
of public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant.

The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested
persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. But if they do
not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of
arbitrary detention, for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative
sanctions.

3. Rebellion vs. People, G.R. No. 175700, July 5, 2010

FACTS:

When two policemen saw Salvador Rebellion and another person exchanging something, the officers
introduced themselves and when asked what he was holding, petitioner handed three strips of
aluminum foil. Upon search, the officers found a sachet of shabu.

The RTC found him guilty of possession of illegal drugs which the CA affirmed. Petitioner that the shabu
found during search is inadmissible as the arrest was not valid.

ISSUE: Whether the warrantless arrest was valid.

RULING:

The SC ruled in the affirmative. But the SC made it clear the even if the warrant was not valid, it would
still prevail because petitioner did not file a motion to quash regarding this before entering his plea.

In answering the petitioner's issue, the Sc rules that the arrest was valid and it was an arrest in flagrante
delicto. After the suspicion of the officers was aroused, they introduced themselves and from a distance
of the officers saw a sachet with white crystalline substance which they confiscated. Consequently, the
results of the attendant search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove his guilt of the offense
charged.

4. Villamor Banaobra vs. People of the Philippines, GR. No. 200396, March
22, 2017
***READ!!! No case digest baby, meron sa scribd kaso one page tas 1/3 lang
pinakita. Sorry iloveyou. Tas Bonaobra lumalabas walang Banaobra. Marunong
bang magspelling yang teacher niyo?
5. People vs. Sy Chua, G.R. Nos. 136066-67, February 4, 2003
FACTS:

Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as
amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal Possession of Drugs in two
separate Informations. SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant
that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago,
Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives. The group positioned themselves across
McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel.

The other group acted as their back up. Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-
appellant which just arrived and parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant alighted
from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and
introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent
plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud
subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from
his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it
contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag,
the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accused-
appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated
items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.

Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different version of the
incident. Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his son to
Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He stopped in front
of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store, he noticed a
man approaches and examines the inside of his car. When he called the attention of the onlooker, the
man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with raised hands. The man
later on identified himself as a policeman.

During the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open his car. He
refused, so the policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police
officer’s companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene, pulled
him away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others searched his car. Thereafter, he was brought to
a police station and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived,
who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and
accusedappellant was made to hold the box while pictures were being taken. The lower court acquitted
Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, yet convicted him for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815
grams of shabu. Hence, this appeal to the Court.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful; and (2) Whether the search of his person and
the subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found on him were conducted in a lawful and valid
manner.

HELD:

The lower court believed that since the police received information that the accused will distribute
illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly
and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a “stop and
frisk”. The trial court confused the concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful
arrest.

These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they
maybe validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the
precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned,
e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search.

In this instance, the law requires that there first be arrest before a search can be made — the process
cannot be reversed. Accordingly, for this exception to apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person
to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer. The two aforementioned elements are lacking in the case at bar. Accused-appellant
did not act in a suspicious manner.

For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. “Reliable information” alone,
absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the
arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto
arrest. With regard to the concept of “stop and frisk”: mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a
“stop-and-frisk”.

A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a “stop-and-
frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the interest of
safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against the police officer.
A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him,
and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should also be emphasized that a search and seizure should
precede the arrest for this principle to apply. The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at
bar. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal
items found in his possession.

The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused appellant’s business in
the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police officers
only introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant. In the case at bar,
neither the in flagrante delicto nor the “stop and frisk” principles is applicable to justify the warrantless
arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant.
Wherefore, accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is hereby Acquitted.

6. People vs. Sucro, GR. No. 93239, March 18, 1991

FACTS:

Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by their Station Commander to
monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro
was selling marijuana

As planned Roy Fulgencio monitored the activities of the accused under the house of Regalado and near
the chapel where the accused was selling marijuana to a group of persons around 5 pm.

Pat reported this to their station commander and instructed him to continue his monitoring.

At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later Identified as
Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant.

At that point, after Macabante bought from the accused, they pursue Macabante and told them he
bought it from herein accused-appellant.

The police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts.
The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another
teabag from Macabante,

Accused appealed that the marijuana teabags were seized without serving upon him a search warrant.

The accused-appellant contends that his arrest was illegal, is a violation of his rights granted under
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

He stresses that there was sufficient time for the police officers to apply for a search and arrest warrants
considering that Fulgencio informed his Station Commander of the activities of the accused two days
before March 21, 1989, the date of his arrest.

ISSUE:

WON the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently

WON the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.

HELD:

YES. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where an arrest
without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states:

Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; (Emphasis supplied)

An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule
authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or
hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof.
From the records of the case, Fulgencio saw Sucro three times dealing drugs inside the chapel where he
is 2 meters away monitoring his nefarious activities then after the 3rd deal, the police intercepted the
buyer Macabante and when confronted by the police, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the
marijuana from Sucro. Therefore, Sucro had just committed an illegal act of which the police officers had
personal knowledge, being members of the team which monitored accused-appellants nefarious
activity.

The accused questions the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant considering that Fulgencio
himself knew of Sucro's activities even prior to the former's joining the police force. Fulgencio reported
Sucro's activities only three days before the incident.

As the records reveal, Fulgencio and Sucro had known each other since their childhood years and that
after Fulgencio joined the police force, he told the accused-appellant not to sell drugs in their locality.
Hence, it is possible that because of this friendship, Fulgencio hesitated to report his childhood friend
and merely advised him not to engage in such activity. However, because of reliable information was
given by some informants that selling was going on every day, he was constrained to report the matter
to the Station Commander.

On the other hand, the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their
knowledge acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of
a search warrant. What is paramount is that probable cause existed.

The general rule is that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute
rule... Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule
126 of the RCP which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

Since the arrest was considered valid, the evidence presented is admissible in evidence.

Hence, this Court is convinced that appellant Edison Sucro had indeed committed the offense charged.
The trial court's decision must be upheld.

7. People vs. Gerente, GR Nos. 95847-48, March 10, 1993

Facts:

Edna Edwina Reyes testified that appellant Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy
Echigoren, started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant which is about
six (6) meters away from the house of the prosecution witness who was in her house on that day. She
overheard the three men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. Appellant allegedly agreed:
“Sigue, papatayin natin mamaya.” Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill
Clarito Blace at about 2:00 p.m. of the same day. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, testified
that she witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by
Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he
fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim’s head. Thereafter, the three men dragged
Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente. At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime
Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a
mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was
informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was massive
fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with
Police Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling
incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches
of marijuana. They were informed by the prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes that she saw the
killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito. The policemen
proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the house
and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin
purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to
the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana.
When arraigned the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. A joint trial of the two cases was held.
The trial court rendered a decision convicting him of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.

Issue:
Whether the Personal Knowledge of the policeman of the crime committed by the accused is justified
and valid in arresting the latter without securing an arrest and search warrant.

Held:

Yes, “To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of
his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest,
the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances.” The
policemen arrested Gerente only some 3 hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They
saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the
instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to
bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen
and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the
policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and
two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed
his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did. The
search conducted on Gerente’s person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid
arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that
Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.”
The frisk and search of appellant’s person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of
arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and
might attack them unless he is first disarmed.