Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L.
GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN
DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR.
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as
SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented
by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 208493
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE
PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his
capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209251
PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former
Provincial Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY
FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"Experience is the oracle of truth."1
-James Madison
Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel
System. Due to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall
heretofore discuss the system‘s conceptual underpinnings before detailing
the particulars of the constitutional challenge.
The Facts
I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English
origin.3 Historically, its usage may be traced to the degrading
ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of
black slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the
porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from
the generosity of their well-fed master.4 This practice was later
compared to the actions of American legislators in trying to
direct federal budgets in favor of their districts.5 While the
advent of refrigeration has made the actual pork barrel obsolete,
it persists in reference to political bills that "bring home the
bacon" to a legislator‘s district and constituents. 6 In a more
technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of
government spending meant for localized projects and secured
solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's
district.7Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to
legislative control of local appropriations.8
In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to
as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the
Legislature,9 although, as will be later discussed, its usage would
evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.
II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).
Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is
considered11 as the earliest form of "Congressional
Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since the utilization of
the funds appropriated therein were subjected to
post-enactment legislator approval. Particularly, in
the area of fund release, Section 312 provides that the
sums appropriated for certain public works
projects13 "shall be distributed x x x subject to the
approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate
and the House of Representatives. "The committee
from each House may also authorize one of its
members to approve the distribution made by the
Secretary of Commerce and Communications."14 Also,
in the area of fund realignment, the same section
provides that the said secretary, "with the approval
of said joint committee, or of the authorized members
thereof, may, for the purposes of said distribution,
transfer unexpended portions of any item of
appropriation under this Act to any other item
hereunder."
In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-
enactment legislator participation broadened from
the areas of fund release and realignment to the area
of project identification. During that year, the
mechanics of the public works act was modified to
the extent that the discretion of choosing projects
was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications to legislators. "For the first time, the
law carried a list of projects selected by Members of
Congress, they ‘being the representatives of the
people, either on their own account or by
consultation with local officials or civil
leaders.‘"16 During this period, the pork barrel
process commenced with local government councils,
civil groups, and individuals appealing to
Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that
were accommodated formed part of a legislator‘s
allocation, and the amount each legislator would
eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by
the majority. The amount was then integrated into
the administration bill prepared by the Department
of Public Works and Communications. Thereafter, the
Senate and the House of Representatives added their
own provisions to the bill until it was signed into law
by the President – the Public Works Act.17 In the
1960‘s, however, pork barrel legislation reportedly
ceased in view of the stalemate between the House of
Representatives and the Senate.18
B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).
While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was
apparently discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law
was declared, an era when "one man controlled the
legislature,"19 the reprieve was only temporary. By
1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already
introduced a new item in the General Appropriations
Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local Development
Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to
Local Government Units". Based on reports,20 it was
under the SLDP that the practice of giving lump-sum
allocations to individual legislators began, with each
assemblyman receiving ₱500,000.00. Thereafter,
assemblymen would communicate their project
preferences to the Ministry of Budget and
Management for approval. Then, the said ministry
would release the allocation papers to the Ministry of
Local Governments, which would, in turn, issue the
checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the
assemblyman‘s locality. It has been further reported
that "Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the
SLDP also began to cover not only public works
projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also "soft
projects",21 or non-public works projects such as
those which would fall under the categories of,
among others, education, health and livelihood.22
C. Post-Martial Law Era:
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-
1992).
 After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and
the restoration of Philippine democracy,
"Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the form
of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the
"Visayas Development Fund" which were created
with lump-sum appropriations of ₱480 Million and
₱240 Million, respectively, for the funding of
development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas
areas in 1989. It has been documented23 that the
clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon
legislators for a similar funding, prompted the
creation of the "Countrywide Development Fund"
(CDF) which was integrated into the 1990 GAA24 with
an initial funding of ₱2.3 Billion to cover "small local
infrastructure and other priority community
projects."
E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).
Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF
funds were, with the approval of the President, to be
released directly to the implementing agencies but
"subject to the submission of the required list of
projects and activities."Although the GAAs from 1990
to 1992 were silent as to the amounts of allocations
of the individual legislators, as well as their
participation in the identification of projects, it has
been reported26 that by 1992, Representatives were
receiving ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds, while
Senators were receiving ₱18 Million each, without
any limitation or qualification, and that they could
identify any kind of project, from hard or
infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and
buildings to "soft projects" such as textbooks,
medicines, and scholarships.27
D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).
The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly
stated that the release of CDF funds was to be made
upon the submission of the list of projects and
activities identified by, among others, individual
legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article
included an allocation for the Vice-President.29 As
F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).
such, Representatives were allocated ₱12.5 Million
each in CDF funds, Senators, ₱18 Million each, and the
Vice-President, ₱20 Million.
In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained
the same provisions on project identification and
fund release as found in the 1993 CDF Article. In
addition, however, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports
to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House
Committee on Appropriations on the releases made
from the funds.33
Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress
and the Vice-President, in consultation with the
implementing agency concerned, were directed to
submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be
funded from their respective CDF allocations which
shall be duly endorsed by (a) the Senate President
and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the
case of the Senate, and (b) the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and the Chairman of the
Committee on Appropriations, in the case of the
House of Representatives; while the list for the
remaining 50% was to be submitted within six (6)
months thereafter. The same article also stated that
the project list, which would be published by the
DBM,35 "shall be the basis for the release of funds"
and that "no funds appropriated herein shall be
disbursed for projects not included in the list herein
required."
The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing
provisions regarding the required lists and
endorsements were reproduced, except that the
publication of the project list was no longer required
as the list itself sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.
The CDF was not, however, the lone form of
"Congressional Pork Barrel" at that time. Other forms
of "Congressional Pork Barrel" were reportedly
fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called
"Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order to
perpetuate the ad ministration‘s political agenda.37 It
has been articulated that since CIs "formed part and
parcel of the budgets of executive departments, they
were not easily identifiable and were thus harder to
monitor." Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as
well as the finance and budget officials of the
implementing agencies, as well as the DBM,
purportedly knew about the insertions.38 Examples
of these CIs are the Department of Education (DepEd)
School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative
Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Niño Fund,
and the Poverty Alleviation Fund.39 The allocations
for the School Building Fund, particularly, ―shall be
made upon prior consultation with the
representative of the legislative district
concerned.”40 Similarly, the legislators had the power
to direct how, where and when these appropriations
were to be spent.41
In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and
replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs, namely,
the "Food Security Program Fund,"43 the "Lingap Para
Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,"44and the "Rural/Urban
Development Infrastructure Program Fund,"45 all of
which contained a special provision requiring "prior
consultation" with the Member s of Congress for the
release of the funds.
It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority
Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in
the GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation with
the respective Representative of the District" before
PDAF funds were directly released to the
implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated
in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of
funds to any expense category was expressly allowed,
with the sole condition that no amount shall be used
to fund personal services and other personnel
benefits.47 The succeeding PDAF provisions
remained the same in view of the re-enactment48 of
the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.
The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and
straightforward as it merely contained a single
special provision ordering the release of the funds
directly to the implementing agency or local
government unit concerned, without further
qualifications. The following year, 2003,50 the same
single provision was present, with simply an
expansion of purpose and express authority to
realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003
budgets of the Department of Public Works and
Highways51 (DPWH) and the DepEd52 required prior
consultation with Members of Congress on the
aspects of implementation delegation and project list
submission, respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA was
re-enacted.53
In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF
shall be used "to fund priority programs and projects
under the ten point agenda of the national
government and shall be released directly to the
implementing agencies." It also introduced the
program menu concept,55 which is essentially a list of
general programs and implementing agencies from
which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently
chosen by the identifying authority. The 2005 GAA
was re-enacted56 in 2006 and hence, operated on the
same bases. In similar regard, the program menu
concept was consistently integrated into the
2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs.
Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were
silent with respect to the specific amounts allocated
for the individual legislators, as well as their
participation in the proposal and identification of
PDAF projects to be funded. In contrast to the PDAF
Articles, however, the provisions under the DepEd
School Building Program and the DPWH budget,
similar to its predecessors, explicitly required prior
consultation with the concerned Member of
Congress61anent certain aspects of project
implementation.
Significantly, it was during this era that provisions
which allowed formal participation of non-
governmental organizations (NGO) in the
 implementation of government projects were
introduced. In the Supplemental Budget for 2006,
with respect to the appropriation for school
buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to
participate. For such purpose, the law stated that "the
amount of at least ₱250 Million of the ₱500 Million
allotted for the construction and completion of school
buildings shall be made available to NGOs including
the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of
Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio
School" program, with capability and proven track
records in the construction of public school buildings
x x x."62 The same allocation was made available to
NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under the DepEd
Budget.63 Also, it was in 2007 that the Government
Procurement Policy Board64 (GPPB) issued
Resolution No. 12-2007 dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB
Resolution 12-2007), amending the implementing
rules and regulations65 of RA 9184,66 the Government
Procurement Reform Act, to include, as a form of
negotiated procurement,67 the procedure whereby
the Procuring Entity68(the implementing agency)
may enter into a memorandum of agreement with an
NGO, provided that "an appropriation law or
ordinance earmarks an amount to be specifically
contracted out to NGOs."69
G. Present Administration (2010-Present).
Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to
the CDF Articles, the 201170 PDAF Article included an
IV. Controversies in the Philippines.
express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated
for individual legislators and the Vice-President:
Representatives were given ₱70 Million each, broken
down into ₱40 Million for "hard projects" and ₱30
Million for "soft projects"; while ₱200 Million was
given to each Senator as well as the Vice-President,
with a ₱100 Million allocation each for "hard" and
"soft projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment
of funds was included, but with the qualification that
it may be allowed only once. The same provision also
allowed the Secretaries of Education, Health, Social
Welfare and Development, Interior and Local
Government, Environment and Natural Resources,
Energy, and Public Works and Highways to realign
PDAF Funds, with the further conditions that: (a)
realignment is within the same implementing unit
and same project category as the original project, for
infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has
not yet been obligated for the original scope of work,
and (c) the request for realignment is with the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.71
In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated
that the "identification of projects and/or designation
of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list,
standard or design prepared by each implementing
agency (priority list requirement) x x x." However, as
practiced, it would still be the individual legislator
who would choose and identify the project from the
said priority list.74
Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund
realignment76 were included in the 2012 and 2013
PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the Vice-
President, which was pegged at ₱200 Million in the
2011 GAA, had been deleted. In addition, the 2013
PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be identified as
implementing agencies if they have the technical
capability to implement the projects.77 Legislators
were also allowed to identify programs/projects,
except for assistance to indigent patients and
scholarships, outside of his legislative district
provided that he secures the written concurrence of
the legislator of the intended outside-district,
endorsed by the Speaker of the House.78 Finally, any
realignment of PDAF funds, modification and revision
of project identification, as well as requests for
release of funds, were all required to be favorably
endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations
and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case
may be.79
III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with
lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of Congress, the
present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have,
however, shown that the term‘s usage has expanded to include
certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund.
On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special
fund under Section 880 of Presidential Decree No. (PD)
910,81 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos)
on March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law, Marcos recognized
the need to set up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen,
and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration,
exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources
vital to economic growth.82 Due to the energy-related activities
of the government in the Malampaya natural gas field in
Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power
Project",83 the special fund created under PD 910 has been
currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.
On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created
under Section 12, Title IV84 of PD 1869,85 or the Charter of the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD
1869 was similarly issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983. More than
two (2) years after, he amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued
PD 1993 on October 31, 1985,86 amending Section 1287 of the
former law. As it stands, the Presidential Social Fund has been
described as a special funding facility managed and
administered by the Presidential Management Staff through
which the President provides direct assistance to priority
programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It
is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate
gross earnings of PAGCOR.88
Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased
tremendously,89 owing in no small part to previous Presidents
who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain
congressional support.90 It was in 1996 when the first
controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted. Former
Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then
an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of
government money that regularly went into the pockets of
legislators in the form of kickbacks."91 He said that "the
kickbacks were ‘SOP‘ (standard operating procedure) among
legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to a high 52
percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything from
dredging, rip rapping, sphalting, concreting, and construction of
school buildings."92 "Other sources of kickbacks that Candazo
identified were public funds intended for medicines and
textbooks. A few days later, the tale of the money trail became
the banner story of the Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of August
13, 1996, accompanied by an illustration of a roasted
pig."93 "The publication of the stories, including those about
congressional initiative allocations of certain lawmakers,
including ₱3.6 Billion for a Congressman, sparked public
outrage."94
Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the
nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 GAA for being
unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent
evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous
Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed.95
Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that "the
government has been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the
past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of
lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost
projects."96 The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits
of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation –
"JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled
billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects"
using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While
the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF
funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the money was
diverted into Napoles‘ private accounts. 97 Thus, after its
investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal complaints
were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5)
lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the
complaints are some of the lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3)
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs
set up by Napoles.98
On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released
the results of a three-year audit investigation99covering the use
of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three
 (3) years of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the audit
was to determine the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF
and the Various Infrastructures including Local Projects
(VILP)100 by the DBM, the application of these funds and the
implementation of projects by the appropriate implementing
agencies and several government-owned-and-controlled
corporations (GOCCs).101 The total releases covered by the audit
amounted to ₱8.374 Billion in PDAF and ₱32.664 Billion in VILP,
representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the total PDAF and
VILP releases that were found to have been made nationwide
during the audit period.102 Accordingly, the Co A‘s findings
contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled
"Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various
Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were made
public, the highlights of which are as follows:103
● Amounts released for projects identified by a
considerable number of legislators significantly
exceeded their respective allocations.
● Amounts were released for projects outside of
legislative districts of sponsoring members of the
Lower House.
● Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the
total amount appropriated under the 2007 to 2009
GAAs.
● Infrastructure projects were constructed on private
lots without these having been turned over to the
government.
● Significant amounts were released to implementing
agencies without the latter‘s endorsement and
without considering their mandated functions,
administrative and technical capabilities to
implement projects.
● Implementation of most livelihood projects was not
undertaken by the implementing agencies
themselves but by NGOs endorsed by the proponent
legislators to which the Funds were transferred.
● The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of
the absence of any appropriation law or ordinance.
● Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law
and regulations.
● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with
implementation of seven hundred seventy two (772)
projects amount to ₱6.156 Billion were either found
questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious
documents, or failed to liquidate in whole or in part
their utilization of the Funds.
● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some
implementing agencies, of goods and services
reportedly used in the projects were not compliant
with law.
As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged
that" at least ₱900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for
agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy
NGO."104 According to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia
Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in
the process of preparing "one consolidated report" on the
Malampaya Funds.105
V. The Procedural Antecedents.
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA
Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions were
lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant
procedural antecedents in these cases are as follows:
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President
of the Social Justice Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition of even date
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the
"Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of
prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents Franklin M.
Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the
incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives,
from further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds for
the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever name it may
be called, and from approving further releases pursuant thereto. 106 The
Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L.
Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.),
and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and
Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated
August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition),
seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the
provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the
Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds
and the Presidential Social Fund,107 be declared unconstitutional and null
and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they
pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.,
Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their
respective capacities as the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and National
Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately cease any expenditure
under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order the
foregoing respondents to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the
complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and
VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the
project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent
data thereto"; and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary
funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and
remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x
project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent
data thereto."108 Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary
deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-sum,
discretionary funds including, but not limited to, proceeds from the
Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR."109 The Belgica
Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566.110
Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno
(Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated August 23, 2012 (Nepomuceno
Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease
and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino
III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to
Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund priority
projects identified and approved by the Local Development Councils in
consultation with the executive departments, such as the DPWH, the
Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of
Transportation, and Communication and the National Economic
Development Authority.111 The Nepomuceno Petition was docketed as
UDK-14951.112
On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a)
consolidating all cases; (b) requiring public respondents to comment on
the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO)
enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any of
the persons acting under their authority from releasing (1) the remaining
PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013, and (2)
Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910 but
not for the purpose of "financing energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government‖ under the same
provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on
October 8, 2013.
On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Consolidated Comment (Comment) of even date before the Court, seeking
the lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting with respect to
educational and medical assistance purposes, of the Court‘s September 10,
2013 TRO, and that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of
merit.113
On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date
directing petitioners to reply to the Comment.
Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective
replies to the Comment: (a) on September 30, 2013, Villegas filed a
separate Reply dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October
1, 2013, Belgica, et al. filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica
Reply); and (c) on October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated October
1, 2013.
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the
guidelines to be observed by the parties for the Oral Arguments scheduled
on October 8, 2013. In view of the technicality of the issues material to the
present cases, incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor
General) was directed to bring with him during the Oral Arguments
representative/s from the DBM and Congress who would be able to
competently and completely answer questions related to, among others,
the budgeting process and its implementation. Further, the CoA
Chairperson was appointed as amicus curiae and thereby requested to
appear before the Court during the Oral Arguments.
On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted.
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda within a period of seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013,
which the parties subsequently did.
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the
following are the main issues for the Court‘s resolution:
I. Procedural Issues.
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve
an actual and justiciable controversy; (b) the issues raised in the
consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review;
(c) petitioners have legal standing to sue; and (d) the Court‘s Decision
dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888,
entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez"114 (Philconsa)
and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers
Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and
Management"115 (LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of the issue of
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" under the principles of res
judicata and stare decisis.
II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they
violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of
powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances;
(d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating
to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by
the Office of the President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869,
as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative
power.
These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated.
In addition, the Court shall also tackle certain ancillary issues as prompted
by the present cases.
The Court’s Ruling
The petitions are partly granted.
I. Procedural Issues.
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving
the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard
and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal
requisites for judicial inquiry,117 namely: (a) there must be an actual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case.118 Of these requisites, case law states that the
first two are the most important119and, therefore, shall be discussed
forthwith.
A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual
case or controversy.120 This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence
provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict
of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or
dispute.121 In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that
can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence."122 Related to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions
raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite
that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege
the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of
the challenged action."123 "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon
constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of
authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions."124
Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and
justiciable controversy in these cases.
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the
antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork
Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for
adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for
their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the
Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the
Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence,
there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of
the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related
thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken
by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in
passing upon the merits.125 Differing from this description, the Court
observes that respondents‘ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would
not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its
resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not
the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains
legally effective and existing. Neither will the President‘s declaration that
he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot
precisely because the Executive branch of government has no
constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By
constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done
either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court,
through a declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is the
following exchange between Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice
Carpio) and the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments: 126
Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the
law,127 correct? Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the
General Appropriations Act, correct?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the
case, for example of the PDAF, the President has a duty to execute the laws
but in the face of the outrage over PDAF, the President was saying, "I am
not sure that I will continue the release of the soft projects," and that
started, Your Honor. Now, whether or not that … (interrupted)
Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the
project, he has the power to stop the releases in the meantime, to
investigate, and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised
Administrative Code128 x x x. So at most the President can suspend, now if
the President believes that the PDAF is unconstitutional, can he just refuse
to implement it?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the
specific case of the PDAF because of the CoA Report, because of the
reported irregularities and this Court can take judicial notice, even outside,
outside of the COA Report, you have the report of the whistle-blowers, the
President was just exercising precisely the duty ….
xxxx
Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. You‘ve seen the CoA Report, there
are anomalies, you stop and investigate, and prosecute, he has done that.
But, does that mean that PDAF has been repealed?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.
xxxx
Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases.
Congress passes a law to repeal it, or this Court declares it unconstitutional,
correct?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF.
(Emphases supplied)
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates
that "the moot and academic‘ principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide
cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar,
and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.129
The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental
posture of petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations of the
Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation of
powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances,
accountability and local autonomy.
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature
of the interests involved
– the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts
of public funds have been and continue to be utilized and expended
undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a
matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have
been lodged at a time when the system‘s flaws have never before been
magnified. To the Court‘s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the
accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government‘s own
recognition that reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of the
PDAF"130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only
underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the
Court finds petitioners‘ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or
hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings
made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the
government. In Delos Santos v. CoA,131 a recent case wherein the Court
upheld the CoA‘s disallowance of irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was
emphasized that:
The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and
disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and
conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and
ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit power is
among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and
balance system inherent in our form of government.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of
administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-
created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation
of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are
entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not
only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted
with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of
discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings.
x x x. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and
justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under
the CoA Report to be sufficient.
The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the
practical need for a definitive ruling on the system‘s constitutionality. As
disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that
thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in
connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this relation,
Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed
out that all of these would eventually find their way to the
courts.132 Accordingly, there is a compelling need to formulate controlling
principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the
anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the
government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in
accordance with constitutional principles.
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the
recognition that the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by
constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence.133 The relevance
of the issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF -
free budget for 2014."134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its
multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance
of truth to petitioners‘ claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing
a different collar."135 In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,136 the government
had already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used
the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception in order "to
prevent similar questions from re- emerging."137 The situation similarly
holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the
manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most
opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade
judicial review.
B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.
The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and
controversies‖ carries the assurance that "the courts will not intrude into
areas committed to the other branches of government."138 Essentially, the
foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine
which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr,139applies when there
is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or "the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light, respondents
submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to
perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the
specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to
impose a solution at this stage."140
The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.
Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present
political but legal questions which are within its province to resolve. A
political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."141 The intrinsic
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent
upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal
one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon.
Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task
that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering
precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the
present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise
judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section
1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law. It includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v.
Desierto,142 the expanded concept of judicial power under the 1987
Constitution and its effect on the political question doctrine was explained
as follows:143
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the
political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review
of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.
Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the
Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new
provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine
what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power
of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)
It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature or the executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution."144 To a great extent, the Court
is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches
of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must
faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed intention
that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede
the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure that the
pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is
in the best interest of the people that each great branch of government,
within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic
and genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the
Court cannot heed respondents‘ plea for judicial restraint.
C. Locus Standi.
"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless
a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the
operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing."145
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as
citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to
the coffers of the National Treasury."146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess
the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel
System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be
utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer
from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules.
Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected
to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, 147 as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing
requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified as
matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest."148 The CoA Chairperson‘s
statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy
involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of
controls"149 amplifies, in addition to the matters above-discussed, the
seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than
the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal
wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid
statute.150 All told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant
cases.
D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.
Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non
quieta et movere (or simply, stare decisis which means "follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has been settled") are general
procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of previous but
factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the
Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to its prior
rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a
judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first
and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter,
and of causes of action.151 This required identity is not, however, attendant
hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved constitutional
challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas
the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork
Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on
a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits – in
that petitioners therein failed to present any "convincing proof x x x
showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members
of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion" or
"pertinent evidentiary support to demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF
in the form of kickbacks and has become a common exercise of
unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such, the Court up held, in view of
the presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF
Article, and saw "no need to review or reverse the standing
pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res
judicata principle, insofar as the Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned,
cannot apply.
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created.
The principle, entrenched under Article 8152 of the Civil Code, evokes the
general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case
should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It
proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus,
where the same questions relating to the same event have been put
forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and
decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any
attempt to re-litigate the same issue.153
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork
Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was resolved by the Court. To
properly understand its context, petitioners‘ posturing was that "the
power given to the Members of Congress to propose and identify projects
and activities to be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the
legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is
in implementation of the law" and that "the proposal and identification of
the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and
amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the
Constitution."154 In deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court
reached the following main conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the
power of appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to Congress;
two, the power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the
project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law and it can be
detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals
and identifications made by Members of Congress are merely
recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa resolution was
a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the
propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to
Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more
holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF
Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire "Pork Barrel
System" as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures
contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those
related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund
release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal
analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful
countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis
principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually
riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly
countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from
the main conclusions of the case, Philconsa‘s fundamental premise in
allowing Members of Congress to propose and identify of projects would
be that the said identification authority is but an aspect of the power of
appropriation which has been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From
this premise, the contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to
identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of
appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress,
then it follows that: (a) it is Congress which should exercise such authority,
and not its individual Members; (b) such authority must be exercised
within the prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be
exercised after the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as
embodied in the GAA, has the force of law and, hence, cannot be merely
recommendatory. Justice Vitug‘s Concurring Opinion in the same case
sums up the Philconsa quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be
objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific
projects as it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the
individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be
constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now largely benefits from
hindsight and current findings on the matter, among others, the CoA
Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa
insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of
Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely
recommendatory. This postulate raises serious constitutional
inconsistencies which cannot be simply excused on the ground that such
mechanism is "imaginative as it is innovative." Moreover, it must be
pointed out that the recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v.
Purisima155(Abakada) has effectively overturned Philconsa‘s allowance of
post-enactment legislator participation in view of the separation of powers
principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will
be discussed in greater detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a
procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine
susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases.
In fine, stare decisis would not apply.
II. Substantive Issues.
A. Definition of Terms.
Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases,
it must first define the terms "Pork Barrel System," "Congressional Pork
Barrel," and "Presidential Pork Barrel" as they are essential to the ensuing
discourse.
Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between
the Legislative and Executive branches of government to accumulate lump-
sum public funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to
determine its distribution as political largesse."156 They assert that the
following elements make up the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-sum funds
are allocated through the appropriations process to an individual officer;
(b) the officer is given sole and broad discretion in determining how the
funds will be used or expended; (c) the guidelines on how to spend or use
the funds in the appropriation are either vague, overbroad or inexistent;
and (d) projects funded are intended to benefit a definite constituency in a
particular part of the country and to help the political careers of the
disbursing official by yielding rich patronage benefits.157 They further state
that the Pork Barrel System is comprised of two (2) kinds of discretionary
public funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently
known as the PDAF;158 and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork
Barrel, specifically, the Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the
Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993.159
Considering petitioners‘ submission and in reference to its local concept
and legal history, the Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective
body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum,
discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized
through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive
branches of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System
involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a
kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either
individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to
effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through various
post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners
consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional
Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows
individual legislators to wield a collective power;160 and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a
kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to
determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated, 161 the
Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the
substantive issues of these cases.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.
1. Separation of Powers.
a. Statement of Principle.
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional
demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government. In the
celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 162 it
means that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government."163 To the legislative branch of
government, through Congress,164belongs the power to make laws; to the
executive branch of government, through the President, 165 belongs the
power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through
the Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great
powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within
its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere."167 Thus, "the
legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive
has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no
power to make or execute the law."168 The principle of separation of
powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the
notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid
concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped,
would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other
branches or the citizenry.169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power
must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are equally
capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates.
Lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of
government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or
others.170
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle
when one branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of
another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of
separation of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch
may interfere impermissibly with the other’s performance of its
constitutionally assigned function";171 and "alternatively, the doctrine may
be violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is
entrusted to another."172 In other words, there is a violation of the principle
when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption
of another department‘s functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA,
is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly
entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon.
Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the phase of budget
execution "covers the various operational aspects of budgeting" and
accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all
"other related activities" that comprise the budget execution cycle.174 This
is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal
branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them.175 Thus,
unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department
should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the
implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well
as any other appropriation law.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more
any of its members, should not cross over the field of implementing the
national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of
the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that "Congress
enters the picture when it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of
the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment
and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the
process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money
may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation
made by law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law -
making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s
role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the
constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern it
self with details for implementation by the Executive."176
The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada
where the Court held that "from the moment the law becomes effective,
any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play
any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the
principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional."177 It must
be clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains to "any role
in the implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still
exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and
balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that
Congress‘ role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-
measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any
constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference
and/or assumption of executive functions. As the Court ruled in
Abakada:178
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to
scrutiny and investigation.1âwphi1 In particular, congressional oversight
must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of
appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection
with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before
and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to
their departments and its power of confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws
pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel –
among others, the 2013 PDAF Article – "wrecks the assignment of
responsibilities between the political branches" as it is designed to allow
individual legislators to interfere "way past the time it should have ceased"
or, particularly, "after the GAA is passed."179 They state that the findings
and recommendations in the CoA Report provide "an illustration of how
absolute and definitive the power of legislators wield over project
implementation in complete violation of the constitutional principle of
separation of powers."180 Further, they point out that the Court in the
Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to exist on the condition that
individual legislators limited their role to recommending projects and not
if they actually dictate their implementation.181
For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers
principle has not been violated since the President maintains "ultimate
authority to control the execution of the GAA‖ and that he "retains the final
discretion to reject" the legislators‘ proposals. 182 They maintain that the
Court, in Philconsa, "upheld the constitutionality of the power of members
of Congress to propose and identify projects so long as such proposal and
identification are recommendatory."183 As such, they claim that
"everything in the Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article follows the
Philconsa framework, and hence, remains constitutional."184
The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms
of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to
participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation.
At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists, 185 prior
consultations186 or program menus187 – have been consistently accorded
post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded
through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013
PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-
GAA may be construed from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well
as the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special
Provision 1 embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced from
past PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to identify PDAF projects
for as long as the identified project falls under a general program listed in
the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides that the
implementing agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA is passed,
submit to Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or design
prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from which the
legislator may make his choice. The same provision further authorizes
legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as long as the
representative of the district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile,
Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects refer to "projects to be
identified by legislators"188 and thereunder provides the allocation limit
for the total amount of projects identified by each legislator. Finally,
paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and
revision of the project identification "shall be submitted to the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for
favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case
may be." From the foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously
doubted that legislators have been accorded post-enactment authority to
identify PDAF projects.
Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been
accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release and
realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of
legislators to participate in the area of fund release through congressional
committees is contained in Special Provision 5 which explicitly states that
"all request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents
prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the
case may be"; while their statutory authority to participate in the area of
fund realignment is contained in: first , paragraph 2, Special Provision
4189 which explicitly state s, among others, that "any realignment of funds
shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the
Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the
implementing agency, as the case may be‖ ; and, second , paragraph 1, also
of Special Provision 4 which authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture,
Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and
Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and
Development and Trade and Industry190 x x x to approve realignment from
one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund,
subject to among others (iii) the request is with the concurrence of the
legislator concerned."
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to
functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to
intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of
budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been,
in one form or another, authorized to participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts
it – "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the
evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the
"regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers
principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada,
cannot be overstated – from the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle
of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. 191 That the said
authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its
unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court
must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the
conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely
recommendatory and, as such, respondents‘ reliance on the same falters
altogether.
Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to
substantiate their position that the identification authority of legislators is
only of recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents –
through the statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments
– have admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a
mandatory requirement before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding
source, thereby highlighting the indispensability of the said act to the
entire budget execution process:192
Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislator’s identification of
the project, can the PDAF of the legislator be utilized?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.
Justice Bernabe: It cannot?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)
Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the
project by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not
done and then there is no identification.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project
was implemented without the identification by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so
but I have no specific examples. I would doubt very much, Your Honor,
because to implement, there is a need for a SARO and the NCA. And the
SARO and the NCA are triggered by an identification from the legislator.
xxxx
Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is
we were replying to a question, "How can a legislator make sure that he is
able to get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he must identify,
in that sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify, he cannot avail
of the PDAF Funds and his district would not be able to have PDAF Funds,
only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013
PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which
legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget
execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same
unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and have,
in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years has not been
substantially disputed here. As pointed out by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes
P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these
cases:193
Chief Justice Sereno:
Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two
(2) Houses of Congress, if we enforces the initial thought that I have, after
I had seen the extent of this research made by my staff, that neither the
Executive nor Congress frontally faced the question of constitutional
compatibility of how they were engineering the budget process. In fact, the
words you have been using, as the three lawyers of the DBM, and both
Houses of Congress has also been using is surprise; surprised that all of
these things are now surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF
provisions did was to codify in one section all the past practice that had
been done since 1991. In a certain sense, we should be thankful that they
are all now in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have,
whether through formal measures written into the law or informal
practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive
department be deprived of what the Constitution has vested as its own.
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.
a. Statement of Principle.
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, 194 legislative power
shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has
conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative
and referendum.195 Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress,
acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative
and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no
other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a)
delegated legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial
practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters; 196 and (b)
constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President
to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national emergency,197or fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as
Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government.198
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a
restriction to delegate rule-making authority to implementing agencies for
the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its
enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring
the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).199The conceptual
treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the
case of People v. Maceren200 as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a
relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to
the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or
"subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are
necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the law."
xxxx
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into
effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to
amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters
not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be
sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar
as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators
are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation,
which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.201 That the power
to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from
Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of
appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular
Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the
setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a
specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual
legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able
to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project
or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts
comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in
Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual
legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been
conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however,
allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative
power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative
identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
3. Checks and Balances.
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.
The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept
separate and distinct does not mean that they are absolutely unrestrained
and independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government. 203
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the
President’s power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue
or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process
known as "bill presentment." The President‘s item-veto power is found in
Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:
Sec. 27. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items
in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the
item or items to which he does not object.
The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President,
wherein he may exercise his power of item-veto, forms part of the "single,
finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage
as specified under the Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada, the final step
in the law-making process is the "submission of the bill to the President for
approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required
publication."205
Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto power and its relevance as a
check on the legislature, the Court, in Bengzon, explained that:206
The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines
make the Chief Executive an integral part of the law-making power. His
disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative
act. The questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are
precisely the same as those the legislature must determine in passing a bill,
except that his will be a broader point of view.
The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative
department of the government, but in this respect it is a grant of power to
the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to
enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the
constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature.
It follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the
Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be confined to
rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise interference of the
judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the
constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as they will presume the
constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature.
(Emphases supplied)
The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on a variety of
policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling legislation,207 impose fiscal
restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch‘s
role in the budgetary process.208 In Immigration and Naturalization Service
v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the President‘s item-power
as "a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the
community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse
unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of
that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the chances in favor
of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste,
inadvertence, or design."209
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows
that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. An
item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars,
the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the
bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine
Islands,210 the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as
follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is
a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which
happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure
that the President may be able to exercise his power of item veto, must
contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general
provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be
an item characterized by singular correspondence – meaning an allocation
of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise
known as a "line-item."211 This treatment not only allows the item to be
consistent with its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but
also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same. Based on
the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund
and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified
amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line- item"
appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must
be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into
component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each
percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose
for such component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as
Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have
several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice
considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating
expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently
specific for the exercise of the President‘s item veto power. Finally, special
purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally square with the
constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule
on singular correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special purpose
funds, it must be added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution requires that the "special appropriations bill shall specify the
purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually
available as certified by the National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect to
discretionary funds, Section 2 5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be
supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may
be prescribed by law."
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations
which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a
source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type
necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be
expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be
chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that
the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of
money‖ and hence, without a proper line-item which the President may
veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the
predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of
its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire
appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally,
it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-
delegability issues considering that the implementing authority would still
have to determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended and the
actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations
constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the
implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative
prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the
PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the legislator‘s identification of the
projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to
veto that item later on."212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto
power of the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item
budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which
effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President
useless."213
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution
envisions a process which is intended to meet the demands of a
modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are essential
to financially address situations which are barely foreseen when a GAA is
enacted. They argue that the decision of the Congress to create some lump-
sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded.214
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as
a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided
among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum
allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF
funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations
are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of
the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation
would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus
effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-
enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation
of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of
presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto.
As petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system forces the
President to decide between (a) accepting the entire ₱24.79 Billion PDAF
allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which
may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting
the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate
projects.215
Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification
feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since
it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation
above-characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of ₱24.79 Billion
would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes
of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents,
preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control,
etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual
amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and,
therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be
subject to the President‘s power of item veto.
reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their
official functions only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution
which embodies the parameters of the people‘s trust. The notion of a public
trust connotes accountability,221 hence, the various mechanisms in the
Constitution which are designed to exact accountability from public
officers.
Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper
expenditure of public funds may be checked is the power of congressional
oversight. As mentioned in Abakada,222 congressional oversight may be
performed either through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘
power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection
with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be
heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments
and its power of confirmation;223 or (b) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation.224
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article,
has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators
are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes
it difficult for them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing,
investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law.
To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect,
be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must
be pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment
authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the
Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its
subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he
may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project
implementation – a matter before another office of government – renders
them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-
enactment authority and/or the individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF
per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the
Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to
this area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter
which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case
basis.

Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close
In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme
operational proximity between legislators and the Executive department,
has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, "limited state auditors from obtaining
through the former‘s post-enactment participation, may affect the process
relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing
of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and
the utilization of said Funds."216 Accordingly, she recommends the
does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System‘s intrinsic
adoption of a "line by line budget or amount per proposed program,
constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.
activity or project, and per implementing agency."217

In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional

Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF
oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus
Article, as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation,
impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of
to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater
Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as
degree of flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse
unconstitutional.
to defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential
truth of the matter is that unconstitutional means do not justify even
commendable ends.218 4. Political Dynasties.

c. Accountability.
Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies public accountability as it
renders Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. In particular,
they point out that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a
direct, financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly
budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into "financially-interested
partners."219 They also claim that the system has an effect on re- election
as "the PDAF excels in self-perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they
add that the "PDAF impairs the power of impeachment" as such "funds are
indeed quite useful, ‘to well, accelerate the decisions of senators.‘" 220
The Court agrees in part.
The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
which states that "public office is a public trust," is an overarching
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables
politicians who are members of political dynasties to accumulate funds to
perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II
of the 1987 Constitution225 which states that:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered
as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase "as may be defined by
law." In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies guideline
for legislative or executive action.226 Therefore, since there appears to be
no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for
enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be
largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the
Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.
5. Local Autonomy.
The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25,
Article II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which
read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
ARTICLE X
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms
of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and
provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other
matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise known as the
"Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), wherein the policy on local
autonomy had been more specifically explicated as follows:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the
State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy
genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the
State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization
whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall
proceed from the National Government to the local government units.
xxxx
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and
offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local
government units, nongovernmental and people‘s organizations, and other
concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is
implemented in their respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the
policy of the State to empower local government units (LGUs) to develop
and ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective contributors to the
national economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine Gamefowl
Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court:228
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the
Constitution to the policy of local autonomy which is intended to provide
the needed impetus and encouragement to the development of our local
political subdivisions as "self - reliant communities." In the words of
Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small republics from which the
great one derives its strength." The vitalization of local governments will
enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and more
important, imbue them with a deepened sense of involvement in public
affairs as members of the body politic. This objective could be blunted by
undue interference by the national government in purely local affairs
which are best resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such political
units. The decision we reach today conforms not only to the letter of the
pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the Constitution. 229 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel
goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows
district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their
judgments in utilizing public funds for local development.230 The Court
agrees with petitioners.
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the
unequal" and that "it is also a recognition that individual members of
Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues,
are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective
constituents and the priority to be given each project."231 Drawing strength
from this pronouncement, previous legislators justified its existence by
stating that "the relatively small projects implemented under the
Congressional Pork Barrel complement and link the national development
goals to the countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas which
are overlooked by central agencies which are preoccupied with mega-
projects.232 Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition" of
PDAF and budgetary reforms, President Aquino mentioned that the
Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy goal,
which is to enable the representatives to identify projects for communities
that the LGU concerned cannot afford.233
Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent
defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of "making
equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF
and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without
taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are
clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or
geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As a result, a
district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same
amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province
which would be relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To
add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List
Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-President – who do not
represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel
as well. These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel‘s
original intent which is "to make equal the unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF
and CDF had become personal funds under the effective control of each
legislator and given unto them on the sole account of their office.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying
the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local
Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to
"assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic
and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its
territorial jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities
whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local
affairs,235 their programs, policies and resolutions should not be
overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national
officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a
body. The undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the post-
enactment authority conferred to the latter was succinctly put by
petitioners in the following wise:236
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development
council and initiate projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its
execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has
not only contributed little to the overall development of the district, but
has even contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and
coordination efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely
local matters and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF
Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is
deemed unconstitutional.
With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court
now turns to the substantive issues involving the Presidential Pork Barrel.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.
1. Validity of Appropriation.
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of
PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993), which respectively provide for the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid
appropriations laws since they do not have the "primary and specific"
purpose of authorizing the release of public funds from the National
Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an
appropriation law since the "primary and specific‖ purpose of PD 910 is
the creation of an Energy Development Board and Section 8 thereof only
created a Special Fund incidental thereto.237 In similar regard, petitioners
argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid appropriations law since
the allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the
"primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of the
Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR.238 In view of the foregoing, petitioners
suppose that such funds are being used without any valid law allowing for
their proper appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."239
The Court disagrees.
"An appropriation made by law‖ under the contemplation of Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets
apart a determinate or determinable240 amount of money and (b) allocates
the same for a particular public purpose. These two minimum designations
of amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the word
"appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a
particular use or purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate
that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution "does
not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals
in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made,
except that it be ‘made by law,‘" an appropriation law may – according to
Philconsa – be "detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be" for as long
as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same. As held in the
case of Guingona, Jr.:241
There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any
particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law,"
such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned
presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an
appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting
legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by
enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may
be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional
authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general
appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special
application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes,
such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if
the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language
employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past
or in the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La
Grave:242
To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund
applicable to the designated purpose. The word appropriate means to allot,
assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose. An appropriation
in the sense of the constitution means the setting apart a portion of the
public funds for a public purpose. No particular form of words is necessary
for the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is plainly manifested.
(Emphases supplied)
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that
the appropriation must be the "primary and specific" purpose of the law in
order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision
designates a determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates
the same for a particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to
appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under contemplation of
the Constitution.
Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
Section 8. Appropriations. x x x
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources
including receipts from service contracts and agreements such as
application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus,
production bonus; all money collected from concessionaires, representing
unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act of
1949; as well as the government share representing royalties, rentals,
production share on service contracts and similar payments on the
exploration, development and exploitation of energy resources, shall form
part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President. (Emphases
supplied)
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%)
percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government
in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise, or
60% if the aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00 shall be
set aside and shall accrue to the General Fund to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines. (Emphases
supplied)
Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned principles, it may
then be concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a Special
Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy
Development Board from any and all sources" (a determinable amount) "to
be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President" (a specified public purpose),
and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which similarly
sets aside, "after deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty
(50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of
PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate gross earnings be less than
₱150,000,000.00" (also a determinable amount) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration of damaged
or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized
by the Office of the President of the Philippines" (also a specified public
purpose), are legal appropriations under Section 29(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be
properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the said constitutional
provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment
measures which effectively create a system of intermediate
appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual
appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by
individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law.
As such, the Court observes that the real appropriation made under the
2013 PDAF Article is not the ₱24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF,
but rather the post-enactment determinations made by the individual
legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law.
Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an "appropriation
made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual
legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as
afore-discussed.
2. Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power since the phrase "and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
gives the President "unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose
the funds will be used."243 Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court
to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the same section and thus,
construe the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" to refer only to other purposes related "to
energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government."244
The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.
While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a
particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the
appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same
law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive245 either for the
purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known
as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law
into actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-making.246 There are
two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for
delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the
"completeness test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the
delegate. On the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient
standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient
standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate‘s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.247 To be sufficient, the standard must specify
the limits of the delegate‘s authority, announce the legislative policy, and
identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.248
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect
to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads,
the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya
Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to
unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That
the subject phrase may be confined only to "energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the government" under the
principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is
to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling,
or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned,249 is belied by
three (3) reasons: first, the phrase "energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government" states a singular
and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of
specific things from which the general phrase "for such other purposes"
may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it
represents, namely energy development programs of the
government;250 and, third, the Executive department has, in fact, used the
Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject
phrase, thereby contradicting respondents‘ own position that it is limited
only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government."251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have
passed the completeness test since the policy of energy development is
clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President" under the same provision of
law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law.
This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8,
insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government," remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the
declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an
assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used – as it should be used
– only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the
fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already been amended by PD 1993
which thus moots the parties‘ submissions on the same. 252 Nevertheless,
since the amendatory provision may be readily examined under the
current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to resolve its
constitutionality.
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that
the Presidential Social Fund may be used "to first, finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the restoration
of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines." The Court
finds that while the second indicated purpose adequately curtails the
authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for
restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated
purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund
for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a "priority". Verily,
the law does not supply a definition of "priority in frastructure
development projects" and hence, leaves the President without any
guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one
of "infrastructure" is too broad of a classification since the said term could
pertain to any kind of facility. This may be deduced from its lexicographic
definition as follows: "the underlying framework of a system, especially
public services and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges, sewers,
and water-systems) needed to support commerce as well as economic and
residential development."253 In fine, the phrase "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" must be stricken down as
unconstitutional since – similar to the above-assailed provision under
Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient
standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions
of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective
and subsisting.
D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.
Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.
Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System
unconstitutional – as the Court did so in the context of its pronouncements
made in this Decision – petitioners equally pray that the Executive
Secretary and/or the DBM be ordered to release to the CoA and to the
public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of
their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the
funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and
all pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List);254 and (b) "the use of
the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds
from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x
from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient
entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"255 (Presidential Pork
Use Report). Petitioners‘ prayer is grounded on Section 28, Article II and
Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
ARTICLE III Sec. 7.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to
information is to file a petition for mandamus. As explained in the case of
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:256
While the manner of examining public records may be subject to
reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the
duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to
public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies.
Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion
of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may
be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The
constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be
compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the
public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are
unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of
mandamus in this case is, whether the information sought by the petitioner
is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied)
Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr. 257 (Valmonte), it has
been clarified that the right to information does not include the right to
compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries and the like." In the
same case, it was stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has a well
-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is
the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required." Hence,
without the foregoing substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular
request for information. The pertinent portions of Valmonte are hereunder
quoted:258
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant
thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does
not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare
lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire
information on matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that
the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing
demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the
act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the
required act must be clear and specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768,
November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344,
August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no
duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested. (Emphases
supplied)
In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the
nature of mandamus actions, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to
establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be furnished by
the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use
Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners
assert any law or administrative issuance which would form the bases of
the latter‘s duty to furnish them with the documents requested. While
petitioners pray that said information be equally released to the CoA, it
must be pointed out that the CoA has not been impleaded as a party to
these cases nor has it filed any petition before the Court to be allowed
access to or to compel the release of any official document relevant to the
conduct of its audit investigations. While the Court recognizes that the
information requested is a matter of significant public concern, however, if
only to ensure that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted and
so as not to unduly hamper the equally important interests of the
government, it is constrained to deny petitioners‘ prayer on this score,
without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA,
may choose to pursue through a separate petition.
It bears clarification that the Court‘s denial herein should only cover
petitioners‘ plea to be furnished with such schedule/list and report and not
in any way deny them, or the general public, access to official documents
which are already existing and of public record. Subject to reasonable
regulation and absent any valid statutory prohibition, access to these
documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court
denied the application for mandamus towards the preparation of the list
requested by petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed access to the
documents sought for by the latter, subject, however, to the custodian‘s
reasonable regulations,viz.:259
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans
granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may
promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end
that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue
interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be
prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the
records may be insured Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p.
538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to the
second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is
meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by
petitioners, i.e.,
"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure
clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.
2. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.
Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary
deliberations with the Congress of all presently, off-budget, lump sum,
discretionary funds including but not limited to, proceeds from the x x x
Malampaya Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the
Executive‘s Social Funds."260
Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers
a matter which is generally left to the prerogative of the political branches
of government. Hence, lest the Court itself overreach, it must equally deny
their prayer on this score.
3. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.
The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by
the DBM to the concept of released funds. In response to the Court‘s
September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF
allocated for the year 2013, the DBM issued Circular Letter No. 2013-8
dated September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which pertinently reads
as follows:
3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a
Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) has been issued by the DBM and
such SARO has been obligated by the implementing agencies prior to the
issuance of the TRO, may continually be implemented and disbursements
thereto effected by the agencies concerned.
Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued
implementation and disbursement of PDAF funds as long as they are: first,
covered by a SARO; and, second, that said SARO had been obligated by the
implementing agency concerned prior to the issuance of the Court‘s
September 10, 2013 TRO.
Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the
issuance of the SARO does not yet involve the release of funds under the
PDAF, as release is only triggered by the issuance of a Notice of Cash
Allocation [(NCA)]."261 As such, PDAF disbursements, even if covered by an
obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.
For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers
"unreleased and unobligated allotments." They explain that once a SARO
has been issued and obligated by the implementing agency concerned, the
PDAF funds covered by the same are already "beyond the reach of the TRO
because they cannot be considered as ‘remaining PDAF.‘" They conclude
that this is a reasonable interpretation of the TRO by the DBM. 262
The Court agrees with petitioners in part.
At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the
Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO should be lifted is a matter rendered moot
by the present Decision. The unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article
as declared herein has the consequential effect of converting the
temporary injunction into a permanent one. Hence, from the promulgation
of this Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF funds for 2013, among
others, is now permanently enjoined.
The propriety of the DBM‘s interpretation of the concept of "release" must,
nevertheless, be resolved as it has a practical impact on the execution of
the current Decision. In particular, the Court must resolve the issue of
whether or not PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at the time this
Decision is promulgated, may still be disbursed following the DBM‘s
interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.
On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners‘ posturing for the
fundamental reason that funds covered by an obligated SARO are yet to be
"released" under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself
in its website, is "aspecific authority issued to identified agencies to incur
obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the
purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is
subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to
separate approval or clearance by competent authority."263
Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the
existence of an obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically speaking,
the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public
funds beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may
even be withdrawn under certain circumstances which will prevent the
actual release of funds. On the other hand, the actual release of funds is
brought about by the issuance of the NCA,264 which is subsequent to the
issuance of a SARO. As may be determined from the statements of the DBM
representative during the Oral Arguments:265
Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the
SARO?
xxxx
Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for
the agencies to obligate or to enter into commitments. The NCA, Your
Honor, is already the go signal to the treasury for us to be able to pay or to
liquidate the amounts obligated in the SARO; so it comes after. x x x The
NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal for the MDS for the authorized
government-disbursing banks to, therefore, pay the payees depending on
the projects or projects covered by the SARO and the NCA.
Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?
Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are
instances that the SAROs issued are withdrawn by the DBM.
Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?
Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as
funds which have been "released." In this respect, therefore, the
disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated
SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of
this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the
unappropriated surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view of the declared
unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated
pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even though already obligated, else
the Court sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an unconstitutional
source.
This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya
Funds which have been obligated but not released – meaning, those merely
covered by a SARO – under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910;
and (b) funds sourced from the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase
"to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether
declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However, these funds should not
be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively
remain under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be
utilized for their corresponding special purposes not otherwise declared
as unconstitutional.
E. Consequential Effects of Decision.
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court‘s pronouncement anent
the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special
Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar
thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12
of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective
in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until
the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain
legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus,
entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and
complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,266 the doctrine merely "reflects
awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ
which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure
is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power
of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no
recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication."267 "In the
language of an American Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of
a statute, prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored.‘"268
For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied
prospectively.
Conclusion
The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in are related to these funds must, however, not be prohibited but merely
the chronicles of our history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike subjected to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations or any valid statutory
down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent prohibition on the same. This denial is without prejudice to a proper
defects in the rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may choose to
allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post- pursue through a separate petition.
enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has
violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the
unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal,
funds subject of these cases in the budgetary deliberations of Congress as
discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects
the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of
which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of
government.
non-delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it has created a system of
budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it
has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the
denied the President the power to veto items ; insofar as it has diluted the government to, within the bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and
effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private individuals
affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be for possible criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or
called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel
accountability ; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national System.
officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence
of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the
power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes
only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under SO ORDERED.
the broad classification of "priority infrastructure development projects,"
it has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.

For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious
unconstitutional methods and mechanisms the Court has herein pointed
out should never again be adopted in any system of governance, by any
name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence or effect.
Disconcerting as it is to think that a system so constitutionally unsound has
monumentally endured, the Court urges the people and its co-stewards in
government to look forward with the optimism of change and the
awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest and vociferous public
debate, the Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it may not
purge all the wrongs of society nor bring back what has been lost, guides
this nation to the path forged by the Constitution so that no one may
heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its course. After all, this is
the Court‘s bounden duty and no other‘s.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the

constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby
declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all
legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such
as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional
Insertions, which authorize/d legislators – whether individually or
collectively organized into committees – to intervene, assume or
participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget
execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification,
modification and revision of project identification, fund release and/or
fund realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional oversight; (c)
all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws,
such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional
Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators
from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves
determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and effect, which the
Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8
of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential
Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both
failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power.

Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013

is hereby declared to be PERMANENT. Thus, the disbursement/release of
the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all
previous years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds
under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No.
910, and (2) the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of
Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993,
which are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice
of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release Orders
(SAROs), whether obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining
PDAF funds covered by this permanent injunction shall not be
disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of
the general fund, while the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be utilized for their
respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.

On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper

substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES petitioners‘ prayer seeking that
the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and
Management be ordered to provide the public and the Commission on
Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the
availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners‘
access to official documents already available and of public record which