[JURISDICTION]

Irene Sante vs Hon. Edilberto Claravall

G.R. No. 173915 February 22, 2010

Facts:
Vita Kalashian (respondent) filed before RTC Baguio a complaint for damages against petitioners. Resp
alleged that while she was inside the Police Station of Natividad Pangasinan, petitioner Irene Sante uttered
words: How many rounds of sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You fuckin’ bitch!"
Bert is respondent’s friend. He and one (1) of her hired personal security guards detained at the said station
is a suspect in the killing of petitioners’ close relative. Petitioners also allegedly went around Natividad,
Pangasinan telling people that she is protecting and cuddling the suspects in the killing. Thus respondent
prayed that Sante be held for moral (300k), exemplary (50k) damages, litigation (20k), attorney’s fees (50k).

Petitioners filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground that MTCC and not RTC had jurisdiction over the case.
They argued that the amount of the claim for moral damages was not more than the jurisdictional amount
of ₱300,000.00, because the claim for exemplary damages should be excluded in computing the total
claim.

Trial Court: denied the MTD

Pet filed Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before CA. Meanwhile resp filed an amended complaint
increasing the moral damages to 1M.
Pet filed Pet for Cert and Prohibition: claiming that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the amendment of the complaint to increase the amount of moral damages from ₱300,000.00 to
₱1,000,000.00.
CA, on Sept 17, 2004, GRANTED the Petition for Cert and Prohib: case clearly falls under the jurisdiction
of the MTCC as the allegations show that plaintiff was seeking to recover moral damages in the amount of
₱300,000.00, which amount was well within the jurisdictional amount of the MTCC. The Court of Appeals
added that the totality of claim rule used for determining which court had jurisdiction could not be applied
to the instant case because plaintiff’s claim for exemplary damages was not a separate and distinct
cause of action from her claim of moral damages, but merely incidental to it. Thus, the prayer for
exemplary damages should be excluded in computing the total amount of the claim.

On January 31, 2006, CA, this time affirmed Order of RTC denying pet’s MTD: total or aggregate amount
demanded in the complaint constitutes the basis of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals did not find merit in
petitioners’ posture that the claims for exemplary damages and attorney’s fees are merely incidental to the
main cause and should not be included in the computation of the total claim.

Pet: insist that the complaint falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTCC. They maintain that
the claim for moral damages, in the amount of ₱300,000.00 in the original complaint, is the main
action. The exemplary damages being discretionary should not be included in the computation of the
jurisdictional amount. And having no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, the RTC acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it allowed the amendment of the complaint to increase the claim for moral
damages in order to confer jurisdiction.

Resp: the nature of her complaint is for recovery of damages. As such, the totality of the claim for
damages, including the exemplary damages as well as the other damages alleged and prayed in the
complaint, such as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, should be included in determining jurisdiction.
HELD:
Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129: SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
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(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand
pesos (₱100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the
abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000.00).

Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7691 further provides:

SEC. 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec.
19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to
Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be
adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos (₱300,000.00): Provided, however, That in the case of
Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years from the
effectivity of this Act to Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00).

Based on the foregoing, there is no question that at the time of the filing of the complaint on April 5, 2004,
the MTCC’s jurisdictional amount has been adjusted to ₱300,000.00

!!!- The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount under
Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where
the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where
the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim
shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. (Emphasis ours.)

In the instant case, the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 5794-R is for the recovery of damages for the
alleged malicious acts of petitioners. The complaint principally sought an award of moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, for the alleged shame and
injury suffered by respondent by reason of petitioners’ utterance while they were at a police station
in Pangasinan. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint
since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s causes of
action. It is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint, that respondent’s main action is for damages.
Hence, the other forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorney’s fees
and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the
primary relief prayed for in the complaint.
- Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was ₱420,000.00, the Court of Appeals was correct
in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.

Other notes:
Lastly, we find no error, much less grave abuse of discretion, on the part of the Court of Appeals in affirming
the RTC’s order allowing the amendment of the original complaint from ₱300,000.00 to ₱1,000,000.00
despite the pendency of a petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. While it is a basic
jurisprudential principle that an amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the
original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court, here, the RTC
clearly had jurisdiction over the original complaint and amendment of the complaint was then still a matter
of right.
MICHAEL SEBASTIAN, Petitioner, vs. ANNABEL LAGMAY NG, represented by her Attorney-in-
fact, ANGELITA LAGMAY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 164594 April 22, 2015

Facts:
In 1997, Angelita Lagmay, representative and atty-in-fact of her daughter Annabel Lagmay Ng, filed a
complaint before the Barangay Justice of Laur, Nueva Ecija. She sought to collect from Michael 350k
that Annabel sent to Michael. She claimed that Annabel and Michael were once sweethearts, and that they
agreed to jointly invest their financial resources to buy a truck. She alleged that while Annabel was working
in Hongkong, Annabel sent Michael the amount of 350k to purchase the truck. However, after Annabel and
Michael’s relationship has ended, Michael allegedly refused to return the money to Annabel, prompting the
latter to bring the matter before the Barangay Justice.

On July 9, 1997, the parties entered into an amicable settlement, evidenced by a document denominated as
"kasunduan" wherein Michael agreed to pay Annabel the amount of ₱250,000.00 on specific dates. The
kasunduan was signed by Angelita.

Kasunduan was not repudiated w/in 10 days from the settlement. Michael failed to honor the kasunduan.
Angelita brought the matter back to the Barangay, but the Barangay Captain failed to enforce the kasunduan,
and instead, issued a Certification to File Action. On Jan 15, 1999, Angelita filed with MCTC a Motion for
Execution. Michael moved for the dismissal of the Motion for Execution, citing as a ground Angelita’s
alleged violation of Section 15, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
MCTC: ordered defendant to pay plaintiff 250k
RTC: upheld MCTC
On Motion for Recon: Michael argued that the MCTC does not have jurisdiction over the case since
the amount of ₱250,000.00 (as the subject matter of the kasunduan) is in excess of MCTC’s jurisdictional
amount of 200k. He also assails the kasunduan on the ground of forgery.
RTC: granted MR and dismissed the MFExec and set aside MCTC decision
CA: reversed RTC decision. MCTC has jurisdiction to enforce any settlement or arbitration award,
regardless of the amount involved. CA also ruled that Michael’s failure to repudiate the kasunduan
in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 7160,
rendered the kasunduan final.

HELD:
- The MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to enforce the kasunduan regardless of the amount
involved. CA correctly upheld the MCTC’s jurisdiction to enforce any settlement or arbitration
award issued by the Lupon.
- Section 417 of the Local Government Code (Execution) that after the lapse of the six (6) month period
from the date of the settlement, the agreement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal
court. Notably, in expressly conferring authority over these courts, Section 417 made no distinction with
respect to the amount involved or the nature of the issue involved. Thus, there can be no question
that the law’s intendment was to grant jurisdiction over the enforcement of settlement/arbitration
awards to the city or municipal courts the regardless of the amount.

- Under this provision, an amicable settlement or arbitration award that is not repudiated within a period of
ten (10) days from the settlement may be enforced by: first, execution by the Lupon within six (6) months
from the date of the settlement; or second, by an action in the appropriate city or municipal trial court if
more than six (6) months from the date of settlement has already elapsed.
The second mode of enforcement, on the other hand, is judicial in nature and could only be resorted to
through the institution of an action in a regular form before the proper City/Municipal Trial Court. The
proceedings shall be governed by the provisions of the Rules of Court. Indisputably, Angelita chose to
enforce the kasunduan under the second mode and filed a motion for execution.
The kasunduan has the force and effect of a final judgment.
Under Section 416 of the Local Government Code, the amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have
the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten (10) days from the date of its
execution, unless the settlement or award has been repudiated or a petition to nullify the award has been
filed before the proper city or municipal court.

Moreover, Section 14, Rule VI of the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules states that the party’s
failure to repudiate the settlement within the period of ten (10) days shall be deemed a waiver of the right
to challenge the settlement on the ground that his/her consent was vitiated by fraud, violence or intimidation.
In the present case, the records reveal that Michael never repudiated the kasunduan within the period
prescribed by the law. Hence, the CA correctly ruled that the kasunduan has the force and effect of a final
judgment that is ripe for execution.

Furthermore, the irregularities in the kasunduan’s execution, and the claim of forgery are deemed waived
since Michael never raised these defenses in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Local
Government Code.

MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, Petitioner, vs. LEONARDO V. NONATO, Respondent

G.R. No. 176492 October 20, 2014
Facts:
In the course of the marriage of respondent Nonato and petitioner Barrido., they were Able to acquire prop
in Bacolod City(house and lot). Their marriage was declared void otg of psychological incapacity. Since
there’s no more co-ownership over the property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition but latter refused. Thus,
Nonato filed Complaint for partition in MTCC.

Barrido: subject property had already been sold to their children. Moved for dismissal of the complaint
because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
MTCC: Applying Art 129 FC, adjudicated the conjugal dwelling to the defendant Marietta Nonato, the
spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Ordered plaintiff to pay
defendant ₱10,000.00 as moral damages for the mental anguish and unnecessary inconvenience brought
about by this suit; and an additional ₱10,000.00 as exemplary
RTC: reversed MTCC’s Decision. House and lot should be equitably partitioned; reimburse amount
advanced by them in payment of debts and obligations, and to deliver the presumptive legitimes.

CA: affirmed RTC since the property’s assessed value was only ₱8,080.00, it clearly fell within the
MTCC’s jurisdiction.

HELD:
The MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or those affecting title to real property,
or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage
on real property.
SEC 33 of BP 129: Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (₱20,000.00)or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed
Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the assessed
value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)

Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely ₱8,080.00, an amount which certainly does not
exceed the required limit of ₱20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila to fall within the jurisdiction
of the MTCC. Therefore, the lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case

BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU, petitioner, vs. Heirs of FRANCISCO PASTOR
G.R. No. 138896 June 20, 2000
Doctrine: An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the
jurisdiction of the regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject property.

Facts:
Pet filed before MTC of Talisay Cebu a Complaint to expropriate a property of respondents. MTC
dismissed the complaint otg of lack of jurisdiction reasoned that "[e]minent domain is an exercise of the
power to take private property for public use after payment of just compensation. In an action for eminent
domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the
action also involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with this Court."

RTC: dismissed the complaint holding that an action for eminent domain affected title to real property;
hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before
the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of
the subject property was less than P20,000,. Appears from current Tax Declaration of the land involved that
its assessed value is only P1,740. So Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction is with MTC The instant action
for eminent domain or condemnation of real property is a real action affecting title to or possession of real
property, hence, it is the assessed value of the property involved which determines the jurisdiction of the
court.

Pet: cites Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation; . . . . ." It argues that the present action involves the exercise of the right to eminent
domain, and that such right is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Resp: contend that the Complaint for Eminent Domain affects the title to or possession of real property.
Thus, they argue that the case should have been brought before the MTC, pursuant to BP 129 as amended
by Section 3 (3) of RA 7691: MTCs shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions that
involve title to or possession of real property, the assessed value of which does not exceed twenty thousand
pesos or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, fifty thousand pesos exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
HELD:
We agree with the petitioner that an expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The test to
determine whether it is so was laid down by the Court in this wise:
!!! This Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy
sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend
on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in
actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.
!!! - In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather,
it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for
public use.
!!- True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-
bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation
suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the
expropriation.
(The government does not dispute respondents' title to or possession of the same. Indeed, it is not a question
of who has a better title or right, for the government does not even claim that it has a title to the property.
It merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to "appropriate and control individual property for the public
benefit, as the public necessity, convenience or welfare may demand.")

MANUEL LUIS C. GONZALES and FRANCIS MARTIN D.

GONZALES, Petitioners,
vs.
GJH LAND, INC. (formerly known as S.J. LAND, INC.), Respondents.

Facts:
Pets Manuel and Francis Gonzales filed a Complaint for Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Status Quo
against resp GLH Land before the RTC of Muntinlupa City seeking to enjoin the sale of S.J. Land,
Inc.'s shares which they purportedly bought from S.J. Global, Inc. on February 1, 2010. Essentially,
petitioners alleged that the subscriptions for the said shares were already paid by them in full in the books
of S.J. Land, Inc. but were nonetheless offered for sale on July 29, 2011 to the corporation's stockholders.
Case was raffled to Branch 276 which is not a Special Commercial Court. It granted the application for
a writ of prelim injunction
Resp filed a MTD otg of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter pointing out that the case involves
an intra-corporate dispute and should, thus, be heard by the designated Special Commercial Court
of Muntinlupa City.
RTC: case involves an intra-corporate dispute that is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTCs designated as Special Commercial Courts. It pointed out that the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch
256 (Branch 256) was specifically designated by the Court as the Special Commercial Court, hence,
Branch 276 had no jurisdiction over the case and cannot lawfully exercise jurisdiction

Pets: filed MR alleging that they filed the case with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of
Muntinlupa City which assigned the same to Branch 276 by raffle. As the raffle was beyond their control,
they should not be made to suffer the consequences of the wrong assignment of the case, especially after
paying the filing fees.; that the RTC has jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes under Republic Act No.
(RA) 8799; the case must, at most, be transferred or raffled off to the proper branch.
Branch 276 denied the motion for reconsideration, holding that it has no authority or power to order the
transfer of the case to the proper Special Commercial Court.

HELD:
- Here, petitioners filed a commercial case, i.e., an intra-corporate dispute, with the Office of the Clerk of
Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is the official station of the designated Special Commercial
Court. It is, therefore, from the time of such filing that the RTC of Muntinlupa City acquired jurisdiction
over the subject matter or the nature of the action.43 Unfortunately, the commercial case was wrongly
raffled to a regular branch, i.e., Branch 276, instead of being assigned44 to the sole Special Commercial
Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is Branch 256. This error may have been caused by a reliance
on the complaint's caption, i.e., "Civil Case for Injunction with prayer for Status Quo Order, TRO and
Damages," which, however, contradicts and more importantly, cannot prevail over its actual allegations
that clearly make out an intra-corporate dispute

- Erroneous raffling to a regular branch instead of to a Special Commercial Court is only a matter of
procedure - that is, an incident related to the exercise of jurisdiction - and, thus, should not negate the
jurisdiction which the RTC of Muntinlupa City had already acquired. In such a scenario, the proper course
of action was not for the commercial case to be dismissed; instead, Branch 276 should have first referred
the case to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case; thereafter, the Executive
Judge should then assign said case to the only designated Special
Commercial Court in the station, i.e., Branch 256.

THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES SHALL BE OBSERVED:

1. If a commercial case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly raffled to its regular branch, the proper
courses of action are as follows:
1.1 If the RTC has only one branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then the case shall
be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case, and thereafter, assigned
to the sole special branch;
1.2 If the RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, then the case shall
be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case, and thereafter, raffled off
among those special branches; and
1.3 If the RTC has no internal branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then the case shall
be referred to the nearest RTC with a designated Special Commercial Court branch within the
judicial region. Upon referral, the RTC to which the case was referred to should redocket the case
as a commercial case, and then: (a) if the said RTC has only one branch designated as a Special
Commercial Court, assign the case to the sole special branch; or (b) if the said RTC has multiple
branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, raffle off the case among those special
branches.
2. If an ordinary civil case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly raffled to its branch designated as a
Special Commercial Court, then the case shall be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as an
ordinary civil case. Thereafter, it shall be raffled off to all courts of the same RTC (including its designated
special branches which, by statute, are equally capable of exercising general jurisdiction same as regular
branches), as provided for under existing rules.
3. All transfer/raffle of cases is subject to the payment of the appropriate docket fees in case of any
difference. On the other hand, all docket fees already paid shall be duly credited, and any excess, refunded.

- Branch 276 to have correctly categorized Civil Case No. 11-077 as a commercial case, more particularly,
an intra-corporate dispute, considering that it relates to petitioners' averred rights over the shares of stock
offered for sale to other stockholders, having paid the same in full. Applying the relationship test and the
nature of the controversy test, the suit between the parties is clearly rooted in the existence of an intra-
corporate relationship and pertains to the enforcement of their correlative rights and obligations under the
Corporation Code
- Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law, whereas a court's exercise of
jurisdiction, unless provided by the law itself, is governed by the Rules of Court or by the orders issued
from time to time by the Court. In Lozada v. Bracewell, it was recently held that the matter of whether
the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a
special court is only a matter of procedure and has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction.
- The objective behind the designation of such specialized courts is to promote expediency and efficiency
in the exercise of the RTCs' jurisdiction over the cases enumerated under Section 5 of PD 902-A. Court
cannot enlarge, diminish, or dictate when jurisdiction shall be removed, given that the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion jurisdiction is, as a general rule, a matter of legislative prerogative.

[RULE 2]

JOSEFINA RUBIO DE LARENA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. HERMENEGILDO VILLANUEVA,

defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-29155 November 5, 1928

Facts:
This is a sequel to case G. R. No. 21706 where the court affirmed the decision ordering the rescission of a
lease of the Tacgajan Sugar Plantation and the payment by the defendant-lessee of the unpaid balance of
the rent for the agricultural year 1920-1922 with interest from August 26, 1922, rent for the agricultural
year 1921-1923 and possession of the leased land be delivered to the plaintiff. A writ of execution was
issued, but before levy was made the parties came to an agreement, under which the money judgment was
to be satisfied by the payment of P10,500 in cash and the transfer to the plaintiff of a dwelling house situated
in the municipality of Bais. In the meantime, the defendant had harvested the sugarcane crop produced in
the agricultural year 1922-1924, and continued in possession of the plantation long enough to appropriate
ratoon cane crop.

The present action was brought on 1925, but the last amended complaint, setting forth three causes of action,
was not filed until June 17, 1927. As her first cause of action, plaintiff averred that defendant, in bad faith
continued in possession during the agricultural year 1922-1924 and produced 1,679.02 piculs for his own
benefit. For the second cause of action, plaintiff alleges that under the contract of lease of the Hacienda, the
obligations include that he would use the care of a good father of the family in conserving the tools,
agricultural implements, draft animals, and other effects, and return said property to the plaintiff. He
returned only a part. As a third cause of action, the plaintiff alleges that the harvest of sugar cane was
illegally made.

In his answer, defendants allege that according to the pleadings in case G. R. No. 21706, the two causes of
action were included in that case and, therefore, must be considered res adjudicata.

ISSUE: Did the Court err in absolving the defendant from liability upon the first cause of action?

HELD: No, because this argument does not involve the doctrine of res judicata but rests on the well-known
American law, that a party will not be permitted to split up a single cause of action an make it the basis for
several suits. But that is not this case. The rule is well established that when a lease provides for the
payment of the rent in separate installments, each installment is an independent cause of action,
though it has been held and is good law, that in an action upon such a lease for the recovery of rent,
the installments due at the time the action brought must be included in the complaint and that failure
to do so will constitute a bar to a subsequent action for the payment of that rent.

The aforesaid action, G. R. No. 21706, was brought on August 23, 1922, the plaintiff demanding payment
of then sue rent in addition to the rescission of the lease. On July 27, 1923, the plaintiff filed a motion for
an amendment to paragraph 6 of the complaint. The plaintiff also amended the prayer of the complaint by
asking judgment for rent for years subsequent to 1922. The motion was granted, and the case came up for
trial on July 30, 1923, and on September 8, 1923, the trial court rendered its decision giving judgment for
rent up to and including the rent for the agricultural year ending in 1923. The lease did not provide for
payment of rent in advance or at any definite time, and it appears plainly from the record that the
rent for an agricultural year was not considered due until the end of the corresponding year. It follows
that the rent for the agricultural year 1922-1924 had not become due time of the trial of the case and that
consequently the trial court could not render judgment therefore. The action referred to is, therefore, no bar
to the first cause of action in the present litigation.

BLOSSOM AND COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. MANILA GAS CORPORATION,

defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-32958 November 8, 1930

Facts:

In 1918, Blossom & Co. and Manila Gas Corp. entered into a contract in which the plaintiff promised and
undertook to purchase and receive from the defendant and the defendant agreed to sell and deliver to the
plaintiff, for a period of four years, three tons of water gas tar per month from September to January 1,
1919. It was agreed that this price should prevail only so long as the raw materials — coal and crude oil —
used by the defendant in the manufacture of gas should cost the defendant the same price as that prevailing
at the time of the contract. The contract was later amended so that it should continue to remain in force for
a period of ten years. In consideration, the plaintiff agreed to purchase from defendant a certain piece of
land lying adjacent to its plants. The defendant sold and conveyed the land to the plaintiff which in turn
executed a mortgage to secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price.

In July 1920, around 4 years after execution of the contract, the defendant willfully, and deliberately
breached its said contract with the plaintiff by ceasing to deliver any coal and water gas tar to it solely
because of the increased price of its tar products and its desire to secure better prices therefor than plaintiff
was obliged to pay to it, notwithstanding the frequent and urgent demands made by the plaintiff upon it to
comply with its aforesaid contract by continuing to deliver the coal and water gas tar to the plaintiff
thereunder. An action for damages was filed and was ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The Court granted the
recovery of damages but refused to order defendants to resume delivery. Subsequently, another action for
damages was filed for breach of contract after refusal to perform its obligation.

ISSUE: Was the plaintiff barred from filing a second action for damages?

HELD: Yes, because the plaintiff's original cause of action, in which it recovered judgment for damages,
was founded on the ten-year contract, and that the damages which it then recovered were recovered for a
breach of that contract. Both actions are founded on one and the same contract. Under plaintiff's own theory,
the defendant was to make deliveries from month to month of the tars during the period of ten years, and it
is alleged in both complaints that the defendant broke its contract, and in bad faith refused to make any
more deliveries.
As a general rule a contract to do several things at several times in its nature, so as to authorize successive
actions; and a judgment recovered for a single breach of a continuing contract or covenant is no bar to a
suit for a subsequent breach thereof. But where the covenant or contract is entire, and the breach total,
there can be only one action, and plaintiff must therein recover all his damages. An unqualified and
positive refusal to perform a contract, though the performance thereof is not yet due, may, if the renunciation
goes to the whole contract, be treated as a complete breach which will entitle the injured party to bring his
action at once (Doctrine of Anticipatory Breach).

Where there is a complete and total breach of a continuous contract for a term of years, the recovery of a
judgment for damages by reason of the breach is a bar to another action on the same contract for and on
account of the continuous breach.

SWAGMAN HOTELS AND TRAVEL, INC., Petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and
NEAL B. CHRISTIAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 161135. April 8, 2005

Doctrine: A complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed cannot be cured by the
accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of the case

Facts:
Petitioner Swagman obtained from private respondent Neal B. Christian loans evidenced by 3 promissory
notes (Aug 1996, March and July 1997) payable after 3 years. Each for USD50k. In Dec 1998, Christian
informed pet that he was terminating the loans and demanded from the latter total amount of 150k plus
interests.
In February 2, 1999. Priv resp filed with RTC Baguio a complaint for sum of money and damages against
pet corporation.
Pet corp filed an answer raising lack of cause of action and novation (interest was reduced from 15% to
6%) of principal obligation. Priv resp had no cause of action because the 3 promissory notes were not
yet due and demandable. It prayed that the complaint be dismissed and damages be paid.

RTC: When the instant case was filed on February 2, 1999, none of the promissory notes was due and
demandable. As of this date however, the first and the second promissory notes have already matured.
Hence, payment is already due.

The petitioner harps on the absence of a cause of action at the time the private respondent’s complaint was
filed with the trial court. In connection with this, the petitioner raises the issue of novation by arguing that
its obligations under the three promissory notes were novated by the renegotiation that happened in
December 1997 wherein the private respondent agreed to waive the interest in each of the three promissory
notes and to accept US$750 per month as installment payment for the principal loans in the total amount of
US$150,000.

HELD:
Cause of action, as defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is the act or omission
by which a party violates the right of another. Its essential elements are as follows:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.

It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff the
right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
!!!Here, at the time the complaint was filed with the trial court on 2 February 1999, none of the three
promissory notes was due yet; although, two of the promissory notes with the due dates of 7 August 1999
and 14 March 2000 matured during the pendency of the case with the trial court. Both courts also found
that the petitioner had been religiously paying the private respondent US$750 per month from January 1998
and even during the pendency of the case before the trial court and that the private respondent had accepted
all these monthly payments.

With these findings of facts, it has become glaringly obvious that when the complaint for a sum of
money and damages was filed with the trial court on 2 February 1999, no cause of action has as yet
existed because the petitioner had not committed any act in violation of the terms of the three
promissory notes as modified by the renegotiation in December 1997. Without a cause of action, the
private respondent had no right to maintain an action in court, and the trial court should have
therefore dismissed his complaint.

!!!- It thus follows that a complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured or remedied
by an amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action while the
case is pending. Such an action is prematurely brought and is, therefore, a groundless suit, which should be
dismissed by the court upon proper motion seasonably filed by the defendant. The underlying reason for
this rule is that a person should not be summoned before the public tribunals to answer for complaints which
are immature.
It is a rule of law to which there is, perhaps, no exception, either at law or in equity, that to recover at all
there must be some cause of action at the commencement of the suit.

We are therefore of the opinion, and so hold, that unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of
action at the time his action is commenced, the defect cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition
or accrual of one while the action is pending, and a supplemental complaint or an amendment setting
up such after-accrued cause of action is not permissible.

Other notes:
The curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at the time the
complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts. For example, if a
complaint failed to allege the fulfilment of a condition precedent upon which the cause of action depends,
evidence showing that such condition had already been fulfilled when the complaint was filed may be
presented during the trial, and the complaint may accordingly be amended thereafter
LILIA B. ADA, LUZ B. ADANZA, FLORA C. BA YLON, REMO BA YLON, JOSE BA YLON,
ERIC BA YLON, FLORENTINO BA YLON, and MA. RUBY BA YLON, Petitioners, vs.
FLORANTE BA YLON, Respondent.
G.R. No. 182435 August 13, 2012

Facts:
This involves the estate of Spouses Baylon. At the time of their death, Spouses were survived by their
legitimate children Rita, Panfila, Lilia herein petitioners.
Pets (wife of Ramon and their children, Lilia, ) filed Complaint for partition and damages against
Florante, Rita and Panfila. They alleged therein that Spouses Baylon, during their lifetime, owned 43 parcels
of land all situated in Negros Oriental. After the death of Spouses Baylon, they claimed that Rita took
possession of the said parcels of land and appropriated for herself the income from the same. Using the
income produced by the said parcels of land, Rita allegedly purchased two parcels of land, Lot No. 47096
and half of Lot No. 4706. Rita refused to effect partition of said lands. Florante, Rita and Panfila asserted
that they and the petitioners co-owned 229 out of the 43 parcels of land mentioned in the latter’s complaint,
whereas Rita actually owned 10 parcels of land out of the 43 parcels which the petitioners sought to
partition, while the remaining 11 parcels of land are separately owned by Petra Cafino. They denied that
Rita appropriated solely for herself the income of the estate of Spouses Baylon, and expressed no objection
to the partition of the estate of Spouses Baylon, but only with respect to the co-owned parcels of land.

During the pendency of the case, Rita, through a Deed of Donation dated July 6, 1997, conveyed Lot
No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 to Florante. Petitioners filed a Supplemental Pleading dated February
6, 2002, praying that the said donation in favor of the respondent be rescinded in accordance with Article
1381(4) of the Civil Code. They further alleged that Rita was already sick and very weak when the said
Deed of Donation was supposedly executed and, thus, could not have validly given her consent.

RTC: rescinded the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 in favor of Florante.
donation inter vivos executed by Rita Baylon in favor of Florante Baylon is rescissible for the reason that
it refers to the parcels of land in litigation x x x without the knowledge and approval of the plaintiffs or of
this Court

CA: reversed RTC insofar as the decree on the rescission of the Deed of Donation. REMANDED to the
trial court for the determination of ownership of lot no. 4709 and half of lot no. 4706; They must first obtain
a favorable judicial ruling that Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 actually belonged to the estate of
Spouses Baylon and not to Rita. Until then, the CA asserted, an action for rescission is premature
before plaintiffs-appellees may file an action for rescission, they must first obtain a favorable judicial ruling
that lot no. 4709 and half of lot no. 4706 actually belonged to the estate of Spouses Florentino and Maximina
Baylon, and not to Rita Baylon during her lifetime. An action for rescission should be filed by the parties
concerned independent of the proceedings below. The first cannot simply be lumped up with the second
through a mere supplemental pleading

HELD:
Misjoinder of Causes of Action.
Complaint filed by pets with RTC involves two separate, distinct, and independent actions – partition (the
refusal of their co-heirs, Florante, Rita and Panfila, to partition the properties which they inherited from
Spouses Baylon)and rescission (assailed the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706
made by Rita in favor of Florante pendente lite).

[Actions of Partition and Rescission cannot be joined in a single action]

- By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action is meant the uniting of two or more
demands or rights of action in one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration.
It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate
suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several
distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.29
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties and subject
matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy
and litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation
at minimum cost.
Nevertheless, while parties to an action may assert in one pleading, in the alternative or otherwise, as many
causes of action as they may have against an opposing party, such joinder of causes of action is subject to
the condition, inter alia, that the joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules.

!!! - Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for partition filed by the petitioners
could not be joined with the action for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante.
Lest it be overlooked, an action for partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary rules of civil
procedure. The variance in the procedure in the special civil action of partition and in the ordinary civil
action of rescission precludes their joinder in one complaint or their being tried in a single proceeding to
avoid confusion in determining what rules shall govern the conduct of the proceedings as well as in the
determination of the presence of requisite elements of each particular cause of action.

[A misjoined cause of action, if not severed upon motion of a party or by the court sua sponte, may
be adjudicated by the court together with the other causes of action.]
- Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. Indeed, the courts have the
power, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or sua sponte, to order the severance of the misjoined
cause of action to be proceeded with separately. However, if there is no objection to the improper joinder
or the court did not motu proprio direct a severance, then there exists no bar in the simultaneous adjudication
of all the erroneously joined causes of action.

(Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear
and proceed with the case. They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof. Instead, under the
Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied admission of the court’s
jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its
own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with separately (in
case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against
said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of parties).
It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only applies if the court trying the case has jurisdiction
over all of the causes of action therein notwithstanding the misjoinder of the same. If the court trying
the case has no jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of action, then such misjoined cause of action has to be
severed from the other causes of action, and if not so severed, any adjudication rendered by the court with
respect to the same would be a nullity.
Here, Florante posed no objection, and neither did the RTC direct the severance of the petitioners’
action for rescission from their action for partition. While this may be a patent omission on the part
of the RTC, this does not constitute a ground to assail the validity and correctness of its decision. The
RTC validly adjudicated the issues raised in the actions for partition and rescission filed by the
petitioners.
NORLINDA S. MARILAG, Petitioner,
vs.
MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 201892 July 22, 2015

Facts:
Rafael Martinez, respondent’s father obtained from petitioner a loan (160k) with 5% monthly interest. It
was secured by Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land. Rafael failed to settle his obligation upon
maturity and despite repeated demands, prompting pet to file a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure. RTC
ordered Rafael to pay 229,200. Meanwhile prior to the decision, respondent agreed to pay Rafael’s
obligation w/c was pegged at 689k. After making a total payment of P400,000, he executed a promissory
note dated February 20, 1998 (subject promissory note), binding himself to pay on or before March 31,
1998 the amount of P289,000.00, "representing the balance”. After learning of the January 30, 1998
Decision, respondent refused to pay the amount covered by the subject promissory note despite demands,
prompting petitioner to file a complaint for sum of money and damages before the court.

Resp: filed his answer, contending that petitioner has no cause of action against him. He averred that he has
fully settled Rafael's obligation and that he committed a mistake in paying more than the amount due under
the loan. He therefore prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, and interposed a compulsory counterclaim
for the release of the mortgage, the return of the excess payment, and the payment of moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

Trial court: granted petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and recalled and set aside its August 28, 2003
Decision. It declared that the causes of action in the collection and foreclosure cases are distinct, and
respondent's failure to comply with his obligation under the subject PN justifies petitioner to seek judicial
relief.

CA: doctrine of res judicata finds application in the instant case, considering that both the judicial
foreclosure and collection cases were filed as a consequence of the non-payment of Rafael's loan, which
was the principal obligation secured by the real estate mortgage and the primary consideration for the
execution of the subject promissory note. The judgment in the judicial foreclosure case relating to
Rafael's obligation to petitioner is final and conclusive on the collection case.

HELD:
-Res judicata is inapplicable to the present case.
!!! - Records are bereft of any indication that the August 28, 2003 Decision(where court a quo denied
recovery on the subject promissory note) in the judicial foreclosure case had already attained finality,
evidenced, for instance, by a copy of the entry of judgment in the said case. Accordingly, with the very first
element of res judicata missing, said principle cannot be made to obtain.

This notwithstanding, the Court holds that petitioner's prosecution of the collection case was barred, instead,
by the principle of litis pendentia in view of the substantial identity of parties and singularity of the causes
of action in the foreclosure and collection cases, such that the prior foreclosure case barred petitioner's
recourse to the subsequent collection case.
To lay down the basics, litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to that
situation wherein another action is pending; between the same parties for the same cause of action,
such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. For the bar of litis pendentia to be
invoked, the following requisites must concur:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; ( b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and ( c) the identity of the
two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party
is successful would amount to res judicata in the other. The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the
theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter and for
the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the same subject matter should
not be the subject of controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may
be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons, and also to avoid the costs and
expenses incident to numerous suits.
Consequently, a party will not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make it a basis for several
suits as the whole cause must be determined in one action. To be sure, splitting a cause of action is a
mode of forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different
prayers, where the ground of dismissal is litis pendentia (or resjudicata, as the case may be).

!!! - The true rule, therefore, is whether the entire amount arises from one and the same act or contract
which must, thus, be sued for in one action, or the several parts arise from distinct and different acts
or contracts, for which a party may maintain separate suits.
In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee has a single cause
of action against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt, through the filing of a personal action
for collection of sum of money or the institution of a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security.
The two remedies are alternative, not cumulative or successive, and each remedy is complete by itself.
Thus, if the creditor-mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he waives the action for the
collection of the unpaid debt, except only for the recovery of whatever deficiency may remain in the
outstanding obligation of the debtor-mortgagor after deducting the bid price in the public auction sale
of the mortgaged properties. Accordingly, a deficiency judgment shall only issue after it is established
that the mortgaged property was sold at public auction for an amount less than the outstanding obligation.

In the present case, records show that petitioner, as creditor-mortgagee, instituted an action for judicial
foreclosure pursuant to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court in order to recover on Rafael's debt.
In light of the foregoing discussion, the availment of such remedy thus bars recourse to the subsequent
filing of a personal action for collection of the same debt, in this case, under the principle of litis pendentia,
considering that the foreclosure case only remains pending as it was not shown to have attained finality.
- Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and subject promissory note both refer to one and the same obligation i.e.
Rafael’s loan obligation. As such, there exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation.
Petitioner cannot split her cause of action on Rafael's unpaid loan obligation by filing a petition for
the judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage covering the said loan, and, thereafter, a personal
action for the collection of the unpaid balance of said obligation not comprising a deficiency arising
from foreclosure, without violating the proscription against splitting a single cause of action, where
the ground for dismissal is either res judicata or litis pendentia, as in this case.

As petitioner had already instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged property, she is
now barred from availing herself of an ordinary action for collection, regardless of whether or not the
decision in the foreclosure case had attained finality.