J Bus Ethics
DOI 10.1007/s10551-017-3642-z
ORIGINAL PAPER
When Does Family Ownership Promote Proactive Environmental
Strategy? The Role of the Firm’s Long-Term Orientation
Junsheng Dou1 • Emma Su2 • Song Wang1
Received: 7 January 2017 / Accepted: 5 July 2017
 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017
Abstract This research proposes an explanation for the
conflicting extant evidence about whether family owner-
ship of a business promotes proactive environmental
strategy (PES). Based on insights drawn from strategic
reference point theory, organizational identity theory, and
the socioemotional wealth preservation perspective, we
propose that family ownership has a moderated–mediated
relationship with PES, with commitment as a moderator
and long-term orientation as a mediator. A test using 454
China private firms with different levels of family owner-
ship supports the hypotheses. This shows that PES as a
strategy related to business ethics does not happen without
commitment and long-term orientation.
Keywords Family commitment
Family ownership

Long-term orientation
Proactive environmental strategy

Socioemotional wealth
Strategic reference point
& Song Wang
wasofei@zju.edu.cn
Junsheng Dou
jsdou@zju.edu.cn
Emma Su
ys381@msstate.edu
1
School of Management, Zhejiang University,
Hangzhou 310058, China
2
Department of Management and Information Systems,
Mississippi State University, Starkville, MS 39762, USA
Introduction
Firms, as systems nested in societal and ecological sys-
tems, have long been seen as having potential negative
effects on the environment (Polanyi 1944) because exces-
sive industrial production can contribute to environmental
imbalance and the erosion of natural systems (Bansal and
Song 2017; Gladwin et al. 1995). Given the growing
concerns about global warming, the depletion of natural
resources, and reductions in biodiversity, finding the best
ways to engage firms in environmentally sustainable
actions is of utmost importance and expediency to both
academics and practitioners (e.g., Uhlaner et al. 2012). One
encouraging development in this direction is the growing
number of firms adopting proactive environmental strate-
gies (PES) (e.g., Aragón-Correa 1998; Aragón-Correa and
Sharma 2003; Dixon-Fowler et al. 2013; Hart 1995;
Sharma and Vredenburg 1998; Stefan and Paul 2008). To
motivate more PES among firms, however, we must first
understand why and how some firms take more proactive
environmental stances than others. Not surprisingly, orga-
nization and strategy researchers have paid an increasing
attention to understanding the factors that influence a firm’s
pursuit of PES.
Researchers have studied the antecedents of PES at
different levels of analysis and in varied contexts (Sharma
and Sharma 2011). For example, research has shown that
managers’ leadership styles (Egri and Herman 2000),
managerial interpretations (Sharma 2000), attitudes toward
environmental issues (Cordano and Frieze 2000), discre-
tion in managing the business and natural environment
interface (Bansal 2003; Sharma 2000), and owner identity
(e.g., Berrone et al. 2010; Dyer and Whetten 2006) are
critical factors influencing a firm’s adoption of PES.
Specifically, firm owner identity (e.g., family, institutional
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investors, government, or state) has long been recognized
as having important effects on firm strategic behavior (e.g.,
Fiss and Zajac 2004; Hautz et al. 2013; Sklivas 1987;
Thomsen and Pedersen 2000). Family ownership, being the
most prevalent type of business ownership around the
world (Anderson and Reeb 2003; Astrachan and Shanker
2003; Villalonga et al. 2015), has therefore received con-
siderable focus in terms of its impact on strategic behavior,
for example, on internationalization (Arregle et al. 2012),
on diversification (Gómez-Mejı́a et al. 2010), and on R&D
investments (Chrisman and Patel 2012). Consequently, it is
not surprising that family ownership’s impact on PES has
also received attention by researchers.1
With respect to family ownership’s influence on PES,
the evidence has been inconclusive. Some studies found
firms controlled by families have better environmental
performance than those without such control (e.g., Berrone
et al. 2010), while others have found no significant dif-
ferences (e.g., Uhlaner et al. 2012) or even the opposite
(e.g., Dekker and Hasso 2016). These studies examined the
influence of ownership by dichotomizing their sample firms
into family and non-family ones using arbitrary cutoff in
ownership percentages. Therefore, the inconsistent findings
could have resulted from the coarse grain approach of
quantifying family ownership. It would be interesting to
examine how the results would change if family ownership
were measured as a continuous variable. More importantly,
while it is worthwhile to examine how methodological
differences may have contributed to the conflicting find-
ings, we believe that our understanding of PES behavior
within this most ubiquitous of business organizations
would be improved much more by looking for theoretical
explanations, which is the purpose of this paper. The the-
oretical explanation that we propose in this paper concerns
that great differences exist among firms with different
degrees of family involvement in ownership (Chrisman
et al. 2012), and such differences may lead to variation in
their adoption of strategies, specifically, PES. Our study
focuses on two of the sources of differences among firms
with various levels of family ownership—long-term ori-
entation and the owner family’s commitment to the con-
tinuity of the business.
According to the strategic reference point (SRP) theory,
strategic behaviors of an organization can be influenced
1
We would like to emphasize this is not a study about family firms.
Instead, it is about owner identity’s, specifically family ownership’s,
influence on firm behavior. There is a consensus that family
ownership does not, by itself, make a firm a family firm. For
example, researchers, when identifying family firms, add to owner-
ship: family management, the intention for intrafamily succession
(Chua et al. 1999), involvement of multiple family generations
(Shanker and Astrachan 1996), or self-identification as a family firm
(Westhead and Cowling 1998).
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J. Dou et al.
directly by its decision makers’ choice of reference points
(Fiegenbaum et al. 1996). SRP is conceptualized as a
multidimensional concept, of which time is an important
dimension that serves as a source of decision frames in a
firm’s strategic choices (Fiegenbaum et al. 1996). In other
words, firms make decisions by anchoring on reference
points that simultaneously include the past, present, and/or
future (e.g., Bearden et al. 2006; Karniol and Ross 1996;
Mosakowski and Earley 2000; Shi and Prescott 2011). The
temporal orientation has been considered a distinguishing
feature of family-owned firms (Brigham et al. 2014; Le
Breton-Miller and Miller 2006; Lumpkin and Brigham
2011). Due to their multigenerational perspective (Ander-
son and Reeb 2003) and emphasis on building long-lasting
relationships among family members and with major
stakeholders (Arregle et al. 2007), firms with high level of
family ownership are argued to be especially cognizant of
time-based issues. For example, Lumpkin et al. (2010)
examined how a long-term orientation (LTO) might affect
the entrepreneurial orientation of family-owned firms. This
line of research suggests that the selection of a temporal
perspective as a reference point may serve as an important
mechanism to understand the influence of family owner-
ship on a firm’s strategic choices.
While family-owned firms are largely considered to
have a long-term temporal perspective relative to non-
family-owned firms (e.g., Anderson and Reeb 2003; Le
Breton-Miller and Miller 2006; Lumpkin et al. 2010), not
all family-owned firms share the same strength of LTO
(Lumpkin and Brigham 2011; Miller and Le Breton-Miller
2006). As such, Brigham et al. (2014) have called for more
research on the heterogeneity among family-owned firms
with respect to LTO, as well as the subsequent conse-
quences of LTO. With the growing recognition that family-
owned firms are heterogeneous (Chrisman et al. 2012;
Melin and Nordqvist 2007), one of the arguments under-
lying this body of research is that family ownership does
not necessarily lead to particularistic behaviors of a firm. A
family-owned firm’s behavior is also determined to a large
extent by the controlling family’s willingness to use its
influence within the firm to pursue particularistic ends.
Such willingness is captured in the concept of ‘‘family
essence’’ (Chrisman et al. 2012, p. 268). A major indicator
of ‘‘family essence’’ is the controlling family’s commit-
ment to the firm (Chrisman et al. 2012; Klein et al. 2005),
which implies a family’s access to resources and desire to
pursue family-centered non-economic goals (Chrisman
et al. 2012; Habbershon et al. 2003). Therefore, in the
present paper we simultaneously examine the indirect
effect of family ownership on a firm’s PES via LTO, and
the moderating effect of family commitment on the rela-
tionship between family ownership and a firm’s LTO.
When Does Family Ownership Promote Proactive Environmental Strategy? The Role of the Firm’s…
By teasing out the moderated mediation effect of family
ownership on a firm’s PES, this paper makes several
important contributions to the literature. First, in terms of
business ethics, it shows that both long-term orientation
and family commitment are needed for a family-owned
business to exhibit ethical behavior. This has important
implications for business ethics research because
researchers may test their hypotheses with only one or the
other variable. Second, with respect to PES as a business
ethical behavior, we show that the relationship between
owner identity and the behavior is much more complex
than currently portrayed in the literature. This suggests that
the relationship between firm attributes and other business
ethical behavior may also be more complex than currently
proposed and tested by researchers. Third, by showing that
the complex relationship between family ownership and
PES involves both mediation and moderation, our results
provide a theoretical explanation that has the potential to
resolve the conflicting evidence about the influence of
family ownership on PES. Finally, it adds to the evidence
that the family’s commitment to the continuity of the firm
strengthens the firm’s LTO (Lumpkin et al. 2010; Lumpkin
and Brigham 2011) which has been proposed as a source of
family-owned firms’ competitive advantage (Le Breton-
Miller and Miller 2006; Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2005).
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
Given the potential of PES to alleviate the negative effects
of human activities on the environment, organization and
natural environment (ONE) scholars have devoted signifi-
cant efforts to understanding the factors that impact a
firm’s pursuit of PES (Sharma and Sharma 2011). One
body of research based on the institutional and stakeholder
theories examined the important roles of external pressures
from market and non-market constituents in shaping a
firm’s environmental initiatives (Searcy 2012; Van Mar-
rewijk 2003). This line of research mainly focused on
examining how government regulations (Clemens and
Douglas 2006), industrial institutions (Hoffman 1999), and
stakeholder pressures (Buysse and Verbeke 2003; Sharma
and Henriques 2005) such as pressures from competitors
(Khanna and Rivkin 2006) may affect a firm’s PES.
Another body of research investigated endogenous drivers
of a firm’s PES at the organizational and individual levels.
At the organizational level, organizational values (Bansal
2003), organizational capabilities (Aragón-Correa and
Sharma 2003; Russo and Fouts 1997; Sharma and Vre-
denburg 1998), and organizational identity (Sharma 2000)
have been identified as important drivers of a firm’s PES.
At the individual level, research shows that a firm’s envi-
ronmental practices are associated with environmental
managers’ attitudes toward pollution prevention, their
perceived behavioral control, and their perceptions of
norms of environmental regulation (e.g., Bansal 2003;
Cordano and Frieze 2000; Sharma 2000).
Research from various disciplines, including corporate
governance, finance, and strategic management, shows that
different types of business owners vary in their time hori-
zons, strategy expectations, risk assessment, and mitigation
criteria and that these differences lead to different strategic
choices for the firms (David et al. 2010; Sprenger 2011;
Tetrault Sirsly and Sur 2013; Thomsen and Pedersen
2000). Therefore, researchers have also examined owner
identity’s influence on firms’ adoption of PES. Since
family ownership represents the most prevalent type of
business ownership around the world (Anderson and Reeb
2003; Claessens et al. 2000; Porta et al. 1999), it is
important to include the family variable in PES research
(Sharma and Sharma 2011).
While the existing research shows that family ownership
matters in a firm’s adoption of PES, the precise effect
remains unclear. For instance, Berrone et al.’s (2010) study
of US public firms shows that family-controlled firms have
better environmental performance than non-family firms.
However, studies in the private setting using a sample of
small- and medium-sized firms in the USA and the
Netherlands show that family firms have weaker pro-en-
vironmental attitudes and performance compared to non-
family firms (Craig and Dibrell 2006; Dekker and Hasso
2016). Further adding to this debate, Uhlaner et al. (2012)
used a sample of small- and medium-sized enterprises from
the Netherlands and found that a significant positive effect
of family involvement on a firm’s engagement in envi-
ronmental management practices was observed only in
family firms with three or more family owners. These
mixed findings suggest that the relationship between family
ownership and a firm’s PES is rather complex. Following
Chrisman et al.’s (2012) suggestion that, when empirical
evidence is conflicting, the behavior studied is likely more
complicated than hypothesized and includes moderation or
mediation, we introduce the LTO as a mediator and family
commitment as a moderator to examine the influence of
family ownership on a firm’s PES.
The SRP theory, the organizational identity theory, and
the SEW preservation perspective provide us with funda-
mental insights into the reasoning underlying the logic of
our mediation and moderation hypotheses. SRPs are
defined as ‘‘the targets or benchmarks that managers use to
evaluate choices, to make strategic decisions, and to signal
to other key personnel their system-wide or organizational
priorities’’ (Bamberger and Fiegenbaum 1996, p. 927).
Thus, SRPs have important implications for managers’
strategic choices (Bamberger and Fiegenbaum 1996;
Fiegenbaum et al. 1996). A core dimension of SRPs is
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time, which represents the past, present, and future orien-
tations of reference points (Fiegenbaum et al. 1996). We
consider the temporal dimension of SRPs, specifically the
LTO, an important perspective to understand the influence
of family ownership on a firm’s PES. First, the ONE lit-
erature suggests that firms with an LTO are prone to have
better environmental performance (e.g., Brammer et al.
2012; Friedman 1970), because ‘‘society expects business
to accomplish a variety of social goods……to profit in the
long-run’’ (Davis 1973, p. 313). Moreover, outcomes
associated with PES are largely uncertain and typically
require a long period of time to be realized (Sharma and
Vredenburg 1998). Thus, an LTO can enable a firm to
operate well beyond current environmental requirements
and engage in proactive environmental practices (Hill and
Snell 1988; Wang and Bansal 2012).
Second, LTO is considered a distinct attribute of family-
owned firms (Brigham et al. 2014; Le Breton-Miller et al.
2006; Lumpkin and Brigham 2011). Family firms’ long-
term perspectives are reflected in longer tenures for their
chief executive officers (Lansberg 1999), family owners’
willingness to pursue intrafamily succession (Chrisman
et al. 2012) and to invest ‘‘patient capital’’ in family firm
initiatives (Sirmon and Hitt 2003), and a longer investment
horizon (Zellweger 2007). The overlap between the family
and business identity as a result of family involvement in
the firm’s ownership (Dyer and Whetten 2006) makes the
business an important component of the family owner’s
and their family members’ identity. Organizational identity
reflects members’ consensual view of ‘‘who we are as an
organization’’ and ‘‘what we do as a collective’’ (Nag et al.
2007, p. 824). Due to human ‘‘conservative impulse’’
(Morris 1975), organizational identity needs to have some
degree of continuity over time (Dutton et al. 1994, Erikson
1994). In other words, organizations strive to protect their
identity to attain continuity over time (Weigert and Hast-
ings 1977). Therefore, LTO will be an intrinsic pursuance
of family owners, as it can help them to ensure the conti-
nuity of the business component of their identity as well as
the integrity of their identity as a whole.
Furthermore, from the SEW preservation perspective,
family owners’ tendency to preserve and enhance SEW is a
unique valence with family involvement (Gómez-Mejı́a
et al. 2007). The ‘‘SEW preservation logic’’ (Gómez-Mejı́a
et al. 2011) is argued to be the single most important
attribute that distinguishes family-owned firms from non-
family-owned firms and, as such, represents a key theo-
retical frame that can be applied to understand various
policies and strategies of family-owned firms (Berrone
et al. 2010; Gómez-Mejı́a et al. 2007). The pursuit of SEW
depends largely on the LTO of the family-owned firm
(Brigham et al. 2014; Chrisman et al. 2012; Lumpkin and
Brigham 2011). LTO is ‘‘the tendency to prioritize the
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J. Dou et al.
long-range implications and impact of decisions and
actions that come to fruition after an extended time period’’
(Lumpkin and Brigham 2011, p. 1152). Thus, LTO can
best be viewed as a dominant logic that represents a
manifestation of a family-owned firm’s dominant coalition,
and it is related to how firms conceptualize the business
and make critical resource allocation decisions (Brigham
et al. 2014). In other words, as a dominant logic that
enables the dominant coalition of a family-owned firm to
interpret and evaluate the information obtained, LTO can
influence a firm’s strategic and managerial decisions
(Lumpkin and Brigham 2011).
While a high level of family ownership may grant the
family legitimacy and power to exert influence on a firm’s
choice of SRP and the corresponding strategic behaviors,
this does not guarantee that a family-owned firm is willing
to do so (Chrisman et al. 2012). With the same extent of
family involvement in the firm’s ownership, intention for
intrafamily succession, emotional attachment to the firm,
and desire to preserve SEW can vary significantly (Schulze
et al. 2002). In other words, family involvement in own-
ership will not always lead to LTO, and the family’s
willingness and commitment to the continuity of the
business are also important (De Massis et al. 2014). The
family’s willingness encompasses the goals, aspirations,
and motivations that drive the family to exert influence on
the firm’s strategic decision making. It is possible that firms
with the same level of family ownership may exhibit dif-
ferent behaviors due to different levels of family commit-
ment and the desirability to pursue the particularistic
behaviors of a firm (Chrisman et al. 2012). This suggests
that family commitment may serve as a moderator in the
relationship between family ownership and LTO.
Family Ownership and a Firm’s LTO
A firm’s temporal orientation can range from short to long
(Ancona et al. 2001; Mosakowski and Earley 2000; Wang
and Bansal 2012). Likewise, some family-owned firms are
argued to be more long-term-oriented than others (Lump-
kin and Brigham 2011; Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2006;
Zahra et al. 2004). We propose that the strength of a firm’s
LTO will be related to the extent of family ownership of
the firm. First, research suggests that family-owned firms
have a greater emphasis on non-economic goals that reflect
the values and aspirations of the dominant family coalition
(Chrisman et al. 2012; Gómez-Mejı́a et al. 2007). For
example, family-owned firms are likely to achieve goals
such as integrating family values into the business system
(Lumpkin and Brigham 2011) and achieving transgenera-
tional family control (Chrisman et al. 2004). The pursuit of
non-economic goals will lead to the accumulation of the
stock of SEW (Chua et al. 2015), which is considered the
When Does Family Ownership Promote Proactive Environmental Strategy? The Role of the Firm’s…
primary reference point in family-owned firms’ strategic
decision making (Gómez-Mejı́a et al. 2007). A larger
percentage ownership of the firm is likely to grant the
family greater power and legitimacy to pursue goals that
favor the family system (Lumpkin and Brigham 2011;
Mitchell et al. 1997; Sharma 2004). Since it requires
‘‘planning, patience, and tenacity’’ to realize these non-
economic goals (Lumpkin and Brigham 2011, p. 1150), an
LTO can facilitate the achievement of these non-economic
goals. This might indicate that firms with a higher level of
family ownership are likely to exhibit a stronger LTO,
because a stronger LTO can help the firm to realize non-
economic goals (Chrisman et al. 2012) and guarantee that
family members harvest affective utilities or SEW from the
realization of these goals (Gómez-Mejı́a et al. 2011).
Second, family-owned firms, as social actors, have their
own identities that can satisfy their inherent needs to be
unique entities and remain the same yesterday, today, and
tomorrow (Whetten and Mackey 2002). From an organi-
zation identity perspective, family ownership leads to the
overlap of family and business identity, and a large per-
centage of family ownership indicates a heightened overlap
of these two identities (Zellweger et al. 2013). Further-
more, managers in a family-owned firm, who are usually
also the owners, especially in the founding generation (i.e.,
the owner-managers), tend to have longer tenures than
those in non-family-owned firms (Zahra et al. 2004; Zell-
weger 2007). Due to their long tenure, family owner-
managers are likely to develop a deep emotional attach-
ment to the existing assets within their firm and within the
broader ecosystem surrounding their organizations (Sydow
et al. 2009). In this sense, the business becomes an irre-
placeable component of the identity of the firm’s owner-
managers. Since identity has the need for continuity over
time (Albert and Whetten 1985), we argue that family
owner-managers may rely on some LTO mechanisms such
as transitioning the business onto future generations (Chua
et al. 1999) to continue their identity for both the business
and family systems (Lumpkin and Brigham 2011). Indeed,
the continuity dimension of LTO is consistent with efforts
to pass the business onto future generations (Lansberg
1999) and create a business with an enduring reputation
and mission (Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2005). We argue
that the propensity for continuity will become stronger
when the family owns a larger percentage of equity shares
due to the heighted overlap of the business and family
identity. In short, a larger percentage of family ownership
will lead to a stronger LTO of the firm due to the height-
ened overlap of the family and business identity and the
need to continue the identity over time.
Third, we argue that firms with a high percentage of
family ownership are likely to be more mindful of a desired
future and believe that planning and evaluating the long-
term consequences of current actions has utility value, or
the futurity dimension of the LTO (Lumpkin and Brigham
2011). Firms with a high percentage of family ownership
are likely to indicate a stronger tendency for transgenera-
tional succession transition (Chrisman et al. 2012; Dyer
and Whetten 2006). Since family-owned firms that stress
succession planning tend to have a higher degree of future
orientation (Davis and Harveston 1998), we argue that
firms with a large family ownership are likely to have a
higher degree of future orientation and view events such as
succession planning as more salient (Sharma et al. 2003).
Furthermore, we argue that a higher percentage of family
ownership is likely to be associated with higher emphasis
on the perseverance dimension of the LTO, because such
firms have patience for future rewards and are conscious of
the value associated with cumulative effort, which is
reflected in the perseverance orientation (Lumpkin and
Brigham 2011). In other words, firms with a high per-
centage of family ownership are likely to exhibit more
patient capital (Sirmon and Hitt 2003) and longer invest-
ment horizons (Zellweger 2007), and they are more likely
to demonstrate persistence and hard work and believe that
it takes time for things to pay off (Lumpkin and Brigham
2011). Thus, these discussions lead to the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 The percentage of shares owned by the
family is positively related to the degree of the firm’s LTO.
Family Commitment as a Moderator
of the Relationship Between Family Ownership
and a Firm’s LTO
We have argued that family ownership is likely to be
positively associated with the strength of a firms’ LTO, due
to the legitimacy and power granted by the high percentage
of family ownership that allows the family to pursue
family-centered non-economic goals that often requires the
firm’s LTO to be achieved. The high percentage of family
ownership also compels the firm to fulfill the need for the
continuity of the family and business identity and be
mindful of the future orientation and preservation reflected
in the patience for future rewards. While family ownership
gives the family power and legitimacy to pursue a LTO to
achieve family-centered non-economic goals and thus
accumulate the SEW stock, this does not mean that the
family will want to do so (De Massis et al. 2014). The
influence of family ownership on a firm’s LTO is likely to
be subject to the influence of the willingness of the family
to pursue these non-economic goals and thus create and
enhance SEW. Moreover, while high family ownership of
the firm leads to a heightened overlap of the family and
business identity, this does not necessarily indicate that the
123

family will value the business component of its identity and
will want to fulfill the need for the continuity of these
identity components. In other words, the continuity of the
family and business identity is likely to depend on family
commitment.
If family-owned firms lack a high degree of commitment
to achievement and perseverance deriving from individual
pride, family pride, and family tradition, they are less likely
to persevere (Winter et al. 2004). Family commitment
refers to the degree to which the dominant coalition is
committed to the values and goals of the business (Astra-
chan et al. 2002; Chrisman et al. 2012). A strong family
commitment suggests that the interests and values of the
family and the firm are likely to be aligned under a dom-
inant vision (Chrisman et al. 2012) or a shared dream
(Lansberg 1988). We argue that this alignment can facili-
tate the coordination and alignment of goals among family
members, thus strengthening the positive effect of family
ownership on a firm’s LTO. Moreover, since commitment
is closely linked to the individual’s identification with the
organization (Allen and Meyer 1990; Bergman 2006), we
argue that a strong family commitment is likely to indicate
the family’s strong tendency to see the business as ‘‘theirs’’
and to maintain a strong identity fit between the family and
the business systems (Zellweger et al. 2013), and that such
tendency will enhance the effect of family ownership to
pursue the continuity of the business element of the family
and business identity. In summary, we expect that a high
level of family commitment is likely to enhance the effect
of family ownership on a firm’s LTO, because it enhances
family willingness to be long-term-oriented to pursue non-
economic goals, strengthens the need for the continuity of
the family and business identity, and enhances the family
firm’s mindfulness about future events and patience for
future rewards. Thus,
Hypothesis 2 The positive effect of family ownership on
a firm’s LTO becomes stronger when the family has a high
level of commitment to the continuity of the firm.
Firm’s LTO and PES
A firms’ temporal perspective is important to understand its
engagement in proactive environmental initiatives.
Research suggests that PES is a time-sensitive choice, the
value of which is ‘‘influenced by how much time passes
before the consequences of the decision are realized’’
(Lumpkin and Brigham 2011, p. 1155). Great uncertainty is
associated with the outcomes of incorporating environ-
mental practices into a firm’s decision process (Sharma and
Vredenburg 1998). Therefore, a firm is often required to be
long-term-oriented in order to adopt PES. PES is explo-
rative in nature and involves experimenting with different
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J. Dou et al.
ways to reduce environmental impact (Sharma and Vre-
denburg 1998). This suggests that a great accumulation of
resources may be required for a firm to adopt PES. Since a
LTO allows firms to have a greater accumulation of slack
resources (Gentry et al. 2016), we argue that firms with a
stronger LTO are more likely to adopt PES because of the
availability of resources.
Further, a firm may adopt PES as a way to preserve and
enhance its reputational capital (Brigham et al. 2014;
Lumpkin and Brigham 2011; Miller and Le Breton-Miller
2005). The family business literature suggests that the firm
serves as a projection that extends the core internally held
values of the family and a mirror that reflects the family’s
self-concept (Cennamo et al. 2012; Westhead et al. 2001).
As such, family-owned firms are likely to be cognizant of
their reputation capital (Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2005).
Reputation capital is considered a form of social insurance
that can protect the firm’s assets when a crisis arises in the
future (Cennamo et al. 2012; Godfrey 2005). It usually
takes a long period of time to develop and maintain a
favorable reputation (Rhee and Haunschild 2006). As noted
elsewhere, ‘‘efforts at quickly building an image as an
upstanding corporate citizen generally fail’’ (Fombrun et al.
2000, p. 102). This suggests that a firm is usually required
to be long-term-oriented in order to develop and enhance
its reputational capital (Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2005).
From a strategic perspective, PES is considered a source of
sustained competitive advantage, which can build reputa-
tional resources and enhance organizational legitimacy
(Aragón-Correa and Sharma 2003; Hart 1995; Sharma and
Vredenburg 1998). The pursuit of PES such as pollution
control may well signal to stakeholders, especially external
stakeholders, the firm’s commitment to environmental
practices, and thus build a favorable reputation in the local
community (Dyer and Whetten 2006). Indeed, ‘‘public
condemnation could be emotionally devastating for family
members because it damages the family’s name’’ (Berrone
et al. 2010, p. 87). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that
a strong LTO will encourage the firm to be mindful of
building its reputational capital and a long-lasting mission
through the adoption of PES.
In sum, we propose that a stronger LTO is more likely to
enable firms to make decisions related to resource alloca-
tion to pursue PES, as well as recognize and realize eco-
nomic and non-economic returns associated with the
adoption of PES. Thus,
Hypothesis 3 A firm’s LTO is positively related to its
pursuit of PES.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 suggest that family ownership is
positively related to a firm’s LTO, and this positive rela-
tionship will be moderated by the family’s commitment to
the firm. Hypothesis 3 predicts that a firm’s LTO will be
When Does Family Ownership Promote Proactive Environmental Strategy? The Role of the Firm’s…

related to its adoption of PES. This demonstrates a pattern (e.g., PES, innovation, and internationalization) was com-
of moderated mediation between the variables under study2 pleted by the financial manager of the firm. Questionnaires
(Preacher et al. 2007), as depicted in Fig. 1. Although were administered and retrieved by the branch offices of
Hypotheses 1–3 may be examined by testing the signifi- the China Federation of Industry and Commerce located in
cance of individual paths in the model, research indicates each province.
that testing individual paths is insufficient for establishing A total of 1500 questionnaires were sent out; 1290
mediation and moderated mediation effects (Edwards and questionnaires were collected, yielding a response rate of
Lambert 2007; Preacher et al. 2007). Therefore, we pro- 86%.3 Cases with extensive missing values were excluded
pose Hypothesis 4, which specifies the overall moderated from the study. Since we measured PES based on a firm’s
mediation effects predicted by our model: environmental practices over the past 3 years, firms that
were younger than 3 years were not included in our anal-
Hypothesis 4 Family ownership will be related to a
ysis. Our final sample consisted of 454 firms with different
firm’s adoption of PES via conditional indirect effects,
levels of family ownership across 20 industries and from
such that its relationship with PES will be mediated by its
12 provinces. To check whether there were significant
LTO, and the relationship between family ownership and a
differences in the demographic information between sam-
firm’s LTO will be moderated by family commitment.
pled and deleted firms, we conducted ANOVA tests. We
did not find significant differences in the characteristics
related to the firm or the owners. Therefore, the firms
Methodology
included in our analysis are considered representative of
the entire population.
Data
Measures
To test our hypotheses, we used the national survey data of
private firms collected by the China Federation of Industry
Proactive Environmental Strategy
and Commerce and the Family Business Research Centre
of Zhejiang University in 2015. Most private firms in China
Consistent with prior research, a 10-item self-report scale
have different levels of family involvement in ownership,
recommended by Buysse and Verbeke (2003) was used to
which makes it appropriate to use these firms as samples to
measure a firm’s PES. We asked the financial manager of
test our hypotheses. The data collection followed a multi-
each firm to rate ‘‘How did your firm perform in the fol-
stage stratified sampling process: (1) A national sample
lowing practices over the past 3 years?’’ on a seven-point
size was identified from 31 provinces in China; (2) based
Likert-type scale (1 = very bad; 7 = very good), for
on their market development level, the 31 provinces were
example, practices related to ‘‘investment in product and
classified into three groups: developed, developing, and
manufacturing process using green technologies’’ and
under-developed (Fan and Wang 2006), and four provinces
‘‘environmental managers’ participation in the strategic
were randomly selected from each group; (3) cities from
decision-making of the firm.’’ The Cronbach’s alpha for the
each province were randomly selected according to their
10 items was 0.968, with factor loadings ranging from .822
economic development level; (4) counties/towns of dif-
to .913.
ferent economic developments within each chosen city
were randomly selected; and (5) firms from each county/-
Family Ownership
town were then randomly selected.
To mitigate the potential common method bias, the
Family ownership was measured based on the total per-
survey adopted a double-respondent questionnaire design.
centage of shares owned by the family (Chrisman et al.
Two different questionnaires were sent to each firm. The
2012; Zellweger et al. 2013). Specifically, the owner-
first questionnaire dealing with questions related to the
managers of the sample firms were asked to report the total
owner’s family structure, family ownership, and family
shares owned by their family members.
commitment to the business was completed by the firm’s
owner-managers. The second questionnaire containing
questions related to the firm’s LTO and strategic behaviors
3
As a not-for-profit organization, the China Federation of Industry
2
Earlier studies tend to call this configuration of conditional indirect and Commerce oversees all private firms in China, with branch offices
effect mediated moderation rather than moderated mediation (Baron located in each province. Each branch office has established a close
and Kenny 1986; Muller et al. 2005). However, we test the model relationship with local government bodies and corporations. Such a
using the PROCESS outlined by Preacher et al. (2007) and adopt their close relationship largely contributed to the high response rate of this
label of moderated mediation. study.

123

Fig. 1 Proposed theoretical
model
Commitment
Family
Ownership
Long-Term Orientation
Following prior research (Venkatraman 1989; Wang and
Bansal 2012), LTO is measured using a four-item seven-
point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree;
7 = strongly agree). The four items include: (1) ‘‘Long-
term goals (over 5 years) are an important part of the
strategic planning of your firm’’; (2) ‘‘Long-term goals are
an important consideration when you make decisions
related to resource allocation’’; (3) ‘‘Building future
competitive advantage is an important goal for your firm’’;
and (4) ‘‘Building future competitive advantage is a major
concern in the strategic planning of your firm.’’ The
Cronbach’s alpha for the four items was .952, with factor
loadings ranging from .923 to .944.
Family Commitment
Consistent with prior research (Lansberg and Astrachan
1994; Sharma et al. 2003), family commitment was mea-
sured using a six-item seven-point Likert-type scale
(1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Items inclu-
ded: (1) ‘‘I was deeply committed to the mission of con-
tinuing the business as a family business’’; (2) ‘‘I would
like my children to take over the business’’; (3) ‘‘Contin-
uing the business in the family is very important for us’’;
(4) ‘‘I believe the potential successor has great capability
to successfully run the business’’; (5) ‘‘I believe the
potential successor is committed to the firm and has great
desire to take over the firm’’; and (6) ‘‘I believe the next
generation is ready to take over the firm and shares my
commitment to the firm.’’ The Cronbach’s alpha for the six
items was 0.902, with factor loadings ranging from .719 to
.896.
Control Variables
We also included control variables to help rule out alter-
native explanations. We controlled for family management
(e.g., Chrisman et al. 2012), firm size (Seifert et al. 2004),
firm age (Darnall et al. 2010), high-tech firm (Rogers and
Larsen 1984), and internationalization of the firm (Bansal
and Hunter 2003). Previous research suggests that family
123
J. Dou et al.
Family
Long-Term Proactive
Orientation Environmental
Strategy
involvement in the top management team can influence a
firm’s choice of reference point, which will further influ-
ence a firm’s strategic behaviors (e.g., Chrisman et al.
2012). In this paper, we use a dummy variable to measure
family management. Specifically, family management is
assigned a value of 1 when there is at least one other family
member(s) involved in the management team other than the
owner-manager, otherwise 0. Firm size was measured
using the total sales of the firm (10,000 yuan) in 2014, and
natural logarithms were used in our regression models.
Firm age was the number of years the company had been in
existence (2014 minus year of founding). High-tech firms
and internationalization were captured using two dummies
(1 for yes; 0 for no). We also controlled for education level
and political ties of the largest family owner. Previous
research suggests a positive association between human
capital resulting from educational level and entrepreneurial
activities (Davidsson and Honig 2003), which may be
associated with a firm’s PES. Owners’ educational level
was measured on a seven-point scale based on the highest
degree earned by the owner as follows: 1 = elementary
school, 2 = middle school, 3 = high school, 4 = some
college, 5 = undergraduate degree, 6 = master’s degree,
and 7 = doctorate degree. Moreover, owners’ political ties
may be associated with the visibility of the firm, which will
then attract greater public scrutiny and therefore drive firms
to adopt higher standards of corporate citizenship (Dou
et al. 2014). The owner’s political ties were measured
based on whether the owner is a member of the People’s
Congress or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference (1 = membership in any of the two parties;
0 = no membership).
We also controlled for environmental turbulence and the
level of market development of the region where the firm
resides. Research suggests that a firm’s adoption of PES is
related to environmental turbulence (Sharma and Vreden-
burg 1998). We measured environmental turbulence using
two seven-point Likert-type scales (Li and Atuahene-Gima
2001): (1) ‘‘Actions by our competitors are highly unpre-
dictable’’ and (2) ‘‘Market demands and consumer tastes
are unpredictable.’’ The Cronbach’s alpha for these two
items was 0.869. Moreover, research suggests that firms
from a developed region are likely to have greater visibility
When Does Family Ownership Promote Proactive Environmental Strategy? The Role of the Firm’s…

-.022
(Wang and Qian 2011) and thus are subject to greater
environmental scrutiny. We coded a firm as 1 if the

12
headquarters of the firm are located in one of the developed

-.184***
areas, including Zhejiang, Guangdong, Fujian, or Liaoning

-.061
province, and 0 otherwise.

11

-.159**
Results

.086

.065
10
Descriptive Statistics

.306***
-.049

-.006
.036
Table 1 presents means, standard deviations, and bivariate

9
correlations among the variables. Among the control

.216***
.153**

.140**
-.007
variables, firm age and internationalization were not cor-

.023
related with any of the study variables. Following the

8
recommendations of Becker (2005), we excluded firm age

.183***
.154**

.127**
and internationalization from further analyses. All predic-

-.059
.008

.062
tor variables were mean-centered prior to analyses (Aiken

7
and West 1991).

.265***

.178***

.198***

-.028
.107*
.070

.033
Hypothesis Testing

.125**

.122**

.256**
-.038

-.063
Our Hypotheses 1–4 propose that the relationship between

.109*

.038

.019
family ownership and PES is mediated by LTO. Mediation
5

has traditionally been analyzed using the step-wise

.287***
-.026

-.083
regression analysis proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986).

.109*
.000

.015
.087
.049
.014
However, this traditional causal step approach has many
4

limitations as pointed out by Edwards and Lambert (2007).

-.162**
.270***

.167***
.128**

Our hypotheses propose further that the relationship -.015

-.070

-.028
.093*
.051

.042
between family ownership and LTO is moderated by the
3

family’s commitment to the continuity of the business. The

-.269***
traditional analysis is not designed to address such com-
-.148**
.194***

-.073
-.013

-.039
.111*

plexity. To deal with the limitations and the additional

.003

.085

.020
.045
complexity, Preacher et al. (2007) proposed an indirect
2

effects or moderated mediation model that has become the

.590***

.170***

.236***
Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix (N = 454)

-.053

-.057

-.057
.104*

prescribed procedure for testing simultaneously the com-

.045

.036

.015

.039
.064

plex relationships combining moderation and mediation (or

1

direct and indirect) effects. Therefore, we use Preacher

22.776
1.113

1.522
1.170
0.501
2.017
8.249
0.497
0.419
0.907
0.499
0.493
1.180
* p \ 0.05; ** p \ 0.01; *** p \ 0.001 (two-tailed)
et al.’s (2007) approach to examine our moderated medi-
SD

ation model. Specifically, we use the SPSS macro (PRO-

CESS)4 developed by Hayes (2013) to estimate our model
5.541

4.474
5.748
0.505
8.664

0.443
0.227
2.238
0.540
0.586
4.919
87.610

16.022
Mean

with covariates.
This model explicitly tests for both direct and indirect
1 Proactive environmental strategy

effects allowing for the explanatory variable to have no

10 Entrepreneur education level

direct effect but an indirect effect on the dependent vari-

13 Environmental turbulence

able through the mediator. Consequently, as opposed to the

4 Long-term orientation

Baron and Kenny (1986) traditional approach, family

5 Family management
3 Family commitment

9 Internationalization
2 Family ownership

ownership does not have to have a direct relationship with

12 Developed areas

PES because a significant relationship between the inde-

11 Political ties

pendent and dependent variables is no longer necessary to

8 High tech
6 Firm size
7 Firm age
Variables

prove mediation (Kenny et al. 1998). In fact, as shown in

4
The macro is downloaded from www.afhayes.com.

123
 J. Dou et al.

Table 1, the correlation between family ownership and
PES is not significant. This shows that family ownership,
by itself, does not necessarily produce PES.
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2: The Mediator Model
The PROCESS procedure provides results in several steps.
The first step focuses on the mediator variable model (the
upper half of Table 2), in which the effects of the inde-
pendent variable (family ownership), the moderator vari-
able (family commitment), and their interaction on the
mediator variable (LTO) were examined. This step pro-
vides tests for Hypotheses 1 and 2.
The results show that the correlation between family
ownership and LTO is not significant; therefore, Hypoth-
esis 1 is not supported. But there is a significant positive
interaction effect between family ownership and family
commitment supporting Hypothesis 2. This interaction
effect is depicted in Fig. 2. Consistent with our prediction,
family ownership shows a positive influence on the LTO of
the firm when the family has a high level of commitment to
the firm. Moreover, simple slope tests demonstrate that the
slope is significantly different from zero only when the
level of family commitment is high.
Hypothesis 3: The Dependent Variable Model

The second step focuses on the dependent variable model

(the lower half of Table 2), in which the effect of the
Table 2 Regression results for estimated coefficients of the moder- mediator on the dependent variable was examined, while
ated mediation model controlling for the independent variables and other control
Variablesa Mediator variable model (LTO) variables. Table 2 shows that the effect of the mediator on
ß SE t p
the dependent variable (i.e., PES) is highly significant, and
as such, Hypothesis 3 is supported.
FO 9 FC .0030 .0014 2.1021 .0361
Family commitment (FC) -.1544 .1320 -1.1692 .2429 Hypothesis 4: Conditional Indirect Effects (Moderated
Family ownership (FO) -.0108 .0060 -1.7850 .0750 Mediation)
Family management -.1858 .1118 -1.6620 .0972
Firm size .0004 .0275 .0142 .9887 In the third step, we examined if the overall conditional
High tech .2175 .1097 1.9822 .0481 indirect effects proposed in Hypothesis 4 were significant.
Entrepreneur education level .1265 .0616 2.0546 .0405 Preacher et al. (2007) recommended two methods for
Political ties .0655 .1114 .5885 .5565 assessing the significance of conditional indirect effects.
Developed areas .1613 .1159 1.3918 .1647 First, researchers may examine the magnitude of the indi-
Environmental turbulence .2765 .0454 6.0932 .0000 rect effect (via the mediator) of the independent variable on
(Constant) 4.4174 .6938 6.3665 .0000 the dependent variable at a range of values of the moder-
b ator (typically, at the mean and one standard deviation
Variables Dependent variable model (PES)
above and below the mean). Second, researchers can use
ß SE t p bootstrapping techniques to generate confidence intervals
Long-term orientation .5161 .0378 13.6510 .0000 to capture the magnitude of the indirect effects. We used
Family ownership .0001 .0020 .0727 .9421 both methods. The results are shown in Table 3. Results
Family management -.1653 .0875 -1.8892 .0595 generated from the first method show that conditional
Firm size .0083 .0219 .3798 .7043 indirect effects are significant at high levels of the mod-
High tech -.0023 .0879 -.0263 .9791
erator (i.e., family commitment) and not significant at the
Entrepreneur education level .1675 .0494 3.3913 .0008
mean or low levels of the moderator. These results provide
Political ties .0337 .0889 .3788 .7050
support for the conditional (moderating) effects proposed
in Hypothesis 2, in which the indirect (mediated) effect on
Developed areas .1878 .0923 2.0350 .0424
the dependent variable is predicted to be significant when
Environmental turbulence .0639 .0378 1.6909 .0916
the level of family commitment is high.
(Constant) 1.6750 .3890 4.3066 .0000
The last two columns of Table 3 report the results
M SE LLCI ULCI generated from 95% confidence intervals for the condi-
tional indirect effect on PES using 5000 bootstrapping
Bootstrap results for conditional .0016 .0007 .0003 .0028
indirect effect samples produced by the PROCESS procedure. The 95%
confidence interval values of the indirect effects at one
Dummy industry codes are included in this model standard deviation above the mean of the moderator
a
Model R2 = .1538; MSE = 1.2009; F = 4.9653; p = .0000 (family commitment) show a result of [.0003, .0078],
b
Model R2 = .3962; MSE = .7736; F = 19.1568; p = .0000 which does not include zero. This result suggests

123
When Does Family Ownership Promote Proactive Environmental Strategy? The Role of the Firm’s…

Fig. 2 Moderating effect of 20

family commitment on the
relationship between family
ownership and a firm’s long- 15
term orientation

Long-Term Orientation
10

Low Family
Commitment
5
High Family
Commitment
0

-5

-10
Low(-1SD) High(+1SD)
Family Ownership

Table 3 Bootstrapping results

Value of family commitment Conditional indirect effect SE 95% CI
for test of conditional indirect
effects at specific values of the Lower Upper
moderator (family
commitment): mean and ±1 -1 SD (2.9516) -.0009 .0013 -.0036 .0016
standard deviation M (4.4736) .0014 .0013 -.0010 .0040
?1 SD (5.9956) .0038 .0019 .0003 .0078

significant conditional indirect effects of family ownership
on a firm’s PES for firms with a high level of family
commitment. In sum, both methods provide support for the
overall indirect effect of family ownership on a firm’s PES
mediated through LTO and moderated through family
commitment to the firm.
Discussion and Conclusions
Over the past two decades, there has been increasing
concern over the potential negative effects of human
activities on the environment. As a result, proactive envi-
ronmental practices have become a ‘‘hot’’ topic and have
gradually been embraced by a growing number of firms.
Accordingly, the academic community has devoted an
increasing amount of research to identifying the factors that
influence a firm’s adoption of PES. Various insights have
been generated regarding the antecedents of a firm’s PES.
However, the potential effect of owner identity on a firm’s
PES has been relatively unexplored, although the important
role of owner identity in determining a firm’s strategic
decisions and behaviors has been recognized and examined
in various research disciplines (e.g., Cummins and Sommer
1996; Fiss and Zajac 2004; Hautz et al. 2013; Sklivas 1987;
Thomsen and Pedersen 2000). The present study sets out to
help fill this literature gap by examining the influence of a
ubiquitous and unique owner identity—family owner-
ship—on a firm’s PES, specifically focusing on investi-
gating the underlying mechanism of the influence of family
ownership. Based on insights drawn from the SRP theory,
the organizational identity theory, and the SEW preserva-
tion perspective, we theorize and empirically test that the
influence of family ownership on a firm’s PES is mediated
by the firm’s LTO and that the relationship between family
ownership and LTO is moderated by the level of family
commitment to the continuity of the business. Our findings,
in support of our hypotheses, show that the positive effect
of family ownership on a firm’s adoption of PES is
mediated through LTO, and the mediation effect is sig-
nificant only when the level of family commitment to the
firm is high.
Our study makes several important contributions to
business ethics studies, family business, and LTO litera-
ture. First, our finding that both long-term orientation and
family commitment are required for family ownership to
exert influence on a firm’s ethical behavior, specifically
PES, highlights the importance of considering both factors
in business ethics research. By so doing, this study extends
our understanding of the antecedents of a firm’s adoption
of PES. Second, by unpacking the underlying mechanism
of the effect of owner identity on a firm’s ethical behavior,
this study also suggests that the relationship between owner
identity and a firm ethical behavior is much more complex

123

than currently portrayed in the literature. Third, by
proposing the moderated mediation model, our study also
helps to reconcile the mixed findings regarding the influ-
ence of family ownership on a firm’s PES that exist in the
literature (e.g., Berrone et al. 2010; Dekker and Hasso
2016; Uhlaner et al. 2012). Finally, it adds to the evidence
that the family’s commitment to the continuity of the firm
strengthens the firm’s LTO (Lumpkin et al. 2010; Lumpkin
and Brigham 2011), which has been proposed as a source
of family firms’ competitive advantage (Le Breton-Miller
and Miller 2006; Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2005).
Our study has important practical implications for firms
that intend to undertake PES. By showing that long-term
orientation can facilitate the adoption of PES, our results
suggest that firm decision makers who take a moral
approach to PES and view pursuing PES as the ‘‘right thing
to do’’ (Bansal and Roth 2000) should cultivate a long-
term-oriented culture. Along this line of thinking, govern-
mental and environmental organizations are recommended
to use monetary and non-monetary incentives to motivate
firms to pursue long-term-oriented goals, thus facilitating
the undertaking of PES. For example, local governments
and regional policy makers can use tax incentives to
encourage firms, especially those publicly held firms that
have been frequently complained for a lack of LTO, to
make long-term-oriented investments (i.e., investments that
have long-term lag), and thus push these firms to pursue
long-term-oriented goals and ultimately adopt proactive
environmental strategies. Moreover, our finding that a high
percentage of ownership by the owner-managers does not
necessarily lead to a firm’s long-term orientation suggests
the practice of incentivizing manager agents by allocating
them more ownership may not lead to a firm’s LTO. Thus,
for firms that tend to undertake PES, a various combina-
tions of incentive systems are recommended.
Our study is not without limitations. First, we employed a
cross-sectional survey research design, which could make it
difficult to infer causality. According to the philosophy of
science, causal relationships cannot be empirically proven
(Hume 1740; Mill 1843) but only inferred (Berk 1988). The
causal relationships underlying our hypotheses are largely
derived based on the current literature and theories; as such,
the reverse causality should be less of a concern in our study.
Moreover, LTO, as a dimension of a company’s culture
(Guenzi and Troilo 2007; Zahra et al. 2004), is likely to be
‘‘permanent’’ and less likely to change over time (Alvesson
2002). Therefore, it is reasonable to hypothesize that PES
will be influenced by the LTO, rather than a reverse effect.
Also, Rindfleisch et al. (2008) compared the validity of a
cross-sectional design with that of longitudinal surveys
using two datasets as well as a Monte Carlo simulation, and
they found that, in many cases, results drawn from cross-
sectional data exhibit validity that is comparable to results
123
J. Dou et al.
obtained from longitudinal data. To generate more insights
into the causality direction, however, future studies are
recommended to adopt a longitudinal design to understand
the effect of family ownership on a firm’s LTO, which, in
turn, will affect a firm’s PES.
In conclusion, this paper proposes a moderated media-
tion model to capture the complex relationship between
family ownership and a firm’s PES. Specifically, we the-
orize that the effect of family ownership on a firm’s PES is
mediated through LTO, and the family’s commitment to
the firm’s continuity enhances the tendency of the firm to
adopt an LTO in decision making. Our research opens up
avenues for further studies on PES from the owner identity
perspective, as well as provides a basis for empirical tests
of the mechanisms underlying the effect of family owner-
ship on a firm’s behaviors.
Acknwledgements The authors would like to thank the editor, Pro-
fessor Cory Searcy, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful
and constructive comments. We also thank Professor Jess Chua for
his comments and suggestions on the earlier versions of this paper.
Errors of omission or commission remain our responsibility.
Funding This study was funded by the National Natural Science
Foundation of China [Grant Numbers 71372059; 71672173;
71402164].
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of
interest.
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