ANTONIO BENGSON III vs.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no
person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen."1

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960,
of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.2

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other,
"rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:

SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following
ways and/or events:

xxx

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed of a foreign country: Provided, That the
rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the
taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not
divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:

(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign country; or

(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of
said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with
his service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or
is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph
(a) or (b), shall not be Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed
forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically
entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and politically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil political rights as
a Filipino citizen x x x.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S.
citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No.
2630.3 He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998
elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for
reelection.1âwphi1.nêt

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives
since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.4

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision5 dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly
elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.6

Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following grounds:
 1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being
such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part.

2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact he did not validly acquire his
Philippine citizenship.

3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed
serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the
petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born
status.7

The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his Philippine
citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He
insists that Article citizens are those who are from birth with out having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such
citizenship.

Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since
the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-
born citizen.

The petition is without merit.

The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority, and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.8

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship
correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of
his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.9

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship."10

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally
under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former
Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he
possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification13 provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The
decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court
is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a
lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or
(4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies. 14
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.
Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired
by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.15

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring
Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this
law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications 17and none
of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.18

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion
of the armed forces;19 services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;20 (3) service in the Armed Forces
of the United States at any other time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;22 and (5) political economic
necessity.23

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided.

In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:

xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire
Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place
of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original.25

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.26 This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United
States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission
in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States,
acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or
last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.27 It bears
stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.

Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his
citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first
defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen birth and (2) he
does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-
born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973,38 of Filipino mothers who, upon
reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born
obviously because they were not Filipino at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born
of Filipino mothers before the effectively of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they
also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippines citizenship.

The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who re
natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are
considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization
to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is
clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their
citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not
required by law to go through naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born
Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.

A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House.29 The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to
check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of
the latter.30 In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the
decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgement for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the
office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision.31 There is no such showing of
grave abuse of discretion in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Poe-Llamanzares vs COMELEC

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with extremely
urgent application for an ex parte issuance of temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction assailing the following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second
Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11 December 2015
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA
No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for having been issued without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The Facts

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of
Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was
passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968,
Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-
Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar." 1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa
Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City.
On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary notations were made by OCR-
Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption,2 the petitioner's adoptive mother
discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure
from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive
parents. 3 Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she submitted
to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe.4

Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the local COMELEC Office in
San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.5

On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and respectively
secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616.7

Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the University of the Philippines 8 but she
opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991
from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.9

On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both the
Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. 10 Desirous of being with her husband who
was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991. 11

While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April 1992.12 Her two daughters
Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004,
respectively. 13

On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. 14 She obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on
19 December 2001. 15

On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support her father's candidacy for
President in the May 2004 elections. It was during this time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter Anika. She
returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July 2004. 16

After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of her
father's deteriorating medical condition. 17 Her father slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in
the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of
his estate.18

According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her entire family. In her earnest desire
to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines
sometime in the first quarter of 2005.19 The couple began preparing for their resettlement including notification of their
children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next semester; 20coordination with property
movers for the relocation of their household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines; 21 and inquiry with
Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the country.22 As early as
2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.23

Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 200524 and without delay, secured a Tax Identification
Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately followed25 while her husband was
forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there.26
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and her husband purchased a condominium
unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of 2005.27 The
corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title covering the unit and parking slot were issued by the Register of Deeds
of San Juan City to petitioner and her husband on 20 February 2006.28 Meanwhile, her children of school age began
attending Philippine private schools.

On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some of the family's
remaining household belongings.29 She travelled back to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.30

In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the family's change and
abandonment of their address in the U.S.31 The family home was eventually sold on 27 April 2006.32 Petitioner's husband
resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and started working for a major
Philippine company in July 2006.33

In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where they
built their family home34 and to this day, is where the couple and their children have been residing.35 A Transfer
Certificate of Title covering said property was issued in the couple's name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on
1June 2006.

On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.36 Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on
behalf of her three minor children on 10 July 2006.37 As can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted
favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her
children are considered as citizens of the Philippines.38 Consequently, the BI issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in
petitioner's name and in the names of her three (3) children. 39

Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August 2006.40 She also secured
from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No. XX4731999.41 This passport was renewed on 18 March 2014
and she was issued Philippine Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA.42

On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and Television
Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a notary
public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010,44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No.
9225.45 The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the BI46 and took her oath of office
as Chairperson of the MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner stopped using her American passport.48

On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of
Renunciation of Nationality of the United States."49 On that day, she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S.
Vice Consul wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent,
among others, of relinquishing her American citizenship.50 In the same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had
resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to
present.51

On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States"
effective 21 October 2010.52

On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013
Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines before May
13, 2013."53 Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. 54

On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530. 55

On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. 56 In her COC, the petitioner
declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would
be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005.57 The petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit
Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14
October 2015. 58

Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases
against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.

Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697

A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition to deny due course or
cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.59She is
convinced that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her petition.60 Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that petitioner
committed material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is
a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day before the 9 May 2016
Elections.61

On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born Filipino on account of
the fact that she was a foundling.62 Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer natural-born status and
Filipino citizenship on foundlings.63 Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for reacquisition
of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen to begin with.64Even
assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when she became a
naturalized American citizen.65 According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be continuous from birth.66

On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound by the sworn declaration she made
in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she had resided in the country for only six ( 6) years and six ( 6)
months as of May 2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to regain
her natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the ten-year residency requirement of the Constitution
as her residence could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under
the said Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the
belief that she failed to reestablish her domicile in the Philippines.67

Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:

(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was actually a petition for quo
warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in the Presidential elections, and that the Department of
Justice (DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;

(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain allegations which, if hypothetically
admitted, would make false the statement in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there any
allegation that there was a willful or deliberate intent to misrepresent on her part;

(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her citizenship and residency
qualifications for:

a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that foundlings were considered citizens;

b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of citizens of the place where they
are found;

c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225;
 d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior to the filing of her COC for
President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and that the same is in full force and effect and has not been
withdrawn or recanted;

e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess natural-born status;

f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her domicile in the Philippines as early as
May 24, 2005;

g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-born citizenship under R.A. No.
9225;

h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for Senator was an honest mistake, not
binding and should give way to evidence on her true date of reacquisition of domicile;

i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of the Filipino people to decide a
purely political question, that is, should she serve as the country's next leader.68

After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was deemed submitted for resolution.

On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding that petitioner's COC, filed for
the purpose of running for the President of the Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and Local
Elections, contained material representations which are false. The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of
the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe
Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED.69

Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner which the COMELEC En
Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015 Resolution by denying the same.70

Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700

This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras)
and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before the COMELEC which were consolidated and raffled to its First
Division.

In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,71 docketed as SPA No. 15-002
(DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the Presidency. 72

Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage,
particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is determinative of
natural-born status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of statutory construction that what is not included is excluded. He averred
that the fact that foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is indicative
of the framers' intent to exclude them.74 Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born
citizen.75

Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to support her claim that foundlings have a
nationality.76 According to Tatad, international conventions and treaties are not self-executory and that local legislations
are necessary in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines.77 He also stressed that there is no
standard state practice that automatically confers natural-born status to foundlings.78
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the option to reacquire Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to former natural-born citizens and petitioner was not as she was a
foundling.79

Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not comply with the ten (10) year residency
requirement.80 Tatad opined that petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon City only from the time she renounced her
American citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or 2011.81 Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of intention
to abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband stayed thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S.82

In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez
alleged that her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the status of a natural-born citizen.83 He
advanced the view that former natural-born citizens who are repatriated under the said Act reacquires only their Philippine
citizenship and will not revert to their original status as natural-born citizens.84

He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that she had only been a resident of the
Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the 13 May 2013 Elections operates against her. Valdez
rejected petitioner's claim that she could have validly reestablished her domicile in the Philippines prior to her
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In effect, his position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year residency
requirement for President.

Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras' petition,85 docketed as SPA No. 15-007 (DC),
limited the attack to the residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for President should be cancelled on the
ground that she did not possess the ten-year period of residency required for said candidacy and that she made false entry
in her COC when she stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9
May 2016.86 Contreras contended that the reckoning period for computing petitioner's residency in the Philippines should
be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship was approved by the BI.87 He asserted
that petitioner's physical presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of reacquisition of her
Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an American citizen and as such, she was governed by the Philippine
immigration laws.88

In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:

First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action. His petition did not invoke
grounds proper for a disqualification case as enumerated under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on the alleged lack of residency and natural-born status of petitioner which are
not among the recognized grounds for the disqualification of a candidate to an elective office.90

Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as they focus on establishing her
ineligibility for the Presidency.91 A petition for quo warranto falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the COMELEC.92

Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the respondents.93 Otherwise stated, she has
a presumption in her favor that she is a natural-born citizen of this country.

Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are presumed to be citizens of
the country where they are found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is considered as a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.95

Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 or the right to
reacquire her natural-born status.96 Moreover, the official acts of the Philippine Government enjoy the presumption of
regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born citizen, her appointment
as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan RTC.97 She believed that all these acts reinforced
her position that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.98
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started reestablishing her domicile of choice in the
Philippines as demonstrated by her children's resettlement and schooling in the country, purchase of a condominium unit
in San Juan City and the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills.99

Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in the Philippines even before she renounced
her American citizenship as long as the three determinants for a change of domicile are complied with.100She reasoned out
that there was no requirement that renunciation of foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for the acquisition of a new
domicile of choice.101

Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her COC for Senator was a mistake made in
good faith.102

In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division ruled that petitioner is not a natural-
born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year residency requirement, and that she committed material
misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First Division concluded
that she is not qualified for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of
said Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petitions
and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the
elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local
and National Elections.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First Division's Resolution. On 23
December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present petitions for certiorari with urgent
prayer for the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary restraining orders were issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC and
its representatives from implementing the assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further orders from the Court. The Court
also ordered the consolidation of the two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12 January 2016. Thereafter, oral
arguments were held in these cases.

The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:

1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.

2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-
002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent.

3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution
of the Second Division.

4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution
of the First Division.

The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May
2016 National Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled "on the
exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity of the ground should
hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for
the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC
cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.

We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its provisions in Article IX, C, Section 2:

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall.

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal
and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters.

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to
other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of
the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which
seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this
Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations,
coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and, when
accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in
addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of
voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of
places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election
frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive,
order, or decision.

(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the provisions of Article VI, Section 17 of the same
basic law stating that:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the President, the Vice-President, Senators
and the Members of the House of Representatives was made clear by the Constitution. There is no such provision for
candidates for these positions.

Can the COMELEC be such judge?

The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections,104 which was
affirmatively cited in the En Banc decision in Fermin v. COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:

Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC
amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 § 1, the following:

Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as
provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds
for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.

The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act
is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its
rule-making power under Art. IX, A, §6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds
from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry
into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, §2(3)]

The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is
contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings
for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already
stated, are based on grounds specified in § 12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of the Local Government
Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for
public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress.
"Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes
for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent
from office.

Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not disqualified
from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy
in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in §2 of the Law does not imply
that he does not suffer from any of [the] disqualifications provided in §4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences of the respective proceedings, the
importance of the opinion is in its statement that "the lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates,
however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule". Justice Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:

Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the
qualifications of a candidate.

First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining his eligibility
for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election
offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be
determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided
that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes
in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he will not be
proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile,
may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the
companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence
was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character
proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a
ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy
that they are eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made
after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in
certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.

Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice President,
Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of
the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the President and Vice President, as the case may be.106

To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated in Fermin, led to the amendment through
COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February1993 version of Rule 25,
which states that:

Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by
the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.107

was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:

Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent
court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution.

A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or
Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.

Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there
must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or
found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution."

Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of one to the other. Both do not
allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a
candidate. The facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority properly
vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by a judgment
of a competent court or tribunal.

If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification "provided by
law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false
representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such
prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found. The only exception
that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are,
anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of representation can be determined.

The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23 that deals with, as in this case,
alleged false representations regarding the candidate's citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC to rule essentially
that since foundlings108 are not mentioned in the enumeration of citizens under the 1935 Constitution,109 they then cannot
be citizens. As the COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when petitioner admitted that she is a foundling, she said it all.
This borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule that herein
petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain that such relationship is indemonstrable,"
proceeded to say that "she now has the burden to present evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino parent."

The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.

At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine
Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation.110 That said, there is more than
sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden
of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have
shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her
because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is
a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.

The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but whether such parents are
Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:

Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or no-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability of improbability of the fact in issue.

The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975,
the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country
was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino
was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and 1970, also from the PSA.
In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In
1970, the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were figures for the child
producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners or 99.68%. In the
same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299 Filipino
females versus 1, 190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165
male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the
oral arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of the population in Iloilo was Filipino.112

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a
Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City.1âwphi1 She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight
black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.

There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life.113 All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church
in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than
a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not
statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are
admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm. In the words of the Solicitor
General:

Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the Philippines so they can get pregnant and
leave their newborn babies behind. We do not face a situation where the probability is such that every foundling would
have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of being a foreigner. We need to frame our questions properly.
What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be foreigners? Almost zero. What are the
chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.

According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly average, there were 1,766,046 children
born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for
that sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the
statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino is 99.93%.

From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos
born in the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This means that the
statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines on that decade would be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.

We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us, but I am confident that the statistical
probability that a child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino will not be affected by whether or not the
parents are known. If at all, the likelihood that a foundling would have a Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%.
Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do not imagine foreigners abandoning their
children here in the Philippines thinking those infants would have better economic opportunities or believing that this
country is a tropical paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a foreign couple has ever
considered their child excess baggage that is best left behind.

To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there may be a theoretical chance
that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright
discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child
born in the Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of
their birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the
fundamental political rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor, constitutional interpretation and the use of
common sense are not separate disciplines.

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as
to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and
ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,114 this Court held that:

The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction
that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary
task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers
and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.115

As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show
that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. The following exchange is recorded:

Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is inserted: "The natural children of a
foreign father and a Filipino mother not recognized by the father.

xxxx
President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment. The gentleman refers to natural children
or to any kind of illegitimate children?

Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown parentage, natural or illegitimate
children of unknown parents.

Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to the
Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards, because the
presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a
child of unknown parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no need ...

Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to be Filipino.

Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for amendment.

Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus:
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children of unknown
parentage."

Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown parentage.

Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize the child, is not unknown.

President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?

Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of a Filipina with a foreigner who does
not recognize the child. Their parentage is not unknown and I think those of overseas Filipino mother and father [whom
the latter] does not recognize, should also be considered as Filipinos.

President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones.

Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands of the Legislature?

Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in between, that the constitution need [not] refer to
them. By international law the principle that children or people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this
nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to include a provision on the subject exhaustively.116

Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any objection to the notion that persons
of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only because their number was not enough to merit specific mention. Such
was the account,117 cited by petitioner, of delegate and constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:
 During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to include as Filipino citizens the
illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings;
but this amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention believed that the cases, being too few to
warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory
legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the effect that
illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of the
place where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed
amendment.

This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16 February 2016 Oral Arguments:

We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was declined was the proposal for a textual and
explicit recognition of foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain the constitutional silence is by saying that it
was the view of Montinola and Roxas which prevailed that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as
Filipinos.

Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally correct. Framers of a constitution can
constitutionalize rules based on assumptions that are imperfect or even wrong. They can even overturn existing rules. This
is basic. What matters here is that Montinola and Roxas were able to convince their colleagues in the convention that there
is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because they are already impliedly so recognized.

In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic efficiency and the avoidance of
redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the
1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a
famous scholar as he was paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is not silently silent, it is silently
vocal. 118

The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create a just and humane society," that "they
were reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory intent against foundlings." He
exhorts that, given the grave implications of the argument that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must
search the records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express intention to deny foundlings the status of
Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the
constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the board marginalization."

We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions
guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of special
consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the "State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the
State to defend the "right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these
provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that
adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The
most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status,
conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad." Adoption deals
with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v.
Republic,119 a child left by an unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. This Court said:

In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain unless it has
jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but also over the res, which is the personal
status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction
over the status of a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction
over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are
foreigners.120 (Underlining supplied)

Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country
Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"),
R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule
on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be
adopted.

It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling
certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which
make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are
those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by the
citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the authorities. 121 Secondly,
the object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the
process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such
citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.

In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling
Certificate issued in her favor.122 The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which approved petitioner's adoption
by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her
"foundling parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling.123

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become
part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.124 On
the other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution,
form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of
international law include international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations.125 International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the
combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a
psychological element known as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring
it.126 "General principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are principles "established by a process of reasoning" or
judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to legal systems generally," 127 such as "general principles of
equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice," and the "general principle against discrimination" which is
embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against
Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation."128 These are the same core principles which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.129

Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of the generally accepted
principles of international law and binding on the State.130 Article 15 thereof states:

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC
imposes the following obligations on our country:

Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a
nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and their obligations
under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.

In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24
thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"

Article 24

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin,
property or birth, the right, to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his
family, society and the State.

2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and
ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the
application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of
which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.

The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of
international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth," to wit:

Article 14

A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's parentage is
established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.

A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was
found. (Underlining supplied)

The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found, contained in
Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:

Article 2

A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to
have been born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.

That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague
Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) ofwhich131effectively affirms
Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 this Court noted that the
Philippines had not signed or ratified the "International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced disappearances in the said convention was
nonetheless binding as a "generally accepted principle of international law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for
declaring the ban as a generally accepted principle of international law although the convention had been ratified by only
sixteen states and had not even come into force and which needed the ratification of a minimum of twenty states.
Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court was content with the practice of international and regional state organs,
regional state practice in Latin America, and State Practice in the United States.

Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v. Ranada, 134 where
only four countries had "either ratified or acceded to"135 the 1966 "Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005. The Court also pointed out that
that nine member countries of the European Common Market had acceded to the Judgments Convention. The Court also
cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign judgments. In all, only the practices of fourteen countries were
considered and yet, there was pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was widespread practice.

Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that "generally accepted principles of
international law" are based not only on international custom, but also on "general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and
the policy against discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which are "basic to
legal systems generally,"136 support the notion that the right against enforced disappearances and the recognition of
foreign judgments, were correctly considered as "generally accepted principles of international law" under the
incorporation clause.

Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America, and Europe have passed
legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the
sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the
Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries
surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens. These circumstances, including the practice of jus
sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having
been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is found.

Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle of international law. In
particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all
of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA
issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive
department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.

Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational
and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born
citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical
data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.

In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings were designed
to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be
restrictive as to their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of
nations. The Solicitor General's warning in his opening statement is relevant:

.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those treaties and conventions were drafted
because the world community is concerned that the situation of foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would be
tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended up using the international instruments which seek to protect and uplift
foundlings a tool to deny them political status or to accord them second-class citizenship.138

The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not
result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must perform an
act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."

The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation statutes in general and
of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.

In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140 repatriation was explained as follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.

R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases. They include Sobejana-Condon v.
COMELEC141 where we described it as an "abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x."
Also included is Parreno v. Commission on Audit,142 which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,143where we said that "[t]he
repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on
Audit144 is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his
natural-born citizenship."

The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as implying "that natural-born
citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed
in line with Congress' sole prerogative to determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to
decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the COMELEC to
disagree with the Congress' determination.

More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already rejected in Bengson III
v. HRET145 where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his
birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or
perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only two types of citizens under
the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category for repatriated citizens:

It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of
citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily
is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after
losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either
be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the
applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the
necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.146

The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And while we may always revisit a
doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of Appeals and
Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where we decreed reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it "should be
prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the Constitution, until
reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines." This Court also said that "while the future may ultimately
uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior to its abandonment. Consequently,
the people's reliance thereupon should be respected."148

Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner committed a falsehood when she put in the
spaces for "born to" in her application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and this
misled the BI to presume that she was a natural-born Filipino. It has been contended that the data required were the names
of her biological parents which are precisely unknown.

This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted. One of the effects of adoption is "to sever all
legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the
adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an amended birth certificate "attesting to the fact that the
adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear any notation that it is an amended
issue."150 That law also requires that "[a]ll records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the
court, the Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency or institution participating in the
adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential."151 The law therefore allows petitioner to state that her adoptive
parents were her birth parents as that was what would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of
strict confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in the same case for cancellation
of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process undertaken by COMELEC is
wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.

On Residence

The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not petitioner committed false material
representation when she stated in her COC that she has before and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the Philippines for
ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.

Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months on the day before the 2016
elections, is true.

The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the Philippines before the day of the
elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident of the
Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the requested information of "Period of Residence in the
Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months" which according to her pleadings in
these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S.

When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the Philippines. There are three
requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there;
and 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile.152 To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically
be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for
an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.153

Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to
the Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005
and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to
September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of their household items weighing about 28,000
pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the
Philippines; school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for
succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot issued
in February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the
Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S.
Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final statement from the First American Title Insurance
Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S.
Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora
Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant until the
condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to
relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to sell the family
home).

The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the COMELEC, particularly in its Resolution in
the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases.

However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been timely changed as of 24 May 2005. At
the oral arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the presence of the first two requisites, namely,
physical presence and animus manendi, but maintained there was no animus non-revertendi.154 The COMELEC
disregarded the import of all the evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of the position that the earliest date that
petitioner could have started residence in the Philippines was in July 2006 when her application under R.A. No. 9225 was
approved by the BI. In this regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC,155 Japzon v.
COMELEC156 and Caballero v. COMELEC. 157 During the oral arguments, the private respondents also added Reyes v.
COMELEC.158 Respondents contend that these cases decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted
until he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa-free entry under
a balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American (without any resident visa) until her
reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.

But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different from her situation. In Coquilla v.
COMELEC,159 the only evidence presented was a community tax certificate secured by the candidate and his declaration
that he would be running in the elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not involve a candidate who wanted to count
residence prior to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing that residence is distinct from
citizenship, the issue there was whether the candidate's acts after reacquisition sufficed to establish residence. In Caballero
v. COMELEC, 161 the candidate admitted that his place of work was abroad and that he only visited during his frequent
vacations. In Reyes v. COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be an American citizen who had not even reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on the citizenship
issue. On residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-month stint as provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted
with approval by this Court, said that "such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency."

It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by the respondents, the Court had no
choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to
no other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the children
from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their
address in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S. employment right after
selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually re-established her residence here on 24
May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a residence
here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her
eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the
years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.

In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the Philippines visa-free as
a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan
Program," shows that there is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after one
year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the
Philippines." 163 The law institutes a balikbayan program "providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary training to
enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the country"164in line
with the government's "reintegration program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients.

Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him reintegrate into society, it would be an
unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms that the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free period is
obviously granted him to allow him to re-establish his life and reintegrate himself into the community before he attends to
the necessary formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that is exactly what petitioner did - she reestablished life
here by enrolling her children and buying property while awaiting the return of her husband and then applying for
repatriation shortly thereafter.

No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in domicile is extensive and overwhelming,
has as yet been decided by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent
that comes close to the facts of residence of petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v. COMELEC,166 and the other
cases cited by the respondents that the Court intended to have its rulings there apply to a situation where the facts are
different. Surely, the issue of residence has been decided particularly on the facts-of-the case basis.

To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of petitioner, the COMELEC ruled that
petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false
because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as "period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for
Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in November 2006. In doing so,
the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.

As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC as the period of
residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which
was the period when the U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised
by her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.

Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence before 13 May 2013) as inquiring
about residence as of the time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change which the COMELEC itself introduced
in the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The
COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first version was vague.

That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of her U.S. house and the return of her
husband is plausible given the evidence that she had returned a year before. Such evidence, to repeat, would include her
passport and the school records of her children.

It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and conclusive admission against
petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all
where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in a COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos
v. COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of residence where the required period was
a minimum of one year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought
to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification
requirement." The COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth
that she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that the 2012
COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of residency.

The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually and physically returned here on
24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only because COMELEC took the position that domicile could be established
only from petitioner's repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the fact that in
reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When she claimed to
have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.

For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As already stated, a petition for quo
warranto had been filed against her with the SET as early as August 2015. The event from which the COMELEC pegged
the commencement of residence, petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an established fact to
repeat, for purposes of her senatorial candidacy.

Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012 COC, petitioner recounted that this
was first brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner
appears to have answered the issue immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not disputed petitioner's evidence on
this point. From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated period of residence in the
2012 COC and the circumstances that surrounded the statement were already matters of public record and were not
hidden.

Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET petition for quo warranto. Her Verified
Answer, which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted that she made a mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six (
6) years and six ( 6) months as she misunderstood the question and could have truthfully indicated a longer period. Her
answer in the SET case was a matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner accomplished her COC for President on
15 October 2015, she could not be said to have been attempting to hide her erroneous statement in her 2012 COC for
Senator which was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.

The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to hide the 2012 statement and have
it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this Court's pronouncement that:

Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily constitute material
misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as
already discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and
qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's
qualifications to run for public office.168

In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number of evidenced dates all of
which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non revertedi to the United States of America. The
veracity of the events of coming and staying home was as much as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus having been
fixed at the petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts to a declaration
and therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines only commence sometime in November 2006"; such that
"based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for President." This conclusion, as already
shown, ignores the standing jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not the statement of the person that determines
residence for purposes of compliance with the constitutional requirement of residency for election as President. It ignores
the easily researched matter that cases on questions of residency have been decided favorably for the candidate on the
basis of facts of residence far less in number, weight and substance than that presented by petitioner.169 It ignores, above
all else, what we consider as a primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her declaration in her COC for Senator
which declaration was not even considered by the SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner
made the declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been a resident for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months
counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference the residency requirements for election as
Senator which was satisfied by her declared years of residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments before us
that at the time the declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did not have as yet any intention to vie for the Presidency
in 2016 and that the general public was never made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for
President in 2016. Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are
facts of residence other than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such other facts of residence have never
been proven to be false, and these, to repeat include:

[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's] husband however stayed in the USA to finish
pending projects and arrange the sale of their family home.

Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City. [Petitioner] enrolled Brian in Beacon
School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning
Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough to go to school.

In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan.
[Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills was completed.

Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her former lawyer who handled [petitioner's]
adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating
[petitioner's] new name and stating that her parents are "Ronald Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."

In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise the disposal of some of the family's
remaining household belongings.1a\^/phi1 [Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.

In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal Service of the family's abandonment of their
address in the US.

The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.

In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He returned to the Philippines on 4 May 2006 and
began working for a Philippine company in July 2006.

In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where they eventually built their
family home.170

In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case fall under the exclusive
ground of false representation, to consider no other date than that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her candidacy as President of the Republic,
the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse
of discretion from root to fruits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:

1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent, stating that:

[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local
Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.

2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002
(DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-
007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and
SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions
and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the
elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local
and National Elections.

3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second
Division stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified
Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The
Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission First Division is AFFIRMED.

4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the First
Division.

are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES
is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.

DJUMANTAN vs.HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with preliminary injunction, to reverse and set
aside the Decision dated September 27, 1990 of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID), ordering the
deportation of petitioner and its Resolution dated January 29, 1991, denying the motion for reconsideration.

Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.

On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974, he married petitioner in accordance with
Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979.

On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez, (two-year old Marina and nine-month old Nikulas)
arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner
and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia.
When petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport on January 13, 1979, Banez,
together with Marina Cabael, met them.

Banez executed an "Affidavit of Guaranty and Support," for his "guests," stating inter alia, that:

That I am the guarantor for the entry into the Philippines of Mrs. Djumantan, 42 years old, and her two minor
children, MARINA, 2 years old, and NIKULAS, 9 months old, all Indonesian citizens, who are coming as
temporary visitors.

That I am willing to guaranty them out of gratitude to their family for the hospitality they have accorded me
during the few years that I have stayed in Indonesia in connection with my employment thereat.

That I guaranty they are law abiding citizens and I guaranty their behavior while they are in the Philippines; I also
guaranty their support and that they will not become a public charge.

That I guaranty their voluntary departure upon the termination of the authorized stay granted them by the
Government (Rollo, p. 41).

As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez.

Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration
Act of 1940.

In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for
"concubinage" with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan against the two. This case was, however,
dismissed for lack of merit.

On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident
under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration.

Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint with the Ombudsman, who subsequently
referred the letter to the CID. On the basis of the said letter, petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell. She later
released pending the deportation proceedings (DEP Case No. 90-400) after posting a cash bond (Rollo, pp. 15-16).
Thereafter, she manifested to the CID that she be allowed to depart voluntarily from the Philippines and asked for time to
purchase her airline ticket (Rollo, p. 10). However, she a change of heart and moved for the dismissal of the deportation
case on the ground that she was validly married to a Filipino citizen (Rollo, pp. 11-12).

In the Decision dated September 27, 1990, the CID, through public respondents, disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Board of Commissioners finds the second marriage of
Bernardo Banes to respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. We
revoke the Section 13(a) visa previously granted to her (Rollo, p. 23).

Public respondents denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in their Resolution dated January 29, 1991 (Rollo, pp.
31-33).

Hence, this petition.

We issued a temporary restraining order, directing public respondents to cease and desist from executing or implementing
the Decision dated September 27, 1990 and the Resolution dated January 29, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 34-36).

On September 20, 1994, Leonardo C. Banez manifested that his father died on August 14, 1994 and that he and his mother
were withdrawing their objection to the granting of a permanent resident visa to petitioner (Rollo, pp. 173-175).

II
Petitioner claims that her marriage to Banez was valid under Article 27 of P.D. No. 1085, the Muslim Code, which
recognizes the practice of polyandry by Muslim males. From that premise, she argues that under Articles 109 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, Article 68 of the Family Code and Article 34 of the Muslim Code, the husband and wife are
obliged to live together and under Article 110 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the husband is given the right to fix the
conjugal residence. She claims that public respondents have no right to order the couple to live separately (Rollo, pp. 5-7).

When asked to comment on the petition, the Solicitor General took the position that the CID could not order petitioner's
deportation because its power to do so had prescribed under Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act of 1940 (Rollo, pp. 57-
74).

III

We need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez, if under the law the CID can validly deport petitioner
as an "undesirable alien" regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Therefore, to be first resolved is the question on
petitioner's immigration status, particularly the legality of her admission into the country and the change of her status from
temporary visitor to permanent resident. Upon a finding that she was not lawfully admitted into the country and she did
not lawfully acquire permanent residency, the next question is whether the power to deport her has prescribed.

There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner's entry into the country and the change of her
immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such privileges were obtained through
misinterpretation.

Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in her applications for temporary
visitor's visa and for permanent residency.

The civil status of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary visitor is a matter that could influence the exercise of
discretion on the part of the immigration authorities. The immigration authorities would be less inclined to allow the entry
of a woman who claims to have entered into a marriage with a Filipino citizen, who is married to another woman
(Cf. Shiu Shin Man v. Galang, 3 SCRA 871 [1961]).

Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is as
absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country (Annotations, 8 ALR 1286). this
right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into the territory is a matter of pure
permission and simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to stay (3 Am.
Jur. 2d. 72).

The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed to continue to reside in the country, is protected only so
far as Congress may choose to protect it (United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shauhnessy 180 F. 2d. 489).

There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be given permanent
residency, in the Philippines.

The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the immigration laws governing
the admission and exclusion of aliens (United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shauhnessy, 338 US 537 94 L. Ed. 317, 70 S. Ct.
309 [1950]; Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 US 460 56 L. Ed. 1165, 32 S. Ct. 734 [1912]; Annotations, 71 ALR 1213).
Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her
from her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien (Joaquin v. Galang,
33 SCRA 362 [1970]).

Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies for a
visitor's visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay. Under Section 13 of the law, an
alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and "may be admitted" as a permanent resident. Among
those considered qualified to apply for permanent residency if the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen (Immigration
Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]). The entry of aliens into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right,
even if they are legally married to Filipino citizens.
 IV

We now address the issue raised by the Solicitor General that the right of public respondents to deport petitioner has
prescribed, citing Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940.

Said Section 37(b) provides:

Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of this section at any time after
entry, but shall not be effected under any clause unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within
five years after the cause for deportation arises. Deportation under clauses 3 and 4 shall not be effected if the
court, or judge thereof, when sentencing the alien, shall recommend to the Commissioner of Immigration that the
alien be not deported (As amended by Rep. Act No. 503).

Section 37(a) of the said law mentioned in Section 37(b) thereof provides:

The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other
officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration
after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged
against the alien:

1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and misleading
statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designating port of entry or at
any place other than at a designated port of entry.

2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was not lawfully admissible at the
time of entry;

3) Any alien who, after the effective date of this Act, is convicted in the Philippines and sentenced for a term of
one year or more for a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after his entry, is so convicted
and sentenced more than once;

4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the law governing prohibited drugs;

5) Any alien who practices prostitution or is an inmate of a house of prostitution or is connected with the
management of a house of prostitution, or is a procurer;

6) Any alien who becomes a public charge within five years after entry from causes not affirmatively shown to
have arisen subsequent to entry;

7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which he was
admitted a non-immigrant;

8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the overthrow by force and violence of the
Government of the Philippines, or of constituted law and authority, or who disbelieves in or is opposed to
organized government, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the assault or assassination of public officials
because of their office, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the unlawful destruction of property, or who is a
member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining, advocating or teaching such doctrines, or who on any
manner whatsoever lends assistance, financial or otherwise, to the dissemination of such doctrines;

9) Any alien who commits any of the acts described in Sections forty-five and forty-six of this Act, independent
of criminal action which may be brought against him: Provided, That in the case of an alien who, for any reason,
is convicted and sentenced to suffer both imprisonment and deportation, said alien shall first serve the entire
period of his imprisonment before he is actually deported: Provided, however, That the imprisonment may be
waived by the Commissioner of Immigration with the consent of the Department Head, and upon payment by the
alien concerned of such amount as the Commissioner may fix and approved by the Department Head, and upon
 payment by the alien concerned of such amount as the Commissioner may fix and approved by the Department
Head (as amended by R.A. No. 144);

10) Any alien who, at any time within five years after entry, shall have been convicted of violating the provisions
of the Philippine Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred and fifty-three, otherwise known as the Philippine
Alien Registration Act of 1941 (now Republic Act No. 562), or who, at any time after entry, shall have been
convicted more than once of violating the provisions of the same Act;

11) Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or black-marketing, independent of any criminal action
which may be brought against him;

12) Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized under Commonwealth Act Numbered Four hundred and
seventy-three, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Laws of the Philippines, or any law relating to
acquisition of Philippine citizenship;

13) Any alien who defrauds his creditor by absconding or alienating properties, to prevent them from being
attached or executed.

Under clause 1 of Section 37(a), an "alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false
and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of
entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry" is subject to deportation.

The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive period and "shall not be effected ... unless
the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for deportation arises" (Immigration Act
of 1940, Sec. 37[b]).

Congress may impose a limitation of time for the deportation of alien from the country (Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 US
341 77 L. Ed. 350, 53 S. Ct. 152 [1932]; Guiney v. Bonham [CA 9] 261 F. 582, 8 ALR 1282).

In Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 (1991), we held that under Section 37(b) of the
Immigration Act of 1940, the deportation of an alien may be barred after the lapse of five years after the cause of
deportation arises. Justice Feliciano, in his dissenting opinion, qualified the broad statement of the law as follows:

Examination of the above quoted Section 37 (b) shows that the five (5) year limitation is applicable only where
deportation is sought to be effected under clauses of Section 37 (a) other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12; that
where deportation or exclusion is sought to be effected under clauses of Section 37(a), no period of limitation is
applicable; and that to the contrary, deportation or exclusion may be effected "at any time after entry."

Justice Davide, in his dissenting opinion, clarified:

Note that the five-year period applies only to clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of the Section.
In respect to clauses 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12, the limitation does not apply.

In Lam Shee v. Bengzon, 93 Phil. 1065 (1953), the alien admitted that she had gained entrance into the Philippines
fraudulently by making use of the name of a Chinese resident-merchant other than that of her lawful husband. The Court,
however, held that she could no longer be deported "for the simple reason that more than 5 years had elapsed from the
date of her admission."

The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed.

Petitioner was admitted and allowed entry into the Philippines on January 13, 1979 on the basis of false and misleading
statements in her application and in the other supporting documents submitted to the immigration authorities. Leonardo C.
Banez first complained with the CID on November 19, 1980 about the manner petitioner was admitted into the country
and asked for her deportation (Rollo, pp. 77-78). After the EDSA Revolution, he sent a follow-up letter to the CID
requesting action on his 1980 letter-complaint (Rollo, p. 78).
Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of the illegal entry
of petitioner into the country, more than five years had elapsed before the issuance of the order of her deportation on
September 27, 1990.

In their Comment, public respondents urged that what is barred under Section 37(b) is the deportation of an alien and
claimed that what they ordered was not the deportation of petitioner but merely the revocation of Section 13(a) which
refers to the visa previously granted her (Rollo, p. 102).

The "arrest" contemplated by Section 37(b) refers to the arrest for the purpose of carrying out an order for deportation and
not the arrest prior to proceedings to determine the right of the alien to stay in the country. When public respondents
revoked the permanent residence visa issued to petitioner, they, in effect, ordered her arrest and deportation as an
overstaying alien.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the temporary restraining order issued on June 4, 1991 is MADE
PERMANENT.

The Decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September 27, 1990 revoking the issuance of the permanent resident
visa to petitioner and the Resolution dated January 29, 1991 are REVERSED.

Mercado vs Manzano

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Mercado and private respondent Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May
11, 1998 elections. The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification
filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United
States. The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and under Sec. 40 of the Local
Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. Private respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending until after the election. The board of canvassers tabulated
the votes but suspended the proclamation of the winner. Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification. COMELEC en banc reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the
position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice
mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare the private respondent
disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati.
On the issue of whether the petitioner has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not the original party in
the disqualification case, the Supreme Court ruled that under Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet
been no final judgment rendered. As regards the issue of citizenship, the Court ruled that by filing a certificate of candidacy
when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTORAL REFORMS LAW OF 1987 (R.A. No. 6646); INTERVENTION, ALLOWED IN
PROCEEDINGS FOR DISQUALIFICATION EVEN AFTER ELECTION IF THERE HAS BEEN NO FINAL
JUDGMENT RENDERED; CASE AT BAR. Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the
matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati
 City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately
disqualified by final and executory judgment. The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought
to intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the
election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private
respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still
has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo vs.
COMELEC, reiterated in several cases, only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and
the question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present
case, at the time petitioner filed a Motion for leave to File Intervention on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation
of the winner, and petitioners purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified from running for [an]
elective local position under Section 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the
disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner
since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City. Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation
any less because he filed a motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to
have garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene
at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No.
6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is
strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if
there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
2. ID.; CITIZENSHIP; DUAL CITIZENSHIP; DISTINGUISHED FROM DUAL ALLEGIANCE. Dual citizenship is
different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws
of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation
may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in
a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is
possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino
fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of
Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country; (3)
Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. There may be other situations in which a citizen
of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are possible
given the constitutional provisions on citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which
a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition. With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, Section
5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. In including Section 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d)
and in R.A. No. 7854, Section 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere
dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should
suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed
out: [D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other
countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country
is something completely beyond our control. By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time
forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual
 citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship.
4. ID.; ID.; FILING OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY SUFFICED TO RENOUNCE AMERICAN
CITIZENSHIP; CASE AT BAR. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private
respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such
certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he
might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo vs. COMELEC it was held: It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983
Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship,
which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him from running for any elective local position?
We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the
time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo
wrote that he had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship-long before May 8, 1995. At best,
Frivaldo was stateless in the interim-when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated
to his Filipino citizenship. On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995: By the laws
of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy
contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government. These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign
nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that
such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness
or abuse. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, private respondent had dual
citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the
termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar vs. COMELEC applies mutatis mutandis to
private respondent in the case at bar: Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American,
the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino [T]he
Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities
or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is no implied
renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must
be express, it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation,
either express or implied. To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent
has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything
which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the
Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced
his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City
of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:

Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853

Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275[1]

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a
certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,[2] the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and
ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and,
under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective
position. The COMELECs Second Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for
the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the
respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a
natural-born Filipino citizen.

In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the
Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen
because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco,
California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his
registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.

Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. In other
words, he holds dual citizenship.

The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?

Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any
elective local position.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate
for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.

On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.[3] The motion remained pending even until after
the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board of
canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. [4] Petitioners motion was opposed by
private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4
to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared
private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. [5] The pertinent
portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:

As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US
citizenship byoperation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.

He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were
Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American
passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He
was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he
did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.

It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the
elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine
law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.

At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet
final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City,
garnering one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado,
who obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred
fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275)
votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex
legal issues involving private international law which may well be settled before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs.
Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).

WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7,
1998, ordering the cancellation of the respondents certificate of candidacy.

We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position of vice-mayor of
Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon proper notice to the parties, to
reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of
Makati City.

Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening of August 31, 1998,
proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare
private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that

[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:

A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:

1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was already 37 years old; and,

2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992,
1995 and 1998.

B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;

C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet
final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for
and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.

We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano whether petitioner Mercado has
personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto
Mamaril nor was petitioners motion for leave to intervene granted.

I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC in support of
his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his
motion for intervention:

Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person allowed to initiate an action or proceeding
may, before or during the trial of an action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in
such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.

Section 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the Commission or the
Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a
separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because
he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of
Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings before the
COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati
City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been
no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race
at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,[6] reiterated in several cases,[7] only applies to cases in
which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified
candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention
on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioners purpose was precisely to have private
respondent disqualified from running for [an] elective local position under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who
originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action,
so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for intervention only on May 20,
1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice
mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private
respondent is clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides:

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.

Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has
yet been no final judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion for intervention was tantamount to a denial of the
motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits
of the case, the present petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitioners motion for intervention but also with
the substantive issues respecting private respondents alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so,
whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160), which declares as disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual
citizenship. This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati.[8]
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with him in this case,
contends that through 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility
of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states.[9] For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of
our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
 (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such
children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act
or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen
of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law. This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of
Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows:[10]

. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the
Bernas Committee according to which a dual allegiance and I reiterate a dual allegiance is larger and more
threatening than that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a
function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.

What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the problem of dual allegiance. For
example, we all know what happens in the triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of
Commerce which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei
ticket. Not widely known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the
Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the Peoples Republic of
China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some
European and Latin countries were represented, which was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic friction. At
that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas Council.

When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are
already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also
took close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who
were concerned about the lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has
always been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.

Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or Malaysia, and this is already
happening. Some of the great commercial places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is
of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a capital famine which
also means economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and social unrest.

And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in
the article on Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND
SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.

In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual allegiance, thus:[11]

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual citizenship in the sense that it implies a
double allegiance under a double sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would
be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and
which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of
course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is,
of course, the concern for national security. In the course of those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of
the wave of naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China was
made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted
that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the
occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and
deep concern about double citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty
and national security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this could be left to the determination of a future
legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us
say, potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the Committee entertain a proposed
amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate double citizenship?

Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual
citizens per sebut with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as
referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status,
for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members
of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: [D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control
of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered
a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control.[12]
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which
they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign
state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the
following discussion on 40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:[13]
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: Any person with dual citizenship
is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose
mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is
no requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine
citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or her father and one
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local government
position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would want to run for
public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the country of the father
claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an election for him
of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under the Constitution,
a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the
citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentlemans example, if he does not
renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first
thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one
citizenship.
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always have one
citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he also acknowledges
other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty[14] of which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a
certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic,[15] it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other country
or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed
by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the
provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter
should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere
with its operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our
Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a
foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all means and at all
cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.

III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino
parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus
soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the
COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent
effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law, so that now he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of
renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37 years old,
it was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American citizenship, the
COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that A
person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting
in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign
territory. To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk[16] as
beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy
when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship. Private respondents certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements made
under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-BORN OR NATURALIZED) NATURAL-BORN
....
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO,
CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR .
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE
THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY
THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I
IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION
OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE
AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held:[17]

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not
effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him from
running for any elective local position? We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that
Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for
governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenship long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim when he abandoned and renounced
his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to
the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy
contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been
effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court,
absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.

There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that the oath of allegiance contained in private respondents
certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of his American citizenship. Equally without merit is
petitioners contention that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the
age of majority since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an American citizen in the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he used in his last travel to the United
States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had
dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the
termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v. COMELEC[18] applies mutatis mutandis to private
respondent in the case at bar:

. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a
Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed,
there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said
citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be express, it stands to
reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either express or implied.

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true
faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a
dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has
spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections
in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that
trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago,[19] we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground
that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one
who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Board of Immigration Commissioners vs Go Callano

On July 13, 1962, the Department of Foreign Affairs informed the Commissioner of Immigration that, on the basis of the
findings made by the National Bureau of Investigation, the signatures of former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto
M. Serrano, on certain documents, amongst them cable authorization No. 2230-V (File No. 23617) authorizing the
documentation of Beato Go Callano and others, were not authentic. Thereupon, the Department declared several
documents among them the cable authorization just mentioned to be null, void and of no effect, and the documentation
made by the Philippine Consulate General at Hongkong pursuant to said cable authorization consisting of the certificates
of registration and identity issued to Beato Go Callano and his brothers Manuel, Gonzalo and Julio for travel to the
Philippines were cancelled. All this was done without previous notice served nor hearing granted to said parties.

On August 21 of the same year, the Board of Immigration Commissioners, exercising its power of review under Section
27 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, issued, also without any previous notice and hearing, an order
reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry dated January 4, 1962, admitting Beato and his three brothers for
entry as citizens; ordering their exclusion as aliens not properly documented for admission pursuant to Section 27 (a) (17)
of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, and ordering that they be returned to the port whence they came
or to the country of which they were nationals, upon the ground that they had been able "to enter this country and gain
admission as Filipino citizens by the fraudulently secured authorization." On the same date (August 21, 1962) the
Commissioner of Immigration issued a warrant of exclusion commanding the deportation officer "to carry out the
exclusion of the above-named applicants (the Go Callano brothers) on the first available transportation and on the same
class of accommodation in which they arrived to the port whence they came or to the country of which they are nationals."

The warrant of exclusion, for one reason or another, was not served immediately upon the parties ordered deported, who,
on November 16, 1962, filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for injunction to restrain the Board of
Immigration Commissioners and the Commissioner of Immigration from executing the order of exclusion or deportation
already mentioned. They based their action on the following grounds: (1) that the Board had no jurisdiction to exclude
them from the Philippines because they were not aliens but Filipino citizens, and (2) that the order of exclusion was issued
by the Board without due process and in violation of the Constitution. Months later, the Court of First Instance issued a
writ of preliminary injunction restraining the respondents in the case from deporting the petitioners. After trial, the Court
rendered judgment finding that, according to petitioners' undisputed evidence, "the petitioners herein are the illegitimate
children of Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen, with her common-law husband — a Chinese citizen," and concluding that
"until the petitioners left for China in 1947, they must be considered as citizens of the Philippines as they were born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father who, however, was not married to their mother."

Notwithstanding the above finding and conclusion, however, the Court dismissed the case holding that "the petitioners are
citizens of the Republic of China and not being properly documented for entry into the Philippines as found by the
Immigration Commissioner, the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Court shall be deemed dissolved
upon finality of this decision." The grounds upon which the Court based its decision were: (1) because petitioners stayed
in China for a period of fifteen years before returning to the Philippines, they must be considered as citizens of the
Chinese Republic; (2) as petitioners were recognized by their alien father as his children, they became Chinese citizens
under the Chinese law of nationality. While the Court also found that the cable authorization mentioned heretofore was a
forgery, it held that, for the purpose of the petition before it, "it was immaterial to determine the genuineness or falsity of
the cable authorization. For if the petitioners are Filipino citizens, they are entitled to remain within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Republic in whatever way they might have entered."

After the denial of herein respondents' motion for re-consideration, they appealed to the Court of Appeals where they
raised the following issues: (a) that being Filipino citizens by birth, they did not lose their citizenship nor acquire Chinese
citizenship, neither by their prolonged stay in China nor by their alleged recognition by their Chinese father, and (b) that
the cablegram authorization was not a forgery.

In due time the Court of Appeals rendered the decision now under review by certiorari, reversing that of the lower court.

Like the court of origin, the Court of Appeals found that herein respondents were the illegitimate children of Go Chiao
Lin, a Chinese citizen, and Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen, who started living maritally in Malitbog, Leyte, in 1934; that
out of their illegitimate union were born the following: Beato, in Sugod, Leyte, on September 28, 1936; Manuel, in
Libagon, Leyte, on June 17, 1941; Gonzalo, in Malitbog, Leyte, on April 17, 1943, and Julio in Malitbog, Leyte, on
January 31, 1945. The Court of Appeals also found that in 1946, Go Chiao Lin, Emilia and their four sons went to Amoy,
China, on vacation, but Go died there the same year. In 1948, Emilia had to return to the Philippines as the maid of Consul
Eutiquio Sta. Romana because she was penniless, leaving her children behind. Subsequently the latter were able to go to
Hongkong, where they sought and obtained employment. In 1961, they applied with the Philippine Consul General in
Hongkong for entry into the Philippines as Filipino citizens. On December 12 of that year, the Consulate received a
cablegram from the Department of Foreign Affairs authorizing it to investigate whether the petitioners for entry were the
illegitimate children of Emilia Callano a Filipino citizen, and, if satisfied, after a thorough screening, to issue the
corresponding document certifying that they were Filipino citizens. The Consulate made thereafter the appropriate
investigation, and on the basis of evidence presented consisting of the sworn statements of the applicants, their birth
certificates and blood test reports, said office issued late that month a certificate of registration and identity to the effect
that the applicant had submitted sufficient evidence of their citizenship and identity and had been allowed to register in the
Consulate as Filipino citizens and to travel directly to the Philippines.

On December 26 of the same year 1961, they arrived in Manila by plane from Hongkong. As the Immigration Inspector at
the airport was of the opinion that their travel documents did not constitute conclusive proof of citizenship, he referred
their case to the Board of Special Inquiry No. 2. Thereupon the latter conducted an investigation at which the respondents
presented oral and documentary evidence to sustain their right to admission as Filipinos (Exhs. B, D, E and H; pp. 93-98;
99-100; 101-102; 104 of the Record). Upon these evidence, the Board on January 4, 1962, promulgated a decision finding
the Go Callano brothers to be the illegitimate children of Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen, and entitled to admission, as
they were in fact admitted, as Filipino citizens.

That Go Chiao Lin, a Chinese citizen, and Emilia Callano a Filipino, lived maritally in several municipalities of Leyte
since 1934 and that out of their union the four private respondents were born, are facts found, after appropriate
proceedings, first, by the Philippine Consulate General in Hongkong; second, by the Board of Special Inquiry who
investigated their case in Manila upon their arrival thereat in 1961; third, by the Court of First Instance of Manila, and
lastly, by the Court of Appeals. These facts, according to well settled jurisprudence, are not reviewable by Us in this
appeal by certiorari.

In this appeal, the Board of Immigration Commissioners and the Commissioner of Immigration maintain the following
propositions: (1) that, in view of the fact that the cable authorization referred to heretofore is a forgery, all the proceedings
had in connection therewith are void and, as a result, the private respondents must be deported as aliens not properly
documented; (2) that, granting that they were Filipino citizens when they left the Philippines in 1946, they lost that
citizenship, firstly, by staying in China for a period of fifteen years, and secondly, because they were recognized by their
common-law father, they became citizens of the Republic of China in accordance with the Chinese Nationality Law.

The Court of First Instance of Manila declared the cablegram authorization a forgery on the strength of the testimony of
Mr. Logan — a handwriting expert. This finding, however, was reversed by the Court of Appeals, the pertinent portion of
its decision being the following:

The next question raised by the petitioners-appellants is whether the Government has satisfactorily proved that the
signature of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs on the cable authorization, Exhibit 1, is a forgery. Felipe P. Logan,
chief of the questioned documents division of the National Bureau of Investigation, testified that he made a
comparative examination of the signature of the Department Secretary on Exhibit 1 and the signatures of the same
official on the detail orders, Exhibits 3-G to 3-L, and from the significant differences in the writing characteristics
which he observed and concluded that the signature on Exhibit 1 was not written by the Department Secretary.

Before it can be said that the questioned signature is a forgery there must be competent proof that the specimens
are the genuine signature of the Secretary. According to witness, Logan, he knows that the signatures on the detail
orders are genuine "because they were submitted to me by an agent who took them from the files of the
Department of Foreign Affairs" (p. 52, transcript). The foregoing testimony of the witness does not prove the
genuineness of the specimen signatures, more so because the agent who allegedly took the detail others from the
files of the Foreign Affairs Department was not presented as a witness. The NBI expert concluded, from his
observation that there are significant differences between the questioned signature and the specimen signatures on
the detail orders, that the former is a forgery. But the conclusion is stultified by the admission of the same witness
that even between the specimen signatures there are variations in the handwriting characteristics of the signatory
(p. 24, transcript). Our appreciation of the evidence showed that there are variations indeed between the specimen
 signatures (Exhibits S-1 to S-5); there are distinct similarities even between the questioned signature and the
specimen signatures (cf. Q-5, S-4 and S-5). Upon the evidence presented by the Government, it cannot be said
that the forgery of the questioned signature has been satisfactorily proven.

Even if the competent proofs were presented showing that the questioned signature is a forgery, the forgery of the
signature on the cable authorization would not have nullified the documentation of the petitioners by the consulate
in Hongkong. We were not cited to any specific rule or regulation of the Department of Foreign Affairs stating
that the prior authorization of this Department is necessary before the consular official abroad can act in
documentation cases. On the other hand, as per resolution of the Cabinet of August 24, 1948, the President
suggested and the Cabinet "resolved to restore the prewar practice of entrusting to our respective consular
officials abroad the duty of receiving all visa applications and investigating the qualifications of the applicants."
(cited in Espina, Immigration Laws, 1956 Ed., p. 142.) It is evident from the aforequoted resolution that the
Executive branch of the Government intended that the right to screen applicants for entry into this country should
be lodged in the consular officials abroad. Giving effect to this intention, the Supreme Court stated in Ng Gioc
Lin vs. The Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. L-2175, March 31, 1950, "that although the
foreign service has been placed under the over-all direction and supervision of the Department of Foreign Affairs
by Executive Order No. 18 (42 Off. Gaz., 2064), this does not necessarily mean that the Department Secretary
takes the place of the consular officers abroad in the matter of the issuance of passport visas, for the Secretary
cannot relieve those officers of their responsibility under the law. ... The reason of the law in conferring upon the
consuls themselves the duty and power to grant passports and visas is obvious. The applicant for visa is in a
foreign country and the Philippine consular officer there is naturally in a better position than the home office to
determine through investigation conducted on the spot whether or not the said applicant is qualified to enter the
Philippines." It can be deduced from the foregoing that the documentation of the petitioners in Hongkong was not
vitiated by a substantial defect even assuming that it was done without prior authorization from the Foreign
Affairs Department.

It must be stated in this connection that the petitioners became Philippine citizens because of their relation with
their mother who is a Filipino. Their status was conferred on them neither by the documentation by the consulate
in Hongkong nor by the finding of the Board of Special Inquiry in Manila. Consequently, whatever defects there
are in the proceedings before the consulate and the board of inquiry cannot affect their status. Therefore, even
assuming that the petitioners were not properly documented, there is no basis for the finding of the respondent
Board that they are aliens who can be excluded.

Due, therefore, to the pronouncement made by the Court of Appeals regarding the insufficiency of the evidence presented
by herein petitioners to prove the alleged forgery — again, a matter not now within our power to review — the questioned
cablegram must be deemed to be authentic. But be that as it may, we agree with both the Court of First Instance of origin
and the Court of Appeals that, even assuming that said document was forged, this would not automatically render void all
the proceedings had before the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong and the Board of Special Inquiry, both of which ended
with a definite finding that the Callanos were Filipino citizens. That these proceedings and finding can not be nullified by
the Department of Foreign Affairs summarily and without giving the parties concerned an opportunity to be heard is too
evident to require any demonstration.

To the other questions relied upon by herein petitioners, the following portions of the decision of the Court of Appeals
would seem to be sufficient answer:

The question, whether petitioners who are admittedly Filipino citizens at birth subsequently acquired Chinese
citizenship under the Chinese Law of Nationality by reason of recognition or a prolonged stay in China, is a fit
subject for the Chinese law and the Chinese court to determine, which cannot be resolved by a Philippine court
without encroaching on the legal system of China. For, the settled rule of international law, affirmed by the Hague
Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws of April 12, 1930 and by the International Court of Justice, is that
"Any question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular state should be determined in
accordance with laws of that state ." (quoted in Salonga, Private International Law, 1957 Ed., p. 112.) There was
no necessity of deciding that question because so far as concerns the petitioners' status, the only question in this
proceeding is: Did the petitioners lose their Philippine citizenship upon the performance of certain acts or the
happening of certain events in China? In deciding this question no foreign law can be applied. The petitioners are
admittedly Filipino citizens at birth, and their status must be governed by Philippine law wherever they may be, in
 conformity with Article 15 (formerly Article 9) of the Civil Code which provides as follows: "Laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, conditions and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad." Under Article IV, Section 2, of the Philippine Constitution, "Philippine
citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law," which implies that the question of whether
a Filipino has lost his Philippine citizenship shall be determined by no other than the Philippine law.

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended by Republic Act No. 106, provides that a Filipino citizen
may lose his citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation of citizenship; subscribing to
an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country; rendering service to, or accepting a
commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country; cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; declaration
by competent authority that he is a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war; in the case of a woman
by marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of laws in force in her husband's country, she acquires his
nationality. Recognition of the petitioners by their alien father is not among the ground for losing Philippine
citizenship under Philippine law, and it cannot be said that the petitioners lost their former status by reason of
such recognition. About the only mode of losing Philippine citizenship which closely bears on the petitioners is
renunciation. But even renunciation cannot be cited in support of the conclusion that petition lost their Philippine
citizenship because the law requires an express renunciationwhich means a renunciation that is made known
distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication; a renunciation manifested by direct and
appropriate language, as distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct. (Opinion No. 69 of the Secretary
of Justice, Series of 1940.) Indeed, as the Supreme Court held in U.S. v. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332, a case for
deportation, where Ong, a natural child of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father, born in the Philippines, was
brought by his parents to China when he was 4 years old, where he remained for 18 or 19 years, returning to the
Philippines at 25 years of age, "The fact that a minor child in those conditions was taken to China and remained
there for several years is not sufficient ground upon which to hold that he has changed his nationality, when, after
reaching his majority, he did not express his desire to choose the nationality of his father." The import of the
foregoing pronouncement is that of itself a protracted stay in a foreign country does not amount to
renunciation. Moreover, herein petitioners were all minors when they where brought to China in 1446. They were
without legal capacity to renounce their status. Upon their return to the Philippines only Beato Go Callano had
attained the age of majority, but even as to him there could not have been renunciation because he did not
manifest by direct and appropriate language that he was disclaiming Philippine citizenship. On the contrary, after
he has attained the age of majority, he applied for registration as a Philippine citizen and sought entry into this
country, which are clear indicia of his intent to continue his former status. The foregoing shows that the
petitioners have not lost their Philippine citizenship.

Lasty, petitioners claim that the private respondents are barred from questioning the decision of the Board of Immigration
Commissioners dated August 21, 1962 and the warrant of exclusion issued by the Commissioner of Immigration on the
same date, because they did not appeal from either to the Secretary of Justice.

We find this to be without merit for the reason that, as stated before, both orders were issued without previous notice and
hearing and were, therefore, in violation of due process. As a matter of fact, even in the case of an alien,decisions of the
Board of Immigration Commissioners, like that of any other administrative body, do not constitute res judicata so as to bar
a re-examination of the alien's right to enter or stay (Ong Se Lun, et al. vs. Board of Immigration, G.R. No. L-6017,
September 16, 1954), and the courts can grant relief if said Board abused its powers, or committed serious legal errors, or
denied the alien a fair hearing (Lao Tang Bun vs. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682).

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby affirmed, with costs. It is so ordered.
Jacot vs Dal

EN BANC G.R. No. 179848

NESTOR A. JACOT, Petitioner,- versus -

ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
November 27, 2008

D E C I S I O N - CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution[1] dated 28 September 2007 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second
Division[2] disqualifying him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007
National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of his United States (US)
citizenship.

Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December
1989. [3]

Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los
Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval[4] of petitioners request, and on the same day, petitioner took
his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. [5] On 27 September 2006,
the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a citizen of
the Philippines.[6]

Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of
the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. [7]

On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification[8] before the COMELEC Provincial
Office in Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US citizenship, as required under Section
5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225, which reads as follows:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.Those who retain or reacquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities
and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

In his Answer[9] dated 6 May 2007 and Position Paper[10] dated 8 May 2007, petitioner countered that his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and the oath contained in his Certificate of
Candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner garnered the highest number of votes
for the position of Vice Mayor.

On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution[11] disqualifying the petitioner from
running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of
his US citizenship. The COMELEC Second Division explained that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225 does not automatically bestow upon any person the privilege to run for any elective public office. It
additionally ruled that the filing of a Certificate of Candidacy cannot be considered as a renunciation of foreign
citizenship. The COMELEC Second Division did not consider Valles v. COMELEC[12] and Mercado
v. Manzano[13] applicable to the instant case, since Valles and Mercado were dual citizens since birth, unlike the petitioner
who lost his Filipino citizenship by means of naturalization. The COMELEC, thus, decreed in the aforementioned
Resolution that:

ACCORDINGLY, NESTOR ARES JACOT is DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Vice-
Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections. If proclaimed,
respondent cannot thus assume the Office of Vice-Mayor of said municipality by virtue of such
disqualification.[14]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 29 June 2007 reiterating his position that his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before the Los Angeles PCG and his oath in his Certificate of Candidacy sufficed as an effective
renunciation of his US citizenship. Attached to the said Motion was an Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United
States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship dated 27 June 2007, wherein petitioner explicitly renounced
his US citizenship.[15] The COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioners Motion in a Resolution[16] dated 28 September
2007 for lack of merit.

Petitioner sought remedy from this Court via the present Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, where he presented for the first time an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to theUnited
States and Any and All Foreign Citizenship[17] dated 7 February 2007. He avers that he executed an act of renunciation of
his US citizenship, separate from the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines he took before the Los Angeles
PCG and his filing of his Certificate of Candidacy, thereby changing his theory of the case during the appeal. He attributes
the delay in the presentation of the affidavit to his former counsel, Atty. MarcianoAparte, who allegedly advised him that
said piece of evidence was unnecessary but who, nevertheless, made him execute an identical document entitled Oath of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship on 27 June 2007 after
he had already filed his Certificate of Candidacy.[18]

Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution of this Court:

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. 9225,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CITIZENSHIP RETENTION AND RE-ACQUISITION ACT OF 2003,
SPECIFICALLY SECTION 5(2) AS TO THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THOSE SEEKING ELECTIVE
PUBLIC OFFICE;

II

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE
COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE AS REGARDS THE PAYMENT OF THE NECESSARY
MOTION FEES; AND

III

WHETHER OR NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT WOULD RESULT

IN THE FRUSTRATION OF THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE OF CATARMAN, CAMIGUIN.[19]
 The Court determines that the only fundamental issue in this case is whether petitioner is disqualified from running
as a candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of
his US citizenship.

This Court finds that petitioner should indeed be disqualified.

Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before
the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and
sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already
naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to
reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship:

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship
upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

I __________ solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is nothing
therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation might arise under Republic Act No. 9225 wherein
said Filipino has dual citizenship by also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship.

The afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in the Certificate of
Candidacy which must be executed by any person who wishes to run for public office in Philippine elections. Such an oath
reads:

I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that I will obey the laws, legal orders and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines; and that I impose
this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. I hereby certify
that the facts stated herein are true and correct of my own personal knowledge.

Now, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 specifically provides that:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.Those who retain or reacquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities
and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
 The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship
or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public
officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.[20]

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a
foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section
3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.

Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an
undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing
Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225),
where the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur Defensorexplained to Hon.
Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of allegiance is different from the renunciation of foreign citizenship:

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Okay. So, No. 2. Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws
and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. I think its very good,
ha? No problem?

REP. JAVIER. I think its already covered by the oath.

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Renouncing foreign citizenship.

REP. JAVIER. Ah but he has taken his oath already.

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Nono, renouncing foreign citizenship.

xxxx

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Can I go back to No. 2. Whats your problem, Boy? Those seeking elective office
in the Philippines.

REP. JAVIER. They are trying to make him renounce his citizenship thinking that ano

CHAIRMAN DRILON. His American citizenship.

REP. JAVIER. To discourage him from running?

CHAIRMAN DRILON. No.

REP. A.D. DEFENSOR. No. When he runs he will only have one citizenship. When he runs for office, he
will have only one. (Emphasis ours.)

There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining
their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify
as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.

By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which is substantially similar
to the one contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought
under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that the said oath of allegiance is a general requirement
for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an
additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and
who seek elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship.
Petitioner erroneously invokes the doctrine in Valles[21] and Mercado,[22] wherein the filing by a person with dual
citizenship of a certificate of candidacy, containing an oath of allegiance, was already considered a renunciation of foreign
citizenship. The ruling of this Court in Valles and Mercado is not applicable to the present case, which is now specially
governed by Republic Act No. 9225, promulgated on 29 August 2003.

In Mercado, which was cited in Valles, the disqualification of therein private respondent Manzano was sought
under another law, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, which reads:
SECTION 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
xxxx

(d) Those with dual citizenship.

The Court in the aforesaid cases sought to define the term dual citizenship vis--vis the concept of dual allegiance. At the
time this Court decided the cases of Valles and Mercado on 26 May 1999 and 9 August 2000, respectively, the more
explicitly worded requirements of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 were not yet enacted by our legislature.[23]

Lopez v. Commission on Elections[24] is the more fitting precedent for this case since they both share the same
factual milieu. In Lopez, therein petitioner Lopez was a natural-born Filipino who lost his Philippine citizenship after he
became a naturalized US citizen. He later reacquired his Philippine citizenship by virtue of Republic Act
No. 9225.Thereafter, Lopez filed his candidacy for a local elective position, but failed to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of his foreign citizenship. This Court unequivocally declared that despite having garnered the highest number
of votes in the election, Lopez is nonetheless disqualified as a candidate for a local elective position due to his failure to
comply with the requirements of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225.

Petitioner presents before this Court for the first time, in the instant Petition for Certiorari, an Affidavit of Renunciation of
Allegiance to the United States and Any and All Foreign Citizenship,[25] which he supposedly executed on 7 February 2007,
even before he filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March 2007. With the said Affidavit, petitioner puts forward in the
Petition at bar a new theory of his case that he complied with the requirement of making a personal and sworn renunciation
of his foreign citizenship before filing his Certificate of Candidacy. This new theory constitutes a radical change from the
earlier position he took before the COMELEC that he complied with the requirement of renunciation by his oaths of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and in his Certificate of Candidacy, and
that there was no more need for a separate act of renunciation.

As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points of
law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial
body need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic
considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule.[26] Courts have neither the time nor the resources to accommodate
parties who chose to go to trial haphazardly.[27]

Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of evidence.[28] Petitioner should have offered the
Affidavit dated 7 February 2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC.

Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that In the absence of any applicable provisions
of these Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in the Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or
in suppletory character and effect. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court categorically enjoins the admission
of evidence not formally presented:

SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. - The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
 Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC, respondent had no opportunity to examine
and controvert it. To admit this document would be contrary to due process. [29] Additionally, the piecemeal presentation of
evidence is not in accord with orderly justice.[30]

The Court further notes that petitioner had already presented before the COMELEC an identical document, Oath of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship executed on 27 June
2007, subsequent to his filing of his Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March 2007. Petitioner attached the said Oath of 27
June 2007 to his Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC en banc eventually refused to
reconsider said document for being belatedly executed. What was extremely perplexing, not to mention suspect, was that
petitioner did not submit the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 or mention it at all in the proceedings before the COMELEC,
considering that it could have easily won his case if it was actually executed on and in existence before the filing of his
Certificate of Candidacy, in compliance with law.

The justification offered by petitioner, that his counsel had advised him against presenting this crucial piece of
evidence, is lame and unconvincing. If the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 was in existence all along, petitioners counsel, and
even petitioner himself, could have easily adduced it to be a crucial piece of evidence to prove compliance with the
requirements of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. There was no apparent danger for petitioner to submit as much
evidence as possible in support of his case, than the risk of presenting too little for which he could lose.
And even if it were true, petitioners excuse for the late presentation of the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 will not
change the outcome of petitioners case.

It is a well-settled rule that a client is bound by his counsels conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the case,
and the client cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had his lawyer proceeded
differently.[31] The only exceptions to the general rule -- that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel -- which this
Court finds acceptable are when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or
when the application of the rule results in the outright deprivation of ones property through a technicality. [32]These
exceptions are not attendant in this case.

The Court cannot sustain petitioners averment that his counsel was grossly negligent in deciding against the
presentation of the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC. Mistakes of attorneys as to
the competency of a witness; the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence; the proper defense or the burden
of proof, failure to introduce evidence, to summon witnesses and to argue the case -- unless they prejudice the client and
prevent him from properly presenting his case -- do not constitute gross incompetence or negligence, such that clients may
no longer be bound by the acts of their counsel.[33]

Also belying petitioners claim that his former counsel was grossly negligent was the fact that petitioner continuously
used his former counsels theory of the case. Even when the COMELEC already rendered an adverse decision, he persistently
argues even to this Court that his oaths of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Los Angeles PCG and in
his Certificate of Candidacy amount to the renunciation of foreign citizenship which the law requires. Having asserted the
same defense in the instant Petition, petitioner only demonstrates his continued reliance on and complete belief in the
position taken by his former counsel, despite the formers incongruous allegations that the latter has been grossly negligent.

Petitioner himself is also guilty of negligence. If indeed he believed that his counsel was inept, petitioner should
have promptly taken action, such as discharging his counsel earlier and/or insisting on the submission of his Affidavit of 7
February 2007 to the COMELEC, instead of waiting until a decision was rendered disqualifying him and a resolution issued
dismissing his motion for reconsideration; and, thereupon, he could have heaped the blame on his former counsel. Petitioner
could not be so easily allowed to escape the consequences of his former counsels acts, because, otherwise, it would render
court proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening at any time by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. [34]

Petitioner cites De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,[35] where therein petitioner De Guzman was unable to present a piece
of evidence because his lawyer proceeded to file a demurrer to evidence, despite the Sandiganbayans denial of his prior
leave to do so. The wrongful insistence of the lawyer in filing a demurrer to evidence had totally deprived De Guzman of
any chance to present documentary evidence in his defense. This was certainly not the case in the Petition at bar.

Herein, petitioner was in no way deprived of due process. His counsel actively defended his suit by attending the
hearings, filing the pleadings, and presenting evidence on petitioners behalf. Moreover, petitioners cause was not defeated
by a mere technicality, but because of a mistaken reliance on a doctrine which is not applicable to his case. A case lost due
to an untenable legal position does not justify a deviation from the rule that clients are bound by the acts and mistakes of
their counsel.[36]

Petitioner also makes much of the fact that he received the highest number of votes for the position of Vice-Mayor
of Catarman during the 2007 local elections. The fact that a candidate, who must comply with the election requirements
applicable to dual citizens and failed to do so, received the highest number of votes for an elective position does not dispense
with, or amount to a waiver of, such requirement.[37] The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the
vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed that the candidate was qualified. The rules on citizenship
qualifications of a candidate must be strictly applied. If a person seeks to serve the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe
his loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. [38] The application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.[39]

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 28 September 2007 of the COMELEC en banc in
SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division,
is AFFIRMED. Petitioner is DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin in the 14 May
2007 National and Local Elections, and if proclaimed, cannot assume the Office of Vice-Mayor of said municipality by
virtue of such disqualification. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Sobejana-Condon vs COMELEC

Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public office.

The Case

At bar is a special civil action for certiorari1 under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify Resolution2 dated
September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in EAC (AE) No. A-44-2010. The assailed
resolution (a) reversed the Order3 dated November 30, 2010 of COMELEC Second Division dismissing petitioner’s
appeal; and (b) affirmed the consolidated Decision4 dated October 22, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bauang,
La Union, Branch 33, declaring petitioner Teodora Sobejana-Condon (petitioner) disqualified and ineligible to her
position as Vice-Mayor of Caba, La Union.

The Undisputed Facts

The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On December 13,
1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.

On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in
Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines on December 5, 2005.

On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the
Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September
27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.6

The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again
sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the
highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.

Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M. Bautista,8 (private respondents)
all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility
before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the
ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian
citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently
complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her
Australian citizenship.

Ruling of the RTC

In its consolidated Decision dated October 22, 2010, the trial court held that the petitioner’s failure to comply with Section
5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. As admitted by the petitioner herself during
trial, the personal declaration of renunciation she filed in Australia was not under oath. The law clearly mandates that the
document containing the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before any public officer authorized to
administer oath. Consequently, the RTC’s decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment in FAVOR of [private respondents] and AGAINST
(petitioner):

1) DECLARING [petitioner] TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, disqualified and ineligible to hold the office of Vice-
Mayor of Caba, La Union;

2) NULLIFYING her proclamation as the winning candidate for Vice-Mayor of said municipality; and

3) DECLARING the position of Vice-Mayor in said municipality vacant.

SO ORDERED.9

Ruling of the COMELEC

The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC but the appeal was dismissed by the Second Division in its Order10 dated
November 30, 2010 for failure to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period. On motion for reconsideration, the
appeal was reinstated by the COMELEC en banc in its Resolution11 dated September 6, 2011. In the same issuance, the
substantive merits of the appeal were given due course. The COMELEC en banc concurred with the findings and
conclusions of the RTC; it also granted the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed by the private respondents.

The decretal portion of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered the Commission RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES as follows:

1. To DISMISS the instant appeal for lack of merit;

2. To AFFIRM the DECISION dated 22 October 2010 of the court a quo; and
3. To GRANT the Motion for Execution filed on November 12, 2010.
SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the present petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC en banc.

The Petitioner’s Arguments

The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she no longer held dual
citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as early as the 2007 elections.
Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual
citizens seeking elective office does not apply to her.
She further argues that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal and not a mandatory requirement. In support thereof, she
cites portions of the Journal of the House of Representatives dated June 2 to 5, 2003 containing the sponsorship speech for
House Bill (H.B.) No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225.

She claims that the private respondents are estopped from questioning her eligibility since they failed to do so when she
filed certificates of candidacy for the 2007 and 2010 elections.

Lastly, she disputes the power of the COMELEC en banc to: (a) take cognizance of the substantive merits of her appeal
instead of remanding the same to the COMELEC Second Division for the continuation of the appeal proceedings; and (b)
allow the execution pending appeal of the RTC’s judgment.

The Issues

Posed for resolution are the following issues: I) Whether the COMELEC en banc may resolve the merits of an appeal after
ruling on its reinstatement; II) Whether the COMELEC en banc may order the execution of a judgment rendered by a trial
court in an election case; III) Whether the private respondents are barred from questioning the qualifications of the
petitioner; and IV) For purposes of determining the petitioner’s eligibility to run for public office, whether the "sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma requirement.

The Court’s Ruling

I. An appeal may be simultaneously reinstated and definitively resolved by the COMELEC en banc in a resolution
disposing of a motion for reconsideration.

The power to decide motions for reconsideration in election cases is arrogated unto the COMELEC en banc by Section 3,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, viz:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in
order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission
en banc.

A complementary provision is present in Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to wit:

Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the Commission en
banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be resolved by the division which issued the order.

Considering that the above cited provisos do not set any limits to the COMELEC en banc’s prerogative in resolving a
motion for reconsideration, there is nothing to prevent the body from directly adjudicating the substantive merits of an
appeal after ruling for its reinstatement instead of remanding the same to the division that initially dismissed it.

We thus see no impropriety much more grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en banc when it
proceeded to decide the substantive merits of the petitioner’s appeal after ruling for its reinstatement.

Further, records show that, in her motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, the petitioner not only
proffered arguments on the issue on docket fees but also on the issue of her eligibility. She even filed a supplemental
motion for reconsideration attaching therewith supporting documents13 to her contention that she is no longer an
Australian citizen. The petitioner, after obtaining an unfavorable decision, cannot be permitted to disavow the en banc’s
exercise of discretion on the substantial merits of her appeal when she herself invoked the same in the first place.

The fact that the COMELEC en banc had remanded similar appeals to the Division that initially dismissed them cannot
serve as a precedent to the disposition of the petitioner’s appeal. A decision or resolution of any adjudicating body can be
disposed in several ways. To sustain petitioner’s argument would be virtually putting a straightjacket on the COMELEC
en banc’s adjudicatory powers.
More significantly, the remand of the appeal to the COMELEC Second Division would be unnecessarily circuitous and
repugnant to the rule on preferential disposition of quo warranto cases espoused in Rule 36, Section 15 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.14

II. The COMELEC en banc has the power to order discretionary execution of judgment.

We cannot subscribe to petitioner’s submission that the COMELEC en banc has no power to order the issuance of a writ
of execution and that such function belongs only to the court of origin.

There is no reason to dispute the COMELEC’s authority to order discretionary execution of judgment in view of the fact
that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.15

Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution pending appeal may be issued by an appellate court after the
trial court has lost jurisdiction. In Batul v. Bayron,16 we stressed the import of the provision vis-à-vis election cases when
we held that judgments in election cases which may be executed pending appeal includes those decided by trial courts and
those rendered by the COMELEC whether in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.

III. Private respondents are not estopped from questioning petitioner’s eligibility to hold public
office.

The fact that the petitioner’s qualifications were not questioned when she filed certificates of candidacy for 2007 and 2010
elections cannot operate as an estoppel to the petition for quo warranto before the RTC.

Under the Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code), there are two instances where a petition questioning the
qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised,
to wit:

(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election; and

(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:

Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. – Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa,
regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall
file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the
election. (Emphasis ours)

Hence, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition within the twenty-
five (25)-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code for whatever reasons, the elections laws do
not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a
petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.17

The above remedies were both available to the private respondents and their failure to utilize Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code cannot serve to bar them should they opt to file, as they did so file, a quo warranto petition under Section
253.

IV. Petitioner is disqualified from running for elective office for failure to renounce her Australian citizenship in
accordance with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic, thus:

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance
to the Republic:

"I, _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines;
and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion."

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and
obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5, viz:

Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other
existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath
of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or
permit to engage in such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended
to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are
naturalized citizens. (Emphasis ours)

Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship when she
took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual
citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.

On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian
citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of
Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
To obviate the fatal consequence of her inutile renunciation, the petitioner pleads the Court to interpret the "sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) to be a mere pro forma requirement in conformity with the
intent of the Legislature. She anchors her submission on the statement made by Representative Javier during the floor
deliberations on H.B. No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225.

At the outset, it bears stressing that the Court’s duty to interpret the law according to its true intent is exercised only when
the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning. The first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law. As such,
when the law is clear and free from any doubt, there is no occasion for construction or interpretation; there is only room
for application.19 Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is one such instance.

Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or of referring to
two or more things at the same time. For a statute to be considered ambiguous, it must admit of two or more possible
meanings.20

The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC,21 we declared its categorical and single
meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he
or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We
also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an
affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and
unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship.

The same meaning was emphasized in Jacot v. Dal,22 when we held that Filipinos re-acquiring or retaining their Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 must explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in
the Philippines, thus:

The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or
those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public
officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a
foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section
3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.

Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking
other than that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions
of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where
the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur Defensor explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel
Javier that the oath of allegiance is different from the renunciation of foreign citizenship;

xxxx

The intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic
Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their
foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine
elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.23 (Citation omitted and italics and
underlining ours)

Hence, in De Guzman v. COMELEC,24 we declared petitioner therein to be disqualified from running for the position of
vice-mayor for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his American citizenship.
We find no reason to depart from the mandatory nature infused by the above rulings to the phrase "sworn renunciation".
The language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning and must
thus be read literally.25 The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer
authorized to administer oath.

It is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey.26 Even a resort to the Journal of
the House of Representatives invoked by the petitioner leads to the same inference, viz:

INTERPELLATION OF REP. JAVIER

Rep. Javier initially inquired whether under the Bill, dual citizenship is only limited to natural-born Filipinos and not to
naturalized Filipinos.

Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative.

Rep. Javier subsequently adverted to Section 5 of the Bill which provides that natural-born Filipinos who have dual
citizenship shall continue to enjoy full civil and political rights. This being the case, he sought clarification as to whether
they can indeed run for public office provided that they renounce their foreign citizenship.

Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that these citizens will only have to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship before any authorized public officer.

Rep. Javier sought further clarification on this matter, citing that while the Bill provides them with full civil and political
rights as Filipino citizens, the measure also discriminates against them since they are required to make a sworn
renunciation of their other foreign citizenship if and when they run for public office. He thereafter proposed to delete this
particular provision.

In his rejoinder, Rep. Libanan explained that this serves to erase all doubts regarding any issues that might be raised
pertaining to the citizenship of any candidate. He subsequently cited the case of Afroyim vs. Rusk, wherein the United
States considered a naturalized American still as an American citizen even when he cast his vote in Israel during one of its
elections.

Rep. Javier however pointed out that the matter of voting is different because in voting, one is not required to renounce his
foreign citizenship. He pointed out that under the Bill, Filipinos who run for public office must renounce their foreign
citizenship. He pointed out further that this is a contradiction in the Bill.

Thereafter, Rep. Javier inquired whether Filipino citizens who had acquired foreign citizenship and are now entitled to
reacquire their Filipino citizenship will be considered as natural-born citizens. As such, he likewise inquired whether they
will also be considered qualified to run for the highest elective positions in the country.

Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that the only requirement is that they make a sworn renunciation of their
foreign citizenship and that they comply with the residency and registration requirements as provided for in the
Constitution.

Whereupon, Rep. Javier noted that under the Constitution, natural-born citizens are those who are citizens at the time of
birth without having to perform an act to complete or perfect his/her citizenship.

Rep. Libanan agreed therewith, citing that this is the reason why the Bill seeks the repeal of CA No. 63. The repeal, he
said, would help Filipino citizens who acquired foreign citizenship to retain their citizenship. With regard then to Section
5 of the Bill, he explained that the Committee had decided to include this provision because Section 18, Article XI of the
Constitution provides for the accountability of public officers.

In his rejoinder, Rep. Javier maintained that in this case, the sworn renunciation of a foreign citizenship will only become
a pro forma requirement.
On further queries of Rep. Javier, Rep. Libanan affirmed that natural-born Filipino citizens who became foreign citizens
and who have reacquired their Filipino citizenship under the Bill will be considered as natural-born citizens, and therefore
qualified to run for the presidency, the vice-presidency or for a seat in Congress. He also agreed with the observation of
Rep. Javier that a natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the country at the time of birth. He also explained that the
Bill will, in effect, return to a Filipino citizen who has acquired foreign citizenship, the status of being a natural-born
citizen effective at the time he lost his Filipino citizenship.

As a rejoinder, Rep. Javier opined that doing so would be discriminating against naturalized Filipino citizens and Filipino
citizens by election who are all disqualified to run for certain public offices. He then suggested that the Bill be amended
by not considering as natural-born citizens those Filipinos who had renounced their Filipino citizenship and acquired
foreign citizenship. He said that they should be considered as repatriated citizens.

In reply, Rep. Libanan assured Rep. Javier that the Committee will take note of the latter’s comments on the matter. He
however stressed that after a lengthy deliberation on the subject, the Committees on Justice, and Foreign Affairs had
decided to revert back to the status of being natural-born citizens those natural-born Filipino citizens who had acquired
foreign citizenship but now wished to reacquire their Filipino citizenship.

Rep. Javier then explained that a Filipina who loses her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to a foreigner can
regain her repatriated Filipino citizenship, upon the death of her husband, by simply taking her oath before the
Department of Justice (DOJ).

Rep. Javier said that he does not oppose the Bill but only wants to be fair to other Filipino citizens who are not considered
natural-born. He reiterated that natural-born Filipino citizens who had renounced their citizenship by pledging allegiance
to another sovereignty should not be allowed to revert back to their status of being natural-born citizens once they decide
to regain their Filipino citizenship. He underscored that this will in a way allow such Filipinos to enjoy dual citizenship.

On whether the Sponsors will agree to an amendment incorporating the position of Rep. Javier, Rep. Libanan stated that
this will defeat the purpose of the Bill.

Rep. Javier disagreed therewith, adding that natural-born Filipino citizens who acquired foreign citizenships and later
decided to regain their Filipino citizenship, will be considered as repatriated citizens.

Rep. Libanan cited the case of Bengzon vs. HRET wherein the Supreme Court had ruled that only naturalized Filipino
citizens are not considered as natural-born citizens.

In reaction, Rep. Javier clarified that only citizens by election or those whose mothers are Filipino citizens under the 1935
Constitution and who elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of maturity, are not deemed as natural-born
citizens.

In response, Rep. Libanan maintained that in the Bengzon case, repatriation results in the recovery of one’s original
nationality and only naturalized citizens are not considered as natural-born citizens.

On whether the Sponsors would agree to not giving back the status of being natural-born citizens to natural-born Filipino
citizens who acquired foreign citizenship, Rep. Libanan remarked that the Body in plenary session will decide on the
matter.27

The petitioner obviously espouses an isolated reading of Representative Javier’s statement; she conveniently disregards
the preceding and succeeding discussions in the records.

The above-quoted excerpts of the legislative record show that Representative Javier’s statement ought to be understood
within the context of the issue then being discussed, that is – whether former natural-born citizens who re-acquire their
Filipino citizenship under the proposed law will revert to their original status as natural-born citizens and thus be qualified
to run for government positions reserved only to natural-born Filipinos, i.e. President, Vice-President and Members of the
Congress.
It was Representative Javier’s position that they should be considered as repatriated Filipinos and not as natural-born
citizens since they will have to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Natural-born citizens are
those who need not perform an act to perfect their citizenship. Representative Libanan, however, maintained that they will
revert to their original status as natural-born citizens. To reconcile the renunciation imposed by Section 5(2) with the
principle that natural-born citizens are those who need not perform any act to perfect their citizenship, Representative
Javier suggested that the sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship be considered as a mere pro forma requirement.

Petitioner’s argument, therefore, loses its point. The "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" must be deemed a formal
requirement only with respect to the re-acquisition of one’s status as a natural-born Filipino so as to override the effect of
the principle that natural-born citizens need not perform any act to perfect their citizenship. Never was it mentioned or
even alluded to that, as the petitioner wants this Court to believe, those who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship and
thereafter run for public office has the option of executing an unsworn affidavit of renunciation.

It is also palpable in the above records that Section 5 was intended to complement Section 18, Article XI of the
Constitution on public officers’ primary accountability of allegiance and loyalty, which provides:

Sec. 18. – Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer
or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his
tenure shall be dealt with by law.

An oath is a solemn declaration, accompanied by a swearing to God or a revered person or thing, that one’s statement is
true or that one will be bound to a promise. The person making the oath implicitly invites punishment if the statement is
untrue or the promise is broken. The legal effect of an oath is to subject the person to penalties for perjury if the testimony
is false.28

Indeed, the solemn promise, and the risk of punishment attached to an oath ensures truthfulness to the prospective public
officer’s abandonment of his adopted state and promise of absolute allegiance and loyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines.

To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is to say that it is only for ceremonial purposes; it would also
accommodate a mere qualified or temporary allegiance from government officers when the Constitution and the
legislature clearly demand otherwise.

Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, under which she is already deemed to have lost her
citizenship, is entitled to judicial notice. We disagree.

Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven.29 To prove a foreign
law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court which reads:

Sec. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice- consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis ours)

Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. – Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof,
as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the
clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that the existence of a foreign law may also be
established through: (1) a testimony under oath of an expert witness such as an attorney-at-law in the country where the
foreign law operates wherein he quotes verbatim a section of the law and states that the same was in force at the time
material to the facts at hand; and (2) likewise, in several naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that evidence of the
law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule
of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is
"satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered." Thus, in a number of decisions, mere authentication of the
Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held to be a competent proof of that law.30

The petitioner failed to prove the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948 through any of the above methods. As uniformly
observed by the RTC and COMELEC, the petitioner failed to show proof of the existence of the law during trial. Also, the
letter issued by the Australian government showing that petitioner already renounced her Australian citizenship was
unauthenticated hence, the courts a quo acted judiciously in disregarding the same.

We are bound to arrive at a similar conclusion even if we were to admit as competent evidence the said letter in view of
the photocopy of a Certificate of Authentication issued by Consular Section of the Philippine Embassy in Canberra,
Australia attached to the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

We have stressed in Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied Workers (AASJS)
Member v. Datumanong31 that the framers of R.A. No. 9225 did not intend the law to concern itself with the actual status
of the other citizenship.

This Court as the government branch tasked to apply the enactments of the legislature must do so conformably with the
wisdom of the latter sans the interference of any foreign law. If we were to read the Australian Citizen Act of 1948 into
the application and operation of R.A. No. 9225, we would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed
wise to require. To do so would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this
Republic.32

The petitioner’s act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effective renunciation of her Australian
citizenship. While this Court has previously declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of
candidacy is already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship,33 such ruling was already adjudged superseded by
the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship.34

The fact that petitioner won the elections can not cure the defect of her candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes
does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory
provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.35

In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their citizenship and seek elective
office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer
prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine
elections.36 The rule applies to all those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as
to whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the right to run for public
office.

Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their
citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that restores their right to run for public office. The
petitioner's failure to comply therewith in accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration
of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political
right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run
for and hold any elective office in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated September 6, 2011
of the Commission on Elections en bane in EAC (AE) No. A-44-2010 is AFFIRMED in toto.
Maquiling vs COMELEC

EN BANC - G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y

CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N - SERENO, CJ.:

THE CASE

This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to review the Resolutions
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division
dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the Local Government Code while the Resolution2 of
the COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y
Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his continued use
of a U.S. passport.

FACTS

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a
citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.5

The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.6

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of
his foreign citizenship, which states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all civil and
political rights and privileges of the United States of America.

I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 7

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which
contains, among others, the following statements:

I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.

I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.

I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.

I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.

I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. 8

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado
and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the
10 May 2010 local and national elections.9

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner,
attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of
Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his
Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his
US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country
on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on
24 November 2009.

Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name
"Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21
April 2010, with the following pertinent travel records:

DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 05778270012

On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to personally file his answer
and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.

After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present evidence ex-parte.

Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest number
of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following documents as
evidence:14

1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April 2009;

2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy
Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and that he has been
conspicuously and continuously residing in his family’s ancestral house in Kauswagan;

3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating
that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and
returned to the Philippines in 2009;

4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office of Kauswagan
stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from
15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and
 5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a registered
voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s contention that
Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence to
support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year
residency requirement under the Local Government Code."17

In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino
citizen.18

We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s
act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his
Affidavit of Renunciation.

xxxx

Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his US
citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind
eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained use of a US passport six times and his claim that he re-
acquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a
passport is defined as an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in
foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to avail of privileges
reserved solely for US nationals.19

The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC

First Division reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 take effect.20

The Motion for Reconsideration and

the Motion for Intervention

Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that "the evidence is
insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to law."21 He raised the following
contentions:22

1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of his Oath of
Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he has substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225;

2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is not tantamount to a
repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than
the Philippines;

3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his Philippine passport, and that
he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;
 4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and the First Division’s
treatment of the petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction;23

5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the elections;

6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over the case; and

7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which should have been
filed within ten days from his proclamation.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the
second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a
Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling
argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and
the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful
votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.

Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for Reconsideration.
Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been
rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or
benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.

RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the
Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the
candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."

As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention
in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say
that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive
portion of the Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government
Code to take effect.

The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for disqualification, and
ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is
not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.

However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for
Reconsideration, on the following premises:

First:

By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as
though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure
Philippine Citizen again.

xxxx

The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is
no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on
renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a
naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of
citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their original citizenship. The
Philippine State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the present case, respondent
is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by working abroad and then decided to
repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation.
Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar.

xxxx

The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he applied for a Philippine
passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine
passport so that he was actually able to get it about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his
Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the
respondent’s submission of a certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same for his travels on the
following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010.
This then shows that the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued
to him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within his control
during that time.25

In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of foreign passport is not
one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may
be lost.

"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in this case. Under said
principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to continue to be
a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case
respondent after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of
his American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts
should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."26

On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:

Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the United States. The
latter’s continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his previous
renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine
citizenship. Respondent’s submission with the twin requirements was obviously only for the purpose of complying with
the requirements for running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections.

Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during his
incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he
lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent
obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post cure the latter’s failure to comply with the qualification requirements
regarding his citizenship.

Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the highest number of votes
does not validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for disqualification was filed before election against a
candidate but was adversely resolved against him after election, his having obtained the highest number of votes did not
make his election valid. His ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. To apply it is to
breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when they ratified the Constitution and when they
elected their representatives who enacted the law.27

THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite
his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for ruling that
Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the
COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.

Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Division’s disqualification of
Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the Local Government Code, claiming that
the COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is
disqualified is in order."

There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as the subsequent
questions hinge on the result of the first.

The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.

The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to
undoing a renunciation earlier made.

A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.

The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to this case.

OUR RULING

Intervention of a rival candidate in a

disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who garnered the second highest
number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering
that in the event the latter is disqualified, the votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should
be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.

It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the
petition as one for disqualification.

The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Mercado v. Manzano28

clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent
is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is
strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there
has yet been no final judgment rendered.29

Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that
Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v.
COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of
the right to elevate the matter before this Court.

Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents therein have not appealed
the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from
attaining finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification
case originally filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as
to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath
of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.

Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

xxxx

(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

x x x31

Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and
renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin requirements required under
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for
public office.

Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for
repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009
simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic,
Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado
had therefore become a dual citizen.

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of
Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign
citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued
to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009.
The pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC,
he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By
using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring
before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges
granted by the United States of America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated
the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil
and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.

Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that
trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground
that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against anyone
who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation
required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective
position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he
recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America."38

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino
citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado
voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place
the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as
it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.

Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying
for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to
take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied
renunciation of foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to
qualify as a candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and
privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.

In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until
14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after renouncing his American citizenship.

This Court has previously ruled that:

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his
title may be seasonably challenged. x x x.41

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the
renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the
citizenship issue to attack.

We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of consistently using his US
passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin
requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.

It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively disqualified him from
running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective public office
would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently
represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.

Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not notified of the issuance of his
Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3)
months later.43

The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought naturalization as a
Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US passport
after his renunciation does not make his use of a US passport less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took.
It was still a positive act of representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.

The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport,
the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad."44 We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three
months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he
would not have used his US passport on 24 November 2009.

Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he renounced his foreign
citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that the use of his
foreign passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his
earlier use of his US passport.

Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights
accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and
country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or
appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding
public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same
Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not
only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.

We now resolve the next issue.

Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring of the principle
that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its
soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible
candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.

The Facts of the case are as follows:

On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal
president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that office.
Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible
in that he was reelected the second time to the office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years
required by Act No. 2045 having intervened.46

Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a second re-election
absent the four year interruption.

The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots."47

This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the effect of a decision
that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by
declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."

The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between the two situations, thus:

Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections
is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the former case the court,
after an examination of the ballots may find that some other person than the candidate declared to have received a
plurality by the board of canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its
mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the manner of holding the
election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined who received a plurality of the
legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and counting
the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the former,
we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found
that the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that
another candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly
speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one case the
question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the personal
character and circumstances of a single individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)

Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest" in
contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing
parties are striving for supremacy."

The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an
ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the
legally cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction
to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of votes in the
election, its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded
his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general
election held in that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be
elected and to hold the office of municipal president."

The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead.
The Court therein ruled:

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in
declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last general
election; and that said order and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and void and of no effect; and,
although this decision is rendered on respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new
and additional issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49

On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis to stand on. It was a
mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and explaining the effects thereof. As an
independent statement, it is even illogical.

Let us examine the statement:

"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another candidate?

When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots
and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging another eligible candidate who received the
next highest number of votes as the winner and bestowing upon him that "wreath?"

An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he
could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening
circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the
opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding
the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his
qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his favor
cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office.

The popular vote does not cure the

ineligibility of a candidate.

The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed
by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a
candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the
will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule
otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who
should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.

This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule
limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone.

The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the
deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty
to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)

This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52 where the Court ruled that the ruling in
Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to
bypass election eligibility requirements."53

We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of
the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We
said that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of
interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed
as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang
v. COMELEC:

The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with the
realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance
for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around
the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make
an informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.

The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the
basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC
that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of
the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC
data wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an election
victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election
eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)

What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any disqualification,
and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so he can submit himself to the
electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?

It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects
the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set
rules are disregarded and only the electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely
serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1âwphi1

Maquiling is not a second-placer as

he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.

With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified candidates.

We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce
any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more
so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice.
The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those who are
allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the
laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications
set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware within the realm of
notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate
obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated
the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.

The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the
candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate
of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can
be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified
candidates.

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent
disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only
the COC but also the proclamation.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file his answer
to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and
after he was already proclaimed as the winner.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the
commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from
holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and
an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office
based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position."
The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from participating as
candidates in the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the
beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted
already and he was already proclaimed the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado
possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although
made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a
candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the
qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 2
February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified
from running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.

No pronouncement as to costs.

David vs Agbay

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the Order1 dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, which denied the petition for certiorari filed by Renato(petitioner)M.
David. Petitioner assailed the Order2 dated March 22, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Socorro, Oriental
Mindoro denying his motion for redetermination of probable cause.

The factual antecedents:

In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement,
petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-square meter lot along the
beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, in the year 2004, they
came to know that the portion where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.

On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application3 (MLA) over the subject land with the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.

Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is
disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the petitioner.

Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225,4 (R.A. 9225) as
evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto) on
October 11, 2007.

In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino. He further
alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the subject property was titled land
and they have the right and authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil and criminal
suits between him and private respondent’s family.
On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution7 finding probable cause to indict
petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the corresponding information in court.
Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s subsequent re-
acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.8

In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by petitioner was denied by the DOJ which held that the
presence of the elements of the crime of falsification of public document suffices to warrant indictment of the petitioner
notwithstanding the absence of any proof that he gained or intended to injure a third person in committing the act of
falsification.9 Consequently, an information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC (Criminal
Case No. 2012) and a warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner.

On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and before his arrest, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Re-
Determination of Probable Cause10 in the MTC. Interpreting the provisions of the law relied upon by petitioner, the said
court denied the motion, holding that R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those who became foreign citizens during its
effectivity, and those who lost their Philippine citizenship before its enactment when the governing law was
Commonwealth Act No. 6311 (CA 63). Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have
been committed on April 12, 2007 before he had re- acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that
petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC ordered:

WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, and for lack of merit, the motion is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.12

In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the foregoing order denying him relief on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and insisted that the issue raised is purely legal. He argued that since his application had yet to receive final
evaluation and action by the DENR Region IV-B office in Manila, it is academic to ask the citizenship of the applicant
(petitioner) who had re-acquired Philippine citizenship six months after he applied for lease of public land. The MTC
denied the motion for reconsideration.14

Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition15 for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the MTC. He asserted that first, jurisdiction over the person of an accused cannot be a pre-
condition for the re-determination of probable cause by the court that issues a warrant of arrest; and second, the March 22,
2011 Order disregarded the legal fiction that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another
country re-acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost on
account of said naturalization.

In his Comment and Opposition,16 the prosecutor emphasized that the act of falsification was already consummated as
petitioner has not yet re-acquired his Philippine citizenship, and his subsequent oath to re-acquire Philippine citizenship
will only affect his citizenship status and not his criminal act which was long consummated prior to said oath of
allegiance.

On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of
discretion committed by the lower court, thus:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate petitioner is not left without any remedy or recourse
because he can proceed to trial where he can make use of his claim to be a Filipino citizen as his defense to be adjudicated
in a full blown trial, and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction.

SO ORDERED.17

Petitioner is now before us arguing that –

 A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for falsification, the lower court has disregarded the undisputed
fact that petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that by re-acquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225
he was by legal fiction "deemed not to have lost" it at the time of his naturalization in Canada and through the
time when he was said to have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship.

B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his legal residence in Canada and to surrender or allow himself to
be arrested under a warrant for his alleged false claim to Philippine citizenship, the lower court has pre-empted
the right of petitioner through his wife and counsel to question the validity of the said warrant of arrest against
him before the same is implemented, which is tantamount to a denial of due process.18

In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that petitioner’s argument regarding the retroactivity of R.A. 9225 is
without merit.1âwphi1 It is contended that this Court’s rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections19 and Altarejos v.
Commission on Elections20 on the retroactivity of one’s re- acquisition of Philippine citizenship to the date of filing his
application therefor cannot be applied to the case of herein petitioner. Even assuming for the sake of argument that such
doctrine applies in the present situation, it will still not work for petitioner’s cause for the simple reason that he had not
alleged, much less proved, that he had already applied for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before he made the
declaration in the Public Land Application that he is a Filipino. Moreover, it is stressed that in falsification of public
document, it is not necessary that the idea of gain or intent to injure a third person be present. As to petitioner’s defense of
good faith, such remains to be a defense which may be properly raised and proved in a full- blown trial.

On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner), the Solicitor General opines that in seeking an
affirmative relief from the MTC when he filed his Urgent Motion for Re-determination of Probable Cause, petitioner is
deemed to have submitted his person to the said court’s jurisdiction by his voluntary appearance. Nonetheless, the RTC
correctly ruled that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion after a
judicious, thorough and personal evaluation of the parties’ arguments contained in their respective pleadings, and the
evidence submitted before the court.

In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a
Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions
of R.A. 9225; and (2) the MTC properly denied petitioner’s motion for re-determination of probable cause on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused (petitioner).

R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re- acquisition Act of 2003," was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law read:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens
of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:

"I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon
myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied)

While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of another country shall be deemed
"not to have lost their Philippine citizenship," such is qualified by the phrase "under the conditions of this Act." Section 3
lays down such conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second paragraphs.
Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign
country who shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took
effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required
for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology used is
different, "re-acquired" for the first group, and "retain" for the second group.

The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the
effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is "Retention of Philippine Citizenship", the authors of the
law intentionally employed the terms "re-acquire" and "retain" to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of the law using both re-acquisition and retention.

In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine
citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by which
Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the
old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other
countries and allowing dual citizenship,21 and also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and retaining Philippine
citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine
citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.

Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-acquisition and retention in R.A. 9225. He asserts that in criminal
cases, that interpretation of the law which favors the accused is preferred because it is consistent with the constitutional
presumption of innocence, and in this case it becomes more relevant when a seemingly difficult question of law is
expected to have been understood by the accused, who is a non-lawyer, at the time of the commission of the alleged
offense. He further cites the letter-reply dated January 31, 201122 of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) to his query, stating
that his status as a natural-born Filipino will be governed by Section 2 of R.A. 9225.

These contentions have no merit.

That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship was made clear in the discussion
of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130
held on August 18, 2003, where Senator Franklin Drilon was responding to the query of Representative Exequiel Javier:

REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under Section 3 of the Senate version, "Any provision of law on
the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, shall… and so
forth, ano, shall retain their Philippine citizenship.

Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have lost their citizenship by reason of their naturalization after
the effectivity of this Act are deemed to have reacquired…

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity.

REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here. Natural-born citizens who acquired foreign
citizenship after the effectivity of this act are considered to have retained their citizenship. But natural-born citizens who
lost their Filipino citizenship before the effectivity of this act are considered to have reacquired. May I know the
distinction? Do you mean to say that natural-born citizens who became, let’s say, American citizens after the effectivity of
this act are considered natural-born?

Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost their citizenship before the effectivity of this act are no
longer natural born citizens because they have just reacquired their citizenship. I just want to know this distinction, Mr.
Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is precisely retention and reacquisition. The
reacquisition will apply to those who lost their Philippine citizenship by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63.Upon the
effectivity -- assuming that we can agree on this, upon the effectivity of this new measure amending Commonwealth Act
63, the Filipinos who lost their citizenship is deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon the effectivity of
the act.

The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship applying to future instances. So that’s the distinction.

REP. JAVIER. Well, I’m just asking this question because we are here making distinctions between natural-born citizens.
Because this is very important for certain government positions, ‘no, because natural-born citizens are only qualified for a
specific…

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct.

REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the law.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later on. It’s one of the provisions, yes. But just for purposes
of the explanation, Congressman Javier, that is our conceptualization. Reacquired for those who previously lost [Filipino
citizenship] by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63, and retention for those in the future. (Emphasis supplied)

Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the
first category of natural- born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine
citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.

For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the
rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his
category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos
who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the
second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.

As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. 9225 without any reference to Section 3 on the particular
application of reacquisition and retention to Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A.
9225.

Petitioner’s plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the accused is likewise misplaced. Courts adopt an
interpretation more favorable to the accused following the time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.23 R.A. 9225, however, is not a penal law.

Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 17224 in relation to Article 17125 of the RPC refers to falsification
by a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position, of public,
private, or commercial documents. The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC
are:

(1)that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position;

(2)that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and

(3)that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.26

Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the
filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he
was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born
citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the
falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status
is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article
172, paragraph 1.

The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner accused as ground for denying petitioner’s motion
for re- determination of probable cause, as the motion was filed prior to his arrest. However, custody of the law is not
required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail.27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which involved a
motion to quash warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the
person, and held that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction
over his person. Thus:

In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent
Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez:

The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either
by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s
jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is
intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused
has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody
of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other
reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,
while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the
custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by
virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes
custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby
deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally
custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.

xxxx

While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who
seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of
Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.

xxxx

To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed
waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the
special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.Therefore, in narrow cases involving
special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the
person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must
first submit himself to the custody of the law.29 (Emphasis supplied)

Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-determination of probable cause, the MTC
clearly erred in stating that it lacked jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding such erroneous ground stated in the
MTC's order, the RTC correctly ruled that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the MTC in denying the said
motion for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan,
Oriental Mindoro in Civil Case No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No. 2012) is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
In re: Petition to Re-Acquire the Privilege to Practice Law in the Ph B.M 2112

EN BANC - B.M. No. 2112 July 24, 2012

IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B.
MUNESES, Petitioner,

R E S O L U T I O N - REYES, J.:

On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 21, 1966; that he
lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981;
that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the
"Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the
Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to
resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition were several documents in support of his petition, albeit mere
photocopies thereof, to wit:

1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P. Nolasco;

2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;

3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;

4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;

5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a similar petition filed by Benjamin M.
Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to resume his practice of law after availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225.
Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek medical
attention for his ailments and eventually became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired
his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the Philippine Consulate
General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and intended to resume his practice of law.

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a continuing
requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioner’s membership in the bar;ipso
jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired
their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a
citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of
the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic.2 R.A. No. 9225
provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice.3

It can not be overstressed that:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.1âwphi1 It is so delicately affected with public interest that it
is both the power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the
public welfare.

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the
legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and
for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the
trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege. 4

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC required the herein
petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following documents in relation to his petition:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;

5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;

6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;

7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and

8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu

of the IC;

5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good moral character as well
as his updated payment of annual membership dues;

6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;

7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and

8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program,
University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all the requirements
were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice
of law.

Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar to the petitioner's resumption
to the practice of law in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the condition that he shall
re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.
Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary guidelines for the re-acquisition of the
privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar.