district neg

1NC
1nc: topicality
CHOOSE ONE OF THESE
 subs = defense relations (0:25)
A substantial reduction must make defense cooperation with the purchasing country
non-viable
DOD, 15 – Department of Defense (“Operation of the Defense Acquisition System” 1/7,
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/i5000_02.pdf

ICPs = International Cooperative Programs

7. INTERNATIONAL ACQUISITION AND EXPORTABILITY a. International Acquisition and Exportability Considerations. Program management is
responsible for integrating international acquisition and exportability considerations into the program’s Acquisition Strategy at each major
milestone or decision point. Program management will consider the potential demand and likelihood of cooperative
development or production, Direct Commercial Sales, or Foreign Military Sales early in the acquisition planning process; and
consider U.S. export control laws, regulations, and DoD policy for international transfers when formulating and implementing the acquisition
strategy; in accordance with DoD Instruction 2040.02 (Reference (az)). Where appropriate, program managers will pursue cooperative
opportunities and international involvement throughout the acquisition life cycle to enhance international cooperation and improve
interoperability in accordance with DoD Instruction 2010.06 (Reference (ba)). b. International Cooperative Program Management (1) An
international cooperative program (ICP) is any acquisition program or technology project that includes
participation by the U.S. and one or more foreign nations, through an international agreement, during any phase of a
system’s life cycle. When applicable, program staff members are encouraged to use streamlined agreement procedures. All ICPs will consider
applicable U.S.-ratified materiel international standardization agreements in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
3170.01HI (Reference (d)(e)), and fully comply with applicable foreign disclosure, export control, technology transfer, program protection, and
security requirements. Programs containing classified information will have a Delegation of Disclosure Authority Letter or other written
authorization issued by the DoD Component’s cognizant foreign disclosure office prior to entering discussions with potential foreign partners.
(2) DoD Components will notify and obtain the approval of the DAE for MDAP and MAIS programs before terminating or substantially reducing
participation in ICPs under signed international agreements. The DAE may require the DoD Component to continue to provide some or all of the
funding for that program. A
substantial reduction is defined as a funding or quantity decrease that impacts the
viability of the program and/or significantly increases the costs to the other participants in the program. c. Waivers. Any foreign
military sales or direct commercial sales of major defense equipment prior to successful completion of operational test and evaluation require
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics approval (i.e., a Yockey Waiver). (Details of this requirement are found in
paragraph C5.1.8.3. in the Security Assistance Management Manual (Reference (bb))).

violation – the plan doesn’t fiat an end to the institutional relationship

reasons to prefer – limits & ground – the best debate happens within a predictable
sphere of argumentation that is limited by the rez and has ground for both sides

voting issues – ensuring fair debates, providing the best education and jurisdiction
which means the judge only has the authority to vote for topical affirmatives.
 reduce ≠ single country (0:30)
definition: reduce refers to sweeping measures that establish qualitative or
quantitative limits on weapon exports- that’s distinct from restrictions on specific
states or types of weapons
Pearson 88 (Frederic S. Pearson, Prof. of Political Science and Fellow at the Center of International
Studies @ University of Missouri-St Louis, Arms Transfer Limitations and Third World Security, ed.
Thomas Ohlson, SIPRI publication, pgs. 129-130)

Based on these general perspectives, second-tier suppliers have formulated both unilateral and multilateral positions on the
management, restriction or reduction of Third World arms transfers. These are examined separately in order to assess the
restraints most likely to be adopted in the future. Arms trade management, whether unilateral or multilateral, implies rules for
reporting or licensing sales in specific circumstances, as well as potential market sharing arrangements. Restriction of
sales entails disapproval, banning or embargoes to specific states or classes of states or of specific types
of weapon. Reduction of transfers includes more sweeping measures, such as qualitative or
quantitative limits or ceilings, and deliberate government policies or international agreements designed to
curtail weapon exports. In the process of devising restraints, there can be trade-offs, such as restraints on transferring arms versus the
technology or equipment to make or use them, on naval versus air versus land systems, or on weapon deliveries versus new sales agreements.

violation: the aff stops sales to a specific country

reasons to prefer – limits & ground – the best debate happens within a predictable
sphere of argumentation that is limited by the rez and has ground for both sides

voting issues – ensuring fair debates, providing the best education and jurisdiction which means the
judge only has the authority to vote for topical affirmatives
1nc: russia DA
 1 min. & 25 sec.
1. Uniqueness: Russian arms sales are capped now---that limits the capacity for
Russian expansionism
Bershidsky 3-12-2019 – founding editor of the Russian business daily Vedomosti and founded the
opinion website Slon.ru. (Leonid, “Trump Is Winning, Putin's Losing in Global Arms Sales. Russia is losing
market share despite Vladimir Putin's international military adventures.,” Bloomberg,
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-03-12/u-s-is-no-1-in-arms-sales-as-russia-loses-
market-share)//BB

Global arms sales are on the increase, consistent with the growing number of conflicts and deaths brought about by them. The U.S. and its allies
have been the main beneficiaries. Russia, by contrast, is on the decline, a sign that Vladimir Putin’s geopolitical bets aren’t turning into long-
term influence. The world has grown significantly less violent since 1950, but there has been an marked uptick in the number of armed conflicts
in recent years. The emergence of Islamic State, hostilities in eastern Ukraine, and the persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar are just some
examples. The number of fatalities has increased even more dramatically, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Between 2011 and
2017, the average annual death toll from conflict neared 97,000, three times more than in the previous seven-year period. That helps to explain
the 7.8 percent increase in international arms transfers from 2014 to 2018 compared with the previous five-year period seen in the latest data
from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the global authority on the weapons trade. The Middle East has been absorbing
weapons at an alarming pace: The flow of armaments to the region rocketed by 87 percent in the last five years. Russia took an active part
in the bloodiest of the conflicts, but it doesn’t appear to have been able to convert this into more sales. It was the only
one of the world’s top five exporters, which together account for 75 percent of the business, to suffer a major loss in market share. It remains
the world’s second-biggest arms exporter. SIPRI has its own, rather complicated, system for calculating transfer volumes based on the military
value of the equipment traded rather than on its market price. But in dollar terms, too, Russia trails the U.S. Yury Borisov, Russia’s deputy prime
minister in charge of the defense industry, said last month thatRussia “steadily reaches” $15 billion in arms exports a year and hopes
to retain that amount. This suggests officials believe sales have hit a ceiling. By contrast, the U.S. closed $55.6 billion of arms deals in
2018, 33 percent more than in 2017, thanks to the Trump administration’s liberalization of weapons exports. According to the SIPRI figures, U.S.
exports were 75 percent higher than Russia’s in 2014 through 2018 – a far wider gap than in the previous five-year period. For the U.S., Middle
Eastern countries have been especially important – particularly Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest arms importer, and its major irritant, Qatar.
Some 52 percent of U.S. weapons sales were to the Middle East in the last five years. Under President Donald Trump, the relationship with
Saudi Arabia became even more lucrative for the defense industry. For Russia, the Middle East accounted only for 16 percent of its weapons
exports over the same period, with most going to Egypt and Iraq. Its major trade partners were India, China and Algeria – but sales to India
dropped significantly as its government sought to diversify suppliers and bought more from the U.S., South Korea and, most painfully for the
Kremlin, Ukraine. Russia has been losing key aircraft tenders in India to the U.S. This, along with the economic collapse of another major client,
Venezuela, and the current potential for regime change in Algeria, all makes a rebound in Russian sales look unlikely. Arms sales are perhaps
the best reflection of a major military power’s international influence. The market isn’t all about price and quality competition; it’s about
permanent and situational alliances. The growing gap between the U.S. and Russia in exports shows that Putin’s forays into areas such as the
Middle East are failing to translate into Russian influence in the region. Although Putin’s warm relations with Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah
el-Sisi and his alliance with Iran, which has a lot of influence over Iraq, are paying off to some extent, they can’t quite compensate
for ground lost elsewhere. The U.S.’s allies, France, Germany and the U.K. among them, have been rapidly increasing their market
share, too. That’s a rarely mentioned way in which the security alliance with Washington is paying off for the Europeans. All the ethical
objections to selling arms to countries such as Saudi Arabia notwithstanding, European Union member states need markets for their defense
industries, which employ about 500,000 people. Being under the U.S. umbrella opens doors where Russia and China are less desirable partners
– that is, in most of the world. Many tears have been shed in the U.S. about the collapse of the American-led global order. But if you take arms
sales as a proxy for influence, the U.S.’s global dominance looks to be resilient. In a more conflict-prone, competitive world, America is
doing rather well while its longstanding geopolitical rivals stumble.
 2. Link: The plan leaves a supply vacuum for Russia to exploit --- they’ll use it to
advance geopolitical power
Bodner 17 – analyst @ Defense News (Matthew, “Sales target: Russia sets its sights on the Middle
East,” Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/dubai-air-
show/2017/11/09/sales-target-russia-sets-its-sights-on-the-middle-east/)//BB

The view from Moscow

Russia’s arms sales in the Middle East do not take place in a vacuum. While driven by defense industry interests, they are seen in
Moscow as part of a broader Russian effort to reassert itself as a player of major consequence. Russia’s expert
community likes to talk of an emerging multipolar world order, and Moscow in many ways tries to act as if that is already the case. But it is
difficult to attribute any strategy to its actions. “Russia is not seeking to displace the U.S. in the Middle East, just cut it down to size,” says
Vladimir Frolov, an independent Russian foreign affairs analyst. “Russia sees weapons sales as additional leverage and a tool to create
Sales to the Gulf, particularly to Saudi, are seen as a tool for other foreign policy objectives, to
dependency on Moscow.
facilitate agreements on political issues and create stakeholders in relations with Russia.” While arms sales
are certainly seen by the government as tools in a larger game, the arms trade in Russia is a little more complicated than that. “To a great
extent these deals are often worked out independently,” according to CAST’s Andrey Frolov. “For example, deliveries to Syria are handled by
the Defense Ministry and taken from military stores. The state export agency Rosoboronexport has nothing to do with this.” This jibes with the
sometimes diffused nature of decision-making in Russia. Contrary to common perception, Putin does not preside over everything that happens.
He sets the general tone and path, and hundreds of officials below him try to interpret and act according to perceived wishes. This makes
dealing with Russia difficult, but it also makes formulating and pursuing broad strategy difficult for the Kremlin. As far as Russia’s competition
with the U.S. in the Middle East arms trade goes, the situation was best described by independent analyst Vladimir Frolov: “Russia’s strategy in
Russians will try
weapons sales is to sell everything to everyone with little geopolitical consideration and zero human rights concern. And
to seize every opportunity where the U.S. is seen as an unreliable partner. Egypt and Turkey are just the most
recent examples.”

3. Internal Link: New arms markets are key to all facets of Russian expansionism
Connolly and Sendstad 17 - *associate fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House.
He is also a senior lecturer in political economy and director of the Centre for Russian, European and
Eurasian Studies (CREES) at the University of Birmingham. He is the author of numerous articles on the
political economy of Russia. **Cecilie Sendstad is the research manager for the Cost Analysis research
programme at the Department of Analysis at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). She
has authored numerous published studies on Russian and Norwegian defence-economic issues, and has
also conducted research on defence acquisitions and lifecycle costing for the Norwegian government
(Richard and Cecilie, “Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter The Strategic and Economic Importance of Arms
Exports for Russia,” Chatham House,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-03-20-russia-arms-
exporter-connolly-sendstad.pdf)//BB

This last potential challenge illustrates that the arms trade is as much driven by developments in the geopolitical marketplace as it is by
commercial concerns. In turn, the multidimensional nature of the arms trade suggests that Russia will make great efforts to ensure that it
remains successful in this industry for decades to come. This is likely to involve a concerted effort to ensure that sufficient domestic investment
in productive capabilities will take place to guarantee that new weapons systems emerge. It is also likely to involve policymakers attempting to
wield arms exports as a component of wider foreign policy. Indeed, it is this final point that deserves greater attention by researchers in the
future. If, as Keith Krause has argued, arms exports serve as an important tool wielded by states in pursuit of other foreign policy objectives,
then it is plausible that Russia’s strong position in the global arms market might be expected to boost the country’s position in international
affairs more widely.90 In addition to the economic motives behind arms sales, Krause suggests that arms exports can help states both in the
pursuit of victory in war and in the broader pursuit of power in the international arena.91 Both motives appear to lie behind Russian arms
exports in a number of cases. For Krause, arms exports can help the exporting country achieve several objectives in the pursuit of the
beneficiary country’s victory in war. They include: guaranteeing independence of arms supply to ensure military security; acting as a quid pro
quo for military base/landing rights; assisting friends and allies in maintaining an effective (and/or common) defensive posture against external
threats; substituting for direct military involvement; and providing testing for new weapons systems. It is not difficult to find at least prima facie
evidence for these motives playing some role in motivating Russian arms exports to Armenia, Syria and Tajikistan. When looking at the role
arms exports play in supporting the exporter’s pursuit of geopolitical power, Krause states that the
sale of weaponry can help to:
provide access to and influence over leaders and elites in recipient states in pursuit of foreign policy
objectives; symbolize commitment to the recipient’s security or stability against internal or external
threats; create or maintain a regional balance of power; create or maintain a regional presence; and
provide access to scarce, expensive or strategic resources. It is likely that at least some of these motives are present in
Russia’s sales to countries all over the world. Moreover, the zeal shown by Russian firms in expanding arms exports to countries beyond their
traditional client base – such as to Saudi Arabia, Turkey or the Philippines – is surely as much to do with the possibility of weakening ties
between those countries and their traditional allies in the West. It is in this respect that Russia’s future performance as an arms exporter might
If Russia is able to expand its influence beyond its traditional markets, we should
have truly strategic significance.
expect to see Russia’s broader political influence in those regions rise. In this sense, the motives underlying the
strenuous Russian efforts to expand arms exports might well go beyond simple commercial concerns or a
desire to place the defence-industrial complex at the centre of efforts to modernize the Russian economy.

4. Impact: Expanded Russian influence leads to nuclear war and collapses the
international order
Gray 17 – PhD, professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading,
where he is the director of the Centre for Strategic Studies (Colin, “Russian strategy Expansion, crisis and
conflict,” Foreword, in Comparative Strategy, 36.1)//BB, sex edited

Short of war itself, the international political and strategic relations between Russia and the United States are
about as bad as they can be. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the simultaneous conduct of two air independent campaigns over Syria
could evolve all too suddenly into a war triggered by accident or by miscalculation. There is little, if any, mystery
about the broad political purpose fueling Vladimir Putin’s conduct of international relations. Subtlety is not a characteristic of Russian
statecraft; cunning and intended trickery, though, are another matter. Stated directly, Putin is striving to recover and restore that of which he is
able from the late USSR. There is no ideological theme in his governance. Instead, there is an historically unremarkable striving after more
power and influence. The challenge for the Western World, as demonstrated in this National Institute study in meticulous and troubling detail,
is to decide where and when this latest episode in Russian expansionism will be stopped. What we do know, for certain, is that it must and
will be halted. It is more likely than not that Putin himself does not have entirely fixed political-strategic objectives. His behavior of recent
years has given a credible impression of opportunistic adaptability. In other words, he will take what he is able, where he can, and when he can.
However, there is ample evidence to support this study’s proposition that Russian state policy today is driven by a clear vision of Russia as a
recovering and somewhat restored superpower, very much on the high road back to a renewed hegemony over Eastern Europe and Central
Asia. Putin’s international political objectives appear largely open today: he will have Russia take whatever turns out to be available to take,
preferably if the taking allows for some humiliation of the principal enemy, the United States. A practical political and strategic problem for
Putin is to guess just how far he dares to push NATO in general and the United States in particular, before he finds himself, almost certainly
unexpectedly, in a situation analogous to 1939. Just how dangerous would it be for Russia to press forcefully the Baltic members of NATO?
Vladimir Putin would not be the first statesman [person] to trust his luck once too often, based upon unrealistic confidence in his own political
genius and power. There is danger not only that Putin could miscalculate the military worth of Russia’s hand, but that he also will
misunderstand the practical political and strategic strength of NATO ‘red lines.’ In particular, Putin may well discover, despite some current
appearances, that not all of NATO’s political leaders are expediently impressionable and very readily deterrable. Putin’s military instrument is
heavily dependent, indeed probably over-dependent, upon the bolstering value of a whole inventory of nuclear weapons. It is unlikely
to have evaded Putin’s strategic grasp to recognize that these are not simply weapons like any others. A single political or strategic guess in
error could well place us, Russians included, in a world horrifically new to all. This National Institute study, Russian Strategy: Expansion,
Crisis and Conflict, makes unmistakably clear Putin’s elevation of strategic intimidation to be the leading element in Russian grand strategy
today. Putin is behaving in militarily dangerous ways and ‘talking the talk’ that goes with such rough behavior. Obviously, he is calculating,
perhaps just hoping, that American lawyers in the White House will continue to place highest priority on avoiding direct confrontation with
Russia. This study presents an abundantly clear record of the Russian lack of regard for international law, which they violate with apparent
impunity and without ill consequence to themselves, including virtually every arms control treaty and agreement they have entered into with
the United States since 1972 (SALT I). The challenge for the United States today and tomorrow is the need urgently to decide what can and
must be done to stop Putin’s campaign in its tracks before it wreaks lethal damage to the vital concept and
physical structure of international order in much of the world, and particularly in Europe
1nc: stocks DA
 1NC
Investors are shifting to defense stocks now---key to overall market health.
Al Root 19. Senior Special Writer for Barrons. 5-6-2019. “Defense Stocks Like Lockheed Martin Offer a Haven When the
Dow Drops.” Barrons. https://www.barrons.com/articles/defense-stocks-lockheed-martin-haven-dow-51557162289.

Companies deriving a majority of revenue from defense contracts were off 0.2% Monday afternoon. Often times, the defense sector is
uncorrelated with the broader stock market. Defense contractor sales are dependent on conflict and government budgets. They
are less dependent on the state of the global economy. That can be a good thing for investors looking for

a haven from global macroeconomic fears. The back story: Defense stocks have been solid performers over recent
history because of growing U.S. defense budgets as well as continuing global conflict. Shares of defense primes—the so-

called largest U.S. defense contractors—have returned 17% a year on average over the past 5 years, better than the 13%

return of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. What’s more, the defense primes trade for 16.3 times estimated 2019 earning, in line with historical averages.
The defense primes are generally taken to be: Boeing (ticker: BA), Lockheed Martin (LMT), General Dynamics (GD), Northrop Grumman (NOC), Raytheon (RTN) and L3 Technologies (LLL).
Barron’s excludes Boeing from defense-only calculations because it derives more of its sales from commercial aerospace. What’s new: The move into the Middle East with more fire power has
the potential to escalate tensions there. For defense stocks, the aggressive move could also mean more funding for overseas contingency operations, or OCO. OCO spending is a supplement
defense dollars dependent on the level of global conflict. According to the Congressional Budget Office, since 2001, the Department of Defense has received large appropriations to augment

the base defense budget totaling about $2.2 trillion, or 20% of total defense appropriations over that span. Military spending is forecast by Wall Street
analysts to rise in 2019—a positive for defense stocks. Additional Middle East operations should add to the amount of money the government will
allocate to defense contractors. Looking ahead: As trade-war fears heat up, defense could become a haven for industrial

investors looking to shift exposure away from China. The defense prime contractors traded at a 30% premium to
the Dow Jones Industrial Average early in 2018. The defense premium to the overall market is a measure investors can use for

two purposes: as a fear gauge as the trade conflict reemerges, and to determine how much safety the
defense sector can offer investors. At valuation parity, the defense space looks like a good bet, but at a premium valuation
multiple even the solid defense space might not offer investors much additional safety for their capital.

Restrictions create a spiraling negative market reaction.

Atsushi Tago 12. Associate Professor of International Relations at Graduate School of Law, Kobe University and Gerald
Schneider is Professor of International Politics at the University of Konstanz, Germany, “The Political Economy of Arms Export
Restrictions: The Case of Japan”, Japanese Journal of Political Science, Sept 2012,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233780864_The_Political_Economy_of_Arms_Export_Restrictions_The_Case_of_Ja
pan

Unanticipated political events and developments do not only influence the general market, but have also
substantial redistributive effects. Herron et al. (1999) for instance show that the altering prospects of US presidential candidates in the 1992 elections have affected the stock returns of 15
out of 74 sectors. In the view of these authors, ‘the pro Clinton bias of aerospace and defense is a function of Clinton’s interest in industrial policy and worker training initiatives’. The developments in the era of George W. Bush
might have changed the partisanship of the US defense sector. Halliburton, for which Vice President Cheney was the CEO from 1995to 2000, cashed in orders worth 11 billion dollars in the period from 2002 to 2002 in Afghanistan

The defense sector, which almost completely depends on government orders, also responds to other
and Iraq.13 234

political events. Bechtel and Schneider (2010) disclose that the summits of the European Union heads of state and government, who regularly convene within the European Council, can have
considerable redistributive effects if these multilateral meetings end with a substantial decision. On average, the value
of the sector increased by about 4 billion Euro following a summit decision that strengthened member states’ common
defense policy and security objectives. Similarly, the returns of the defense sector strongly respond to military
expenditures. Capelle-Blancard and Couderc (2008) show that publication of financial statements and other firm-relevant events influence the performance of defense stocks. Obviously, war events influence the
stock market returns of the armament industry, too, although the effects are to some extent ambiguous. While an increase in the hostilities in the Korean War lowered the returns on investment in the armament and consumer
goods industries, the development in the Vietnam War provoked growing returns (Kaun, 1990). Berrebi and Klor (2010: 541) document in an analysis of Israeli Q2 249 firms similarly ‘that terrorism has a positive effect on the stock-
market valuation of companies involved with defense, security or anti-terrorism products or clients, and a significantly negative effect on that of other companies’. According to DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2010), companies in highly
corrupt countries violate arms embargoes more often than manufacturers that reside in states with lower levels of corruption. Chaney’s (2008) analysis of the Iraqi bond yield spread reveals moreover that traders reacted to

we develop, based on this emerging

overtures towards Iran, but did not respond systematically to events which politicians portrayed as milestones towards democracy. In this article,

literature, a rational expectations model to account for the stock market reactions to defense policy
statements and decisions on the Japanese arms exportation restrictions. We expect in line with the semi-strong
version of the market efficiency thesis (Fama, 1965) that traders will absorb any information considered to be
relevant for the profitability of a specific asset and that they know about its past performance on the market. The magnitude of a stock
market reaction accordingly depends on how surprising a credible news report was. This hypothesis necessitates
that we clearly differentiate between leaks and official statements in the empirical analysis. Media disclosures are by nature surprising, and we only
need to assess whether the report is in favor or against the interests of the armament industry to anticipate either a positive or a negative effect. Official statements, by contrast, are often expected, not the least because of the
piecemeal nature of Japanese policy reforms. The government cabinet typically decides on defense matters in December and announces a policy change or the preservation of the status quo as part of the review of Boei taiko

policy changes have market effects if the decided changes fall short of
(National Defense Program Guideline). Nevertheless, even anticipated

the expectations of the traders or if they anticipated a much tamer reform than the one finally
delivered. In other words, the financial sector reacts negatively to announcements which dash its hopes for an
easing of the arms exportation policy and positively to what it considers to be exceptionally good news in the form of more radical changes. Obviously, the reactions
depend on who is responsible for the policy announcement. As in other political systems, statements by the Prime
Minister or the Defense Minister carry more credibility that the declared policy reforms will really be delivered than
announcements by civil servants or junior ministers. However, this increased trustworthiness comes at the price of increasing leverage that high-level politicians possess
and that may entice them to make ‘spontaneous’ remarks far away from the party line. One example was Prime Minister Abe, who had well-known credentials as a conservative, but who nevertheless showed some concern over
the possible further easing of the arms export restrictions. We nevertheless expect that LDP politicians are more open towards a liberalization of the restrictions, not the least because of the close contacts this party has entertained
over decades with the defense industry. If governments run by other parties reform the policy, the market reaction should, in other words, be more pronounced than the one attached to an equivalent move made by the
traditional government party after World War II.

Stock market collapse leads to full recession.

Miao et al. 12 (Jianjun Miao† , Pengfei Wang‡ , and Lifang Xu§. †Department of Economics, Boston University
‡Department of Economics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, §Department of Economics, Hong Kong
University of Science and Technology, “Stock Market Bubbles and Unemployment”,
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/51ee/14529d89b630638b0ca428e929f56d7f3b48.pdf)
This paper provides a theoretical study that links unemployment to the stock market bubbles and crashes. Our theory is based on three observations from the U.S. labor, credit, and stock
markets. First, the U.S. stock market has experienced booms and busts and these large swings may not be explained entirely by fundamentals. Shiller (2005) documents extensive evidence on
the U.S. stock market behavior and argues that many episodes of stock market booms are attributed to speculative bubbles. Second, the stock market booms and busts are often accompanied

A boom is often driven by a rapid expansion of credit to the private sector

by the credit market booms and busts.

accompanied by rising asset prices. Following the boom phase, asset prices collapse and a credit crunch
arises. This leads to a large fall in investment and consumption and an economic recession may follow.1
Third, the stock market and unemployment are highly correlated.2 Figure 1. plots the post-war U.S. monthly

data of the price-earnings ratio (the real Standard and Poor’s Composite Stock Price Index divided by the ten-year moving average real earnings on the index)
constructed by Robert Shiller and the unemployment rate downloaded from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).3 This figure

shows that, during recessions, the stock price fell and the unemployment rate rose. In particular, during the recent Great
Recession, the unemployment rate rose from 5.0 percent at the onset of the recession to a peak of 10.1 percent in October 2009, while the stock market fell by more than 50 percent from

October 2007 to March 2009. [Insert Figure 1 Here.] Motivated by the preceding observations, we build a search model with credit constraints, based
on Blanchard and Gali (2010). The Blanchard and Gali model is isomorphic to the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) search and matching model of unemployment (Diamond (1982),

The presence of this

Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1985)). Our key contribution is to introduce credit constraints in a way similar to Miao and Wang (2011a,b,c, 2012a,b).4

type of credit constraints can generate a stock market bubble through a positive feedback loop
mechanism. The intuition is the following: When investors have optimistic beliefs about the stock market value of a
firm’s assets, the firm wants to borrow more using its assets as collateral. Lenders are willing to lend
more in the hope that they can recover more if the firm defaults. Then the firm can finance more
investment and hiring spending. This generates higher firm value and justifies investors’ initial optimistic
beliefs. Thus, a high stock market value of the firm can be sustained in equilibrium. There is another
equilibrium in which no one believes that firm assets have a high value. In this case, the firm cannot
borrow more to finance investment and hiring spending. This makes firm value indeed low, justifying
initial pessimistic beliefs. We refer to the first type of equilibrium as the bubbly equilibrium and to the second type as the bubbleless equilibrium. Both types can coexist
due to self-fulfilling beliefs. In the bubbly equilibrium, firms can hire more workers and hence the market tightness is higher, compared to the bubbleless equilibrium. In addition, in the bubbly

After analyzing
equilibrium, an unemployed worker can find a job more easily (i.e., the job-finding rate is higher) and hence the unemployment rate is lower. [Insert Figure 2 Here.]

these two types of equilibria, we follow Weil (1987), Kocherlakota (2009) and Miao and Wang (2011a,b,c, 2012a,b) and introduce a third type of
equilibrium with stochastic bubbles. Agents believe that there is a small probability that the stock
market bubble may burst. After the burst of the bubble, it cannot re-emerge by rational expectations. We
show that this shift of beliefs can also be self-fulfilling. After the burst of the bubble, the economy enters a

recession with a persistent high unemployment rate. The intuition is the following. After the burst of the bubble, the
credit constraints tighten, causing firms to reduce investment and hiring. An unemployed worker is then
harder to find a job, generating high unemployment. Our model can help explain the high
unemployment during the Great Recession. Figures 2 and 3 plot the hires rate and the job-finding rate from the first month of 2001 to the last month of
2011 using the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) data set.5 These figures reveal that both the job-finding rate and the hires rate fell sharply following the stock market crash
during the Great Recession. In particular, the hires rate and the job-finding rate fell from 4.4 percent and 0.7, respectively, at the onset of the recession to about 3.1 percent and 0.25,
respectively, in the end of the recession.

Nuclear war.
Stein Tønnesson 15, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala
University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-
311.

recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how
Several

and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce
the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence
may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but
asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions
leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland,
2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war
between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context
it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a

global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people,
who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the
value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to

seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence,
appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt
protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of
socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or
against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in

the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial

dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in
ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a
trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen

consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the
world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers
might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with
each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.
1nc: military relations DA
 1 min. & 15 sec.
1. Uniqueness: Arms sales are key to U.S. leadership – sustains bilateral relations,
boosts credibility and economy, out competes Russia/China, and better
protects human rights
Cooper, assistant sec. of state, 6-12-19 (TESTIMONY OF R. CLARKE COOPER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE,
POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE JUNE 12, 2019, 10 O’CLOCK AM
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20190612/109641/HHRG-116-FA00-Wstate-CooperR-20190612.pdf)

As the 2017 National Security Strategy makes clear, we are in an era of global competition against near-peer adversaries, including Russia and
China. That competition includes security and defensive relationships that have political, military, and economic ramifications. In such an
United States remain the partner of choice and be trusted as a dependable
environment it is crucial that the
provider of defense capabilities – including materiel – to our partners. Our National Security Strategy describes the
invaluable advantages that our strong relationships with allies and partners deliver. While the United States continues to build and offer
our partners with the most capable, advanced, defense technologies, we do not have a monopoly on fostering or maintaining reliable security
relationships. The National Security Strategy makes clear that the United States must compete for positive relationships around the
world as China and Russia target their investments in the developing world to expand influence and gain competitive
advantages against the United States. Our adversaries, including Russia and China, have adopted deliberate, long-term strategies of trying
to disrupt our partnerships by seeking to replace the United States as the credible supplier of choice. We simply cannot allow
openings that our adversaries will exploit to disrupt partnerships, to reduce our regional influence, to impact our defense industrial base,
and to spread chaos. Remaining a reliable security partner to our allies and friends around the world is also in the interest and
furtherance of our values. When our adversaries sell weapons of war, they do not place the same, if any, premium that we do on addressing
the risk that the capabilities we provide may contribute to abuses of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law. China does
not work to expand transparency on the battlefield, and there is no Russian Conventional Arms Transfer Policy that requires action to facilitate
partner efforts to reduce civilian casualties, which is a policy we have had in place since 2018. When President Trump issued the updated
Conventional Arms Transfer Policy in 2018, a centerpiece of the new Policy was its unprecedented directive that we work with partners to
reduce the risk of civilian harm in their military operations. We are working on the implementation of that directive to shape future
engagements, including with partners in advance of conflict situations. Before I close, let me address a few other aspects of these sales and the
emergency certification that may be of interest to you.

2. Link – The plan undermines the U.S.’ credibility as a reliable partner and ally – the
unexpected nature of the plan undermines trust and stability with allies
Spindel ‘18
(Jennifer, Assistant Professor of International Security at the University of Oklahoma. Her research
examines issues related to foreign policy, weapons transfers, and signaling. She received her Ph.D. in
Political Science from the University of Minnesota, and was a fellow at the Institute for Security and
Conflict Studies at George Washington University department of political science University of
Minnesota may 2018, “beyond military power: The symbolic politics of conventional weapons transfers
A dissertation submitted to The faculty of the university of minnesota In partial fulfillment of the
requirements for The degree of doctor of philosophy,” pg 43-73 //um-ef)

Weapons transfers are intimately linked to foreign policy and grand strategy because they reveal
info about the political relationship between the sender and receiver
rmation weapons are . To actors in the international system,

credible signals of alignment and intentions even when the weapon does not affect the relative ,

balance of power . State leaders and policymakers have long observed that weapons transfers have effects beyond the military balance. Scholarly assessments of the consequences of arms transfers have not incorporated this insight, and thus reaches

arms build alliance trust,

contradictory conclusions: arms might increase the likelihood of conflict, or decrease it; might or they might undermine it; or, they might have no independent effect on state behavior whatsoever.54 I argue that
weapons send signals about the relationship between the sending and receiving state
affect a state’s military power and . The signals

These political signals have

sent by weapons transfers help states differentiate between close friends, acquaintances, and opponents in a manner that is clear and comprehensible in an otherwise noisy international system.

observable effects on a state’s foreign policy behavior Weapons create two . are intimately linked to grand strategy and foreign policy because they

types of power material power.55 Weapons most clearly provide also , enabling a state to more credibly make coercive threats or undertake forceful diplomatic actions because of increased capabilities. Weapons transfers are

signals of political ties, which creates a more diffuse, relational power Weapons transfers signal the .

extent and depth of states’ political alignments , and can even sort states in intra-group status hierarchies. Weapons transfers are bright lines against the noisy (and sticky) background that is state’s

broader political networks. They affect the shape of and tensions in the network. State leaders use the ties created by weapons transfers as a convenient shortcut for understanding how states are related to one another, where the center of power is located, and the relative power of

some transfers facilitate cooperation, while other transfers

one group of states compared to another. In focusing on the signals sent by weapons transfers, I show, for example, that

incentivize prevention or aggression These foreign policy outcomes show the . , determined by the signal sent by weapons transfers, more generally

importance of the symbols and signals that make and unmake relations that constitute world politics. As the following empirical chapters show, without an
analysis of the political effects of weapons transfers, explanations of international political outcomes are incomplete. Chapter three, on India and Pakistan, shows how weapons transfers can moderate a revisionist state’s impulses to take advantage of its weakened neighbor. The chapter
on the Middle East offers a revised explanation for the 1967 war, focusing on the arms transfers that fueled uncertainty about political relationships. Chapter five demonstrates how weapons transfers expand foreign policy options available to states by allowing them to hold on to

otherwise contradictory relationships. The US used transfers to simultaneously reassure Taiwan and deter China – the foundation of the policy of strategic
ambiguity. Finally, chapter six shows that states remain sensitive to and interested in arms signals even when the state can produce its own weapons. These cases are specific instances of more general patterns in which weapons transfers have a causal effect on state behavior. It is these
political effects, and how they explain foreign policy decisions, that are the focus of the remainder of this chapter. This chapter develops an explanation of foreign policy behavior based on signals sent through international conventional weapons transfers. First, I situate my discussion of
arms as signals within existing scholarship. Second, I go beyond existing literature by explicitly and systematically building a theory of the political effects of weapons transfers. Third, I discuss scope conditions for this theory. Fourth, I show the broader theoretical significance of this theory
with respect to foreign policy, signaling, and hierarchies in international security. I conclude with a discussion of case selection and concept analysis. What do weapons do for a state? While existing literature acknowledges that states can seek weapons for purposes beyond relative
capabilities, there is not yet a coherent description of the political effects of arms transfers. Scholarship generally treats “conventional weapons” as a monolithic category, overlooking differences between planes, tanks, and ICBMs. Any first step toward creating a typology of weapons

must therefore take into account the different functions and perceptions of weapons. Weapons quite obviously affect relative capabilities . Greater capabilities give a state increased ability to
coerce its adversaries or to conduct military operations. However, the effects of capabilities are not universal. A tank enables a very different type of fighting than long-range bombers; a refueling plane is quite different from a submarine. A logical first cut for differentiating among types

of weapons is based on their military utility. Second, scholars have a sense that weapons can be acquired for reasons other than relative capabilities, but have not
explored these purposes. With the exception of ambiguous statements that some weapons are more “symbolic” than others, non-military reasons for weapons acquisition are, in the conventional realm, largely ignored. Linguistic politics approaches suggest the salient point of information
is the name of the weapon,56 whereas others have argued the weapon itself is a symbol, and that supersonic aircraft are particularly notable because they are “expensive, visible, and get a great deal of attention in the policy-making process.”57 Other weapons thought to receive

weapons can be used as

significant attention are submarines and main battle tanks.58 It’s not clear, though, why submarines, supersonic aircraft, and tanks are conceptually distinct from other types of weapons. There is, however, a sense that

political signals . Arms can be part of a reciprocal agreement for some other good, or they can be a means of gaining influence in the receiving state .59 As I show later,
weapons are long-term investments and providing (or denying) new technologies to a state is a central process in the development of status hierarchies. Unlike iPads, new fighter jet models are not released every year. The transfer of high-tech weapons thus creates durable status

arms can send signals ranging from “gestures of political support,” to friendship
hierarchies between and within groups of states. Additionally,

and trust, There is startling lack of attention to the

to signals of technological modernity.60 In sum, arms can do things, but there is no consensus about which arms or what things. also a

decision not to sell arms withholding arms can be an act of great political import
, even though . Freedman is a rare exception, accurately

refusing to sell arms is a major political act as

observing that, “though only limited political benefits can normally be expected from agreeing to sell arms, since this is seen in commercial terms, . It appears

a calculated insult, reflecting on the stability, trust, and credit-worthiness, of the would-be or technical competence

recipient .”61 However, other researchers have not pursued this line of thinking, perhaps because the usual databases focus on the arms transfers that come to fruition. Since withholding arms means a transfer does not appear in these databases, the act is usually
ignored.62 CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND SYMBOLIC SIGNALING To understand the political effects of weapons, scholars need a way to talk about similarities and differences between and among types of weapons; the content of ties between states is just as important as t he existence
of one. This section develops a theory to explain the effects of weapons transfers on foreign policy by making two moves. First, I unpack the umbrella category of conventional weapons along the dimensions of prestige and military utility. This lets me discuss differences between weapons

and the different conditions under which they will be transferred. Second, I explain the signals that weapons transfers send, and connect these signals to distinct foreign policy behaviors. Weapon Typology Weapons have dual functions: they most obviously

affect capabilities, enabling actors to wage war and deter aggression. But there is also a symbolic dimension : states share understandings of prestigious and non-prestigious weapons. I create a typology of weapons by contrasting the prestige of
weapons with the more familiar dimension of military utility, which provides the first step toward analyzing the political effects of weapons transfers. This typology draws on existing literature, as well as fieldwork at two international weapons exhibitions, where I observed the importance
of prestige for the way different actors talked about, and purchased, weapons. Dimension 1: Prestige Prestige captures the symbolic dimension of weapons, the shared understanding that some weapons are more tha n others. This dimension builds on insights from other disciplines that
have long recognized a difference between prestige and “functional” goods. Functional goods accomplish basic necessary tasks, whereas prestige goods are kept for use and displayed periodically to indicate wealth, success, and power.63 This distinction between prestige and functional
goods needs to be modified to fit weapons transfers, since high prestige weapons are not simply for display, periodically dusted off for a military parade or two. Further, even relatively useless weapons are qualitatively distinct goods because they have the ability to harm, and are thus not
directly comparable to regular gifts given between individuals, such as a vase or a ring.64 Prestige weapons are usually thos e with a high level of offensive striking power or technological sophistication. These weapons do more than the basic functional task of territorial defense, though I
note that firepower or technological sophistication is necessary, but not sufficient, as a cause of prestige. One insight that does carry over concerns reciprocity. On the level of the individual social relationship, giving a gift incurs a mutual obligation from the receiver to the giver, and the

possession of prestige goods is a way to get others to recognize your importance.65 At the level of interstate relations, there is still an implied mutual obligation – State A gives State B a weapon and expects state B to behave “properly”, however defined. Equally important, the
transfer of prestige weapons is a statement about the type of relationship the states have Just as .

diamond rings are usually exchanged between committed couples, prestigious weapons are usually
exchanged between similarly committed/aligned states . Though nuclear weapons are recognized as prestigious weapons,66 prestige is not the privilege solely of the nuclear realm: there

is a hierarchy of prestige in conventional weapons, too. Existing literature considers three types of weapons prestigious – supersonic aircraft, main battle tanks, and submarines.67 The criteria this implies for assessing prestige is unclear, since the three weapons are very different in use,
firepower, and technological sophistication. Though highly capable and technologically sophisticated, supersonic aircraft are usually defensive weapons designed to quickly intercept an opponent’s aircraft. Submarines, on the other hand, enable stealthy offense, have high capabilities and
technology, and can be nuclear-capable. Main battle tanks are considered a prestigious weapons platform even though their offensive firepower is limited in both range and caliber, and their level of technological sophistication is significantly below that of fighter jets and submarines. By

perceptions play a
all of these measures, main battle tanks are an outlier on the list of prestigious weapons platforms. Clearly, the correlation between prestige and offensive power or technological sophistication is not determinative. I propose that

large role in determining what types of platforms are prestigious, and that these perceptions usually cue on superpower actions. Main battle tanks are considered prestigious

because of their association with the great power wars of the twentieth century.68 Similarly, intercontinental ballistic missiles are a prestigious platform because of their perceptual association with nuclear weapons,69 even though there are many weapons within this platform that are
universally ineffective because they have poor targeting capabilities and poor construction.70 The opposite relationship holds, too. Refueling planes stand out as weapons that have extremely high levels of technology – from the sensors to detect how close it is to the plane taking on fuel,
to the in-air delivery system, to an engine able to give lift to a massive plane, to all of the associated safety mechanisms – and that require an extraordinary level of skill to pilot, but these weapons are not considered prestigious. Though there may be a minimum baseline of either
technological sophistication or offensive power necessary to be a candidate for a prestige weapon, these factors are not determinative. Rather, prestige is determined by perceptions.71 I observed the importance of perceptions in creating prestige during fieldwork at two international
weapons shows. Many manufacturers tried to portray their weapons as particularly important by unveiling them at a designated time during the show, drawing significant crowds and creating an air of excitement by pumping music through nearby speakers, or using security ropes to
allow only important visitors – usually in military uniforms or other official-looking attendees – nearest to the weapon. During an outdoor demonstration of a number of weapons, the “coolness” factor of an armored vehicle was enhanced through a hard rock soundtrack. The tempo of
the music was used to manipulate the audience’s perceptions of the weapon on display, and varied based on how much perceptions of different weapons needed to be manipulated.72 More mundane weapons, like a firetruck and a fueling vehicle, were accompanied by explosions, to get
the audience to pay attention and to associate these weapons with the battlefield, rather than support roles. Throughout the convention halls, brochures touted specific capabilities or linked a particular weapon to a known prestigious weapon. For example, Finnish arms company Patria
emphasized its integration of weapons systems in its Armored Modular Vehicle as providing “the digital backbone for 21st century soldiers,” perhaps trying to portray this armored vehicle – usually not very technologically sophisticated – as at the technological cutting edge, and thus
prestigious. The concept of prestige is not reducible to the economic cost of the weapons transfer. First, states often give weapons at free or significantly discounted rates to friends and allies. Second, there is no agreed upon way to calculate cost. For example, the AGM-154 Joint Standoff
Weapon, produced by Raytheon, has an acquisition cost of $3.3 billion. But because the Navy and Air Force ordered 12,000 missiles the per-unit production cost is $246,585.73 By contrast, General Dynamic’s M1A1 Abrams Tank has a per-unit cost of $2.38 million.74 The Abrams tank,
though a useful main battle tank, was first produced in the 1970s, where as the JSOW is a brand-new missile. Determining prestige based on cost would be misleading in this case. Further, some transfer agreements include contracts for maintenance and/or spare parts. This would

Prestige is a heuristic used by a variety of actors to make inferences

increase the value of the transfer, but would not indicate anything about prestige.75

about the future relationship between the sending and receiving states . This heuristic suggests that higher prestige weapons signify a greater relationship to

weapons – like gifts between two individuals – reflect the weight

come; states woo one another with the prettiest, most attention-grabbing weapons. Different types of

of the relationship and change in type and/or amount as the closeness between the states changes
, .76
Weapons are certainly valuable for their military functions, but the symbol of prestigious weapons is a way of distinguishing allies from non-
allies Prestigious weapons are a visible signal of commitment
,77 can be an invitation to a closer relationship,78 and is an expression of the sender’s perception of the receiver.79

and interest , and states are therefore more circumspect in transferring these weapons. Less prestigious weapons are more likely to be transferred because they don’t signal a deep commitment; they are one of the means states have for expressing potential interest.
Low prestige doesn’t mean that the weapon is devoid of use: support weapons like transport aircraft or armored personnel carriers are essential for both offensive and defensive operations. But because every state that has a functioning military needs to pay attention to the “tail” in the
tooth-to-tail ratio, the transfer of low prestige weapons is not nearly as noticeable and does not constitute a political relationship in the same way as high prestige weapons. Treating prestige as a heuristic is in line with the cognitive psychology literature that reminds us that individuals
use heuristic principles to reduce the complex task of assessing probability and predicting outcomes, especially in situations of high uncertainty.80 Weapons prestige functions as a representative and an availability heuristic: it is the cue by which states reduce complex inputs about the
future.81 In this case, cognitive psychology applies as much to the state as to individuals. States are composed of individuals, and we know that people reflect on their lifetime of experiences in making associations between particular actions as part of a larger class of actions.82 This
process should be compounded in states because of both institutional and national memories: while an individual will rely on events from her lifetime, states institutions and bureaucracies effectively increase the “lifetime” of events on which individuals can rely for making these

judgments. Further, the actors involved as the individual, bureaucratic, and state-level decision-making process are especially attentive to signaling
and intentions , increasing the salience of this heuristic. Prestige, then, is a perceptually determined assessment of weapons, that draws on technology, firepower, and the status of states that use the weapon. Dimension 2: Military Utility Military utility captures
the ways in which a weapon affects a state’s relative capabilities. My use of the concept draws inspiration from Glaser and Kaufman’s call to broaden the conceptualization of the offense-defense balance.83 Military utility may incorporate appraisals of versatility, efficacy, reliability,
portability, or maintenance. For example, there are a number of medium-range or intercontinental missiles that – because of targeting issues – cannot hit the broad side of a barn. Compared to similar types of missiles, these specific ones, such as the Chinese-made DF-3 missile, popular in
the 1980s, are rather useless.84 Similarly, Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter may initially be read as a capable weapons because of its technological sophistication and advanced engineering: it is a stealthy plane with vertical take-off and landing functions. But it has performance
issues that include impaired aerial combat capabilities, a limited payload, and the tendency to decapitate pilots when making high-G turns. The F-35 is designed to be a single node in high-tech networked warfare, but for most states at most times it is not a militarily useful plane. I
compare weapons produced within the same time frame so that vastly different levels of technology are not directly compared. Even if a weapon meets a baseline level of military utility, different strategic environments, skill level of militaries, or state infrastructure can reduce the
usefulness of certain weapons for certain states. Some weapons can be more militarily useful for one country but not for another. An extreme example of this is Singapore’s recent obsession with Cold War-era German tanks. As an island city-state, it is unclear how Singapore would make
use of the tanks, but it purchased nearly 200 Leopard Tanks and even built an underground storage facility for them.85 Tanks don’t make strong military sense for Singapore. As discussed in greater detail at the end of this chapter, military utility compares weapons produced in the same
time period and results in a relative measure of capabilities. It parses out differences in use so that not all weapons are assumed to have an equal effect on a state’s ability to wield power. Contrasting these two dimensions gives four types of weapons, shown in Table 2. Boom weapons
are prestigious and highly capable. Contemporary examples include the F15 fighter jet, submarines (especially nuclear powered), and the S-300 missile defense system.86 Bling in the world of armaments are weapons that are significantly less effective than others of the same type.
Historical examples include the F-104 fighter jet – a very fast and literally shiny plane that was ineffective as a defensive interceptor or mid-air fighter— as well as the DF-3 missile, a medium-range intercontinental ballistic missile that has significant targeting issues that reduce its ability to
be militarily effective. Backbone weapons are low in prestige and capabilities, include weapons like the KC-46 Pegasus tanker plane, mundane vehicles like Jeeps, and transport and training aircraft. These weapons are often ignored in analyses of the offense-defense balance, but
backbone weapons are the unsung heroes of the military: they are essential for enabling most operations, but never get any of the credit. Finally, blip weapons are those low in prestige and low in capabilities. This category includes ammunition, firearms, and small bombs. Though all of
these weapons do have military use, they need to be used in large quantities, and usually in conjunction with other weapons, in order to be useful; the scope of their usefulness is much more limited compared to other weapons. However, contexts of civil war or armed group movements
can change the salience of blip weapons, and they can become important intra-war signaling devices. For example, in some contexts having new M-4 rounds signals support from one individual/group to another, but AK-47 rounds do not.87 While this typology is an important first step in
breaking apart the diverse category of conventional weapons, on its own it does not provide any guidance about what weapons should be transferred between different states, or what types of transfers send what type of signal. For that, I shift to a relational lens, and explain how existing
relationships generate expectations of different types of weapons transfers. Weapons Transfer Expectations and Signal Type Intuitively, the quality of states’ relationships should matter: closer states should transfer different types of weapons than states that have less in common or that

routine transfers among NATO allies

do not share strategic goals. This is why, as explained in the Introduction, Turkey’s choice of China as a missile supplier caused such outrage among its NATO allies. Similarly, the

are less notable for their political signaling than they are as evidence of standard operating procedure
within the alliance, building inter-operability, bolstering the capabilities of the alliance , and reinforcing NATO as a political
institution. The proposed transfer from China to Turkey was unexpected, whereas transfers among NATO allies are routine and expected. This relational dynamic has long been recognized by policymakers. Take, for example, United States Military Sales and Assistance Manuals, which all
state: “The willingness of the U.S. Government to sell military equipment varies country by country in accordance with the military requirement, ability to maintain and use, compatibility with existing inventory, and impact on the preconceptions and the actions of the buyer's neighbors.”
88 In other words, states do not act in a dyadic vacuum: the relationship between the sender and the receiver and the receiver’s neighborhood affect which transfers are expected or unexpected.89 For example, US transfers to Saudi Arabia are not a dyadic process: US law prohibits the
transfer of weapons that would make any Middle Eastern state qualitatively superior to Israel.90 I generalize these relational patterns through the concept of strategic interest, which captures the extent to which states’ interests and ideologies align or conflict. This concept allows me to
differentiate between weapons transfers that accord with existing ties and those that are more surprising, which is an important interim step in determining which transfers send different signals. Strategic interest is a concept central to bargaining and deterrence theory, two bodies of
literature that have addressed ways to send signals,91 and encompasses both instrumental reasons for alignment, such as common foe, natural resource or economic dependence, as well as diffuse or ideational reasons like shared worldview or cultural affinity.92 The degree of shared
strategic interest between states can often be determined by threat perceptions and national security narratives, whether the states identify the same foe(s) and the threat posed by them, or whether states have similar ideas about how the world should work. Depending on the degree

of shared interests between states, different types of arms are expected (because they confirm or cement existing relations) or unexpected (because they constitute a new relationships). Expected arms reinforce ties
between the sender and receiver, and generally have a readily-apparent balance of power logic to them: states transfer weapons to bolster the relative capabilities
of their friends , and refrain from bolstering capabilities of their opponents or of their friends’ opponents.93 Table 3, below, summarizes th e expected and unexpected transfers based on the degree of shared strategic interest. The following sub-sections explain

why certain types of weapons are expected or unexpected in different contexts, and connects the (un)expectedness of the transfer to different signals. Expected transfers: Reinforcement Signals Expected arms transfers accord with and support

send a reinforcement signal.

the status quo; they Oftentimes, these transfers become so routine and ingrained in relationships that the reinforcement signal goes unnoticed; it is part of standard operating procedure and only
noticeable when there is an interruption to the reinforcement signal . Most types of weapons transfers are expected when states have substantial common
interests. Prestigious and capable boom weapon transfers are expected for reasons of interoperability– facilitating joint operations – and because of bureaucratic standard operating procedure.94 Again, it’s not surprising that the NATO allies have remarkably similar arsenals, nor that
these states engage in cooperative development of advanced weapons in order to reduce costs and share knowledge.95 Boom weapons transferred between states that share close ties reinforce and maintain these ties. Bling weapons – those that are highly prestigious but less militarily
useful – are useful for reinforcing ties among states that share interests as well. Backbone weapons are expected transfers when states have substantial common interests, or when they have a mix of interests. When states have similar goals and policies, these weapons are desired for
their military use. The workhorses of modern militaries, backbone weapons are essential for moving troops and materiel. When states have a mix of interests, t hese weapons are desirable because of their low prestige. The arms are useful, but don’t signal a deep political relationship, so
the sender can transfer the weapons without fear of emboldening the receiver, and the receiver can accept the weapons without fear that it is signaling alignment with the sender. Blip weapons are also expected when states have a mix of interests. Though all of these weapons do have

can be unexpected
military use, they can be transferred without any signaling consequences because of their low prestige. Unexpected Transfers: Upgrade and Downgrade Signals Transfers in either a positive or

it would be very
negative way, which correspond, respectively, with upgrade and downgrade signals. An absence of transfers between states that have substantial common interests is unexpected. To rely on the familiar example of the NATO allies,

surprising if a NATO ally was denied the transfer of a weapon other allies possessed , or if a NATO ally decided to seek weapons from

The lack of transfer sends a downgrade signal: it is a visible interruption to the shared ties
outside the alliance.

between the states .96

Footnote:

96 Some might argue that the lack of a transfer in this condition is epiphenomenal to a larger strategic interest shift (e.g., the US pivot to Asia might lead to fewer transfers to Europe). While it is plausible that the lack of a transfer
might signal a downgrading of the states’ relationship, this should be a very rare case. States, even if undertaking a strategic shift, will still want their friends and allies to have advanced weaponry. Being seen to

draw away from or downgrade the relationship with states with whom you share significant strategic
interests could undermine the sender’s reputation as a reliable ally.

End Footnote

Downgrade signals can also come if the transfer is a mismatch with the receiver’s expectations. This can be
caused by receiving a lower quantity or lower type of weapon, such as expecting fighter jets but receiving cargo planes. Mismatched
transfers indicate a growing rift between the sender and receiver. Jordan, for example, expected to
receive the F-104 Starfighter jet, a bling weapon, from the United States in 1967. It was instead sent a small number of backbone
and blip weapons, including rifles and utility trucks, leading King Hussein to reconsider what he thought was a close US-Jordanian
relationship. Importantly, a downgrade signal can be initiated by the sender or the receiver of a weapon. The sender can choose to prevent the receiver from acquiring a weapon, or
the receiver can rebuff offers. The downgrade signal is sent regardless. For example, in March 2015, Sweden decided not to negotiate a new defense agreement with Saudi Arabia, a move that
signaled new tensions and disputes between the two states.97

3. Impact: Alliances solve nuclear war---the alt is allied prolif and adventurism.
Brands & Feaver ’17 (Hal Brands – PhD in History @ Yale, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor
of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Senior Fellow
at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Peter
D. Feaver – PhD @ Harvard, Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke University, Director
of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, Director of the Duke Program in American Grand Strategy.
“What Are America’s Alliances Good For?” Summer 2017, The US Army War College Quarterly
Parameters, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=803998)

Geostrategic Influence and Global Stability

If alliances are thus helpful in terms of the conflicts America wages, they are more helpful still in terms of the conflicts they prevent and
the broader geostrategic influence they confer. Indeed, although the ultimate test of America’s alliances lies in their efficacy as
warfighting coalitions, the most powerful benefits they provide come in the normal course of peacetime geostrategic management and
competition.

First, US alliances bind many of the richest and most militarily capable countries in the world to Washington through enduring
relationships of deep cooperation. Alliances reflect shared interests rather than creating them, of course, and the United States
would presumably have close ties to countries such as the United Kingdom even without formal alliances. But alliances nonetheless serve as
“hoops of steel.” They help create a sense of permanence and shared purpose in key relationships; they provide forums for regular interaction
and cooperation; they conduce to deeply institutionalized exchanges (of intelligence, personnel, and other assets) that insulate and perpetuate
friendly associations even when political leaders clash.38 And insofar as US alliances serve these purposes with respect to immensely influential
countries in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, they help Washington preserve a significant overbalance of power vis-à-vis any competitor.

Second, alliances have a strong deterrent effect on would-be aggressors. American alliances lay down “redlines” regarding areas in which
territorial aggression is impermissible; they complicate the calculus of any potential aggressor by raising the strong possibility that an attack on
a US ally will mean a fight with the world’s most formidable military. The proposition that “defensive alliances deter the initiation of
disputes” is, in fact, supported by empirical evidence, and the forward deployment of troops strengthens this deterrence
further still.39

NATO clearly had an important deterrent effect on Soviet calculations during the Cold War, for instance; more recently, Russia has behaved
most aggressively toward countries lacking US alliance guarantees (Georgia and Ukraine), rather than toward those countries possessing them
(the Baltic states or Poland). In other words, alliances make the geostrategic status quo—which is enormously favorable to the United States—
far “stickier” than it might otherwise be.

Third, and related to this second benefit,

alliances tamp down international instability more broadly. American security
guarantees allow US allies to underbuild their own militaries; while always annoying and problematic when taken to extremes, this
phenomenon also helps avert the arms races and febrile security competitions that plagued Europe and East Asia in
earlier eras. In fact, US alliances are as useful in managing tensions among America’s allies as they are in constraining America’s adversaries.

NATO was always intended to keep the “Americans in” and the “Germans down” as well as the “Russians out”; US presence, along with the
creation of a framework in which France and Germany were incentivized to cooperate rather than compete with one another, would help stifle
any resurgence of tensions between these historical rivals.40 Similarly, US alliance guarantees in the Asia-Pacific were designed, in part, to
create a climate of security in which Japan could be revived economically without threatening its neighbors, just as the expansion of NATO after
the Cold War helped prevent incipient rivalries and territorial irredentism among former members of the Warsaw Pact.41 US alliances keep
things quiet in regions Washington cannot ignore, thereby fostering a climate of peace in which America and its partners can flourish.
Fourth, US alliances impede dangerous geostrategic phenomena such as nuclear proliferation. As scholars such as Francis
Gavin have emphasized, US security guarantees and forward deployments have played a critical role in convincing historically insecure,
technologically advanced countries—Germany, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, among others—to forego possession of the world’s
absolute weapon. In several of these cases, moreover, the United States has used the security leverage provided by
alliance guarantees to dissuade allies from pursuing the bomb after they had given indications of their intent to start
down that path.42 If, as seems likely, a world with more nuclear powers is likely to be a more dangerous world in which crises more
frequently take on a nuclear dimension and the risk of nuclear conflict is higher, then the value of American alliances looms large
indeed.

In sum, as the framers of the post-World War II order understood, phenomena such as massive instability, arms racing, and violence in key
regions would eventually imperil the United States itself.43 Whatever modest reduction in short-term costs might come from pursuing a “free
hand” or isolationist strategy was thus more than lost by the expense of fighting and winning a major war to restore order. Accordingly,
America’s peacetime alliance system represents a cheaper, more prudent alternative for maximizing US influence while also preventing raging
instability by deterring aggression and managing rivalries among friends. The fact that so many observers seem to have forgotten why,
precisely, America has alliances in the first place is an ironic testament to just how well the system has succeeded.
1nc: conditions CP
 1nc: conditions CP (:24)
plan: the USFG should continue sales to _____ but implement new human rights
conditions, peace initiatives, and de-escalatory measures

The CP creates a durable signal that spills over to affect future arms sales
Dalton et al ’18 – Project Director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(Melissa, “Oversight and Accountability in US Security Sector Assistance: Seeking Return on Investment,”
Feb 2018, date accessed: 6.28.2019, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/180207_Dalton_OversightAccountability_Web.pdf)//AP

When strategically applied, conditionality has the potential to mitigate risks, strengthen security
partnerships, and incentivize good behavior. Policymakers can employ punitive conditionality to
mitigate the risk that a partner country will abuse U.S. SSA Transparent, positive conditionality, in which
U.S. policymakers collaborate with recipient countries to develop a road map for SSA, would help
incentivize reform and likely result in stronger partnerships and a better alignment of policy objectives
between donor and recipient countries 47 Conditioning SSA to promote interna-tional norms and
human rights demonstrates U.S. commitment to these values, mandates better behavior among current
partner countries, and may also signal and influence the behavior of those seeking SSA in the future.
48
case
IF YOU DON’T HAVE ANY OTHER CASE, USE THIS
 circumvention
Reducing sales fails – lots of ways to bypass – arms get loaned, leased, bartered or
given as aid
Holden 17 - historian and researcher. His previous books include Who Rules South Africa? (2012), The
Devil in the Detail: How the Arms Deal Changed Everything (2011) and The Arms Deal in Your Pocket
(2008). He was also lead researcher on Andrew Feinsteins book The Shadow World (2012) and on the
documentary feature of the same name released in 2016. He currently works as Director of
Investigations at Corruption Watch UK (Paul, “Indefensible: Seven Myths That Sustain The Global Arms
Trade,” p. 78-81)//dmr
BUT WHAT ABOUT THE ARMS TRADE TREATY? The fact that we have reached this point in the chapter without mentioning the much-discussed
Arms Trade Treaty is something of a give-away in itself: the ability of the treaty to seriously impact on the trade in weapons is minimal. The
treaty had auspicious and well-intentioned roots. It emerged out of a discussion between numerous NGOs: including Amnesty international and
Oxfam, which had campaigned for a full recognition of how the arms trade was fueling human rights abuses around the world. Flowing from a
list of initial principles, the treaty that emerged out of this group sought to put in serious controls over the arms trade, so as to stop the very
things that we have described so far in this chapter happening: arms being sold to repressive regimes, diverted to human rights abusers, and
generally fueling some of the world’s most intransigent conflicts. 85 As with many international agreements, the treaty became sucked into a
seemingly endless round of negotiations, as different states around the world attempted to modify its content to suit their ends. The treaty, as
it was passed in 2013 reflects this: it is riddled with bullet holes that will limit its ability to properly limit the trade. The noted campaign group,
Ceasefire, has pointed to five major problems:86 1. The treaty sets a threshold for stopping arms exports way too high. The treaty requires that
arms should not be exported to a state if there is an overriding risk" they are to be used in violating human rights. The use of the word
‘overriding’ is not only open to interpretation, but implies that the trade in weapons should only be stopped in exceptional circumstances.
Indeed, in the original drafts of the treaty, it stated that weapons should not be exported only if it was ‘likely’ that they would be used in ways
the treaty forbids. 2. The treaty doesn't have any major requirements regarding record keeping and reporting. One of the big selling points of
the early drafts of the treaty was that it would make the trade in weapons transparent by forcing states to properly report on their imports and
exports. However, the final version of the treaty only requires states to submit a horribly under-detailed list with minimal information to the UN
Secretariat, which the Secretariat doesn’t even publish. States are also allowed to leave out any information that is ‘commercially sensitive’ or
constitutes ‘national security information’. 3. The treaty does not include a whole raft of weapons. The treaty is applicable to eight categories of
conventional arms (such as battle tanks and attack helicopters). But the list is so circumscribed, and so out of date, that it is entirely unlikely to
be applicable to new and emerging categories of weapons (such as drones). Most importantly, while mentioning ammunition, the treaty
excludes the trade in ammunition from a whole host of its central provisions. 4. The treaty only covers sales. This is
distinct from
other forms of arms transfer we’ve discussed above, such as weapons that are loaned, leased, bartered
covering
or given as part of an aid package. The treaty also excludes arms transferred as part of a "defense cooperation
agreement’, that is, an arrangement where the militaries of two countries work together. It would be easy
for most states to simply claim that controversial weapons sales fall under the rubric of these sorts of
agreements and bypass the treaty altogether. 5. There is simply no international enforcement or assessment. Determining
whether there is an ‘overriding risk’ that arms will be used to violate human rights remains the responsibility of the exporting state. Is it realistic
to expect that exporting states, which want to transfer weapons in their own economic interests, will apply this rigorously? More to the point,
are states likely to really apply these provisions when there is no international review and there are no legal sanctions for violating the treaty. In
a legal sense, the treaty is a set of polite suggestions rather than iron-clad requirements. A lot of people who supported the Arms Trade Treaty
in civil society may baulk at such a blunt description of the Treaty; almost as if we’re saying that the treaty was a waste of effort and a failure on
their part. This is not true. The act of getting this issue on the agenda was brave in and of itself, and bringing the public’s attention to the issue
for the first time in decades was immensely necessary and powerfully done. Securing the attention of i million people who signed petitions in
support of regulating the trade has to be lauded and shows what can be achieved with effective campaigning. The weakness of the Arms Trade
Treaty is not a reflection on them; it is a further commentary on how states around the world, in particular those that are the biggest arms
producers, so effectively manipulate the international regulatory environment in the interests of arms manufacturers rather than global
citizens. Perhaps it is the beginning of a bigger debate, and the treaty can be radically revised over time. But as it stands, it will do little to limit
the worst parts of the arms trade.

Circumvention through non-commercial transfers is likely

Helena Whall et al 3-12-13 -- Helena Whall - currently working as a freelance research consultant. She
worked in Oxfam's Campaigns and Policy division from 2010 - 2013 as project coordinator of the website
armstreaty.org and then advocacy officer on the Arms Trade Treaty team. Deepayan BasuRay - Director
of Arms Control for the Centre for Armed Violence Reduction, where he helps governments to adopt
and implement arms control instruments around the world, providing capacity building, analysis of
current legislation and the support of civil society to reduce and prevent armed violence.. Previously, he
was ATT Monitor Coordinator for the Control Arms Secretariat, managing all aspects of the project,
including editing and preparing research, managing outreach and communications, and building and
maintaining research and advisory networks. Elizabeth Kirkham - Saferworld's Small Arms and Transfer
Controls Adviser, having joined the organisation in 1993. (“Getting It Right The pieces that matter for
the Arms Trade Treaty” https://controlarms.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/bp169-getting-it-right-
arms-trade-treaty-120313-en1.pdf) mba-alb

gifts, loans, and leases of arms The scope of the draft treaty is such that it could be viewed as excluding
4. Circumventing the ATT:

non-commercial transfers, within which category could fall loans, gifts, and military aid. This means that
States could donate or lend weapons to other countries irrespective of whether the recipient would
be likely to use them for serious violations of human rights, international humanitarian law, or in
supporting terrorist acts. While data relating to gifting, lending, and donating weapons by governments is not widely available, it is clear that these kinds of
transfers are a fact of life in the international arms trade. As the case study below illustrates, governments across the
world are routinely engaging in these types of transfers, with potentially serious implications for the
effectiveness of a future ATT.

It completely takes out the aff – transfers will continue

Sangeet Jain 2018 -- incoming research student at the University of Cambridge and earned her masters
in International Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. She has worked at the Indian Institute
of Advanced Studies and the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi previously. Her current research
focuses on India's booming development partnerships, with an emphasis on the Asian region. (“Why
India’s Position on the Arms Trade Treaty Endures” https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/why-indias-
position-arms-trade-treaty-endures) mba-alb

The treaty also contains some gaping loopholes which leaves options open for arms transfers such as
“gifts, loans, leases and aid “. Under any of these labels, exporting states could arm political allies
which would otherwise be barred under the treaty. This loophole , in this author’s opinion, nullifies the whole
rationale for the treaty itself . The treaty is also clearly not in tune with the times as it fails to cover
technology transfer – an increasingly crucial component of arms deals today. According to Max Mutschler of the Bonn
International Center for Conversion (Dorrie Peter, 2015), arms deals come with intellectual property which allows recipients to produce arms locally as well. Mutschler also argues that the
reporting requirements have fundamental lacunae such as the exclusion of ammunition and weapons parts and components.

BPC is the go to for DOD arms transfers – continues to expand in scope and appeal
McInnis and Lucas 15 McInnis, Kathleen J, and Nathan J Lucas. “What Is ‘Building Partner Capacity?’
Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, 18 Dec. 2015,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44313.pdf Kathleen J. McInnis is International Security Analyst for the
Congressional Research Service and Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Brent Scowcroft Center on
International Security, USA. Nathan J Lucas is a section research manager for the Congressional Research
Service, A former Country Director for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, a former Division Manager
for the Defense Intelligence Agency, and a former Action Officer for Joint Staff on NATO Policy // ank
What Is “Building Partner Capacity”? The breadth and scope of the different activities and programs that fall under DOD’s catchall term
“Building Partner Capacity” (BPC) has made analyzing these programs—and their overall efficacy—difficult. This difficulty arises in part because
the term “building partner capacity,” based on recent DOD usage, has been used to capture DOD’s wide
variety of engagements with an extensive range of non-DOD actors. As a recent report from the Center for a New
American Security (CNAS) notes, “the term building partner capacity (BPC) has become a catchall for a wide array
of programs, only some of which actually pertain to enhancing the capabilities and capacity of a
partner’s military and civilian institutions.”4 Indeed, as a RAND study noted, BPC is more a “term of art” than a
specific program or capability. Moreover, like many other terms of art, BPC means different things to different people.5 Regardless
of how the term BPC is used, it is primarily associated with a fundamental assumption: that enhancing the
security capabilities of partners in less capable, weak, and/or failing states will ultimately advance U.S.
national security interests. DOD Activities That Build Partner Capacity Illustratively, in no particular order, BPC includes the
following activities: Establishing senior-level personal relationships between the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff or Combatant Commanders and the Chiefs of Defense of other states. Holding bilateral
military exercises like the annual African Lion exercise conducted by the United States Marine Corps and
the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces. Conducting multilateral exercises such as NATO’s annual Combined
Endeavor communications interoperability exercises involving NATO Allies and Partnership for Peace
countries. Engaging in multilateral military planning and discussion of capabilities development, for
example as practiced by NATO allies and “Partnership for Peace” countries. Including foreign military
officers as students at U.S. military schools, as well as the participation of U.S. military officers as
students at foreign military schools such as the National Defense University of Pakistan. Training and
equipping of foreign military and security forces. Fostering specific capabilities in a country or given
region of the world, such as the maritime capability-focused Africa Partnership station. Preparing
foreign security forces to participate in multilateral military operations, such as training Burundian
battalions to support their deployment to Somalia as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia.
Embedding advisors into foreign military and security ministries, such as in Bosnia, Kosovo, and
Afghanistan (plans exist to send advisors to Yemen, Indonesia, Botswana, and Ukraine). BPC in National
Strategy6 The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks (9/11 attacks) and the subsequent global war on terror provided the impetus for expanding
DOD’s security cooperation and assistance tools under the rubric of BPC. 7 The term “Building Partner Capacity” first came into use in the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which argued, Long-duration, complex operations involving the U.S. military, other government agencies
and international partners will be waged simultaneously in multiple countries around the world... Maintaining a long-term, low-visibility
presence in many areas of the world where U.S. forces do not traditionally operate will be required. Building and leveraging partner capacity
will also be an absolutely essential part of this approach, and the employment of surrogates will be a necessary method for achieving many
goals.8 According to the 2006 QDR, BPC was, in essence, a maximalist interpretation and employment of a concept normally executed by
Over time, BPC became a
Special Operations Forces when working with partner forces on the ground—“by, with and through.”9
preferred, if not primary, means by which the United States could secure its interests—as well as a
national security objective in its own right. As the argument goes, much like Afghanistan before 9/11, the collapse of fragile
states into conflict zones could ultimately create areas in which terrorist groups could plan and execute attacks against the United States and its
allies. As then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued, Building the governance and security capacity of other countries was a critical
element of our strategy in the Cold War. But it is even more urgent in a global security environment where, unlike the Cold War, the most likely
and lethal threats – an American city poisoned or reduced to rubble – will likely emanate from fractured or failing states, rather than aggressor
states.10 Gates went on to note that, “in these situations, the effectiveness and credibility of the United States will only be as good as the
effectiveness, credibility, and sustainability of our local partners… [BPC] is in many ways the ideological and security challenge of our time.”
Over time, BPC became primarily associated with DOD’s activities to enhance the capabilities of, and
cooperation with, international partners characterized by weakness, instability, or fragility. In the QDR reports
between 2006 and the current 2014 version, DOD seemed to emphasize BPC as a concept distinct from traditional security assistance and
security cooperation, with the latter more geared toward building linkages with U.S. allies. Together, the QDR reports could be interpreted to
make the following distinctions regarding BPC: BPC should help the United States maintain a long-term, low-
visibility presence in parts of the world where U.S. forces do not traditionally operate (2006 QDR); BPC
should focus on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations (2006 QDR); BPC should deal with
threats that emanate from state weakness rather than state strength (2010 QDR); BPC authorities
apply in situations without a neat divide between defense, diplomacy, and development (2010 QDR);
Security Force Assistance (SFA) operations are an increasingly critical element of BPC (2010 QDR); and
BPC includes improving partners’ peacekeeping and counterterrorism capabilities and applies especially
in fragile states (2014 QDR). The 2010 QDR draws out the idea that the U.S. government widened its aperture when discussing when,
whether, and how to build partner capacity. Rather than using “traditional” security cooperation programs exclusively to help its allies, the
United States would help weaker states, thereby preventing conflicts stemming from non-state actors from becoming serious or even beginning
in the first place. This approach could be seen as using BPC as a state-building tool for partner countries. In the context of U.S. operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan, though, perhaps the key phrase is using BPC to “reduce risk to U.S. forces and extend security to areas we cannot reach
alone.” Using this approach, this broadly conceptualized notion of BPC may be seen as a means of
achieving U.S. strategic objectives at a lower cost without necessarily using U.S. military forces to
achieve the same ends. Perhaps in response to events in Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere, recent DOD strategy
documents appear to be re-expanding BPC’s aperture. The 2015 National Military Strategy appears to
link building partner capacity efforts both to counterterrorism (generally conducted in fragile states) and
alliance/coalition building (a task normally applied to more durable states and U.S. allies): As we look to the future, the U.S. military
and its allies and partners will continue to protect and promote shared interests. We will preserve our alliances, expand
partnerships, maintain a global stabilizing presence, and conduct training, exercises, security
cooperation activities, and military to military engagement. Such activities increase the capabilities and
capacity of partners, thereby enhancing our collective ability to deter aggression and defeat
extremists.11 Altogether, BPC appears to have moved from a post-9/11 counterterrorism strategy applied
to fragile states to a key means through which the United States seeks to accomplish “traditional” and
“non-traditional” national security objectives. Recently, some scholars have argued that this emphasis
on BPC constitutes a grand strategy in its own right—one of “sponsorship”—that counsels strategic
patience and working with partners to achieve mutual objectives. As their logic goes, “proponents of
sponsorship strategies recognized that they are likely to achieve acceptable results at a lower cost and
with greater long-term legitimacy to the policy being implemented.”12

Growing reliance on BPC provides the DOD with an alternative means to provide the
target country arms, equipment and training
McInnis and Lucas 15 McInnis, Kathleen J, and Nathan J Lucas. “What Is ‘Building Partner Capacity?’
Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, 18 Dec. 2015,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44313.pdf Kathleen J. McInnis is International Security Analyst for the
Congressional Research Service and Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Brent Scowcroft Center on
International Security, USA. Nathan J Lucas is a section research manager for the Congressional Research
Service, A former Country Director for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, a former Division Manager
for the Defense Intelligence Agency, and a former Action Officer for Joint Staff on NATO Policy // ank
A number of reasons underlie a growing Congressional interest in the complex national security policy area that has come to be labeled
“Building Partnership Capacity,” or “BPC.” First, since 2006
BPC has increased in prominence within U.S. strategy,
arguably becoming a central pillar of U.S. national security and foreign policy in recent years. Following the terrorist attacks
on September 11, 2001, successive U.S. and Department of Defense leaders concluded that the traditional set of security assistance and
security cooperation tools did not meet the needs of the changed strategic landscape. The term “Building Partnership Capacity” was coined in
the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. Since then, BPC
has become a catchall phrase for a wide array of programs, 1
all underpinned by the assumption that strengthening foreign security institutions in weak and fragile
states will have tangible positive benefits for U.S. national security. Activities in which DOD engages toward those
ends include (but are not limited to): training, mentoring, advising, equipping, exercising, educating and planning with
foreign security forces, primarily in fragile and weak states. BPC is also used to describe a core element of recent U.S. military
campaigns—namely, training and equipping foreign security forces—in Iraq (2003-2011), Afghanistan (2001-present) and Iraq/Syria (2014-
present).

Pseudo-FMS circumvents – its quicker and the DOD already prioritizes it

GAO, 17 United States Government Accountability Office. The Government Accountability Office is a
legislative branch government agency that provides auditing, evaluation, and investigative services for
the United States Congress. It is the supreme audit institution of the federal government of the United
States. “FOREIGN MILITARY SALES: DOD Needs to Improve Its Use of Performance Information to
Manage the Program.” GAO, United States Government Accountability Office, Aug. 2017,
www.gao.gov/assets/690/686720.pdf. // ank
The United States provides military equipment and training to partner countries through a variety of programs. Foreign partners may pay the
U.S. government to administer the acquisition of materiel and services on their behalf through the FMS program. The United States also
provides grants to some foreign partners through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program to fund the partner’s purchase of materiel and
services through the process used for FMS. In recent years, Congress
has expanded the number of security cooperation
programs to include several new programs with funds appropriated to the Department of Defense
(DOD), as well as administered and implemented by DOD, that focus on building partner capacity. In this
report, we refer to these programs as “pseudo-FMS” cases. FMS and pseudo-FMS transactions follow the same process,
but the roles, responsibilities, and actors involved can differ. One important difference highlighted by DOD and Department of State (State)
officials is that with FMS, there is a much greater level of involvement on the part of the partner country in defining requirements and
developing the Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). As a result,
the amount of time it takes to develop FMS cases on
average will tend to exceed the time it takes for pseudo-FMS cases. According to DOD and State officials, there may
also be differences in the types of equipment that tend to be provided via FMS as opposed to pseudo-FMS cases. For example, pseudo-FMS is
not typically used to provide complex weapons systems with long production cycles such as advanced fighter aircraft. According to DOD
and State officials, pseudo-FMS cases are often prioritized because the funds used for these programs generally are only
available for obligation for 1 or 2 years, depending on the program. These officials note that funds for traditional FMF programs do not have
such time constraints. As a result, pseudo-FMS cases are, on average, processed faster than FMS cases. Army and Air
Force officials noted that pseudo-FMS cases tend to be more labor intensive than FMS cases for several reasons. For example, according to Air
Force officials, pseudoFMS cases often involve items that frequently require a new contract because the item is not part of the Air Force
inventory. For that reason, Air Force officials noted that they cannot modify an existing contract to add additional items. Army officials said that
pseudo-FMS cases require more work because of the nature of expiring funds. This requires an acceleration of almost all their processes.

It's a core priority – they’ll move whatever weapons they can to the CCL
William D. Hartung 8-21-13 -- director of the Common Defense Campaign: Arms & Security Project at
the Center for International Policy. (“Risks of Loosening Arms Export Controls Far Outweigh Benefits”
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/risks-loosening-arms-export-controls-far-outweigh-
benefits)mba-alb

the administration
An Obama administration plan to loosen U.S. arms export controls could make it easier for weapons to find their way into the wrong hands—a risk that far outweighs the measure’s paltry economic benefits. In August 2009,

launched ECRI designed to streamline U.S. arms export controls,

the Export Control Reform Initiative ( ), The enhance national security, and grow the economy.

administration said it wanted to eliminate or reduce controls on items of limited national security
concern while increasing controls on more dangerous exports. The policy is being implemented in stages and the first round of changes will take effect in October. But the

The loosening of arms export

administration’s proposed reforms are unlikely to accomplish either goal, according to a report issued by the Center for International Policy, with support from the Open Society Foundations.

controls is being justified on the grounds that selling U.S.-made weapons and parts to America’s
potential military adversaries does not pose a significant security threat as long as the exports are nearly
obsolete or readily available. This narrow focus on controlling the flow of modern equipment ignores the danger of giving countries of concern access to less sophisticated weapons and components. Iran, for example, wants spare parts
to keep its aged American-made fighter jets and attack helicopters flying. China wants older technology that it can copy and manufacture. Other regimes want the means of daily repression, like low-tech guns and communications and surveillance equipment. Under the envisioned Obama

A central element of the administration’s new policy has been to move

reforms, none of these items would be kept behind the fence of U.S. export controls.

thousands of items from the United States Munitions List (USML)—a compendium of arms and arms-
related technologies monitored by the State Department—to the Commerce Control List (CCL), which
subjects equipment destined for export to less rigorous scrutiny. In fact, the White House has asserted
that it eventually intends to permit a significant percentage of the items that are now being transferred
off of the USML to be exported without a license. This means that oversight would be lifted from these
items. To promote the reform package, the administration is touting its economic benefits. A former
assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, Andrew Shapiro, has argued that the
administration’s export control reform would “have a real impact on our economy at a time when
competition is even more fierce and at a time when our manufacturing base could really use a boost.”
But neither the administration nor the arms and aerospace industries, the major supporters of the export reform effort, have provided credible evidence that loosening controls will have substantial economic benefits. In fact, there is strong evidence to suggest that export reform is
unlikely to significantly increase U.S. sales of military technology. The United States already accounts for nearly 80 percent of the global arms market. Even a radical reform of arms export controls is unlikely to push that figure much higher. As one business analyst has noted, the economic
benefits of arms export reform, if they exist at all, are likely to be “infinitesimal.” It is even possible that loosening restrictions on arms exports could reduce U.S. employment. Thomas Buffenbarger, president of the International Association of Machinists, the union which represents the
bulk of the workers in the arms and aerospace industries, has warned that “the less stringent controls provided under the CCL could lead to further transfers of technology or production from the U.S. to another country,” with potentially devastating consequences for U.S.-based
production and employment. A number of steps should be taken to ensure that the administration’s export control reform initiative does not undermine critical policy goals. First, there should be a moratorium on moving additional items from the USML to the CCL until strict safeguards
have been developed to prevent the transfer or retransfer of U.S. arms and arms technology to terrorists, human rights abusers, or countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons. Second, Congress and the administration should review the Export Control Reform Initiative’s impact on
stopping arms transfers to dictatorships and human rights abusers. They should strengthen those restrictions to ensure that items moved from the USML to the CCL receive the same level of human rights screening they currently undergo. These changes should be embedded in law, not
just left to the discretion of a given administration. Finally, the Department of Commerce should undertake a detailed analysis of the employment impacts that may result from transferring items from the USML to the CCL or from decontrolling them altogether. These economic effects
should then be used to help determine whether to ease controls on a given item.
2NC / 1NR
topicality: subs = defense relations
 overview
1. extend our DOD 15 evidence – a substantial reduction of arms sales makes defense
cooperation with nations non-viable. this is a double bind: either they don’t end
defense relations and therefore aren’t topical. or they do end defense relations and
link to the military relations disad
2. our interp allows the best debate by granting negative double bind ground to
discuss the relational implications of arms embargoes
3. their interp allows affs to be miniscule and therefore decreases the discussion
surrounding the diplomatic impacts of the aff
4. reasons to prefer includes topic education, clash, and competitive equity
 AT we meet
*** make a smart explanation of why they don’t meet based on the aff ***
 AT counterinterp
1. they don’t meet their counterinterp – explain why
2. our interp sets a better limit – their interp of substantial is arbitrary whereas ours
makes a clear brightline based on the perception and clear affects of the plan
3. limits are the best for debate – they provide fairness for both sides, better education,
and prevents the coinflip from deciding the round
4. permutation – topical affs can include both interpretations but they have to meet
both
 AT reasonability
1. arbitrary – there’s no actual brightline of what is considered topical
2. race to the bottom – then aff’s get more and more untopical to see how far
reasonability reaches
3. jurisdiction – the judge still doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote aff. they can
only vote on fully topical affs
topicality: reduce ≠ one country
 overview
1. extend our Pearson 88 evidence – arms reductions are qualitative and quantitative
restrictions – not embargoes to single countries
2. our interp allows the best debate by increasing policy based education around legal
implementation rather than specific country reductions
3. their interp allows affs to be miniscule and therefore decreases the discussion
surrounding the policy changes of the aff
4. reasons to prefer includes topic education, clash, and competitive equity
 AT we meet
*** make a smart explanation of why they don’t meet based on the aff ***
 AT counterinterp
1. they don’t meet their counterinterp – explain why
2. our interp sets a better limit – their interp of substantial is arbitrary whereas ours
makes a clear brightline based on the perception and clear affects of the plan
3. limits are the best for debate – they provide fairness for both sides, better education,
and prevents the coinflip from deciding the round
4. permutation – topical affs can include both interpretations but they have to meet
both
 AT reasonability
1. arbitrary – there’s no actual brightline of what is considered topical
2. race to the bottom – then aff’s get more and more untopical to see how far
reasonability reaches
3. jurisdiction – the judge still doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote aff. they can
only vote on fully topical affs
russia DA
 overview
An increase in Russian global influence goes nuclear. Putin and Trump are both
risky foreign policy makers with aggressive instincts which creates a high risk of
miscalculation. This turns case because – nuclear conflicts makes all structural
violence inevitable AND the US and Russia are two world super powers which
means conflict spills over into every region. Also if Russia is selling arms to
________ that alone turns case because HR is still violated
 AT non-UQ
1. extend Bershidsky 19 – Russian arms sales are currently capped – this is the
independent factor limiting Russian expansionism because lack of markets
limits economic stability as well as new avenues for continued expansion.
2. even if you buy that russia is already selling arms, the plan still ensures the
growth of Russian influence in ***insert country*** which is a unique avenue
for expansion.
3. Russian arms sales and their defense industry are low now
Stratfor 4-29-2019 - American geopolitical intelligence platform and publisher founded in 1996 in
Austin, Texas, by George Friedman, who was the company's chairman. Chip Harmon was appointed
president in February 2018. Fred Burton is Stratfor's chief security officer (“Russia's Defense Industry
Finds Itself in a Tailspin,” Strafor Worldview, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russias-defense-
industry-finds-itself-tailspin)//BB

Russia's defense industry is face to face with a major foe, but it's not a foreign military power. The Kremlin has been
striving to modernize all branches of the Russian military, but the country's defense industry is struggling
thanks to decreasing volumes of orders, difficulties in attracting high-skilled talent and limits to its technological
capabilities. According to recent figures, the performance of Russia's aerospace sector is declining precipitously. In
2018, for instance, Russian aircraft and spacecraft makers produced 13.5 percent less than in 2017. And there's been no letup in 2019 either: In the first two

months of the year, aerospace output plummeted 48 percent year on year. The decline in Russia's defense output

raises concerns about the competitive strength of Russia's defense industry in general, whose health is
critical if the country is to project itself as a military power in the longer term. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov
attributed the reduction in output to a slowdown of orders for military systems, but projections suggest the slowdown is not just a short-term

fluctuation; in fact, it's expected to become even worse in the future. The downturn in oil prices has taken a bite
out of Russia's bottom line, squeezing spending for the military — all at a time when the country's arms manufacturers have lost
their competitive edge in the global arms market. Together, these factors ensure that Russia's defense industry will struggle to get out

of its funk. Suffering From a Dearth of Funds This dire picture stands in stark contrast to Russia's frequent presentation of sensational new platforms. In reality,
however, just a few of the big-ticket weapon systems — such as the T-14 main battle tank or the Su-57 fighter aircraft — find buyers, as the rest remain mere
prototypes. Russia has prioritized some hardware, such as the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, due to their strategic relevance to the country's overall
military posture, but Moscow has failed to fully develop other programs or only introduced them on a limited scale. Under pressure from a limited
government budget, the Kremlin even started reducing its military spending in 2017 — a strong indicator that, despite the
modernization push, Russia's financial challenges are taking a toll on the country ambitions. Economically, the plunge in oil prices at the end of 2014 hurt Russia's
bottom line, depriving the country of essential revenue and forcing it to dip into its reserves to bridge the gap. Today, more than four years on, Russian oil revenues
are rising, yet the country is continuing to deal with the consequences of the lean years. Beyond that, low revenues from taxes, which have forced Russia to raise
taxes and the retirement age, and Western sanctions over Moscow's activities in Ukraine and elsewhere, have shrunk the financial pool available to military
planners. Low oil prices, declining revenues from taxes and Western sanctions have taken a chunk out of the financial pool available to Russia's military and the
broader defense industry. But the Kremlin's problems don't end there. In the past, Russia has benefited from its position as a
major global arms exporter to fuel further military development. During the 1990s, for example, such
sales were critical to the country as it faced severe economic hardship. While Russia remains the world's
second-largest arms exporter (only the United States sells more), the actual value of those exports has
been decreasing significantly. Between 2014 and 2018, their total value dropped by as much as 17 percent. Again, budgetary limits are somewhat
to blame: In the past, Russia frequently used arms exports as a political tool, offering weapons at a heavy discount, if not

entirely free. But with Russia no longer able to offer customers a good deal on its fighter jets and other defense products, the country is losing

business.
 AT no link
1. extend Bodner 17 – russia will expand any time it gets the chance, especially
when trying to check against the US
2. risk outweighs – any risk of fill in means you err neg, especially considering
3. Russia will pounce on US arms cuts wherever possible
Freilich 18 –Senior Fellow, International Security Program @ Harvard (Chuck, “How Russia Is Taking
Over the Middle East, One Country at a Time,” Belfer Center,
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/how-russia-taking-over-middle-east-one-country-time)//BB

President Putin's fundamental strategic objective is to restore Russian global leadership, or to put it
somewhat less delicately, to stick it to the United States wherever possible. His primary problem is that
Russia does not have that much to offer today, it cannot compete with the United States and Western
countries on an economic level, or alternatively on a diplomatic one, and all it does have to offer is
weapons, nuclear technology, and energy.

4. It’s empirically true --- Egypt proves fill-in

Caverley 17 – Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College and Research
Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Jonathan, “Slowing the Proliferation of Major
Conventional Weapons: The Virtues of an Uncompetitive Market,” Ethics & International Affairs,
31.4)//BB

The effect of U.S. market power is not absolute and is likely only to delay the spread of weapons. As the
Egyptian case demonstrates, when the United States restricts weapons to punish what it considers bad
behavior, other countries can fill the gap. The recent removal of many technologies from the United
States Munitions List—a roster of products subject to controls under the Arms Export Control Act of
1976—was driven in part by the American arms industry convincing the government that it is losing
competitive advantage abroad. Consequently, many weapons transfers may no longer be subject to
rigorous human rights vetting and end-use monitoring by the State Department. Eroding American
market dominance of higher-end weapons makes it less likely that the United States will continue to
exercise its traditional policy of “unilateral restraint” in their sale.
 AT link turn
1. extend the link uniqueness – Russian arms sales are already low – that’s
Bershidsky 17
2. extend mpx uniqueness
3. link o/w link turn (timeframe, magnitude, probability)
4. they don’t win our nuclear war impact so even if the link turn means ______, the
link means nuclear war kills us first
5. Russia will pounce on US arms cuts wherever possible
Freilich 18 –Senior Fellow, International Security Program @ Harvard (Chuck, “How Russia Is Taking
Over the Middle East, One Country at a Time,” Belfer Center,
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/how-russia-taking-over-middle-east-one-country-time)//BB

President Putin's fundamental strategic objective is to restore Russian global leadership, or to put it
somewhat less delicately, to stick it to the United States wherever possible. His primary problem is that
Russia does not have that much to offer today, it cannot compete with the United States and Western
countries on an economic level, or alternatively on a diplomatic one, and all it does have to offer is
weapons, nuclear technology, and energy.

6. It’s empirically true --- Egypt proves fill-in

Caverley 17 – Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College and Research
Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Jonathan, “Slowing the Proliferation of Major
Conventional Weapons: The Virtues of an Uncompetitive Market,” Ethics & International Affairs,
31.4)//BB

The effect of U.S. market power is not absolute and is likely only to delay the spread of weapons. As the
Egyptian case demonstrates, when the United States restricts weapons to punish what it considers bad
behavior, other countries can fill the gap. The recent removal of many technologies from the United
States Munitions List—a roster of products subject to controls under the Arms Export Control Act of
1976—was driven in part by the American arms industry convincing the government that it is losing
competitive advantage abroad. Consequently, many weapons transfers may no longer be subject to
rigorous human rights vetting and end-use monitoring by the State Department. Eroding American
market dominance of higher-end weapons makes it less likely that the United States will continue to
exercise its traditional policy of “unilateral restraint” in their sale.
 AT no impact (expansion)
1. extend that an expansion in Russian influence causes nuclear conflict and
collapse in global order – gray 17 – an expanded russia not only spreads
dangerous policy making but is seen as a threat making miscalc likely
2. their no impact evidence doesn’t account for trump – at best it says that
expansion may not be likely or may not be detrimental, but this doesn’t account
for trump’s risky foreign policy actions and an era of high technology and cyber
warfare
3. Russia will pursue revisionist expansionism as long as it has the economic
capacity to do so --- leads to war
Payne and Foster 17 – *Keith, PhD in IR @ USC, Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies @ Mo
State, **John, PhD, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense; Director of
the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (“Russian strategy Expansion, crisis and conflict,”
Comparative Strategy, 36.1)

Russia’s domestic political system under Putin is oriented to expansionist policies and is predicated on
recasting Russia as a de facto empire. The inherent revisionism of Russian policy and its fundamental
anti-liberalism makes anti-Americanism the default option of Russian policy. Cooperation, where possible is tactical and
instrumental, not a result of a strategic rapprochement. This applies to arms control accords where Moscow feels free to break inconvenient agreements.
Russia’s overall security policies begin with the presupposition of conflict with most of its interlocutors
and thus entails a consistent bias toward the militarization of its domestic and foreign policies. Domestic
dissent is equated to treason by fifth columnists linked to external enemies and virtually all elements of domestic policy are viewed through this prism.71 Given

these continuing and strongly rooted factors, Russia’s conventional and nuclear buildup will continue as
long as Russia can afford it and Putin retains power, even if he must ratchet back the level or scope of this buildup as a result of economic pressures.
The dangerous threat environment for the West described above will not change unless there are dramatic changes
in Russia’s expansionist goals and Russia’s willingness to use any and all forms of pressure to advance them, i.e., Russia’s grand strategy. Absent such a change in
Russia’s strategic goals, U.S. and NATO conciliatory behavior/actions are likely to present an image of disunity and indecision, and thereby potentially provoke
further Russian belligerence. The
usual Western hope that arms control will address threats and relieve it of the
need to respond more forcefully appears particularly fanciful now. Putin is little interested in new arms control and is
manifestly willing to violate existing agreements. As will be discussed in Chapters Two and Five, Russia has systematically violated the Helsinki Final Act, all the
treaties with Ukraine and other CIS governments on the inviolability of borders, and the 1994 Budapest Accord with Washington, London and Kiev on Ukraine’s
denuclearization; it also has broken the INF treaty, the CFE treaty (Conventional Forces in Europe) and its political promises in the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives.
Unfortunately, abundant evidence points to the continuing mobilization of Russia for a long-term state of siege with the West, if not actual war, as Moscow
continues to insist that it is secure only if all its interlocutors are not. A mobilization policy initiated by 2009 has greatly accelerated since 2013. If Russia cannot
escape from the Putin regime’s anti-Western hostility and insistence upon hegemony, the ensuing state of siege will be a source of crises and conflict for years.
Perhaps most dangerous is the fact that Putin is not a magician who can control the nationalism and militarism he has inflamed. As the then-Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin Dempsey said in July 2014, “If I have a fear about this it’s that Putin
may actually light a fire that he loses
control of.”72 Indeed, crises and conflict are the logical consequences of Putin’s expansionist grand
strategy.
4. The internal link alone turns the case --- US will sell new arms in response to
Russian fill-in
Caverley 17 – Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College and Research
Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Jonathan, “Slowing the Proliferation of Major
Conventional Weapons: The Virtues of an Uncompetitive Market,” Ethics & International Affairs,
31.4)//BB

And the entry of desperate second-tier suppliers shapes U.S. behavior in turn. The presence of alternate
sources, also known as the “gray threat,” has an effect even on the United States, as shown by the recent U.S.
decision to resume military aid and most sales to Egypt. Thailand presents a similar example. The United
States, the Thai military’s traditional supplier, largely ceased both arms sales and military assistance after that country’s
2014 coup. Thailand accordingly procured weapons from relatively new suppliers, such as China, Russia, and Ukraine, and has strengthened

ties with suppliers from Israel, Sweden, and other countries in Europe. The United States is now resuming much of its sales to that

country.
 AT no impact (us-russia war)
1. extend that an expansion in Russian influence causes nuclear conflict and
collapse in global order – gray 17 – an expanded russia not only spreads
dangerous policy making but is seen as a threat making miscalc likely
2. their no impact evidence doesn’t account for trump – at best it says that war
isn’t in russia’s best interest but this doesn’t account for the risky actions by
both putin and trump – even if war isn’t in their best interest, they are both
prone to lash outs which makes it probable
3. Both Putin and Trump are “risk-affectionate.” neither have the de-escalation
skills to prevent conflict
Wood 17 - senior military correspondent for The Huffington Post. His second book, What Have We
Done: the Moral Injury of Our Longest Wars, based on his Pulitzer Prize-winning reporting on veterans of
Iraq and Afghanistan, was published by Little, Brown in November 2016. (David, “THIS IS HOW THE NEXT
WORLD WAR STARTS,” https://highline.huffingtonpost.com/articles/en/trump-russia-putin-military-
crisis/)//BB

Putin’s favored tactic, intelligence officials say, is known as “escalation dominance.” The idea is to push the other side until you
win, a senior officer based in Europe explained—to “escalate to the point where the adversary stops, won’t go farther. It’s a very

destabilizing strategy.” Stavridis cast it in the terms of an old Russian proverb: “Probe with a bayonet; when you hit steel withdraw, when you hit mush,
proceed.” Right now, he added, “the Russians keep pushing out and hitting mush.” This mindset is basically the opposite of how both American and Soviet leaders
approached each other during the Cold War, even during periods of exceptional stress such as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Having endured the devastation of
World War II, they understood the horror that lurked on the far side of a crisis. “When things started to get too close, they would back off,” said Miller, the retired
Pentagon official. The term of art for this constant recalibration of risk is “crisis management”—the “most demanding form of diplomacy,” writes Sir Lawrence
Freedman, an emeritus professor of war studies at King’s College London. Leaders had to make delicate judgments about when to push their opponent and when to
create face-saving off-ramps. Perhaps most critically, they had to possess the confidence to de-escalate when necessary. Skilled crisis management, Freedman
writes, requires “an ability to match deeds with words, to convey threats without appearing reckless, and to offer concessions without appearing soft, often while
under intense media scrutiny and facing severe time pressures.” A recent textbook example came in January 2016, when Iran seized those 10 U.S. Navy sailors,
claiming that they had been spying in Iranian waters in the eastern Persian Gulf. President Barack Obama’s secretary of state, John Kerry, immediately opened
communications with his counterpart in Tehran, using channels established for negotiating the nuclear deal with Iran. By the next morning, the sailors had been
released. The U.S. acknowledged the sailors had strayed into Iranian waters but did not apologize, asserting that the transgression had been an innocent error. Iran,
meanwhile, acknowledged that the sailors had not been spying. (The peaceful resolution was not applauded by Breitbart News, headed at the time by Stephen
Bannon, who is now Trump’s chief White House strategist. Obama, a Breitbart writer sneered, has been “castrated on the world stage by Iran.”) Neither

Putin nor Trump, it’s safe to say, are crisis managers by nature. Both are notoriously thin-skinned,
operate on instinct, and have a tendency to shun expert advice. (These days, Putin is said to surround
himself not with seasoned diplomats but cronies from his old spy days.) Both are unafraid of brazenly
lying, fueling an atmosphere of extreme distrust on both sides. Stavridis, who has studied both Putin and
Trump and who met with Trump in December, concluded that the two leaders “are not risk-averse. They are risk-
affectionate.” Aron, the Russia expert, said, “I think there is a much more cavalier attitude by Putin toward war in general
and the threat of nuclear weapons. He continued, “He is not a madman, but he is much more inclined to use the threat
of nuclear weapons in conventional [military] and political confrontation with the West.” Perhaps the most significant
difference between the two is that Putin is far more calculating than Trump. In direct negotiations, he is said to rely on videotaped analysis of the facial expressions
of foreign leaders that signal when the person is bluffing, confused or lying. At
times, Trump has been surprisingly quick to lash out
at a perceived slight from Putin, although these moments have been overshadowed by his effusive praise for the Russian leader. On December 22,
Putin promised to strengthen Russia’s strategic nuclear forces in his traditional year-end speech to his officer corps. Hours later, Trump vowed, via Twitter, to
“greatly strengthen and expand” the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. On Morning Joe the following day, host Mika Brzezinski said that Trump had told her on a phone
call, “Let it be an arms race. We will outmatch them at every pass and outlast them all.” And in late March, the Wall Street Journal reported that Trump was
becoming increasingly frustrated with Russia, throwing up his hands in exasperation when informed that Russia may have violated an arms treaty. Some in

national security circles see Trump’s impulsiveness as a cause for concern but not for panic. “He can always overreact,” said Anthony Cordesman, senior strategic

analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a veteran of many national security posts throughout the U.S. government. “[But] there
are a
lot of people [around the president] to prevent an overreaction with serious consequences.” Let’s say that Trump acted upon
his impulse to tell a fighter pilot to shoot a jet that barrel-rolled an American plane. Such a response would still have to be carried out by the Pentagon, Cordesman
said—a process with lots of room for senior officers to say, “Look, boss, this is a great idea but can we talk about the repercussions?” And yet
that process
is no longer as robust as it once was. Many senior policymaking positions at the Pentagon and State
Department remain unfilled. A small cabal in the White House, including Bannon, Jared Kushner and a few others, has asserted a role in foreign
policy decisions outside the normal NSC process. It’s not yet clear how much influence is wielded by Trump’s widely respected national security adviser, Lieutenant
General H.R. McMaster. When lines of authority and influence are so murky, it increases the risk that a minor
incident could boil up into an unintended clash, said retired Marine Corps General John Allen, who has served in senior military and
diplomatic posts. To complicate matters further, the relentless pace of information in the social media age has

destroyed the one precious factor that helped former leaders safely navigate perilous situations: time. It’s
hard to believe now, but during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, for instance, President Kennedy and his advisers deliberated for a full 10 weeks before announcing a
naval quarantine of the island. In 1969, a U.S. spy plane was shot down by North Korean jets over the Sea of Japan, killing all 31 Americans on board. It took 26
hours for the Pentagon and State Department to recommend courses of action to President Richard Nixon, according to a declassified secret assessment. (Nixon
eventually decided not to respond.) Today, thanks to real-time video and data streaming, the men in the Kremlin and White House can know—or think they know—
as much as the guy in the cockpit of a plane or on the bridge of a warship. The president no longer needs to rely on reports from military leaders that have been
filtered through their expertise and deeper knowledge of the situation on the ground. Instead, he can watch a crisis unfold on a screen and react in real time.
Once news of an incident hits the internet, the pressure to respond becomes even harder to withstand.
“The ability to recover from early missteps is greatly reduced,” Marine Corps General Joseph Dunford, the chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, has written. “The speed of war has changed, and the nature of these changes makes the global

security environment even more unpredictable, dangerous, and unforgiving.” And so in the end, no matter how
cool and unflappable the instincts of military men and women like Kevin Webster, what will smother the
inevitable spark is steady, thoughtful leadership from within the White House and the Kremlin. A
recognition that first reports may be wrong; a willingness to absorb new and perhaps unwelcome
information; a thick skin to ward off insults and accusations; an acknowledgment of the limited value of threats and bluffs; and a
willingness to recognize the core interests of the other side and a willingness to accept a face-saving solution. These
qualities are not notably on display in either capital.
 AT impact turn
1. extend that an expansion in Russian influence causes nuclear conflict and
collapse in global order – gray 17 – an expanded russia not only spreads
dangerous policy making but is seen as a threat making miscalc likely
2. the impacts outweigh the impact turn – they say that the only way we have
Russian war is in the case of collapse but
Putin is resilient – economic collapse improbable
Miller 12-29-2016 – PhD, associate director of the Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy at Yale
University and the author of “The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and the
Collapse of the U.S.S.R.” (Chris, “Why Putin’s Economy Survives,” Wall Street Journal, Factiva)//BB

In the late 1980s, as the Soviet economy began to freeze up, Vladimir Putin was a KGB agent in Dresden,
East Germany. Mr. Putin suffered firsthand from the Soviet empire’s demise and vowed never to let
such a catastrophe happen again. The primary lesson he drew was simple: avoid large deficits and high
inflation. Since taking power in 1999, Mr. Putin has studiously implemented a conservative
macroeconomic policy. This has let him weather crises that many observers expected would bring down
his regime. In mid-2014, oil prices began to collapse, and the West slammed financial sanctions on
Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. But Mr. Putin is still standing. Where the Soviets suffered from an
exploding budget deficit, financed by money creation, today’s Russia has pushed through an aggressive
austerity program, slashing spending on social programs and pensions to balance the budget. The Bank
of Russia has hiked interest rates to double-digit levels, driving inflation down to 6%, a respectable
figure for an emerging market. The Kremlin’s budget deficit will be a bit more than 3% of GDP this year,
even though oil—which previously provided half of government revenues—is now selling for half its
price two years ago. And Russia’s government debt remains less than 20% of GDP, according to Russian
government statistics. America’s public debt, by contrast, is more than 75% of GDP, according to the
Federal Reserve. This conservative fiscal posture helps explain why, unlike the U.S.S.R., Mr. Putin’s
Russia has proven so unexpectedly resilient. Despite Western financial sanctions, large Russian firms
continue to attract the foreign-currency funding that they need. Despite the commodity crash, Russian
oil production is at a post-Soviet high. Russia’s economy is returning to growth even as Russia’s military
wages war in Ukraine and Syria. The Kremlin has mustered the resources that it needs to deploy power
at home and abroad, even amid conditions similar to those that bankrupted the Soviets. ‘Putin has
expropriated his rivals, tolerated epic corruption and sent investors fleeing.’ Russia’s economic
accomplishments shouldn’t be overstated, of course. Mr. Putin has expropriated his rivals, tolerated
epic corruption and sent investors fleeing. The Russian state plays a far larger role in the economy today
than it did when Mr. Putin took power—not to provide useful services such as health or education but
to monopolize oil production and fund his patronage networks. Russian wages grew rapidly in the
2000s, but growth has since slowed—and even reversed. Yet on the economic issues crucial to the
survival of Mr. Putin’s regime, the record is far better. Macroeconomic stability has underwritten a
decade and a half of relative prosperity. The coming anniversary of the Soviet collapse won’t be widely
marked in Moscow. The demise of the U.S.S.R. is a period most Russians would prefer to forget—and a
catastrophe that Mr. Putin is determined not to repeat.

3. turn the turn - if he does collapse, that solves European wars

Kirchick 17 – fellow @ Brookings, author of The End of Europe: Dictators, Demagogues, and the
Coming Dark Age @ Yale Press (James, “Russia’s plot against the West,”
https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-plot-against-the-west-vladimir-putin-donald-trump-europe/)//BB

The annexation of Crimea and invasion of Eastern Ukraine is a warning shot across the bow of the West, a message, written in blood, that the old ways of doing
business are over. Less implausible is Russia’s ability to alter the political trajectory of Western politics in a way that suits its geopolitical aims. Last year in the
Netherlands, a motley collection of Russian expatriates, far-right nationalists and left-wingers banded together to defeat a referendum on an EU trade agreement
with Ukraine. Though the Dutch intelligence agency could find no hard evidence of direct Russian government support to the opposition side, it did conclude that
the Netherlands is a target in Moscow’s “global campaign to influence policy and perceptions on Russia,” and that the Kremlin has mobilized a “network of contacts
built up over the years.” Speaking of Russia’s suspected involvement in this week’s parliamentary election, a Dutch foreign policy analyst told the New York Times
that, “A little effort goes a long way” and could “destroy the European Union from inside.” While waging a nonviolent war against the West from within, Russia is
rapidly building up its military capacities and engaging in kinetic action along Europe’s. Over the course of Putin’s 17-year reign, Russian defense spending has
increased 20-fold. Arms procurement grew by 60 percent in 2015 alone. Kremlin rhetoric over the past several years has also shifted in a disturbingly
confrontational direction. Putin’s recent justification for the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union—stating, alongside a
stunned Merkel, that the infamous agreement which divided up Eastern Europe between the two totalitarian powers “ensur[ed] the security of the USSR”—
epitomizes the moral failure of Russian elites to come to terms with the Soviet past. Other Russian officials, meanwhile, engage in shockingly loose talk about using
nuclear weapons and Russian military exercises frequently end with simulated nuclear strikes on NATO capitals. The West has neither acknowledged the threat from
Russia nor adequately prepared to defend itself against potential aggression. Only four European members of NATO commit the recommended 2 percent of their
GDP to defense; so poorly equipped is the Bundeswehr that its soldiers infamously had to use broomstick handles instead of guns during a training exercise. This is
why Russia’s war in Ukraine is about far more than Ukraine. The annexation of Crimea and invasion of Eastern Ukraine is a warning shot across the bow of the West,
a message, written in blood, that the old ways of doing business are over. “Protecting” ethnic Russians was never the issue for Putin; Russian intervention was about
exerting a veto over Ukraine’s Western path. Moscow’s highly sophisticated execution of hybrid war, a forecast of conflict to come, belies the haughty complacency
of people like Obama and his hapless secretary of state, John Kerry, who scoffed that Russia is trapped in “the 19th century.” On the contrary, it is the allegedly
backwards Russians who have adapted their war-fighting capabilities to the future, and the supposedly advanced Westerners who have been caught in their dust.
To quote Lenin again, what is to be done? To avert catastrophe, it is imperative that the United States pivot back to
Europe. As a collective political entity, Europe is America’s most important ally, with whom we share values and interests. Abandoning Europe at this time
would create a political and security vacuum on the Continent, one that would inevitably be filled by Russia. In response to Brexit, the U.S. election and the rise of
populists across Europe, many in the West are beginning to question the assumptions upon which the postwar liberal world order stands. While introspection is
necessary, we do not need to rethink first principles. Protectionism remains wrong, both morally and economically. NATO remains the bedrock of our security, no
matter how many times certain individuals call it “obsolete.” The postwar international system has benefited America enormously; it’s not a rip-off. Lavrov’s call for
a “post-Western world order” is not new; Russian leaders have frequently floated proposals aimed at diluting the Western-led international system by incorporating
a non-democratic Russia into its structures. The West wants peace and Russia wants victory. These desires are incompatible. Increasingly, these calls for reassessing
the liberal world order are finding an audience on this side of the ocean, where voices posit that it has outlived its usefulness. In a combination of astonishing
historical illiteracy and sinister prophecy, the president’s senior counselor says he wants to make the world “as exciting as the 1930s” and that “strong nationalist
movements in countries make strong neighbors.” Meanwhile, a leading figure in what passes for the pro-Trump intellectual movement, who now serves as a high-
ranking national security official in the administration, asks of NATO, “What is the alliance for once its original purpose has evaporated?” The original purpose of
NATO was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” With exception of that last part about Germany, whose neighbors want it to play a
more assertive role in continental defense and security, the founding rationale for the Atlantic Alliance endures. The fundamentals remain; the arrangements we
have are working. They need strengthening, not a redesign. The West wants peace and Russia wants victory. These desires are
incompatible. Those who cherish liberal democracy and wish to see it endure must accept the fact that a Russian regime is once against trying to debilitate
and subvert the free world. While Russia today may not be as conventionally strong an adversary as it was during the Cold War, the threat it poses is more diffuse.
Russia is as much an enemy today as it was a generation ago, and we need to adopt a more hardheaded, adversarial footing and mentality to defeat it. In a
globalized world where the cancerous influences of Russian money and disinformation can more easily corrupt us than when an Iron Curtain divided Europe, and
where the ideological terrain is more confusing than the Cold War’s rigid bipolarity, containing Russia presents different challenges than it did a generation ago, not
the least of which is maintaining Western unity against a more ambiguous adversary skilled at fighting asymmetrically. Never during the Cold War, for instance, was
there such a traumatic break within the Western political alliance as Britain’s departure from the European Union—nor, for that matter, did an overtly pro-Russian
leader ever capture the presidency of the United States. If the Putin regime cannot live alongside a democratic West, a
democratic West cannot
live with the Putin regime. A genuinely democratic Russia would feel no threat from Europe, and thus
lack the impulse to debase and disrupt it. To be sure, the illiberal movements currently roiling the EU would exist regardless of Russia;
anyone remotely familiar with the Continent’s bloody history knows that Europeans don’t require outside instigation to fall for the siren songs of chauvinism,
populism and other illiberal forces. But only
absent the revisionist and belligerent regime in Moscow is a Europe
whole, free and at peace possible.
stocks DA
 overview
investment in defense stocks is key to overall market health. the plan causes a market
decline which leads to an all out recession. that triggers nuclear war and turns case
because nuclear conflict makes structural violence inevitable and because economic
downturn is the most probable scenario for extinction.
 AT non-UQ:
1. extend Root 19, as the trade war takes a toll on investment security, investors
shift to the stable region of defense stocks
2. extend Miao et al 12, the stock market is stable enough to prevent a
recession
3. their non-UQ doesn’t account for new developments in military relations such
as the attack on a Saudi oil facility and Trump’s withdrawal of support in Syria
4. the link outweighs, we don’t have to win that stocks are great right now, just
that they’re good enough to prevent a recession.
5. defense stocks soared in response to the oil attack in Saudi Arabia
Sheetz Sept 16, 2019
“Defense stocks rise as Trump says US is ‘locked and loaded’ in response to attack on Saudi oil,” PUBLISHED MON,
SEP 16 2019. Michael Sheetz reports primarily on Markets, while specializing in coverage of the space industry. He
is an alumnus of the 2016 Dow Jones News Fund. In May 2017, Michael graduated as a Founder’s Scholar from The
King’s College with a bachelor of the arts in Politics, Philosophy and Economics, double-minoring in Journalism and
Theology. He served as Editor-in-Chief of The Empire State Tribune for three semesters.
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/16/defense-stocks-rise-trump-says-us-locked-and-loaded-after-saudi-attack.html

Shares of defense companies rose Monday after President Donald Trump declared that the United
States was “locked and loaded” following weekend drone attacks on Saudi Arabian oil installations. The
S&P 500 Aerospace and Defense index rose 1%, with shares of L3Harris and Raytheon leading the gains
with increases of about 3% each. Lockheed Martin’s stock also climbed 2%, while Northrup Grumman
rose 2.1%. The gains came as the broader stock market declined. “This is more a missile defense play,”
Jefferies analyst Sheila Kahyaoglu told CNBC. “This highlights the continuous need for air defense missile
systems and Lockheed and Raytheon are the biggest beneficiaries of that.” Half of Saudi Arabia’s oil
production was stopped due to huge fires that broke out after attacks by as many as 10 aerial drones.
Yemen’s Houthi rebels claimed responsibility for the attack. Trump said in a tweet on Sunday that the
“there is reason to believe we know the culprit” behind the attacks, adding that the United States is
“locked and loaded depending on verification.” Saudi Arabia oil supply was attacked. There is reason to
believe that we know the culprit, are locked and loaded depending on verification, but are waiting to
hear from the Kingdom as to who they believe was the cause of this attack, and under what terms we
would proceed! Secretary of State Mike Pompeo accused Iran of launching “an unprecedented attack on
the world’s energy supply.” “There is no evidence the attacks came from Yemen,” Pompeo said.
 AT no link:
1. extend Tago 12, announcements of changes in arms policy contribute to investment
concerns that deplete the value of defense stocks
2. the link outweighs, stopping major arms deals such as ____ is more likely to concern
investors than not concern them
3. any risk of nuclear conflict means we should reevaluate our policy opportunities
4. their no link evidence doesn’t consider a post khashoggi, post Syrian pullout climate
5. after the murder of khashoggi, defense contractors were fearful of a block affecting
their profits and investments
Matt Spetalnick, Mike Stone and Patricia Zengerle Oct 12, 2018, 1:22 PM
https://www.businessinsider.com/r-us-arms-makers-express-concern-to-trump-admin-over-saudi-deals-
2018-10

Major U.S. defense contractors have expressed concern to the Trump administration that lawmakers
angered by the disappearance of a Saudi journalist in Turkey will block further arms deals with Saudi
Arabia, a senior U.S. official told Reuters on Friday. Turkish reports that Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, a vocal critic of Riyadh, was killed at
the Saudi consulate in Istanbul have hardened resistance in the U.S. Congress to selling weapons to Saudi Arabia, already a sore point for many
lawmakers concerned about the Saudi role in Yemen's civil war. U.S. President Donald Trump said on Thursday he was wary of halting arms
sales to Saudi Arabia over the case as the key U.S. ally would just shift its weapons purchases to Russia and China. In Congress, Democrats and
some of Trump's fellow Republicans, have said the Khashoggi case had heightened resistance to moving ahead with Saudi
weapons sales that could be worth tens of billions of dollars. Even before that, Democratic U.S. lawmakers had placed
"holds" on at least four military equipment deals, largely because of Saudi attacks that killed Yemeni civilians. "They've had holds on major
systems for months for Yemen issues," the senior administration official said, speaking on condition of anonymity. "This makes it more likely
they'll expand holds to include systems that aren't necessarily controversial by themselves. It's a major concern." The U.S. official declined to
name the companies that had contacted the administration over their Saudi deals. Defense contractors did not immediately respond to a
request for comment. Lockheed Martin Corp and Raytheon Co have been the most active U.S. defense
companies with potential sales to Saudi Arabia since Trump announced a $110 billion package of arms
deals with the country last year as part of his "Buy American" agenda to create jobs at home. Since then,
about $19 billion in deals have been officially notified to Congress, according to government records,
making it unlikely that they can be halted. These include training packages for Saudi troops and pilots as well as the THAAD anti-
missile system that could cost as much as $15 billion. CONTRACTORS RATTLED One lobbyist for a defense company who spoke
on condition of anonymity said worries about a potential across-the-board blockage of Saudi sales by
Congress had surfaced in recent days, a development that would hurt a range of contractors. Senator Bob
Corker, the Republican Foreign Relations Committee chairman, told reporters on Thursday he recently told a defense contractor not to push for
a deal with the Saudis, even before the Khashoggi case. "I shared with him before this happened, please do not push to have any arms sales
brought up right now because they will not pass. It will not happen. With this, I can assure it won't happen for a while," Corker said. While
details of all the previously blocked Saudi deals were not immediately available, one was the planned sale of hundreds of millions of dollars
worth of high-tech munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Senator Robert Menendez, the top Foreign Relations Committee
Democrat, said the Trump administration had not satisfied concerns he first raised in June about the sale to members of the Saudi-led coalition
of Raytheon's precision-guided munitions, or PGMs. A second U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said there were also current
holds in place on training sales for the Saudi government. An informal U.S. review process lets the top Republicans and Democrats on the
Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees stall major foreign arms deals if they have concerns such as whether weapons
would be used to kill civilians. Khashoggi, a U.S. resident who wrote columns for the Washington Post, entered the Saudi consulate in Istanbul
on Oct. 2 to get documents for his forthcoming marriage. Saudi officials say he left shortly afterwards but Turkish officials and his fiancee, who
was waiting outside, said he never came out. Turkish sources have told Reuters the initial assessment of the police was that Khashoggi, an
outspoken critic of the Saudi government, was deliberately killed inside the consulate. Riyadh has dismissed the allegations as baseless.
 AT link turn:
1. extend Tago 12, announcements of changes in arms policy contribute to investment
concerns that deplete the value of defense stocks
2. link outweighs – investors are already nervous because of the trade war and Syrian
pullout, the link is the most probable
3. turn the turn – they can win that decreasing investment is good because _____, but
____ causes _____. AND they aren’t winning the impact flow which means nuclear
conflict kills us before we reap the benefits of ____.
4. prefer a risk of nuclear conflict first – we can’t solve <AFF MPX> if we all die
5. after the murder of khashoggi, defense contractors were fearful of a block affecting
their profits and investments
Matt Spetalnick, Mike Stone and Patricia Zengerle Oct 12, 2018, 1:22 PM
https://www.businessinsider.com/r-us-arms-makers-express-concern-to-trump-admin-over-saudi-deals-
2018-10

Major U.S. defense contractors have expressed concern to the Trump administration that lawmakers
angered by the disappearance of a Saudi journalist in Turkey will block further arms deals with Saudi
Arabia, a senior U.S. official told Reuters on Friday. Turkish reports that Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, a vocal critic of Riyadh, was killed at
the Saudi consulate in Istanbul have hardened resistance in the U.S. Congress to selling weapons to Saudi Arabia, already a sore point for many
lawmakers concerned about the Saudi role in Yemen's civil war. U.S. President Donald Trump said on Thursday he was wary of halting arms
sales to Saudi Arabia over the case as the key U.S. ally would just shift its weapons purchases to Russia and China. In Congress, Democrats and
some of Trump's fellow Republicans, have said the Khashoggi case had heightened resistance to moving ahead with Saudi
weapons sales that could be worth tens of billions of dollars. Even before that, Democratic U.S. lawmakers had placed
"holds" on at least four military equipment deals, largely because of Saudi attacks that killed Yemeni civilians. "They've had holds on major
systems for months for Yemen issues," the senior administration official said, speaking on condition of anonymity. "This makes it more likely
they'll expand holds to include systems that aren't necessarily controversial by themselves. It's a major concern." The U.S. official declined to
name the companies that had contacted the administration over their Saudi deals. Defense contractors did not immediately respond to a
request for comment. Lockheed Martin Corp and Raytheon Co have been the most active U.S. defense
companies with potential sales to Saudi Arabia since Trump announced a $110 billion package of arms
deals with the country last year as part of his "Buy American" agenda to create jobs at home. Since then,
about $19 billion in deals have been officially notified to Congress, according to government records,
making it unlikely that they can be halted. These include training packages for Saudi troops and pilots as well as the THAAD anti-
missile system that could cost as much as $15 billion. CONTRACTORS RATTLED One lobbyist for a defense company who spoke
on condition of anonymity said worries about a potential across-the-board blockage of Saudi sales by
Congress had surfaced in recent days, a development that would hurt a range of contractors. Senator Bob
Corker, the Republican Foreign Relations Committee chairman, told reporters on Thursday he recently told a defense contractor not to push for
a deal with the Saudis, even before the Khashoggi case. "I shared with him before this happened, please do not push to have any arms sales
brought up right now because they will not pass. It will not happen. With this, I can assure it won't happen for a while," Corker said. While
details of all the previously blocked Saudi deals were not immediately available, one was the planned sale of hundreds of millions of dollars
worth of high-tech munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Senator Robert Menendez, the top Foreign Relations Committee
Democrat, said the Trump administration had not satisfied concerns he first raised in June about the sale to members of the Saudi-led coalition
of Raytheon's precision-guided munitions, or PGMs. A second U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said there were also current
holds in place on training sales for the Saudi government. An informal U.S. review process lets the top Republicans and Democrats on the
Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees stall major foreign arms deals if they have concerns such as whether weapons
would be used to kill civilians. Khashoggi, a U.S. resident who wrote columns for the Washington Post, entered the Saudi consulate in Istanbul
on Oct. 2 to get documents for his forthcoming marriage. Saudi officials say he left shortly afterwards but Turkish officials and his fiancee, who
was waiting outside, said he never came out. Turkish sources have told Reuters the initial assessment of the police was that Khashoggi, an
outspoken critic of the Saudi government, was deliberately killed inside the consulate. Riyadh has dismissed the allegations as baseless.

6. economic decline under Trump is particularly likely to trigger diversionary war---

their turn only applies to normal, non-awful Presidents
Dennis M. Foster 16, professor of international studies and political science at the Virginia Military
Institute, 12/19/16, “Would President Trump go to war to divert attention from problems at home?,”
http://inhomelandsecurity.com/would-president-trump-go-to-war-to-divert-attention-from-problems-
at-home/

If the U.S. economy tanks, should we expect Donald Trump to engage in a diversionary war? Since the age of
Machiavelli, analysts have expected world leaders to launch international conflicts to deflect popular attention away from problems at home.
By stirring up feelings of patriotism, leaders might escape the political costs of scandal, unpopularity — or a poorly performing economy.

One often-cited example of diversionary war in modern times is Argentina’s 1982 invasion of the Falklands, which several (though not all)
political scientists attribute to the junta’s desire to divert the people’s attention from a disastrous economy.

In a 2014 article, Jonathan Keller and I argued that whether

U.S. presidents engage in diversionary conflicts depends in
part on their psychological traits — how they frame the world, process information and develop plans of action. Certain traits
predispose leaders to more belligerent behavior.
Do words translate into foreign policy action?

One way to identify these traits is content analyses of leaders’ rhetoric. The more leaders use certain types of verbal constructs, the more likely
they are to possess traits that lead them to use military force.

For one, conceptually

simplistic leaders view the world in “black and white” terms; they develop
unsophisticated solutions to problems and are largely insensitive to risks. Similarly, distrustful leaders tend to
exaggerate threats and rely on aggression to deal with threats. Distrustful leaders typically favor military action
and are confident in their ability to wield it effectively.

Thus, when faced with politically damaging problems that are hard to solve — such as a faltering
economy — leaders who are both distrustful and simplistic are less likely to put together complex, direct
responses. Instead, they develop simplistic but risky “solutions” that divert popular attention from the problem,
utilizing the tools with which they are most comfortable and confident (military force).
Based on our analysis of the rhetoric of previous U.S. presidents, we found that presidents whose language appeared more simplistic and
distrustful, such as Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower and George W. Bush, were more likely to use force abroad in times of rising inflation and
unemployment. By contrast, John F. Kennedy and Bill Clinton, whose rhetoric pegged them as more complex and trusting, were less likely to do
so.

What about Donald Trump?

Since Donald Trump’s election, many commentators have expressed concern about how he will react to new challenges and whether he might
make quick recourse to military action. For example, the Guardian’s George Monbiot has argued that political realities will stymie Trump’s
agenda, especially his promises regarding the economy. Then, rather than risk disappointing his base, Trump might try to rally public opinion to
his side via military action.

I sampled Trump’s campaign rhetoric, analyzing 71,446 words across 24 events from January 2015 to December 2016. Using a program for
measuring leadership traits in rhetoric, I estimated what Trump’s words may tell us about his level of distrust and conceptual complexity. The
graph below shows Trump’s level of distrust compared to previous presidents.

As a candidate, Trump also scored second-lowest among presidents in conceptual complexity. Compared to earlier presidents, he used more
words and phrases that indicate less willingness to see multiple dimensions or ambiguities in the decision-making environment. These include
words and phrases like “absolutely,” “greatest” and “without a doubt.”
A possible implication for military action

I took these data on Trump and plugged them into the statistical model that we developed to predict
major uses of force by the United States from 1953 to 2000. For a president of average distrust and
conceptual complexity, an economic downturn only weakly predicts an increase in the use of force.

But the model would predict that a president with Trump’s numbers would respond to even a minor
economic downturn with an increase in the use of force. For example, were the misery index (aggregate inflation
and unemployment) equal to 12 — about where it stood in October 2011 — the model predicts a president with Trump’s psychological traits
would initiate more than one major conflict per quarter.
 AT no IL:
Economic decline under Trump is particularly likely to trigger diversionary war---their
defense only applies to normal, non-awful Presidents
Dennis M. Foster 16, professor of international studies and political science at the Virginia Military
Institute, 12/19/16, “Would President Trump go to war to divert attention from problems at home?,”
http://inhomelandsecurity.com/would-president-trump-go-to-war-to-divert-attention-from-problems-
at-home/

If the U.S. economy tanks, should we expect Donald Trump to engage in a diversionary war? Since the age of
Machiavelli, analysts have expected world leaders to launch international conflicts to deflect popular attention away from problems at home.
By stirring up feelings of patriotism, leaders might escape the political costs of scandal, unpopularity — or a poorly performing economy.

One often-cited example of diversionary war in modern times is Argentina’s 1982 invasion of the Falklands, which several (though not all)
political scientists attribute to the junta’s desire to divert the people’s attention from a disastrous economy.

In a 2014 article, Jonathan Keller and I argued that whether

U.S. presidents engage in diversionary conflicts depends in
part on their psychological traits — how they frame the world, process information and develop plans of action. Certain traits
predispose leaders to more belligerent behavior.
Do words translate into foreign policy action?

One way to identify these traits is content analyses of leaders’ rhetoric. The more leaders use certain types of verbal constructs, the more likely
they are to possess traits that lead them to use military force.

For one, conceptually

simplistic leaders view the world in “black and white” terms; they develop
unsophisticated solutions to problems and are largely insensitive to risks. Similarly, distrustful leaders tend to
exaggerate threats and rely on aggression to deal with threats. Distrustful leaders typically favor military action
and are confident in their ability to wield it effectively.

Thus, when faced with politically damaging problems that are hard to solve — such as a faltering
economy — leaders who are both distrustful and simplistic are less likely to put together complex, direct
responses. Instead, they develop simplistic but risky “solutions” that divert popular attention from the problem,
utilizing the tools with which they are most comfortable and confident (military force).
Based on our analysis of the rhetoric of previous U.S. presidents, we found that presidents whose language appeared more simplistic and
distrustful, such as Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower and George W. Bush, were more likely to use force abroad in times of rising inflation and
unemployment. By contrast, John F. Kennedy and Bill Clinton, whose rhetoric pegged them as more complex and trusting, were less likely to do
so.

What about Donald Trump?

Since Donald Trump’s election, many commentators have expressed concern about how he will react to new challenges and whether he might
make quick recourse to military action. For example, the Guardian’s George Monbiot has argued that political realities will stymie Trump’s
agenda, especially his promises regarding the economy. Then, rather than risk disappointing his base, Trump might try to rally public opinion to
his side via military action.

I sampled Trump’s campaign rhetoric, analyzing 71,446 words across 24 events from January 2015 to December 2016. Using a program for
measuring leadership traits in rhetoric, I estimated what Trump’s words may tell us about his level of distrust and conceptual complexity. The
graph below shows Trump’s level of distrust compared to previous presidents.

As a candidate, Trump also scored second-lowest among presidents in conceptual complexity. Compared to earlier presidents, he used more
words and phrases that indicate less willingness to see multiple dimensions or ambiguities in the decision-making environment. These include
words and phrases like “absolutely,” “greatest” and “without a doubt.”

A possible implication for military action

I took these data on Trump and plugged them into the statistical model that we developed to predict
major uses of force by the United States from 1953 to 2000. For a president of average distrust and
conceptual complexity, an economic downturn only weakly predicts an increase in the use of force.

But the model would predict that a president with Trump’s numbers would respond to even a minor
economic downturn with an increase in the use of force. For example, were the misery index (aggregate inflation
and unemployment) equal to 12 — about where it stood in October 2011 — the model predicts a president with Trump’s psychological traits
would initiate more than one major conflict per quarter.

Best statistical practices demonstrate causal relationship

Tir 10 (Jaroslav Tir, PhD, professor of political science at University of Colorado at Boulder, “Territorial Diversion:
Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 72, No. 2, April 2010, pp. 413–425)

Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These
results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests,
riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while fixing the
economy would take a more concerted and prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the
most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky
diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and
by more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming economy). Next, I conduct a series of follow-up tests
suggested by an anonymous Reviewer; results based on the reanalysis of Model 1 are presented in the online appendix. Evaluating the implication
that territorial diversions are indeed more likely to result from diversionary conditions than nonterritorial
diversions, I set up a multinomial logit model that contrasts the initiation of territorial MIDs versus nonterritorial MIDs (base outcome). The
results show a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the government unpopularity variable (first column of Table 3), meaning that
higher levels of government unpopularity are more likely to produce territorial rather than nonterritorial MIDs. Further checks include
performing rare events logit (King and Zeng 2001) and population-averaged logit analyses to verify whether
the rare events nature of the dependent variable or cross-sectional characteristics of the data alter the
findings, respectively. The findings for the two independent variables remain unchanged (see Table 3, columns two and three).
Finally, protesting behavior in more populous countries could be considered more ‘‘normal’’ and less threatening to the government,
potentially lowering the incentive to divert. Dividing the government unpopularity variable by the log of country’s population (from the
Correlates of War National Capabilities data set, Singer 1987) reveals that the population size-standardized government unpopularity variable
remains positive and significant; see Table 3, final column. Concerning the control variables, the effects of power and distance are consistent
with expectations and across the Models in Table 1. Democracy, alliance ties, and trade coefficients have mostly the expected dampening
influence on territorial conflict initiation; but only trade exhibits a significant impact and only when the dependent variable is the fatal
territorial MID (i.e., in Models 3–4). 16 These results are somewhat surprising, but the reader is reminded that the effects of alliance are highly
contested (see Maoz 2000), while the impact of trade has not been established in the domain of territorial conflict. Similarly, recent research
shows that the democratic peace weakens considerably in the context of territorial conflict (James, Park, and Choi 2006) and that the democratic peace may be
epiphenomenal to territorial peace (Gibler 2007). 17 Importantly, the control variable results imply that some of the related interests (e.g., security, regime ties)
may indeed be subordinated to the territorial diversion impetus. Revisiting the link between regime type and diversion, some scholars argue that democratic leaders have a
greater motivation—due to the need for popular support—for diversion (e.g., Gelpi 1997; Russett 1990; Smith 1996). Yet, others (e.g., Downs and
Rocke 1994; Miller 1995; Pickering and Kisangani 2005) assert that authoritarian leaders need popular support in order to appear legitimate. Because they
cannot derive legitimacy from democratic institutions and elections, they look to diversions to help them achieve this goal. Autocrats can also
divert with greater impunity due to the lack of institutional checks and balances. In follow-up tests available from the online appendix, Table 4, I
restrict the set of initiator countries in Model 1 to democracies only, autocracies only, all nondemocracies, and all nonautocracies. That the
findings hold suggests that both democratic and autocratic leaders value territorial diversions. Nevertheless,
resolving the broader debate is beyond the scope of this study.
 AT no impact:
1. extend Tonneson 15, economic decline leads to nuclear conflict through tit-for-tat
struggles, miscalculation, escalation of small conflicts and more
2. any chance of economic decline outweighs – magnitude – recession fuels military
confrontation – great powers will turn outwards and blame others for internal
conflicts---it breaks down interdependence and makes leaders ignore deterrence---
means we control the direction of escalation---effective deterrence checks conflict
escalation and reduces propensity for military conflict
3. Economic decline under Trump is particularly likely to trigger diversionary war---
their defense only applies to normal, non-awful Presidents
Dennis M. Foster 16, professor of international studies and political science at the Virginia Military
Institute, 12/19/16, “Would President Trump go to war to divert attention from problems at home?,”
http://inhomelandsecurity.com/would-president-trump-go-to-war-to-divert-attention-from-problems-
at-home/

If the U.S. economy tanks, should we expect Donald Trump to engage in a diversionary war? Since the age of
Machiavelli, analysts have expected world leaders to launch international conflicts to deflect popular attention away from problems at home.
By stirring up feelings of patriotism, leaders might escape the political costs of scandal, unpopularity — or a poorly performing economy.

One often-cited example of diversionary war in modern times is Argentina’s 1982 invasion of the Falklands, which several (though not all)
political scientists attribute to the junta’s desire to divert the people’s attention from a disastrous economy.

In a 2014 article, Jonathan Keller and I argued that whether

U.S. presidents engage in diversionary conflicts depends in
part on their psychological traits — how they frame the world, process information and develop plans of action. Certain traits
predispose leaders to more belligerent behavior.
Do words translate into foreign policy action?

One way to identify these traits is content analyses of leaders’ rhetoric. The more leaders use certain types of verbal constructs, the more likely
they are to possess traits that lead them to use military force.

For one, conceptually

simplistic leaders view the world in “black and white” terms; they develop
unsophisticated solutions to problems and are largely insensitive to risks. Similarly, distrustful leaders tend to
exaggerate threats and rely on aggression to deal with threats. Distrustful leaders typically favor military action
and are confident in their ability to wield it effectively.

Thus, when faced with politically damaging problems that are hard to solve — such as a faltering
economy — leaders who are both distrustful and simplistic are less likely to put together complex, direct
responses. Instead, they develop simplistic but risky “solutions” that divert popular attention from the problem,
utilizing the tools with which they are most comfortable and confident (military force).
Based on our analysis of the rhetoric of previous U.S. presidents, we found that presidents whose language appeared more simplistic and
distrustful, such as Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower and George W. Bush, were more likely to use force abroad in times of rising inflation and
unemployment. By contrast, John F. Kennedy and Bill Clinton, whose rhetoric pegged them as more complex and trusting, were less likely to do
so.

What about Donald Trump?

Since Donald Trump’s election, many commentators have expressed concern about how he will react to new challenges and whether he might
make quick recourse to military action. For example, the Guardian’s George Monbiot has argued that political realities will stymie Trump’s
agenda, especially his promises regarding the economy. Then, rather than risk disappointing his base, Trump might try to rally public opinion to
his side via military action.

I sampled Trump’s campaign rhetoric, analyzing 71,446 words across 24 events from January 2015 to December 2016. Using a program for
measuring leadership traits in rhetoric, I estimated what Trump’s words may tell us about his level of distrust and conceptual complexity. The
graph below shows Trump’s level of distrust compared to previous presidents.

As a candidate, Trump also scored second-lowest among presidents in conceptual complexity. Compared to earlier presidents, he used more
words and phrases that indicate less willingness to see multiple dimensions or ambiguities in the decision-making environment. These include
words and phrases like “absolutely,” “greatest” and “without a doubt.”

A possible implication for military action

I took these data on Trump and plugged them into the statistical model that we developed to predict
major uses of force by the United States from 1953 to 2000. For a president of average distrust and
conceptual complexity, an economic downturn only weakly predicts an increase in the use of force.

But the model would predict that a president with Trump’s numbers would respond to even a minor
economic downturn with an increase in the use of force. For example, were the misery index (aggregate inflation
and unemployment) equal to 12 — about where it stood in October 2011 — the model predicts a president with Trump’s psychological traits
would initiate more than one major conflict per quarter.

4. Best statistical practices demonstrate causal relationship

Tir 10 (Jaroslav Tir, PhD, professor of political science at University of Colorado at Boulder, “Territorial Diversion:
Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 72, No. 2, April 2010, pp. 413–425)

Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These
results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests,
riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while fixing the
economy would take a more concerted and prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the
most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky
diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and
by more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming economy). Next, I conduct a series of follow-up tests
suggested by an anonymous Reviewer; results based on the reanalysis of Model 1 are presented in the online appendix. Evaluating the implication
that territorial diversions are indeed more
likely to result from diversionary conditions than nonterritorial
diversions, I set up a multinomial logit model that contrasts the initiation of territorial MIDs versus nonterritorial MIDs (base outcome). The
results show a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the government unpopularity variable (first column of Table 3), meaning that
higher levels of government unpopularity are more likely to produce territorial rather than nonterritorial MIDs. Further checks include
performing rare events logit (King and Zeng 2001) and population-averaged logit analyses to verify whether
the rare events nature of the dependent variable or cross-sectional characteristics of the data alter the
findings, respectively. The findings for the two independent variables remain unchanged (see Table 3, columns two and three).
Finally, protesting behavior in more populous countries could be considered more ‘‘normal’’ and less threatening to the government,
potentially lowering the incentive to divert. Dividing the government unpopularity variable by the log of country’s population (from the
Correlates of War National Capabilities data set, Singer 1987) reveals that the population size-standardized government unpopularity variable
remains positive and significant; see Table 3, final column. Concerning the control variables, the effects of power and distance are consistent
with expectations and across the Models in Table 1. Democracy, alliance ties, and trade coefficients have mostly the expected dampening
influence on territorial conflict initiation; but only trade exhibits a significant impact and only when the dependent variable is the fatal
territorial MID (i.e., in Models 3–4). 16 These results are somewhat surprising, but the reader is reminded that the effects of alliance are highly
contested (see Maoz 2000), while the impact of trade has not been established in the domain of territorial conflict. Similarly, recent research
shows that the democratic peace weakens considerably in the context of territorial conflict (James, Park, and Choi 2006) and that the democratic peace may be
epiphenomenal to territorial peace (Gibler 2007). 17 Importantly, the control variable results imply that some of the related interests (e.g., security, regime ties)
may indeed be subordinated to the territorial diversion impetus. Revisiting the link between regime type and diversion, some scholars argue that democratic leaders have a
greater motivation—due to the need for popular support—for diversion (e.g., Gelpi 1997; Russett 1990; Smith 1996). Yet, others (e.g., Downs and
Rocke 1994; Miller 1995; Pickering and Kisangani 2005) assert that authoritarian leaders need popular support in order to appear legitimate. Because they
cannot derive legitimacy from democratic institutions and elections, they look to diversions to help them achieve this goal. Autocrats can also
divert with greater impunity due to the lack of institutional checks and balances. In follow-up tests available from the online appendix, Table 4, I
restrict the set of initiator countries in Model 1 to democracies only, autocracies only, all nondemocracies, and all nonautocracies. That the
findings hold suggests that both democratic and autocratic leaders value territorial diversions. Nevertheless,
resolving the broader debate is beyond the scope of this study.
 AT impact turn:
1. extend Tonneson 15, economic decline triggers nuclear conflict
2. impact outweighs – any chance of nuclear conflict outweighs
3. even if economic decline is good for some reason, nuclear war kills us all which
means we can’t reap the benefits of the turn
4. Economic decline under Trump is particularly likely to trigger diversionary war---
their defense only applies to normal, non-awful Presidents – probability is on our side
Dennis M. Foster 16, professor of international studies and political science at the Virginia Military
Institute, 12/19/16, “Would President Trump go to war to divert attention from problems at home?,”
http://inhomelandsecurity.com/would-president-trump-go-to-war-to-divert-attention-from-problems-
at-home/

If the U.S. economy tanks, should we expect Donald Trump to engage in a diversionary war? Since the age of
Machiavelli, analysts have expected world leaders to launch international conflicts to deflect popular attention away from problems at home.
By stirring up feelings of patriotism, leaders might escape the political costs of scandal, unpopularity — or a poorly performing economy.

One often-cited example of diversionary war in modern times is Argentina’s 1982 invasion of the Falklands, which several (though not all)
political scientists attribute to the junta’s desire to divert the people’s attention from a disastrous economy.

In a 2014 article, Jonathan Keller and I argued that whether

U.S. presidents engage in diversionary conflicts depends in
part on
their psychological traits — how they frame the world, process information and develop plans of action. Certain traits
predispose leaders to more belligerent behavior.
Do words translate into foreign policy action?

One way to identify these traits is content analyses of leaders’ rhetoric. The more leaders use certain types of verbal constructs, the more likely
they are to possess traits that lead them to use military force.

For one, conceptually

simplistic leaders view the world in “black and white” terms; they develop
unsophisticated solutions to problems and are largely insensitive to risks. Similarly, distrustful leaders tend to
exaggerate threats and rely on aggression to deal with threats. Distrustful leaders typically favor military action
and are confident in their ability to wield it effectively.

Thus, when faced with politically damaging problems that are hard to solve — such as a faltering
economy — leaders who are both distrustful and simplistic are less likely to put together complex, direct
responses. Instead, they develop simplistic but risky “solutions” that divert popular attention from the problem,
utilizing the tools with which they are most comfortable and confident (military force).
Based on our analysis of the rhetoric of previous U.S. presidents, we found that presidents whose language appeared more simplistic and
distrustful, such as Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower and George W. Bush, were more likely to use force abroad in times of rising inflation and
unemployment. By contrast, John F. Kennedy and Bill Clinton, whose rhetoric pegged them as more complex and trusting, were less likely to do
so.

What about Donald Trump?

Since Donald Trump’s election, many commentators have expressed concern about how he will react to new challenges and whether he might
make quick recourse to military action. For example, the Guardian’s George Monbiot has argued that political realities will stymie Trump’s
agenda, especially his promises regarding the economy. Then, rather than risk disappointing his base, Trump might try to rally public opinion to
his side via military action.
I sampled Trump’s campaign rhetoric, analyzing 71,446 words across 24 events from January 2015 to December 2016. Using a program for
measuring leadership traits in rhetoric, I estimated what Trump’s words may tell us about his level of distrust and conceptual complexity. The
graph below shows Trump’s level of distrust compared to previous presidents.

As a candidate, Trump also scored second-lowest among presidents in conceptual complexity. Compared to earlier presidents, he used more
words and phrases that indicate less willingness to see multiple dimensions or ambiguities in the decision-making environment. These include
words and phrases like “absolutely,” “greatest” and “without a doubt.”

A possible implication for military action

I took these data on Trump and plugged them into the statistical model that we developed to predict
major uses of force by the United States from 1953 to 2000. For a president of average distrust and
conceptual complexity, an economic downturn only weakly predicts an increase in the use of force.

But the model would predict that a president with Trump’s numbers would respond to even a minor
economic downturn with an increase in the use of force. For example, were the misery index (aggregate inflation
and unemployment) equal to 12 — about where it stood in October 2011 — the model predicts a president with Trump’s psychological traits
would initiate more than one major conflict per quarter.
 AT clary:
Clary assumes every country is democratic
Clary’s uses a dataset of only dyadic rivals from 1950
Clary 15 (“Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,”
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2015--‐8,
“Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,”
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597712)
Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence
that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is

to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition . Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 1950, 67 of
which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true
controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and
international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with
diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles. Defining and Measuring Rivalry and Rivalry Termination I define a rivalry as the
perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry
termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of
the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between
rivals has been reduced dramatically. This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and
James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view
each other as a significant politicalmilitary threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further: The presumption is that decisionmakers
explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they
will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well

Drawing from available records and histories,

as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3

Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that
serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as
occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry.5

Using dyadic rivalries results in inaccurate conclusions---looking at territorial

disputes establishes economic downturns result in diversionary conflict
Tir 10 – (Jaroslav, PhD, professor of political science at University of Colorado at Boulder, “Territorial
Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 72, No. 2,
April 2010, pp. 413–425)

Neglecting to link territorial and diversionary research is important because the link could be used to
address important critiques leveled against the theory. The critiques have emerged from the literature’s inability to produce a set of unambiguous, supportive
findings. Even though domestic problems may be encouraging leaders to contemplate diversions, other factors may prevent these incentives from being acted upon. Consequently, a reliable pattern between diversionary

I identify the two most relevant types of critiques and argue that they can be
incentives and use of force may not be detectable. Below,

addressed successfully in the context of territorial diversion. First, Levy (1998; see also Tir and Jasinski 2008) observes that
suitable diversionary targets are quite difficult to find. For just about all the states in the international system, the loss of strength gradient (Boulding 1962) is so
serious that they are only able to interact militarily with their immediate neighbors. This would limit diversionary opportunities significantly for all but the most powerful states. Furthermore, many countries would make poor

targets because they are important economic, security, or diplomatic partners or because the attack would go against the constraints posed by the democratic peace (Russett and Oneal 2001). Cognizant of
these issues, Mitchell and Prins (2004), for example, focus on diversions between enduring rivals. Enduring rivals (e.g., India-Pakistan) have a history of
antagonism, which indicates that they are willing and able to interacting militarily. Moreover, the context of rivalry can provide an aura of credibility to the leader’s claim that their actions are conducted not out of selfish interest

The problem, however, is that rivalry-

but for the benefit of the country. And given their already poor relations, the attacks would not be particularly damaging to their relationship.6

related diversionary opportunities are available to only few countries. Enduring rivals constitute only
5.4% of dyads that experience militarized international conflict (Diehl and Goertz 2000) and an even smaller fraction
of all dyads (.4% to 3.75%, depending on how politically relevant dyads are defined). The above concerns
may be lessened in the context of territorial diversion. First, the power projection capability is not
necessarily an issue because most territorial conflicts take place precisely between neighboring
countries (Tir 2003, 2006; Vasquez 1993). Second, diversionary action has to be perceived by the population as so
important that it is persuaded that the conflict (i.e., the diversion) is worth the cost of damaging or even breaking
the otherwise important ties. Territorial diversion is arguably in a good position to help the leader do this because territorial issues are seen as so central to the matters of national survival and
protection of identity that economic, diplomatic, and other considerations can be subordinated. These important points suggest that diversionary behavior could be a cross-national phenomenon, not limited to the most powerful

The second critique challenges diversionary theory’s core logical mechanism, which is rooted in
or rival states.

the ingroup, outgroup premise (Coser 1956). Diversions are launched to unify a fractured society (i.e., transform it into the ingroup) by painting the foreign enemy as the outgroup.7 Morgan and
Anderson (1999; Morgan and Bickers 1992), however, argue that overcoming the societal division to create a cohesive ingroup is no easy task. If the leader calculates that surmounting this important obstacle is unlikely, then they

territorial diversion provides what is probably the most promising option

would presumably be deterred from diverting. I argue below that

for unifying the society, because territorial issues have the unique ability to speak to and ‘‘connect’’ with
the broad swaths of the population. Theoretical Argument In this section, I present arguments specifying why territorial diversion may be particularly attractive for an embattled leader. I
contend that territorial diversion can provide the leader with certain advantages, which are unlikely to be found in the realm of conflicts over

other issues. People have unique and strong bonds to land, which can be manipulated by the unscrupulous

leader them to mask the true intents of their actions, which include rally effects and retention of power.
In explaining why researchers have repeatedly found territory to be the most war prone issue (seeHensel 2000; Tir and Vasquez 2010), Vasquez (1993) notes that humans’ tendency to define themselves as territorial creatures is
deeply ingrained into their collective genetic and/or cultural inheritance—arguments well known in the sociobiological and evolutionary psychology literatures (e.g., Buss 1995; Valzelli 1981). The tendency is seen in the great
willingness of people to fight over economically and strategically worthless land, which suggests that the pursuit of territory is more than just about rational, calculating behavior. It may be either a function of how humans are
wired or of learning ‘‘that territorial issues . . . are ‘best’ handled by the use of force and violence’’ (Vasquez 1993, 140). While the related literature debates whether the traits are more inherent or learned, the point is that the
bond people feel to land, their anxiety over who controls it, and their willingness to support the use of force to act on territorial disagreements can all potentially be manipulated and exploited by the leader who is seeking to
distract the people’s attention from the real problems plaguing the country. A related argument focusing on how people develop their conceptions of self is offered by the constructivist school of thought. Among others, Gottman
(1973), Sack (1986), and Touval (1972) find that people become socialized and emotionally attached to the territory they think of as belonging to them. The land becomes an integral part of their identity, ingrained in the national
psyche. This even holds in cases where there are only weak objective claims to the land in question. Witness, for example, the fervor by which ordinary Chinese respond to suggestions that Tibet is not legitimately Chinese territory.
Or consider the Serbian attitude toward Kosovo. Despite the fact that few Serbs remain there, Milosevic successfully rallied the Serb nation in the late 1980s by arguing that it could hardly afford a repeat of the 1389 Battle of
Kosovo where that land was lost. Such predispositions suggest that disagreements over territorial control quickly turn into highly emotionally charged affairs where objective facts hold little sway. In fact, the territorial conflict
literature argues that the emotional connections and related proclivities feed into the perceptions of land as zerosum, indivisible, and unsubstitutable, where compromises are seen as improbable, territorial disputes are thought of
as irresolvable, and brute force is counted on as the only real means of obtaining (temporary) control (Hensel and Mitchell 2005; Tir 2006; Vasquez 1993). Critically for this project, the emotions connected to the land are something
the unscrupulous leader can attempt to tap into, manipulate, and exploit for their own gain—much like Milosevic did. Further relevant insights can be derived from prospect theory (e.g., Jervis 1992; Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
According to the theory, people are risk acceptant when they perceive that they are losing (as opposed to gaining) something they value, that is when they are operating in the domain of losses.8 The reference point separating
gains from loses is set according to whether one is trying to protect existing ownership versus acquire something new. Yet, if an individual believes that the object outside of their control rightfully belongs to them, this would imply
that the ‘‘loss’’ of the object took place at some point in the past and the person would be in the domain of losses. The psychological reference point is hence not the objective status quo but rather a mental image of the ‘‘rightful’’
distribution of valued resources (Berejikian 2004). Undoing the ‘‘loss’’ thus becomes a priority, even if it involves highly risky actions, because accepting the objective status quo would mean accepting the certain loss. Connecting
these arguments with those of constructivism implies that the tendency to become emotionally attached to the land people think of as their own sets their reference point to the domain of losses, irrespective of whether the
defense of currently held land (i.e., an objective loss) or acquisition of land that someone else is controlling (i.e., an objective gain) is in question. That is, by perceiving the disputed land as rightfully theirs, the people interpret not
controlling it to mean a loss—regardless of whether this land ever belonged, or how long ago, to them. Consequently, the people become willing to support risky courses of action in the belief that they would be ‘‘retaking’’ the

attitudes and tendencies toward territory are

land. A series of important inferences follows from the above insights. The most basic one is that the above

common human responses. As such, they apply to the populations of states, which opens them up for
manipulation and exploitation by unscrupulous leaders for personal gain. The leader can manufacture, use, or escalate a territorial conflict
with another country in an attempt to manipulate the people’s emotions into becoming willing to give the leader carte blanche or at least a greater benefit of the doubt for taking what under more objective circumstances may be
seen as an unnecessary, questionable, and risky action. The end result, the leader hopes, is that via the mechanism of territorial conflict, the population will increasingly support and rally behind them. Importantly, the above
indicates that the leader can expect their manipulation to be more successful when territorial issues are at stake, rather than some more poorly defined threats to the country, including low politics issues that can distract people’s
attention but not elicit the same level of passion. Furthermore, because territorial issues are at the heart of human perceptions of identity, they can be used by the leader to overcome societal divisions. The leader can argue that
the society as a whole is the ingroup with a common territorial interest and cast the state controlling, or attempting to control, the land that ‘‘rightfully’’ belongs to the leader’s country as the outgroup. Few other issues are
expected to provide as strong of a bonding experience for a population. Examples of societies like South Korea, which is plagued by deep political divisions, suggest that in the face of territorial crises such as the dispute over the
Dokto Islands with Japan, the society becomes more unified. Territory could therefore be one of the few issues that could, at least temporarily, be used by leaders to overcome internal divisions— including those that may be
caused precisely by controversy over the leader’s rule. The traditional diversionary argument also relies on portraying the diversionary action as protecting a vital national interest. Yet, the leader’s initiation of a crisis with a far-
away, unknown-to-the-public foreign enemy (a scenario satirized in the movie Wag the Dog) and over an issue not clearly vital to the national interest would have a hard time capturing the public’s attention and creating belief in—
and let alone fervent support for—the leader. After all, many ordinary people know about the diversionary theory, so the leader has to overcome the public’s—and particularly the political opposition’s—natural skepticism that the
action is a mere diversion meant to manipulate the populace. The issue of land control, via the above-described mechanisms—stands a much better chance of accomplishing these tasks. In sum, territorial diversions are able (1) to
capture the public’s attention, (2) to tap into the people’s instincts and/or and feelings about their identity, and (3) to help the leader unify a fractured society behind them. The logic of territorial diversion is thus arguably more
compelling and plausible than that of the more standard version of the theory. The discussion leads to the following hypothesis. H1: Domestic unpopularity problems that threaten the leader’s ability to retain effective control over
their office are associated with an increased likelihood of territorial conflict initiation. Given the relative ease with which the leader can exploit the population’s instincts and/or attitudes toward territorial control may make
territorial diversion appear a relatively risk-free, no-cost option. Yet, this is certainly not the case. The leader does not know that the diversion will for sure have the desired popularity-boosting effect. They are acting with the hope
of a rally, but the rally is by no means guaranteed; prior research generally reports only small and short-lasting rallies (e.g., Lian and Oneal 1993; see also Chiozza and Goemans 2004, 424). Furthermore, engaging in prolonged or
frequent diversions would likely outlast the desired rally effect, as the public tires of the issue and costs and casualties mount (Gartner and Segura 1998). The leader is hence expected to use diversion sparingly, such as during times
when their leadership abilities are in question—just as the hypothesis suggests. Moreover, the diversion carries with it the inherent risk that the action will not go as planned. Becoming embroiled in protracted, escalating,
stalemated, costly, or losing conflicts is likely to hurt the leader’s popularity (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Their calculus should therefore be affected by a variety of constraints; the key ones are considered control variables and
are discussed in the next section. Research Design Dependent Variables, Spatial-Temporal Domain, and Method of Analysis In the diversionary research, diversionary activity is not measured directly but rather by associating
governmental use of force with diversionary incentive variables that tap into domestic discontent with the government. I follow a similar approach but focus on uses of military force9 that concern the issue of territorial control. To
check the findings’ robustness, I utilize three different operationalizations of my dependent variable. The first two versions rely on the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004), which
identifies militarized disputes between countries, their timing, the dispute initiator, whether a territorial revision was sought, and fatality numbers.10 Combining this information, I identify (1) all territorial MID initiations (my main
dependent variable) and (2) fatal territorial MID initiations; I use the fatality restriction because disputes involving fatalities may have an easier time capturing the public’s attention and inspiring a rally. Finally, the International
Crisis Behavior (ICB) project defines a foreign policy crisis as a situation in which the highest-level decision makers perceive ‘‘a threat to one or more basic values [to their state], along with an awareness of a finite time for response
to the value threat, and a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities’’ (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000, 3). The project notes the timing of the crisis, perceived initiator (i.e., in this case the state from which the crisis-
related threat is emanating), and whether a territorial threat is involved (i.e., threat of integration or annexation of a part of the target’s territory). By matching perceived initiators with territorial threats, I derive a list of (3)
territorial crisis initiations. Each of the three dependent variables enters into the below-defined data set dichotomously, depending on whether the relevant event took place in a given year. The directed dyadic approach, which can
simultaneously capture conditions within the prospective initiator country as well as the identity of and relationships with potential target states, is utilized. Monadic design, popular in early studies of diversion, is equipped to
perform only the first task (Bennett and Stam 2000b). With the help of the EUGene software (Bennett and Stam 2000a), I create a directed dyad-year (my unit of analysis) data set of all contiguous (up to 400 miles of water)11 pairs
of states. The analyses are restricted to the post-World War II period due to availability of economic data. Given the dichotomous structure of the dependent variables, I rely on logit for my analyses. Robust standard errors are
employed to account for the observations from the same dyad being related. I use the Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) binary timeseries cross-section correction to account for the fact that my data are composed of several cross-
sections (i.e., dyads) and to deal with potential duration dependence as these cross-sections are observed over time. To save space, the associated years of peace and natural cubic spline (with three interior knots) variables are
omitted from the table. And finally, all the right-hand-side variables (with the exception of elections) are lagged by one year, in order to make sure that the presumed causes actually precede the use of force; such a setup is also
reasonable as it may take a little bit of time for discontent to spur the leader into a territorial diversion. The Main Independent Variables The ideal indicator of the diversionary incentive, the leader’s popularity rating, is either
unavailable for a broad range of countries or cannot be trusted as it is subject to governmental manipulation. As a substitute, I rely on two proxy indicators of the leader’s (un)popularity. The first one captures the extent to which
the citizens of a country are visibly dissatisfied with their government. I sum the incidents of protests, strikes, and riots from the Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS) Archive (2005) into an index reporting the number of unrest
activities in a given country in a given year.12 Pickering and Kisangani (2005; Kisangani and Pickering 2007) have a similar approach. The second indicator, the economic (GDP) growth rate is typically used in the diversionary
research (e.g., Hess and Orphanides 1995; James and Oneal 1991; Oneal and Tir 2006; Pickering and Kisangani 2005) because the state of the economy is seen as an important predictor of leaders’ popularity (Hibbs 1987; MacKuen,
Erikson, and Stimson 1992). To check the robustness of my findings, I rely on two different sources for the growth rate, Gleditsch (2002), abbreviated below as KSG, and the CNTS Archive (2005).13 Control Variables I control for
several influences that have been found to affect the likelihood of dyadic conflict. To capture countries’ relative power, I use the Correlates of War project’s combined index of military capabilities (Singer 1988) and create a
measure that takes the natural logarithm of the ratio of the stronger country’s capabilities to those of the weaker member of the dyad. I control for whether the dyad is democratic by noting whether both member states achieve a
score greater than 6 on Polity IV’s (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) scale. Allies may fight each other less because they share common security interests; I control for this with data from Gibler and Sarkees (2004). To capture the
potential deterrent effects of trade, I divide the sum of the initiator’s exports and imports with the prospective target by the initiator’s GDP (all from Gleditsch 2002); the measure captures the extent to which the initiator’s
economy is dependent on the target. Because for most states the ability to fight is determined primarily by geographic proximity—I control for the effects of distance between the dyad members (Stinnett et al. 2002); see also note
11. Finally, diversions are thought to be the most likely right before elections, because this is when the leaders are the most likely to need a boost in their popularity ratings (e.g., Hess and Orphanides 1995; Smith 1996). I code
upcoming elections by using the CNTS Archive (2005). Results and Discussion Each Model in Table 1 employs a different combination of territorial conflict (the dependent variable) and economic growth (an independent variable)
operationalizations. Starting the evaluation of H1 with the government unpopularity variable, its coefficient is consistently significant and positive in Models 1–6. The likelihood of territorial conflict initiation increases significantly
as the government becomes more unpopular, and this finding is robust to all the alternate specifications of the dependent variable. With the hope of deflecting attention from domestic unrest and creating a rally effect, embattled
leaders initiate territorial conflicts. By focusing on territorial diversions, my findings thus provide clear support for the detrimental effects of domestic unrest. Other than in Tir and Jasinski’s (2008) work on diversion against
domestic ethnic groups, findings for domestic unrest proved to be elusive in Rummel (1963) and Tanter (1966) and inconsistent in Pickering and Kisangani’s (2005; see also Kisangani and Pickering 2007) study. None of these works,
however, consider the possibility of territorial diversion. Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict
initiation is significant only in Models 3–4.14 The weak results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature. In accordance with the insignificant relationships of Models 1–2 and 5–6, Ostrom and Job (1986),
for example, note that the likelihood that a U.S. President will use force is uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to divert the public’s attention with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the economic
problem, thus reducing the inclination to act abroad. Similarly, Fordham (1998a, 1998b), DeRouen (1995), and Gowa (1998) find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force. Furthermore, Leeds and Davis (1997)
conclude that the conflictinitiating behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani (2005) and Russett and Oneal (2001) in global studies. In contrast and more in line
with my findings of a significant relationship (in Models 3–4), Hess and Orphanides (1995), for example, argue that economic recessions are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordham’s
(2002) revision of Gowa’s (1998) analysis shows some effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake (2002) report that U.S. use of force diverts the public’s attention from a poor economy. Among cross-national studies, Oneal
and Russett (1997) report that slow growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes, as does Russett (1990)—but only for the United States; slow growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani and
Pickering (2007) report some significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir and Jasinski (2008) find a clearer link between economic underperformance and increased attacks on domestic ethnic
minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions, my own inconsistent findings for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.15 Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support
via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity
(e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while fixing the economy would take a more concerted and
prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky diversions for the times when they
are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and by more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming economy). Next, I conduct a series of follow-
up tests suggested by an anonymous Reviewer; results based on the reanalysis of Model 1 are presented in the online appendix. Evaluating the implication that territorial diversions are indeed more likely to result from diversionary
conditions than nonterritorial diversions, I set up a multinomial logit model that contrasts the initiation of territorial MIDs versus nonterritorial MIDs (base outcome). The results show a positive and statistically significant
coefficient for the government unpopularity variable (first column of Table 3), meaning that higher levels of government unpopularity are more likely to produce territorial rather than nonterritorial MIDs. Further checks include
performing rare events logit (King and Zeng 2001) and population-averaged logit analyses to verify whether the rare events nature of the dependent variable or cross-sectional characteristics of the data alter the findings,
respectively. The findings for the two independent variables remain unchanged (see Table 3, columns two and three). Finally, protesting behavior in more populous countries could be considered more ‘‘normal’’ and less
threatening to the government, potentially lowering the incentive to divert. Dividing the government unpopularity variable by the log of country’s population (from the Correlates of War National Capabilities data set, Singer 1987)
reveals that the population size-standardized government unpopularity variable remains positive and significant; see Table 3, final column. Concerning the control variables, the effects of power and distance are consistent with
expectations and across the Models in Table 1. Democracy, alliance ties, and trade coefficients have mostly the expected dampening influence on territorial conflict initiation; but only trade exhibits a significant impact and only
when the dependent variable is the fatal territorial MID (i.e., in Models 3–4). 16 These results are somewhat surprising, but the reader is reminded that the effects of alliance are highly contested (see Maoz 2000), while the impact
of trade has not been established in the domain of territorial conflict. Similarly, recent research shows that the democratic peace weakens considerably in the context of territorial conflict (James, Park, and Choi 2006) and that the
democratic peace may be epiphenomenal to territorial peace (Gibler 2007). 17 Importantly, the control variable results imply that some of the related interests (e.g., security, regime ties) may indeed be subordinated to the
territorial diversion impetus. Revisiting the link between regime type and diversion, some scholars argue that democratic leaders have a greater motivation—due to the need for popular support—for diversion (e.g., Gelpi 1997;
Russett 1990; Smith 1996). Yet, others (e.g., Downs and Rocke 1994; Miller 1995; Pickering and Kisangani 2005) assert that authoritarian leaders need popular support in order to appear legitimate. Because they cannot derive
legitimacy from democratic institutions and elections, they look to diversions to help them achieve this goal. Autocrats can also divert with greater impunity due to the lack of institutional checks and balances. In follow-up tests
available from the online appendix, Table 4, I restrict the set of initiator countries in Model 1 to democracies only, autocracies only, all nondemocracies, and all nonautocracies. That the findings hold suggests that both democratic
and autocratic leaders value territorial diversions. Nevertheless, resolving the broader debate is beyond the scope of this study.

Here’s Clary explaining that his argument relies on defense cuts

Clary 15 – (Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Watson Institute for
International Studies, Brown University, 4/22/15, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation:
Evidence from International Rivalries,” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597712)

Economic crises generate pressure for austerity. Government revenues are a function of national economic production, so
that when production diminishes through recession, revenues available for expenditure also diminish. Planning almost invariably assumes
growth rather than contraction, so the deviation in available revenues compared to the planned expenditure can be sizable. When growth
slowdowns are prolonged, the cumulative departure from planning targets can grow even further, even if no single quarter meets the technical
definition of recession. Pressures for austerity are felt most acutely in governments that face difficulty borrowing to finance deficit
expenditures. This is especially the case when this borrowing relies on international sources of credit. Even for states that can borrow, however,
intellectual attachment to balanced budgets as a means to restore confidence—a belief in what is sometimes
called “expansionary austerity”—generates incentives to curtail expenditure. These incentives to cut occur
precisely when populations are experiencing economic hardship, making reductions especially painful that target
poverty alleviation, welfare programs, or economic subsidies. As a result, mass and elite constituents strongly resist such cuts. Welfare
programs and other forms of public spending may be especially susceptible to a policy “ratchet effect,”
where people are very reluctant to forego benefits once they have become accustomed to their
availability.6 As Paul Pierson has argued, “The politics [of welfare state] retrenchment is typically treacherous, because it imposes tangible
losses on concentrated groups of voters in return for diffuse and uncertain gains.”7 Austerity Leads to Cutbacks in Defense Spending At a
minimum, the political costs
of pursuing austerity through cutbacks in social and economic expenditures
alone make such a path unappealing. In practice, this can spur policymakers to curtail national security
spending as a way to balance budgets during periods of economic turmoil. There is often more discretion over
defense spending than over other areas in the budget, and it is frequently distantly connected to the welfare of the mass public. Many
militaries need foreign arms and foreign ammunition for their militaries, so defense expenditures are doubly costly since they both take up
valuable defense budget space while also sending hard currency overseas, rather than constituencies at home. Pursuing defense cuts
may also conform to the preferences of the financial sector, which shows a strong aversion to military conflict even if that
means policies of appeasement and conciliation.8 During periods of economic expansion, the opportunity costs
associated with defense expenditure—the requirement for higher taxes or foregone spending in other areas—are real but
acceptable. Economic contraction heightens the opportunity costs by forcing a choice between different
types of spending. There is a constituency for defense spending in the armed services, intelligence agencies, and
arms industries, but even in militarized economies this constituency tends to be numerically much smaller
than those that favor social and economic expenditures over military ones.

That means decline causes new U.S. defense cuts---that ends U.S. hegemony
and causes full withdrawal from the world

Data goes neg---economic crisis causes war---strong statistical support

--- causes power redistributions that are prone to miscalculation

--- decreases trade’s dampening effect on conflict

--- causes conflict self-reinforcement

--- diversionary theory

Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic
Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and
Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has
contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at
systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow.¶ First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle

rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power
theory, finding that

and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic
crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing
the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead
to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that
global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and
connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown.¶ Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that

'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security
behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations.
However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for

conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could
potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4¶ Third,

others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national
level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict,
particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write:¶ The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually
reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify

the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89)¶
Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana,
2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions.¶ Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary

theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have
increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and
Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and

Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic
states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing

periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked
that

to an increase in the use of force.¶ In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of
economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic,
dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and
deserves more attention.¶ This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a

decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus
on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the
occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.
 AT dedev:
maintaining plutonium reserves requires economic stability – impact is
extinction
Atkisson 3
(Alan, former executive editor of In Context: A Quarterly of Humane Sustainable Culture, 3-20-, “Sustainability is
Dead— Long Live Sustainability”,
http://www.rrcap.unep.org/uneptg06/course/Robert/SustainabilityManifesto2001.pdf)
At precisely the moment when humanity’s science, technology, and economy has grown to the point that we can monitor and evaluate all the
major systems that support life, all over the Earth, we have discovered that most of these systems are being systematically degraded and
destroyed . . . by our science, technology, and economy. The evidence that we are beyond the limits to growth is by now
overwhelming: the alarms include climatic change, disappearing biodiversity, falling human sperm counts, troubling slow-downs in food
production after decades of rapid expansion, the beginning of serious international tensions over basic needs like water. Wild storms and floods
and eerie changes in weather patterns are but a first visible harbinger of more serious trouble to come, trouble for which we are not
adequately prepared. Indeed, change of all kinds—in the Biosphere (nature as a whole), the Technosphere (the entirety of human manipulation
of nature), and the Noösphere (the collective field of human consciousness)—is happening so rapidly that it exceeds our capacity to understand
it, control it, or respond to it adequately in corrective ways. Humanity is simultaneously entranced by its own power, overwhelmed by the
problems created by progress, and continuing to steer itself over a cliff. Our economies and technologies are changing certain basic structures
of planetary life, such as the balance of carbon in the atmosphere, genetic codes, the amount of forest cover, species variety and distribution,
and the foundations of cultural identity. Unless
we make technological advances of the highest order, many of the
destructive changes we are causing to nature are irreversible. Extinct species cannot (yet) be brought back to life. No
credible strategy for controlling or reducing carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere has been put
forward. We do not know how to fix what we’re breaking. At the same time, some of the very products of our technology— A
Manifesto | 3 plutonium, for instance—require of us that we maintain a very high degree of cultural continuity,
economic and political stability, and technological capacity and sophistication, far into the future. To ensure our
safety and the safety of all forms of life, we must always be able to store, clean up, and contain poisons like
plutonium and persistent organic toxins. Eventually we must be able to eliminate them safely. At all times, we must be able to
contain the actions of evil or unethical elements in our societies who do not care about the consequences to life of unleashing our most
dangerous creations. In the case of certain creations, like nuclear materials and some artificially constructed or genetically modified organisms,
our secure custodianship must be maintained for thousands of years. We
are, in effect, committed to a high-technology
future. Any slip in our mastery over the forces now under our command could doom our descendants—
including not just human descendants, but also those wild species still remaining in the oceans and wilderness areas—to
unspeakable suffering. We must continue down an intensely scientific and technological path, and we can
never stop.

Growth sustainable and self-correcting - innovations

Worstall 12
(Tim, Senior Fellow at the Adam Smith Institute in London, and one of the global experts on the metal
scandium, "Infinite growth on a finite planet? Easy-peasy!", May 18 2012,
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/timworstall/100017248/infinite-growth-on-a-finite-planet-easy-
peasy/)

You'll have heard this before, no doubt: infinite growth is impossible on a finite planet. It's something of a mantra for
environmentalists and is used as absolute proof that we're just going to have to do without that pesky economic growth thing. The
problem here is that the conclusion isn't justified by the premise: it's driven by ignorance of what
economic growth actually is. The basic idiocy starts with the observation that there isn't an infinite amount of stuff out of which we
can make stuff. This is obviously true and no one asserts differently. However, it's entirely possible to have a system which is
finite in one dimension, and this will not limit growth within that system in another, entirely different,
direction. Using good old neoclassical economics, we define economic growth as an increase in GDP (not quite, but that's close enough for
us). GDP is the value at market prices of all final goods and services. This is, by definition, equal to the
value produced in that economy, the value as perceived by those doing the buying of all those things.
GDP is by no means perfect. Simon Kuznets, who invented it, pointed out much the same things that Ms Lucas and all the rest point out now.
It doesn't measure distribution, doesn't measure exhaustion of natural resources and so on. But it is what it is,
and it is what we normally mean by economic growth. So, using GDP, can we have infinite economic growth on a finite
planet by just making ever more things? No, clearly, we cannot: there is a limit to the number of atoms available to us. But
that's not actually what we're measuring in GDP: we're not measuring the amount, tonnage (it was the Soviets
who measured that), volume or even number of things that are made. We are measuring the value. So, is there a limit to
the amount of value that we can add? A useful way of thinking about technological advance is that it offers us either
better ways of doing old things or the opportunity to do entirely new things. Either of which can also be
described as the ability to add more value. Which leads us to the conclusion that as long as technology keeps
advancing then we can continue to add more value and thus we can continue to have more economic
growth. Strange as it may seem, this explanation built purely on standard neoclassical economics is exactly the same as the diagnosis that
Herman Daly gives us in ecological economics. He tells us that we face real and imminent resource constraints (I don't agree, but let's go with
his argumenent) and that thus we can have no more quantitative growth. This "quantitative" is the same as the above "more stuff". Daly also
talks about qualitative growth. The "qualitative" is equal to the "add more value" and I suspect the only reason Daly doesn't say so is that he
wants to be able to define what is valuable for people: you know the sort of thing, more walking in forests, more digging our own veg patches,
rousing choruses of Kumbaya, as opposed to the neoclassical method of measuring value, which is what you, each and individually, value. Walks
in the woods are just fine but so are steaks, excessive booze and even Simon Cowell. Whatever floats your boat. As an example, let's have a
glimspe of an extreme form of Daly's "steady-state economy". This is one where resources from the environment are taken only at the rate that
that environment can support. Renewables are used only at the rate at which they can be renewed. We're not
chewing up mounntains to make copper: we're only recycling that copper we've already got. Is
economic growth possible here? Yes, obviously it is. For while we've got limited resources to play with, it is still always open
to us to find new ways to add value to them. To be silly about it, we've got 1 million tonnes of copper and that's it. We use
that copper to make paperweights. Then we learn how to make copper into computer motherboards
and we recycle all paperweights into computers. We value the computers more than the paperweights:
we've just had GDP growth, we've just had economic growth, with no increase in the consumption of resources.
Even in this steady-state economy therefore, even one in which everything is recycled, we can still have
economic growth through advancing technology. This advancing technology is known as an increase in total factor
productivity (TFP). What we'd like to know next is how much limiting ourselves to only this type of growth is going to limit total growth. Bob
Solow once worked out that 80 per cent of the economic growth in 20th-century market economies came from TFP growth. Only 20 per cent
came from more resource use: in the socialist economies there was no TFP growth, and all growth came from greater resource use. So we can
indeed have quite a lot of economic growth even in the greenest of economies, can we not?

Collapse doesn’t change the system – it will rebound and be worse

Mead 9
(Walter Russell Mead, Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, 2-4-2009,
The New Republic, “Only Makes You Stronger”, 2/4,
http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2)
And yet, this relentless series of crises has not disrupted the rise of a global capitalist system, centered first on the power
of the United Kingdom and then, since World War II, on the power of the United States. After more than 300 years, it seems
reasonable to conclude that financial and economic crises do not, by themselves, threaten either the international capitalist
system or the special role within it of leading capitalist powers like the United Kingdom and the United States. If anything, the opposite
seems true--that financial crises in some way sustain Anglophone power and capitalist development. Indeed, many critics of both
capitalism and the "Anglo-Saxons" who practice it so aggressively have pointed to what seems to be a perverse relationship
between such crises and the consolidation of the "core" capitalist economies against the impoverished periphery.
Marx noted that financial crises remorselessly crushed weaker companies, allowing the most successful and
ruthless capitalists to cement their domination of the system. For dependency theorists like Raul Prebisch, crises served a
similar function in the international system, helping stronger countries marginalize and impoverish developing ones.

Financial markets key to expanding renewable tech in developing countries-

that’s key to emissions and boosts their economies, solving the impact
GES 12, 9-15-12, Global Economic Symposium, “Climate Change and Economic Development,” http://www.global-economic-
symposium.org/knowledgebase/the-global-environment/climate-change-and-economic-development

Climate change poses the serious challenge of carbon dioxide emission reduction.
Emission control by developing countries is
becoming a key for effective mitigation of climate change, as those countries now account for more than
a half of global emissions and are still expanding their energy infrastructure. Substantial emission
reduction in developing countries would require strong policy commitments and subsequent investments in a
green economy. Some highly efficient, emission-saving production technologies could already be implemented without technical
complexities. The challenge is therefore how to bring these technologies to countries that do not have the
financial means to invest in them. The successful implementation could generate a “triple dividend,” that
is, energy saving, emission reduction and job creation. In this sense climate change can be seen as a chance
for economic development in these countries. Meanwhile, climate experts indicate that the damages of climate change will
fall disproportionately on developing countries and particularly on the poor, which are the most vulnerable and least able to adapt. Those
damages could inhibit economic development. The
World Bank estimates that developing countries will need $145-
$175 billion for mitigation and $30-$100 billion for adaptation annually by the year 2030. However, the
amount of international funding is currently $9 billion for both measures combined. There are two areas in which we need international
solutions. The first is how to promote
implementation of efficient technologies in developing countries. The second
one is how to finance the adaption to climate change in developing countries. The first part can
be solved not only on the political
level, but to a high degree on a business level, particularly by multinational firms. How can we encourage the
business sector in implementation of efficient technologies? What will be effective ways of public-private partnerships to achieve the goal? In
order to solve the second part, there is a need for intensified communication between politics and development
partners. How can we guarantee such communication given the multiplicity of institutions involving development assistance, which include
bilateral aid organizations as well as multilateral ones such as UN institutions? Also, how should we set priorities in the distribution of funds
(e.g., finding a balance between financial support of climate change adaptation and conventional development aid, streamlining funding bodies
for climate change adaptation and for other types of development assistance)? Meanwhile, should governments also establish new
mechanisms to raise such funds, such as the allocation of revenues from auctioning emission permits and the introduction of a new global tax
(e.g., a Tobin tax)?
Economic growth is not intertwined with increased emissions evidenced by
large scale decoupling
Muro and Saha 16 – Mark, Muro holds a bachelor’s degree from Harvard and master’s degree from
UC Berkley. He is an expert in economic development and he is currently working as a Policy Director for
the Metropolitan Policy Program. Saha is a former associate of the Metropolitan Policy Program.
(Growth, carbon, and Trump: States are “decoupling” economic growth from emissions growth,
December 8, 2016) https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2016/12/08/decoupling-economic-
growth-from-emissions-growth/ )

What do these data show? Overall, some 33 states delinked their growth and carbon emissions between 2000
and 2014, confirming that economic growth does not inevitably require emissions growth. To see what’s
going on, take a look at the following state map and the set of small line charts below that. A look at these graphics shows that, as a group,
the 33 decoupling states expanded their economies by 22 percent while reducing their emissions by
nearly 12 percent. Maine achieved the largest CO2 decline among the 50 states, at 25 percent, while
growing its economy by 9 percent. Among the larger states (in terms of GDP), Massachusetts, New York, and Georgia saw some of
the largest reductions in emissions since 2000. Massachusetts managed to cut its emissions by 22 percent even as its
GDP grew by 21 percent. New York and Georgia decreased their emissions by 20 percent and 17 percent, respectively, while growing
their GDPs by 24 percent and 15 percent. The pace of decoupling, meanwhile, has accelerated over time, with more
and more states breaking the historically tight link between economic growth and emissions growth. For
instance, in 2007, only 14 states had decoupled. In the years since then, however, the number has doubled, with new states
like California, Georgia, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Virginia joining the ranks of the delinked.

No Mindset shift people wont want to dedev so the turn is non uq

 util
Extinction outweighs
Bostrum 12 (Nick, Professor of Philosophy at Oxford, directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute
and winner of the Gannon Award, Interview with Ross Andersen, correspondent at The Atlantic, 3/6,
“We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction”,
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-
extinction/253821/)

Bostrom, who directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, has argued over the course of several papers that human extinction risks are poorly understood
and, worse still, severely underestimated by society . Some of these existential risks are fairly well known, especially the natural ones. But others are obscure or
even exotic. Most worrying to Bostrom is the subset of existential risks that arise from human technology, a subset that he expects to grow in number and potency over the next century.¶
Despite his concerns about the risks posed to humans by technological progress, Bostrom is no luddite. In fact, he is a longtime advocate of transhumanism---the effort to improve the human
condition, and even human nature itself, through technological means. In the long run he sees technology as a bridge, a bridge we humans must cross with great care, in order to reach new
and better modes of being. In his work, Bostrom uses the tools of philosophy and mathematics, in particular probability theory, to try and determine how we as a species might achieve this
safe passage. What follows is my conversation with Bostrom about some of the most interesting and worrying existential risks that humanity might encounter in the decades and centuries to
come, and about what we can do to make sure we outlast them.¶ Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future

existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that existential risk mitigation may in fact be a
dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering . Can you explain why? ¶ Bostrom: Well suppose you have a
moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people . You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter
whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---

something. A human life is a human life. If you have

somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or

that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get
this very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything
else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity
survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize
billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently.
Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to
outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be
 turns terrorism
Turns terrorism
Bremmer 9 (Ian, - President of the Eurasia Group, sr. fellow @ World Policy Institute, 3/4/09, Foreign
Policy,
http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/03/04/the_global_recession_heightens_terrorist_risks)

But there's another reason why the financial crisis heightens the risk of global terrorism. Militants thrive
in places where no one is fully in charge. The global recession threatens to create more such places. No
matter how cohesive and determined a terrorist organization, it needs a supportive environment in
which to flourish. That means a location that provides a steady stream of funds and recruits and the
support (or at least acceptance) of the local population. Much of the counter-terrorist success we've
seen in Iraq's al Anbar province over the past two years is a direct result of an increased willingness of
local Iraqis to help the Iraqi army and US troops oust the militants operating there. In part, that's
because the area's tribal leaders have their own incentives (including payment in cash and weaponry)
for cooperating with occupation forces. But it's also because foreign militants have alienated the locals.
The security deterioration of the past year in Pakistan and Afghanistan reflects exactly the opposite
phenomenon. In the region along both sides of their shared border, local tribal leaders have yet to
express much interest in helping Pakistani and NATO soldiers target local or foreign militants. For those
with the power to either protect or betray the senior al-Qaeda leaders believed to be hiding in the
region, NATO and Pakistani authorities have yet to find either sweet enough carrots or sharp enough
sticks to shift allegiances. The slowdown threatens to slow the progress of a number of developing
countries. Most states don't provide ground as fertile for militancy as places like Afghanistan, Somalia,
and Yemen. But as more people lose their jobs, their homes, and opportunities for prosperity -- in
emerging market countries or even within minority communities inside developed states -- it becomes
easier for local militants to find volunteers. This is why the growing risk of attack from suicide bombers
and well-trained gunmen in Pakistan creates risks that extend beyond South Asia. This is a country that
is home to lawless regions where local and international militants thrive, nuclear weapons and material,
a history of nuclear smuggling, a cash-starved government, and a deteriorating economy. Pakistan is far
from the only country in which terrorism threatens to spill across borders.
 turns china war
Decline of growth causes China war and CCP collapse.
Barry F. MURDACO 16. Adjunct Lecturer in Political Science, Lehman College. “The Hermeneutics of
International Trade Conflicts: U.S. Punitive Trade Policy Towards China and Japan.” CUNY Academic
Works. 214-7, http://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/737.

Since the CCP holds most of China’s debt, if the bubble were to burst, it would not spread like a contagion to other states. To manage these kinds of potential crises actually undermines the

the government has maintained a

case for further liberalization, since that only leads to more volatility and more unpredictable shifts in economic forces. So far,

delicate balancing act of raising interest rates to cool off the economy and lowering interest rates to
stimulate more spending, to respond to fluctuations that can easily turn into another crisis. The difficulty
of maintaining this balance, and the flexibility and adaptation to respond to economic shifts is
complicated by the dynamics of the global economy and China’s main trading partners. The sluggishness
of the American and Eurozone economies has had a depressing effect on Chinese economic growth as well,
so efforts to cool off the economy end up being reversed by policies to stimulate spending. Housing prices in China

plummeted as much as 20 or 50 percent in some cities, virtually overnight, but then was further stimulated by the government to raise prices again. The Chinese

government seems unable to fully pull out of its dependence in the housing market, but this is in part due to the lack of
alternatives for investment in China. One area of liberalization that could be beneficial is to adopt the transparency standards for corporations, the stock exchange as well as for government
bureaucracies, this will help establish trust and confidence in other institutions for investment, and reduce corruption that is also endemic within Chinese corporations and government

If the global economy as a whole were more stable, then there would be less pressure on China to
bureaucracy.

continue stimulating spending through debt. The precariousness of this situation means that it is unlikely the Chinese government will accelerate its path
of liberalization in conformity with U.S. policymakers.¶ Another important factor that needs to be taken into consideration is that China’s economy is still in its developing stages. Its per capita
GDP is still very low compared the U.S., Japan, or other developed economies (CIA 2015). The level of urbanization in China is just over half, where in most developed economies, almost 80 or
90 percent of the population live in urban areas. The service sector only barely exceeds the percentage of GDP concentrated in industries, where in most developed economies the service
sector is usually at least twice as large as the concentration of GDP in industry (CIA 2015). What this means is the level of competitiveness in the structure of trade between the U.S. and China
has yet to hit its peak. What happens when Chinese autos, computers, telecommunication, internet services, etc., are in more direct competition with U.S. industries, as early signs show
already, and similar to the level of competition between the U.S. and Japan in the 1980s? There is no indication that China’s lead in developing renewable energy resources is declining either.
When trade conflicts with Japan intensified in the 1980s, Japan had already attained the status of a developed economy and was in more direct competition with the most important, and most

Conflicts with China have reached already such a high pitch of intensity, even though
advanced U.S. industries.

China is still largely a developing economy, and the structure of trade with China is still largely
complementary, meaning that the bulk of Chinese exports still tend to come from sectors where the U.S.
has presumably moved away from (although workers in those sectors may not be aware of that).¶ Another dimension lacking in the conflict with Japan is the
national security dimension to these conflicts, which unquestionably raises the intensity level. Many commentators in the U.S. were critical of the idea of Japanese investors purchasing U.S.
assets in the 1980s whether it was Rockefeller Center or Columbia Pictures (an unintended consequence of the appreciation of the yen), but it does not compare to the intense condemnation
of the attempted purchase of Unocal by CNOOC. By the end of the 1980s, the U.S. was putting enormous pressure on Japan to build up its military and take more of an active role in policing

there is a range of potential issues that could

the region, but reacts with anxiety at the idea of China’s military buildup. In the international arena,

serve to catalyze conflict. The unpredictability of the North Korean regime raises tensions; the still
unresolved issue between the PRC and the Republic of China in Taiwan is also a potential catalyst. Beginning
in 2014, there have been major demonstrations in Hong Kong, dubbed the “umbrella revolution,” an extension of the occupy movement, and poses the most

serious challenge to the institutional principle of “one country, two systems” which has defined the re-absorption of Hong Kong into China since 1997. Also, conflicts between

China and other Asian states regarding the Spratly and Paracel islands create great controversy and
tension; or conflict between China and Japan over the Ryukyu and Senkaku islands, not to mention the
still lingering animosity between these two states from World War II and the Second Sino-Japanese War.
Commentators in the U.S. portray China as propping up the teetering North Korean regime, even while leaked documents suggest that China would accept Korean reunification under the
South. Commentators also frame the conflicts over the Spratly and Paracel Islands as China versus the rest of the states in the region, even though states like the Philippines, Indonesia, and

The U.S. also has an interest in this conflict for the reported large
Vietnam argue as intensely with each other, as they do with China.

quantities of natural gas and oil that can be exploited from drilling in the seabeds around these islands.
These manipulative and self-serving impressions are easier to circulate in U.S. media since it plays on people’s ignorance of foreign affairs. This is happening at the same time in which the U.S.
is trying to isolate China with the passage of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that will help consolidate the institutionalization of the Washington Consensus. The most intense conflict

creating some kind of international incident, that would

between the U.S. and China would probably involve a third party actor provoking, or

force the U.S. and China to react using economic, and perhaps even military means.¶ Even in the absence of that kind of
worst-case scenario, which cannot by any stretch of the imagination be ruled out, conflicts with China will continue to intensify as the Chinese economy develops more and takes on more of

If U.S. economic growth continues to be sluggish, if it is unable to raise its exports

the features of a developed economy.

to China in products other than scrap metal and raw materials, and if it is unable to pacify the
tremendous social instability resulting from stagnant wages and a mélange of other social and political
dysfunctions, then it is likely that trade wars and other sanctions will continue to intensify in the frequency
in which they occur and in the depth of the conflicts themselves. These forms of conflict are all but guaranteed to
intensify, so long as free trade norms narrow the framing of trade discourse, and obstruct the adoption of new policies that may have a chance of reversing over three decades of
failure to effect positive trade outcomes.
 turns indo-pak war
Econ decline causes Indo-Pak war.
Evan HILLEBRAND AND Stacy CLOSSON 15. *Professor of International Economics, Patterson
School of Diplomacy. **Distinguished Visiting Professor, Patterson School of Diplomacy. Energy,
Economic Growth, and Geopolitical Futures: Eight Long-Range Scenarios. MIT Press. 49-53.

The global economic downturn, coupled with the humiliation of the liberal democratic model in the
United States and Europe, leaves India without either a strong market for its exports or a modernization
model. Its government becomes incapable of making decisions, its infrastructure cracks, and its long-
simmering insurgencies become bloody and widespread. In some cases, Pakistani-backed groups and their
Indian sympathizers commit terrorist acts on critical sites in India. Full-blown low-intensity conflict erupts in
Kashmir between the Muslims and the Hindus. The establishment of Al-Qaida branch in India also
contributes to the increase in intra-religious conflict in the country. The Taliban resume control in
Afghanistan, and Indian investments there are threatened.
military relations DA
 overview
continued arms sales are key to preventing a collapse of military relations with other
nations. that prevents global conflict. turns case because it prevents future deterrence
cooperation and human rights aid
 AT non unique
1. Extend UQ- extend the cooper 6/12 card that clearly states that arms sales are
key to u.s leader ship as it boosts the u.s credibility and it checks china and
Russia.
2. risk outweighs – any risk of nuclear conflict means you err neg. even if defense
cooperation is low now, the aff pushes it past the brink
3. And: CAT Policy removes the barriers to allow the U.S. to be competitive and
ward off great power challengers in political, economic, and military spheres
Gray, 18 --- deputy director of the White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy (8/8/18,
Alex, “U.S. Arms Transfer Policy: Shaping the Way Ahead,” https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-arms-
transfer-policy-shaping-way-ahead, accessed on 6/5/19, JMP)

ALEX GRAY: Thanks so much to Andrew and his team and CSIS for having me here. It’s been a pleasure
to be here with my interagency colleagues Laura, Ambassador Kaidanow, and the State Department.
We’ve got a great collaboration on CAT throughout the interagency – DOD, the White House, State
Department. I particularly want to acknowledge our colleagues at the National Security Council who led
this effort, who have just been tireless and incredibly skilled at pushing this – pushing this through.

You know, I’m here on behalf of the White House Trade and Manufacturing Policy Office, and our
mission is to work with our interagency colleagues and with the National Security Council to promote
policies that expand balanced trading opportunities abroad, encourage policies that buy American and
hire American, and protect and strengthen the U.S. defense industrial base. The Conventional Arms
Transfer Policy encapsulates all of those objectives.

Rather than – you know, Laura and State have done such a great job articulating the implementation
side of this. I’m going to talk a little bit more about how CAT fits into the administration and the
president’s broader agenda, and some of the – some of the connections and connectivity between
different aspects of that agenda.

CAT was designed in response to a shifting strategic landscape that’s increasingly characterized by great-
power competition across the political, economic, and military spheres. CAT prioritizes staying ahead
of this competition by responding proactively instead of reactively to the defense needs of allies and
partners. It also recognizes one of this president’s signature themes: economic security is national
security. By removing some of the previous administration’s artificial barriers to the transfer of arms to
critical partners, the UAS export policy being one example, this administration is both strengthening
our hand in the ongoing strategic competition while also stimulating economic growth at home, as
well as job creation.

It should be noted that the U.S. aerospace and defense industries contribute almost $1 trillion annually
to the U.S. economy and they support about 2 ½ million American jobs. Just as one point, the
international – UAS export market alone is estimated to be worth more than $50 billion a year within
the next decade. Those are the stakes we’re competing for.
Key objectives of CAT going forward – and Laura outlined most of these – working closely with allies and
partners to identify the capability requirements they have and undertaking a whole-of-government
response to meet those needs. Particularly, one of the things that our office has been very much
involved in with NSC and State is the advocacy piece of this, and ensuring that the competitiveness of
our defense exports abroad for both economic and security purposes is maintained. I would note, as
Ambassador Kaidanow did, that the administration dispatched one of the highest-level delegations to
date to the Farnborough Airshow several months ago, which I think demonstrates just how committed
the whole-of-government approach is to that particular aspect.

Working with partners to ensure that U.S. barriers to entry are reduced and that policies like offset
requirements do not threaten American jobs or reduce our technological edge.

And, like Laura said, continuing to update the policy and regulatory frameworks that underlie the arms
transfer policy, including revising outdated policies and updating regulatory frameworks like ITAR.

The CAT Policy is part of a larger administration effort to stress the connectivity of economic and
national security, another being the assessment of the defense and manufacturing industrial base that
was mandated by Executive Order 13806, which we’re hoping will be released in the near future.
Defense exports are an important tool for maintaining a healthy and resilient defense industrial base,
including one capable of surging in a crisis. A diversified defense export sector also supports a wide
variety of critical labor skills that are required by the U.S. defense industrial base, as well as our allies
and partners.

I look forward to continuing to participate in this interagency process as implementation of CAT

progresses. And we look forward to continuing this dialogue with all the relevant stakeholders here –
whether industry or NGOs. And we want that dialogue to be frank, honest, and ongoing. I would
particular urge U.S. industry to engage with the interagency on this process by offering specific,
quantifiable steps that will help meet the goals laid out in CAT. Again, I want to thank all my interagency
colleagues and the NSC, of course, for their hard work and dedication. Thank you.
MR. HUNTER: Thank you, Alex. Keith.

KEITH WEBSTER: Great. Andrew, thank you. And thank you to CSIS for this opportunity to speak.

And first of all, I’d like to put in context the Defense and Aerospace Export Council, which was recently launched a few months ago, in April, at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, is a unique opportunity capitalizing on the administration’s interest in moving forward with CAT policy changes
to put forward a brand-new council at the Chamber that’s focused on influencing the government – both U.S. government and foreign governments – and working with our industrial sector to advance opportunities for industries globally. And it’s an honor for me to be part of that
initiative. And my executive director, Ben Schwartz, is here in the front row as well.

As Andrew kindly pointed out, I have a little bit of experience – roughly 33 years of experience in this very issue of arms transfer and cooperative research and development work with friends and allies globally. And what has changed in that 33 years is that the United States and its
industries, although having incredibly capable military equipment, is not the only game in town. We are seeing the emergence of the Chinese and their military-industrial complex. And we’re also seeing Russia continue to advance some of its capabilities in the global market, as well as
others – friends and allies – who have created military-industrial complexes. So when I started in this business 33 years ago, we had a very strong corner on the market for advanced military capability. That is no longer the case today. So there is a paradigm shift.

Specific to the CAT changes, we at this council at the Chamber are welcoming of the economic impact considerations as an element of the arms transfer review process. In my 33 years, it’s the first time that the policy has been expanded to include this consideration – the economic
impact. It is not an overarching consideration, but it is allowed now to be a credible component of consideration in transfers. We also encourage consideration of foreign availability as an element of the arms transfer review process.

As we are witnessing China – as an example, not alone – but China filling voids the U.S. left with a denial to a friend or ally. The consequence of a denial filled by China or other s is as follows: The U.S. loses market share that is not easily recaptured, and in some cases will never be
recaptured. The U.S. loses control of the capability. The U.S. loses the opportunity to train, influence, and maintain a military relationship with foreign forces, who now are introducing into their inventory a Chinese – Korean, Israeli, et cetera – capability. And finally, with the introduction
of, let’s say, Chinese or Russian system into the military inventory of that friend or ally, we now have a far more complicated future arms transfer decision process that is now compounded by a prior U.S. denial . And in some instances, we complicate the potential for expanded diplomatic
relations.

Let me explain how – what I mean here. India. Let’s take India as an example. I’ve worked very closely with India over the recent years for Dr. Carter. Years ago we denied AESA radar for the MMRCA jet competition, fighter competition several years ago, and the French clinched the deal.
Now I like the French. Don’t get me wrong. But I like American industry better. Now, several years later – and I worked this initiative with Dr. Carter; we’re Johnny-come-lately to the effort – for additional aircraft capability in India. And now we’re all in. We’ve revised our policies. AESA’s
possible, coproduction, production of aircraft and making it in India is possible. But we are behind now because the French bid us out.

Another example with India, we never answered India’s request for ballistic missile defense capability. That ask of the U.S. went unanswered for a number of years. And now, India has been forced to consider and has – may potentially go buy, potentially, the Russian S-400 system. Similar
to what Turkey’s buying- - or said they were going to buy. Now we are rushing to put together a proposal for BMD for India to counter that situation. And why is that a problem for us? We have legislation on the Hill in 2017, CAATSA, which penalizes friends and allies who lean towards
Russian equipment specifically. Fortunately there’s been a congressional carve out for India, but it created a lot of anxiety.

So NDAA 2019, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2019, is headed to the president. And we at the chamber, and on this council, Defense Aerospace Export Council, are encouraged with the language is Section 1752 that reinforces economic consideration in this review
process, and also requires, as well, the consideration of foreign availability – a recommendation that we published in 30 proposals to the administration on June 8th. So we’re excited a bout the language in NDAA 2019.

Finally, the DAEC, this council, is working closely with the administration and the Congress specific to our 30 recommendations that we published on June 8th. We are encouraging the administration to use the tools it has to affect real change, to issue executive orders, directives, and to
hold the system accountable to seize this opportunity to address issues that we have debated since the Defense News article “ Wrapped in Red Tape” that was published in 1997. I remember that. Many of you probably do not. A unique opportunity for true change. And I am honored to
work with the colleagues here representative of State, the NSC and the White House, and others to advance these changes. Thank you.

MR. HUNTER: Thank you. Keith. And I as I mentioned, I’m going to sort of take a break now on opening remarks and ask some questions as the moderator. But I would like the whole panel to weigh in on if they would like to.

And I want to start with the question – if I could just pose it in its most general form and then elaborate a little bit – about how you implement a policy and a process that is a case by case review process? Because these cases come up as individual transactions or deals. They may not be
single transactions. They may involve multiple transactions. But they’re reviewed – well, if we’re lucky, they’re reviewed as a – (laughs) – as an overarching case. And so any individual situation has its own unique, you know, bumps and hurdles and roadblocks. And t hat can lead to an
outcome which may seem inconsistent at first blush with the policy statements that are being made.
So I guess that’s in terms of how you implement this policy approach. And I really take to heart the kind of paradigm shift that was referenced by several about being proactive rather than reactive. And I strongly resonate with Keith’s remarks that, you know, we – previously we had a
situation where U.S. products were so much in demand, so much the pinnacle that the world was seeking that, you know, reactive probably worked, at least for a while, because you had what everyone wanted, and you could afford to be in a reactive mode. That I tend to think has
changed. So how do we actually do a proactive process on something where it’s case by case and we’re trying to balance all these competing priorities? And I welcome anyone on the panel who has thoughts on this.

MS. CRESSEY: I’ll take a first shot. So I think looking at a case-by-case review, to us what that means is that provides us with an element of flexibility. It does not mean that we are going to ignore past licenses or past arms transfers, that we’re going to, you know, turn a blind eye to any
kind of precedent. But what it does give us, is it gives us a bit of flexibility. All of those various considerations that are in the CAT policy that we have to – that we have to take heed of when we’re looking at a – when we’re looking at a potential transfer, it’s – what’s great about the CAT
policy is it does not – it does not prioritize any of the – any of the considerations that are out there. It just lays them out there for us to – for us to consider.

And as my boss was saying in a Chamber of Commerce event just yesterday – my undersecretary – she says, you know, the world changes from week to week, from month to month. And so, you know, something that we may have been willing to provide a partner two months ago, maybe
something has changed – you can imagine right now – some things have changed such that we’re not really quite ready to approve that transfer today. And so that’s the kind of case-by-case review that we’re talking about. It does not mean, just to underline, that we not going to be
considering precedents, that we’re not going to be looking at past licenses, that, you know, if a company comes to us and says, well, this is the third of 10 transfers that we have planned, we’re not going to necessarily take that third transfer and look at it without thinking about the –
about the whole picture. So hopefully that allays some of the – some of the concerns.

But we do have a bit of a – a big of a balancing act here with this case-by-case review and our desire to – as Alex was talking about – to really try to look proactively at what we want to do with partners and allies. And that proactive, strategic look is a little bit different from what we’re
doing on a case-by-case – on the case-by-case basis. And it’s trying to take into account, you know, what are the things that we want to accomplish as a country? What are the things that have been outlined in the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy? And how
can we work proactively with our partners and allies to try to realize those goals and objectives?

MR. HUNTER: Dak?

DAK HARDWICK: Andrew, I think it’s a great lead-off question for what we’re talking about here. And I think it’s illustrated in one of the reform proposals that the Aerospace Industries Association submitted to the U.S. government. How do you rationalize the case-by-case with the – with
the broad overall policy change? And one of the best examples is you look at some of your existing processes – and specifically, I’m talking about the concept of a program license. So for those that are unfamiliar with the program license, instead of licensing on a case-by-case basis on
individual – on individual licenses, what you do is you provide a license for an entire program, and then any of the associated licenses that are responsible for – or, that fall under that program could then be expedited through the U.S. government.

Those licenses, that program, has already been adjudicated by the United States government. We already see the considerations. Whether it’s for human rights or humanitarian concerns or technology transfer, all of that has already been adjudicated. And that allows for those licenses to
continue through the system, which is already burdened, to move through more quickly than you would do on a case by case basis. So a program license really is a good solution for one of these really thorny issues that we run into when you do overall defense trade and defense trade
reform. And we’re hopeful that the administration, as part of the national implementation plan, will look at a program license and consider that particular structure as something that can be considered going forward.

MELISSA DALTON: Thanks, Andrew.

To build off that point, I mean, I think, you know, there is the risk of being inundated and overwhelmed from a capacity and workforce perspective in terms of the range of inputs that’ll have to be taken into consideration with this policy. It has always been multifaceted. Arguably there
are additional layers of complexity that the administration is endeavoring to incorporation, which I think is the right approach. But perhaps, as a similar but broader effort to what Dak and AIA have recommended, is building a series of archetypes or templates for the types of challenges
that the U.S. National Security Community is going to encounter when it wrestles with these arms transfer policy decisions.

Based on the complexity of the context into which we’re inserting these arms, in terms of the foreign policy tradeoffs, in terms of tech release concerns, such that you could develop a range of archetypes that move along a spectrum of a highly capable ally – such as European or Eastern
Asian allies, to perhaps a more fractious debate surrounding partners in some other parts of the world. So that might be an approach to consider, but would require all the different nodes of the interagency and also a dialogue with industry, Chamber of Commerce, and others that have a
voice in this process, along with civil society and humanitarian actors, to construct these archetypes.

MR. HUNTER: Jeff, go ahead.

JEFF ABRAMSON: Just briefly on this. It’s an interesting question, and I get where it’s coming from. But I want to sort of maybe stress what Laura was saying. It’s really important that you keep this as part of your approach because of the changing dynamics and the changing situations.
And then maybe later we can talk about there should be additional insertion points where you are taking account of changing times. I understand the desire here, but I think it’s also really important as a – from the idea of responsibility with these sales that there is this case-by-case
review.

MR. GRAY: Just one addition to what Laura said. I think while maintaining the case-by-case review, I
think it’s important that we do have these big-picture policy statements, not only because they convey
a sense of the administration and the president’s intent in this policy throughout the entire whole-of-
government approach, but also I think having these economic security – you know, being able to
compete in a great power competition, having all of that as a signal of intent to our allies and
partners, as well as our competitors, I think that’s really important. So the balance between the big-
picture signaling and kind of the case-by-case nuance that the interagency needs to do this effective, I
think that’s really important.

4. And: The new CAT policy expands arms sales by making the government a
critical advocate
Ambassador Kaidanow, 18 --- Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs at the U.S.
Department of State (8/8/18, Tina, “U.S. Arms Transfer Policy: Shaping the Way Ahead,”
https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-arms-transfer-policy-shaping-way-ahead, accessed on 6/5/19, JMP)

So, with no further ado, let me just say I think, again, as Andrew mentioned and I know that most of you
are aware, in April of this past year the president issued a national security policy memorandum
announcing a revised conventional arms transfer – or, as we like to call it affectionately, a CAT – policy.
The CAT Policy provides a framework under which the U.S. government and all of its agencies will review
and evaluate proposed arms transfers. The new policy reflects the priorities of the president’s National
Security Strategy, which are, namely, to preserve peace through strength by reforming regulations to
facilitate the exports of U.S. military equipment; to strengthen partners and allies; to facilitate U.S.
economic security and innovation – we’ll talk a little bit more about that; and to uphold respect for
human rights and U.S. nonproliferation objectives. In short, the new CAT Policy was designed to expand
opportunities for American industry, create American jobs, and maintain U.S. national security,
ensuring that we continue to review each arms transfer thoroughly in order to ensure that it is in the
national interest of the United States.

The release of the new policy was only the first step in a series of what we believe will be very practical
results-focused initiatives to transform the way that the U.S. government works to support and grow
our defense industrial base. Through that memorandum, the president also directed the secretary of
state, in coordination with the secretaries of defense, commerce, and energy, to submit an
implementation plan within 60 days. So, during the 60 days following the release of the policy, my
colleagues from across the executive branch and I met with stakeholders from industry, from civil
society, as well as congressional staffers to collect all of their input and hopefully closely align our
implementation plan with real-world challenges. In fact, as part of this engagement, in April I met with a
group of scholars from the NGO and think-tank community right here at CSIS to discuss the new CAT
Policy. We’re very grateful for everybody who contributed feedback to that very important process.

And subsequently, as directed by the president’s national security policy memorandum, we did indeed
submit a national implementation plan on July 13 th. The plan represents an integrated strategy, one
that aligns our conventional arms transfers with our national security and economic interests, and it’s
built on three specific lines of effort.

First, the plan calls for prioritizing strategic and economic competition through a paradigm shift from the
current reactive posture to a more proactive posture that actively develops partnerships and capabilities
reflective of U.S. strategic and economic objectives. We will use this policy tool to ensure that U.S.
products can win in the competitive global marketplace.

Second, the plan envisions organizing our efforts for success, ensuring that the executive branch is
positioned, staffed, and resourced to best support efficient execution of the Conventional Arms Transfer
Policy, and that its processes are also similarly constructed.

Third, the plan calls for creating conducive environments through engagement with Congress, industry,
international partners, and other stakeholders to foster the efficient operation of U.S. defense trade.

What all this really ultimately means and what the initiative makes clear is that under this administration
there will be no more active advocate for U.S. sales than the U.S. government itself. Thus, a top
priority of my bureau – the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the State Department – is maintaining
the United States as the security partner of choice for our many friends and allies overseas.

As just one example of this effort, not even a month ago really I attended the Farnborough Airshow in
the U.K., where I met with defense industry representatives from U.S. companies of all sizes to discuss
the CAT Policy implementation plan and to seek feedback in real time. And let me say, again, those
companies were both small and medium, as well as large. So we tried to hit on the array of companies
that were represented there, all of which were present. I also met with counterparts from strategic
partners and allies – some from Europe, other parts of the world – to brief them on the president’s new
policy, and to advocate strongly for ongoing and prospective defense sales.

For years, U.S. embassies and consulates have been committed to supporting U.S. companies’ efforts to
grow their global exports. Our diplomats have long worked to ensure that U.S. products and services
have the best possible chance to compete abroad. Through participation in key forms like Farnborough,
the administration’s defense-trade-focused initiatives build upon this tradition of economic diplomacy
and direct the U.S. government to support America’s defense industry by strengthening our advocacy
for defense sales that are obviously so critical to our national interest.

The State Department, through my bureau, has played a central role in the development of the CAT
Policy and its implementation plan because arms transfers are and must be tools of our overall foreign
policy objectives. Through the responsible oversight of arms transfers, we’re supporting existing allies
and partners, or in some cases establishing and expanding new security partnerships that we hope will
last for generations.

The complexities of our operating environment are clearly manifest. The issues we tackle every day at
State are at the confluence of policy, regulatory, economic, and congressional imperatives. As we
endeavor to faithfully implement the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, we are anchoring our arms
transfers in, as I said, our larger foreign policy framework, and simultaneously protecting the security
and the integrity of our technological advantage and our defense industrial base.
 AT no link
1. Extend the link- Spindel 18 evidence shows that our military commitments are a
key signal of broader US credibility in other issues – arms sales are key to every
other cooperation
2. Link o/w the no link on probability – it’s much more probable that the plan
signals a commitment shift
3. And: Arms restrictions deck diplomatic and military relations with foreign
forces --- countries will shift to other buyers
Webster, 18 --- President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Defense and Aerospace Export Council
(8/8/18, Keith, “U.S. Arms Transfer Policy: Shaping the Way Ahead,” https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-
arms-transfer-policy-shaping-way-ahead, accessed on 6/5/19, JMP)

KEITH WEBSTER: Great. Andrew, thank you. And thank you to CSIS for this opportunity to speak.

And first of all, I’d like to put in context the Defense and Aerospace Export Council, which was recently
launched a few months ago, in April, at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, is a unique opportunity
capitalizing on the administration’s interest in moving forward with CAT policy changes to put forward a
brand-new council at the Chamber that’s focused on influencing the government – both U.S.
government and foreign governments – and working with our industrial sector to advance opportunities
for industries globally. And it’s an honor for me to be part of that initiative. And my executive director,
Ben Schwartz, is here in the front row as well.

As Andrew kindly pointed out, I have a little bit of experience – roughly 33 years of experience in this
very issue of arms transfer and cooperative research and development work with friends and allies
globally. And what has changed in that 33 years is that the United States and its industries, although
having incredibly capable military equipment, is not the only game in town. We are seeing the
emergence of the Chinese and their military-industrial complex. And we’re also seeing Russia continue
to advance some of its capabilities in the global market, as well as others – friends and allies – who have
created military-industrial complexes. So when I started in this business 33 years ago, we had a very
strong corner on the market for advanced military capability. That is no longer the case today. So there
is a paradigm shift.

Specific to the CAT changes, we at this council at the Chamber are welcoming of the economic impact
considerations as an element of the arms transfer review process. In my 33 years, it’s the first time that
the policy has been expanded to include this consideration – the economic impact. It is not an
overarching consideration, but it is allowed now to be a credible component of consideration in
transfers. We also encourage consideration of foreign availability as an element of the arms transfer
review process.

As we are witnessing China – as an example, not alone – but China filling voids the U.S. left with a denial
to a friend or ally. The consequence of a denial filled by China or others is as follows: The U.S. loses
market share that is not easily recaptured, and in some cases will never be recaptured. The U.S. loses
control of the capability. The U.S. loses the opportunity to train, influence, and maintain a military
relationship with foreign forces, who now are introducing into their inventory a Chinese – Korean,
Israeli, et cetera – capability. And finally, with the introduction of, let’s say, Chinese or Russian system
into the military inventory of that friend or ally, we now have a far more complicated future arms
transfer decision process that is now compounded by a prior U.S. denial . And in some instances, we
complicate the potential for expanded diplomatic relations.

Let me explain how – what I mean here. India. Let’s take India as an example. I’ve worked very closely
with India over the recent years for Dr. Carter. Years ago we denied AESA radar for the MMRCA jet
competition, fighter competition several years ago, and the French clinched the deal. Now I like the
French. Don’t get me wrong. But I like American industry better. Now, several years later – and I worked
this initiative with Dr. Carter; we’re Johnny-come-lately to the effort – for additional aircraft capability in
India. And now we’re all in. We’ve revised our policies. AESA’s possible, coproduction, production of
aircraft and making it in India is possible. But we are behind now because the French bid us out.

Another example with India, we never answered India’s request for ballistic missile defense capability.
That ask of the U.S. went unanswered for a number of years. And now, India has been forced to consider
and has – may potentially go buy, potentially, the Russian S-400 system. Similar to what Turkey’s buying-
- or said they were going to buy. Now we are rushing to put together a proposal for BMD for India to
counter that situation. And why is that a problem for us? We have legislation on the Hill in 2017,
CAATSA, which penalizes friends and allies who lean towards Russian equipment specifically. Fortunately
there’s been a congressional carve out for India, but it created a lot of anxiety.

So NDAA 2019, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2019, is headed to the president.
And we at the chamber, and on this council, Defense Aerospace Export Council, are encouraged with the
language is Section 1752 that reinforces economic consideration in this review process, and also
requires, as well, the consideration of foreign availability – a recommendation that we published in 30
proposals to the administration on June 8th. So we’re excited about the language in NDAA 2019.

Finally, the DAEC, this council, is working closely with the administration and the Congress specific to our
30 recommendations that we published on June 8th. We are encouraging the administration to use the
tools it has to affect real change, to issue executive orders, directives, and to hold the system
accountable to seize this opportunity to address issues that we have debated since the Defense News
article “Wrapped in Red Tape” that was published in 1997. I remember that. Many of you probably do
not. A unique opportunity for true change. And I am honored to work with the colleagues here
representative of State, the NSC and the White House, and others to advance these changes. Thank you.

4. And: Arms sales boosts relationships, isolates adversaries and creates foreign
policy leverage --- every sale is key and restrictions just lets competitors fill-in
Nathan, 18 --- VP for International Affairs, Aerospace Industries Association (2/27/18, Remy, “It’s Time
for a National Security Cooperation Strategy,” https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/02/its-time-
national-security-cooperation-strategy/146269/, accessed on 5/19/19, JMP)

The current way the U.S. government approves what weapons get exported and where is fragmented
and slow. That undermines American leadership and interests.
Defense exports advance U.S. foreign policy and national security interests; when used effectively, they
enable our allies and partners to help frustrate and isolate our adversaries and competitors. These
exports also save money for the U.S. military while creating enduring foreign policy leverage fueled by
training, maintenance, and spare parts. Unfortunately, the U.S. government’s system for determining
what weapons get exported and to where is fragmented and slow. The White House should develop a
National Security Cooperation Strategy to guide the current system with a more efficient and
transparent whole-of-government approach.

U.S. allied and partner countries request U.S. defense products and services after consultation with the
U.S. government, military, and industry. Every possible defense export undergoes an extensive review
and approval process by the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce, along with the White
House and Congress. Reconciling the disparate and sometimes competing views of the various
government stakeholders takes time, energy, and resources to get to an answer.

Although the system isn’t broken—we calculate that in the last year alone, $20 billion in U.S. defense
exports created a $51.9 billion positive economic impact for our nation, translating into about 200,000
high-quality American jobs—the most critical measure of its success is whether the system helps our
partners be ready, resilient, and relevant to deter or defend against common adversaries, consistent
with U.S. foreign policy objectives. And by that measure, we can and should do better.

Increasing demand for American defense products has strained the government’s export review system,
and the result is an overburdened and fragmented process, often beset by avoidable delays at each step
of a multi-step review process with no inherent deadlines for action. Unfortunately, no single
department or agency is solely responsible or accountable for the review, making attempts to
streamline the process more difficult. Whenever countries wait for our decision, it impedes their ability
to stand beside us or to act on their own in our common interest. This is true whether the product is a
fighter jet or the spare parts needed to keep it flying.

When the partner cannot wait any longer, they can and increasingly will, choose another country’s
bid, as has been the case recently with Chinese sales of unmanned aerial systems in the Middle East.
When this happens, we lose economic benefits, the ability to foster interoperability and connectivity
with U.S. forces, and the ongoing supply-and-maintenance relationship that provides enduring foreign
policy influence.

The current system is designed solely to manage risk. We’re looking for a new one that also maximizes
benefits as we “outpartner” our adversaries. That means creating an expedited approval process to get
U.S.-made equipment, promoting time-sensitive national security objectives while improving
interoperability with U.S. forces.

Industry unequivocally supports getting the right answers on approvals and conditions for export from
the government’s review process. We’re not looking to change answers from no to yes, but rather are
focused on reforms that provide a better process to decide yes or no.

The first step in a comprehensive solution is for the White House to develop a National Security
Cooperation Strategy that maps out the priorities, policies, and processes needed for the demands and
opportunities of today’s security cooperation environment. An effective strategy would align the
disparate departments and agencies overseeing parts of the security cooperation enterprise into a
concerted, whole-of-government approach that emphasizes putting the right capability into the right
hands at the right time.

This would be a win for our allies, who want to align with American values and security interests, and a
win for industry and American workers. That’s increasingly important in what’s become a time-
sensitive, zero-sum game for influence in the global security arena where every sale won or lost has
an enduring impact.

The quality of U.S. defense equipment is unparalleled, and the world recognizes the value of
interoperability with the U.S. military. However, the customer always gets the final vote, and
competitors are lining up to fill any void. Our allies and partners will not wait indefinitely for reforms to
our burdened and fragmented security cooperation enterprise. We need a comprehensive solution, and
a National Security Cooperation Strategy would do just that. Without it, we’re ceding our advantages,
the influence of our values, our military-to-military relationships, and our economic prosperity.
 AT link turn
1. Extend the link- Spindel 18 evidence shows that our military commitments are a
key signal of broader US credibility in other issues – arms sales are key to every
other cooperation
2. Link o/w the link turn – even if it makes one relationship stronger, it wrecks
another one in the process which makes it net worse
3. And: Arms restrictions deck diplomatic and military relations with foreign
forces --- countries will shift to other buyers
Webster, 18 --- President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Defense and Aerospace Export Council
(8/8/18, Keith, “U.S. Arms Transfer Policy: Shaping the Way Ahead,” https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-
arms-transfer-policy-shaping-way-ahead, accessed on 6/5/19, JMP)

KEITH WEBSTER: Great. Andrew, thank you. And thank you to CSIS for this opportunity to speak.

And first of all, I’d like to put in context the Defense and Aerospace Export Council, which was recently
launched a few months ago, in April, at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, is a unique opportunity
capitalizing on the administration’s interest in moving forward with CAT policy changes to put forward a
brand-new council at the Chamber that’s focused on influencing the government – both U.S.
government and foreign governments – and working with our industrial sector to advance opportunities
for industries globally. And it’s an honor for me to be part of that initiative. And my executive director,
Ben Schwartz, is here in the front row as well.

As Andrew kindly pointed out, I have a little bit of experience – roughly 33 years of experience in this
very issue of arms transfer and cooperative research and development work with friends and allies
globally. And what has changed in that 33 years is that the United States and its industries, although
having incredibly capable military equipment, is not the only game in town. We are seeing the
emergence of the Chinese and their military-industrial complex. And we’re also seeing Russia continue
to advance some of its capabilities in the global market, as well as others – friends and allies – who have
created military-industrial complexes. So when I started in this business 33 years ago, we had a very
strong corner on the market for advanced military capability. That is no longer the case today. So there
is a paradigm shift.

Specific to the CAT changes, we at this council at the Chamber are welcoming of the economic impact
considerations as an element of the arms transfer review process. In my 33 years, it’s the first time that
the policy has been expanded to include this consideration – the economic impact. It is not an
overarching consideration, but it is allowed now to be a credible component of consideration in
transfers. We also encourage consideration of foreign availability as an element of the arms transfer
review process.

As we are witnessing China – as an example, not alone – but China filling voids the U.S. left with a denial
to a friend or ally. The consequence of a denial filled by China or others is as follows: The U.S. loses
market share that is not easily recaptured, and in some cases will never be recaptured. The U.S. loses
control of the capability. The U.S. loses the opportunity to train, influence, and maintain a military
relationship with foreign forces, who now are introducing into their inventory a Chinese – Korean,
Israeli, et cetera – capability. And finally, with the introduction of, let’s say, Chinese or Russian system
into the military inventory of that friend or ally, we now have a far more complicated future arms
transfer decision process that is now compounded by a prior U.S. denial . And in some instances, we
complicate the potential for expanded diplomatic relations.

Let me explain how – what I mean here. India. Let’s take India as an example. I’ve worked very closely
with India over the recent years for Dr. Carter. Years ago we denied AESA radar for the MMRCA jet
competition, fighter competition several years ago, and the French clinched the deal. Now I like the
French. Don’t get me wrong. But I like American industry better. Now, several years later – and I worked
this initiative with Dr. Carter; we’re Johnny-come-lately to the effort – for additional aircraft capability in
India. And now we’re all in. We’ve revised our policies. AESA’s possible, coproduction, production of
aircraft and making it in India is possible. But we are behind now because the French bid us out.

Another example with India, we never answered India’s request for ballistic missile defense capability.
That ask of the U.S. went unanswered for a number of years. And now, India has been forced to consider
and has – may potentially go buy, potentially, the Russian S-400 system. Similar to what Turkey’s buying-
- or said they were going to buy. Now we are rushing to put together a proposal for BMD for India to
counter that situation. And why is that a problem for us? We have legislation on the Hill in 2017,
CAATSA, which penalizes friends and allies who lean towards Russian equipment specifically. Fortunately
there’s been a congressional carve out for India, but it created a lot of anxiety.

So NDAA 2019, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2019, is headed to the president.
And we at the chamber, and on this council, Defense Aerospace Export Council, are encouraged with the
language is Section 1752 that reinforces economic consideration in this review process, and also
requires, as well, the consideration of foreign availability – a recommendation that we published in 30
proposals to the administration on June 8th. So we’re excited about the language in NDAA 2019.

Finally, the DAEC, this council, is working closely with the administration and the Congress specific to our
30 recommendations that we published on June 8th. We are encouraging the administration to use the
tools it has to affect real change, to issue executive orders, directives, and to hold the system
accountable to seize this opportunity to address issues that we have debated since the Defense News
article “Wrapped in Red Tape” that was published in 1997. I remember that. Many of you probably do
not. A unique opportunity for true change. And I am honored to work with the colleagues here
representative of State, the NSC and the White House, and others to advance these changes. Thank you.

4. And: Arms sales boosts relationships, isolates adversaries and creates foreign
policy leverage --- every sale is key and restrictions just lets competitors fill-in
Nathan, 18 --- VP for International Affairs, Aerospace Industries Association (2/27/18, Remy, “It’s Time
for a National Security Cooperation Strategy,” https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/02/its-time-
national-security-cooperation-strategy/146269/, accessed on 5/19/19, JMP)

The current way the U.S. government approves what weapons get exported and where is fragmented
and slow. That undermines American leadership and interests.
Defense exports advance U.S. foreign policy and national security interests; when used effectively, they
enable our allies and partners to help frustrate and isolate our adversaries and competitors. These
exports also save money for the U.S. military while creating enduring foreign policy leverage fueled by
training, maintenance, and spare parts. Unfortunately, the U.S. government’s system for determining
what weapons get exported and to where is fragmented and slow. The White House should develop a
National Security Cooperation Strategy to guide the current system with a more efficient and
transparent whole-of-government approach.

U.S. allied and partner countries request U.S. defense products and services after consultation with the
U.S. government, military, and industry. Every possible defense export undergoes an extensive review
and approval process by the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce, along with the White
House and Congress. Reconciling the disparate and sometimes competing views of the various
government stakeholders takes time, energy, and resources to get to an answer.

Although the system isn’t broken—we calculate that in the last year alone, $20 billion in U.S. defense
exports created a $51.9 billion positive economic impact for our nation, translating into about 200,000
high-quality American jobs—the most critical measure of its success is whether the system helps our
partners be ready, resilient, and relevant to deter or defend against common adversaries, consistent
with U.S. foreign policy objectives. And by that measure, we can and should do better.

Increasing demand for American defense products has strained the government’s export review system,
and the result is an overburdened and fragmented process, often beset by avoidable delays at each step
of a multi-step review process with no inherent deadlines for action. Unfortunately, no single
department or agency is solely responsible or accountable for the review, making attempts to
streamline the process more difficult. Whenever countries wait for our decision, it impedes their ability
to stand beside us or to act on their own in our common interest. This is true whether the product is a
fighter jet or the spare parts needed to keep it flying.

When the partner cannot wait any longer, they can and increasingly will, choose another country’s
bid, as has been the case recently with Chinese sales of unmanned aerial systems in the Middle East.
When this happens, we lose economic benefits, the ability to foster interoperability and connectivity
with U.S. forces, and the ongoing supply-and-maintenance relationship that provides enduring foreign
policy influence.

The current system is designed solely to manage risk. We’re looking for a new one that also maximizes
benefits as we “outpartner” our adversaries. That means creating an expedited approval process to get
U.S.-made equipment, promoting time-sensitive national security objectives while improving
interoperability with U.S. forces.

Industry unequivocally supports getting the right answers on approvals and conditions for export from
the government’s review process. We’re not looking to change answers from no to yes, but rather are
focused on reforms that provide a better process to decide yes or no.

The first step in a comprehensive solution is for the White House to develop a National Security
Cooperation Strategy that maps out the priorities, policies, and processes needed for the demands and
opportunities of today’s security cooperation environment. An effective strategy would align the
disparate departments and agencies overseeing parts of the security cooperation enterprise into a
concerted, whole-of-government approach that emphasizes putting the right capability into the right
hands at the right time.

This would be a win for our allies, who want to align with American values and security interests, and a
win for industry and American workers. That’s increasingly important in what’s become a time-
sensitive, zero-sum game for influence in the global security arena where every sale won or lost has
an enduring impact.

The quality of U.S. defense equipment is unparalleled, and the world recognizes the value of
interoperability with the U.S. military. However, the customer always gets the final vote, and
competitors are lining up to fill any void. Our allies and partners will not wait indefinitely for reforms to
our burdened and fragmented security cooperation enterprise. We need a comprehensive solution, and
a National Security Cooperation Strategy would do just that. Without it, we’re ceding our advantages,
the influence of our values, our military-to-military relationships, and our economic prosperity.
 AT no internal link

1. Extend the Spindel 18 evidence, credibility is uniquely tied to arms sales, when
we reduce those sales we decrease our credibility writ large
2. The global security environment is dynamic --- great powers are emerging and
preserving flexibility is key to be able to react quickly
Clark & Hardwick, 18 --- *Editor at Breaking Defense, AND **assistant vice president, international
affairs, at the Aerospace Industries Association (8/8/18, Dak, “U.S. Arms Transfer Policy: Shaping the
Way Ahead,” https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-arms-transfer-policy-shaping-way-ahead, accessed on
6/5/19, JMP)

Q: Colin Clark, Breaking Defense.

I am a grizzled veteran of watching these. I go back almost as far as Keith: the Defense Trade Security
Initiative, wonderful ideas, they were going to change everything, everything was going to be faster,
better, more wonderful.

Not to be snide, but a lot of this sounds similar, although there is less focus on process than there was in
the DTSI, I think. So my question would be, OK, the laws and regulations haven’t changed. How do you
actually – aside from pushing people to say yes more often, actually get things done?
(Pause.) (Laughter.)

MR. HUNTER: Laura, please.

MS. CRESSEY: Well, you were looking at me, right? (Laughs.)

Now, excellent question. I think I tried to allude to this a little bit when I was making my opening remarks where we have a situation right now where, you know, for the past several years, before this administration even – you
know, we were hearing – as Dak had mentioned, we were hearing from partners, we were hearing from a lot of folks that, you know, we’re slow, we can’t compete, we take too long to make decisions, we take too long to produce
our stuff. We really, you know – we produce wonderful stuff, but it’s too expensive, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera – mostly focused on the foreign military sales process.

And so the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, under then-director Admiral Rixey, really tried to take a look at reforming the process. And they ran into some bumps along the way.

But now what we have is we have kind of top-down direction from the White House that we need to really take a better look at how we are doing things, and we have the – we have that top cover to implement those kinds of
changes that will make the FMS process, you know, smoother where we could try to address the real contracting issues that we have, that we can look at non-program-of-record items that take forever to get through the technical
disclosure process – those kinds of things.

So I think what has really changed is the buy-in from the top level. And it’s – you know, it’s the White House, but it’s not just the White House. You talk to the secretary of State, or the Secretary of Defense, or the deputies, or the
undersecretaries, and everyone is very much aware of all of the different things that we’re doing and very much behind us.

So I think that’s – you know, in the absence of, you know, other documents and legislation and the like, you really do have a changed situation with the – you know, with the top-down direction.

MR. HUNTER: Hand? Or Keith, if you would like to –

MR. WEBSTER: So the reason why I agreed to head this council at the chamber is because I believe there is a unique opportunity and interest by this administration at the highest levels in a way that is unprecedented. Let’s look at
export control reform. It was tried by the Clinton administration, but half-heartedly. It was tried by the George W. Bush administration half-heartedly. It wasn’t until the Obama team came on board, with Secretary Gates’ support
and direct intervention that export control reform actually happened. That is what it takes.

The proposals that we put forward to the White House – 30 proposals – were very detailed, 16 pages based on my experience and the experience of others. It doesn’t mean that that is the only way to get this done, but it has to be
a very specific, driven, solution-driven, detail-driven rose pinned on someone to see it through. That is the only way that we will see true transformation.

Let’s look at contracting. It takes over 300 days to get a major system on contract under an FMS case because you have a contracting community in the Pentagon that is decimated in numbers, it is grossly understaffed. They are
overwhelmed with the current fight supporting U.S. forces and then supporting allied forces in the current fight, and then FMS comes along as a third priority for contracting. That’s why you have the unprecedented use of UCAs –
Undefinitized Contracting Actions.

That is an opportunity potentially with the administration to look at carving out, with the Congress’ support, unique federal acquisition regulation procedures for FMS contracting to have a truly rapid process. That’s going to take
whole-of-community support, and we at the chamber are willing to help with that.

That’s just one little example, but if you look at export control reform over two decades, how did that actually get done, that’s a roadmap for how to get this done instead of continue to talk about it.

MR. HARDWICK: I want to quickly just say one thing. So what has changed? It’s a great question. The
easy answer is that your global security environment has changed, and our U.S. government
colleagues see it in their bilateral discussions. Our industry members see it when they meet with
customers. We see it in the daily media about how great powers are emerging, how certain countries
are moving to align themselves. So the global security environment is changing, and continues to
change, and is dynamic; it is not fixed. And there has been a recognition by the administration. There
has been a recognition by our friends in our agencies, and there has been a recognition by industry that
the global security environment is shifting, the dynamic is changing quickly, and that we need to make
some key reforms in order to ensure that we are meeting the challenges of the next 50 years.

So your global security environment has changed. And after 15-plus years of conflict, we should expect
that the environment should change and is going to continue to change. That is why we think that
some of the recommendations that we put forward allow the U.S. government, allow industry to be
flexible, to be nimble, to be able to react quickly to a world that is going to change and change very
quickly.
 AT no impact
1. extend the Brands and Feaver evidence – alliances foster cooperation that is
key to preventing escalation of conflict and promoting deterrence strategies
2. The global security environment is dynamic --- great powers are emerging and
preserving flexibility is key to be able to react quickly
Clark & Hardwick, 18 --- *Editor at Breaking Defense, AND **assistant vice president, international
affairs, at the Aerospace Industries Association (8/8/18, Dak, “U.S. Arms Transfer Policy: Shaping the
Way Ahead,” https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-arms-transfer-policy-shaping-way-ahead, accessed on
6/5/19, JMP)

Q: Colin Clark, Breaking Defense.

I am a grizzled veteran of watching these. I go back almost as far as Keith: the Defense Trade Security
Initiative, wonderful ideas, they were going to change everything, everything was going to be faster,
better, more wonderful.

Not to be snide, but a lot of this sounds similar, although there is less focus on process than there was in
the DTSI, I think. So my question would be, OK, the laws and regulations haven’t changed. How do you
actually – aside from pushing people to say yes more often, actually get things done?
(Pause.) (Laughter.)

MR. HUNTER: Laura, please.

MS. CRESSEY: Well, you were looking at me, right? (Laughs.)

Now, excellent question. I think I tried to allude to this a little bit when I was making my opening remarks where we have a situation right now where, you know, for the past several years, before this administration even – you
know, we were hearing – as Dak had mentioned, we were hearing from partners, we were hearing from a lot of folks that, you know, we’re slow, we can’t compete, we take too long to make decisions, we take too long to produce
our stuff. We really, you know – we produce wonderful stuff, but it’s too expensive, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera – mostly focused on the foreign military sales process.

And so the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, under then-director Admiral Rixey, really tried to take a look at reforming the process. And they ran into some bumps along the way.

But now what we have is we have kind of top-down direction from the White House that we need to really take a better look at how we are doing things, and we have the – we have that top cover to implement those kinds of
changes that will make the FMS process, you know, smoother where we could try to address the real contracting issues that we have, that we can look at non-program-of-record items that take forever to get through the technical
disclosure process – those kinds of things.

So I think what has really changed is the buy-in from the top level. And it’s – you know, it’s the White House, but it’s not just the White House. You talk to the secretary of State, or the Secretary of Defense, or the deputies, or the
undersecretaries, and everyone is very much aware of all of the different things that we’re doing and very much behind us.

So I think that’s – you know, in the absence of, you know, other documents and legislation and the like, you really do have a changed situation with the – you know, with the top-down direction.

MR. HUNTER: Hand? Or Keith, if you would like to –

MR. WEBSTER: So the reason why I agreed to head this council at the chamber is because I believe there is a unique opportunity and interest by this administration at the highest levels in a way that is unprecedented. Let’s look at
export control reform. It was tried by the Clinton administration, but half-heartedly. It was tried by the George W. Bush administration half-heartedly. It wasn’t until the Obama team came on board, with Secretary Gates’ support
and direct intervention that export control reform actually happened. That is what it takes.

The proposals that we put forward to the White House – 30 proposals – were very detailed, 16 pages based on my experience and the experience of others. It doesn’t mean that that is the only way to get this done, but it has to be
a very specific, driven, solution-driven, detail-driven rose pinned on someone to see it through. That is the only way that we will see true transformation.

Let’s look at contracting. It takes over 300 days to get a major system on contract under an FMS case because you have a contracting community in the Pentagon that is decimated in numbers, it is grossly understaffed. They are
overwhelmed with the current fight supporting U.S. forces and then supporting allied forces in the current fight, and then FMS comes along as a third priority for contracting. That’s why you have the unprecedented use of UCAs –
Undefinitized Contracting Actions.

That is an opportunity potentially with the administration to look at carving out, with the Congress’ support, unique federal acquisition regulation procedures for FMS contracting to have a truly rapid process. That’s going to take
whole-of-community support, and we at the chamber are willing to help with that.

That’s just one little example, but if you look at export control reform over two decades, how did that actually get done, that’s a roadmap for how to get this done instead of continue to talk about it.

MR. HARDWICK: I want to quickly just say one thing. So what has changed? It’s a great question. The
easy answer is that your global security environment has changed, and our U.S. government
colleagues see it in their bilateral discussions. Our industry members see it when they meet with
customers. We see it in the daily media about how great powers are emerging, how certain countries
are moving to align themselves. So the global security environment is changing, and continues to
change, and is dynamic; it is not fixed. And there has been a recognition by the administration. There
has been a recognition by our friends in our agencies, and there has been a recognition by industry that
the global security environment is shifting, the dynamic is changing quickly, and that we need to make
some key reforms in order to ensure that we are meeting the challenges of the next 50 years.

So your global security environment has changed. And after 15-plus years of conflict, we should expect
that the environment should change and is going to continue to change. That is why we think that
some of the recommendations that we put forward allow the U.S. government, allow industry to be
flexible, to be nimble, to be able to react quickly to a world that is going to change and change very
quickly.
 AT impact turn
1. extend the Brands and Feaver evidence – alliances foster cooperation that is
key to preventing escalation of conflict and promoting deterrence strategies
2. turn the turn – response to terrorism and nuclear strikes makes our impact
scenario more probable and larger
3. The global security environment is dynamic --- great powers are emerging and
preserving flexibility is key to be able to react quickly
Clark & Hardwick, 18 --- *Editor at Breaking Defense, AND **assistant vice president, international
affairs, at the Aerospace Industries Association (8/8/18, Dak, “U.S. Arms Transfer Policy: Shaping the
Way Ahead,” https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-arms-transfer-policy-shaping-way-ahead, accessed on
6/5/19, JMP)

Q: Colin Clark, Breaking Defense.

I am a grizzled veteran of watching these. I go back almost as far as Keith: the Defense Trade Security
Initiative, wonderful ideas, they were going to change everything, everything was going to be faster,
better, more wonderful.

Not to be snide, but a lot of this sounds similar, although there is less focus on process than there was in
the DTSI, I think. So my question would be, OK, the laws and regulations haven’t changed. How do you
actually – aside from pushing people to say yes more often, actually get things done?
(Pause.) (Laughter.)

MR. HUNTER: Laura, please.

MS. CRESSEY: Well, you were looking at me, right? (Laughs.)

Now, excellent question. I think I tried to allude to this a little bit when I was making my opening remarks where we have a situation right now where, you know, for the past several years, before this administration even – you
know, we were hearing – as Dak had mentioned, we were hearing from partners, we were hearing from a lot of folks that, you know, we’re slow, we can’t compete, we take too long to make decisions, we take too long to produce
our stuff. We really, you know – we produce wonderful stuff, but it’s too expensive, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera – mostly focused on the foreign military sales process.

And so the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, under then-director Admiral Rixey, really tried to take a look at reforming the process. And they ran into some bumps along the way.

But now what we have is we have kind of top-down direction from the White House that we need to really take a better look at how we are doing things, and we have the – we have that top cover to implement those kinds of
changes that will make the FMS process, you know, smoother where we could try to address the real contracting issues that we have, that we can look at non-program-of-record items that take forever to get through the technical
disclosure process – those kinds of things.

So I think what has really changed is the buy-in from the top level. And it’s – you know, it’s the White House, but it’s not just the White House. You talk to the secretary of State, or the Secretary of Defense, or the deputies, or the
undersecretaries, and everyone is very much aware of all of the different things that we’re doing and very much behind us.

So I think that’s – you know, in the absence of, you know, other documents and legislation and the like, you really do have a changed situation with the – you know, with the top-down direction.

MR. HUNTER: Hand? Or Keith, if you would like to –

MR. WEBSTER: So the reason why I agreed to head this council at the chamber is because I believe there is a unique opportunity and interest by this administration at the highest levels in a way that is unprecedented. Let’s look at
export control reform. It was tried by the Clinton administration, but half-heartedly. It was tried by the George W. Bush administration half-heartedly. It wasn’t until the Obama team came on board, with Secretary Gates’ support
and direct intervention that export control reform actually happened. That is what it takes.

The proposals that we put forward to the White House – 30 proposals – were very detailed, 16 pages based on my experience and the experience of others. It doesn’t mean that that is the only way to get this done, but it has to be
a very specific, driven, solution-driven, detail-driven rose pinned on someone to see it through. That is the only way that we will see true transformation.

Let’s look at contracting. It takes over 300 days to get a major system on contract under an FMS case because you have a contracting community in the Pentagon that is decimated in numbers, it is grossly understaffed. They are
overwhelmed with the current fight supporting U.S. forces and then supporting allied forces in the current fight, and then FMS comes along as a third priority for contracting. That’s why you have the unprecedented use of UCAs –
Undefinitized Contracting Actions.

That is an opportunity potentially with the administration to look at carving out, with the Congress’ support, unique federal acquisition regulation procedures for FMS contracting to have a truly rapid process. That’s going to take
whole-of-community support, and we at the chamber are willing to help with that.

That’s just one little example, but if you look at export control reform over two decades, how did that actually get done, that’s a roadmap for how to get this done instead of continue to talk about it.

MR. HARDWICK: I want to quickly just say one thing. So what has changed? It’s a great question. The
easy answer is that your global security environment has changed, and our U.S. government
colleagues see it in their bilateral discussions. Our industry members see it when they meet with
customers. We see it in the daily media about how great powers are emerging, how certain countries
are moving to align themselves. So the global security environment is changing, and continues to
change, and is dynamic; it is not fixed. And there has been a recognition by the administration. There
has been a recognition by our friends in our agencies, and there has been a recognition by industry that
the global security environment is shifting, the dynamic is changing quickly, and that we need to make
some key reforms in order to ensure that we are meeting the challenges of the next 50 years.

So your global security environment has changed. And after 15-plus years of conflict, we should expect
that the environment should change and is going to continue to change. That is why we think that
some of the recommendations that we put forward allow the U.S. government, allow industry to be
flexible, to be nimble, to be able to react quickly to a world that is going to change and change very
quickly.
conditions CP
 overview
the conditions CP solves better than the aff – we can implement human rights
enforcement while also increasing deterrence strategies
 net benefits
1. avoids russia – with conditions, there is no need for nations to buy from russia
because of a lack of vacuum. also, monitoring means we can check international
actors
2. avoids stocks – implementing conditions doesn’t lead to the abandonment of
investors
3. turns military relations – actually increases our diplomatic engagement and
deterrence measures
 AT perm do both
1. severance – severs the certainty of the plan because they no longer must defend a
permanent reduction of arms sales
2. mutually exclusive – ending sales and continuing them is a contradiction that
cannot occur. without sales, there is no leverage with which to implement conditions
3. links to russia – any removal of sales creates a vacuum for exploitation
4. links to stocks – the initial ending of sales creates a negative market reaction, even
with conditions
5. links to military relations – ending sales decreases credibility on the global stage
 AT perm do the counterplan
1. severs certainty – the 1AC must defend a certain implementation of the plan in its
original form – voter for fairness and education
2. mutually exclusive – ending sales is contradictory to continuing them under
conditions – unless the aff kicks the 1AC, this perm fails
3. time skew – we don’t get to read a new 1NC now that the aff’s advocacy has
changed
4. allows the aff to be a moving target by shifting the plan post 1AC
5. creates shallow, messy debates instead of clash
 AT perm do the aff then the CP
1. solvency deficit – doing the aff first removes leverage that the CP relies on
2. severs durability – the plan must pass and stay passed in its original form – doing
the CP post plan changes that – voter for fairness and education
3. links to russia – russia will fill in before we can resume sales
4. links to stocks – the initial removal of sales crashes the market
5. links to game of thrones – initial sale removal creates a window for MBS’s
replacement
 AT perm do the CP then the aff
1. solvency deficit – implementing conditions and then removing them means none of
the net benefits are actualized – also leads to worse backlash because of a change of
US message
2. severs immediacy – the plan must pass immediately so the neg has ground related
to the current political sphere – doing the aff later destroys that
3. its intrinsic – adds an element of delay not in the original plan – voter for fairness
and education
4. links to all the net bens – even if it resolves them to begin with, they all eventually
happen once the CP is implemented
 AT conditional CP’s bad
1. its not a PIC – the CP doesn’t fiat the 1AC
2. conditions CP fiat isn’t harmful – it’s a yes or no scenario
3. it’s not regressive – the conditions must be aff specific
4. we don’t fiat any delay – the CP happens immediately
5. consult CP’s are worse – if the answer is no then they don’t access the net bens –
conditions CP’s still access the net benefits
6. ***do a LBL answer to their shell here***
 AT conditionality bad
conditionality good
1. clash – the 1AC should have to defend every aspect of the plan; therefore, the neg
should get to test it from multiple angles
2. reciprocity – the 1AC gets multiple advantages – we should have multiple
advocacies to test those advantages
3. strategy – the aff gets the first and last speech, the neg should be allowed to adapt
their strategy as the round progresses
4. ***do a LBL answer to their shell here***
 solvency
The new monitoring mechanisms created by the CP guarantee it has teeth
Cambanis and Hanna 10-24-18
(Thanassis Cambanis is a journalist specializing in the Middle East and American foreign policy. Michael Wahid Hanna focuses on issues of
international security, international law, and U.S. foreign policy in the broader Middle East and South Asia.
https://tcf.org/content/commentary/war-yemen-tragedy-america-can-end-complicity/)

Those measures alone, however, will not be enough. Congress

ought to write new legislation that imposes far more
substantive reporting and certification obligations on the administration. Legislation with more teeth
would make it much harder for the administration to treat certification as a hollow pro forma
exercise. Such legislation should not allow for national security waivers, which in the past have been
used by administrations to sidestep Congressional oversight. Tougher legislation would also suspend
ongoing sales if the administration does not actively fulfil its reporting requirements. The Pentagon has
an affirmative obligation to prove that its actions are fulfilling the United States’ stated aims—in the
case of the Yemen War, that U.S. actions are advancing strategic aims and reducing civilian casualties.

The CP improves monitoring and enforcement, aff evidence assumes the status quo
Leonard, Lt. Colonel, 17
(Andrew M., https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-06-29/getting-leahy-law-right, 6-29)

There are several steps the State and Defense Departments can take to ensure they are properly
implementing the Leahy laws. First, the two departments should call for a review of all cases in which security
cooperation funds are suspended or rejected. This review will verify the quality of existing withholdings and could identify
cases eligible for remediation. Both departments should give priority to remediation, including open and honest
engagement with partner nations. In addition, the State and Defense Departments should update and
disseminate, based on input from practitioners in the field, revised policies and procedures on how to
manage human rights vetting in order to ensure current U.S. policy is implemented in a coherent and
consistent manner. Existing challenges include the lack of standards for determining if the source reporting a human rights violation is
credible. There is also no standard in determining whether the unit itself or every individual in the unit must undergo vetting or what level of
leadership is permitted to approve or withhold U.S. funding to a foreign security force unit. Once
such guidance is clarified, it
should be codified in State and Defense Department operating procedures. Both the State and Defense Departments must also address
ongoing misunderstandings about which department is accountable for implementing the Leahy laws. Both departments are separate but equal
collaborators in implementing them. Therefore, even if the State Department oversees the administrative aspects of human rights vetting for
both departments, the Defense Department needs to remain informed at every level and phase of that process when it involves Defense
Department–funded activities, and vice versa. While these procedures are put in place, the State and Defense Departments should ensure
training is available to officials at all levels who are responsible for human rights vetting decisions. This training should involve studying best
practices and techniques for working with partner nations. Congress also plays a role in ensuring the Leahy laws are properly implemented.
It should
provide both the State and Defense Departments with sufficient resources to undertake the very
technical and time-intensive work of vetting human rights violations, as well as sufficient funds to
ensure department personnel are properly trained to implement the laws. Both departments spend billions of
dollars per year on security cooperation activities worldwide but spend only a fraction of a percent of this amount on implementation of the
human rights vetting required. Professional and
capable armed forces that respect and protect human rights are
critical to the long-term stability and security of the United States and its global partners. In advancing
this issue, the U.S. government should not only continue to limit security cooperation with nations that
violate human rights but also renew support and cooperation with those that hold violators
accountable.

History shows carefully administered sales work

Karlin, PhD, 17
(Mara, associate Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the
Brookings Institution. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-10-16/why-military-assistance-programs-disappoint, Nov/Dec)

History is not replete only with tales of failure, however. Under certain circumstances, the United States has succeeded in
reforming foreign militaries. Perhaps the best example is the first: the U.S. program to build Greece’s military after
World War II. In 1946, communist insurgents began waging war against the Greek government. In the words of Dean Acheson, then the
U.S. secretary of state, “Greece was in the position of a semiconscious patient on the critical list whose relatives and physicians had been
discussing whether his life could be saved.” Concerned about growing Soviet influence around the world, the administration of President Harry
Truman quickly undertook a $300 million effort to strengthen the Greek economy and military. Crucially, the United States deeply involved
itself in all aspects of Greek military affairs. State Department officials even drafted the Greek government’s initial request for aid. U.S. officials
worked closely with Greece to reorganize the Hellenic Army’s structure to align with the mission of defending the government against
communist guerillas rather than foreign armies. And they made sure that capable military leaders were appointed to the right positions. The
architect of the U.S. effort, General James Van Fleet, was himself a capable and charismatic leader committed to keeping Athens and
Washington on the same page. Under Van Fleet’s leadership, U.S.
advisers trained and equipped the Greek forces,
provided tactical and strategic advice, planned operations to rout guerilla fighters, and made
organizational and personnel changes. Van Fleet and his team oversaw a complete overhaul of military personnel, appointing a
new chief of staff and compelling all of the Hellenic Army’s lieutenant generals except one to resign. They then facilitated the promotion and
placement of eight major generals and encouraged the removal of division and corps commanders who were reluctant or incapable of
supporting the broader strategy. In Washington, senior
national security officials regularly assessed the program to
ensure its purpose was clear, making necessary adjustments as the situation evolved. They held serious debates
about the appropriate role for the U.S. military, including when and if the United States should consider becoming a co-combatant in Greece’s
civil war. And Truman responded promptly and decisively to signs of division among those administering the program. When a clash between
Lincoln MacVeagh, the U.S. ambassador to Greece, and Dwight Griswold, who was in charge of the U.S. aid program in the country, proved
insurmountable, the president removed MacVeagh. There were challenges, to be sure. The most intense disagreements with the Greeks
centered on the size of the Hellenic Army, which Athens wanted to increase beyond what the United States thought necessary for internal
defense. After more than a year of debate, during which the Greeks kept expanding the military despite American displeasure, U.S. officials
finally threatened to withdraw U.S. support. The threat had its intended effect: the Greeks dropped the issue, and the military stayed within its
authorized limits. All told, the program was a success. When Yugoslavia diminished its support for the communist insurgents as
part of an effort to reposition itself away from the Soviet Union, the Greek military, thanks to the reforms instituted at the behest of
Washington, was able to extend its control over the country. By 1949, thanks to U.S. support and training, government forces had defeated the
guerillas, and the Greek state prevailed in one of the first proxy conflicts of the Cold War. TO BUILD OR NOT TO BUILD Past experience
offers two key lessons for U.S. officials as they seek to strengthen the security sectors of weak states. First, like all state-building
endeavors, these are political, not technical, exercises. Instead of focusing narrowly on training and
equipment, U.S. policymakers responsible for implementing such programs must address the purpose and scope of
the U.S. role and the mission, leadership, and organizational structure of the partner’s military. In Saudi
Arabia, for example, the U.S. military is running a handful of programs to train and equip the country’s
armed forces, but it stays far away from sensitive issues, in line with Saudi preferences. The United States should
align these disjointed programs, assess the broader purpose of U.S. support, and use the findings to meaningfully
engage on crucial but sensitive matters. To be sure, increasing U.S. involvement in the details of a foreign
country’s military is rife with colonial undertones and therefore might be difficult to digest. To minimize
pushback, U.S. officials should watch how they communicate and avoid creating the perception that
they are bullying those they seek to assist. That said, it would be foolish not to acknowledge the reality of
the relationship between the United States and its partners: as the provider of often irreplaceable
military assistance, Washington has more influence than it may realize. Recent efforts to condition military aid to
Pakistan on the country’s cracking down on the militants within its borders, for example, are a good first step. The second lesson for
policymakers is that they cannot afford to ignore the destabilizing potential of third parties that pose a serious challenge to a
newly equipped military. When and where possible, the United States should marshal its tools to limit external
meddling. This might involve enhancing border security, going to the UN to leverage international
pressure, or even, in extreme cases, attacking the third parties themselves.
 more impact stuff
Sales are key to US leadership- bilateral relations, credibility, economy, Russia/China
flip case
Cooper, assistant sec. of state, 6-12-19
(TESTIMONY OF R. CLARKE COOPER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE JUNE 12, 2019, 10 O’CLOCK AM https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20190612/109641/HHRG-116-FA00-Wstate-CooperR-
20190612.pdf)

As the 2017 National Security Strategy makes clear,

we are in an era of global competition against near-peer
adversaries, including Russia and China. That competition includes security and defensive relationships
that have political, military, and economic ramifications. In such an environment it is crucial that the United States
remain the partner of choice and be trusted as a dependable provider of defense capabilities –
including materiel – to our partners. Our National Security Strategy describes the invaluable
advantages that our strong relationships with allies and partners deliver. While the United States
continues to build and offer our partners with the most capable, advanced, defense technologies, we do not
have a monopoly on fostering or maintaining reliable security relationships. The National Security Strategy makes
clear that the United States must compete for positive relationships around the world as China and Russia
target their investments in the developing world to expand influence and gain competitive advantages
against the United States. Our adversaries, including Russia and China, have adopted deliberate, long-term strategies of
trying to disrupt our partnerships by seeking to replace the United States as the credible supplier of choice.
We simply cannot allow openings that our adversaries will exploit to disrupt partnerships, to reduce our
regional influence, to impact our defense industrial base, and to spread chaos. Remaining a reliable
security partner to our allies and friends around the world is also in the interest and furtherance of our values. When
our adversaries sell weapons of war, they do not place the same, if any, premium that we do on
addressing the risk that the capabilities we provide may contribute to abuses of human rights or
violations of international humanitarian law. China does not work to expand transparency on the
battlefield, and there is no Russian Conventional Arms Transfer Policy that requires action to facilitate partner efforts
to reduce civilian casualties, which is a policy we have had in place since 2018. When President Trump issued the updated Conventional Arms
Transfer Policy in 2018, a centerpiece of the new Policy was its unprecedented directive that we work with partners to reduce the risk of civilian
harm in their military operations. We are working on the implementation of that directive to shape future engagements, including with
partners in advance of conflict situations. Before I close, let me address a few other aspects of these sales and the emergency certification that
may be of interest to you.