Dimaporo v.

Mitra
202 SCRA 779 / G.R. No. 96859
October 15, 1991

FACTS:

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second
Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. On
15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy
for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao in the immediately following elections. Upon being informed of this
development by the COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the
House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members
of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the
Omnibus Election Code which states:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the
one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-
President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed

to respondent Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties
and functions as elected Member of Congress. He maintains that he did not
thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg.
881 is not operative under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and
therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.

In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of
members of the House of Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the
incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in the
Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators,
Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected
under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992," while Section 7,
Article VI states: "The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected
for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. He asserts that
under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881 is repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the
shortening of a congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the
Constitution.
Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only
when a congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is
decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another
office or employment.
ISSUE:

1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE
PRESENT CONSTITUTION?

2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT

SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER
FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY
PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS
CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES
AS SUCH?

HELD:

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be
considered resigned not because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of
office facilities but primarily because under our Constitution, we have this
…chapter on accountability of public officers (both in the 1973 and 1987
constitution). Section 1 of Article XI (1987) on "Accountability of Public Officers"
states that:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.

Under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public

officers must serve their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition.
Petitioner failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective
public officials, this statutory provision (Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881)
seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by
discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting
short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they
cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional
edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not
trifle with the mandate, which they have received from their constituents.

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a
certificate of candidacy for another office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary
renunciation of the elective office presently being held, he is deemed to have
voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. Forfeiture (is) automatic and
permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another
office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is
filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment
can restore the ousted official. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent
upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable.

That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in
the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of
Congress, does not preclude its application to present members of Congress.
Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on
impeachment … All other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional
expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the
Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not
exclusive. The expression in the constitution of the circumstances which shall
bring about a vacancy does not preclude the legislature from prescribing other
grounds

Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of

constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify the nullification of a law, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.
2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General
perform ministerial functions; It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from
the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881.
When the COMELEC communicated to the House of Representatives that
petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim
Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and
unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. These officers
cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the
statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder
the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all
cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties
upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers
of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are
bound to obey it.

In conclusion, we reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust.
It is created for the interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof
is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he
cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.

NOTES:

- In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office
of a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of
office: The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or
shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer
actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or
beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may
not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office
(see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).

- 4 grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a

Congressman may be shortened:

a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral
Tribunal in an election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.

Aquino v COMELEC (1995)

Aquino vs. Comelec

Agapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on Election, Move Makati, Mateo
Bedon, and Juanito Icaro, respondents
Sept, 18, 1995
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and
a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding
the day of the election.

Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new (remember: newly
created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy,
Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola
Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-
NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify
Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, should be for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8,
1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his
residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission
on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and
allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won
against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on
May 15, the latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino
until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on
Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of
constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

Issue:
1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile”
to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just
residence (not in the sense of the COC)in the district he was running in.

Held:
1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with
“domicile” not only under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987
Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to
require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of elections.
…
What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual
residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of
election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation
given to it was domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
…
Mr. De los Reyes
So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not
physical and actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning
of domicile.
The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,”
where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution
refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions
and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances
existing in that community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a
given area for meeting election law requirements, this defeats the essence of
representation, which is to place through assent of voters those most cognizant
and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the
period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was
running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he
established a domicile of choice and not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of
residency prior to the elections in the district in which he seeks election to .
Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates
that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for
more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth certificate indicated that
Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a registered
voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well)
up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease
agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a
permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit
instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of
Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other
residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his
physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to
qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City.
Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a
bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal
or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his
lack of one year residence in the district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from
proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the
congressional elections of Second district of Makati City made permanent.
Dicta:
I. Aquino’s petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelec’s lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue
involving congressional candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such
determination reserved with the house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case
after the elections and the remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum
which is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to
promulagate its questioned decision despite its own recognition that a threshold
issue of jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo
that the Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelec’s finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of
one year against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and
jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing
the one year residency requirement of Congressional candidates in newly
created political districts which were only existing for less than a year at the time
of the election and barely four months in the case of petitioner’s district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
ordered the board of canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the
remaining qualified candidates after the erroneous disqualification of the
petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second place candidate or a person
who was repudiated by the electorate is a loser and cannot be proclaimed as
substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers can’t be allowed to take advantage of the creation
of new political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new
districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of
existing conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to
support the one year residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of
the HR, by establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a oerfectly
valid lease agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of choice, this
particular lease agreement cannot be better.
211 SCRA 219 – Political Law – Congress Authorizing the President to Tax
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438
which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by
law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad
valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported
articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In
1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475
was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil
products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from
Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section
24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills
in Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating
measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of
appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the
province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not
follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming
they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised
by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the
Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the
President “subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose”
to fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .” In
this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the President ot
issue the said EOs.

The United States [US] v. Ang Tang Ho, No. 17122, February 27, 1922, 43 Phil.
6, (1922)

Political Law – Delegation of Power – Administrative Bodies

In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and
approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of
Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances,
authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and
Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act,
in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on
August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On
the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro
Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than
that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On
August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the said EO. He was found guilty
as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine.
He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power
to the Governor General.
ssue:

Whether Act No. 2868 constitutes undue delegation of legislative

power

Held:

Yes. This question involves an analysis and construction of Act No.

2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice
should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General,
with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate
temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the
Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency
measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature does
not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the
Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued
“for any cause,” and leaves the question as to what is “any cause” to the
discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says: “For any cause,
conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or
corn.” The Legislature does not specify or define what is “an extraordinary rise.”
That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that
the Governor-General, “with the consent of the Council of State,” is authorized to
issue and promulgate “temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out
the purposes of this Act.” It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or
an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency
measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is
to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis
for the order, but has left it to the sole judgment and discretion of the Governor-
General to say what is or what is not “a cause,” and what is or what is not “an
extraordinary rise in the price of rice,” and as to what is a temporary rule or an
emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state
of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing
the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without
notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been any
cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have
been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such
facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller
commits a crime.
 A law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves
the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the
judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that,
in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be
left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any
prescribed fact or event.

The law says that the Governor-General may fix “the maximum sale
price that the industrial or merchant may demand.” The law is a general law and
not a local or special law.

The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and
different prices in other and different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and
delegates the power to determine the other and different prices to provincial
treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of
legislative power to the Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that power
to provincial treasurers and their deputies, who “are hereby directed to
communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating from the Director of
Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of the
above regulations in their respective localities.” The issuance of the proclamation
by the Governor-General was the exercise of the delegation of a delegated
power, and was even a sub delegation of that power.

When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the
Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was
no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole
discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not “any
cause” for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not “an extraordinary
rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,” and under certain undefined conditions to
fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also
to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not
the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law
should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was “any
cause,” or what was “an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn,”
Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should
be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The
alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued
the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the
different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale “of
one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater
than that fixed by Executive order No. 53.”

Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his

discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of
rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the
proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.
 Solicitor General v Metro Manila Authority
Cruz, 1991
FACTS:
In
Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong
, the SC ruled that (1) the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for
traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the
Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605; and, that (2) even the confiscation of
driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor
was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. Several
complaints were filed in the SC against the confiscation by police authorities of
driver's licenses and removal of license plates for alleged traffic violations. These
sanctions were not among those that may be imposed under PD 1605. The
Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991,
authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/
unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of
traffic in Metro Manila." The Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said
ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred
upon it by EO 392. There was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance
because the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter. The
Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void
because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. It
violated PD 1605 which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal
of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in
Metropolitan Manila.

ISSUE & HELD:

WON Ordinance No. 11 is valid (NO)
RATIO:

The problem before the Court is not the validity of the delegation of legislative
power. The question the SC must resolve is the validity of the exercise of such
delegated power.
A municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be
unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. PD 1605
does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's
licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in
the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission, now the
Metropolitan Manila Authority, to impose such sanctions. Local political
subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative
power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their
own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself).
They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate
legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot
contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. Here, the
enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against
the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. The measures in question
do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions
the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. There is no statutory
authority for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the imposition
of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their
merits, they cannot be imposed by the challenged enactments by virtue only of
the delegated legislative powers.

NOTE:
SC emphasized that the ruling in the
Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an
exception to the general authority conferred by RA 413 on the Commissioner of
Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country
with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned.

Emmanuel Pelaez v. The Auditor General, G.R. No. L-23825, December 24,
1965, 15 SCRA 569 (1965)

15 SCRA 569 – Political Law – Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33
municipalities – this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary… of
any… municipality… and may change the seat of government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require…
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil
action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for
the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said
that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370
which provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor
their names changed” except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the
President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities?”
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios
were barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from
the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating barrios. He further
maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power
to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to
the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to
another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must
set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard.
Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect,
make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without
the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope
of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare
may require” – which would mean that the President may exercise such power as
the public welfare may require – is present, still, such will not replace the
standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the
phrase “as the public welfare may require” qualifies is the text, which immediately
precedes hence, the proper interpretation is “the President may change the seat
of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare
may require.” Only the seat of government may be changed by the President
when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially
and eminently legislative in character not administrative (not executive).

Edu v. Ericta 35 SCRA 481 (1970)

Facts:

1. Assailed is the validity of the Reflector Law and Admin Order No. 2 which
implements it. Under the law, a vehicle has to comply with the requirements of
having reflective device prior to being registered at the LTO.

2. The respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other motorists filed a suit for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the
challenged Act as an invalid exercise of the police power for being violative of the
due process clause. This he followed on May 28, 1970 with a manifestation
wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent
Judge would hold said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the
Land Transportation Commissioner, now petitioner, implementing such
legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power.

Issue: W/N Reflector Law is unconstitutional, and w/n AO2 is valid

YES, both the law and AO 2 are valid.

It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the
police power to promote public safety. What is delegated is authority which is
non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the
hands of Congress being assumed.

1. Police Power
It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government.
"the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable of powers," (Justice Holmes)
aptly pointed out "to all the great public needs."
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate
the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: "Needs that were narrow or
parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the
nation.

2. Delegation of Legislative Power

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that
Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the
government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local
affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under
the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the
completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the
hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue
delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and
definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its
functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is
the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only
way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully
been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be
done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised
under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made. The
Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary
resources of flexibility and practicability.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies
at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay
down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be
hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps
out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the
criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the
executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above
guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation
objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered
as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety.

Agustin v. Edu 88 SCRA 195 (1979)

Facts:
Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of Letter
of Instruction 229 and its implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO Commissioner
Romeo Edu. His car already had warning lights and did not want to use this. The
letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early warning device installed
on a vehicle to reduce accidents between moving vehicles and parked cars. The
LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not more than 15% of the
acquisition cost.
The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked on any street or
highway for 30 minutes. It was mandatory.
Petitioner: 1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation of police power, equal
protection, and due process/
2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers and car dealers
millionaires at the expense of car owners at 56-72 pesos per set. Hence the
petition. The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with
regard to the unconstitutionality and undue delegation of police power to such
acts.
The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on
road signs as a regulation. To the petitioner, this was still an unlawful delegation
of police power.

Issue:
Is the LOI constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation of police power?

Held: Yes on both. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
Police power, according to the case of Edu v Ericta, which cited J. Taney, is
nothing more or less than the power of government inherent in every sovereignty.
The case also says that police power is state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare.
Primicias v Fulgoso- It is the power to describe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order, and general welfare of the people.

J. Carazo- government limitations to protect constitutional rights did not also

intend to enable a citizen to obstruct unreasonable the enactment of measures
calculated to insure communal peace.
There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute validity.
Ermita Malate Hotel-The presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of factual record in over throwing the statute.
Brandeis- constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation
in overthrowing the statute. Even if the car had blinking lights, he must still buy
reflectors. His claims that the statute was oppressive was fantastic because the
reflectors were not expensive.

SC- blinking lights may lead to confusion whether the nature and purpose of the
driver is concerned. Unlike the triangular reflectors, whose nature is evident
because it’s installed when parked for 30 minutes and placed from 400 meters
from the car allowing drivers to see clearly. There was no constitutional basis for
petitioner because the law doesn’t violate any constitutional provision. LOI 229
doesn’t force motor vehicle owners to purchase the reflector from the LTO. It only
prescribes rge requirement from any source. The objective is public safety. The
Vienna convention on road rights and PD 207 both recommended enforcement
for installation of ewd’s. Bother possess relevance in applying rules with the
declaration of principles in the Constitution. On the unlawful delegation of
legislative power, the petitioners have no settled legal doctrines.

Rubi v. Provincial Board 39 Phil. 660 (1919)

Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were
ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from
their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still
in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment
if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to
that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are
a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of “very low culture”.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was
later caught and was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped
from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf
by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the
resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had
been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of
the Administrative Code, which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any
province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
was challenged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes
undue delegation. Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their
liberty.
HELD:
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality
of this section of the Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who
else was in a better position to determine whether or not to execute the law but
the provincial governor. It is optional for the provincial governor to execute the
law as circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the
provincial governor. The Legislature may make decisions of executive
departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the
execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
II. No. Among other things, the term “non-Christian” should not be given a literal
meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees
of civilization. The term “non-Christian” it was said, refers not to religious belief,
but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine
Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were being
reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their
seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where they can adapt
to the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro
was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: “.
. . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the
degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for
their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due
process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process
of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be
reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.”