PFR CASES

Beatriz Wassmer vs Francisco Velez

In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided to schedule it on
September 4, 1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as: making and sending wedding
invitations, bought her wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities. But 2 days
before the scheduled day of wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer advising her that he will not be
able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding. And one day before the
wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her that nothing has changed and that he will
be returning soon. However, he never returned.

This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an answer and eventually
judgment was made in favor of Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary and moral damages in favor of
Wassmer.

On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous
events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry
Wassmer because there is no law upon which such an action may be grounded. He also contested the
award of exemplary and moral damages against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.

HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also unsubstantiated. It is
true that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, in this case, it was
not a simple breach of promise to marry. because of such promise, Wassmer made preparations for the
wedding. Velez’s unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy. Wassmer’s cause of action is supported under Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides
in part “any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”

And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral
damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary damages
is also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to
Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner – this warrants the imposition of exemplary
damages against him.

Gashem Shookat Baksh vs Court of Appeals

In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales, then 21
years old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange student from Iran who was studying
medicine in Dagupan. The two got really close and intimate. On Marilou’s account, she said that Gashem
later offered to marry her at the end of the semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to her parents
where they expressed their intention to get married. Marilou’s parents then started inviting sponsors
and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for animals to slaughter for the occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they had sexual intercourse. But
in no time, their relationship went sour as Gashem began maltreating Marilou. Gashem eventually
revoked his promise of marrying Marilou and he told her that he is already married to someone in
Bacolod City. So Marilou went home and later sued Gashem for damages.

The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court.

On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he cannot be
adjudged to have violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being an Iranian, was not familiar
with Filipino customs and traditions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.

HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really because of his breach of
promise to marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides:

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the deceit and fraud
employed by Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. His promise of marrying
Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her into sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou was
not a woman of loose morals. She was a virgin before she met Gashem. She would not have surrendered
herself to Gashem had Gashem not promised to marry her. Gashem’s blatant disregard of Filipino
traditions on marriage and on the reputation of Filipinas is contrary to morals, good customs, and public
policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our country and even taking advantage of the
opportunity to study here he is expected to respect our traditions. Any act contrary will render him
liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.

The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the concepts of torts and quasi
delict. It is meant to cover situations such as this case where the breach complained of is not strictly
covered by existing laws. It was meant as a legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which
is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books – such as the
absence of a law penalizing a the breach of promise to marry.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to marry was made and
there was carnal knowledge because of it, then moral damages may be recovered (presence of moral or
criminal seduction), Except if there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made because of the promise
(expenses for the wedding), then actual damages may be recovered.

CIR vs Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. 148 SCRA 315Facts:

From January, 1952 to 1958, private respondent Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. entered into various
insurance contracts involving casualty, fire and marine risks, for which the corresponding insurance
policies were issued. From January, 1952 to 1956, documentary stamps were bought and affixed to the
monthly statements of policies issues; and from 1957 to 1958 documentary stamps were bought and
affixed to the corresponding pages of the policy register, instead of on the insurance policies issued. In
1959, respondent company discovered that its monthly statements of business and policy register were
lost and reported such to the NBI and the CIR. The CIR through its examiner, after conducting an
investigation of said loss, ascertained that respondent company failed to affix the required documentary
stamps to the insurance policies issued by it and failed to preserve its accounting records within the
time prescribed by Sec. of the Revenue Code by using loose leaf forms as registers of documentary
stamps without written authority from the CIR. As a consequence of these findings, petitioner assessed
and demanded from petitioner the payment of documentary stamp taxes for the years 1952 to 1958 in
the total amount of P 79,806.87 and plus compromise penalties, a total of P 81,406.87.

Issue:

WON the CIR may impose and require the payment of the subject stamp tax for the documents
inquestion.

Ruling:

NO. There is no justification for the government which has already realized the revenue which is the
object of the imposition of subject stamp tax, to require the payment of the same tax for the same
documents. Enshrined in our basic legal principles is the time honored doctrine that no person shall
unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another. It goes without saying that the government is not
exempted from the application of this doctrine. While there appears to be no question that the purpose
of imposing documentary stamp taxes is to raise revenue, however, the corresponding amount has
already been paid by respondent and has actually become part of the revenue of the government. In the
same manner, evidence was shown to prove that the affixture of the stamps on documents not
authorized by law is not attended by bad faith as the practice was adopted from the authority granted
to one of respondent's general agents.
St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. CA

Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical
Center, seek to recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where St Louis Realty
Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr. Arcadio.

St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading “where the heart is”. This was
republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house featured was Dr Aramil’s house and
not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked permission and the intended house to be published.
After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding an explanation 1 week
after such receipt. No rectification or apology was published despite that it was received by Ernesto
Magtoto, the officer in charge of the advertisement. This prompted Dr. Aramil’s counsel to demand
actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, St Louis published an ad now with Mr.
Arcadio’s real house but nothing on the apology or explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint
for damages on March 29. During the April 15 ad, the notice of rectification was published.

ISSUE: Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil.

HELD: St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated publication.
Furthermore, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself
with a cavalier "rectification ".

The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as
attorney's fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA affirmed the judgement for
the reason that “St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the
Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to
Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps”.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.