Didipio Earth Savers Multipurpose Association et al vs DENR Sec Elisea

Gozun et al

Facts:
In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign
companies when it comes to either technical or financial large scale exploration or
mining. In 1995, Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In
1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company.
The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and
N. Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After the passage of the law, DENR rolled out its
implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to have the law and the RR to be annulled as it
is unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of property. In seeking to nullify
Rep. Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional,
petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO
96-40 which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust “taking”• of private property
for private purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that private property shall not be taken except for public use and the
corresponding payment of just compensation. They assert that public respondent
DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot,
on its own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land without
payment of just compensation.

Traversing petitioners’ assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not a

taking provision but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the
state may prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This government regulation
involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and that this adjustment curtails
some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. Public
respondents concluded that “to require compensation in all such circumstances would
compel the government to regulate by purchase.”•

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid.

HELD: The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain.
They are:

(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;

(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.

(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;

(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated
or injuriously affected;

(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed there is taking
involved but it is not w/o just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for just
compensation as well as section 107 of the DENR RR. To wit,

Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner,
occupant, or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly
compensated as may be provided for in the implementing rules and regulations.

Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage done
to the property of the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a
consequence of the mining operations or as a result of the construction or installation
of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and justly
compensated.

Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain to
exercise entry, acquisition and use of private lands.

MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC v. SECRETARY OF DSWD

711 SCRA 302
G.R. No. 175356
December 3, 2013

TOPIC: Bill of Rights; Eminent Domain v. Police Power

FACTS: RA 7432 was passed into law (amended by RA 9257), granting senior citizens
20% discount on certain establishments.

To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance and the DSWD
issued its own Rules and Regulations.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners are not questioning the 20% discount granted to senior citizens but are
only assailing the constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme prescribed under RA
9257 and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF.

Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of
the Constitution, which provides that: "private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation."

Respondents maintain that the tax deduction scheme is a legitimate exercise of the
State’s police power.

ISSUE: Whether the legally mandated 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of
police power or eminent domain.

RULING: The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power.

It may not always be easy to determine whether a challenged governmental act is

an exercise of police power or eminent domain. The judicious approach, therefore, is
to look at the nature and effects of the challenged governmental act and decide on
the basis thereof.

The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their
age, are less likely to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other
disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic commodities. It serves
to honor senior citizens who presumably spent their lives on contributing to the
development and progress of the nation.

In turn, the subject regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of a
private establishment.

The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial distinctions
from, price control or rate of return on investment control laws which are traditionally
regarded as police power measures.

The subject regulation differs there from in that (1) the discount does not prevent
the establishments from adjusting the level of prices of their goods and services, and
(2) the discount does not apply to all customers of a given establishment but only to
the class of senior citizens. Nonetheless, to the degree material to the resolution of
this case, the 20% discount may be properly viewed as belonging to the category of
price regulatory measures which affect the profitability of establishments subjected
thereto. On its face, therefore, the subject regulation is a police power measure.
Heirs of Navarro v. IAC
HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT &
HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL

Facts:
On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application for foreshore lease
covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of
approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This application was denied on January 15,
1953. So was his motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-
in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application with
the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in
Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially the application was denied, eventually however
the grant was given. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property,
The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the
Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting in an
accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner. On
March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General,
filed an opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-
interest possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the same being a portion
of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. On
November 10, 1975, the courta quorendered judgment finding the subject property
to be foreshore land and, being a part of the public domain, it cannot be the subject
of land registration proceedings. On appeal, the respondent court reversed the
findings of the courta quoand granted the petition for registration of the subject
property but excluding certain areas. A motion for reconsideration was filed by in the
CA but the same was denied. Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of
the Civil Code, petitioners vigorously argue that the disputed 14-hectare land is an
accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their
course on the eastern and western boundaries, respectively, of petitioners' own tract
of land.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners can rightfully claim the land under the principle of
accretion

Held:
The petitioner’s claim is misplaced. The principle of accretion is only applicable to
owners whose estates are adjacent to rivers as stated in Article 457 of the Civil Code.
The disputed land is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what
used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land
on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of to Civil Code
but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. The disputed property is an
accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the
disputed property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of
the public domain. As part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is intended
for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain
and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by any private
person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a competent
authority."Only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the right
and the power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea
is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of establishment
of special industries or for coast guard services.Petitioners utterly fail to show that
either the executive or legislative department has already declared the disputed land
as qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property
of petitioners as owners of the estates adjacent thereto.

City Of Manila vs. Chinese Community Of Manila, 40 Phil. 349 (1919)

FACTS: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion
private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims
that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the
private cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because
other routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the
cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons
owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the
particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right
to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire
and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity
of the expropriation.

HELD:The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the
actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law.
The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority
conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The
necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the
right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether
or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case
under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts
have the right to inquire to.

REPUBLIC vs. LIM (GR no. 161656)

FACTS:
In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of a land in
Lahug, Cebu City for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the
Philippine Army. The said lots were registered in the name of Gervasia and Eulalia
Denzon. The Republic deposited P9,500 in the PNB then took possession of the lots.
Thereafter, on May 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay
the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation. The Denzons appealed to
the CA but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment was made on
April 5, 1948.

In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation
a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it "denied knowledge of the matter." On
September 6, 1961, Lt. Cabal rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the
appraised value of the lots within a reasonable time.

For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons·
successors-in-interest,Valdehueza and Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for
recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and AFP officers in
possession of the property.

On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the names of Valdehueza
and Panerio with the annotation "subject to the priority of the National Airports
Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and939 upon previous payment
of a reasonable market value".

On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio,
holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over lots
because of the Republic·s failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10,adjudged in the
expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land titles,
they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic.

They appealed the CFI·s decision to the SC. The latter held that Valdehueza and
Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no
payment of just compensation by the Republic. SC still ruled that they are not entitled
to recover possession of the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair
market value.
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim,
herein respondent, as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite
demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. The lot title was issued in his
name.

On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the RTC against
the petitioners herein. On 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Lim, declaring
that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the lot with all the rights of an absolute
owner including the right to possession. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In
its Decision dated September 18, 2003, it sustained the RTC Decision saying: ´...
This is contrary to the rules of fair play because the concept of just compensation
embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners
of the land,but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just"...”

Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for review alleging that they
remain as the owner of Lot 932.

ISSUE:
Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to the
judgment of the CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940.

HELD:
One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be
deprived of his private property without due process of law; and in expropriation
cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be just compensation
whenever private property is taken for public use. Accordingly, Section 9, Article III,
of our Constitution mandates: "Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation." The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when
it failed and refused to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the just
compensation for Lots 932 and 939.

The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republic’s delay is contrary to the rules
of fair play. In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated
property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that if the
compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a
trespasser ab initio.
As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay
respondent’s predecessors-in- interest the sum of P16,248.40 as "reasonable market
value of the two lots in question." Unfortunately, it did not comply
and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Court’s mandate. It is
tantamount to confiscation of private property. While it is true that all private
properties are subject to the need of government, and the government may take
them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however from
the taking of private property by the government under the power of eminent
domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the owner for his loss.
There is a recognized rule that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the
owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. So, how
could the Republic acquire ownership over Lot 932 when it has not paid its owner the
just compensation, required by law, for more than 50 years? Clearly, without full
payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner
to the expropriator.

SC ruled in earlier cases that expropriation of lands consists of two stages. First is
concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise. The second is concerned
with the determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought
to be taken." It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is
said to have been completed In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, we ruled
that, "the process is not completed until payment of just compensation." Thus, here,
the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a
period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process incomplete.

Thus, SC ruled that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle
respondent to recover possession of the expropriated lot from the Republic.

While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation does not
entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however,
in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years
from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners
concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. After all, it is
the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private persons against
their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of
Appeals, we defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within
a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
"just."
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority and Air Transportation Office
v. Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. et. al*

*Heirs thereof

FACTS:

 Petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse, annul, and set aside
Decision dated February 28, 2006 and the Resolution dated February 7, 2007
of the CA

 Subject: Lot No. 88-SWO-25042 (Lot No. 88)

o In Lahug, Cebu
o Orig. Owner: Anastacio Deiparine
o Subject to expropriation proceedings for expansion and improvement of
Lahug Airport
 Initiated by RP, represented by then Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA)
 As early as 1947, lots already occupied by US Army
o Turned over to Surplus Property Commission, the Bureau of
Aeronautics, the National Airport Corporation then to CAA
 During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, respondent Bernardo
L. Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine.
o TCT No. 9045 issued in Lozada’s name
 December 29, 1961, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of RP
o Ordered latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of Lot No. 88 with
conseq damages (legal interest from 1947)
o Lozada received P3,018.00
o Affected landowners appealed

 Pending appeal, Air Transportation Office (ATO), formerly CAA, proposed

compromise settlement
o If owners not appeal or withdraw appeals, ATO will resell to them the
lots at the expropriated price in the event that Lahug Airport will be
abandoned
 Therefore, Lozado did not pursue appeal
o Lot 88 transferred to RP under TCT No. 25057

 Projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport not
pursued
 Lozada and other owners contacted CAA, formerly ATO, (Dir. Vicente Rivera)
and asked to reacquire lots under the previous proposition
 o CAA said lots might still be needed for an emergency airport
o But reiterated previous proposition
 29 Nov. 1989 – Pres. Aquino signed memo to Dept. Of Transpo to transfer gen.
Aviation ops of Lahug to Mactan Airport = closure of Lahug
 1990 – Congress passed RA 6958
o Created Mactan-Cebu Intl. Authority = authority to operate and manage
Mactan and Lahug assets
 From date of expropriation proceedings to present, public purpose (airport)
never materialised
o Old airport became commercial complex (Ayala IT Park)
o Lot 88 became a jail and portion inhabited by squats
 4 June 1996 – Lozada initiated complaint for recovery of Lot 88
o Petitioners:
 Specifically denied proposition
 Asked for immediate dismissal
 Asserted that petitioners not entitled to recovery regardless non-
use or abandonment bec. Judgment of condemnation
unconditional

1st Ruling (RTC): in favour of petitioners

 MCIAA and ATO to return lot upon payment of expropriation price
 Transfer of TCT

2nd Ruling (CA): affirmed RTC ruling

ISSUE: W/N the existence of a constructive trust is sufficient for the restitution of an
expropriated property which was not used** for a public purpose.

HELD: Yes.

 The agreement between the Lozadas and the CAA (later transferred to MCIAA
due to RA 6958) is a constructive trust.

 Constructive trusts are fictions of equity which are bound by no unyielding

formula when they are used by courts as devices to remedy any situation in
which the holder of legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial
interest.
o Constructive trusts are similar to implied trusts as defined by Art. 1454

 In constructive trusts, the arrangement is temporary and passive in which the

trustee’s sole duty (in this case, MCIAA) is to transfer the title and possession
over the property to the plaintiff-beneficiary (in this case, Lozada).
 o In seeking aid of court in establishing constructive trust, beneficiary
must also do equity.
o If lot is returned:
 Beneficiary – has obligation to reimburse trustee the
compensation received from the latter
 Obligation to reimburse trustee expenses incurred while
maintaining or improving the property, especially if
beneficiary will incur benefits from those

 Art. 1190 details the rights and obligations bet. Constructive trustee and
beneficiary

 Following Art. 1187, petitioners may keep whatever income or fruits they may
have obtained from Lot No. 88, and respondents need not account for the
interests that the amounts they received as just compensation may have
earned in the meantime.

o MCIAA must returned Lot 88 to Lozadas

o Lozadas must repay/return to MCIAA the amount received for the
expropriated property [recall they received P3,801] plus legal interest
 Also pay MCIAA expenses they incurred in maintaining Lot 88 as
well as fiscal value of their services which benefitted them
[Lozadas]

 Following Art. 1190 vis-a-vis Art. 1189, Lozadas, as creditors, do not have to
pay, as part of the process of restitution, the appreciation in value of Lot No.
88 bec. it is a natural consequence of nature and time.

** Recall State’s power of eminent domain. Expropriation of property always

subject to condition that it be used for specific public purpose for which it was
taken. Abandonment or fulfilment of public purpose = must return property to
original owners.