Crime Victimization in Latin America

and Intentions to Migrate to the

United States
Charles H. Wood
Chris L. Gibson
University of Florida

Ludmila Ribeiro
IUPERJ

Paula Hamsho-Diaz
University of Florida

Among the challenges faced by Latin America at the onset of the 21st
century is the increase in crime and violence that began in the mid-
1980s, and which, to one degree or another, has afflicted most coun-
tries in the region. In this study we explore the potential implications
of the upsurge in crime on migration by testing the hypothesis that
crime victimization in Latin America increases the probability that
people have given serious thought to the prospect of migrating with
their families to the United States. Using Latinobarometro public
opinion surveys of approximately 49,000 respondents residing in 17
countries in 2002, 2003, and 2004, the results of a Hierarchical Gen-
eralized Linear Model found that, net of individual and country-level
control variables, the probability of seriously considering family
migration to the United States was around 30 percent higher among
respondents who reported that they or a member of their family was
a victim of a crime sometime during the year prior to the survey. Evi-
dence that victimization promotes the propensity to emigrate is a
finding that contributes to an understanding of the transnational con-
sequences of the increase in crime in Latin America, and adds a new
variable to the inventory of factors that encourage people to migrate
to the United States.

The increase in crime and violence that began in the 1980s on the streets
of Latin America has sadly become a defining characteristic of nearly every
country in the region as it enters the 21st century (Davis, 2006). The
crime surge is reflected in the number of homicides recorded per 100,000

 2010 by the Center for Migration Studies of New York. All rights reserved.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-7379.2009.00796.x

IMR Volume 44 Number 1 (Spring 2010):3–24 3

4 International Migration Review

persons, an indicator that, in the absence of better data, is sometimes used

as a proxy measure of unreported violent crimes. By the year 2002, the
region’s homicide rate reached 23.2, which is nearly three times the world
average of 8.8, and ahead, even, of the war-torn countries of West and
Central Africa (Waiselfisz, 2008). The grim statistic has bestowed on
Latin America the sad distinction of being the most violent region in the
world.
In contrast to the homicide rate, the proportion of people who
report being a victim of a robbery, assault, or burglary is a better measure
of the more ordinary types of crime that threaten most people in their
daily lives. Although comparable and accurate data on crime victimization
across countries in the region are hard to come by, social surveys carried
out by the polling agency Latinobarometro provide a rough estimate of
the proportion of people who have experienced one form of victimization
or another. Estimates derived from the Latinobarometro surveys in 2002,
2003, and 2004 show that 38.6 percent of respondents indicated that they
or a member of their family had been the victim of a crime in the previ-
ous year, a proportion that ranged from 24.8 percent in Panama to 67.6
percent in Mexico.
Given that more than a third of the respondents reported some form
of victimization, it is unsurprising that crime is uppermost in people’s
mind. Responses to a question in the 2006 Latinobarometro survey
showed that a large number of people (16.2 percent) declared ‘‘crime and
personal insecurity’’ to be the ‘‘main problem’’ that their country faces.
This figure was well above the 10.2 percent who put poverty at the top of
their list of concerns, and was second only to the 24.3 percent who
declared unemployment to be their main worry.
Fear of crime and the sense of personal vulnerability, in turn, have
multiple social and political consequences, many of which erode the legiti-
macy of the state and promote attitudes and preferences not conducive to
the consolidation of democracy in fragile political regimes (Buvinic and
Morrison, 2001; Prillaman, 2003; Sanchez, 2006). The personal insecurity
caused by the prevalence of criminal behavior is thought to weaken peo-
ple’s commitment to the principles of democratic representation and
erode confidence in the political system (Cruz, 2000, 2008). Lack of sup-
port for democracy has been related to the rise of ‘‘neo-populist’’ leaders
who come to power riding waves of popular enthusiasm, and who use
decree and plebiscitary powers to bypass the legislature, the courts, and
other institutions that might otherwise check their authority (O’Donnell,
 Crime Victimization in Latin America 5

1994; Weyland, 1996; Carlin, 2006:51). Victimization weakens trust in

others (Cuesta, Alda, and Lamas, 2007) and promotes illiberal behaviors,
such as restricting civil rights and endorsing repressive law enforcement
(Bailey and Flores-Macı́as, 2007). Widespread insecurity and the public
demand for quick solutions often justify military style responses to vio-
lence in ways that undermine the rule of law and promote further crimi-
nal behavior (Pérez, 2003 ⁄ 04).
Estimates of the material costs of crime and violence amount to a
significant fraction of production (Soares and Naritomi, 2007). When
direct costs as well as expenditures on criminal justice and crime preven-
tion are included in the calculation, the estimates are around 2.1 percent
of Gross Domestic Product per year for the United States, and 3.6 per-
cent for Latin America (Bourguignon, 1999; Londoño and Guerrero,
1999). When the monetary costs related to property crime are included,
the proportion of GDP that is due to crime and violence increases to 5.1
percent for Latin America (Bourguignon, 1999). The consequences of
crime have come to influence the economic development of countries in
Latin America (Ayres, 1998).
The social consequences of the high prevalence of crime are
expressed in the way it has affected people’s daily lives. In cities ridden
with fear, people restrict their movements, go out less at night, and make
every effort to avoid the ‘‘forbidden zones’’ that loom ever larger in resi-
dents’ mental map of the urban terrain (Caldeira, 2000:297). More gener-
ally, the sense of fear and vulnerability that taints Latin American cities
has changed the ways in which people relate to one another, to the state,
and to the very notion of citizenship (Rotker, 2002:17). The rising tide
of violence not only engulfs the poor population but also affects the
wealthy and the powerful, many of whom contract private security details
or barricade themselves in gated communities (Caldeira, 2000). ‘‘Sad as it
is to say’’ wrote Diane Davis (2006:178) in a recent review of books on
the topic, ‘‘violence could arguably be considered the central – if not
defining – problem in contemporary Latin America as it faces the new
millennium.’’ For many people in the region leaving their country and
migrating to the United States has become one means of escape.
This study explores the implications of the upsurge in crime on
migration by testing the hypothesis that crime victimization in Latin
America increases the probability that people have given serious thought
to the prospect of migrating with their families to the United States. Our
analysis of Latinobarometro public opinion surveys of respondents
6 International Migration Review

residing in 17 countries in 2002, 2003, and 2004 indicate that, net of

individual and country-level control variables, the probability of seriously
considering family migration to the United States was substantially higher
among respondents who reported that they, or a member of their family,
was a victim of a crime sometime during the year prior to the survey.
The focus on crime victimization represents an extension of research on
the effects of violence and repression in Latin America on migration to
the United States.

CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND MIGRATION

Emigration in response to violence and repression is hardly a new phe-

nomenon in Latin America. In the 1960s, Haitian refugees made their
way to the United States in response to acute poverty and the pervasive
brutality that became the hallmark of the Duvalier administration
(Schmeidl, 2001:71). The 1959 revolution in Cuba similarly provoked a
flow of mostly middle class migrants to the United States in their effort
to escape the repression imposed by the Castro regime. Migrant flows in
the 1970s were associated with the violence that erupted following mili-
tary takeovers in Chile (1973–1995), Uruguay (1973–1976), and Argen-
tina (1976–1980). A decade later, a massive number of refugees arose in
Central America, linked to civil wars in Nicaragua, El Salvador (Stanley,
1987), and Guatemala (Morrison and May, 1994).
Violence, repression, and civil wars similarly shape the magnitude
and direction of within-country migration flows in Latin America. The
connection between people’s sense of vulnerability and their decision to
move is evident in the displacement of refugees in Colombia who were
forced to leave their homes in the countryside during the 1980s, when
armed rebels deliberately targeted the civilian population. The number of
involuntary migrants is estimated at 2.9 million persons, corresponding to
29.1 percent of the Colombia’s rural population (Ibáñez and Vélez,
2008).
Important as these examples are, the focus on political repression,
refugees, and cases of extreme violence (see Richmond, 1988) diverts
attention from the migration effects of the more banal and ubiquitous
sources of personal insecurity in neighborhoods and public places caused
by the increase in robbery, assault, and ordinary street crimes. The crime
surge in Latin America means that devising ways to ensure personal safety,
and ways to protect children and family members, has become another
 Crime Victimization in Latin America 7

element in people’s survival strategies, which include migration to the

United States, the leading destination of Latin American emigrants.
‘‘Owing to the urgency of their circumstances at home,’’ Magaly Sanchez
(2006:192) wrote, ‘‘(migrants) view U.S. metropolitan areas as ideal places
that provide significant opportunities for advancement as well as an
immediate exit from danger.’’ Economic and security considerations have
thus become interrelated causes of migration. Escaping crime may not be
the only, or even the most important factor that explains emigration to
the United States. Nonetheless, as we will show in this study, crime
victimization in Latin America has become a significant consideration in
people’s desire to leave their homeland in search jobs and safety.
Although arguments have been advanced that assert a link between
out-migration and the increase in crime victimization in Latin America
(e.g., Binford, 1999; Sanchez, 2006), empirical evidence to support the
claim is lacking. The scant attention given to the association between
crime in Latin America and migration to the United States is reflected in
the absence of any reference to the migration effects of the increase in
crime within Latin America, even in recent reviews of the published litera-
ture on transnational migration (e.g., Portes, 2006; Levitt and Jaworsky,
2007). To analyze the relationship between individual victimization and
the propensity to migrate, we turn to annual social surveys carried out by
Latinobarometro, an independent polling organization headquartered in
Santiago, Chile.

DATA AND MEASURES

Latinobarómetro is funded by multiple sources in the private and public

sectors, with significant participation from international organizations such
as the inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the European Union,
and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).1 Nearly every
year since 1995, Latinobarómetro has applied questionnaires to around
1,200 randomly selected individuals residing in Mexico and all the
nations of Central America and South America, except Belize, Surinam,
and Guyana. Because the surveys are sub-contracted to national polling
firms, the sample design of the Latinobarometro surveys varies somewhat
from one country to another. All sample designs nonetheless used quotas
to ensure representation by gender, socioeconomic status, and age,

1
Addition information is available at http://www.latinobarometro.org.
8 International Migration Review

although urban areas remain over-represented (Gaviria and Pagés, 1999;

McClintock and Lebovic, 2006:fn 6).
Despite the fact that the Latinobarometro surveys were not specifi-
cally designed to study crime, the questionnaires used in all surveys since
1995 contain an item on crime victimization, along with other measures,
one of which is especially pertinent to this study. In the 2002, 2003, and
2004 surveys, respondents were asked whether they ever seriously consid-
ered leaving their country to live in the United States. By including infor-
mation on both crime victimization and the intention to migrate, the
nationally representative samples make it possible to analyze the relation-
ship between the two variables in countries across the region. For the pur-
poses of this study, we combine the data for the three survey years to
yield a data set that contains 51,052 respondents 18–65 years of age
living in Mexico and 16 countries in Central and South America.
As one of the few sources of comparable attitudinal indicators for
the major countries in Latin America, the Latinobarometro data have been
the basis of numerous comparative studies (e.g., Lagos, 1997; Lagos 2003;
Seligson, 2002; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Lora and Panizza, 2003), and
have routinely been used to assess political opinions in the region (The
Economist 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004). The contribution of Latinobarometro
data to migration studies has been less impressive, however, largely
because the surveys do not include variables known to play an important
role in transnational migration research, such as family size, migration his-
tory, and information on other family members in the United States.
These limitations notwithstanding, the Latinobarometro surveys have the
potential to advance migration scholarship by virtue of the character of
the samples and the geographic scope of the data. Most studies of migra-
tion to the United States, for example, are based on census data and other
sources of information collected at the place of destination. Data of this
type have enabled analysts to explore a wide range of issues regarding
migrants once they have arrived in the US, but they are less suitable for
addressing the decision to migrate in the first place. Analyses of the latter
rely on data at the place of origin, such as those collected and analyzed
by Douglass Massey and his colleagues, which have provided the basis for
generating important insights into the factors that initiate and perpetuate
migration between Mexico and the United States (Durand, Massey, and
Zenteno 2001). But the fact remains that there are comparatively few
quantitative analyses across multiple countries in the hemisphere of the
individual level factors that promote migration to the US. The seventeen
 Crime Victimization in Latin America 9

countries included in the Latinobarometro, by contrast, permit us to test

the hypothesized relationship between crime victimization in Latin America
and people’s intention to migrate to the United States.

Considering Migration to the United States

The dependent variable in the analysis is given by responses to a question

that asked ‘‘Have you and your family seriously considered [given concrete
thought to] living in another country?’’ (¿Ud. y su familia han pensado en la
posibilidad concreta de ir a vivir en otro paı́s?). A follow-up question, ‘‘To
which country are you considering emigrating to?’’ (¿A que paı́s están con-
siderando emigrar?), enables us to limit the sample to people who intend to
migrate to the United States.
Two features of the questionnaire item are noteworthy. First, the
question explicitly extends the scope of the answer to include the respon-
dent’s family. An affirmative response thus includes individuals who are
not only contemplating a move, but who also intend to bring their fam-
ily. The phrasing of the item presumably excludes individuals who intend
to migrate on their own, as is most often the case among men who
migrate temporarily or seasonally in search of jobs.
Second, the phrasing of the question is designed to limit affirmative
responses to people who have given the matter ‘‘serious consideration.’’
By qualifying people’s responses in this way, the item is intended to elim-
inate individuals who may have thought about migrating but who have
not given the matter serious thought, as well as people who might truly
like to emigrate yet recognize that, for whatever reason, the option to
leave their country is so unrealistic as to eliminate migration as a realistic
possibility.
An affirmative answer to the question does not mean that all of the
respondents in the Latinobarometro surveys who indicated that they have
given serious thought to the idea of migrating to the United States will
necessarily do so, if only because a number of other variables enter into
the decision to migrate. Theories put forth in the field of migration
studies point to a wide range of considerations including the cost-benefit
calculation in deciding whether to migrate internationally (Todaro and
Marusko 1987), the expected rewards to human capital at the place of
destination (Massey et al. 1993; Chiswick 1988), the anticipated value
of U.S. social services and educational opportunities, and the availability
of social networks that increase access to information and enhance the
10 International Migration Review

probability of getting a job, thereby reducing the risk of entering the Uni-
ted States. Attempts to incorporate the security dimension into the micro-
economic model of migration proposed by Harris and Todaro (1970)
treat the decision process as one in which individuals use their income to
purchase consumption and safety in combinations that yield maximum
utility (Morrison and May, 1994: 119–122). Accordingly, actual migra-
tion will depend on a number of factors, including the cost of moving,
the perceived security benefits of migration, and the resources available to
the family. In this study we predict that people’s propensity to migrate is
positively associated with the experience of being a victim of a crime, the
primary independent variable in the study.

Crime Victimization

A question in the Latinobarometro survey asked whether the respondent

or someone in the respondent’s family had been assaulted, attacked, or
had been the victim of a crime in the previous twelve months [¿Ha sido
Ud. o algún pariente asaltado, agredido,o vı́ctima de un delito en los últimos
doce meses?]. The proportion of respondents in each country who
answered this question in the affirmative is given in Table 1.

TABLE 1
SAMPLE SIZE, CRIME VICTIMIZATION, AND INTENTIONS TO MIGRATE TO THE
UNITED STATES BY COUNTRY, 2002–2004
Crime Intentions to migrate to
Country N victimization (%) the United States (%)
Argentina 3,178 42.1 3.1
Bolivia 3,413 36.9 4.3
Brazil 2,937 33.4 6.5
Colombia 3,418 31.2 7.9
Costa Rica 2,779 35.7 11.2
Chile 3,142 35.6 3.2
Ecuador 3,328 40.2 11.6
El Salvador 2,792 36.3 23.0
Guatemala 2,827 40.0 13.5
Honduras 2,823 35.1 20.0
Mexico 3,526 67.6 10.5
Nicaragua 2,637 33.5 14.4
Panama 2,823 24.8 6.8
Paraguay 1,599 46.0 6.1
Peru 3,458 39.1 11.5
Uruguay 2,999 27.3 5.7
Venezuela 3,373 46.9 6.1
Total 50,634 38.6 9.6
Source: Latinobarometro 2002, 2003, 2004.
 Crime Victimization in Latin America 11

Unlike the National Crime Victimization Survey in the United

States, which records separate information on rape, robbery, and aggra-
vated and simple assault, a shortcoming of the Latinobarómetro data is
the absence of information about the type of crime the victim suffered.
This limitation has not prevented analysts from drawing conclusions
about the main types of crime most likely involved. Referencing data
from studies carried out in Colombia, El Salvador, and Lima, Gaviria and
Pagés (1999) concluded that Latinobarómetro estimates of crime victim-
ization correspond mainly to property crimes and robbery. This conclu-
sion is confirmed by our analyses of the AmericasBarometer surveys of ten
countries in Latin America carried out in 2006 by the Latin American
Public Opinion project (LAPOP) which show that robbery accounted for
74.7 percent of crimes committed during the previous year.
Turning to the questionnaire item itself, it is evident from the
phrasing of the question that a positive occurrence is recorded when the
respondent or anyone else in the family was victimized. The absence of a
follow-up question makes it impossible to know whether the recorded
criminal incident occurred to the respondent, to a member of the house-
hold, or, perhaps, to a cousin or brother living in another town. By
including crimes visited on other family members, the data overestimate
the true victimization rate by inflating the numerator of the ratio. The
form of the question may further overestimate victimization by virtue of
leaving the term ‘‘family’’ (pariente) undefined. If we plausibly assume
that bad news travels far, it is likely that the size of reference kin group to
which the response applies may expand to encompass members who have
a troubling story to tell. In keeping with this line of reasoning, one study
of Rio de Janeiro (Soares, Miranda, and Borges, 2006) has shown that for
every homicide committed in the city there are many more ‘‘occult vic-
tims’’ within the family who experience intense and prolonged emotional
distress.
These considerations make it evident that the family-based measure
of victimization is flawed, at least when the objective is to estimate the
true victimization rate in a population. However, the objective of this
study is not to estimate the victimization rate but, instead, to test the
effects of crime victimization on family intentions to migrate to the Uni-
ted States. With this purpose in mind, the family-based measure of vic-
timization is actually an advantage. By including other family members in
the measure, the Latinobarómetro data define the experience of victi-
mization within the affective networks of family life. The measure thus
12 International Migration Review

captures the subjective consequences of a threatening event that may have

occurred to the respondent, or to another individual that the respondent
cares about. Compared to a measure that restricts the definition of victim-
ization to the individual respondent, broadening the scope of the indica-
tor to include members of the family better reflects the emotional effects
of victimization within the domestic unit.
Finally, it is worth noting that both the item on crime victimization
and the question on whether people have given thought to the notion of
migrating use the respondent’s family as a reference point for data collec-
tion. Hence there is a desirable consistency in the Latinobarometro data
between the dependent variable (propensity to migrate) and the main
independent variable (crime victimization). To test for victimization
effects on the likelihood that people have contemplated migration, we
introduce statistical controls for variables at both the individual and the
country levels.

Individual-Level Control Variables (Level 1)

At the individual level, we include three socio-demographic variables

(Table 2). Sex is entered as a dummy variable (male = 1; female = 0).
Age is entered as a set of three dummy variables, using the oldest age
group (40–65 years) as the reference category. The respondent’s level of

TABLE 2
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
Level Variable Description N Mean SD
1 Age 18–29 19,735 0.387 0.487
30–39 11,883 0.233 0.423
40–65 = 0 (ref) 19,434
Sex Male = 1 24,875 0.487 0.500
Female = 0 (ref) 26,177
Years of school Range 1–15 51,052 9.262 4.007
Residence Capital city = 1 11,015 0.216 0.411
Other = 0 (ref.) 40,037
Socioeconomic status Range 0–3 50,475 1.281 1.151
Family’s economic situation Range 1–5 50,861 2.923 0.789
Crime victimization Yes = 1 19,532 0.386 0.487
No = 0 (ref) 31,102
Intentions to migrate to U.S. Yes = 1 4,905 0.096 0.295
No = 0 (ref) 46,147
2 Human Development Index Range 0.649–0.863 17 0.759 0.064
Distance Range 751–6,197 17 2,887 1,764
Homicide rate (per 100,000) Range 0.40–79.70 17 21.14 20.29
Source: Latinobarometro 2002, 2003, 2004.
 Crime Victimization in Latin America 13

educational achievement varies from a score of 1.0 (no years of schooling)

to 15 (individuals who completed university-level education).
On the assumption that people’s level of economic well-being influ-
ences their disposition to emigrate we include two additional control vari-
ables. The first is an objective indicator of the respondent’s socioeconomic
status. Although the Latinobarometro surveys do not contain a measure of
household income, they nonetheless provide a ten-item inventory of the
consumer durables in the home. Given the variation in living standards
across the countries in the merged sample, we used factor analysis to identify
the subset of variables which loaded on a single factor and whose factor
scores were similar in all countries. The result was a composite index based
on the presence of hot water on the premises, and ownership of a washing
machine and telephone. The three-item index, which varies from 0 (low) to
3 (high) had an acceptable Cronbach’s Alpha reliability score of 0.727, with
single-component factor loadings of 0.767, 0.809, and 0.770, respectively.
The second variable refers to the respondent’s subjective assessment of his or
her family’s economic situation: ‘‘In general, how would you describe your
economic situation and that of your family?’’ The item allows five responses:
very good (5), good (4), about average (3), bad (2), and very bad (1).
Finally, we assume that the respondent’s place of residence within
their country will influence the likelihood that people have seriously con-
sidered migration to the United States. Specifically, people living in the
capital city have greater access to information about international travel,
as well as the social networks that facilitate transnational migration. To
account for this effect, we include in the equation a dummy variable
coded 1 for people who live in the capital city, 0 otherwise.

Country-Level Control Variables (Level 2)

At the country level, we include the Human Development Index (HDI)

constructed by the United Nations. The HDI is a composite index com-
posed of key dimensions of human development: life expectancy, knowl-
edge (measured by the adult literacy rate), education (the combined
primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrollment ratio), and standard of
living (as measured by the log of gross domestic product per capital and
purchasing power parity in US dollars). The HDI serves as an indicator
of economic performance and socioeconomic development. The HDI
varies between 0 (lowest) and 1 (highest). Scores below 0.500 generally
represent a low level of development.
14 International Migration Review

The second variable we include at the country level is the distance

between the capital city and Houston, Texas in the United States. The
distance in miles between the place of origin and destination serves as
proxy measure of the cost of migration. Independent of the other mea-
sures at the individual and at the country level, we anticipate that the
greater distance to the United States, the lower the likelihood that people
seriously consider making the trip.
The homicide rate is the third country-level variable we add to the
equation. The number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants is a com-
monly used measure of violence in a country. The homicide rates pro-
vided by the World Health Organization provide indicative estimates,
although they hide disparities within sub-regions of the countries in which
they are calculated. We introduce the country-level estimate of homicide
rate as a proxy measure of the degree of fear and insecurity citizens may
perceive, independent of their experience as a crime victim.2

VICTIMIZATION AND THE INTENTION TO MIGRATE TO

THE UNITED STATES

Individual data in the Latinobarometro surveys in 2002, 2003, and 2004

are ‘‘nested’’ within countries. Because each country has a distinctive eco-
nomic and political history, and each is characterized by a particular level
of economic and political development, it is likely that responses by peo-
ple within the same country are more similar to each other than responses
by individuals who live in different countries. The dependence between
observations violates the assumption of independent residuals, one of the
requirements of ordinary least squares regression. In such cases, the use of
conventional regression techniques may produce biased results by underes-
timating the standard errors of coefficients (Hox, 2002; Goldstein, 2003;
Gelman and Hill, 2007) such that even small intra-country correlations
can make the results vulnerable to a Type I error.

2
A questionnaire item that directly measures respondents’ fear of crime was not included
in the Latinobarometro surveys in 2002, 2003, and 2004. Given this limitation, other
variables, such as indicators of political rights and civil liberties provided by Freedom
House, can also be considered proxy measures inasmuch as low levels of political rights
and limited civil rights may contribute to citizen insecurity independent of victimization
status. Our analysis (not shown) found that neither of the Freedom House variables
exerted a statistically significant effect on the probability of seriously considering migration
to the United States.
 Crime Victimization in Latin America 15

Hierarchical Generalized Linear Model

Given the nature of the research hypothesis and the nested structure of
the data, it is appropriate to use multilevel modeling to simultaneously
assess between- and within-country differences in the probability that
respondents have seriously considered family migration to the United
States (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). For this study we estimate a deriva-
tive of the Hierarchical Linear Model (HLM), commonly known as a
Hierarchical Generalized Linear Model (HGLM). HGLM can use an
identity link function for a binary outcome variable, coded ‘‘1’’ for those
who have given migration serious thought or ‘‘0’’ otherwise.
We estimate a series of HGLM’s, beginning with an unconditional
model to determine if variation in the desire to migrate to the United
States varies significantly across countries. Evidence of statistically signifi-
cant country-level differences points to the need to identify variables that
account for the country-level variation in the disposition to emigrate. We
estimate the unconditional equation as follows:

ln½p/l  pij ¼ coo þ uoj þ rij ð1Þ

The model is similar to a one-way ANOVA with random effects,

but allows us to partition the variance in the proneness to migrate to the
United States into two levels: the between and within country variances.
Specifically, this allows us to determine if country level differences exist
with respect to the intention to emigrate.
We then assess whether our measure of victimization can predict
variation in intent to migrate to the Unites States, net of other individual
level controls, using the following equation:

ln½p/1  pij ¼ b0j þ b1j X ij þ ::: þ rij ð2Þ

Equation 2 is a level 1 equation which is estimated to predict the

natural log odds of seriously intending to migrate as a function of all
individual level covariates, where rij is a random effect that determines if
intent to migrate to the United States significantly varies across countries
net of individual charcateristics.
Assuming that country level differences in proneness to migrate are
present after estimating a level 1 model, controls for country level
variables will be included. Equation 3 is a level 2 equation, commonly
16 International Migration Review

known as a random intercept model, which will be estimated to deter-

mine if country variation in homicide rates, the HDI, and distance to the
United States explain variation in the dependent variable.

b0j ¼ c00 þ c01 W 1 þ :::: þ u0j ð3Þ

Combining Equations 2 and 3 generates simultaneous estimates of

country and individual level effects, allowing us to assess the effect of
crime victimization on intent to migrate to the United States while con-
trolling for both individual and country level variables.

Results

Model 1 in Table 3 presents the results of the unconditional model. The

variance component at the foot of the table indicates the presence of
statistically significant variance across the 17 countries in the data set in

TABLE 3
MULTILEVEL MODELS PREDICTING INTENTION TO MIGRATE FROM LATIN AMERICA TO THE UNITED
STATES: 2002–2004
Fixed effect Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept, c00 )2.222* (0.108) )2.225* (0.108) )2.391* (0.092)
Country level
Human Development Index – – )5.630* (0.004)
Distance to U.S. – – )0.000* (0.100)
Homicide rate – – 0.002 (0.002)
Person level
Victimization – 0.257* (1.293) 0.265* (1.304)
Male – 0.057* (1.059) 0.060* (1.061)
Age (18–29) – 0.433* (1.541) 0.449* (1.567)
Age (30–39) – 0.330* (1.390) 0.342* (1.408)
Age (40 and up) – reference Ref Ref
Socioeconomic status – 0.190* (1.209) 0.199* (1.220)
Family economic situation – -0.101* (0.904) )0.105* (0.900)
Years of school – 0.035* (1.036) 0.036* (0.037)
2003 – -0.027 (0.96) -0.027 (0.974)
2004 – 0.014 (1.014) 0.016 (1.016)
2002 – reference Ref Ref
Capital city – 0.206* (1.228) 0.212* (1.237)
Variance component
Random effect
Serious intent to migrate, u0j 0.397* 0.572* 0.138*
Reliability estimate 0.987 0.991 0.963
Source: Latinobarometro 2002, 2003, 2004.
Note: N = 49,106 cases in level 1; 17 cases in level 2.
*p < 0.05.
 Crime Victimization in Latin America 17

the proportion of respondents in the sample who say that they have given
serious consideration to the idea of migrating to the United States with
their families. The average odds of the propensity to migrate indicated by
the intercept term is 0.108.
Model 2 introduces socio-demographic and economic variables to
predict individual differences in the intent to migrate to the United
States. The findings show that the between-country differences observed
in Model 1 remain statistically significant after controlling for the individ-
ual-level attributes introduced in Model 2. As hypothesized, Model 2
shows that, net of the effects of sex, age, place of residence, and various
indicators of economic wellbeing, crime victimization has a positive and
statistical significant effect on the probability that the respondent had seri-
ously considered the prospect of leaving his or her country and moving to
the United States (odds ratio = 1.293).
Other variables in Model 2 provide revealing insights into the deter-
minants of the intent to migrate. Compared to female respondents, males
were somewhat more likely to have considered the idea of moving (odds
ratio = 1.059). The desire to leave their home country and come to the
United States was highest among respondents 18–29 years old, and
declined with increasing age. Socioeconomic status of the family was posi-
tive and statistically significant, indicating that families who had higher
socioeconomic status were more likely to have seriously considered moving
to the United States (odds ratio = 1.209). Respondents educational achieve-
ment and their perceived economic situation and were also statistically sig-
nificant. The probability of giving serious thought to migrating was
inversely related to people’s subjective assessment of their family’s economic
circumstance (odds ratio = 0.904), and was positively associated with the
number of years of school completed (odds ratio = 1.036). As expected,
place of residence was highly correlated with the dependent variable. Net of
the effects of the other variables in the equation, the probability of express-
ing an intent to emigrate to the United States was higher among people
who lived in the capital city of their country compared to those who resided
in smaller urban places (odds ratio = 1.228).3

3
When the intention to migrate to the United States is regressed on victimization within
each country in the region (controlling for the variables shown in Model 2, Table 3), the
odds ratio for the victimization variable is highest in Paraguay (2.17), followed by Bolivia
(1.93), Chile (1.61) and Mexico (1.60). The victimization effect on the propensity to
migrate was not statistically significant in Uruguay, Ecuador, Argentina, and Nicaragua.
18 International Migration Review

The third model in Table 3 introduces variables at the country level,

two of which show a statistically significant association with the probabil-
ity that respondents seriously contemplated the prospect of migrating to
the United States. Specifically, the likelihood of considering emigration
was lower among people living in more developed countries, as measured
by the Human Development Index. The results further show that the
higher the cost of migration, measured by the distance between the respon-
dent’s home country and the United States, the less likely the intent to
migrate. The country’s homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants was not sta-
tistically significant.
An important conclusion drawn from the results of Model 3 is that
introducing controls for the various country level indicators left the indi-
vidual level effects virtually unchanged. When we focus on the coefficients
shown in the lower panel in Table 3, it is apparent that there is little dif-
ference between the statistical significance and the sign of the coefficients
in Model 2, which excluded country-level indicators, and the significance
and the size of the coefficients in Model 3, which included the three
country-level indicators.
The estimate most pertinent to the main objective of this study is
the coefficient for the victimization variable. As noted in the third column
of Table 3, the experience of crime victimization exerts a positive and sta-
tistically significant effect on intentions to migrate, even after introducing
controls for variables at both the individual and country levels. Other
things being equal, respondents who declared that they or a member of
their family had been a victim of a crime in the year prior to the survey
were 1.304 times more likely to have seriously considered the possibility
of leaving their home country and moving their family to the United
States compared to those who did not report that a family member had
been victimized.

VICTIMIZATION AND MIGRATION: IMPLICATIONS

At a time in which the presence of immigrants in the United States has

again become a topic of heated political controversy, and when countries
in Latin America are undergoing profound economic and political trans-
formation, the task of identifying new factors that influence transnational
migration assumes particular importance. In keeping with this objective,
we present evidence that supports the conclusion that the rise in crime
and violence that has taken place across Latin America in recent decades
 Crime Victimization in Latin America 19

has increased people’s intention to migrate to the United States. Our

analysis, based on Latinobarometro surveys in 2002, 2003, and 2004,
found that the conditional probability of seriously considering family emi-
gration to the United States was 30 percent higher among respondents
who reported that they or a member of their family was a victim of a
crime sometime during the year prior to the survey. The victimization
effect on the desire to migrate was statistically significant after controlling
for individual-level socio-demographic and economic variables, as well
three country-level indicators: the Human Development Index, the
national homicide rate, and the distance from the capital city to the
United States.
By testing the effects of crime victimization on the intention to
migrate at the place of origin, the approach in this study differs from the
large body of literature that focuses instead on the effects of immigration
on crime rates at the place of destination. For the past two centuries ste-
reotypical images of the ‘‘criminal immigrant’’ have appeared in the popu-
lar press, in political discourse, and in public opinion (Reid et al.,
2005:758). Early studies of criminal offending argued for a positive rela-
tionship between immigration and crime (e.g., Shaw and McKay, 1942),
while more recent analyses in the field of urban sociology find that large
immigrant populations may have beneficial effects in cities, leading to
fewer social problems, including crime (Lee, Martinez, and Rosenfeld
2001; Portes and Mooney, 2002; Reid et al., 2005). The study presented
here focuses instead on the potential migration effects of victimization
that occurred in the migrant’s home country. To our knowledge, the
hypothesis that victimization encourages people to migrate abroad has not
been empirically tested at the individual level.
Whether the desire to escape insecure environments in Latin America
will lead to actual migration to the United States will depend on many fac-
tors, including future trends in the crime rate. Innovative public policies in
cities like Bogotá Colombia have successfully reduced crime and homicide
rates (Llorente and Rivas, 2005), yet the overall picture is less promising.
The pessimism expressed by many analysts (e.g. Prillaman, 2003) is pre-
mised on a number of considerations, five of which stand out in impor-
tance. One is the self-perpetuating nature of crime waves, a phenomenon
demonstrated in studies that show that high rates of criminality endure long
after the socio-economic causes have disappeared or have been addressed
through policy interventions (Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza, 1998). A
second reason is the strong correlation worldwide between ‘‘youth bulges’’
20 International Migration Review

in the age distribution of the population and high urban crime rates.
Although the proportion of the population under 14 years of age is pro-
jected to decline over the next 50 years (Potter and Tuirán Gutiérrez, 2005)
the absolute number of youths will nonetheless increase. The crime-induc-
ing effects of population growth in cities across the region are likely to be
exacerbated by rural to urban migration, especially in the face of relatively
stagnant labor markets, a phenomenon some analysts associate with the
neo-liberal economic policies that, to one degree or another, have been
adopted by most countries in the region (Portes and Hoffman, 2003; Portes
and Roberts, 2005). Also noted are police actions themselves that, in legal
environments characterized by weak rule of law, often lead to a ‘‘spiral of
corruption and violence’’ that undermines the already fragile foundations of
due process by promoting further violence and criminality (Pérez,
2003 ⁄ 04). A fifth reason for pessimism is predicated on the notion that
many of the causes of criminality in Latin America are not easily subject to
change in the short term. The latter include many often-cited variables
presumed to contribute to high rates of crime, such as the high degree of
income inequality, media promoted consumption aspirations, and the
reduced social control exercised by the family unit (Briceño-León, 2005).
If the current intensity of crime and violence persists, or even
increases as many analysts anticipate, the results of this study suggest that
citizen insecurity in Latin America may become an increasingly important
consideration in people’s decision to leave their homeland. Evidence that
victimization has the potential to promote emigration is a finding that
contributes to our understanding of the transnational consequences of the
increase in crime in Latin America, and adds a new variable to the inven-
tory of factors that encourage people to migrate to the United States.

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