Title: 031 Calanza v.

PICOP, 586 SCRA 408 (2009) Gr AUTHOR: SJ Catubay

No. 146622
TOPIC: IV. Establishing the status of a LGC (C: NOTES/QUICKIE FACTS:
settlement of boundary dispute)
There is no boundary dispute.
PONENTE: Concepcion, C.J.

Nature: Petition for review under Rule 45

Parties:

Petitioner: Leonora P. Calanza, Eva M. Amoren, Gene P. Roño, Sanny C. Calanza, Gregorio C. Yncierto II, and Angel M.
Puyo are approved applicants of a small-scale mining permits for the purpose of extracting gold by the Governor of
Davao Oriental

Respondent:

Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP), owner of the TLAs over the land in which petitioners are to mine
gold.

FACTS:

1. Petitioners having their applications for small-scale mining permits approved and allowed by the Governor of Davao
Oriental negotiated entry to the mining site with the PICOP.
2. The problem arose when PICOP prohibited them to enter into the mining area on the grounds that:
 it has exclusive right of occupation, possession and control over the area being a logging concessionaire
 The mining permits were defective since the mining area is situated in Surigao del Sur.
3. Petitioners filed a complaint against PICOP before the RTC praying that it or its agent be enjoined from preventing and
prohibiting the petitioners from entering into the mining site.
4. PICOP Contends:
 RTC of Davao does not have jurisdiction over the complaint since the disputed area is situated in the Province of
Surigao del Sur.
 The petitioners permits are void since it violated sec. 5 of RA 7076, which allegedly prohibits the issuance of mining
permits over areas covered by forest rights such as TLAs or forest reservation unless their status is withdrawn by the
competent authority
5. The RTC rule in favor of the petitioners ruling that:
 The mining area is within the territory of the province of Davao thus the governor is vested with the power to issue
the small-scale permits.
6. The CA however reversed the decision of the RTC, ruling that:
 The RTC erred in passing upon the issue of the boundary dispute between the provinces of Davao Oriental and
Surigao del Sur since the resolution of the boundary dispute primarily resides with the sangguniang panlalawigans
of the two provinces and the RTC has only appellate jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to the Local Government
Code of 1991.
 The governor has no power to issue small-scale mining permits since such authority under Section 9 of Republic
Act No. 7076 is vested with the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board.
7. Hence the petition for review under Rule 45.
ISSUE:

1) WON RTC has jurisdiction to determine the boundary dispute with regard to the contention of PICOP
2) WON the small-scale mining permits are valid.
HELD:

1) No, The Supreme affirmed the CA. RTC has no jurisdiction on the boundary dispute between Davao Oriental
and Surigao del Sur, its decision is a total nullity. There being no boundary dispute between LGUs.
2) No, the governor has no authority to issue mining permits pursuant to the prevailing statute of RA 7076.
RATIO:

1) There is boundary dispute when a portion or the whole of the territorial area of a Local Government Unit (LGU) is claimed by two or
more LGUs.7 In settling boundary disputes, Section 118 of the 1991 Local Government Code provides:

Sec. 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Dispute. – Boundary disputes between and among local government
units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. To this end:

(a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or municipality shall be referred for settlement to
the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned.

(b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to
the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.

(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement
to the sanggunians of the provinces concerned.

(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other, or
two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.

(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days from the date the dispute was
referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by
the sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification referred to
above.1avvphi1

Under paragraph (c) of Section 118, the settlement of a boundary dispute involving municipalities or component cities of different
provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians or the provincial boards of the different provinces
involved. Section 119 of the Local Government Code gives a dissatisfied party an avenue to question the decision of the sanggunian to
the RTC having jurisdiction over the area, viz:

Section 119. Appeal. - Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of
the sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute x x x.

Article 17, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing The Local Government Code of 1991 outlines the procedures governing
boundary disputes, which succinctly includes the filing of the proper petition, and in case of failure to amicably settle, a formal trial will be
conducted and a decision will be rendered thereafter. An aggrieved party can appeal the decision of the sanggunian to the appropriate
RTC. Said rules and regulations state:

Article 17. Procedures for Settling Boundary Disputes. – The following procedures shall govern the settlement of boundary disputes:

(a) Filing of petition - The sanggunian concerned may initiate action by filing a petition, in the form of a resolution, with
the sanggunian having jurisdiction over the dispute.

(b) Contents of petition - The petition shall state the grounds, reasons or justifications therefore.

(c) Documents attached to petition - The petition shall be accompanied by:

 1. Duly authenticated copy of the law or statute creating the LGU or any other document showing proof of creation of
the LGU;

2. Provincial, city, municipal, or barangay map, as the case may be, duly certified by the LMB.

3. Technical description of the boundaries of the LGUs concerned;

4. Written certification of the provincial, city, or municipal assessor, as the case may be, as to territorial jurisdiction
over the disputed area according to records in custody;

5. Written declarations or sworn statements of the people residing in the disputed area; and

6. Such other documents or information as may be required by the sanggunian hearing the dispute.

(d) Answer of adverse party - Upon receipt by the sanggunian concerned of the petition together with the required documents,
the LGU or LGUs complained against shall be furnished copies thereof and shall be given fifteen (15) working days within
which to file their answers.

(e) Hearing - Within five (5) working days after receipt of the answer of the adverse party, the sanggunianshall hear the case
and allow the parties concerned to present their respective evidences.

(f) Joint hearing - When two or more sanggunians jointly hear a case, they may sit en banc or designate their respective
representatives. Where representatives are designated, there shall be an equal number of representatives from
each sanggunian. They shall elect from among themselves a presiding officer and a secretary. In case of disagreement,
selection shall be by drawing lot.

(g) Failure to settle - In the event the sanggunian fails to amicably settle the dispute within sixty (60) days from the date such
dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to the effect and copies thereof shall be furnished the parties
concerned.

(h) Decision - Within sixty (60) days from the date the certification was issued, the dispute shall be formally tried and decided by
the sanggunian concerned. Copies of the decision shall, within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation thereof, be furnished the
parties concerned, DILG, local assessor, COMELEC, NSO, and other NGAs concerned.

(i) Appeal - Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of
the sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the dispute by filing therewith the
appropriate pleading, stating among others, the nature of the dispute, the decision of the sanggunian concerned and the
reasons for appealing therefrom. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the case within one (1) year from the filing thereof.
Decisions on boundary disputes promulgated jointly by two (2) or more sangguniang panlalawigans shall be heard by the
Regional Trial Court of the province which first took cognizance of the dispute.

The records of the case reveal that the instant case was initiated by petitioners against respondents predicated on the latter’s refusal to
allow the former entry into the disputed mining areas. This is not a case where the sangguniang panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and
Surigao del Sur jointly rendered a decision resolving the boundary dispute of the two provinces and the same decision was elevated to
the RTC. Clearly, the RTC cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction over the case since there was no petition that was filed and decided by
the sangguniang panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur. Neither can the RTC assume original jurisdiction over the
boundary dispute since the Local Government Code allocates such power to the sangguniang panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and
Surigao del Sur. Since the RTC has no original jurisdiction on the boundary dispute between Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur, its
decision is a total nullity. We have repeatedly ruled that a judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void and may be
attacked anytime.8 It creates no rights and produces no effect. In fact it remains a basic fact in law that the choice of the proper forum is
crucial as the decision of a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity. A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at
all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it
have no legal effect.

2) Petitioners’ small-scale mining permits are legally questionable. Under Presidential Decree No. 1899,
applications of small-scale miners are processed with the Director of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7076, which took effect10 on 18 July 1991, approval of the applications for mining
 permits and for mining contracts are vested in the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. Composed of the
DENR representative, a representative from the small-scale mining sector, a representative from the big-scale
mining industry and a representative from an environmental group, this body is tasked to approve small-scale
mining permits and contracts.

In the case under consideration, petitioners filed their small-scale mining permits on 23 August 1991, making
them bound by the procedures provided for under the applicable and prevailing statute, Republic Act No. 7076.
Instead of processing and obtaining their permits from the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board, petitioners were
able to get the same from the governor of Davao del Norte. Considering that the governor is without legal
authority to issue said mining permits, the same permits are null and void.

UY vs CONTRERAS
G.R. Nos. 111416-17. September 26, 1994

FACTS:

Petitioner Uy subleased from respondent Susanna Atayde the other half of the second floor of a
building Makati. The sublease contract expired on 15 April 1993. However, Uy was not able to remove
all her movable properties.

On 17 April 1993, an argument arose between Uy and Atayde when the former sought to withdraw
from the subleased premises her remaining movable properties. The argument degenerated into a
scuffle between Uy, on the one hand, and Atayde and several of Atayde's employees, including private
respondent Winnie Javier, on the other.

The private respondents then filed a complaint with the barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati,
however, during their scheduled confrontation before the barangay captain, only the petitioner
appeared. The prosecutor then filed two informations for slight physical injuries against the petitioner
with the MTC of Makati.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss alleging the prematurity of the filing of the criminal cases for failure
to undergo conciliation proceedings. On the other hand, private respondents contend that prior referral
of the dispute to the lupon is not applicable since she and petitioner are not residents of barangays in
the same city or municipality or of adjoining barangays in different cities or municipalities and that
referral to the lupon is not likewise required if the case may otherwise be barred by the statute of
limitations. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that prior referral to the lupon applies to the case of
private respondent, the latter had, nevertheless, substantially complied with the requirement with the
subsequent certification of the barangay to file the action.

Judge Contreras denied the motion to dismiss. The MR was likewise denied. Hence, Uy filed a petition
for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case should be dismissed

HELD:

While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the L GC of 1991, the jurisprudence built thereon regarding
prior referral to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of an action in court remains applicable
because its provisions on prior referral were substantially reproduced in the Code.

In view of the respondents' failure to appear at the scheduled mediation, no complaint for slight
physical injuries could be validly filed with the MTC of Makati at any time before such date. The filing
then of criminal cases was premature and respondent Judge Contreras should have granted the
motion to dismiss the criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by taking refuge under Section 6 of
P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section 412(b)(4) of the Local Government Code of 1991) which states
that the parties may go directly to court where the action is about to prescribe. This is because pursuant
to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code, the prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a
maximum period of sixty days from 23 April 1993 when the private respondents filed their complaints
with the lupon of Valenzuela Makati.

Accordingly, since the slight physical injuries charged in Criminal Cases were allegedly inflicted on 17
April 1993, the prescriptive period therefor would have expired two months thereafter. Nevertheless,
its running was tolled by the filing of the private respondents' complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela,
Makati, on 23 April 1993 and automatically suspended for a period of sixty days, or until 22 June 1993.
If no mediation or conciliation could be reached within the said period of suspension and, accordingly,
a certification to file action is issued, the private respondents would still have fifty-six days within which
to file their separate criminal complaints for such offense. Evidently, there was no basis for the
invocation by the respondent judge of the exception provided for in paragraph (b), Section 412 of the
Local Government Code.

Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private
respondents are estopped from disavowing the authority of the body which they themselves had
sought. Their act of trifling with the authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the scheduled
mediation hearings and instead filing the complaint right away with the trial court cannot be
countenanced for to do so would wreak havoc on the barangay conciliation system.

Neither is the argument that petitioner "had already waived the right to a reconciliation proceedings
before the barangay, persuasive. The petitioner did not waive the reconciliation proceedings before
the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati; she submitted to it and attended the scheduled conciliation and
invoked the pre-condition of referral to the lupon in her counter-affidavit.

Lastly, nor could the Court accept the contention of the respondent that the parties could not agree on
a compromise and that they had to request the barangay captain to issue a certification to file action.
The request was nearly one and a half months after criminal cases were filed with the court a quo.
Evidently, this was done to support their contention that, in any event, there was substantial
compliance with the requirement of referral to the lupon. It must be stressed that the private
respondents, after failing to appear at the initial confrontation and long after the criminal cases were
filed, had no right to demand the issuance of a certification to file action.

Petition granted. Respondent judge was ordered to dismiss the case.

MICHAEL SEBASTIAN v. ANNABEL LAGMAY NG

GR No. 164594, Apr 22, 2015

Facts:

Sometime in 1997, Angelita Lagmay (Angelita), acting as representative and attorney-in-fact of her
daughter Annabel Lagmay Ng (Annabel), filed a complaint before the Barangay Justice of Siclong,
Laur, Nueva Ecija. She sought to collect from Michael the sum of P350,000.00 that Annabel sent to
Michael. She claimed that Annabel and Michael were once sweethearts, and that they agreed to
jointly invest their financial resources to buy a truck. She alleged that while Annabel was working in
Hongkong, Annabel sent Michael the amount of P350,000.00 to purchase the truck. However, after
Annabel and Michael's relationship has ended, Michael allegedly refused to return the money to
Annabel, prompting the latter to bring the matter before the Barangay Justice.

On July 9, 1997, the parties entered into an amicable settlement, evidenced by a document
denominated as "kasunduan'' wherein Michael agreed to pay Annabel the amount of P250,000.00 on
specific dates. The kasunduan was signed by Angelita (on behalf of Annabel), Michael, and the
members of the pangkat ng tagapagkasundo

When Michael failed to honor the kasunduan, Angelita brought the matter back to the Barangay, but
the BarangayCaptain failed to enforce the kasunduan, and instead, issued a Certification to File
Action.

After about one and a half years from the date of the execution of the kasunduan or on January 15,
1999, Angelita filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) a Motion for Execution of
the kasunduan.

Michael moved for the dismissal of the Motion for Execution, citing as a ground Angelita's alleged
violation of Section 15, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
MCTC rendered a decision in favor of Annabel.

RTC rendered a decision setting aside the case and dismissing the Motion for Execution
of Kasunduan on the ground that the MTCT has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter.

CA reversed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether MCTC does not have jurisdiction over the case since the amount of P250,000.00 (as
the subject matter of the kasunduan) is in excess of MCTC's jurisdictional amount of
P200,000.00.2
2. Whether or not the kasunduan could be given the force and effect of a final judgment; and

RULING:

1. YES. The MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction

to enforce the kasunduan regardless of the amount involved

The law, as written, unequivocally speaks of the "appropriate city or municipal court" as the forum for
the execution of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. Notably, in expressly
conferring authority over these courts, Section 417 made no distinction with respect to the amount
involved or the nature of the issue involved. Thus, there can be no question that the law's intendment
was to grant jurisdiction over the enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards to the city or
municipal courts regardless of the amount.

2. The kasunduan has the force and effect of a final judgment.

Under Section 416 of the Local Government Code, the amicable settlement and arbitration award
shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration often (10) days from
the date of its execution, unless the settlement or award has been repudiated or a petition to nullify
the award has been filed before the proper city or municipal court.

Moreover, Section 14, Rule VI of the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules states that the
party's failure to repudiate the settlement within the period often (10) days shall be deemed a waiver
of the right to challenge the settlement on the ground that his/her consent was vitiated by fraud,
violence or intimidation.

In the present case, the records reveal that Michael never repudiated the kasunduan within the
period prescribed by the law. Hence, the CA correctly ruled that the kasunduan has the force and
effect of a final judgment that is ripe for execution.
 G.R. No. 153567 February 18, 2008
LIBRADA M. AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
ERNEST S. AURE1, respondent.

FACTS
Aure Lending filed a Complaint for ejectment against Aquino. In their Complaint, Aure and Aure
Lending alleged that they acquired the subject property from a Deed of Sale.

Aquino countered that the Complaint lacks cause of action for Aure and Aure Lending do not have
any legal right over the subject property.

MeTC rendered in favor of Aquino and dismissed the Complaint for ejectment of Aure and Aure
Lending for non-compliance with the barangay conciliation process, among other grounds. Te MeTC
observed that Aure and Aquino are residents of the same barangay but there is no showing that any
attempt has been made to settle the case amicably at the barangay level.

RTC affirmed.

CA reversed the MeTC and RTC Decisions and remanding the case to the MeTC for further
proceedings and final determination of the substantive rights of the parties.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE BARANGAY CONCILIATION

PROCEEDINGS IS A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT THAT WARRANTS THE DISMISSAL OF THE
COMPLAINT.

HELD: NO

There is no dispute herein that the present case was never referred to the Barangay Lupon for
conciliation before Aure and Aure Lending instituted Civil Case No. 17450. In fact, no allegation of
such barangay conciliation proceedings was made in Aure and Aure Lending’s Complaint before the
MeTC.

It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of Section 412 of
the Local Government Code on barangay conciliation (previously contained in Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 1508) is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies -- the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; and the
controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The complaint becomes vulnerable to
a motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement,
so that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise
acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.

As enunciated in the landmark case of Royales v. Intermediate Appellate Court:

Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground
of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent
jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the
defendants, as in this case, failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer
and even during the entire proceedings a quo.

While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case by
seasonably taking exception thereto, they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an
answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, they participated in the trial of the case
by cross-examining respondent Planas. Upon this premise, petitioners cannot now be allowed
belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which
they had submitted themselves voluntarily. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. As long as
these allegations demonstrate a cause of action either for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer, the
court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter. This principle holds, even if the facts proved
during the trial do not support the cause of action thus alleged, in which instance the court -- after
acquiring jurisdiction -- may resolve to dismiss the action for insufficiency of evidence.

x x x. The law, as revised, now provides instead that when the question of possession cannot
be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession. On its face, the new Rule on Summary
Procedure was extended to include within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts ejectment cases which
likewise involve the issue of ownership. This does not mean, however, that blanket authority to
adjudicate the issue of ownership in ejectment suits has been thus conferred on the inferior courts.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated 17 October 2001 and its Resolution dated 8 May 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63733 are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
 Dante M. Pascual, represented by Reymel Sagario v Marilou M. Pascual
GR No. 157830, November 17, 2005

FACTS: Petitioner Dante, a permanent resident of USA, appointed Sagario as attorney- in- fact by an
SPA. Pursuant to such SPA, Sagario filed a complaint entitled “Dante M. Pascual v Marilou M. Pascual
and Register of Deeds, Defendants for Annulment of TCT and Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered
Land and/or Reconveyance with Damages. Respondent then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
non- compliance with the requirement under Sec 412 of LGC, contending that there is no showing that
the dispute was referred to the barangay court before the case was filed in court. RTC granted the
motion to dismiss ruling that when real property or any interest therein is involved, the dispute shall be
filed before the barangay where the property is located regardless of the residence of the parties.
Hence, this petition where petitioner Dante argues that he, not his attorney- in – fact Sagario is the
real party- in- interest and since he actually resides abroad, the lupon would have no jurisdiction to
pass upon the dispute involving real property. Respondent, on the other hand argued that it is Sagario
who is considered as the real party- in- interest, and that since Sagario is a resident of the same
barangay as that of hers, the matter shall be brought under the jurisdiction of the lupon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lupon has authority to act upon the case (WON PD 1508 or the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law applies)
HELD: Negative.
Sec 408 of LGC provides that “the lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the
parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes xxx”
In the case of Tavora v Veloso, SC held that where the parties are not actual residents in the
same city or municipality or adjoining barangays, there is no requirement for them to submit their
dispute to the lupon as provided for in Section 6 vis a vis SEC 2 and 3 of PD 1508.
To construe the express statutory requirement of actual residency as applicable to the attorney-
in- fact of the party- plaintiff, as contended by the respondent, would abrogate the meaning of a “real
party- in- interest” as defined in Sec 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. In fine, since the plaintiff herein
petitioner, the real party in interest, is not an actual resident of the barangay where the defendant
herein respondent resides, the local lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior referral
to it for conciliation is not a pre- condition to its filing in court. RTC thus erred in dismissing complaint.

JOSE AUDIE ABAGATNAN v. SPS. JONATHAN CLARITO AND ELSA CLARITO, GR No.
211966, 2017-08-07
Facts:
Wenceslao Abagatnan (Wenceslao) and his late wife, Lydia Capote (Lydia), acquired a parcel of
land designated as Lot 1472-B, with a total land area of 5,046 square meters, and located at
Barangay Cogon, Roxas City from Mateo Ambrad (Mateo) and Soteraña Clarito (Soteraña), by virtue
of a Deed of Absolute Sale[4] executed on August 1, 1967.
October 4, 1999, Lydia died, leaving her children, who are co-petitioners in this case, to succeed into
the ownership of her conjugal share of said property
In 1990, respondents allegedly approached Wenceslao and asked for permission to construct a
residential house made of light materials on a 480-square meter portion of Lot 1472-B (subject
property). Because respondent Jonathan Clarito (Jonathan) is a distant relative, Wenceslao allowed
them to do so subject to the condition that respondents will vacate the subject property should he
need the same for his own use
September 2006, petitioners decided to sell portions of Lot 1472-B, including the subject property
which was then still being occupied by respondents. They offered to sell said portion to respondents,
but the latter declined... petitioners sent respondents a Demand Letter[9] dated October 2, 2006
requiring the latter to vacate the subject property within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the letter.
The respondents, however, refused to heed such demand
November 10, 2006, petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages[11] against
respondents before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Roxas City, where they
claimed to have been unlawfully deprived of the use and possession of a portion of their land.
Complaint alleged that prior barangay conciliation proceedings are not required as a pre-condition
for the filing of the case in court, given that not all petitioners are residents of Roxas City.
Specifically, petitioner Jimmy C. Abagatnan (Jimmy) resided in Laguna, while petitioner Jenalyn A.
De Leon (Jenalyn) resided in Pasig City... n their Answer with Counterclaim,[13] respondents argued
that prior barangay conciliation is a mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed with,
considering that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already executed a Special Power of Attorney[14] (SPA) in
favor of their co-petitioner and sister, Josephine A. Parce (Josephine), who is a resident of Roxas
City.[15]
Issues:
Petitioners raise the sole issue of whether the CA correctly dismissed the Complaint for failure to
comply with the prior barangay conciliation requirement under Section 412 of the LGC, despite the
fact that not all real parties in interest resided in the same city or municipality
Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving
any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other
government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before
the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as
certified by the lupon or pangkat secretary and attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman [or
unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto
Ruling:
LGC requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the
Pangkat as a pre-condition to the filing of a complaint in court
This is true regardless of the fact that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already authorized their sister and co-
petitioner, Josephine, to act as their attorney-in-fact in the ejectment proceedings before the MTCC.
As previously explained, the residence of the attorney-in-fact of a real party in interest is irrelevant in
so far as the "actual residence" requirement under the LGC for prior barangay conciliation is
concerned.
Principles:
GC further provides that "the lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the
parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes,"
subject to certain exceptions enumerated in the law.[30]... in cases where the dispute involves
parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, unless said barangay
units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable
settlement by an appropriate lupon
Thus, parties who do not actually reside in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays are
not required to submit their dispute to the lupon as a precondition to the filing of a complaint in court.

REFERENDUM AND INITIATIVE

Initiative is the direct legislation of the people.

People will directly propose a law through initiative although it can be also be revision or amendment of the
constitution but in the local sense it is for the proposition of an ordinance either a new, an amendment or modification
can be done though initiative.

Process

1. Can be 2 or more proposition on subject matter

2. Required no of voters
a. 1000 province
b. 100 municipality
c. 50 barangay
3. Submit the proposition to the sanggunian concern but if it refuses or fails to act w/in 30 days the initiative shall
push through
4. Submit petition to the COMELEC and conduct the citing of the proposition w/ required no. of petitioners
5. Submit for approval of elective
REFERENDUM

Is just the same except that there is an existing ordinance, they can either approve or reject the ordinance through
referendum in keeping w/ democratic principle

KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY (marcos administration)

Punong barangay is the most powerful official ( e is the judge, executive, legislative)

In western, they have jury coming from the community who are not lawyers.

Qualification:

1. Integrity
2. Good record in community
3. Process for selection would by the contending parties from certain no. of community
Confine in room until the case is resolved

Jury will determine whether the accuse is guilty/ innocent but the award id the function of judge

In katarungang pambarangay, they have lupong tagapamayapa

The punong barangay shall constitute the lupong tagapamayapa

But the lupon will be chaired by punong barangay

Lupon is composed of 10 to 20 memebers

Selected from community in certain qualification same with jury.

General all cases shall be heard by punong pambarangay except those stated by law.

Factors if it within the authority of Katarungang pambarangay are

1. Location of the property if within its territory

2. Residence of the parties
3. For criminal cases is the penalty and the residence of the parties

Labor cases not under the authority of katarangang pambarangay.

The value /amount of property is not determining factor.
 If complainant failed to comply and filed the case directly to the court, the case maybe dismissed because it is
condition precedent and not lack of jurisdiction.

The complaint maybe filed in any form (oral or writing) but the punong barangay shall reduce the oral complaint in
writing.

Summons may be served and appear for personal confrontation.

May a lawyer appear before the katarungang pambarangay?

Lawyers are prohibited to appear as counsel BUT not as parties.

In case of minor cannot be represented by lawyer family member as counsel, but he may be represented by a person of
legal age.

Personal confrontation

1. 1st stage Mediation- punong barangay is the mediator, parties will mutually come up with agreement, they are
not required to present evidence.
2. If no settlement 2nd stage conciliation-parties will go to pangakat tagapagkasundo, composed of 3 persons
coming from the lupon and the parties shall select among the member among the lupon who will constitute the
contract.
3. Suppose the parties does not agree who will constitute the contract, resolve to once draw lots
4. Once the pangkat is constituted they will now decide who will be the chaiman, secretary and 3rd member.
5. They will convince the parties for amicable settlement, if with settlement, it shall be reduced in writing and sign
it
6. If no settlement, the punong barangay shall issue certification to file action

Secretary of barangay is also the secretary of the lupon.

Another process is the arbitration process, may happen before lupon chairman or lupon pangkat provided that the
parties execute written to conduct arbitration. The punong barangay or pagkat as arbitrator shall require to submit
evidence so that they will have basis for their decision. The decision rendered by arbitrator is final and executory
and not subject to appeal.

Conciliation or mediation no need for written agreement.

Cases:
 g.r. no

Human Resource and Development

-business side of the local government unit the need to have an organizational structure

Main purpose of LGU is delivery of basic services to the people which needs to have an organization that would to the
task of delivery of basic services. E.g. Departments (in the last part of the LGC)

Common Position to the LGU

1. Engineer (provincial city)

2. Accountant

Such positions also have people under them, the need to hire other employees which we call as “ appointive
employees”

Distinguish

1. Domestic employees
2. Regular permanent
3. Regular temporary
4. Casual
5. Job order
6. Emergency employees
7. Co terminus
8. Confidential employees (http://www.csc.gov.ph/phocadownload/userupload/itduser/mc22s2007.pdf)

As to the manner of selection, they are subject to civil service law especially for legal officer and administrator, the LGC
requires them to be eligible for their position but for other confidential employees the rule on eligibility maybe waived
because of the nature of their position.
Limitation as to appointments

1. Prohibition for the employment of relatives either by consanguinity or affinity or the 4 th civil degree but
confidential employees are not covered by the limitation because of the nature of employment

Personal selection board s base in civil service law and adopted in LGC, before a person can be appointed it has to
undergo screening and requirement that any vacancy whether for promotion must be published.

The next in rank does not have the absolute right to be promote to higher position

Barrozo case (case in baguio city)

SC: The appointing authority has wide discretion as to whom to appoint provided that the appointee meets the
minimum qualification.

Personal selection board will only rate and rank the applicants and not automatic that if you rank no.1 automatic you
will be hired in the position but up to the appointing authority.

Appointing authority for sangunian is the vice mayor or vide governor as the case maybe but for other employee or
official the appointing authority is the local chief executive.

Department head and LCG except for confidential position shall go to selection process (screening, ranking, interview)
but their appoint must be confirmed by sangunian same with the Department head and LCG.

Sangunian my override the appointment of the Local chief executive as far as heads of department as concerned but
ordinary employee no need for confirmation.

Appointment will be submitted to civil service commission and will evaluate the appointment (to affirm or disapprove
on qualifications)

What happened if the appointed employee had already reported for work?
If disqualification was due to experience, training or eligibility, the appointed is entitled to the salaries and other
benefits up the time that the local government unit receives the disapproval of the appointment.

If he is occupying a position where he was promoted he goes back to his original position.( no peeling up of vacated
position by until such time that the promotion as confirmed )

But if the reason of disapproval is not meeting the requirement of law (e. citizenship) he is not entitled to salaries and
other benefits (the appointing authority shall he have the obligation such as reimbursement of salary).

Dual citizen is also prohibited from holding government position.

Rules:

1. Publish vacancy
2. Anybody can apply
3. Limited on salary grade as far as promotion the position that is subject must not be 3 grades higher except if
there are no other applicant who qualify for the position e.g. clerk to civil registry

Salary standardization law to determine what is the compensation of the officials.

Prohibition on practice of profession

Local chief executives are absolutely prohibited from exercising their profession in private except for medical doctors in
emergency cases.

LGC does not speak about punong barangay, he may be allowed provided that he get permission from the secretary of
DILG.
CATU VS. RELLOSA (A.C. NO. 5738 02/19/2008)

FACTS: Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor who were
occupying one of the units in a building in Malate which was owned by the former. The said
complaint was filed in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District
of Manila where respondent was the punong barangay. The parties, having been summoned for
conciliation proceedings and failing to arrive at an amicable settlement, were issued by the
respondent a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court. Petitioner, thus, filed a
complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
where respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants. Because of this,
petitioner filed the instant administrative complaint against the respondent on the ground that he
committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for
the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the
litigants as punong barangay. In his defense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he
performed his task without bias and that he acceded to Elizabeth’s request to handle the case for
free as she was financially distressed. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) where after evaluation, they found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.
According to them, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and,
as an elective official, the prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713. Consequently, for the
violation of the latter prohibition, respondent committed a breach of Canon 1. Consequently, for
the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent was then recommended suspension from the
practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar
act will be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well
as the recommendation on the imposable penalty of the respondent were proper.

HELD: No. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 the Code of
Professional Responsibility as this applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and
in connection to former government lawyers who are prohibited from accepting employment
in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in their service. In the case
at bar, respondent was an incumbent punong barangay. Apparently, he does not fall within the
purview of the said provision.

Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713 which governs the practice
of profession of elective local government officials. While RA 6713 generally applies to all public
officials and employees, RA 7160, being a special law, constitutes an exception to RA 6713
.Moreover, while under RA 7160,certain local elective officials (like governors,
mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total
or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such
interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius since they are excluded from any prohibition, the
presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. Respondent, therefore, is not
forbidden to practice his profession.

Third, notwithstanding all of these, respondent still should have procured a prior permission
or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations. The
failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. In acting as counsel for a party
without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law but also violated a civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

 Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of
the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

 CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIESOF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

A lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces
the dignity of the legal profession. Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's oathand/or for
breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional

misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any
repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Vice-mayor, v-governor including the sanggunian, they are allowed to practice their profession in private but with
limitation.

DOUBLE COMPENSATION/ DOUBLE EMPLYMENT in government is not allowed.

If you hold a position whether employee or official you are not allowed to hold another position to get another
compensation w/c is integrated in LCG.

COMMITTEE -the nature of work in committee is a sort of duly duty of employees and honoraria is not considered
double compensation but only as benefit that derived from the activity.

If example you are HR officer and asked to be lecture and u ask to be paid for the hourly rate for the same 8 hours, such
is double compensation.

MENDOZA known in MARCOS era holding several positions and is paid to all said position, the constitution prohibited.
Such is double compensation.

Teaching law, allowed provided it is not within office hours within the meaning of civil service law with permission of
head of LGU.

OMMIBUS RULES ON APPOINTMENT FOLLOWED IN HIRING

Province of Antique vs Calabocal

G.R. No. 209146 / June 8, 2016 / Carpio, CJ./ Locgov – Settlement of Boundary Disputes /JMB

NATURE Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order

PETITIONERS PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE AND MUNICIPALITY OF CALUYA

RESPONDENTS HON. RECTO A. CALABOCAL, JUDGE-DESIGNATE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO,
PROVINCE OF ORIENTAL MINDORO, AND MUNICIPALITY OF BULALACAO

SUMMARY. The provinces of Antique and Oriental Mindoro are both claiming jurisdiction over
Liwagao Island. Petitioners claim that the case involves a boundary dispute and as per the
LGC, RTC does not have jurisdiction. The RTC ruled that it has jurisdiction and that the case is
one of recovery and not a boundary dispute. The SC ruled that the RTC has jurisdiction but the
case is a boundary dispute as defined by the LGC.

DOCTRINE. A boundary dispute may involve "a portion or the whole" of a local government
unit's territorial area. Nothing in this provision excludes a dispute over an island. So long as the
island is being claimed by different local government units, there exists a boundary dispute.
LGC 118 (c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different
provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the Sanggunians of the provinces concerned.

As the Court has previously ruled, it is "only upon the failure of these intermediary steps will
resort to the RTC follow, as specifically provided in Section 119 of the [Local Government
Code.]"

FACTS.

 Sometime between the years 1978 and 1979, Mayor Bago, then Mayor of the Municipality of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro, agreed to lend the
administration of Liwagao Island to Mayor Lim, then Mayor of the Municipality of Caluya, Antique.
 The agreement was made orally and without executing any formal documents to this effect. The condition attached to the agreement was that
the island would be returned upon termination of either party's terms in office.
 The terms of both mayors ended in 1987. Mayor Lim allegedly returned Liwagao Island to the Mun. of Bulalacao. However, the Mun. of Caluya
continued to exercise administration over the island.
 Apr 2002: Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Oriental Mindoro passed a resolution confirming its jurisdictional rights and dominion over
Liwagao Island. However, according to respondents, the Municipality of Caluya and the Province of Antique continued to claim and exercise
authority over Liwagao Island (collecting real property taxes).
 Feb 2012: SP of Oriental Mindoro passed a resolution calling for the Conduct of a Joint Session between the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Oriental Mindoro and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Antique for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Claim over the
Island of Liwagao.
 The Vice Governor of Antique was willing to conduct a joint session to settle the boundary dispute but the SP of Antique issued a resolution
informing the Mindoro that it was not amenable to any form of settlement over the jurisdiction of Liwagao Island as the same rightfully belongs
to their province.
 SP of Oriental Mindoro issued a resolution directing the Provincial Legal Office to file the necessary legal action to claim Liwagao Island.
 Antique: the maps of [NAMRIA] and DENR show Liwagao Island to be part of Antique. All national agencies of the government have always
considered the island to be part of Caluya. Likewise, the people living there have always recognized Caluya's jurisdiction over the island as
evidenced by the fact that they have registered their births, paid real property taxes and voted in Antique.
: lack of jurisdiction of the RTC. They argued that "under LGC 118 par (c), jurisdiction over boundary disputes between municipalities of
different provinces is vested on the Sangguniang Panlalawigans of the provinces involved."
 RTC: Defense of lack of jurisdiction is denied. This is not a boundary dispute but for recovery.
 Petitioners: This case involves a boundary dispute. The RTC erred in assuming jurisdiction over respondents' petition because "the SPs of both the
provinces of Antique and Oriental Mindoro, sitting jointly, have primary, original and exclusive jurisdiction over this boundary dispute. They
contend that under the LGC, "a boundary dispute between municipalities of different provinces shall be referred first for settlement to the
sanggunians of the provinces jointly" and if no settlement is reached, the case shall be jointly tried by the sanggunians concerned. After trial, the
aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the RTC having jurisdiction over the area. The RTC "cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction over
[respondents' petition] since there was no petition [for the adjudication of the boundary dispute] that was filed and decided by the SPs of
Antique and Oriental Mindoro.
 Respondents: the RTC has jurisdiction over their petition because the same is not an appeal but an "an original legal action to recover and get
back the Island of Liwagao. The boundary lines between the Province of Oriental Mindoro and the Province of Antique "[have] long been set
forth and known to the parties." Factual circumstances has rendered it impossible for the SPs to resolve the issue involving the Island of Liwagao.
Prior to filing the petition before the RTC, it had already made several attempts to "amicably discuss the issue on jurisdictional claim." However,
the SP of Antique categorically proclaimed that it was not amenable to any form of settlement.

ISSUES & RATIO.

1. WON RTC has jurisdiction over the respondents' petition for recovery of property and declaration of territorial and political jurisdiction/dominion
over Liwagao Island. YES.
 The Case involves a boundary dispute:

Respondents: this case stems from an original action for "recovery/declaration of territorial and political jurisdiction/dominion" and not a boundary
dispute; hence, it is not within the purview of LGC 118.

SC:

 The LGC IRR defines a boundary dispute as follows: There is a boundary dispute when a portion or the whole of the territorial area of an LGU
is claimed by two or more LGUs. Boundary disputes between or among LGUs shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably 1.
 Based on this definition, a boundary dispute may involve "a portion or the whole" of a local government unit's territorial area. Nothing in this
provision excludes a dispute over an island. So long as the island is being claimed by different local government units, there exists a boundary
dispute.
 Respondents are asserting their lawful jurisdiction over Liwagao Island as against another local government unit that currently has jurisdiction
over the same. Therefore, whether the case is denominated as recovery of possession or claim of ownership, respondents' objective is the same:
for respondents to regain their alleged territorial jurisdiction over Liwagao Island. Respondent itself acknowledges that the conflict is a
"boundary row" between itself and the Province of Antique. As stated in Resolution No. 1454-2012, the Province of Oriental Mindoro claims to
"adhere to the basic principle of amicably settling said boundary dispute, as laid down in the provision of the Local Government Code of
1991[.]" Thus, they are bound by their own assertions and cannot now claim that the conflict does not involve a boundary dispute.

Settlement of Boundary Dispute Governed by LGC 1991

 Under LGC 118 and 1192: "the respective legislative councils of the contending local government units have jurisdiction over their boundary
disputes."
 Specifically: LGC 118 (c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement
to the Sanggunians of the provinces concerned.
 As the Court has previously ruled, it is "only upon the failure of these intermediary steps will resort to the RTC follow, as specifically provided in
Section 119 of the [Local Government Code.]"
 The specific procedure is outlined in the IRR of the LGC3.

1 LGC IRR Rule III Art 15

2 SECTION 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Dispute. - Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably.
To this end: (a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more Barangays in the same city or municipality shall be referred for settlement to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan
concerned. (b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan concerned. (c) Boundary
disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the Sanggunians of the provinces concerned. (d) Boundary disputes involving
a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective
Sanggunians of the parties. (e) In the event the Sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a
certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the Sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification
referred to above.
SECTION 119. Appeal. - Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of the Sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court
having jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Pending final resolution of the disputed area prior to the
dispute shall be maintained and continued for all legal purposes.
3 RULE III Settlement of Boundary Disputes x x x x ARTICLE 17. Procedures for Settling Boundary Disputes. — The following procedures shall govern the settlement of boundary disputes:

(a) Filing of petition — The sanggunian concerned may initiate action by filing a petition, in the form of a resolution, with the sanggunian having jurisdiction over the dispute. x x x
(g) Failure to settle — In the event the sanggunian fails to amicably settle the dispute within sixty (60) days from the date such dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that
effect and copies thereof shall be furnished the parties concerned.
(h) Decision — Within sixty (60) days from the date the certification was issued, the dispute shall be formally tried and decided by the sanggunian concerned. Copies of the decision shall,
within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation thereof, be furnished the parties concerned, DILG, local assessor, COMELEC, NSO, and other NGAs concerned.
(i) Appeal — Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having
jurisdiction over the dispute by filing therewith the appropriate pleading, stating among others, the nature of the dispute, the decision of the sanggunian concerned and the reasons for
appealing therefrom. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the case within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Decisions on boundary disputes promulgated jointly by two (2) or more
sangguniang panlalawigans shall be heard by the Regional Trial Court of the province which first took cognizance of the dispute.
RTC has jurisdicition

 Respondents followed procedure in the LGC. They took all the necessary steps to settle the dispute within the procedure set out in the law, and by
all indication, was prepared to see the matter thru in order to lay the issue to rest.
 Petitioners failed to perform their responsibility under the same law, leaving respondents with no other recourse but to bring the matter to court.
Petitioners cannot demand that respondents now follow the procedure when they themselves have made it impossible for any party to follow the
same. The Province of Antique's Resolution dated 25 May 2012, stating that the Province of Antique was not amenable to any form of settlement,
effectively blocked any way to continue following the steps in the IRR.
 Respondents' petition before the RTC must be upheld. Otherwise, they will be left without any recourse or legal remedy to assert their claim over
Liwagao Island. Such uncertainty is unacceptable, as the fate of the island's residents rest in the immediate resolution of the dispute.

DECISION.

RTC is ORDERED to hear and decide the case with dispatch.