BASIC LEGAL ETHICS

1' Semester; AY 2019-2020

INSTRUCTIONS:
1. Read and digest the following cases below.
2. Write your case digests in a big record book. Observe proper format in writing your case digests.
3. Case books shall be submitted during the Final Examinations schedule. No Case Book, No Final Exam Policy.

LIST OF CASES FOR FINALS:

Cayetano vs. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of
the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article
IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial
body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager,
a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor
– verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

In Re: Petition to sign in the Roll of Attorneys Michael Medado, B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013

B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.

FACTS:

1. Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1979, and
passed the same year’s bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7
 2. On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC) together
with the successful bar examinees.
3. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but he failed to do so on his scheduled date,
allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys given by the Bar Office when he
went home to his province for a vacation.
4. Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of
Attorneys.
a. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the
entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.
5. By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing corporate
and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice.
a. Thus, he operated “under the mistaken belief [that] since he ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of
the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer”; and “the matter of
signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten.”
6. In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required to
provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of
Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
7. About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed
to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.
8. The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross
negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.
ISSUE: WON Medado should be allowed to sign the roll of attorney’s
HELD: YES
A. not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty
of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the
Bar.
a. In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
i. petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the instant
Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys (not 3rd person)
ii. as not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of law,
iii. ppears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions at
the Laurel Law Office, Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and
the Energy Development Corporation
B. HOWEVER
a. While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his
acts as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification,
because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.
i. the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could
no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification.
ii. he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
C. PENALTY
a. Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or
officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court,
which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.
i. in the nature of criminal contempt and must be reached after the filing of charges and the
conduct of hearing (NO COMPLAINT)
b. CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
i. Previous violations of Canon 9 have warranted the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law.
1. As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice
of law.
a. a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution.
b. fine him in the amount of P32,000.
c. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to
engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that
constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be
dealt with severely by this Court.

Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyer's Oath, B.M. No. 712, March 19, 1997
 B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH

In Re: Argosino, B.M. No. 712, 19 March 1997

FACTS:

This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar applicant.

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however
deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In
Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte
during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other
accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later
withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide.

He was sentenced with 2 years and 4 months of imprisonment where he applied a probation
thereafter which was approved and granted by the court. He took the bar exam and passed but
was not allowed to take the oath. He filed for a petition to allow him to take the lawyer’s oath of
office and to admit him to the practice of law averring that his probation was already terminated.
The court note that he spent only 10 months of the probation period before it was terminated.

ISSUE: Whether or not Al Argosino may take the lawyer’s oath office and admit him to the
practice of law.

HELD: The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the STRICT,
INTELLECTUAL and MORAL QUALIFICATIONS required of lawyers who are instruments in the
effective and efficient administration of justice. The court upheld the principle of maintaining the
good moral character of all Bar members, keeping in mind that such is of greater importance so
far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned. Hence he was
asked by the court to produce evidence that would certify that he has reformed and has become
a responsible member of the community through sworn statements of individuals who have a
good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of
time to certify that he is morally fit to the admission of the law profession.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving
to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other
services to the more unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the
lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to
practice the legal profession.

Garrido v. Attys. Garrido and Valencia, A.C. No. 6593, February 4, 2010

A.C. No. 6593 February 4, 2010

Facts:
The petitioner, the respondent’s legal wife, filed a complaint-affidavit and a
supplemental affidavit for disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido and
Atty. Romana P.Valencia before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on
Discipline, charging them with gross immorality, in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01,
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The complaint arose after the petitioner
caught wind through her daughter that her husband was having an affair with a
woman other than his wife and already had a child with her; and the same
information was confirmed when one of her daughters saw that her husband
walking in a Robinsons mall with the other respondent, Atty. Valencia, with their child in
tow.

After a much further investigation into the matter, the time and effort given yielded
resultstelling her that Atty. Valencia and her legal husband had been married in Hong
Kong. Moreover, on June 1993, her husband left their conjugal home and joined Atty.
Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence, and has since failed to render much needed
financial support. In their defense, they postulated that they were not lawyers as of yet
when they committed the supposed immorality, so as such, they were not guilty of
a violation of Canon1, Rule 1.01.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Garrido’s and Valencia’s actions constitute a violation of Canon
1, Rule1.01 and thus a good enough cause for their disbarment, despite the offense being
supposedly committed when they were not lawyers.

Held:
Yes. Membership in the Bar is a privilege, and as a privilege bestowed by
law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where
circumstances show the lawyer’s lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers,
be they academic or moral.

In the present case, the Court had resolved to withdraw this privilege from Atty.
Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for the reason of their blatant violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which commands
that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Furthermore, The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers when they got
married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions; good moral character
was already required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar.

As a lawyer, a person whom the community looked up to, Atty. Garrido and Valencia
wereshouldered with the expectation that they would set a good example in promoting
obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When they violated the law and distorted it to
cater to his own personal needs and selfish motives, not only did their actions discredit the
legal profession. Such actions by themselves, without even including the fact of Garrido’s
abandonment of paternal responsibility, to the detriment of his children by the petitioner;
or the fact that Valencia married Garrido despite knowing of his other marriages to two
other women including the petitioner, are clear indications of a lack of moral values not
consistent with the proper conduct of practicing lawyers within the country. As such, their
disbarment is affirmed

Tan v. Atry. Gumba, A.C. No. 9000, Jan 10, 2018

January 10, 2018

A.C. No. 9000

TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Complainant

vs.
ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA, Respondent

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Facts:
Atty. Gumba obtained a loan of P350,000.00 from Mr. Tan and offered the parcel of land registered in her fath
er’s name as security. She even showed Special Power of Attorney that she was authorized to sell or encumber t
he property. However, Atty. Gumba defaulted on her loan obligation and failed to pay the same despite repeate
d demands. So, Mr. Tan went to the Register of Deeds to register the sale, only to find out that the SPA did not
give respondent the power to sell the property but only empowered respondent to mortgage the property solely
to banks.
Issue:
Whether or not a lawyer should be subject to disciplinary actions considering that the deception was made in h
er private capacity.

Ruling:
Yes, a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. Cano
n 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integr
ity of the legal profession. Lawyers are similarly required, under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code, not to en
gage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
In the case at bar, Atty. Gumba’s actions clearly show that she deceived complainant into lending money to her
through the use of documents and false representations and taking advantage of her education and complaina
nts ignorance in legal matters.
However, suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. Disbarment will be impose
d as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the law
yer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.

Brennisen v. Atty. Contawi, A.C. No. 7481, April 24, 2012

PER CURIAM: Before the Court is an administrative complaint[1] for disbarment filed by complainant Lorenzo D.
Brennisen against respondent Atty. Ramon U. Contawi for deceit and gross misconduct in violation of his lawyer's
oath.

The Facts

Complainant is the registered owner of a parcel of land located in San Dionisio, Parañaque City covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 21176[2] of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. Being a resident of the United
States of America (USA), he entrusted the administration of the subject property to respondent, together with the
corresponding owner's duplicate title.

Unbeknownst to complainant, however, respondent, through a spurious Special Power of Attorney (SPA) mortgaged
and subsequently sold the subject property to one Roberto H o (“Ho”). As a result, TCT No. 21176 was cancelled and
replaced by TCT No. 150814[5] issued in favor of Ho.

Thus, on April 16, 2007, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent for having violated
his oath as a lawyer, causing him damage and prejudice. In his counter-affidavit,[6] respondent denied any formal
lawyer-client relationship between him and the complainant, claiming to have merely extended his services for free.
He also denied receiving money from the complainant for the purpose of paying the real estate taxes on the property.
Further, he averred that it was his former office assistants, a certain Boy Roque (“Roque”) and one Danilo Diaz
(“Diaz”), who offered the subject property to Ho as collateral for a loan. Nevertheless, respondent admitted to having
confirmed the spurious SPA in his favor already annotated at the back of TCT No. 21176 upon the prodding of Roque
and Diaz, and because he was also in need of money at that time. Hence, he signed the real estate mortgage and
received his proportionate share of P130,000.00 from the proceeds of the loan, which he asserted to have fully
settled.

Finally, respondent denied signing the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Ho and insisted that it was a forgery.
Nonetheless, he sought complainant's forgiveness and promised to repay the value of the subject property.

In the Resolution[7] dated July 16, 2008, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

In its Report the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD),found that respondent had undeniably mortgaged and
sold the property of his client without the latter's knowledge or consent, facilitated by the use of a falsified SPA.
Hence, in addition to his possible criminal liability for falsification, the IBP-CBD deduced that respondent violated
various provisions of the Canons of Professional Responsibility and accordingly recommended that he be disbarred
and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

Issue

1.
 The sole issue before the Court is whether respondent violated his lawyer's oath when he mortgaged and sold
complainant's property, which was entrusted to him, without the latter's consent.

2. (In relation to evidence) – WON there is sufficient, clear and convincing evidence to hold Atty. Contawi
administratively liable for forgery. Ruling

YES.

1. Indisputably, respondent disposed of complainant's property without his knowledge or consent, and partook of the
proceeds of the sale for his own benefit. His contention that he merely accommodated the request of his then
financially-incapacitated office assistants to confirm the spurious SPA is flimsy and implausible, as he was fully aware
that complainant's signature reflected thereon was forged. As aptly opined by Commissioner De Mesa, the fraudulent
transactions involving the subject property were effected using the owner's duplicate title, which was in respondent's
safekeeping and custody during complainant's absence.

2. The Court notes that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. Having carefully scrutinized the
records of this case, the Court therefore finds that the standard of substantial evidence has been more than satisfied.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. RAMON U. CONTAWI, having clearly violated his lawyer's oath and the Canons of
Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct, is DISBARRED and his name ordered
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Figueroa v. Barranco, SBC Case No. 519, July 31, 1997

Facts:

Patricia Figueroa and Simeon Barranco were town-mates and teen sweethearts. Their intimacy yielded to a child
Simeon. Subsequently, Simeon first promised he would marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Their
relationship continued and Simeon allegedly made
more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage.

Patricia learned that Simeon married another woman. Meanwhile, Simeon successfully passed the 1970 bar
examinations. But before he could
take his oath, Patricia filed a petition to disqualify Simeon to take the Lawyer’s Oath on the ground of gross immoral
conduct.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the act of Simeon in engaging in premarital relations with Patricia and making promises to marry her
constitute gross immoral conduct?

Rationale/Held:

The SC ruled that the facts do not constitute gross immoral conduct warranting a permanent exclusion of Simeon
from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry
suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court
has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly
immoral.

A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. It is wilful, flagrant, or shameless act, which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.

We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which
should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.

Ui v. Atty. Bonifacio, A.C. No. 3319, June 8, 2000

Ui v. Bonifacio
 A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000.

De Leon, Jr., J.

FACTS:

Complainant Leslie Ui filed an administraive complaint for disbarment against Aty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carryin
on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, complainant’s husband. It is respondent’s contention, however, that
when she discovered Carlos Ui’ true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him.

ISSUE:

WON respondent is guilty of immoral conduct.

RULING:

No. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good
and respectable members of the community. Respondent’s act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon
discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of
flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession/ Complainant’s bare assertions to the contrary
deserve no credit.

Facts:

Complainant Lesli Ui found out that her husband Carlos Ui was carrying out an illicit relationship with respondent Atty.
Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot two children. Hence, a complaint for disbarment was filed by complainant against
respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on the ground of
immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant’s husband. It is respondent’s
contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and that after June
1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui’s true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred
that Carlos Ui never lived with her.

Issue:
Whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the
practice of law.

Held:
The complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, was dismissed.

All the facts taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her
personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what
respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that
shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be “grossly immoral,” that is, it
must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2009

PALE – ON SOLICITATION
LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO

AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS

ABROAD.

Facts:
• A complaint of disbarment – was filed by Pedro Linsangan of the
Linsangan, Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentino for:
A] solicitation of clients &
B] encroachment of professional services
• Linsangan – alleges that Tolentino with the help of paralegal
Labiano convinced his clients to transfer legal representation by
promising:
A] financial assistance and
B] expeditious collection of their claims
• To induce them, Tolentino – allegedly texted and called them
persistently
• To support his allegation, Linsangan – presented the sworn
affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail
over him to sever his client-atty relationship with Linsangan
- Also, he attached “respondent’s calling card”:

In his defense, Tolentino – denies knowing Labiano and authorizing

the printing and circulating of said calling card.

Issue: W/N Atty. Tolentino is guilty of advertising his advertising services

Held: Yes
• Atty. Tolentino – was suspended for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03,
8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
• With regard to Canon 3, the practice of law is a profession and not
a business.
√ Thus, lawyers should not advertise their talents as
merchants advertise their wares.
√ To allow lawyers to advertise their talents/skill – is a
commercialization of the practice of law (degrading the profession
in the public’s estimation).
• With regard to Rule 2.03, lawyers – are prohibited from soliciting
cases for purpose of gain, either personally or through an agent
√ In relation to Rule 1.03, which proscribes “ambulance
chasing” (involving solicitation personally or through an
agent/broker) as a measure to protect community from barratry
and champertry
• As a final note regarding the calling card presented as evidence
by Linsangan, a lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on
his character and conduct
√ For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their
services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple
professional cards.
√ Professional calling cards may only contain the following
details:
(a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.
• Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase “with financial
assistance.”

√ The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already

had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to
finance their legal actions
√ Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original
 lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and
emotional vulnerability

√ This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the

bar and deserves no place in the legal profession.

Dulalia Jr. v. Cruz, A.C. No. 6854, April 25, 2007

Facts:
The primary duty of lawyers is to be well-informed of the existing laws, o keep abreast with
legal developments, recent enactments, and jurisprudence, and be conversant with basic legal
principles.

Susan Soriano Dulalia (Susan), wife of Juan, applied for a permit in the Municipal
Government to build a high rise building in Bulacan. The permit was not released due to the
opposition of Atty. Cruz who sent a letter to the Municipal Engineers office, claiming that
the building impedes the airspace of their property which is adjacent to the Dulalia’s
property. Juan Dulalia (Juan) filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Pablo Cruz
(Cruz) for immoral conduct.

Juan also claimed that Cruz’s illicit relationship with a woman while still married is in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Cruz invokes good faith, claiming to
have had the impression that the applicable provision at the time was Article 83 of the Civil
Code, for while Article 256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive
application, there is a qualification.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cruz violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD:

Cruz’s claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took effect on August 3,
1988 as he was in the United States from 1986 and stayed there until he came back to the
Philippines together with his second wife on October 9, 1990 does not lie, as “ignorance of
the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.”

Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as opposed to grossly immoral conduct, connotes “conduct that shows
indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members
of the community.” Gross immoral conduct on the other hand must be so corrupt and false
as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. This duty carries with it the obligation to be
well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent
enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge
competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may
become susceptible to committing mistakes.

The Court therefore concludes that Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and
Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is suspended from the practice of law
for one year.

PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 151809-12, April 12, 2005

Imong mama
In the Matter of IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, December 19, 1980

FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of
par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and
suspension for failure to pay the same.

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is
being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and
to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization
to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed
to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-
Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.

HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as distinguished from bar
associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The
Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to
associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the
meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the State’s legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory program –
the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice law before the courts
of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as
arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the
court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues

Santos Jr. v. Atty. Llamas, A.C. No. 4749, January 20, 2000

FACTS: This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent
Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who for a number of years has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date
& palce of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated “IBP Rizal 259060” but he has been using this for at
least 3 years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 & 1997.
Respondent’s last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover
his membership fees up to the present. He likewise admit that as appearing in the pleadings submitted by
complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years
1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the
years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that
he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, as a
senior citizen since 1992.

ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R.
number in his pleadings of at least 6 years and therefore liable for his actions.

Whether or not the respondent is exempt from paying his membership dues owing to limited practice of law and for
being a senior citizen.
HELD: Yes. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts
that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

No. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and default thereof for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a
ground for removal of the delinquent’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not
respondent is only engaged in “limited” practice of law. Moreover, While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, grants senior
citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not
exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year,"
the exemption however does not include payment of membership or association dues.

Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the
most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea
for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or
until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate. Respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.

In re: Victorino Lanuevo, A.M. No. 1162, August 29, 1975

In re: Lanuevo A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975

Posted on June 20, 2018

FACTS:
Landicho wrote a confidential letter to the court about the startling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil
Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results were released that year
and that there are grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects that underwent alterations to raise the
grades prior to the release of results. The Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the
grades in five subjects — Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law, and
Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate with office code no. 954, Ramon Galang, underwent some changes
which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Each of the five
examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook involved
pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the
same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular and/or was on the borderline of passing.

The investigation showed that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang alias Roman Galang,
was unauthorized, and therefore he did noy obtain a passing average in the 1971 Bar Examinations.

Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation or re-checking. The five examiners having re-evaluated or re-checked the notebook to him
by the Bar Confidant.

As investigator conducted by the NBI also showed that Ramon Galang was charged with the crime of slight
physical injuries committed on certain de Vera, of the same University. Confronted with this information, respondent
Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case.

It must also be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar Examinations,
Lanuevo gained possession of few properties, including that of a house in V+BF Homes, which was never declared in
his declaration of assets and liabilities. But Lanuevo’s statement of assets and liabilities were not taken up during the
investigation but were examined as parts of the records of the court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Lanuevo is guilty defrauding the examiners into re-evaluating Galang’s exam notebook.

2. Whether or not Galang is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the court his pending case.

RULING:
 1. Yes. It is evident that Lanuevo staged the plot to convince the examiners to individually re-examine the grades of
Galang to help him pass even without the authority of the Court.

2. Yes. Ramon Galang is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case
for physical injuries in 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1971; and in 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1971, he
committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. That the concealment
of an attorney of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, in his application to take
the Bar Exam is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law as well-settled. He is therefore unworthy of
becoming a member of the noble profession of law.

Ricafort v. Medina, A.C. No. 5179, May 31, 2016

In re:Lanuevo

A.C. No. 1162. August 29, 1975.

Makasiar, J.

FACTS:

Based on a confident letter of a bar flunked, the Supreme Court checked the records of the 1991 bar examinations.
Upon investigation, Bar Confidant Victorino Lanuevo admitted having brought back the five examination notebooks
for re-evaluation. Ramon Galang, bar candidate and who owns the examination notebooks under investigation, denied
having any knowledge of the actuations of the Bar Confidant.

ISSUE:

WON Lanuevo and Galang be disbarred.

RULING:

Yes. For Lanuevo, the Bar Confidant is simply the custodian of the bar examination notebooks for and in behalf of the
court; hence, any suggestion or request by him for reevaluation or reconsideration of the grades of the examinee is
not only presumptuous but also offensive in the norms of delicacy. Thus, he is therefore guilty of serious misconduct
and should be disbarred.

In the case of Ramon Galang, he is disbarred on the grounds that he (1) omitted to declare his case of slight physical
injury on his applications for bar examinations and (2) cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades
given after the said re-evaluation.

Barandon v. Ferrer, Sr., A.C.5768, March 26, 2010

BARANDON, JR. V. FERRER, SR.

FACTS: On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit with the
Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment, suspension from the practice
of
law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for filing a reply
with
opposition to motion to dismiss that contained abusive, offensive and improper language which insinuated that
Atty.
Barandon presented a falsified document in court. The said document purported to be a notarized document
executed
at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer.

Moreover, on December 19, 2000, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened Atty. Barandon saying, “Laban kung
laban,
patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte,
angabogadonarito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwina kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito” at the
Municipal
Trial Court in Daet before the start of a hearing.

The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against repeating his unethical act; yet he faces a
disbarment charge for sexual harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte; a related
criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and criminal cases for libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed
against
him.

On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD submitted to this Court a
Report, recommending the suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating Commissioner found enough
evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrer’s violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040, the falsification of the plaintiff’s
affidavit
despite the absence of evidence that the document had in fact been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to
it.
The Investigating Commissioner also found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks imputed to him in the
presence of other counsels, court personnel, and litigants before the start of hearing. On June 29, 2002 the IBP
Board
of Governors passed Resolution adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation but
reduced the penalty of suspension to only one year.

ISSUE:

DID THE IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND THE IBP INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER ERR IN
FINDING RESPONDENT GUILTY OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM AND IF THE PENALTY
IMPOSED WAS JUSTIFIED?

HELD: The Supreme Court examined the records of this case and finds no reason to disagree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and the Investigating Commissioner.

The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality.
Any
violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy,
fairness
and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Atty. Ferrer’s actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that he imputed to Atty. Barandon the
falsification of an affidavit without evidence that the document had indeed been falsified. Moreover, Atty. Ferrer
could
have aired his charge of falsification in a proper forum and without using offensive and abusive language against a
fellow
lawyer. The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite the
adversarial
nature of our legal system.

Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to
uphold
the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrer’s
drunken invectives at Atty. Barandon shortly before the start of a court hearing and Atty. Ferrer failed to show
convincing evidence denying the said charge against him.

All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity
of
the legal profession, hence they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Atty. Ferrer’s display of improper
attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of
the
court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to
uphold.
Consequently, the penalty of suspension of one from the practice of law is deemed just and proper.

Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio, A.C. No. 6290, July 14, 2004

VI. Facts
Ana Cambaliza, a former employee of Ana Luz
Cristal-Tenorio, filed a complaint for disbarment
against Cristal-Tenorio, stating that she had
commited deceit, grossly immoral conduct and
malpractice.
Deceit: falsely representing herself as married to
Felicisimo Tenorio Jr., who has had a prior
subsisting marriage, under the use of a false
marriage contract, which the local civil registrar
and the NSO had no record of. In the birth
certificates of their 2 out of 4 children, the stated

date and place of marriage was in Manila in

February 10, 1980, while in the other 2 children’s
birth certificate, their marriage was supposedly
held in Malaybalay, Bukidnon on February 12,
1980.
Grossly immoral conduct: dissemination of libelous
affidavits against Makati Councilor Divina Jacome.
Malpractice: 1) Illegal practice of Atty. CristalTenorio’s husband, 2) using clients’ money for her
own use and benefit, and 3) threatening the
complainant saying “Isang bala ka lang.” to deter
her from divulging her illegal activities.
In her answer, Atty. Cristal-Tenorio denied the
allegations, saying that she and her husband was
legally married on February 12, 1980 in Quezon
City. Also, it was Councilor Jacome that had
caused the execution of the document, and it was
the complainants and her cohorts going around
Makati to besmirch her good name and reputation.
While for the allegations against malpractice, her
law office, Cristal-Tenorio Law, is registered, and had no partners, and the estafa case had been
dropped.
Atty Cristal-Tenorio added that the complainant
was politically motivated, with other politicians
promising to hire her in exchange for the execution
of the complaint. She had also stated that the
complainant simply wanted revenge because the
respondent had terminated her, due to the
complainant’s acts of extortion against clients.
The complainant added allegations that 1) the law
office’s letterhead stated Felicisimo’s name as
senior partner, 2) in the Sagip Communications
Radio Group’s ID card, which is signed by
Felicisimo as the Chairman, Felicisimo is identified
with the title as attorney, and 3) Felicisimo has
appeared in court as counsel.
The respondent replied that the letterheads were
false reproductions, but admitted that Felicisimo
and a certain Gerardo Panghulan were named as
partners due to their investments in the firm.
In November 13, 2002, the complainant filed a
Motion to Withdraw, but the court found it
necessary to continue with the investigation, as
held in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, that disbarment

VIII.

may proceed regardless of the interest of the

complainant.
VII.
Issue/s and Held
1. Whether or not Atty. Cristal-Tenorio acted in
deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and
malpractice.

Held:
XI.
On the charges of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct, the court held that the
complainant failed to substantiate the
charges.
XII.
XIII. But on the charge of malpractice,
Atty. Cristal-Tenorio was found guilty,
because of the unauthorized practice of her
husband, which goes against Canon 9, and
Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Hueysuwan-Florido v. Atty. Florido, A.C. No. 5624, January 20, 2004

Facts:
This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James
Benedict C. Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating
his oath as a lawyer “by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of
Appeals Resolution.
Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido, the complainant, averred that she was the legitimate
spouse of the respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido, the respondent, but because of the
estranged relation, they lived separately. They have two children whom the complainant has the
custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage; meanwhile there, was
another related case pending in the Court of Appeals.
Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainant’s residence
in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be
surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the
Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody.

Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not received any motion
for temporary child custody filed by respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of
Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the resolution
closely and noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing
something amiss, she refused to give custody of their children to respondent. The complainant
verified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification dated January 18,
2005 from the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering complainant to surrender
custody of their children to respondent had been issued.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Florido was liable for making false court resolution.
Held:
Yes. A lawyer who used a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals is presumed to
have participated in its fabrication. Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The
burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is
asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of
allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is
expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a client’s cause, it must never be at the
expense of the truth.

Maligaya v. Doronilla, A.C. No. 6198, September 15, 2006

FACTS: Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel for several military officers. During ahearing, he said “…we had
an agreement that if we withdraw the case against him(Maligaya) he will also withdraw all the cases. Do
with that understanding, he evenretired and he is now receiving pension.” Atty. Doronilla was then charge
of misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting in obstruction of justice.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Doronilla guilt of purposely stating a falsehood in violation of canon 10 of the code
of professional responsibility.

RULING: by stating untruthfully in open court, Att. Doronilla breached peremptorytenets of ethical conduct.
Not only violated the lawyer’s oath to “do no falsehood,nor consent to the doing of an in court,” but
also his acts infringed on everylawyer’s duty to “ never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by
anartifice or false statement of fact or law. He was suspended from practice of law fortwo months.

Anudon v. Cefra, A.C. No. 5482, February 10, 2015

Case Digest:
Jimmy Anudon and Juanita Anudon, Complainants v. Atty. Arturo B. Cefra, Respondent | A.C. No. 5482, 10 February
2015
December 20, 2017
Jimmy Anudon and Juanita Anudon, Complainants v. Atty. Arturo B. Cefra, Respondent
A.C. No. 5482, 10 February 2015

Facts:
Complainants Jimmy Anudon and Juanita Anudon are brother- and sister-in-law. Complainants , along with Jimmy’s
brothers and sister, co-own a 4,446 square meter parcel of land located in Sison, Pangasinan. Atty. Cefra notarized a
Deed of Absolute Sale over a land owned by the complainants. The names of petitioners appeared as vendors, while
the name of Celino Paran, Jr. appeared as the vendee. The complainants claimed that the Deed of Absolute Sale was
falsified. They alleged that they did not sign it before Atty. Cefra. The National Bureau of Investigation’s Questioned
Documents Division certified that Jimmy and Juanita’s signatures were forged. This was contrary to Atty. Cefra’s
acknowledgment over the document. Moreover, it was physically impossible for Jimmy’s brothers and sister to have
signed the document because they were somewhere else at that time. Due to the forgery of the Deed of Absolute
Sale, the Assistant Prosecutor, with Jimmy and Juanita as witness, filed a case of falsification of public document
against Atty. Cefra and Paran.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

Held:
The Supreme Court agreed and adopted the findings of fact of the IBP-Investigating Commissioner. The respondent
violated Rule II, Section 1, and Rule IV, Section 2(6) of the Notarial Practice 2004, and Canon 1 of the CPR.
 The Supreme Court suspended the respondent from the Practice of Law for two years, revoked his incumbent
Notarial Commission, and perpetually disqualified him from being commissioned as a Notary Public.

Uy v. Depasucat, A.C. No. 5332, July 29, 2003

After the parties had filed their respectivebriefs with the Court of Appeals and before thelatter's resolution
submitting the case fordecision was released, respondent lawyers, Atty.Depasucat, and others filed a
pleading"Manifestation of Usurpation of Authority of theHon. Court of Appeals from a Self-ConfessedBriber
of Judges", which stated that plaintiff-appellant Uy had, in fact, confessed to
bribing judges. Consequently, Uy filed a verifiedcomplaint against respondent lawyers for gross
misconduct.

Should the respondents bedisciplined for having authored and filed the
“Manifestation of Usurpation of Authority of the
Hon. Court of Appeals from a Self-Confessed
Briber of Judges”?

A:
Yes.
Respondents went overboard by stating inthe Manifestation that complainant "had in factconfessed to
bribery and telling one of the judges,after the judges allegedly refused to give in totheir demands, by using
illegally taped conversations-both actual and/or by telephone".It belied their good intention and exceeded
thebounds of propriety, hence not arguablyprotected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a
litigant; it offends the courtbefore which it is made. A lawyer shall abstainfrom scandalous, offensive or
menacing languageor behavior before the courts. It must beremembered that the language vehicle does
notrun short of expressions which are emphatic butrespectful, convincing but not derogatory,illuminating
but not offensive. It has been saidthat a lawyer's language should be dignified inkeeping with the dignity of
the legal profession. Itis the duty of Atty. Depasucat et.al. as membersof the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personalityand to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor orreputation of a party or witness,
unless requiredby the justice of the cause with which he ischarged.
Note:
The language of a lawyer, both oral andwritten, must be respectful and restrained inkeeping with the
dignity of the legal profession andwith his behavioral attitude toward his brethren inthe profession. The use
of abusive language bycounsel against the opposing counsel constitutes atthe same time disrespect to the
dignity of the court justice. Moreover, the use of impassioned languagein pleadings, more often than not,
creates more heatthan light.

Roxas v. Zuzuarregui, et al., G.R. No. 152072, July 12, 2007

G.R. No. 152072

January 31, 2006

The instant cases had their beginnings in 1977 when the National Housing Authority
(NHA) filed expropriation proceedings against the Zuzuarreguis for parcels of land
belonging to the latter situated in Antipolo, Rizal. The said case was ordered archived.
About a month before the aforecited case was ordered archived, the Zuzuarreguis
engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor, to
represent them. This was sealed by a Letter-Agreement which indicates that: The lawyers
endeavor to secure the just compensation with the National Housing Authority and other
governmental agencies at a price of ELEVEN PESOS (P11.00) or more per square meter.
Any lower amount shall not entitle us to any attorney’s fees. At such price of P11.00 per
square meter or more our contingent fee[s] is THIRTY PERCENT (30%) of the just
compensation. The lawyer’s fees shall be in the proportion of the cash/bonds ratio of the
just compensation.
A Motion to Set Case for Hearing was filed by Attys. Roxas and Pastor praying that the
case be revived and be set for hearing by the court at the earliest date available in its
calendar.
The appropriate proceedings thereafter ensued. A Partial Decision was rendered fixing the
just compensation to be paid to the Zuzuarreguis at P30.00 per square meter.
A Letter-Agreement was executed by and between Antonio Zuzuarregui, Jr., Pacita Javier
and Enrique De Zuzuarregui, on the one hand, and Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago
Pastor, on the other. It confirms an amendment to their agreement regarding the attorney’s
fees. The Zuzuarreguis confirmed and agreed that they are willing to accept as final and
complete settlement for their 179 hectares expropriated by NHA a price of SEVENTEEN
PESOS (P17.00) per square meter, or for a total of THIRTY MILLION FOUR HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P30.4 Million), all payable in NHA Bonds. And that they also agree
and confirm to pay their lawyers and counsels the contingent attorney’s fees any and all
amount in excess of the SEVENTEEN PESOS (P17.00) per square meter payable in NHA
bonds.
A resolution was issued by the NHA stating that the Zuzuarregui property would be
acquired at a cost of P19.50 per square meter; that the Zuzuarreguis would be paid in
NHA Bonds, subject to the availability of funds; and that the yield on the bonds to be paid
to the Zuzuarreguis shall be based on the Central Bank rate at the time of payment.
The total amount in NHA bonds released by the NHA Legal Department to Atty. Romeo G.
Roxas in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis amounted to P54,500,000.00. Out of this amount, the
records show that the amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted to
P30,520,000.00 in NHA bonds.
Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the 1,790,570.36 square meters property of the
Zuzuarreguis was expropriated at a total price of P34,916,122.00. The total amount
1

released by the NHA was P54,500,000.00. The difference of P19,583,878.00 is,

undoubtedly, the yield on the bonds.
A letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis’ new counsel, Jose F. Gonzalez, to Attys. Roxas and
Pastor, demanding that the latter deliver to the Zuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to
bonds paid by the NHA within a period of 10 days from receipt, under pain of
administrative, civil and/or criminal action.
Attys. Roxas and Pastor answered via a letter stated therein, among other things, that the
amount that they got seems huge from the surface, but it just actually passed their hands,
as it did not really go to them.
A letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis through Antonio De Zuzuarregui, Jr., to Attys.
Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor, informing the latter that their services as
counsels of the Zuzuarreguis (except Betty) in the expropriation proceedings filed by the
NHA was being formally terminated.
The Zuzuarreguis filed a civil action for Sum of Money and Damages before the RTC,
Quezon City against the NHA, Jose B. H. Pedrosa, Atty. Romeo G. Roxas and Atty.
Santiago N. Pastor. The Zuzuarreguis demanded that the yield on the NHA bonds be
turned over to them.
A Decision was rendered dismissing the Complaint. It further ordered plaintiffs, jointly and
solidarily, to pay for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fee and the cost of
suit.
Upon appeal by the Zuzuarreguis a Decision was eventually promulgated reversing and
setting aside the ruling of RTC. Defendants-Appellees Roxas and Pastor were ordered to
return to plaintiffs-appellants the amount of P12,596,696.425, the balance from the
P17,073,122.70, received as yield from NHA bonds after deducting the reasonable
attorney’s fees in the amount of P4,476,426.275.25 (P2.50 per square meter of the
1,790,570.51 square meter)
Both parties filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE LETTER-AGREEMENT EXECUTED BY THE
ZUZUARREGUIS, AND ATTYS. ROXAS AND PASTOR, FIXING THE EXACT AMOUNT
THAT MUST GO TO THE FORMER, SHOULD STAND AS LAW BETWEEN THE
PARTIES.

Rationale:
It is basic that a contract is the law between the parties. Obligations arising from contracts
have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good
faith. Unless the stipulations in a contract are contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy, the same are binding as between the parties.
Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to receive contingent fees for
their professional services. It is a deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not per se
prohibited by law. They are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics,
viz:
13. Contingent Fees. –
A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but
should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.
and Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,46 viz:
3

CANON 20 – A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.

However, in cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the same should be
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, and should always be subject to the
supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness, such that under Canon 20 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and reasonable fees.
Indubitably entwined with the lawyer’s duty to charge only reasonable fees is the power of
this Court to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees if the same is excessive and
unconscionable. Thus, Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court partly states:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. – An attorney shall be entitled
to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his
services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent
of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. x x x. A written
contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefore unless found by the
court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of justice, decency or
reasonableness. It becomes axiomatic therefore, that power to determine the
reasonableness or the, unconscionable character of attorney's fees stipulated by the
parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts.
It is imperative that the contingent fees received by Attys. Roxas and Pastor must be
equitably reduced.
On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, we cannot award the same for there was
no direct showing of bad faith on the part of Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for as we said
earlier, contingency fees are not per se prohibited by law. It is only necessary that it be
reduced when excessive and unconscionable.

Jardin v. Atty. Villar, Jr., A.C. No. 5474, August 28, 2003

FACTS: Atty. Villar Jr. was the lawyer of Jardin in a Civil Case. However, the said case was dismissed
for the lawyer’s failure to formally offer documentary exhibits despites extensions given by the court. It
prejudices his client. This led to this case for disbarment.

ISSUE: WON Canon 12 was violated of Code of Professional Responsibility

RULING: Atty. Villar Jr. has fallen short of the competence and diligence required for every member of
the Bar. Canon 12 – a lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of Justice.

Foronda v. Atty. Guerrero, A.C. No. 5469, August 10, 2004

Rodica v. Atty. Lazaro, et al. A.C. No. 9259, August 23, 2012

FACTS:

This is a disbarment complaint filed by Rodica against the respondent atty. Lazaro on grounds of
gross and serious misconduct, deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct and violation of the code of
professional responsibility.
On May 5, 2011, William Strong was arrested and detained by the bureau of immigration for
allegedly being involved in an international gang and conspiracy in Brazil on fraud involving the creation of
hundreds of dollars in illegal securities. Strong requested his friend Philip Apostol to look for a lawyer.
Apostol recommended the Lazaro law office represented by atty. Manuel Lazaro and his associates who
initially declined but later accepted to handle the deportation case.
Strong initiated giving the information that his deportation case may be due to the complaint filed by his live-
in partner jasper Rodica before the RTC against the Hillview marketing corporation for recovery and
possession and damages involving a property they have in Boracay which is represented by atty. Tan. Rodica
was represented by atty. Ibutnande in this case. Apparently, Rodica claimed that atty. Manuel met with atty.
Tan to discuss the settlement package on the deportation case they filed against strong on the condition that
Rodica withdraws her complaint from the RTC of Cebu.

On May 25, 2011 the bureau of immigration rendered a judgment deporting strong to leave the
country. On June 6, 2011 Rodica filed before the RTC a motion to withdraw her complaint against Hillview.
Rodica now alleges that after strong was deported and withdrawing the case before the RTC, she was
deceived by Atty. Manuel et al for over settlement of 7 million which was allegedly extorted from her after
misrepresenting that the withdrawal of the case before the RTC is only a part of the settlement package.

It appears on the record that Atty. Espejo, an associate of the Lazaro law office helped in drafting the
manifestation with motion to withdraw motion for reconsideration after Rodica pleaded him to prepare the
motion and was requested further to indicate the name of the Lazaro law office including the name of atty.
Manuel and atty. Michelle to give more weight on the pleading. Rodica promised atty. Espejo to talk to atty.
Manuel about it. The case before the RTC was actually dismissed on March 29, 2011 for failure to show
cause of action but a motion for reconsideration was filed by Rodica.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the allegations of Rodica merit the disbarment of the respondents.

HELD:

The court ruled that Rodica failed to overcome the presumption of innocence of the respondents. As a
general rule, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant
to clearly prove the allegations made against them. The required quantum of proof is preponderance of
evidence which is an evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.

On Rodica's claim with regards to the settlement package, the court find it without merit because she
withdrew her complaint only after the deportation of strong. It was also evident on record that the said case
was already dismissed even before the deportation case was filed only she filed a motion for reconsideration.
Therefore, it cannot be said that her withdrawal of the complaint is a settlement consideration regarding the
deportation case of strong. Moreover, strong is not a party to the case she filed before the RTC therefore there
is no connection between these 2 cases.

There was sufficient preponderance of evidence that was presented that the cause of her withdrawal
of the complaint is to facilitate the sale of her property in Boracay. According to Atty. Espejo who helped
Rodica draft the motion for withdrawal of the complaint, the said withdrawal is for the purpose of selling her
property to Apostol. Apostol further corroborated that he told Rodica he is willing to purchase the property
once it is free from any pending case. Rodica promised him to work on the termination of the pending case
attached to the property to make the sale.

On her claim to have paid 7 million to atty. Manuel et al, she failed to substantiate such claim despite
showing off withdrawals from her bank account certain amount of money after failing to prove that the said
amount was paid to the respondents. Moreover, the court held that Rodica is not a client of Lazaro law office.
They merely handled the deportation case of strong.

As for Atty. Espejo, the court found him to have aided Rodica for misrepresenting before the court
that she was aided by the Lazaro law office when in fact she is not. Atty. Espejo explained that Rodica
assured him to talk to atty. Manuel and atty. Michelle about including their name on the pleading but she did
not do so. Atty. Espejo should have known better that atty. Ibutnande was the counsel on record on the case
before the RTC and therefore it is not his duty to prepare said pleading. He also should have known that all
pleadings before the court are acted based on merit or the lack of it and not by the name of the law firm.
However, the court give due recognition on the fact that atty. Espejo expressed remorse on his conduct and
made a sincere apology to the RTC for wrongly employing the name of the Lazaro law office and that he was
newly admitted to the bar in 2010, the court find it proper to give him a warning to become more prudent on
his actuation in the practice of his profession.

The complaint for disbarment was dismissed.

Ramos v. Dajoyag, Jr., A.C. No. 5174, February 28, 2002

RAMOS VS. Atty. DAJOYAG February 28, 2002

FACTS:

This is a complaint filed by Ernesto M. Ramos against Atty. Mariano A. Dajoyag Jr. for negligence in failing to appeal a
ruling of the NLRC, which affirmed the dismissal by the Labor Arbiter of a complaint for legal dismissal. It appears that
Ramos was terminated from work for failure of his lawyer, Atty. Dajoyag, to file on time the petition for certiorari,
when the Supreme Court dismissed it with finality. From the records, it can be gleaned that Atty. Dajoyag moved for
an extension to file which was granted but the Resolution granting the 1st extension contained a warning that no
further extension would be given. Atty. Dajoyag, on the other hand, explained that he was not aware of this because
when he filed his motion for last extension for only 20 days, he had not yet received the copy of said resolution. He
further explained that he relied on good faith that his Motion for 1st Extension of 30 days would be granted without
the warning – as this was only a first extension; and also that he requested for a second and last extension of 20 days
for which he complied with the filing of the Petition for Certiorari on the last day of the supposed extended period.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ramos is guilty of negligence.

HELD: Yes. Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: “A lawyer shall not, after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering
an explanation for his failure to do so ". Motions for extension are not granted as a matter of right but in the sound
discretion of the court, and lawyers should never presume that their motions for extension or postponement will be
granted or that they will be granted the length of time they pray for. Due diligence requires that they should conduct a
timely inquiry with the division clerks of court of the action on their motions and, the lack of notice thereof will not
make them any less accountable for their omission.

Rollon v. Atty. Naraval, A.C. No. 6424, March 4, 2005

A.C. No. 6424 March 4, 2005

CONSORCIA S. ROLLON, Complainant,

vs.
Atty. CAMILO NARAVAL, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Lawyers owe fidelity to their clients. The latter’s money or other property coming into the former’s possession should
be deemed to be held in trust and should not under any circumstance be commingled with the lawyers’ own; much
less, used by them. Failure to observe these ethical principles constitutes professional misconduct and justifies the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions.

The Case and the Facts

Before us is a letter-complaint against Atty. Camilo Naraval, filed by Consorcia S. Rollon with the Davao City Chapter of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on November 29, 2001. The Affidavit1 submitted by complainant alleges the
following:
"Sometime in October of 2000, I went to the office of Atty. Camilo F. Naraval together with my son, Freddie Rollon, to
seek his assistance in a case filed against me before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities Branch 6, Davao City entitled
‘Rosita Julaton vs. Consorcia S. Rollon’ for Collection of Sum of Money with Prayer for Attachment;

"After going over the documents I brought with me pertaining to the said case, Atty. Naraval agreed to be my lawyer
and I was required to pay the amount of Eight Thousand Pesos (Php 8,000.00) for the filing and partial service fee,
which amount was paid by me on October 18, 2000, a copy of the Official Receipt is hereto attached as Annex ‘A’ to
form part hereof;

"As per the instruction of Atty. Naraval, my son, Freddie, returned to his office the following week to make follow-up
on said case. However, I was informed later by my son Freddie that Atty. Naraval was not able to act on my case
because the latter was so busy. Even after several follow-ups were made with Atty. Naraval, still there was no action
done on our case;

"Sometime in November 29, 2001, I decided to withdraw the amount I paid to Atty. Naraval, because of the latter’s
failure to comply with our mutual agreement that he will assist me in the above-mentioned case;

"My son Freddie Rollon went to Atty. Naraval’s office that same day to inform Atty. Naraval of our decision to
withdraw the amount I have paid and to retrieve my documents pertaining to said case. Unfortunately, despite our
several follow-ups, Atty. Naraval always said that he cannot return the documents because they were in their house,
and that he could not give us back the amount we paid him (Php 8,000.00) because he has no money;

"Having failed to obtain any response, I decided to refer the matter to Atty. Ramon Edison Batacan, IBP President of
Davao City and to Atty. Pedro Castillo, the Commissioner on Bar D[i]scipline;

xxx xxx x x x."

In an Order dated March 12, 2002,2 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Director Victor C. Fernandez,
directed respondent to submit his answer to the Complaint. The same directive was reiterated in the CBD’s May 31,
2002 Order3 issued through Commissioner Jovy C. Bernabe. Respondent did not file any answer despite his receipt of
the Orders.4

Not having heard from him despite adequate notice, the CBD proceeded with the investigation ex parte. Its Order5
dated November 11, 2002, issued through Commissioner Bernabe, required complainant to submit her position paper
within ten days from receipt thereof, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for resolution.

The CBD received complainant’s Position Paper6 on December 10, 2002.

Report of the Investigating Commissioner

In his Report and Recommendation dated October 16, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year for neglect of duty and/or
violation of Canons 15 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Report reads in part as follows:

"Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his client with utmost dedication,
competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard
renders him administratively liable x x x.

"In the case at bar, the deplorable conduct of the respondent in misrepresenting to the complainant that he will
render legal services to her, and after receiving certain amount from the latter as payment for ‘filing fee and service
fee’ did nothing in return, has caused unnecessary dishonor to the bar. By his own conduct the respect of the
community to the legal profession, of which he swore to protect, has been tarnished.

xxx xxx xxx

"In fact, complainant claimed to have been shortchanged by the respondent when he failed to properly appraised her
of the status of her case which she later on found to have become final and executory. Apparently, the civil suit
between Rosita Julaton and the complainant have been decided against the latter and which judgment has long
become final and executory. However, despite full knowledge by the respondent of such finality based on the
documents furnished to him, respondent withheld such vital information and did not properly appraise the
complainant. Thus, respondent violated the mandate in Canon 15 x x x."7
 IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution

On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-64 upholding the above-quoted
Report. The Board recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years for violation
of Rules 15 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the restitution of complainant’s P8,000.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondent’s Administrative Liability

Ordinarily, lawyers are not obliged to act either as advisers or as advocates of any person who may wish to become
their client.8 They may decline employment and refuse to accept representation, if they are not in a position to carry
it out effectively or competently.9 But once they agree to handle a case, attorneys are required by the Canons of
Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion.10

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to
the client’s cause.11 Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, skill and competence,
regardless of importance.12 The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states:

CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the client’s request for information.

Hence, practising lawyers may accept only as many cases as they can efficiently handle.13 Otherwise, their clients
would be prejudiced. Once lawyers agree to handle a case, they should undertake the task with dedication and care. If
they do any less, then they fail their lawyer’s oath.14

The circumstances of this case indubitably show that after receiving the amount of P8,000 as filing and partial service
fee, respondent failed to render any legal service in relation to the case of complainant. His continuous inaction
despite repeated followups from her reveals his cavalier attitude and appalling indifference toward his client’s cause,
in brazen disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Not only that. Despite her repeated demands, he also unjustifiably failed
to return to her the files of the case that had been entrusted to him. To top it all, he kept the money she had likewise
entrusted to him.

Furthermore, after going through her papers, respondent should have given her a candid, honest opinion on the
merits and the status of the case. Apparently, the civil suit between Rosita Julaton and complainant had been decided
against the latter. In fact, the judgment had long become final and executory. But he withheld such vital information
from complainant. Instead, he demanded P8,000 as "filing and service fee" and thereby gave her hope that her case
would be acted upon.

Rule 15.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers give their candid and best opinion to their
clients on the merit or lack of merit of the case, neither overstating nor understating their evaluation thereof. Knowing
whether a case would have some prospect of success is not only a function, but also an obligation on the part of
lawyers.15 If they find that their client’s cause is defenseless, then it is their bounden duty to advise the latter to
acquiesce and submit, rather than to traverse the incontrovertible.16 The failure of respondent to fulfill this basic
undertaking constitutes a violation of his duty to "observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients."17

Likewise, as earlier pointed out, respondent persistently refused to return the money of complainant despite her
repeated demands. His conduct was clearly indicative of lack of integrity and moral soundness; he was clinging to
something that did not belong to him, and that he absolutely had no right to keep or use.18
Lawyers are deemed to hold in trust their client’s money and property that may come into their possession.19 As
respondent obviously did nothing on the case of complainant, the amount she had given -- as evidenced by the receipt
issued by his law office -- was never applied to the filing fee. His failure to return her money upon demand gave rise to
the presumption that he had converted it to his own use and thereby betrayed the trust she had reposed in him.20 His
failure to do so constituted a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession.21

The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes and the courts,22 but also mandates the
utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary
relationship.23 Respondent clearly fell short of the demands required of him as a member of the bar. His inability to
properly discharge his duty to his client makes him answerable not just to her, but also to this Court, to the legal
profession, and to the general public.24 Given the crucial importance of his role in the administration of justice, his
misconduct diminished the confidence of the public in the integrity and dignity of the profession.25

WHEREFORE, Atty. Camilo Naraval is found GUILTY of violating Rule 15.05 and Canons 16, 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective
upon his receipt of this Decision. Furthermore, he is ORDERED TO RESTITUTE, within thirty (30) days from notice of
this Decision, complainant’s eight thousand pesos (P8,000), plus interest thereon, at the rate of six percent per
annum, from October 18, 2000, until fully paid. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar
Confidant, as well as the National Office and the Davao City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

Baens v. Sempio, A.C. No. 10378, June 9, 2014

A.C. No. 10378 June 9, 2014

JOSE FRANCISCO T. BAENS, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JONATHAN T. SEMPIO, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is an administrative case, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Jonathan T. Sempio (respondent), for
violation of Canons 15,1 17,2 183 and Rule 18.034 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), commenced thru
a complaint-affidavit5 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by
Jose Francisco T. Baens (complainant).

This legal battle stemmed when the complainant engaged the services of the respondent to represent him and file a
case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against his wife, Lourdes V. Mendiola-Baens. In his complaint-affidavit
dated March 15, 2010, the complainant alleged, among others, that the respondent: (1) despite receiving the sum of
250,000.00 to cover for the expenses in the said case,6 failed to file the corresponding petition, and it was the
complainant’s wife who successfully instituted Civil Case No. 2463-08,7 for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on
December 8, 2008; (2) even with the complainant furnishing him a copy of the Summons dated December 15, 2008,8
belatedly filed an Answer9 and was able to file it only on March 13, 2009 which was after the 15-day period stated in
the Summons; (3) failed to make an objection on the petition on the ground of improper venue as neither the
complainant nor his wife were and are residents of Dasmariñas, Cavite; (4) never bothered to check the status of the
case and thus failed to discover and attend all the hearings set for the case; and (5) as a result, Civil Case No. 2463-08
was decided10 on October 27, 2009 without the complainant being able to present his evidence.

In his Answer,11 the respondent denied the allegations in the complaint, and explained that: (1) after a meeting with
the complainant, he drafted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and asked the complainant to go over
said draft after which he proceeded to file the same with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City; (2) the
complainant was aware that said petition will be filed in Malabon City as the latter had signed the verification and
certification of the petition; (3) the case became pending and was later on withdrawn because of the complainant’s
refusal to testify; (4) what contributed to the delay in filing the Answer was the fact that he still had to let the
complainant go over the same and sign the verification thereof; (5) he was not able to attend the hearings for the case
because he did not receive any notice from the trial court; and (6) it was only on December 2, 2009 when he found out
that the trial court has already rendered its decision and that the complainant had changed counsels.

In the mandatory conference held before the IBP-CBD on October 29, 2010, only the complainant appeared; thus, the
respondent was declared as having waived his right to further participate in the IBP proceedings. Nonetheless, in the
interest of justice, both parties were required to submit their respective position papers.12

The Investigating Commissioner submitted his Report and Recommendation13 dated October 22, 2011, finding the
respondent guilty of violation of the Code and recommended that the respondent be suspended for six (6) months
from the practice of law. Specifically, the Investigating Commissioner found that the respondent failed to diligently
attend to the case and was grossly negligent in discharging his responsibilities considering the fact that he has already
been fully compensated. The Investigating Commissioner said that the respondent should have manifested or made
known to the trial court that he was not receiving any notice at all since it behoves upon him to make a follow-up on
the developments of the cases he is handling.

As to the respondent’s argument that he indeed filed a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage for the
complainant, the Investigating Commissioner held that it cannot betaken at face value absent the presentation of the
pleading itself which by a perusal of the records of the case was not submitted to the IBP-CBD. Moreso, the veracity of
the Certification attached to the respondent’s answer was highly questionable because it failed to state when the said
petition was filed. Lastly, the Investigating Commissioner faulted the respondent for not sufficiently explaining to the
complainant the consequences of the petition being filed in the RTC of Malabon City since it was the respondent’s
duty and responsibility to explain the complexities of the same to his client for he is the one tasked with the technical
know-how in the field of law.

On June 22, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the Investigating Commissioner’s report
but deemed it proper to increase the recommended period of suspension from six (6) months to one (1) year.14 On
February 14, 2014, the IBP-CBD transmitted the notice of the resolution and the case records to the Court for final
action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.15

The Court finds it fitting to sustain the IBP’s findings and the recommended sanction of suspension from the practice
of law since the attendant facts of the case show substantial evidence to support the respondent’s delinquency.

The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard,
clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required
degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard
of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance
and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.16 Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty of public
service, not money, is the primary consideration.17

It is beyond dispute that the complainant engaged the services of the respondent to handle his case. The records,
however, definitively bear out that the respondent was completely remiss and negligent in handling the complainant’s
case, notwithstanding his receipt of the sum of ₱250,000.00 for the total expenses to be incurred in the said case.

The excuse proffered by the respondent that he did not receive any orders or notices from the trial court is highly
intolerable.1âwphi1 In the first place, securing a copy of such notices, orders and case records was within the
respondent’s control and is a task that a lawyer undertakes. Moreso, the preparation and the filing of the answer is a
matter of procedure that fully fell within the exclusive control and responsibility of the respondent. It was incumbent
upon him to execute all acts and procedures necessary and incidental to the advancement of his client’s cause of
action.

Records further disclose that the respondent omitted to update himself of the progress of his client’s case with the
trial court, and neither did he resort to available legal remedies that might have protected his client’s interest.
Although a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him, he must
present every remedy or defense within the authority of law to support his client’s interest. When a lawyer agrees to
take up a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights.18

Evidently, the acts of the respondent plainly demonstrated his lack of candor, fairness, and loyalty to his client as
embodied in Canon 15 of the Code. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the
interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession.19

In this case, the respondent’s reckless and inexcusable negligence deprived his client of due process and his actions
were evidently prejudicial to his clients’ interests. A lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not merely
reviewing the cases entrusted to his care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the
client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required
pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination even without
prodding from the client or the court.20

Clearly, it cannot be doubted that the respondent violated Canon 17, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code which
states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him." It further mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence," and that "a
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable."21

It must be emphasized that after the respondent agreed to handle the complainant’s case, he became duty-bound to
serve his client with competence and diligence, and to champion his cause with whole-hearted fidelity. By failing to
afford his client every remedy and defense that is authorized by law, the respondent fell short of what is expected of
him as an officer of the Court.22

Thus, for the respondent’s negligence and inadequacies in handling his client’s case, the recommendation of the IBP to
suspend the respondent from the practice of law is well-taken. While the IBP Board of Governors increased the period
of suspension to one year, the Court finds the period of six months as recommended by the Investigating
Commissioner commensurate to the facts of the case.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Resolution dated June 22, 2013 of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 10-2673. The Court hereby SUSPENDS Atty. Jonathan T. Sempio
from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective immediately upon receipt of this Decision.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of Atty. Jonathan T. Sempio as a member of the Bar, and
copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Artueza v. Atty. Maderazo, A.C. No. 4354, April 22, 2002

A.C. No. 4354 April 22, 2002

LOLITA ARTEZUELA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RICARTE B. MADERAZO, respondent.

PUNO, J.:

For his failure to meet the exacting standards of professional ethics, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) in its Resolution of May 2, 2000 recommended the suspension from the practice of law of
respondent Atty. Ricarte B. Maderazo for the period of six (6) months, with a stern warning that repetition of the same
act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent allegedly represented conflicting interests in violation of Canon 6 of
the Code of Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1

By way of a Motion for Reconsideration,2 respondent now comes before this Court to challenge the basis of the IBP's
resolution, and prays for its reversal.

The factual antecedents of the case are as follows: On or about 3:00 in the early morning of December 24, 1992, Allan
Echavia had a vehicular accident at Caduman St., corner H. Abellana St., Mandaue City. At the time of the accident,
Echavia was driving a Ford Telstar car owned by a Japanese national named Hirometsi Kiyami, but was registered in
the name of his brother-in-law, Jun Anthony Villapez. The car rammed into a small carinderia owned by complainant
Lolita Artezuela.3

The destruction of the complainant's carinderia caused the cessation of the operation of her small business, resulting
to her financial dislocation. She incurred debts from her relatives and due to financial constraints, stopped sending her
two children to college.4

Complainant engaged the services of the respondent in filing a damage suit against Echavia, Villapez and one Bernardo
Sia.5 Docketed as Civil Case No. 13666, the case was assigned to Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. An
Amended Complaint was thereafter filed, impleading Echavia, Kiyami and Villapez, and dropping Sia as a party-
defendant.6 For his services, complainant paid the respondent the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) as
attorney's fees and Two Thousand Pesos (₱2,000.00) as filing fee.7 However, the case was dismissed on March 22,
1994, allegedly upon the instance of the complainant and her husband.8

Because of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, complainant filed a civil case for damages against the respondent. It
was docketed as CEB-18552 and assigned to Branch 57, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. The case was dismissed on
June 12, 2001.9

On November 24, 1994, Artezuela filed before this Court a verified complaint for disbarment against the respondent.
She alleged that respondent grossly neglected his duties as a lawyer and failed to represent her interests with zeal and
enthusiasm. According to her, when Civil Case No. 13666 was scheduled for pre-trial conference on August 20, 1993,
respondent asked for its postponement although all the parties were present. Notwithstanding complainant's
persistent and repeated follow-up, respondent did not do anything to keep the case moving. He withdrew as counsel
without obtaining complainant's consent.10

Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in activities inimical to her interests. While acting as her counsel,
respondent prepared Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint. The said document was even printed in
respondent's office. Complainant further averred that it was respondent who sought the dismissal of the case,
misleading the trial court into thinking that the dismissal was with her consent.11

Respondent denied the complainant's allegations and averred that he conscientiously did his part as the complainant's
lawyer in Civil Case No. 13666. He withdrew as counsel because the complainant was uncooperative and refused to
confer with him. He also gave several notices to the complainant and made known his intention before he filed his
Manifestation to withdraw as counsel. Because of the severed relationship, the lower court, after holding a
conference, decided to grant respondent's manifestation and advised the complainant to secure the services of a new
lawyer. Complainant, however, refused and instead, sought the dismissal of the case.12

Respondent alleged that he sought the postponement of the Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on August 20, 1993 so
that he could file the Amended Complaint. He admitted that Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint was printed
in his office but denied having prepared the document and having acted as counsel of Echavia. He claimed that
complainant requested him to prepare Echavia's Answer but he declined. Echavia, however, went back to his office
and asked respondent's secretary to print the document. Respondent intimated that the complainant and Echavia
have fabricated the accusations against him to compel him to pay the amount of ₱500,000.00.13

This Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP-Visayas Regional Committee
on Bar Discipline formed an Investigating Committee to hear the disbarment complaint.

On October 6, 1999, Commissioner Gabriel T. Ingles issued a Report finding the respondent guilty of representing
conflicting interests, in violation of Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as, of
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics. He recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year.14 Commissioner Ingles did not rule on the other issues.

As aforesaid, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upheld the findings of the Committee
with modification only as to the penalty.

Seeking reconsideration of the IBP's resolution, respondent contends that the Investigating Committee did not
conduct trial; hence, he was not able to confront and examine the witnesses against him. He argues that the
Investigating Committee's finding that he represented Echavia is contrary to court records and the complainant's own
testimony in CEB-18552. He also casts doubt on the credibility of the Investigating Committee to render just and fair
recommendations considering that the Investigating Commissioner and the respondent are counsel-adversaries in
another case, Civil Case No. R-33277. Finally, he questions the imposition of a six-month suspension, which he claims
to be harsh considering that his private practice is his only source of income.15

After carefully examining the records, as well as the applicable laws and jurisprudence on the matter, this Court is
inclined to uphold the IBP's resolution.1âwphi1.nêt

In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full adversarial proceedings, as
"actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for clarification or when there is a need to propound searching
questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies."16 Due process is fulfilled when the parties were given
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support of their arguments.17

In the case at bar, records show that respondent repeatedly sought the postponement of the hearings, prompting the
Investigating Commissioner to receive complainant's evidence ex parte and to set the case for resolution after the
parties have submitted their respective memorandum. Hence:

"The records show that this is already the third postponement filed by respondent namely December 12, 1996 (sic),
January 3, 1996 and April 1, 1996.

The Commission for the last time, will cancel today's hearing and can no longer tolerate any further postponement.
Notify respondent by telegram for the hearing for (sic) April 22, 1996 at 2:00 P.M. Said hearing is intransferable in
character.

In the meantime, complainant affirmed her complaint and likewise her witness, Allan Echavia, also affirmed the
contents of his affidavit and further stated that he had executed the same and understood the contents thereof."18

It is by his own negligence that the respondent was deemed to have waived his right to cross-examine the
complainant and her witness. He cannot belatedly ask this Court to grant new trial after he has squandered his
opportunity to exercise his right.

Respondent's contention that the finding of the Investigating Committee was contrary to the records and the
complainant's own admission in CEB-18552 is without merit. It is true that Atty. Aviola was Echavia's counsel-of-record
in Civil Case No. 13666 as evidenced by the certification from the clerk of court,19 and as admitted by the complainant
in CEB-18552, viz:

"ATTY. MADERAZO: (To witness- ON CROSS)

Q: Madam witness, you mentioned that the defendant in this case was the counsel of Allan Echavia as early as
August 20, 1993, wherein you learned for the first time of this fact when you say he is counsel of Allan Echavia. (sic)
You mean he is the counsel of record of Allan Echavia in the Civil Case before Judge Dacudao? Is that what you mean?

A: What I learned was that Atty. Alviola was the counsel of Allan Echavia in the case before Judge Dacudao but I
heard Atty. Maderazo telling Allan Echavia not to admit that Atty. Maderazo is appearing for me because he will be
the one to coordinate with Allan's case.

Q: So it is clear that the defendant in this case is not the counsel of record of Allan Echavia. It was Atty. Alviola
stated by you now?

A: Atty. Maderazo was not Allan Echavia's counsel but it was Atty. Alviola who was the counsel of record of Allan
Echavia."20

Nevertheless, the issue in this case is not whether the respondent also acted as the counsel-of-record of Echavia.
Rather, it is whether or not he had a direct hand in the preparation of Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint.

To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not also be counsel-of-record
of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold himself as the counsel of the adverse party, nor make his
efforts to advance the adverse party's conflicting interests of record--- although these circumstances are the most
obvious and satisfactory proof of the charge. It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation
of the pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of his original client. To require
that he also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party would punish only the most obvious form of deceit and reward,
with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty.

Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:

"It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of the retainer to disclose to the client the circumstances of his relations to the
parties and any interest in or in connection with the controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of
the counsel.

"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this Canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when in behalf of
one of the clients, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose." (emphasis
supplied)

An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of the attorney-client
relationship, sound public policy dictates that a lawyer be prohibited from representing conflicting interests or
discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a
person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. Indeed, good faith and honest intention on
the part of the erring lawyer does not make this rule inoperative.21 The lawyer is an officer of the court and his
actions are governed by the uncompromising rules of professional ethics. Thus:

"The relations of attorney and client is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. The question is not
necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional
standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Ceasar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged
to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice."22

The professional obligation of the lawyer to give his undivided attention and zeal for his client's cause is likewise
demanded in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Inherently disadvantageous to his client's cause, representation
by the lawyer of conflicting interests requires disclosure of all facts and consent of all the parties involved. Thus:

"CANON 15- All lawyers shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.

xxx

Rule 15.03- A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts."

While the Resolution of the IBP is purely recommendatory, we find no reason to reverse the same. In disciplinary
proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is required to establish liability. As
long as the evidence presented by complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the Court is more convincing and
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto, the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified.23

A perusal of Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint shows that it indeed conflicts with the complainant's claims.
It reads:

"1. The allegations (sic) in Paragraph One (1) of the Complaint is admitted in so far as it pertains to the personal
circumstance and residence of the answering defendant. The rest of the allegations in Paragraph One (1), and all the
allegations in Paragraph Two (2) , THREE (3), FOUR (4), FIVE (5), SIX (6), ELEVEN (11), TWELVE (12), and FOURTEEN
(14), of the Complaint are DENIED for lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such
allegations."24

By way of prayer, Echavia states:

"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after hearing, judgment be rendered dismissing plaintiff's complaint."25
Anent the authorship by the respondent of the document quoted above, the Investigating Committee found the
testimonies of the complainant and Echavia credible as opposed to respondent's bare denial. As pointed out by
Echavia, he was approached by Atty. Maderazo, introduced himself as his lawyer and after some sessions in the
latter's office, asked him to return and sign a document which he later identified as the Answer to the Amended
Complaint.

The Investigating Committee found respondent's defense weak. Respondent did not bother to present his secretary as
witness, nor obtain her affidavit to prove his allegations. Instead, he offered a convenient excuse--- that he cannot
anymore locate his secretary.

Respondent argued that it was the complainant who asked him to prepare Echavia's Answer to the Amended
Complaint, after reaching an agreement whereby Echavia would testify in favor of the complainant. After he declined
the request, he claimed that it was the complainant who prepared the document and asked his secretary to print the
same. But as shown, Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint was in no way favorable to the complainant.

With the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, Echavia is practically off the hook. We cannot find any reason why Echavia
would commit perjury and entangle himself, once again, with the law. He does not stand to profit at all by accusing
the respondent falsely.

Furthermore, considering complainant's stature and lack of legal education, we can not see how she could have
prepared Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint and device a legal maneuver as complicated as the present
case.

Respondent's attack on the credibility of Investigating Commissioner Ingles to render an impartial decision, having
been an adversary in Civil Case No. R-33277, does not convince us to grant new trial. This is the first time that
respondent questions the membership of Commissioner Ingles in the Investigating Committee. If respondent really
believed in good faith that Commissioner Ingles would be biased and prejudiced, he should have asked for the latter's
inhibition at the first instance. Moreover, we could not find any hint of irregularity, bias or prejudice in the conduct of
the investigation that would lead us to set it aside.

Finally, we remind the respondent that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such,
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.26 The suspension of the respondent's privilege to practice law may result to financial woes. But as the
guardian of the legal profession, we are constrained to balance this concern with the injury he caused to the very
same profession he vowed to uphold with honesty and fairness.1âwphi1.nêt

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of the IBP finding the respondent guilty of violating Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is affirmed. Respondent is
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months with a stern warning that a similar act in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. v. Atty. Richard V. Funk. A.C. No. 9094, August 15, 2012

A.C. No. 9094 August 15, 2012

SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC., represented by GABRIEL H. ABAD, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RICHARD V. FUNK, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This is a disbarment case against a lawyer who sued a former client in representation of a new one.

The Facts and the Case

Complainant Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. (Hocorma Foundation) filed a complaint for disbarment
against respondent Atty. Richard Funk. It alleged that Atty. Funk used to work as corporate secretary, counsel, chief
executive officer, and trustee of the foundation from 1983 to 1985.1 He also served as its counsel in several criminal
and civil cases.

Hocorma Foundation further alleged that on November 25, 2006 Atty. Funk filed an action for quieting of title and
damages against Hocorma Foundation on behalf of Mabalacat Institute, Inc. (Mabalacat Institute). Atty. Funk did so,
according to the foundation, using information that he acquired while serving as its counsel in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and in breach of attorney-client relationship.2

In his answer, Atty. Funk averred that Don Teodoro V. Santos (Santos) organized Mabalacat Institute in 1950 and
Hocorma Foundation in 1979. Santos hired him in January 1982 to assist Santos and the organizations he established,
including the Mabalacat Institute, in its legal problems. In 1983 the Mabalacat Institute made Atty. Funk serve as a
director and legal counsel.3

Subsequently, according to Atty. Funk, when Santos got involved in various litigations, he sold or donated substantial
portions of his real and personal properties to the Hocorma Foundation. Santos hired Atty. Funk for this purpose. The
latter emphasized that, in all these, the attorney-client relationship was always between Santos and him. He was more
of Santos' personal lawyer than the lawyer of Hocorma Foundation.4

Atty. Funk claimed that before Santos left for America in August 1983 for medical treatment, he entered into a
retainer agreement with him. They agreed that Atty. Funk would be paid for his legal services out of the properties
that he donated or sold to the Hocorma Foundation. The foundation approved that compensation agreement on
December 13, 1983. But it reneged and would not pay Atty. Funk's legal fees.5

Atty. Funk also claimed that Santos executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in his favor on August 13, 1983. The
SPA authorized him to advise Hocorma Foundation and follow up with it Santos' sale or donation of a 5-hectare land in
Pampanga to Mabalacat Institute, covered by TCT 19989-R. Out of these, two hectares already comprised its school
site. The remaining three hectares were for campus expansion.

Atty. Funk was to collect all expenses for the property transfer from Hocorma Foundation out of funds that Santos
provided. It was Santos' intention since 1950 to give the land to Mabalacat Institute free of rent and expenses. The
SPA also authorized Atty. Funk to register the 5-hectare land in the name of Mabalacat Institute so a new title could be
issued to it, separate from the properties of Hocorma Foundation.6 When Santos issued the SPA, Atty. Funk was
Mabalacat Institute's director and counsel. He was not yet Hocorma Foundation's counsel.7 When Santos executed
the deeds of conveyances, Atty. Funk's clients were only Santos and Mabalacat Institute.8

According to Atty. Funk, on August 15, 1983 Santos suggested to Hocorma Foundation's Board of Trustees the
inclusion of Atty. Funk in that board, a suggestion that the foundation followed.9 After Santos died on September 14,
1983, Atty. Funk was elected President of Mabalacat Institute, a position he had since held.10

Atty. Funk claims that in 1985 when Hocorma Foundation refused to pay his attorney's fees, he severed his
professional relationship with it. On November 9, 1989, four years later, he filed a complaint against the foundation
for collection of his attorney's fees. The trial court, the Court of Appeals (CA), and the Supreme Court decided the
claim in his favor.11

After hearing, the Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty. Funk to have violated Canon 15, Rule 15.0312 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) with the aggravating circumstance of a pattern of misconduct consisting of
four court appearances against his former client, the Hocorma Foundation. The CBD recommended Atty. Funk's
suspension from the practice of law for one year.13 On April 16, 2010 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the CBD's report and recommendation.14 Atty. Funk moved for reconsideration but the IBP Board of
Governors denied it on June 26, 2011.

The Issue Presented

The issue here is whether or not Atty. Funk betrayed the trust and confidence of a former client in violation of the CPR
when he filed several actions against such client on behalf of a new one.

The Court's Ruling

Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer cannot represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Here, it is undeniable that Atty. Funk was formerly
the legal counsel of Hocorma Foundation. Years after terminating his relationship with the foundation, he filed a
complaint against it on behalf of another client, the Mabalacat Institute, without the foundation's written consent.

An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship, sound
public policy dictates that he be prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent
duties.1âwphi1 An attorney may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person
whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. This rule is so absolute that good faith and honest
intention on the erring lawyer's part does not make it inoperative.15

The reason for this is that a lawyer acquires knowledge of his former client's doings, whether documented or not, that
he would ordinarily not have acquired were it not for the trust and confidence that his client placed on him in the light
of their relationship. It would simply be impossible for the lawyer to identify and erase such entrusted knowledge with
faultless precision or lock the same into an iron box when suing the former client on behalf of a new one.

Here, the evidence shows that Hocorma Foundation availed itself of the legal services of Atty. Funk in connection with,
among others, the transfer of one of the properties subject of the several suits that the lawyer subsequently filed
against the foundation. Indeed, Atty. Funk collected attorney's fees from the foundation for such services. Thus, he
had an obligation not to use any knowledge he acquired during that relationship, including the fact that the property
under litigation existed at all, when he sued the foundation.

The Court finds it fitting ti adopt the CBD's recommendation as well as the IBP Board of Governor's resolution
respecting the case.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
dated April 16, 2010 and June 26, 2011 and SUSPENDS Atty. Richard Funk from the practice of law for one year
effective immediately. Serve copies of this decision upon the Office of the Court Administration for dissemination, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant so the latter may attach its copy to his record.

SO ORDERED.

Suzuki v. Tiamson, A.C. No. 6542, September 30, 2005

FACTS: Suzuki entered into contract of sale and real estate

mortgage with several persons facilitated by Atty. Tiamson,
counsel of sellers. Suzuki paid P80k as her share in expense
for registration. Atty. Tiamson retained into his position the
subject deeds of both contracts and owner's title copy but
he never registered said documents as well transferred the
title over Suzuki. Hence, this administrative case.
Respondent, as his defense, said that he did that to protect
the interest of his client because it hasn't been fully paid.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Tiamson reason is justified.

RULING: No. Rule 15.07 obliges lawyers to impress upon

their client’s compliance with the laws and the principle of
fairness. To permit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous
practices for the protection of the supposed rights of their
clients is to defeat one of the purposes of the State, the
administration of justice.
o CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT
WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
o Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and
shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten
to present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an
improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
De Guzman v. Atty. Emmanuel Basa, A.C. No. 5554, June 29, 2004

[A.C. NO. 5554 : June 29, 2004]

LUIS DE GUZMAN, represented by his son Rodrigo C. de Guzman, Complainant, v. ATTY. EMMANUEL M. BASA,
Respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

When a lawyer accepts to handle a case, whether for a fee or gratis et amore, he undertakes to give his utmost
attention, skill and competence to it, regardless of its significance. Thus, his client, whether rich or poor, has the right
to expect that he will discharge his duties diligently and exert his best efforts, learning and ability to prosecute or
defend his (clients) cause with reasonable dispatch.Failure to fulfill his duties will subject him to grave administrative
liability as a member of the Bar. For the overriding need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the legal
profession demands that an erring lawyer should be sanctioned.

On August 14, 2000, Luis de Guzman, represented by his son Rodrigo C. de Guzman, filed with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) a complaint against Atty. Emmanuel M. Basa for disbarment for having committed
misrepresentation and gross negligence in his duties as counsel.

The complaint, docketed as CBD Case No. 00-756, alleges that complainant was the defendant in Civil Case No. 535-M-
90 for rescission and recovery of possession of two lots and damages filed by Roxas Realty Corporation with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch XI, Malolos, Bulacan. His counsel was Atty. Emmanuel M. Basa, herein respondent.

On September 2, 1992, the RTC issued an Order adverse to complainant.Desiring to challenge the Order through a
Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, he agreed to pay respondent P15,000.00 for his legal services.
Thereupon, respondent collected and received from complainant a down payment of P5,000.00.1 However, no such
petition was filed by respondent, in violation of their agreement.

On September 20, 1994, the RTC rendered its Decision in Civil Case No. 535-M-90 against complainant. He filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied in an Order dated December 28, 1994.2 ςrνll

Complainant, through respondent, appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
49928.Respondent then filed successively three motions for extension of time to submit the appellants brief, or a total
of 135 days from March 11, 1996 until July 25, 1996. The motions were granted, but with a warning that no further
extension would be allowed.3 ςrνll

Notwithstanding the Court of Appeals warning, respondent still failed to file the appellants brief. Instead, he filed two
more motions for extension on July 24, 1996 and August 3, 1996, or a total of 15 days.

Expectedly, the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated September 17, 1996, denied respondents motions and
ordered the appellants brief filed on August 8, 1996 expunged from the records.4 Respondent then filed a motion for
reconsideration.In a Resolution dated November 29, 1996,5 the Appellate Court denied his motion and dismissed the
appeal.

Consequently, complainant, through respondent, filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Court of Appeals Resolutions of September 17, 1996 and November 29, 1996, docketed as G.R. No. 127190.

However, this Court, in a Resolution dated February 26, 1997, dismissed complainants petition for his failure to submit
a certification of non-forum shopping duly executed by him.

Respondent rectified the error by filing with this Court a motion for reconsideration, attaching thereto the required
certification signed by the complainant himself. Still, the motion was denied on the ground that the Court of Appeals
did not commit any reversible error in dismissing complainants appeal.6 ςrνll

On September 19, 1997, the dismissal of complainants petition in G.R. No. 127190 became final and executory.7 ςrνll
Complainant claims that he lost his case before the Court of Appeals and this Court, not on the merits, but due to
technicality caused by respondents dereliction of his duty as counsel.8 In effect, he adds, it totally dissipated his quest
for justice and thereby deprived him of all the remedies that may be availed of.9 Complainant thus prayed that
respondent be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.

In his answer to the complaint before the IBP, respondent admitted the following material facts: (1) he received from
complainant P5,000.00 as expenses to be incurred in filing the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals; (2) he
was granted by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49928 three extensions of time to file the appellants brief, but
he filed it beyond the extended period due to his illness, resulting in the dismissal of his appeal; and (3) he signed the
certification of non-forum shopping attached to the Petition for Review filed with this Court in G.R. No. 127190
because complainant was ill.10 Respondent thus prayed that the complaint be dismissed.11 ςrνll

During the scheduled hearing of the instant case before the IBP, the parties agreed to submit it for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings and other documents filed.

In its Report dated March 7, 2001,12 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Tyrone R.
Cimafranca, found respondent negligent in the performance of his professional duty to his client, herein complainant,
and recommended that:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

1.The respondent be REPRIMANDED and warned that any similar or other complaint in the future for breach of his
professional duties will be dealt with more severely; andcralawlibrary

2.To return to the complainant, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the order, the collected amount of P5,000.00.

Commissioner Cimafrancas Report was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XV-
2001-259 dated October 27, 2001.13 ςrνll

The IBP then forwarded the records of CBD Case No. 00-756 to this Court.

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence. Rule 18.03 of the same Canon mandates that A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Also, Rule 12.03, Canon 12 of the same Code requires that A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so.

In his lawyers sacred oath, respondent imposed upon himself the duty, among others, that he will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients, x x x.

We sustain the IBP Board of Governors finding that respondent was negligent in the performance of his professional
duty towards complainant. Clearly, he violated the above Canons14 and his lawyers oath.

Firstly, respondent admitted that he did not seasonably file with the Court of Appeals the required appellants brief in
CA-G.R. CV No. 49928 resulting in the dismissal of the complainants appeal. Despite several extensions to file the
appellants brief, respondent failed to do so. Instead, he filed two more motions for extension. While he eventually
filed the appellants brief, however, it was late, being beyond the last extension granted by the Appellate Court. His
excuse that his illness caused such delay is flimsy and deserves no consideration. A motion for extension of time to file
an appellants brief carries with it the presumption that the applicant-lawyer will file the same within the period
granted. As aptly stated in the IBP-CBD Report:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Respondent failed to show in his Answer and other pleadings that he exercised that degree of competence and
diligence required of him in prosecuting particularly the appeal of his client (now complainant) which resulted in its
dismissal. If respondent really believed that his physical condition was the cause why he was not able to submit the
requisite appellants brief seasonably, resulting in its being expunged from the record, he should have excused himself
from the case. A lawyer may withdraw his services when his mental or physical condition renders it difficult for him to
carry out the employment effectively (see Rule 22.01 (d), Canon 22, Code of Professional Responsibility). That could
have spared him and complainant from the undue strictness shown by the Honorable Court of Appeals which
expunged from the record the belated appellants brief that he filed in the case.15 ςrνll
Secondly, respondents contention that he signed the certification of non-forum shopping in the Petition for Review in
G.R. No. 127190 because the complainant was ill lacks merit.We quote with approval the IBP-CBDs finding on this
matter, thus:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Furthermore, respondent failed to show that he exercised that degree of competence and diligence required of him in
prosecuting the appeal of complainant when he himself signed (instead of complainant) the certification of non-forum
shopping, resulting in the dismissal of the Petition for Review on Certiorari . He should know, as all lawyers are
presumed to know, that it should be the petitioner (not the counsel) who should sign the certification of non-forum
shopping in the petition. The explanation offered to justify such non-compliance that complainant was too old, weak
and ill to sign the said certification is too flimsy and, therefore, untenable. If in the motion for reconsideration that he
(respondent) subsequently filed, he was able to submit a certification duly signed by complainant, there is no reason
why it could not be submitted earlier at the time that the Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed.16 ςrνll

Thirdly, despite receipt from complainant the sum of P5,000.00 for the filing of a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals, respondent did not file the same. Thus, he should have returned the amount to complainant who,
incidentally, is now deceased.17 In Lothar Schulz v. Atty. Marcelo G. Flores ,18 we held that where a client gives
money to his lawyer for a specific purpose, such as to file an action or appeal an adverse judgment, the lawyer should,
upon failure to take such step and spend the money for it, immediately return the money to his client. Respondents
unjustified withholding of complainants money is a gross violation of the general morality and professional ethics
warranting the imposition of disciplinary action.19 Again, as correctly found by the IBP-CBD:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω
lιbrαrÿ

The undersigned likewise finds respondents failure to file a petition for certiorari despite having collected the initial
amount of P5,000.00 for attorneys fees reprehensible. There is no doubt whatsoever that in the contract dated
January 10, 1993 (Annex A, complaint) respondent committed to file said petition for complainant. His explanation as
to why he failed to do so is gratuitous. It should not even be given any probative value as it would tend to violate the
parol evidence rule.

A lawyer may be disciplined for refusing to return to his client what he collected as payment for his professional
services which he never rendered (see Espere v. Santos, 96 Phil. 987). 20 ςrνll

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for committing
any gross misconduct specified therein, thus:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party in a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Underscoring supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

In Spouses Jeneline Donato and Mario Donato v. Atty. Isaiah B. Asuncion, Sr .,21 we explained the concept of gross
misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the
administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause.
Such conduct is generally motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. The term, however, does
not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.

To our mind, respondents dereliction of duty amounts to gross misconduct. Certainly, he misused the judicial
processes and abused the trust and confidence reposed upon him by complainant. We have consistently held that a
lawyer should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence in fulfilling his duty subjects him
to disciplinary action.22 Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only upon
those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally.23 We have been exacting in our expectations for
the members of the Bar to always uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and confidence of the public.24 ςrνll

Hence, we cannot sustain the IBP Board of Governors recommendation that respondent should only be reprimanded.
For violating Rule 12.03, Canon 12, and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
constitutes gross misconduct, as well as his lawyers oath, he should be suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months.25 ςrνll
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Emmanuel M. Basa is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct in violation of Canons 12
and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his lawyers oath. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
six (6) months effective from notice and is WARNED that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more
severely. He is further ordered to RETURN, within five (5) days, also from notice, the sum of P5,000.00 directly to the
heirs of complainant and submit to this Court the proof of his compliance within three (3) days therefrom.

A copy of this Decision shall be entered in the record of respondent as a member of the Bar. Further, let copies of this
Decision be served on the IBP as well as the Court Administrator, who is directed to circulate these to all the courts in
the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Miranda v. Carpio, A.C. No. 6281, September 26, 2011

Frias v. Lozada, A.C. NO. 6656, December 13, 2005

A.C. No. 6656 December 13, 2005

(formerly CBD-98-591)

BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CARMENCITA BAUTISTA LOZADA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

In this disbarment case, we are faced with conflicting versions of the incidents surrounding the filing of the verified
complaint1 for deception and malpractice allegedly committed by Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada.

For her part, complainant Bobie Rose Frias alleged that respondent became her retained counsel and legal adviser in
the early part of 1990. She entrusted to respondent documents and titles of properties in November of that year.
Sometime in December 1990, respondent persuaded complainant to sell her house located at 589 Batangas East,
Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City. Respondent allegedly acted as broker as she was in need of money.

On December 7, 1990 respondent hastily arranged a meeting with her and a prospective buyer, Dra. Flora San Diego,
in Valenzuela, Manila. She was allegedly made to sign a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)2 without her having read
it because "they had to reach the bank before it closed at 3:00 p.m."

When they arrived at the Security Bank branch in Valenzuela, San Diego handed respondent ₱2M in cash and ₱1M in
check, instead of ₱3M in cash as the down payment3 indicated in the MOA.
Out of the ₱2M in cash, respondent took ₱1M as her commission without complainant’s consent. When complainant
protested, respondent promised to sign a promissory note later. The ₱1M check was later on dishonored by the bank
because it was a stale check.

San Diego eventually backed out from the sale. However, she converted the aborted sale into a mortgage loan at 36%
p.a. interest, as provided for in the MOA.

Since the transaction between her and San Diego did not materialize, complainant allegedly tried to recover from
respondent the title4 to the property and other documents.5 Respondent, however, started avoiding her.
Complainant recovered the documents placed inside an envelope only on May 6, 1991. On the same day, however,
the envelope was allegedly stolen from her Pajero. She reported the incident to the police.6 She also informed
respondent about the incident, and the latter prepared an affidavit of loss.7 Complainant later offered this affidavit as
evidence in a petition for issuance of a duplicate copy of the title she filed in the RTC of Makati, Branch 142.8

A perjury case9 was then filed by San Diego against complainant on the ground that the title to the property was
never really lost (as alleged by complainant in the affidavit of loss) but was with San Diego all along. San Diego
maintained that complainant handed it to her on the day they signed the MOA. Complainant denied these allegations.
She instead claimed that the perjury case was filed by San Diego, with respondent as counsel, to coerce her
(complainant) to assign the property to San Diego and to abandon her claim of ₱1M from respondent.

San Diego also filed a case10 for the return of the ₱3M she paid complainant, at 36% p.a. interest. Complainant
claimed that her failure to return the money to San Diego was by reason of respondent’s refusal to give back the ₱1M
she took as commission. Complainant was thus constrained to file a civil case against respondent. Despite the
favorable decision11 of the trial court, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals12 , respondent refused to return
the money.

In her answer13 to the disbarment complaint, respondent claimed that, although complainant was engaged in the
buy-build-and-sell of real property, she represented her only in labor cases relative to the latter’s overseas
recruitment business. Respondent denied that she persuaded complainant to sell the property in Ayala Alabang.
Rather, it was complainant who offered to sell or mortgage the property to respondent. Since respondent did not
have enough money, complainant requested her to sell or mortgage the property and offered her a loan, commission
and attorney’s fees on the basis of the selling price.

According to respondent, complainant confided that on October 29, 1990 she offered the Alabang property to a
certain Nelia Sta. Cruz. Complainant received ₱400,000 as earnest money in this transaction on the condition that she
would return the said amount to Sta. Cruz in two weeks in case the latter decided not to proceed with the sale.14 The
said amount would in turn be used to buy another property.

Respondent also claimed that on December 4, 1990, she introduced complainant to another client, Dra. San Diego, as
a prospective buyer. They visited the Alabang property to check on the house. It was there that complainant offered
the house to San Diego for either sale or mortgage. They then discussed the terms and conditions to be contained in
the MOA.15 The agreement was thereafter signed in respondent’s office in Valenzuela, Metro Manila on December 7,
1990, duly notarized by Atty. Manuel Aguinaldo.16 They then proceeded to Prudential Bank (not Security Bank as
alleged in the complaint) to withdraw ₱2M in cash. Upon receipt of ₱2M in cash and ₱1M check down payment,
complainant gave San Diego the TCT.

Complainant then handed to respondent ₱900,000 as commission and loan, duly receipted in a promissory note.17
Complainant further entrusted ₱100,000 to respondent to be given to Nelia Sta. Cruz as partial reimbursement of the
₱400,000 earnest money.18

Respondent maintained that when San Diego backed out from the transaction, the latter demanded the return of only
₱2M, not ₱3M, as clearly stated in San Diego’s letter19 to the complainant dated March 20, 1991.

Respondent denied that complainant previously demanded the return of the ₱1M until the civil case against her was
instituted. She expressed her willingness to pay the ₱900,000 plus the agreed interest, but not the ₱1M plus interest
baselessly demanded from her by complainant. In an attempt to settle the controversy, respondent offered to pay the
₱900,000 to complainant in the presence of San Diego, so complainant could in turn pay San Diego the ₱2M.

Respondent also denied that she prepared the affidavit of loss which was offered as evidence by complainant in the
petition for issuance of lost title.
Respondent further denied that she represented San Diego in the criminal cases of perjury and false testimony which
the latter filed against complainant.

In a report and recommendation dated July 25, 2000, the IBP Investigating Commissioner20 found respondent guilty
of dishonesty and malpractice for concealing the identity of the person in actual possession of complainant’s
documents and for preparing an affidavit of loss even if she knew that the documents were in San Diego’s custody. A
suspension for six months from the practice of law was accordingly recommended.

A careful study of the records reveals that the IBP recommendation relied solely on complainant’s self-serving and
unsupported claims. A re-examination of the differing claims of the parties, however, discloses that, instead of the
grounds relied on by the IBP, respondent should be held accountable for certain serious violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Canon 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.

A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts
with that of his present21 or former client.22 He may not also undertake to discharge conflicting duties any more than
he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.23
It springs from the relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence.

The test of conflict of interest is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-
dealing in its performance.24 The conflict exists if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to
perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represented him and also whether
he will be called upon in his new relation to use against the first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection.25

In this case, respondent not only admitted that she represented both complainant and San Diego in unrelated actions
but also counseled both of them in the sale of the Alabang property.

As their lawyer, she was duty-bound to protect both of their interests. She should have therefore refrained from
jumbling their affairs. Yet she introduced complainant to another client of hers as a buyer of the property. She even
had the temerity to broker the transaction. At that early stage, she should have realized that her role as their lawyer
had been seriously compromised. Since buyer and seller had evident antagonistic interests, she could not give both of
them sound legal advice. On top of this, respondent’s obvious tendency then was to help complainant get a high
selling price since the amount of her commission was dependent on it.

After several suits were filed as an offshoot of the transaction between her two clients, respondent found herself in a
very tight situation. Although she denied that she represented any of them, her active participation in the transaction
was obvious and it clearly displayed an utter disregard of the rule against discharging inconsistent duties to her clients.
The great likelihood was that she would be called upon to use against either the complainant or San Diego information
acquired through her professional connection with them.

Furthermore, her role as their counsel in the other unrelated cases was also compromised. Both parties had, at this
point, become wary of her since she had by then taken – for her own convenience – San Diego’s side by refusing to
return the ₱900,000 to complainant until San Diego was paid. It was not surprising therefore that complainant filed
this administrative case because of the suspicion that respondent had double-crossed her.

The records further establish that respondent collected her full commission even before the transaction between
complainant and San Diego was completed. This unmasked respondent’s greed which she now wants us so badly to
ignore. Her integrity was placed in serious doubt the moment her promised commission started motivating her every
move. Her behavior was, sad to say, simply distasteful.

Likewise, her act of borrowing money from a client was a violation of Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the
case and by independent advice.
A lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very unethical. It comes within those acts
considered as abuse of client’s confidence. The canon presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability
to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on her obligation.

Finally, respondent should be reminded that a lawyer should, at all times, comply with what the court lawfully
requires.26 Here, respondent continues to disregard the final order of the Court of Appeals finding her liable for the
₱900,000 she received from complainant. We see no justification for her continued delay in complying with an order
that has long become final. Respondent adamantly insists that she and complainant should simultaneously settle their
obligations. As a lawyer, she should have known that her obligation to complainant was independent of and separate
from complainant’s obligation to the buyer. Her refusal to comply with the appellate court’s order is, therefore, a
willful disobedience to its lawful orders and must not be left unpunished.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada is hereby found guilty of violating Rule 15.03 and 16.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final and executory decision of the Court of
Appeals. She is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years from notice, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the
Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in respondent’s personal records.

SO ORDERED.

Brunet v. Guaren, A.C. No. 10164, March 10, 2014

Sanchez v. Ag,uilos, A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016

Solidon v. Macalalad, A.C. No. 8158, February 24, 2010

Ramiscal v. Orro, A.C. No. 10945, February 23, 2016

4. ANGELITO RAMISCAL and MERCEDES ORZAME, vs. ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO

A.C. No. 10945; February 23, 2016
FACTS:
 Spouses Angelito Ramiscal and Mercedes Orzame (spouses Ramiscal) engaged the legal
services of Atty. Edgar S. Orro to handle a case in which they were the defendants seeking the
declaration of the nullity of title to a parcel of land situated in the Province of Isabela.
Upon receiving the P10,000.00 acceptance fee from them, Atty. Orro handled the trial of
the case until the Regional Trial Court (RTC) decided it in their favor and as expected, the plaintiffs
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), and they ultimately filed their appellants’ brief. Upon
receipt of the appellants’ brief, Atty. Orro requested from spouses Ramiscal an additional amount
of P30,000.00 for the preparation and submission of their appellees’ brief in the CA. They obliged
and paid him.
Later on, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and Atty. Orro did not inform the
spouses Ramiscal of the adverse decision of the CA and they only learned about it from their
neighbors. They tried to communicate with Atty. Orro but their efforts were initially in vain. When
they finally reached him, he asked an additional P7,000.00 from them as his fee in filing a motion
for reconsideration in their behalf, albeit telling them that such motion would already be belated.
They paid to him the amount sought but later they discovered that he did not file the motion for
reconsideration and the decision attained finality, eventually resulting in the loss of their property
measuring 8.479 hectares with a probable worth of P3,391,600.00. the amount requested.
Then, they filed the instant complaint before the Court. The Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for proper evaluation, report, and recommendation.
Despite due notice, spouses Ramiscal and Atty. Orro did not appear during the scheduled
mandatory conferences set by the IBP. Neither did they submit their respective evidence.
IBP Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda rendered his findings to the effect that Atty. Orro
violated Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
recommended his suspension from the practice law for one year.
The IBP Board of Governors issued a resolution and adopted the report of IBP
Commissioner Almeyda but modified the penalty by increasing the period of suspension to two
years.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Orro should be held administratively liable.

RULING:
Yes, Atty. Orro should be held administratively liable because he violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly its Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon
18, which reads as follow:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.
xxxx
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

The relationship of the lawyer and the client becomes imbued with trust and confidence
from the moment that the lawyer-client relationship commences, with the lawyer being bound to
serve his clients with full competence, and to attend to their cause with utmost diligence, care and
devotion.
In the case at bar, Atty Orro obviously failed to discharge his burdens to the best of his
knowledge and discretion and with all good fidelity to his clients. By voluntarily taking up their
cause, he gave his unqualified commitment to advance and defend their interest therein. Even if
he could not thereby guarantee to them the favorable outcome of the litigation, he reneged on his
commitment nonetheless because he did not file the motion for reconsideration in their behalf
despite receiving from them the P7,000.00 he had requested for that purpose.
Accordingly, the Court found Atty Orro guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is suspended from the practice of law for a period for two years effective upon
notice, with the stern warning that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

Rosario v. de Guzman, G.R. No. 191247, July 10, 2013

The Facts
Sometime in August 1990, Spouses Pedro and Rosita de Guzman (Spouses de Guzman) engaged the legal services of
Atty. Francisco L. Rosario, Jr. (petitioner) as defense counsel in the complaint filed against them by one Loreta A.
Chong (Chong) for annulment of contract and recovery of possession with damages involving a parcel of land in
Parañaque City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1292, with an area of 266 square meters, more or
less. Petitioner’s legal services commenced from the RTC and ended up in this Court.3 Spouses de Guzman,
represented by petitioner, won their case at all levels. While the case was pending before this Court, Spouses de
Guzman died in a vehicular accident. Thereafter, they were substituted by their children, namely: Rosella de Guzman-
Bautista, Lellani de Guzman, Arleen de Guzman, and Philip Ryan de Guzman (respondents).4

On September 8, 2009, petitioner filed the Motion to Determine Attorney’s Fees5 before the RTC. He alleged, among
others, that he had a verbal agreement with the deceased Spouses de Guzman that he would get 25% of the market
value of the subject land if the complaint filed against them by Chong would be dismissed. Despite the fact that he had
successfully represented them, respondents refused his written demand for payment of the contracted attorney’s
fees. Petitioner insisted that he was entitled to an amount equivalent to 25% percent of the value of the subject land
on the basis of quantum meruit.

On November 23, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed order denying petitioner’s motion on the ground that it was
filed out of time. The RTC stated that the said motion was filed after the judgment rendered in the subject case, as
affirmed by this Court, had long become final and executory on October 31, 2007. The RTC wrote that considering that
the motion was filed too late, it had already lost jurisdiction over the case because a final decision could not be
amended or corrected except for clerical errors or mistakes. There would be a variance of the judgment rendered if his
claim for attorney’s fees would still be included.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.

The Issues

This petition is anchored on the following grounds:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING THE MOTION TO DETERMINE ATTORNEY’S FEES ON
THE GROUND THAT IT LOST JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE SINCE THE JUDGMENT IN THE CASE HAS BECOME FINAL
AND EXECUTORY;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

II

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER’S CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES WOULD RESULT
IN A VARIANCE OF THE JUDGMENT THAT HAS LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION DID NOT BAR PETITIONER FROM
FILING THE MOTION TO RECOVER HIS ATTORNEY’S FEES.6nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary

Petitioner claims that Spouses de Guzman engaged his legal services and orally agreed to pay him 25% of the market
value of the subject land. He argues that a motion to recover attorney’s fees can be filed and entertained by the court
before and after the judgment becomes final. Moreover, his oral contract with the deceased spouses can be
considered a quasi-contract upon which an action can be commenced within six (6) years, pursuant to Article 1145 of
the Civil Code. Because his motion was filed on September 8, 2009, he insists that it was not yet barred by
prescription.7

For their part, respondents counter that the motion was belatedly filed and, as such, it could no longer be granted. In
addition, the RTC had already resolved the issue when it awarded the amount of ?10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Respondents further assert that the law, specifically Article 2208 of the Civil Code, allows the recovery of attorney’s
fees under a written agreement. The alleged understanding between their deceased parents and petitioner, however,
was never put in writing. They also aver that they did not have any knowledge or information about the existence of
an oral contract, contrary to petitioner’s claims. At any rate, the respondents believe that the amount of 25% of the
market value of the lot is excessive and unconscionable.8

The Court’s Ruling

Preliminarily, the Court notes that the petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court because of the denial of his motion to determine attorney’s fees by the RTC. Apparently, the petitioner
pursued the wrong remedy. Instead of a petition for review under Rule 45, he should have filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 because this case involves an error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court.

Moreover, petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts which prohibits direct resort to this Court unless the
appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals.9 In this case, petitioner should have first elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals (CA) which has concurrent jurisdiction, together with this Court, over special civil actions
for certiorari.10 Even so, this principle is not absolute and admits of certain exceptions, such as in this case, when it is
demanded by the broader interest of justice.11

Indeed, on several occasions, this Court has allowed a petition to prosper despite the utilization of an improper
remedy with the reasoning that the inflexibility or rigidity of the application of the rules of procedure must give way to
serve the higher ends of justice. The strict application of procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy
disposition of the case on the merits.12 Thus, this Court deems it expedient to consider this petition as having been
filed under Rule 65.

With respect to the merits of the case, the Court finds in favor of petitioner.

In order to resolve the issues in this case, it is necessary to discuss the two concepts of attorney’s fees – ordinary and
extraordinary. In its ordinary sense, it is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services
rendered. In its extraordinary concept, it is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing
party as indemnity for damages.13 Although both concepts are similar in some respects, they differ from each other,
as further explained below:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

The attorney’s fee which a court may, in proper cases, award to a winning litigant is, strictly speaking, an item of
damages. It differs from that which a client pays his counsel for the latter’s professional services. However, the two
concepts have many things in common that a treatment of the subject is necessary. The award that the court may
grant to a successful party by way of attorney’s fee is an indemnity for damages sustained by him in prosecuting or
defending, through counsel, his cause in court. It may be decreed in favor of the party, not his lawyer, in any of the
instances authorized by law. On the other hand, the attorney’s fee which a client pays his counsel refers to the
compensation for the latter’s services. The losing party against whom damages by way of attorney’s fees may be
assessed is not bound by, nor is his liability dependent upon, the fee arrangement of the prevailing party with his
lawyer. The amount stipulated in such fee arrangement may, however, be taken into account by the court in fixing the
amount of counsel fees as an element of damages.

The fee as an item of damages belongs to the party litigant and not to his lawyer. It forms part of his judgment
recoveries against the losing party. The client and his lawyer may, however, agree that whatever attorney’s fee as an
element of damages the court may award shall pertain to the lawyer as his compensation or as part thereof. In such a
case, the court upon proper motion may require the losing party to pay such fee directly to the lawyer of the
prevailing party.

The two concepts of attorney’s fees are similar in other respects. They both require, as a prerequisite to their grant,
the intervention of or the rendition of professional services by a lawyer. As a client may not be held liable for counsel
fees in favor of his lawyer who never rendered services, so too may a party be not held liable for attorney’s fees as
damages in favor of the winning party who enforced his rights without the assistance of counsel. Moreover, both fees
are subject to judicial control and modification. And the rules governing the determination of their reasonable amount
are applicable in one as in the other.14 [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

In the case at bench, the attorney’s fees being claimed by the petitioner refers to the compensation for professional
services rendered, and not as indemnity for damages. He is demanding payment from respondents for having
successfully handled the civil case filed by Chong against Spouses de Guzman. The award of attorney’s fees by the RTC
in the amount of P10,000.00 in favor of Spouses de Guzman, which was subsequently affirmed by the CA and this
Court, is of no moment. The said award, made in its extraordinary concept as indemnity for damages, forms part of
the judgment recoverable against the losing party and is to be paid directly to Spouses de Guzman (substituted by
respondents) and not to petitioner. Thus, to grant petitioner’s motion to determine attorney’s fees would not result in
a double award of attorney’s fees. And, contrary to the RTC ruling, there would be no amendment of a final and
executory decision or variance in judgment.

The Court now addresses two (2) important questions: (1) How can attorney’s fees for professional services be
recovered? (2) When can an action for attorney’s fees for professional services be filed? The case of Traders Royal
Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC15 is instructive:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

As an adjunctive episode of the action for the recovery of bonus differentials in NLRC-NCR Certified Case No. 0466,
private respondent’s present claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before the NLRC even though or, better stated,
especially after its earlier decision had been reviewed and partially affirmed. It is well settled that a claim for
attorney’s fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a
separate action.

With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorney’s fees as an incident of the main action may be
availed of only when something is due to the client. Attorney’s fees cannot be determined until after the main
litigation has been decided and the subject of the recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney’s
fees only arises when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid.

While a claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the determination as to the propriety
of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyer’s
claim for attorney’s fees may arise has become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will be
premature. Of course, a petition for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied
or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client.

It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options as to when to file his claim for professional
fees. Hence, private respondent was well within his rights when he made his claim and waited for the finality of the
judgment for holiday pay differential, instead of filing it ahead of the award’s complete resolution. To declare that a
lawyer may file a claim for fees in the same action only before the judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would
deprive him of his aforestated options and render ineffective the foregoing pronouncements of this Court. [Emphases
and underscoring supplied]

In this case, petitioner opted to file his claim as an incident in the main action, which is permitted by the rules. As to
the timeliness of the filing, this Court holds that the questioned motion to determine attorney’s fees was seasonably
filed.

The records show that the August 8, 1994 RTC decision became final and executory on October 31, 2007. There is no
dispute that petitioner filed his Motion to Determine Attorney’s Fees on September 8, 2009, which was only about
one (1) year and eleven (11) months from the finality of the RTC decision. Because petitioner claims to have had an
oral contract of attorney’s fees with the deceased spouses, Article 1145 of the Civil Code16 allows him a period of six
(6) years within which to file an action to recover professional fees for services rendered. Respondents never asserted
or provided any evidence that Spouses de Guzman refused petitioner’s legal representation. For this reason,
petitioner’s cause of action began to run only from the time the respondents refused to pay him his attorney’s fees, as
similarly held in the case of Anido v. Negado:17

In the case at bar, private respondent’s allegation in the complaint that petitioners refused to sign the contract for
legal services in October 1978, and his filing of the complaint only on November 23, 1987 or more than nine years
after his cause of action arising from the breach of the oral contract between him and petitioners point to the
conclusion that the six-year prescriptive period within which to file an action based on such oral contract under Article
1145 of the Civil Code had already lapsed.

As a lawyer, private respondent should have known that he only had six years from the time petitioners refused to
sign the contract for legal services and to acknowledge that they had engaged his services for the settlement of their
parents’ estate within which to file his complaint for collection of legal fees for the services which he rendered in their
favor. [Emphases supplied]

At this juncture, having established that petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees and that he filed his claim well within
the prescribed period, the proper remedy is to remand the case to the RTC for the determination of the correct
amount of attorney’s fees. Such a procedural route, however, would only contribute to the delay of the final
disposition of the controversy as any ruling by the trial court on the matter would still be open for questioning before
the CA and this Court. In the interest of justice, this Court deems it prudent to suspend the rules and simply resolve
the matter at this level. The Court has previously exercised its discretion in the same way in National Power
Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay:18

In the event of a dispute as to the amount of fees between the attorney and his client, and the intervention of the
courts is sought, the determination requires that there be evidence to prove the amount of fees and the extent and
value of the services rendered, taking into account the facts determinative thereof. Ordinarily, therefore, the
determination of the attorney’s fees on quantum meruit is remanded to the lower court for the purpose. However, it
will be just and equitable to now assess and fix the attorney’s fees of both attorneys in order that the resolution of “a
comparatively simple controversy,” as Justice Regalado put it in Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v.
NLRC, would not be needlessly prolonged, by taking into due consideration the accepted guidelines and so much of
the pertinent data as are extant in the records.19 [Emphasis supplied]

With respect to petitioner’s entitlement to the claimed attorney’s fees, it is the Court’s considered view that he is
deserving of it and that the amount should be based on quantum meruit.

Quantum meruit – literally meaning as much as he deserves – is used as basis for determining an attorney’s
professional fees in the absence of an express agreement. The recovery of attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum
meruit is a device that prevents an unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the legal services of
counsel without paying for it and also avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the attorney himself. An attorney must
show that he is entitled to reasonable compensation for the effort in pursuing the client’s cause, taking into account
certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees.20

Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility lists the guidelines for determining the proper amount of
attorney fees, to wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Rule 20.1 – A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

c) The importance of the subject matter;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

d) The skill demanded;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered

case;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he
belongs;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the
service;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

Petitioner unquestionably rendered legal services for respondents’ deceased parents in the civil case for annulment of
contract and recovery of possession with damages. He successfully represented Spouses de Guzman from the trial
court level in 1990 up to this Court in 2007, for a lengthy period of 17 years. After their tragic death in 2003, petitioner
filed a notice of death and a motion for substitution of parties with entry of appearance and motion to resolve the
case before this Court.21 As a consequence of his efforts, the respondents were substituted in the place of their
parents and were benefited by the favorable outcome of the case.

As earlier mentioned, petitioner served as defense counsel for deceased Spouses de Guzman and respondents for
almost seventeen (17) years. The Court is certain that it was not an easy task for petitioner to defend his clients’ cause
for such a long period of time, considering the heavy and demanding legal workload of petitioner which included the
research and preparation of pleadings, the gathering of documentary proof, the court appearances, and the various
legal work necessary to the defense of Spouses de Guzman. It cannot be denied that petitioner devoted much time
and energy in handling the case for respondents. Given the considerable amount of time spent, the diligent effort
exerted by petitioner, and the quality of work shown by him in ensuring the successful defense of his clients,
petitioner clearly deserves to be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees for services rendered. Justice and equity dictate
that petitioner be paid his professional fee based on quantum meruit.

The fact that the practice of law is not a business and the attorney plays a vital role in the administration of justice
underscores the need to secure him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and
respectability of the legal profession. A layer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice, imposition or
fraud on the part of his client as the client against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone
to see that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner; it is also its duty to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With
his capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure
of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client
to escape payment of his just compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice
for his client he himself would not get his due.22

The Court, however, is resistant in granting petitioner's prayer for an award of 25% attorney's fees based on the value
of the property subject of litigation because petitioner failed to clearly substantiate the details of his oral agreement
with Spouses de Guzman. A fair and reasonable amount of attorney's fees should be 15% of the market value of the
property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court grants the Motion to Determine Attorney's Fees filed by
petitioner Atty. Francisco L. Rosario, Jr. Based on quantum meruit, the amount of attorney's fees is at the rate of 15%
of the market value of the parcel of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1292, at the time of payment.

Macariola v. Asuncion, A.G. No. 133-J, May 31, 1982

A.M. No. 133-J, May 31 1982, 114 SCRA 77

FACTS:

In 1963, Macariola and her step sister (Reyes) had a dispute over their inheritance involving parcels of land located in
Leyte. A trial ensued and Judge Macariola, after determining the legibility of the parties to inherit rendered a decision
in the civil case. Thereafter, the counsels of the parties submitted a project partition reflecting the preference of the
parties. The project partition was, however, unsigned by Macariola. But her lawyer assured Asuncion that he is duly
authorized by Macariola as counsel. The judge then approved the project partition. The decision became final in 1963
as well.

Reyes et al sold some of their shares to Arcadio Galapon, who later sold the property to judge Asuncion in 1965.

On 6 Aug 1968, Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion with “acts unbecoming a judge” on the ground
that he bought a property (formerly owned by Macariola) which was involved in a civil case decided by him; this act by
Asuncion is averred by Macariola to be against Art. 1491, par 5 of the Civil Code which provides:

"Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in person or
through the mediation of another:

xxx xxx xxx

"(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees
connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before
the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the
act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the
object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession".

Also, Macariola said that Asuncion’s act tainted his earlier judgment. Macariola said that the project partition was
unsigned by her and that what was given to her in the partition were insignificant portions of the parcels of land.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated said provision.

HELD:

No. The prohibition only applies if the litigation is under pendency. The judge bought the property in 1965 – 2 years
after his decision became final. Further, Asuncion did not buy the property directly from any of the parties since the
property was directly bought by Galapon, who then sold the property to Asuncion. There was no showing that
Galapon acted as a “dummy” of Asuncion.

Also, Macariola did not show proof that there was a gross inequality in the partition; or that what she got were
insignificant portions of the land.

The Supreme Court however admonished Judge Asuncion to be more discreet in his personal transactions.

Bautista v. Gonzales, A.M. No. 1625, February 12, 1990

Bautista vs Gonzales [A.M. No. 1625. February 12, 1990]

16
OCT
[Per Curiam]

FACTS:

In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit,
gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges against him, respondent
filed a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by making his
charges more definite. In a resolution the Court granted respondent’s motion and required complainant to file an
amended complaint. Complainant submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent
committed the following acts:

1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha
Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of
fifty percent (50%) of the value of the property in litigation.

xxx

4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him on August 30, 1971 for the
development into a residential subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929,
claiming that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney’s fees from the Fortunados, while knowing
fully well that the said property was already sold at a public auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of
Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City;

xxx

Pertinent to No. 4 above, the contract, in No. 1 above, reads:

We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all
expenses, for the suit, including court fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent committed serious misconduct involving a champertous contract.

HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for six (6) months.

RATIO:

The Court finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of
litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the
expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the
Fortunados, however, does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An
agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client’s rights is champertous
[citation omitted]. Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed
to carry on the action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute
[citation omitted]. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his
client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.

1. LEGAL ETHICS; DISBARMENT OF SUBMISSION OF ATTORNEYS; REFERENCE TO THE IBP OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST
LAWYERS IS NOT MANDATORY; CASES MAY BE REFERRED TO THE SOLICITOR GENERAL. — Contrary to respondent’s
claim, reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988]. Reference of complaints to the IBP is not
an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of
Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by referring
cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court. In such
a case, the report and recommendation of the investigating official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court.
The Court shall base its final action on the case on the report and recommendation submitted by the investigating
official and the evidence presented by the parties during the investigation.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ONLY PENDING CASES, THE INVESTIGATION OF WHICH HAS NOT BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETED BY
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL SHALL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE IBP. — There is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at
the time of the effectivity of Rule 139-B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor
General had been substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that only pending cases, the
investigation of which has not been substantially completed by the Office of the Solicitor General, shall be transferred
to the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor General was terminated even before the effectivity of Rule
139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his motion to dismiss that the Solicitor General terminated the investigation
on November 26, 1986, the date when respondent submitted his reply memorandum [Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; Record,
p. 353]

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REFERRAL OF CASE WHERE THE SOLICITOR GENERAL HAS ALREADY MADE A THOROUGH
INVESTIGATION RESULTS IN DUPLICATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DELAY. — There is no need for further
investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General already made a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the
case. To refer the case to the IBP, as prayed for by the respondent, will result not only in duplication of the
proceedings conducted by the Solicitor General but also to further delay in the disposition of the present case which
has lasted for more than thirteen (13) years.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; NO DENIAL OF, WHERE RESPONDENT WAS GIVEN AMPLE
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE. — Respondent’s assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not
warrant the referral of the case to the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General
respondent was given ample opportunity to present evidence, his failure to adduce additional evidence is entirely his
own fault. There was therefore no denial of procedural due process. The record shows that respondent appeared as
witness for himself and presented no less than eleven (11) documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed
to cross-examine the complainant who appeared as a witness against him.

5. CIVIL LAW; SALES; CAPACITY TO BUY; LAWYER IS PROHIBITED FROM ACQUIRING HIS CLIENT’S PROPERTY OR
INTEREST IN LITIGATION WHICH HE MAY TAKE PART. — The record shows that respondent prepared a document
entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was signed by on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent one-half
(1/2) of the properties of the Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. m., and TCT No. T-
3041, with an area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in consideration of his legal services to the latter. At the time the
document was executed, respondent knew that the abovementioned properties were the subject of a civil case [Civil
Case No. Q-15143] pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the
Fortunados in said case [See Annex "B" of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the document
transferring one-half (1/2) of the subject properties to himself, respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting a
lawyer from acquiring his client’s property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of
his profession [Article 1491, New Civil Code].

6. LEGAL ETHICS; DISBARMENT AND SUSPENSION; PURCHASE BY A LAWYER OF CLIENT’S PROPERTY OR INTEREST IN
LITIGATION IS A BRANCH OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONSTITUTES MALPRACTICE. — This Court has held that the
purchase by a lawyer of his client’s property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes
malpractice [Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 (1940)].

7. ID.; ID.; TRANSGRESSION OF ANY LAW BY A LAWYER IS A REPULSIVE AND REPREHENSIBLE ACT. — The very first
Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal process." Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to
take an oath to "obey the laws [of the Republic of the Philippines] as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein." And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court
[Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules of Court]. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal
system. The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will
not countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be held
accountable both to his client and to society.

8. ID.; ID.; NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABSENCE OF PROVISION PROHIBITING PURCHASE OF CLIENT’S PROPERTY AND
INTEREST, A DISCIPLINARY ACTION MAY BE BROUGHT AGAINST LAWYER. — It should be noted that the persons
mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of
their existing trust relationship with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and
rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as with the client. And it
cannot be claimed that the new Code of Professional Responsibility has failed to emphasize the nature and
consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall
hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Hence, notwithstanding the
absence of a specific provision on the matter in the new Code, the Court, considering the abovequoted provisions of
the new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase
by a lawyer of his client’s property in litigation constitutes a breach of professional ethics for which a disciplinary
action may be brought against him.

9. ID.; ID.; A LAWYER SHOULD OBSERVE HONESTY AND FAIRNESS EVEN IN PRIVATE DEALINGS. — Another misconduct
committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant, at the time the land development agreement was
entered into, that the land covered by TCT No. T-1929 had already been sold at a public auction. The land
development agreement was executed on August 31, 1977 while the public auction was held on June 30, 1971.
Respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards of ethics of the law profession which place a premium on
honesty and condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant was not a former client of respondent does not
exempt respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an important fact pertaining to the land which is subject of
their negotiation. Since he was a party to the land development agreement, respondent should have warned the
complainant of the sale of the land at a public auction so that the latter could make a proper assessment of the
viability of the project they were jointly undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and
fairness even in his private dealings and failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against him [Custodio v.
Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517].

10. ID.; ID.; A LAWYER SHOULD NEVER SEEK TO MISLEAD THE COURT BY AN ARTIFICE OR FALSE STATEMENT OF FACT.
— When respondent submitted the alleged true copy of the addendum on May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of his
Manifestation filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly misled the Court into believing that
the original addendum was signed by Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes willful
disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should
never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised Rules
of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of Professional Responsibility].

11. ID.; ID.; AN AGREEMENT WHEREBY AN ATTORNEY AGREES TO PAY EXPENSES OF PROCEEDINGS IS CHAMPERTOUS.
— The Court, finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part that: [the
Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, [respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the
suit, including court fees . . . is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer
may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of
Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should
be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide
for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to
pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client’s rights is champertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324
(1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry
on the action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [See Sampliner
v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., Et Al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary
relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.

12. ID.; ID.; RULE AGAINST REPRESENTATION OF CONFLICTING INTEREST; EXCEPTION. — One of the recognized
exceptions to the rule against representation of conflicting interests is where the clients knowingly consent to the dual
representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule
15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility].

13. ID.; ID.; FOR FAILING TO LIVE UP TO THE STANDARDS EXPECTED OF A MEMBER OF THE BAR, LAWYER IS
SUSPENDED FROM PRACTICE OF LAW. — The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the
respondent violated the law and the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to assist
in the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to live up to the standards
expected of a member of the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647].
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that, considering the nature of the offenses committed by respondent and
the facts and circumstances of the case, respondent lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with
malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges
against him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order complainant
to amend his complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted
respondent’s motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976, complainant
submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following acts:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha
Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of
fifty percent (50%) of the value of the property in litigation.

2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-15143, wherein Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants
and, without said case being terminated, acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490;

3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados, which properties are the subject of the
litigation in Civil Case No. Q-15143, while the case was still pending;

4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him on August 30, 1971 for the
development into a residential subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929,
claiming that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney’s fees from the Fortunados, while knowing
fully well that the said property was already sold at a public auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of
Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City;

5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified documents purporting to be true copies of
"Addendum to the Land Development Agreement dated August 30, 1971" and submitting the same document to the
Fiscal’s Office of Quezon City, in connection with the complaint for estafa filed by respondent against complainant
designated as I.S. No. 7512936;

6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who was his client;

7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without legal basis before the Court of First Instance and the
Fiscal’s Office of Quezon City;

8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal’s Office by making false assertion of facts in his
pleadings;
9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not intentionally tell a lie, he does not tell the truth
either."cralaw virtua1aw library

Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on November 18, 1976, denying the
accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply to respondent’s answer on December 29, 1976 and on March 24,
1977 respondent filed a rejoinder.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. In the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, complainant
presented himself as a witness and submitted Exhibits "A" to "PP’, while respondent appeared both as witness and
counsel and submitted Exhibits "1" to "11." The parties were required to submit their respective memoranda.

On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming that the long delay in the
resolution of the complaint against him constitutes a violation of his constitutional right to due process and speedy
disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court, the Solicitor General filed a comment to the motion to dismiss on
August 8, 1988, explaining that the delay in the investigation of the case was due to the "numerous requests for
postponement of scheduled hearings filed by both parties and the motions for extension of time to file their
respective memoranda." [Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p. 365]. Respondent filed a reply to the
Solicitor General’s comment on October 26, 1988. In a resolution dated January 16, 1989 the Court required the
Solicitor General to submit his report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice.

On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation that Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales
be suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General found that respondent committed the following acts of
misconduct:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the pendency of the case where the properties
were involved;

b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land development agreement had already
been sold at a public auction prior to the execution of said agreement; and

c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document where two signatories who had not signed the
original (or even the xerox copy) were made to appear as having fixed their signatures [Report and Recommendation
of the Solicitor General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404].

Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondent manifested that he
intends to submit more evidence before the IBP. Finally, on November 27, 1989, respondent filed a supplemental
motion to refer this case to the IBP, containing additional arguments to bolster his contentions in his previous
pleadings.

I.

Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by Respondent. It is respondent’s contention that
the preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor General was limited to the determination of whether or not
there is sufficient ground to proceed with the case and that under Rule 139 the Solicitor General still has to file an
administrative complaint against him. Respondent claims that the case should be referred to the IBP since Section 20
of Rule 139-B provides that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule 139 entitled "DISBARMENT OR
SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS." All cases pending investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be transferred
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and disposition as provided in this Rule
except those cases where the investigation has been substantially completed.

The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to respondent’s claim, reference to the
IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707;
Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988]. Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive
procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-B,
the Supreme Court may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by referring cases for
investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court. In such a case,
the report and recommendation of the investigating official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court. The
Court shall base its final action on the case on the report and recommendation submitted by the investigating official
and the evidence presented by the parties during the investigation.

Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity of Rule 139-B [June 1, 1988]
the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General had been substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule
139-B provides that only pending cases, the investigation of which has not been substantially completed by the Office
of the Solicitor General, shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor General was
terminated even before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his motion to dismiss that the
Solicitor General terminated the investigation on November 26, 1986, the date when respondent submitted his reply
memorandum [Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353].

Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General already made a thorough and
comprehensive investigation of the case. To refer the case to the IBP, as prayed for by the respondent, will result not
only in duplication of the proceedings conducted by the Solicitor General but also to further delay in the disposition of
the present case which has lasted for more than thirteen (13) years.

Respondent’s assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the referral of the case to the IBP.
Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General respondent was given ample opportunity to
present evidence, his failure to adduce additional evidence is entirely his own fault. There was therefore no denial of
procedural due process. The record shows that respondent appeared as witness for himself and presented no less
than eleven (11) documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to cross-examine the complainant who
appeared as a witness against him.

II.

The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent committed the acts of misconduct
alleged by complainant Bautista.

After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Solicitor General, the Court
finds that respondent committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary
power.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was signed by the
Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent one-half (1/2) of the properties of the
Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. m., and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907 sq.
m., for and in consideration of his legal services to the latter. At the time the document was executed, respondent
knew that the abovementioned properties were the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending before the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the Fortunados in said case [See Annex "B" of
Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the document transferring one-half (1/2) of the subject properties
to himself, respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his client’s property or interest
involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession [Article 1491, New Civil Code]. This
Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of his client’s property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional
ethics and constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248
(1940)].

However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that" [t]he lawyer
should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting," does not appear
anymore in the new Code of Professional Responsibility. He therefore concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer of
property in litigation is void under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for disciplinary
action under the new Code of Professional Responsibility.

This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process" (Emphasis supplied).
Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an oath to "obey the laws [of
the Republic of the Philippines] as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein." And for any
violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules
of Court]. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. The transgression of any
provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will not countenance. In the instant
case, respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be held accountable both to his client and to
society.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are prohibited from
purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their existing trust relationship with the latter. A lawyer is
disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with
such property and rights, as well as with the client. And it cannot be claimed that the new Code of Professional
Responsibility has failed to emphasize the nature and consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." On
the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession." Hence, notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision on the matter in the new Code,
the Court, considering the abovequoted provisions of the new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well as
the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase by a lawyer of his client’s property in litigation constitutes a
breach of professional ethics for which a disciplinary action may be brought against him.

Respondent’s next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really implemented, because the land
development agreement on which the transfer depended was later rescinded, is untenable. Nowhere is it provided in
the Transfer of Rights that the assignment of the properties of the Fortunados to respondent was subject to the
implementation of the land development agreement. The last paragraph of the Transfer of Rights provides
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, Filipino, married to Lilia Yusay, and a
resident of 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila, Quezon City, rendered to our entire satisfaction, we hereby, by these
presents, do transfer and convey to the said ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, his heirs, successor, and assigns, one-half
(1/2) of our rights and interests in the above-described property, together with all the improvements found therein
[Annex "D" of the Complaint, Record, p. 28; Emphasis supplied].

It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to respondent to be absolute and
unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the land development agreement was implemented.

Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant, at the time the land
development agreement was entered into, that the land covered by TCT No. T-1929 had already been sold at a public
auction. The land development agreement was executed on August 31, 1977 while the public auction was held on
June 30, 1971.

Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his appearance for the complainant in an
anti-graft case filed by the latter against a certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon the request of complainant and was
understood to be only provisional. Respondent claims that since complainant was not his client, he had no duty to
warn complainant of the fact that the land involved in their land development agreement had been sold at a public
auction. Moreover, the sale was duly annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, serves as
constructive notice to complainant so that there was no concealment on his part.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale was annotated at the back of TCT
No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent failed to inform the complainant of the sale of the land to Samauna
during the negotiations for the land development agreement. In so doing, respondent failed to live up to the rigorous
standards of ethics of the law profession which place a premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous conduct. The
fact that complainant was not a former client of respondent does not exempt respondent from his duty to inform
complainant of an important fact pertaining to the land which is subject of their negotiation. Since he was a party to
the land development agreement, respondent should have warned the complainant of the sale of the land at a public
auction so that the latter could make a proper assessment of the viability of the project they were jointly undertaking.
This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and fairness even in his private dealings and failure to do so
is a ground for disciplinary action against him [Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517].

Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents purporting to be true copies of
an addendum to the land development agreement.chanrobles law library : red

Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the document filed by respondent
with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the signatories to the addendum to the land development agreement -
namely, Ramon A. Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautista —
were made to appear as having signed the original document on December 9, 1972, as indicated by the letters"
(SGD.)" before each of their names. However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and complainant who signed
the original and duplicate original (Exh. "2") and the two other parties, Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado, never
did. Even respondent himself admitted that Edith and Nestor Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh. "2-A") after
respondent wrote them on May 24, 1973, asking them to sign the said xerox copy attached to the letter and to send it
back to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant’s Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329]. Moreover, respondent
acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado had merely agreed by phone to sign, but had not actually signed, the
alleged true copy of the addendum as of May 23, 1973 [Respondent’s Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, p. 16]. Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged true copy of the addendum on
May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly
misled the Court into believing that the original addendum was signed by Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such
conduct constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with the
truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d),
Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility].

Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety was committed by respondent
in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados [Report and Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394].
The Court, however, finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

We [the Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all
expenses, for the suit, including court fees.

Alfaro T. Fortunado [signed]

Editha T. Fortunado [signed]

Nestor T. Fortunado [signed]

CONFORME

Ramon A. Gonzales [signed]

[Annex "A" to the Complaint, Record, p. 4].

is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with
a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a
lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The
agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of
litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce
the client’s rights is champertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements are against
public policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in
consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., Et
Al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his
client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.

The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr.
in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel for the Fortunados against the same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case
No. Q-15143. The Court, after considering the record, agrees with the Solicitor General’s findings on the matter. The
evidence presented by respondent shows that his acceptance of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was with the knowledge and
consent of the Fortunados. The affidavit executed by the Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly states that they gave
their consent when respondent accepted the case of Eusebio Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of Fortunados, dated June 23, 1976;
Rollo, p. 198]. One of the recognized exceptions to the rule against representation of conflicting interests is where the
clients knowingly consent to the dual representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon 6, Canons of
Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility].

Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before the Court of First Instance and
the Fiscal’s Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose of harassing him.

The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General’s investigation of this case, Civil Case No. Q-18060 was still
pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, while the complaints for libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury
(I.S. No. 5913) were already dismissed by the City Fiscal for insufficiency of evidence and lack of interest, respectively
[Report and Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 402-403]. The Solicitor General found no basis for holding that the
complaints for libel and perjury were used by respondent to harass complainant. As to Civil Case No. Q-18060,
considering that it was still pending resolution, the Solicitor General made no finding on complainant’s claim that it
was a mere ploy by respondent to harass him. The determination of the validity of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-
18060 was left to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the case was pending resolution.

The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly holds that there is no basis for
holding that the respondent’s sole purpose in filing the aforementioned cases was to harass complainant.

Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since the above discussion on the other
grounds sufficiently cover these remaining grounds.

The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent violated the law and the rules
governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to assist in the administration of justice and to
uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar." [Artiaga
v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General
that, considering the nature of the offenses committed by respondent and the facts and circumstances of the case,
respondent lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious misconduct, the Court Resolved
to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for SIX (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this
Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts of the country for their information and guidance,
and spread in the personal record of Atty. Gonzales.

Pineda v. de Jesus, G.R. No. 155224, Aug. 23, 2006

G.R. No. 155224 August 23, 2006

VINSON B. PINEDA, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. CLODUALDO C. DE JESUS, ATTY. CARLOS AMBROSIO and ATTY. EMMANUEL MARIANO, Respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

The subject of this petition for review is the April 30, 2002 decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68080
which modified the order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 151, in JDRC Case No. 2568 entitled
Ma. Aurora D. Pineda v. Vinson B. Pineda.

The facts follow.

On April 6, 1993, Aurora Pineda filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against petitioner Vinson Pineda in
the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151, docketed as JDRC Case No. 2568. Petitioner was represented by respondents Attys.
Clodualdo de Jesus, Carlos Ambrosio and Emmanuel Mariano.

During the pendency of the case, Aurora proposed a settlement to petitioner regarding her visitation rights over their
minor child and the separation of their properties. The proposal was accepted by petitioner and both parties
subsequently filed a motion for approval of their agreement. This was approved by the trial court. On November 25,
1998, the marriage between petitioner and Aurora Pineda was declared null and void.

Throughout the proceedings, respondent counsels were well-compensated.3 They, including their relatives and
friends, even availed of free products and treatments from petitioner’s dermatology clinic. This notwithstanding, they
billed petitioner additional legal fees amounting to P16.5 million4 which the latter, however, refused to pay. Instead,
petitioner issued them several checks totaling P1.12 million5 as "full payment for settlement."6

Still not satisfied, respondents filed in the same trial court7 a motion

for payment of lawyers’ fees for P50 million.8

On April 14, 2000, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay P5 million to Atty. de Jesus, P2 million to Atty. Ambrosio
and P2 million to Atty. Mariano.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced the amount as follows: P1 million to Atty. de Jesus, P500,000 to Atty.
Ambrosio and P500,000 to Atty. Mariano. The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this recourse.

The issues raised in this petition are:

(1) whether the Pasig RTC, Branch 151 had jurisdiction over the claim for additional legal fees and

(2) whether respondents were entitled to additional legal fees.

First, a lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident of the main action in
which his services were rendered or in an independent suit against his client. The former is preferable to avoid
multiplicity of suits.9

The Pasig RTC, Branch 151, where the case for the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed, had jurisdiction over the
motion for the payment of legal fees. Respondents sought to collect P50 million which was equivalent to 10% of the
value of the properties awarded to petitioner in that case. Clearly, what respondents were demanding was additional
payment for legal services rendered in the same case.

Second, the professional engagement between petitioner and respondents was governed by the principle of quantum
meruit which means "as much as the lawyer deserves."10 The recovery of attorney’s fees on this basis is permitted, as
in this case, where there is no express agreement for the payment of attorney’s fees. Basically, it is a legal mechanism
which prevents an unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without
paying for it. In the same vein, it avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the lawyer himself.

Further, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid controversies with clients
concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to
collect fees should be avoided and should be filed only when circumstances force lawyers to resort to it.11

In the case at bar, respondents’ motion for payment of their lawyers’ fees was not meant to collect what was justly
due them; the fact was, they had already been adequately paid.

Demanding P50 million on top of the generous sums and perks already given to them was an act of unconscionable
greed which is shocking to this Court.

As lawyers, respondents should be reminded that they are members of an honorable profession, the primary vision of
which is justice. It is respondents’ despicable behavior which gives lawyering a bad name in the minds of some people.
The vernacular has a word for it: nagsasamantala. The practice of law is a decent profession and not a money-making
trade. Compensation should be but a mere incident.12

Respondents’ claim for additional legal fees was not justified. They could not charge petitioner a fee based on
percentage, absent an express agreement to that effect. The payments to them in cash, checks, free products and
services from petitioner’s business — all of which were not denied by respondents — more than sufficed for the work
they did. The "full payment for settlement"13 should have discharged petitioner’s obligation to them.

The power of this Court to reduce or even delete the award of attorneys’ fees cannot be denied. Lawyers are officers
of the Court and they participate in the fundamental function of administering justice.14 When they took their oath,
they submitted themselves to the authority of the Court and subjected their professional fees to judicial control. 15

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2002 in
CA–G.R. CV No. 68080 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of additional attorney’s fees in favor of respondents is hereby
DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

Hilado v. David, G.R. No. L-961, September 21, 1949

Hilado v. David, G.R. No. L-961, September 21, 1949

 FACTS
Blandina Hilado filed a complaint to have some deeds of sale annulled against Selim Assad. Attorney
Delgado Dizon represented Hilado. Assad was represented by a certain Atty. Ohnick. Atty. Vicente Francisco replaced
Atty. Ohnick as counsel for Assad . Four months later, Atty. Dizon filed a motion to have Atty. Francisco be disqualified
because Atty. Dizon found out that Hilado approached Atty. Francisco to ask for additional legal opinion regarding her
case and for which Atty. Francisco sent Hilado a legal opinion letter. Atty. Francisco opposed the motion for his
disqualification. In his opposition, he said that no material information was relayed to him by Hilado; that in fact, upon
hearing Hilado’s story, Atty. Francisco advised her that her case will not win in court; but that later, Hilado returned
with a copy of the Complaint prepared by Atty. Dizon; that however, when Hilado returned, Atty. Francisco was not
around but an associate in his firm was there (a certain Atty. Federico Agrava); that Atty. Agrava attended to Hilado;
that after Hilado left, leaving behind the legal documents, Atty. Agrava then prepared a legal opinion letter where it
was stated that Hilado has no cause of action to file suit; that Atty. Agrava had Atty. Francisco sign the letter; that Atty.
Francisco did not read the letter as Atty. Agrava said that it was merely a letter explaining why the firm cannot take on
Hilado’s case. Atty. Francisco also pointed out that he was not paid for his advice; that no confidential information was
relayed because all Hilado brought was a copy of the Complaint which was already filed in court; and that, if any,
Hilado already waived her right to disqualify Atty. Francisco because he was already representing Assad in court for
four months in the said case.

Judge Jose Gutierrez David ruled in favor of Atty. Francisco.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disqualified in the said civil case.

HELD:

Yes. There already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado and Atty. Francisco. Hence,
Atty. Francisco cannot act as counsel against Hilado without the latter’s consent. As ruled by the Supreme Court, to
constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or
charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the
consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in
his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily
permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established.
Section 19 (e) of Rule 127 imposes upon an attorney the duty “to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril
to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client.” Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number
of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the
complexity of what is said in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature
suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the
complainant’s cause. We conclude therefore that the motion for disqualification should be allowed.

Sps. Warriner v. Atty. Dublin, A.C. No. 5239, November 18, 2013

Spouses George A. Warriner and Aurora R. Warriner vs. Atty. Reni M. Dublin
A.C. No. 5239, November 18, 2013
Facts:
Complainant spouses alleged that they secured the services respondent Atty. Reni M. Dublin for
claim of damages against E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd. Respondent requested the RTC for a
period of 10 days within which to submit his Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence. However,
respondent did not send anything. This prompted the RTC to dismiss the Civil Case to the
prejudice of the complainants. On 26 June 2000, respondent was directed to file his comment to
the administrative complaint. He thereafter requested an extension of 30 days which the court
eventually granted. However respondent had not yet filed his comment as of August 5, 2002 or
after a lapse of almost two years. Respondent did not show any cause why he should not be
disciplinary dealt with or held in contempt. On March 10, 2008, the court resolved to order
respondent's arrest and detention. In his side, respondent Atty. Dublin claimed that complainant
Warriner's cause in filing the Civil Case No. 23, 396-95 is vitiated by fraud, thus, led him to
believe that his late comment in the instant case was with the contention of protecting the legal
profession and in accordance with his oath not to do any falsehood or promote unlawful causes.
Issue:
The issue in this case is whether Atty. Reni M. Dublin should be held guilty of violating Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in representing the cause of herein complainant
spouses George A. Warriner and Aurora R. Warriner

Ruling:
The Court suspended respondent Atty. Reni M. Dublin from the practice of law for six months.
The court held that respondent is guilty of mishandling Civil Case No. 23, 396-95. Responded,
thus, violated Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states
that “A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence" and "A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection there with shall render
him liable ". Respondents admittedly claim that he deliberately failed to timely file a formal offer
of exhibits.