Heine v.

New York Life Insurance Company

Facts: The New York Life Insurance Company and the Guardian Insurance Company ("the insurance companies") were
corporations created in New York, USA. As conditions to be allowed to conduct business in Germany, they were made to
agree to be supervised by German authorities, to invest the proceeds of policies in German securities, and to establish a
local agency to whom summons may be served. The insurance companies were later sued before courts in both the US
and Germany for the recovery on some 240 life insurance policies issued in Germany to German nationals, payable in
German currency.

Arguments for the Plaintiff: As the US courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, they have no choice
but to try the case.

Issue: Whether or not the US courts may dismiss the case on the ground of forum non conveniens.

Held: Yes. Under the circumstances, the case may be more suitably tried before German courts.

Ratio Decidendi
The courts in both jurisdictions are competent to try the case and summons may be served upon the insurance companies
in both jurisdictions. Requiring the insurance companies to defend their interests in the US would subject them to great and
unnecessary inconvenience and expenses, including the possibility of having to bring documentary evidence all the way
from their office in Germany. Moreover, trying the case in the US additionally burden the courts in that jurisdiction, to the
detriment of other litigants. The assumption of jurisdiction over a case the cause of action of which arose from another
jurisdiction and wherein both parties are non-residents is discretionary upon the court.

In Re: Union Carbide Gas Plant Disaster

Facts
On the night of 23 December 1984, a gas leak occurred at the pesticide plant of Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) in
Bhopal, India resulting in the deaths of more than 2,000 people and injuries to more than 200,000 others. . Thereafter, the
India passed a law giving the Indian government the exclusive right to represent the victims of the disaster. As thus, the
Indian government filed a complaint before a New York district court. The Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens and lack of personality. The district court granted the motion on three
conditions, namely, that UCC: (1) consent to the jurisdiction of Indian courts and waive defenses based on the Statute of
Limitations; (2) agree to the satisfy the judgement of the Indian court, provided it complied with the requirements of due
process; and (3) be subject to discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the US. Consequently, the Indian
government filed sued the UCIL and the UCC before the a district court in India. The UCC appealed the conditions.

Arguments for the Defendant

While Indian courts may provide an adequate alternative forum, they adhere to standards of due process much lower than
that followed in the US. Hence, US courts must supervise the proceedings before Indian courts.

Issue
Whether or not the dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens is proper.

Held
Yes. The Indian courts are adequate alternative fora.

Ratio Decidendi
Almost all of the estimated 200,000 plaintiffs are citizens and residents of India who have revoked their representation by an
American counsel in favor of the Indian government, which now prefers Indian courts. Further, the UCC has already
consented to the assumption of jurisdiction by the Indian courts. All the witnesses and evidence are likewise in India.
As to the conditions, the first is valid in order to secure the viability of the Indian courts as alternate fora. The second is
problematic as it gives the impression that foreign judgments the UCC's consent is necessary in order for the judgement of
the Indian courts to be enforceable in New York. The laws of New York, in fact, recognizes that a judgment rendered by a
foreign court may be enforced in that State except if such judgment was rendered in violation of due process or without
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The request of UCC of supervision by US courts of Indian courts is untenable.
The power of US courts cannot extend beyond their territorial jurisdiction. Moreover, once US courts dismiss a case on the
ground of forum non conveniens, they lose any further jurisdiction over the case, except in case of an action for
enforcement later on. Denial of due process may, however, constitute a defense against the enforcement of the Indian
judgment. The third condition is likewise invalid. Basic justice dictates that both parties must be given equal access to
evidence in each other's possession. Hence, both parties maybe subjected to the modes of discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure on equal terms subject to approval by Indian courts.

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CRESCENT PETROLEUM, LTD., Petitioner, vs. M/V "LOK MAHESHWARI," THE SHIPPING CORPORATION OF INDIA, and PORTSERV
LIMITED G.R. No. 155014 November 11, 2005
FACTS: Respondent M/V "Lok Maheshwari" (Vessel) is an oceangoing vessel of Indian registry that is owned by respondent
Shipping Corporation of India (SCI), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of India and principally owned by
the Government of India. It was time-chartered by respondent SCI to Halla Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. (Halla), a South Korean
company. Halla, in turn, sub-chartered the Vessel through a time charter to Transmar Shipping, Inc. (Transmar). Transmar
further sub-chartered the Vessel to Portserv Limited (Portserv). Both Transmar and Portserv are corporations organized and
existing under the laws of Canada.
On or about November 1, 1995, Portserv requested petitioner Crescent Petroleum, Ltd. (Crescent), a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of Canada that is engaged in the business of selling petroleum and oil products for the use and
operation of oceangoing vessels, to deliver marine fuel oils (bunker fuels) to the Vessel. Petitioner Crescent granted and
confirmed the request through an advice via facsimile dated November 2, 1995. As security for the payment of the bunker
fuels and related services, petitioner Crescent received two (2) checks in the amounts of US$100,000.00 and US$200,000.00.
Thus, petitioner Crescent contracted with its supplier, Marine Petrobulk Limited (Marine Petrobulk), another Canadian
corporation, for the physical delivery of the bunker fuels to the Vessel.
On or about November 4, 1995, Marine Petrobulk delivered the bunker fuels amounting to US$103,544 inclusive of barging
and demurrage charges to the Vessel at the port of Pioneer Grain, Vancouver, Canada. The Chief Engineer Officer of the
Vessel duly acknowledged and received the delivery receipt. Marine Petrobulk issued an invoice to petitioner Crescent for
the US$101,400.00 worth of the bunker fuels. Petitioner Crescent issued a check for the same amount in favor of Marine
Petrobulk, which check was duly encashed.
Having paid Marine Petrobulk, petitioner Crescent issued a revised invoice dated November 21, 1995 to "Portserv Limited,
and/or the Master, and/or Owners, and/or Operators, and/or Charterers of M/V ‘Lok Maheshwari’" in the amount of
US$103,544.00 with instruction to remit the amount on or before December 1, 1995. The period lapsed and several demands
were made but no payment was received. Also, the checks issued to petitioner Crescent as security for the payment of the
bunker fuels were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. As a consequence, petitioner Crescent incurred additional expenses
of US$8,572.61 for interest, tracking fees, and legal fees.
On May 2, 1996, while the Vessel was docked at the port of Cebu City, petitioner Crescent instituted before the RTC of Cebu
City an action "for a sum of money with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary attachment" against
respondents Vessel and SCI, Portserv and/or Transmar. On May 3, 1996, the trial court issued a writ of attachment against the
Vessel with bond at P2,710,000.00. Petitioner Crescent withdrew its prayer for a temporary restraining order and posted the
required bond.
On May 18, 1996, summonses were served to respondents Vessel and SCI, and Portserv and/or Transmar through the Master
of the Vessel. On May 28, 1996, respondents Vessel and SCI, through Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (Pioneer), filed
an urgent ex-parte motion to approve Pioneer’s letter of undertaking, to consider it as counter-bond and to discharge the
attachment. On May 29, 1996, the trial court granted the motion; thus, the letter of undertaking was approved as counter-
bond to discharge the attachment.

ISSUE: Whether the Philippine court has or will exercise jurisdiction and entitled to maritime lien under our laws on foreign vessel
docked on Philippine port and supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port?

RULING: In a suit to establish and enforce a maritime lien for supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port, whether such lien
exists, or whether the court has or will exercise jurisdiction, depends on the law of the country where the supplies were
furnished, which must be pleaded and proved. The Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis trilogy of cases, which replaced such single-
factor methodologies as the law of the place of supply. The multiple-contact test to determine, in the absence of a specific
Congressional directive as to the statute’s reach, which jurisdiction’s law should be applied. The following factors were
considered: (1) place of the wrongful act; (2) law of the flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4) allegiance of the
defendant shipowner; (5) place of contract; (6) inaccessibility of foreign forum; and (7) law of the forum. This is applicable
not only to personal injury claims arising under the Jones Act but to all matters arising under maritime law in general The Court
cannot sustain petitioner Crescent’s insistence on the application of P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 and
hold that a maritime lien exists. Out of the seven basic factors listed in the case of Lauritzen, Philippine law only falls under one
– the law of the forum. All other elements are foreign – Canada is the place of the wrongful act, of the allegiance or domicile
of the injured and the place of contract; India is the law of the flag and the allegiance of the defendant shipowner. Applying
P.D. No. 1521,a maritime lien exists would not promote the public policy behind the enactment of the law to develop the
domestic shipping industry. Opening up our courts to foreign suppliers by granting them a maritime lien under our laws even
if they are not entitled to a maritime lien under their laws will encourage forum shopping. In light of the interests of the various
foreign elements involved, it is clear that Canada has the most significant interest in this dispute. The injured party is a
Canadian corporation, the sub-charterer which
placed the orders for the supplies is also Canadian, the entity which physically delivered the bunker fuels is in Canada, the
place of contracting and negotiation is in Canada, and the supplies were delivered in Canada.

2
Saudi Arabia Airlines and Brenda Betia v. Ma. Jopette Rebesencio, et al.

GR No: 198587 Jan.14,2015 Leonen, J.

SUMMARY: Various flight attendants got pregnant while working for Saudi Arabia Airlines, to
which they requested for Maternity leaves. Apparently there was a recently passed Unified
Employment Contracts which allowed for them to be terminated should they ever be pregnant
due to lack of physical fitness. The flight attendants were made to resign upon threat of losing
any benefits they might have should they have resigned, and thus petition for illegal dismissal;
Petitioner Airlines claim that the Labor Arbiter and NLRC do not have jurisdiction.
DOCTRINE: Labor Contracts are a matter of Public Policy, and thus Philippine laws clearly find
application in this case.

FACTS:
1) Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is a foreign
corporation established and existing under the
Royal Decree No. M/24 of Jeddah, who hired
Respondents as flight attendants. After undergoing
seminars required by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration for deployment
overseas, as well as training modules offered by
Saudia, Respondents became Temporary and then
eventually Permanent Flight Attendants; they
entered into the necessary Cabin Attendant
Contracts with Saudi.
2) Respondents were released from service on
separate dates in 2006; claimed that such release
was illegal since the basis of termination of contract
was solely because they were pregnant. They claim
that they had informed Saudia of their respective
pregnancies and had gone through the necessary
procedures to process their maternity leaves and
while initially, Saudia had given its approval, they
ultimately reneged and rather required them to file
for resignation.
5)November 8,2007 - Respondents filed a Complaint
with the Labor Arbiter against Saudia and its officers
for illegal dismissal and for underpayment, along
with moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees. Petitioner Airlines contests the Labor Arbiter’s
jurisdiction, as the contract’s points referred to
foreign law and that Respondents had no cause of
action since they already voluntarily resigned.
6) Executive Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint,
but on appeal the NLRC reversed the Labor
Arbiter’s decision and denied Petitioner Airlines’
Motion for Reconsideration, hence the current
appeal.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
WON the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC has jurisdiction
over Saudi Arabian Airlines and apply Philippine
jurisdiction over the dispute? YES. Summons were
validly served on Saudia and jurisdiction over it
validly acquired.

3) Respondents claim that Petitioner Airlines

threatened that if they would not resign, they would
be terminated along with loss of benefits,
separation pay, and ticket discount entitlements;
they anchored such on its “Unified Employment
Contract for Female Cabin Attendants" which
provides that “ if the Air Hostess becomes pregnant
at any time during the term of this contract, this shall
render her employment contract as void and she
will be terminated due to lack of medical fitness.

RATIO:
No doubt that the pleadings were served to
Petitioner Airlines through their counsel, however
they claim that the NLRC and Labor Arbiter had no
Furthermore, contracts relating to labor and
employment are impressed with public interest.
Article 1700 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he
3
 jurisdiction since summons were served to Saudi
Airlines Manila and not to them, Saudi Airlines
Jeddah. Saudi Airlines Manila was neither a party to
the Cabin attendant contracts nor funded the
Respondents, and it was to Saudi Jeddah that they
filed their resignations. Court ruled however that by
its own admission, Saudia, while a foreign
corporation, has a Philippine office, and that under
the Foreign Investments act of 1991, they are a
foreign corporation doing business in the Phils and
therefore are subject to Philippine jurisdiction.
Petitioner Airlines also asserts that the Cabin
Attendant Contracts require the application of the
laws of Saudi Arabia rather than those of the
Philippines. It claims that the difficulty of
ascertaining foreign law calls into operation the
principle of forum non conveniens, thereby
rendering improper the exercise of jurisdiction by
Philippine tribunals.
Court: Forum non conveniens finds no application
and does not operate to divest Philippine tribunals
of jurisdiction and to require the application of
foreign law. Though Article 1306 of the Civil Code
provides that Parties may stipulate terms they may
deem convenient, Philippine tribunals may not lose
sight of considerations of law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy that underlie
the contract.
relation between capital and labor are not merely
contractual. They are so impressed with public
interest that labor contracts must yield to the
common good.
Pakistan Airlines Ruling: relationship is much
affected with public interest and that the otherwise
applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot
be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon
some other law to govern their relationship.
As the present dispute relates to (what the
respondents allege to be) the illegal termination of
respondents' employment, this case is immutably a
matter of public interest and public policy.
Consistent with clear pronouncements in law and
jurisprudence, Philippine laws properly find
application in and govern this case.
DISPOSITIVE: Appealed Decision is Affirmed, case is
remanded for a detailed computation of the
amount to be paid by Saudi Airlines.

Article II, Sections 1 and 14 of the 1987 Constitution

ensures the equal protection of persons, and the
equality between men and women. Though
pregnancy does present physical limitations that
may render difficult the performance of functions
associated with being a flight attendant, it would be
the height of iniquity to view pregnancy as a
disability so permanent and immutable that, it must
entail the termination of one's employment.

Gray v. Gray (1934)

Facts:
 Gray filed an action in New Hampshire
o Action is for damages arising out of personal injuries
o Alleged to have been caused by her husband while driving from their home in New Hampshire to Maine
where the accident happened.
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  In Maine: spouses are barred from maintaining an action against each other.
o No such prohibition exists in New Hampshire.
Issue/s:
 WON Mrs. Gray can sue Mr. Gray – NO
Held:
 Rule: conflict between the lex loci and the lex fori – lex loci governs, as regards the legal effect and the incident of
acts
o Therefore: whatever would be a defense to this action if it had been brought in Maine is a defense here (New
Hampshire), EXCEPT IF: the cause of action had arisen in this (New Hampshire) state.
 Mrs. Gray’s argument:
o only reason a recovery could not be had in Maine is the spousal relation between her and Mr. Gray
o Since they are residents of New Hampshire, where no such prohibition exists, she could sue in New Hampshire.
 Is Mrs. Gray’s argument correct? NO
o Her argument fails to distinguish between status and the incidents which local law attaches to the status.
 Status of parties: husband and wife, which they brought into Maine.
 Incidents of the status: those prescribed by law of the place where transactions take place (e.g.
applied in torts)
o It should be observed that much of the plaintiff’s argument is based upon the assertion that inability to recover
in Maine is merely because suits between husband and wife are forbidden (hence the resort to a jurisdiction
where such suits are allowed)
 BUT: examination of Maine law shows that there is not only a prohibition of suit, but that acts
complained of do not give rise to any cause of action.
 Rules and conduct have no force to regulate acts done outside the jurisdiction which made the rules, save as their
operation is enforced by control over parties found within the jurisdiction.
o In the great majority of cases, complaints of conduct are adjusted in the jurisdiction where the conduct took
place. It is desirable that the remedy be the same, wherever the action is brought.

Alabama Great Southern R.R. Co. v. Carroll

Brief Fact Summary: Carroll (Plaintiff) worked as a railroad brakeman, and was injured in Mississippi due to the failure of
other employees’ to inspect the brakes in Alabama.
Synopsis of Rule of Law: Where a negligent act is committed in one state, but causes injury in a different state, an action
seeking damages for injuries resulting from the act may be brought only in the state where the result occurred, and not
where the act was committed.
Facts: Carroll (Plaintiff), a resident of Alabama, was injured in Mississippi due to a break in a defective railroad car link. The
Railroad’s (Defendant) employees had been negligent in their duty to inspect the links in Alabama. Plaintiff sued the
Defendant in Alabama under a state statute that authorized recovery. Mississippi would have denied recovery as it had no
similar statute.
Issue: May recovery be obtained for a tortious act in the state where the breach of duty occurred, but not the injury?
Held: No. The general rule is that recovery cannot be made in one state for the injuries to the person sustained in a different
state unless the infliction of the injuries is actionable under the law of the state where the injuries were received. In this case,
up to the time the train passed from Alabama, no injury had resulted. The Alabama statute has no efficiency beyond state
lines. Only Mississippi could apply proper jurisdiction over the claim. There may have been a different result if Carroll had been
injured in Alabama but suffered in Mississippi. As for an argument that the Railroad (Defendant) was under a contractual
duty to Carroll (Plaintiff), which arose in Alabama, the Alabama law will govern only occurrences of the employment
relationship and not with any specific contractual obligations. Reversed and remanded.

Auten v Auten (1922) – Fuld, J.

Plaintiff: Margarite Auten
Defendant: Harold Auten

Brief facts: Margarite Auten sues Harold Auten in New York to recover support for her and her children that Harold owed by
virtue of a separation agreement. The Autens were married in England. Harold deserted her, went to America, obtained a
Mexican divorce, then married another woman. Margarite went to New York, where she and Harold came to a separation
agreement which provided that Harold was to pay to a trustee, for Margarite’s account, 50 pounds sterling (British currency)
a month for her support and that of their 2 children. The agreement also provided that they were not to sue each other in
any action relating to their separation, and Margarite would not cause any complaint against Harold in any jurisdiction
because of his alleged divorce and remarriage. Harold made a few payments only, so Margarite filed a petition for separation
5
in England, charging Harold with adultery. Harold was served in New York with process in that suit and he was ordered to pay
alimony pendent lite. This English case never proceeded to trial. Margarite instituted the instant suit to recover support due
under the agreement.
Doctrine: Center of Gravity/Grouping of Contacts Theory: The courts, instead of regarding as conclusive the parties’ intention
or the place of making or performance, lay emphasis rather upon the law of the place which has the most significant contacts
with the matter in dispute.

FACTS:
1. 1917: Harold and Margarite Auten were married in England, living there with their 2 children until 1931.
2. 1931: According to Margarite, Harold deserted her, came to America, obtained a Mexican divorce, then married another
woman.
3. 1933: They came to a separation agreement, which provided that:
o Harold was to pay to a trustee, for the account of Margarite, £50 (50 pounds sterling) a month for the support of
Margarite and her 2 children.
o They were to live separate and apart.
o They were not to sue each other in any action relating to their separation.
o Margarite would not cause any complaint to be lodged against Harold in any jurisdiction because of the alleged
divorce or remarriage.
4. Harold made a few payments only, leaving Margarite and her children destitute.
5. August 1934: Margarite filed a petition for separation in an English court, charging Harold with adultery
6. December 4, 1936: Harold was served in New York with process in that suit.
7. July 1938: Harold was ordered to pay alimony pendente lite.
8. This English case never proceeded to trial.
9. 1947: Margarite brought the instant suit to recover $26,564 representing support due under the agreement, from January 1,
1935 to September 1, 1947.

CFI dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision

ISSUES: Which law applied as to the issue of whether Margarite’s commencement of the English case (petition for separation
with charge of adultery) constituted a rescission and repudiation of the separation agreement? English

RATIO: Based on the “center of gravity” or “grouping of contacts” theory of the conflict of laws, English law governs.
The decisions in New York jurisprudence as to which law applies to contracts with elements in different jurisdictions show several approaches.
o Most of the cases rely on these general rules, which were thought to be conclusive:
 "All matters bearing upon the execution, the interpretation and the validity of contracts are determined by the law of the place where the
contract is made"
 "All matters connected with performance are regulated by the law of the place where the contract, by its terms, is to be performed."
 What constitutes a breach of the contract and what circumstances excuse a breach are considered matters of performance, governable,
within this rule, by the law of the place of performance.
o However, recent decisions have innovated by employing a method that rationalizes the choice of law. This method has been called the
“center of gravity” or “grouping of contracts” theory.
 “The courts, instead of regarding as conclusive the parties’ intention or the place of making or performance, lay emphasis rather upon
the law of the place which has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute.”

 This method may seem less predictable but it gives to the jurisdiction having the most interest in the problem, control over the legal issues
arising from a specific set of circumstances, allowing the forum to apply the rules of the jurisdiction most intimately connected with the
outcome of the particular case.
 This has been thought to effect the probable intention of the parties when making their contract.
In the instant case:
o England has the most significant contacts with the case.
 The agreement was between British subjects.
 They were married in England.
 They lived there as a family for 14 years.
 Harold abandoned his family and was in the US on a temporary visa.
 Margarite’s sole purpose was to get Harold to agree to support their family.
 The money was to be paid to a trustee in New York but those who stood to benefit live in England.
 The agreement refers to British currency (pounds sterling.)
o New York’s only connection to the case is where the agreement was made , and where the trustee to whom the money was to be paid held
office.
o It is unlikely that Margarite intended to subject herself to the law of another state which she was not familiar with.
 English law must be applied.

6
 o It is for the courts of that state to determine whether Margarite’s institution of a case constituted a breach of their agreement.
o The Court noted that based on English law, there was no breach of the agreement by Margarite.

DISPOSITIVE: The judgment of the Appellate Division and that of Special Term insofar as they dismiss the complaint should be reversed, with costs
in all courts, and the matter remitted for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

01 Haag v Barnes AUTHOR:

9 N.Y. 2d 554 (1961) NOTES:
TOPIC: Modern Approaches
PONENTE: Fuld
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The more modern view is that "the courts, instead of regarding as conclusive the
parties' intention or the place of making or performance, lay emphasis rather upon the law of the place
`which has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute'".
Emergency Recitation: Haag met Barnes in New York while Barnes was in a business trip. They became
friends since Barnes hired Haag as a law secretary. Eventually, Haag became pregnant. As a result, they
had an agreement executed in Illinois, since Illinois was the principal place of work of Barnes, wherein it
provided the terms of support, that Haag releases Barnes from any action, and that their agreement will
be govern by the laws of Illinois. Eventually, Haag instituted a complaint in New York for the alleged
violation of Sec. 64 of the New York City Criminal Courts Act. In dismissing the complaint and ruling in
favor of Barnes, the court said that the Illinois laws would apply since it has the most significant contacts
with the matter in dispute because: (1) both parties are designated as being “of Chicago, Illinois”; (2) the
child was born in Illinois; (3) the agents to act in behalf of the parties are all Illinois residents; and (4)
support were always made from Chicago, Illinois.
FACTS:
 The complainant Dorothy Haag alleges that in 1947 she moved from Minnesota and took up
residence in New York City and that since then she has been a resident of New York.
 The defendant Norman Barnes, on the other hand, is a resident of Illinois.
 According to the statements contained in the complainant's affidavits:
o She met Barnes in the spring of 1954 in New York.
o She was a law secretary and had been hired by Barnes to work for him while he was in New
York.
o The relationship between them "ripened into friendship" and, on the basis of representations
that he loved her and planned to divorce his wife and marry her, she was "importuned" into
having sexual relations with him.
o That she became pregnant and that, upon being informed of this, Barnes asked her to move to
Illinois to be near him.
o She refused and, instead, went to live in California with her sister to await the birth of her
child. Fearing that Barnes was losing interest in her, she returned to Chicago before the child
was born and, upon attempting to communicate with Barnes, she was referred to his
attorney. The attorney told Haag to choose a hospital in Chicago, which she did, and the baby
was born there with Barnes paying the expenses.
 Shortly after the birth of the child, Haag attempts to see Barnes in New York failed and she was
advised by Barnes’ attorney to return to Chicago in order that an agreement might be made for the
support of her and her child.
 Returning to that city, Haag procured an attorney and signed an agreement which provides:
o For the child’s support;
o That Haag releases Barnes from all manner of actions; and

7
 o That their agreement "shall in all respects be interpreted, construed and governed by the laws
of the State of Illinois".
 Shortly after the agreement was signed, Haag lived in California for 2 years. She then returned to New
York where she and her child have ever since been supported by Barnes in full compliance with the
terms of the agreement. In fact, Barnes has provided sums in excess of their agreement.
 The present proceeding was instituted in 1959 and Barnes was thereafter arrested pursuant to section
64 of the New York City Criminal Courts Act.
 A motion, made by Barnes, to dismiss the proceeding was granted by the Court of Special Sessions
and the resulting order was affirmed by the Appellate Division.
o The ground urged for dismissal was that the parties had entered into an agreement providing
for the support of the child which has been fully performed;
o That in this agreement the Haag relinquished the right to bring any action for the support of
the child; and
o That, in any event, the action is precluded by the laws of the State of Illinois which, the parties
expressly agreed, would govern their rights under the agreement.
 In opposition, Haag contended:
o That New York, not Illinois, law applies;
o That the agreement in question is not a sufficient basis for a motion to dismiss under either
section 63 of the New York City Criminal Courts Act or section 121 of the Domestic Relations
Law, since both of these provisions provide that "An agreement or compromise made by the
mother * * * shall be binding only when the court shall have determined that adequate
provision has been made"; and
o That, even were the Illinois law to apply, it does not bar the present proceeding.
ISSUE(S): Whether the law of New York or of Illinois applies

HELD: The law of Illinois applies. The motion to dismiss was properly granted.

RATIO:
 Haag may not upset a support agreement which is itself perfectly consistent with the public policy of
New York, which was entered into in Illinois with the understanding that it would be governed by the
laws of Illinois and which constitutes a bar to a suit for further support under Illinois law.
 The traditional view was that the law governing a contract is to be determined by the intention of the
parties. However, The more modern view is that "the courts, instead of regarding as conclusive the
parties' intention or the place of making or performance, lay emphasis rather upon the law of the
place `which has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute'". Whichever of these views
one applies in this case, however, the answer is the same, namely, that Illinois law applies.
 The agreement, in so many words, recites that it "shall in all respects be interpreted, construed and
governed by the laws of the State of Illinois" and, since it was also drawn and signed by Haag in
Illinois, the traditional conflicts rule would, without doubt, treat these factors as conclusive and result
in applying Illinois law.
 But, even if the parties' intention and the place of the making of the contract are not given decisive
effect, they are nevertheless to be given heavy weight in determining which jurisdiction "`has the
most significant contacts with the matter in dispute'".
 And, when these important factors are taken together with other of the "significant contacts" in the
case, they likewise point to Illinois law. Among these other Illinois contacts are the following:
o both parties are designated in the agreement as being "of Chicago, Illinois", and Barnes’ place
of business is and always has been in Illinois;

8
 o the child was born in Illinois;
o the persons designated to act as agents for the principals (except for a third alternate) are
Illinois residents, as are the attorneys for both parties who drew the agreement; and
o all contributions for support always have been, and still are being, made from Chicago.
Contrasted with these Illinois contacts, the New York contacts are of far less weight and significance.
Chief among these is the fact that child and mother presently live in New York and that part of the
"liaison" took place in New York.

BABCOCK V. JACKSON (1963)

FACTS: Miss Babcock (as guest) went with Mr. and Mrs. Jackson (as hosts) to Canada for a weekend trip using
the Jackson’s car. (All are residents of Rochester, New York). Mr. Jackson was driving along Ontario, Canada
when he lost control of the car and went off the highway. Babcock was seriously injured and consequently
sued Mr. Jackson for Tort/ Damages in NY court. Jackson moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
the law of the place where the accident occurred should govern. The law of Canada states that any owner or
driver of a vehicle is not liable for any bodily injury (except if in the business of common carrier).

ISSUE: What law should be applied in this case?

HELD: New York law should apply.

 The traditional view of Lex Loci Delicti (“Law of the place where the tort was committed”) or the
Vested Rights Doctrine has already been discredited because it fails to take account underlying policy
considerations. It affects to decide concrete cases upon generalities which do not state the practical
considerations involved. More particularly, as applied to torts, the theory ignores the interest which
jurisdictions other than that where the tort occurred may have in the resolution of particular issues.
 Citing Auten v. Auten (1953), the traditional view has been abandoned and has applied what has been
termed the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" theory of the conflict of laws.
 This is applied by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its
relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific
issue raised in the litigation.

 In this case, New York has the greater and more direct concern than Ontario. The present action
involves (1) injuries sustained by a New York guest (2) as a result of the negligence of a New York host
(3) in the operation of an automobile, garaged, licensed and undoubtedly insured in New York. In sharp
contrast, Ontario's sole relationship with the occurrence is the purely adventitious circumstance that
the accident occurred there.
 New York's policy of requiring a tortfeasor to compensate his guest for injuries caused by his
negligence cannot be doubted. This is attested by the fact that the State Legislature has repeatedly
refused to enact a statute denying or limiting recovery in such cases.