Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Resolution March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to
1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.

DIOKNO, J.:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as
Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of
Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may
be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general
average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127,
sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar
examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination
papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had
obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74
per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this
court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A.
No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those
admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No.
12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent
effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with
that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments
adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the
veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the
vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the
matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature.
The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

 AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one

hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general
average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred
and forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations;
seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-
two per cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-
three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate
obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided,
however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall
be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject
in any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be
deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be
included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in
any subsequent examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to
the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their
examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground
for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades
without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the
court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had
invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their
grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which,
if declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or
not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by this decision, as well as a
more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as
Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data
are set forth:

(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972
total 1,168, classified as follows:
 1946 (August) 206 121 18
1946 (November) 477 228 43
1947 749 340 0
1948 899 409 11
1949 1,218 532 164
1950 1,316 893 26
1951 2,068 879 196
1952 2,738 1,033 426
1953 2,555 968 284
TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have
filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for
reconsideration.

(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said
Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but
failed to obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades
in different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient
to reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of
which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had
individually presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful
candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are still pending
because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, — although as has been
already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal
profession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as
to its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the
sole question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.

We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the
members of the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in
which the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente
J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law,
and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz,
Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de
Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of
counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio
Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly helped
us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and
American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation
for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority
opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as possible above all
suspicion of prejudice or partiality.

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator
Pablo Angeles David stated:

The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous
handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation
has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the
preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation.

Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it
is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because
they suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as
was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands
of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem
evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital
requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To
the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To
approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a
delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an
insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials.
Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the public during
those years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and annual
digests. The Official Gazette had been published continuously. Books and magazines published
abroad have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised
and enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine
Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition
of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable
principles, but the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of
similar background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any
precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the
judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and
which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial
history of more than half a century? From the citations of those defending the law, we can not
find a case in which the validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against its
validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs.
Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR
1061), of Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his
vote of the original bill and which the postponement of the contested law respects.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been
promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within
our power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed law.

To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited
to us as a favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of
Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the
petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute
concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was
declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the state of New
York.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either
of them for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the
Legislature or the people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of
appointment to public office. Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good
moral character, and who possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability,
shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).

According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:

Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had
previously rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which
they possessed. The convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this
power had been exercised, and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon
admission to practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was
aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting the admission
of attorneys, in this particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its
connection with the object of this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of
confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion of their power over
this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of
the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of
must be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and that the power of granting
necessarily implies the power of refusing, and of course the right of determining
whether the applicant possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.

These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided
that the possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree
of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of
applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law,
which we cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the country.

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the
Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:

The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an
institution of established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of
able professors, the students in which department were not only subjected to a formal
examination by the law committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of
study before being entitled to a diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently,
and no doubt justly, considered this examination, together with the preliminary study
required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary
examination by the court; and as rendering the latter examination, to which no definite
period of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and burdensome.

The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant,
and for the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the
college for that of the court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater
scope should be given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature
designed entirely to dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the
Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate an intention that the
authorities of the college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students
before granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act admits is,
that it was intended to make the college diploma competent evidence as to the legal
attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a
modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these
statutes and with the Constitution itself in order to determine the present condition of
the law on the subject. (p.89)

xxx xxx xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of
admission, that has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases
upon that question. (p.93)

From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be
clearly seen. Please note only the following distinctions:

(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in
the bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court
its jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the
admission of any lawyer.

(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different
on the matter of admission of the practice of law.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this
attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have been
demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of
titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter
supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law,
to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement
of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable.
The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether
past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are
governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it
becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the
petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.

We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been
undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a
legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was
discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:

This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of
the English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been
much uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the
ultimate qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts,
and the act of admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act
purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone
as an assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)

Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section
1, art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are
legislative in character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when
it sets up and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)

But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will
serve the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose
other and further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
 Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct,
independent, and coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the
powers of sovereignty which properly belongs to its department. Neither department
should so act as to embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective functions. That
was the scheme and thought of the people setting upon the form of government under
which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs.
Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)

The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state
government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts
cannot escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus
committed to the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)

The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an
attache of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small
degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and
reproach to the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute.
(p.445)

Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at
least in the English speaking countries. (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the
adoption of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to
Parliament since the Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who
should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's
at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts
and judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should be
admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to
isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power
of the court, or an essential element of the judicial power exercised by the court, but that
it is a power belonging to the judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign
institution, but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the
government. They took this institution along with the power traditionally exercise to
determine who should constitute its attorney at law. There is no express provision in the
Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of the judicial
department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the
dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make the three great
departments of government separate and independent of one another. The idea that the
Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate
qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making
the judicial independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose should not be
 inferred in the absence of express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may
legislate with respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its
general and unquestioned power to protect the public interest. When it does legislate a
fixing a standard of qualifications required of attorneys at law in order that public
interests may be protected, such qualifications do not constitute only a minimum
standard and limit the class from which the court must make its selection. Such
legislative qualifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the
court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course of the
proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to compel
courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives
of an attorney at law. (p. 450)

Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite

likely true that the legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in
pursuance of a legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous
that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the
states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our
investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to practice law by their
admission as members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex
parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366;
Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P.
646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030,
20 Ann. Cas. 413.

The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the
courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney
to practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the
Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it
seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial
function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of
the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:

It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that

there be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral
character. This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and
restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the
public be protected from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for
doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin,
242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a
privilege burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for something more than
private gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is due
"whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such
attorneys at law the judicial department of government would be hampered in the
performance of its duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the common law,
 both in this country and England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost
without exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in
courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is
accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its
records. The establishment by the Constitution of the judicial department conferred
authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of
government. It is an inherent power of such a department of government ultimately to
determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting
in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient
learning, and those not possessing good moral character. Chief Justice Taney stated
succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has
been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests
exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as
an attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed." (p.727)

In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the
legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:

In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath
for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as
follows: "They are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of
their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has always been
the general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the
parties. In this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest court of the
states to which they, respectively, belong for, three years preceding their application, is
regarded as sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the
statement of counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and
professional character is fair. The order of admission is the judgment of the court that
the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and are
entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties become
officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold
their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has
been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a
mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in
numerous cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the matter of the
application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors",
said that court, "are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost
exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their appointment may, with
propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his duty, may very
justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp.
650-651).

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the

exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in
 this point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the
inherent powers of the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.

Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent
power of the court. — A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See
Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.

The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is
that it is the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern
in matters of transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the
judiciary determines rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or
conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a
vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial
decree.

The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other
departments of the government. — 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.

If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of
them construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so
directly, by settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering
the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the
progress of a judicial inquiry. — Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.

In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general
average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to
the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking
those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates
concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for
justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive
department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a
clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the
rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid
argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.
Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the
power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and
 procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. — Constitution of
the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and
responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress
found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over
which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the
Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit
that Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power
on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend,
disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the
practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the
matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires
it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and
reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.

Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them
may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful
consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers
have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious
delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on
the admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar
endowed with high virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means
of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the
judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient administration of
justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms
as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these
reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which,
exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary
to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and
exacting necessities of the administration of justice.

The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took examination and
failed by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one
who had been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without
a previous examination. The Government appointed Guariña and he discharged the duties of
Fiscal in a remote province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous
examinations. The court said:

Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks
admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he
holds the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
 Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety,
entitled "An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special
Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:

1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under
the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as
members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this act, or at any time
thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of
justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate
judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of
Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the
office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney
of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro
Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in
the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the
Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.

The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and
failed to pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated
March 23, 1907, shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various
branches of legal learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of
the required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty
to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency
of the applicant in the required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he
presented his former application for admission to the bar, we should grant him license
to practice law in the courts of these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that
despite his failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability."

But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is
entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination
"upon motion before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has
held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged
that having in mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in
enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context
generally and especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that
section of the original Act which specifically provides for the admission of certain
candidates without examination. It is contented that this mandatory construction is
imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator,
and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.

And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2,
16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:
 Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and
confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case
such as that under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in
the above citation from Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress
prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon the commission is to that
extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful limits and authority.

Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions
enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:

In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the
provisions of this statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact
that such appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of
the applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had
been practicing attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.

In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was
not and never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the
date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he
was deficient in the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for
admission to the bar.

In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think
that his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his
possession of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore
that this application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be
denied.

In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points
short of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the
fact that since that time he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province
of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of
the duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the
Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing
him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above-
cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination
prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in
a special examination which will be given him by a committee of the court upon his
application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present
himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. — (In
re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer
from the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a
classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.

In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until
December 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began
studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma
issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an
examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies after
the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being,
among others, a class legislation. The Court said:

This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of
diplomas from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly
passed in 1899, under which the application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section
1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors,"
approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in
the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the section of the following: "And every
application for a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard
to admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant commend the study of law,
either in a law or office or a law school or college, shall be granted a license under this
act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules". — In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p.
646.

. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to
December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder
of every diploma regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws
of this state, whose regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an
attendance by the student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that
the student began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with
the usual proofs of good moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any
student who has studied law for two years in a law office, or part of such time in a law
office, "and part in the aforesaid law school," and whose course of study began prior to
November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by the examining
board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right to admission
exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights
and privileges upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of legislative
creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)

Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation,

prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to
admit attorneys to practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice,
and could prescribe the character of evidence which should be received by the court as
conclusive of the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only
be done by a general law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right
to practice law is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer
of the court, and confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and
 to collect fees therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and
arrest on civil process while attending court. The law conferring such privileges must be
general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that
purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing classes in general, and has
some reasonable relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which
furnishes a reasonable basis for different one, having no just relation to the subject of the
legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155
Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.

The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may
furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place
where such physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such
basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void
(State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what
shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of the law, and plainly, any classification
must have some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such practice.
The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons who began the study of law prior to
November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two classes — First, those presenting
diplomas issued by any law school of this state before December 31, 1899; and, second,
those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a
law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the
subjects specified in the present rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there
seems to be no limit of time for making application for admission. As to both classes, the
conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as between the two different conditions
and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a
diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe
is made all-sufficient. Can there be anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness
of persons to practice law resting upon the mere date of November 4, 1897, which will
furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who began the study of law
November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as those who
began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two years in study,
while those who commenced the next day must spend three years, although they would
complete two years before the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If
possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before December 31,
1899, and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed
course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot
rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is
suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain
defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)

In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature
attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to
its aspect of being a class legislation:

But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has
power to prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must
admit and license those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in
 the manner here attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which
will apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the
Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice
Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed.
626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any
lawful calling, business or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as
are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition." This right may in many
respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here all
vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of
livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for their successful
prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them —
that is, the right to continue their prosecution — is often of great value to the possessors
and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real or personal property
can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of government that all similarly
situated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even
statutes regulating the practice of medicine, requiring medications to establish the
possession on the part of the application of his proper qualifications before he may be
licensed to practice, have been challenged, and courts have seriously considered
whether the exemption from such examinations of those practicing in the state at the
time of the enactment of the law rendered such law unconstitutional because of
infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E.
517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345;
State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.

This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice
law and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or
favor. It is not material that he had once established his right to practice law and that
one time he possessed the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to
that right. That fact in no matter affect the power of the Legislature to select from the
great body of the public an individual upon whom it would confer its favors.

A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to
admit to the practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or
naval forces of the United States during the World War and received a honorable
discharge therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of
the Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924
and whose disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of
this Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the
quality clauses of the constitution of that state. In re Application of George W.
Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-

153 as follows:

The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be
valid must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those
excluded and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has
 sometimes avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and
real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law
that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial
difference between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it does not
apply and must rest on some reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there
must be such a difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members of
the class and the situation and circumstances of all other members of the state in relation
to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause for
the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A
law is not general because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial
reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur.
pp. 151-153.)

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject,
have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5
per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per
cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75
per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature
indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none
has been given, then the classification is fatally defective.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average
indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates
of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful
candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those
who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no
record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some
other means his right to an equal consideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity,
it is argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972
intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted
admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in
1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in
1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent,
which was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by
reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing
averages during those years were all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to
undo what had been done — cancel the license that was issued to those who did not obtain the
prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so.
Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that
the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952
as sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of
the Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the
disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the
general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This
purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and
correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply
taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done during those years
according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power exercised was not to repeal,
alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend
them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because
it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which
such duty been confided.

Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals.
The grave defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may
happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this
manner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar
examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case,
however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect
only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite
time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls
article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity
affect the entire law.

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the
legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because
they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and
third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has
already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is
unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons,
to wit:

1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of
1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was
exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these
candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present
already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something
contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the
constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of
these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and
although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for
justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do
it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.

3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they
ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to
improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as
minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement
of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of
judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the
primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who
may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.

4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is
contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar
of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is
undoubtedly a class legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is
void.

6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the
examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in
those years, shall continue in force.

RESOLUTION

Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and
impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the
debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two of
our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to take part
in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and
resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:

1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946
to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without
force and effect.

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the
examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid
and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the
examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have
filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted
to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or
dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-34620. April 29, 1977.]

JESUS P. GARCIA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE RECOLETO and JUDITH A.

RECOLETO, Respondents.

Jesus P. Garcia in his own behalf.

Benjamin S. Rallon for Private Respondents.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J.:

The facts of this certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus proceedings are simple and
uncomplicated. The Court of First Instance of Cebu having on September 30, 1970 rendered a
decision in favor of petitioner against private respondents, the spouses Jose Recoleto and Judith
A. Recoleto, in an action for the recovery of a portion of Lot No. 1357 of the Banilad Friar Lands
Estate in Cebu City, the latter filed on January 21, 1971 a notice of appeal and thereafter on
January 28, 1971, a record on appeal, which did not state when such decision was received by
them. 1 Then on February 11, 1971, they filed a motion "seeking to detach and substitute page 3
of the record on appeal, by offering to change it with a new page, which would add the phrase
‘and which decision was received by plaintiffs on January 7, 1971.’" 2 Such a motion was denied
by the lower court on February 20, 1971, acting favorably on an opposition of petitioner. 3 It was
thus a record on appeal that did not show when the decision was received that was transmitted
to respondent Court of Appeals, but it denied nonetheless petitioner’s motion to dismiss appeal
in its Resolution of May 27, 1971, 4 sustaining the opposition filed by private respondents. Such
resolution reads: "Upon consideration of the motion to dismiss appeal, the opposition thereto
and the reply to opposition, the Court [resolved] that since the opposition appears to be well-
founded, motion to dismiss appeal is [denied]; appellant is given 10 days from notice hereof to
insert and add the phrase, ‘and which decision was received by the plaintiff on January 7, 1971’
on par. 21 of the typewritten record on appeal." 5 It was this resolution, the reconsideration of
which was denied, that is now assailed in this proceeding. 6 The question that emerges from
such a state of facts is whether respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in not
dismissing appeal in view of the failure of private respondents to observe literally the material
data rule. 7 The answer is supplied by a recent decision, Krueger v. Court of Appeals. 8 It is
adverse to the claim of petitioner.

Respondent Court did not commit a grave abuse of discretion. Hence this petition must be
dismissed.

1. This is the opening paragraph of the opinion of Justice Muñoz Palma in the Krueger decision:
"This is another case covered by the liberalized interpretation and application of the ‘material
data rule’ enunciated in recent decisions to this Court." 9 The facts of the case correspond to that
in the present litigation. Petitioner Krueger as plaintiff-appellant failed to state the date he
received the decision appealed from. Accordingly, there was a motion to dismiss such a
pleading. Respondent Court of Appeals, through its Ninth Division, issued the challenged
resolution of April 10, 1975 granting such a motion. It was reversed by this Court. As stated in
the opinion of Justice Muñoz Palma: "We now find and so hold that petitioner Frank Krueger is
deserving of relief." 10 She pointed out that the once prevailing doctrine as to the literal
adherence to the material data rule being of mandatory and jurisdictional character, first
announced in Government v. Antonio, 11 has been eroded considerably by the more recent
decisions of this Court. Reference was made by her to Berkenkotter v. Court of Appeals 12 as
reflecting this new trend. It should be said that such a tendency is discernible as far back as
Design Masters v. Court of Appeals, 13 where this Court, in an opinion of former Chief Justice
Concepcion, reversed the Court of Appeals for granting a motion to dismiss upon the ground
that nowhere in the record on appeal does the date of its filing appear although said date is
stamped on the first page of the original record. Chief Justice Concepcion explained why: "The
printed record on appeal in L-31510 does not show the date on which it was filed with the trial
court, but such date is stamped on the original record on appeal, which was approved by said
court and forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, obviously
refers to the record on appeal filed with the trial court, not to the record on appeal printed in the
appellate court. At any rate, the Court of Appeals is in position to determine the date
aforementioned, by examining the original record on appeal thereto, forwarded, and, hence,
forming part of its own records. Accordingly, petitioner’s record on appeal meets the objective
of said provision of the Rules of Court, which may be deemed to have been substantially
complied with." ‘ 14 The rigidity of a previous doctrine was thus subjected to an inroad under
the concept of substantial compliance. Such a ruling was followed in Ever Ice Drop and Ice
Cream Factory v. Court of Appeals 15 where this Court, through Justice Barredo, categorically
stated: "Clearly, therefore, the alleged failure of petitioners to comply with Section 6 of Rule 41
found by the Court of Appeals would be true only, if the printed joint record on appeal alone is
used as basis. Actually, however, the original thereof on file also with said appellate court bears
out the contention of counsel that petitioners’ notice of appeal and joint record on appeal are in
order." 16 He then referred to the Design Masters opinion. Again, such a ruling was cited with
approval in Villarica v. Court of Appeals, 17 the opinion being penned by the then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice, Castro.

2. There is no doubt, however, that as pointed out by Justice Muñoz Palma, after Berkenkotter
this Court has consistently applied the liberal doctrine whenever the material data rule is
invoked to dismiss an appeal. 18 The latest decision in point, Libongco v. Court of Appeals, 19
was promulgated on February 28, 1977. In this case, the material data allegedly omitted in the
record on appeal consisted of the resolution of the entire court on the defendant’s alleged
motion for extension of time to file his record on appeal and the date when the defendant
received a copy of such resolution. After referring to Berkenkotter and five other cases, 20 this
Court, through Justice Concepcion, ruled: "In view thereof, the respondent Court of Appeals
did not commit an error, much less abuse its discretion, in denying the petitioners’ motion to
dismiss the appeal of the defendant Raul Casumpang." 21 So we rule again.
3. There is even less justification for another ground invoked by petitioner to manifest what he
considered a grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Court of Appeals when
according to him, private respondents in submitting their mimeographed record on appeal
added a new page not found in the typewritten record on appeal. 22 Ever alert to detect any
procedural irregularity, petitioner filed anew a motion to dismiss appeal. 23 Respondent Court,
in a resolution of October 26, 1971, denied petitioner’s motion in a minute resolution notable for
its adherence to the law and sound procedural principles:" [Resolved]: Denied; the main point
has already been ruled upon in the resolution of 2 September, 1971, page 167; and this Court
does not see its way clear to changing its former position; as to the fact that appellants added in
the mimeographed Record on Appeal the names of all the defendants, yes, this is a defect, and
therefore, such additional names should be as they are hereby ordered to be, stricken out, but
this defect is not jurisdictional, and this Court does not believe that it would be enough to
justify dismissal of the appeal." 24 It would be to magnify a trifle to dismiss an appeal based on
such allegation.

4. It is not amiss to refer to this excerpt from Toribio v. Montejo: 25 "This Court, as is thus
evident, has been quite consistent in preserving the right to appeal and has viewed with
disfavor attempts on the part of appellees to denigrate its effectiveness. That is in line with the
basic postulate that the system of procedure, to quote from Cardozo, ‘is perverted from its
proper function when it multiplies impediments to justice without the warrant of clear
necessity.’ So it has been in the Philippines from the leading case of Alonso v. Villamor, a 1910
decision, with Justice Moreland correctly stressing: ‘Technicality, when it deserts its proper
office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts.’" 26

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is dismissed.

 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 39773. April 9, 1934.]

JESUS MA. CUI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TEODORO CUI, Defendant-Appellee. MARIANO

CUI, Intervenor-Appellant.

Jayme & Jayme, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

DeWitt, Perkins & Brady for Intervenor-Appellant.

Manuel C. Briones, Eugeniano O. Perez and Gullas, Lopez & Leuterio, for Defendant-
Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. QUO WARRANTO; ACTION BY A PRIVATE PERSON. — This court held in the cases of
Navarro v. Gimenez (10 Phil., 226), and Lino Luna v. Rodriguez (36 Phil., 401) that a person
entitled to a public office may maintain quo warranto intervention of the Attorney-General, or
the fiscal, and without necessity of first obtaining leave of the court.

2. ID.; ID. — In the case of A. L. Ammen Transportation Co. v. Golingco (43 Phil., 280), this
court held: "If the right which any public utility is exercising pursuant to lawful order of the
Public Utility Commissioner has been invaded by another public utility, it is not essential that
an action be maintained by the Government of the Philippine Islands under section 197 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, but, in appropriate cases, actions may be maintained by the
complainant public utility."cralaw virtua1aw library

3. ID.; ID. — If the right of any person to an office in any corporation created by the authority of
the Government of the Philippine Islands has been invaded or usurped by another, it is not
essential that an action be maintained by that Government under section 197 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, but such action may be maintained under section 201 of that Code by a person
having an interest which is injuriously affected.

4. ID.; ID. — The Government may waive any breaches of any condition, expressed or implied,
on which a corporation was created. If the Government of the Philippine Islands should decide
not to bring this action at the instance of the plaintiff or the intervenor, they would be left
without recourse to the courts. There would be no way by which the Solicitor-General could be
compelled to aid them in vindicating their alleged private or individual rights. This case does
not involve a public question, such as would arise were an attach made upon a franchise of a
corporation, but is a case involving a private right.
 DECISION

GODDARD, J.:

This case presents an interesting question and one of first impression in this jurisdiction. The
question is whether an office in a corporation is a public office within the meaning of section
201 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing that "a person claiming to be entitled to a public
office, unlawfully held and exercised by another, may bring an action therefor," without the
intervention of the Attorney-General or of the fiscal of the province, as required in other quo
warranto proceeding under sections 199 and 200 of the same Code, especially where, as in this
case, the corporation involved was created by a special Act of the Legislature of the Philippine
Islands (Act No. 3239), wherein the succession to the office in question, as well as the duties
attaching thereto, are defined by legislature act.

On November 27, 1925, an Act of the Philippine Legislature (Act No. 3239) was approved,
accepting an offer of one Pedro Cui and one Benigna Cui to establish, maintain, and support in
the Province of Cebu a home for the care and support free of charge of indigent invalids and
incapacitated and helpless persons, to be known as Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. The text of
the Act is an follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. The offer of Pedro Cui and Benigna Cui to establish, maintain, and support in the
Province of Cebu, Philippine Islands, a Home for the care and support, free of charge, of
indigent invalids and incapacitated and helpless persons, to be known as Hospicio de San Jose
de Barili, is hereby accepted. The Home so created shall be maintained with the revenues of the
person and real property with which its founders and other donators shall endow the same, and
upon its organization in the special manner provided for in section eight of this Act, said Home
shall have its legal domicile in the pueblo of Barili, in the province mentioned, shall be a body
corporate for an indefinite period and endowed with the right of succession in its corporate
name and competent to sue and be sued and to acquire and convey personal and real property,
and shall be considered as a real corporation and vested in general with all the powers granted
to and vested in corporations organized in accordance with Act Numbered Fourteen hundred
and fifty-nine, and be subject to the provisions of said Act in so far as the same are not
inconsistent herewith.

"SEC. 2. The Home organized in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the person and
real property owned by it and donated to it by its founders, Pedro Cui and Benigna Cui, and
any other property it may hereafter acquire by donation or any other legal method, shall be
managed by said founders during their lifetime, and, in case of their incapacity or death, by
such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed by them. In case of the
absolute incapacity of the persons designated by the founders of the institution, the
administration of all the personal and real property of the same shall devolve upon the
provincial government of Cebu, which shall manage the Home through the provincial board, in
accordance with this Act, for the original purpose contemplated by its founders.

"SEC. 3. The managers or trustees of the Home shall —

"(a) Organize and appoint the personnel necessary for its administration.

"(b) Fix the salaries, functions, and authority of said personnel.

"(c) Make regulations for the government of said institution.

"(d) Prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated the destitute persons
may be admitted into the institution: Provided, however, That no discriminations on account of
religion shall be made in the admission of such persons.

"(e) Insure all the property of the Home with reputable insurance companies, in such manner as
may best safeguard the existence of the institution, in case such precaution is necessary.
Whenever the income of the Home shall exceed its operating expense, the managers or trustees
shall invest the surplus in the purchase of additional revenue-producing real estate wherewith
the institution may extend its activities on behalf of the helpless and destitute.

"(f) After providing for the purposes of sections six and seven, maintain at all times such
number of places as the income from the property of the Home may permit, and admit all
qualified destitute persons for whom a vacancy exists.

"In the performance of the duties prescribed in this section, the rules and conditions of
admission promulgated shall be valid only in so far as they are not in conflict with the
provisions of this Act and the conditions stipulated by the founders of the institution in the
instruments of donation.

"SEC. 4. The personal and real property donated to the Home by its founders or by other
persons shall not be sold under any consideration: Provided, however, That this prohibition
shall not prevent the managers or trustees of the Home from selling or alienating personal
property belonging to it, which sale or alienation shall be made in the ordinary process of the
operation or business of the Home. In connection with the administration of the Home, the
Public Welfare Commissioner shall have power to audit the accounts and watch over the proper
and adequate investment of the revenues of the property of the Home, and to ascertain whether
the provisions of this Act are being complied with; but this power of supervision shall be
exercised without prejudice to the discretional powers of administration conferred by this Act.

"SEC. 5. All real property of the Home and the revenues thereof shall be exempt from the
payment of the land tax, the income tax, and any other tax now or hereafter established by law.

"SEC. 6. The managers or trustees of the Home may establish and operate a pharmacy for the
preparation and dispensing of the medicines necessary for the use of the Home and the public,
and the Home shall be authorized to charge reasonable prices for medicine sold to the public.
The income from this source shall be paid into the funds of the Home: Provided, That the
pharmacy so established may sell medicine to the public only so only as there shall be no other
privately owned pharmacy in the pueblo of Barili, Province of Cebu.

"SEC. 7. The managers or trustees of the Home shall set aside a part of the income thereof for
the support of a young man or woman graduate of the public high school of the City of Cebu,
selected by the faculty thereof, while studying medicine, and of a young man or woman
graduate of the Colegio de San Carlos, Cebu, selected by the faculty of the latter, while studying
pharmacy. These pensionados shall continue their studies in Manila in the University of the
Philippines, or in such other university as the Government may maintain in lieu thereof.

"The managers of trustees of the Home shall also support a boy or girl graduate of the public
elementary schools of the Province of Cebu, selected by the superintendent of schools of said
province, until the completion of the high school course in the City of Cebu. All such
pensionados shall be natives of Cebu without sufficient means to continue their studies.

"The three scholarships authorized in this section shall be permanent and shall be filled as soon
as any of them becomes vacant by the death or incapacitation of the beneficiary or the
completion of the studies contemplated.

"SEC. 8. As prerequisite for the organization and legal recognition of this Home, the founders
thereof or, in case of their death, their executors, bind themselves to endow the same with
personal and real property of a market value of not less than half a million pesos, the revenues
of which shall be used exclusively for the purposes of the Home mentioned in this Act. The
Public Welfare Commissioner of the Philippine Government is hereby authorized to accept the
donation mentioned in this section on behalf of the Home; and as soon as said donation has
been made and accepted by the Public Welfare Commissioner, the institution hereby
authorized, known as Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, shall be understood to be organized and
have entered upon its legal existence. Upon its legal foundation as provided in this section, all
powers and functions thereof shall be exercised by the managers of trustees, in accordance with
the provisions of this Act.

"SEC. 9. Nothing in this Act provided shall be understood to authorize the institution hereby
created to engage in any business other than that herein authorized, or to exempt it from the
revocation of its rights and privileges in case of the violation by it of the provisions of this Act
or of any other law to which it may be subject.

"SEC. 10. The privileges granted by this Act to the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili shall be
understood to be subject to the provisions concerning the granting of privileges and franchises
of the Act of Congress of the United States of August twenty-ninth, nineteen hundred and
sixteen, commonly known as the Jones Law.

"SEC. 11. This Act shall take effect on its approval."cr

This donation was duly accepted by the Public Welfare Commissioner, as provided in section 8
of Act No. 3239 above quoted, on January 14, 1926 (pages 33-35, B. of E.) , and the donors were
duly notified of such acceptance on the same date (page 32, B. of E.) , and they, in turn, on
January 20, 1926, acknowledged receipt of such notification (pages 36-37, B. of E.) .

On March 1, 1926, the said Pedro Cui executed another deed of donation of additional
properties in favor of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili under the same terms and conditions as
the original donation (pages 39-57, B. of E.) , except that he donor stipulated that the donee was
to pay him a monthly pension of five hundred pesos (P500) to live upon. This donation was
accepted by the donee in the deed itself (pages 57, B. of E.) .

On the same date, Benigna Cui, the other donor, executed another deed of donation of
additional properties in favor of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili upon the same terms and
conditions as those executed by Pedro Cui on that date (pages 62-65, B. of E.) . This donation
was also accepted by the donee in the same instrument (pages 64, 65, B. of E.) .

On January 26, 1932, the plaintiff herein, Jesus Ma. Cui, filed a complaint in quo warranto
against the defendant, Teodoro Cui, setting up three causes of action. In the first of these, after
reciting the foregoing facts, it is alleged that the total value of the property donated by Pedro
and Benigna Cui, according to the three deeds of donation above described, is eight hundred
forty thousand two hundred sixteen pesos and fifteen centavos (P840,216.15); that, as provided
in section 2 of Act No. 3239 above quoted, the donors, Pedro Cui and Benigna Cui, administered
the Hospicio after the latter had acquired corporate existence under the provisions of Act No.
3239, until the death of Pedro Cui on June 4, 1926, whereupon Benigna Cui continued to
administer the same until her death on March 22, 1929; that, thereafter the Hospicio was jointly
administered by Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem until the death of Mauricio Cui on May
8, 1931, and that the administration continued in the hands of Dionisio Jakosalem until his
death on July 1, 1931; that, on the following day, the defendant herein, without any right
whatever, usurped and illegally assumed the administration of said Hospicio and continues to
usurp and illegally assume that administration without any legal justification whatever
therefor; that the deeds of donation provided, that after the death of the donors, the
administration should be in charge either of Mariano Cui (the intervenor) and Dionisio
Jakosalem jointly, and of an individual who shall be the oldest adult male legitimate descendant
of any of the nephews of the donors, who may be a lawyer, a doctor, a civil engineer, or a
pharmacist (said nephews being Mariano Cui, the intervenor, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, and
Victor Cui), or in case there be none of these among said descendants, he who pays the most
taxes, and in case of equality of circumstances, the eldest male descendant from the last
administrator; that the legitimate sons of Mariano Cui are Jose Ma. Cui, forty years of age; Jesus
Ma. Cue, plaintiff herein, twenty-seven years of age; Antonio Ma. Cui, twenty- six years of age;
Serafin Ma. Cui, twenty-one years of age; and Jorge Cui, nineteen years of age; that the
legitimate son of Mauricio Cui is Teodoro Cui, the defendant herein, thirty years of age; that the
legitimate son of Vicente Cui is Angel Cui, thirty-seven years of age; and the sons of Victor Cui
are Mariano V. Cui, twenty-eight years of age, and Ramon Cui, twenty-six years of age; and that
the plaintiff is the only one of the these who is a lawyer, and hence has the preferential right to
the administration of the Hospicio.

In the second cause of action, after repeating by reference the allegations of the first cause of
action, it is alleged that, even assuming, which is emphatically denied, that the defendant is
entitled to the administration, he is inept for the office, because of excessive alcoholism and
because of extravagant practices in employing an excessive number of subordinates in the
administration of the Hospicio and paying them excessive salaries.

In the third cause of action, the plaintiff, after repeating by reference the allegations of the first
cause of action, alleged that the defendant has refused to deliver the administration of the
Hospicio to him, notwithstanding repeated demands therefor.
The prayer of the complaint is for a judgment to the effect that the defendant is without right to
administer the Hospicio; that the plaintiff is vested with that right; that the defendant be ousted
or removed from the office of administrator of said Hospicio so illegally held by him; that the
plaintiff be named administrator of said Hospicio; and for costs and general relief. (Pages 1-10,
B. of E.)

On February 20, 1932, the plaintiff (page 14, B. of E.) was permitted to amend his complaint by
making the deed of donation a part thereof, marked Exhibit X (pages 15-67, B. of E.) .

On February 29, 1932, the defendant interposed a demurrer to the three causes of action of the
complaint (page 67, B. of E.) with supporting argument (pages 68-75, B. of E.) , this being an
amplification of a demurrer filed by him on February 9, 1932 (page 11, B. of E.) . This demurrer
was predicated upon the grounds, first that the plaintiff is without legal capacity to sue, and
second that there is a defect in the party plaintiff.

On June 29, 1932, a petition for intervention with a complaint in intervention attached thereto
was filed by Mariano Cui (pages 75-81, B. of E.) , and on July 2, 1932, the trial court entered an
order, admitting the complaint in intervention (page 82, B. of E.) . In this complaint, the
intervenor, Mariano Cui, alleged that he is the Mariano Cui mentioned in all the pleadings of
the case; that in accordance with Act No. 3239, the corporation called Hospicio de San Jose de
Barili has been organized and is existing; that in accordance with that Act, Pedro Cui and
Benigna Cui donated certain properties to said Hospicio, which were duly accepted, and the
donors advised of such acceptance, said properties constituting the capital of the said Hospicio;
that also in accordance with said Act and with said deeds of donation, the office of
administrator of said Hospicio was to be held by the donors, while either of them live. Upon
their death or incapacity, the administration was to pass either to Mariano Cui or Dionisio
Jakosalem jointly, or to Mauricio Cui, temporarily in substitution of Mariano Cui, if the latter
were absent from Cebu at the time of the death of the donors, and upon the death of Dionisio
Jakosalem and Mauricio Cui, or their incapacity, the administration would pass to one person
who would be that adult male legitimate descendant of Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente
Cui, or Victor Cui, who may be a lawyer, a doctor, a civil engineer, or a pharmacist; that
accordingly the Hospicio was administered by Pedro Cui and Benigna Cui jointly until the
fourth of June, 1926, when Pedro Cui died, by Benigna Cui alone until the 22d of March, 1929,
when she died, by Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem jointly until the 8th of May, 1930, when
Mauricio Cui died, and by Dionisio Jakosalem alone until the first of July, 1931, when he died;
that the only reason why the plaintiff intervenor, Mariano Cui, could not assume his office as
administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose at the time of the death of Benigna Cui, to exercise it
jointly with Dionisio Jakosalem, was because of his temporary absence in Manila, but since
November, 1930, he, Mariano Cui, has returned to Cebu and resides there permanently; that on
the 2d of July, 1931, while Mariano Cui was living in Cebu, the defendant, Teodoro Cui, without
any right, took and assumed for himself alone the office of administrator of the Hospicio,
depriving said Mariano Cui of that office and refusing to deliver it to him, and that until the
time of representing the complaint in intervention, the defendant, Teodoro Cui, continues to
exercise the office of administrator of said Hospicio and to prevent the intervenor from
occupying said office, without just reason; that the real intention of the donors, Pedro Cui and
Benigna Cui, in designating Mauricio Cui as a temporary substitute of the intervenor was
because of the frequent absence of Mariano Cui from Cebu, which would prevent him from
attending personally to his duties as administrator, but it never was their intention to exclude
him permanently from the administration of the Hospicio de San Jose merely because at the
time of their death, he was not in Cebu, but in Manila; and that the plaintiff, notwithstanding
the fact that he is the legitimate son of the intervenor, Mariano Cui, is not entitled to exercise the
office of administrator, for the reason that said Mariano Cui is still living and claims for himself
that office, in accordance with the wishes of Pedro Cui and Benigna Cui, as sanctioned by Act
No. 3239. The prayer of the complaint in intervention is that the intervenor be adjudged entitled
to the office of the administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose and that the defendant be adjudged
not entitled thereto; and for general relief.

On the 26th of July, 1932, the plaintiff answered the demurrer of the defendant (page 82, B. of
E.) , and on the 29th of July, 1932, the defendant interposed a demurrer to the complaint in
intervention, based upon the same grounds as the demurrer of February 29, 1932, to the original
complaint herein (page 97, B. of E.) .

On the 1st of August, 1932, the plaintiff filed his answer to the complaint in intervention,
denying generally and specifically each and every allegation contained in each of the
paragraphs therein, with the exception of those expressly or impliedly admitted in the answer,
as well as those expressly or impliedly set up in the amended complaint.

On the 26th of November, 1932, the intervenor presented a memorandum in opposition to the
demurrer of the defendant to the complaint in intervention (pages 107-121, B. of E.) , to which
the defendant made reply on the 6th of January, 1933 (pages 121-125, B. of E.) .

On the 4th of April, 1933, the trial court entered an order, sustaining the demurrer to the
complaint of the plaintiff and to the complaint in intervention, on the ground that the provincial
fiscal of Cebu is the only person with capacity to institute the actions set up in the complaint
and the complaint in intervention, and, taking the view that the complaint and the complaint in
intervention were not susceptible of amendment, the same were dismissed without any order as
to costs.

This order is based upon the theory that, since the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili is a
corporation authorized by the Government of the Philippine Islands, under the provisions of
section 197 of the Code of Civil Procedure in conjunction with sections 199 and 204 thereof, only
the provincial fiscal may maintain an action for the removal from office of one who is alleged to
retain the same unlawfully (pages 130-132, B. of E.); and on the further ground that the violation
of the order of succession contained in the deed of donation is a violation of the conditions of
the donation and of Act No. 3239, wherefore, under the third of the conditions of the deed of
donation, as well as under Act No. 3239 providing that the donors should regulate the
succession, only the provincial fiscal could maintain the action and that, in so far as the alleged
incapacity of the defendant is concerned or his maladministration, the third condition of the
deed of donation is that, in such cases, the action for the removal of the administrator shall be
instituted by the provincial fiscal.

The plaintiff-appellant assigns seven errors as having been committed by the trial court, but the
only question in issue in this case is tersely summed up in the one assignment of error of the
intervenor-appellant which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The trial court erred in holding that no action may be maintained by the plaintiff or the
intervenor in this case or by any other private person to try title to the office of administrator of
the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, but that such action may only be instituted and maintained
by the provincial fiscal."cralaw virtua1aw library

The plaintiff-appellant contends that the Hospicio de San Jose is a public corporation in view of
the fact that it was not organized under the general Corporation Law, Act No. 1459, but by a
special law, Act No. 3239, and maintains that private corporations are those formed for some
private purpose, benefit, aim, or end, as distinguished from public corporations which have for
their purpose the general good or welfare, and that the Hospicio de San Jose was created for the
general good and welfare. Therefore the administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose is a public
officer. The plaintiff-appellant however contends that even admitting that the Hospicio de San
Jose is not a public corporation, it is in the nature of the quasi-public corporation and that the
office of an administrator of a quasi-public corporation is a public office.

The intervenor-appellant contends that an office in a private corporation is a "public office" and
in support of that contention invites the attention of this court to the adjudication of American
courts in which that view has been sustained.

The defendant-appellee contends that the Hospicio de San Jose is a private corporation, that its
officers are not public officers and cites the decision of this court in the case of National Coal Co.
v. Collector of Internal Revenue (46 Phil., 583), in which it was held that the National Coal Co. is
a private corporation, and that a private individual can not institute a quo warranto proceeding
to try title to an office in a private corporation. Hence, neither the plaintiff nor the intervenor
"can sue under the authority of section 201 of Act No. 190."

In this case it is not necessary to decide whether the Hospicio de San Jose is a public or a private
corporation. The issue in this case can be confined to the contention of the intervenor-appellant,
i.e., whether an office in a private corporation is a public office so that an individual, who
believes himself entitled thereto, may bring an action of quo warranto against another
unlawfully holding it without the intervention of the Attorney-General or the provincial fiscal
under section 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure which as we have seen provides as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 201. An individual may commence such action. — A person claiming to be entitled to a
public office, unlawfully held and exercised by another, may bring an action therefor." The basis
upon which the view of the intervenor-appellant is grounded is "that private corporations,
whether created directly by special Act of the Legislature or indirectly under the authority of a
general corporation law, differ in no essential that affects the public character of the franchise
from corporations created for purely public services, such as municipal corporations and others;
its transactions are interlaced with the whole of the business life as defined and controlled by
law, it can lawfully do only those things and can do them only in the manner prescribed by the
law of its creation and of the state, and whatever may be the purpose of its creation, whether for
private profit or public good, its offices are public in the sense that enables the state, by proper
remedies, to compel obedience and prevent disobedience of its laws."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case of Brooks v. State ex rel. Richards (26 Del., 1; 79 Atl., 790; Ann. Cas., 1915A, 1133; 51
L. R. A. [N. S. ], 1126, 1133, 1134), the court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"This brings us to a consideration of what is a public office. At the time the common-law
remedy by information was employed in England, public offices seem to have been only those
which were a part of the apparatus of government at large, or that of municipalities, cities, and
boroughs. Here, as in England, we have offices of the same public character in our municipal
corporations, created and established by acts of the legislature, in regard to the protection of
which, by the remedy of an information, there can be no question; and we have as well a large
number of corporate offices, created by special and general legislative authority in connection
with grants of corporate franchises. These offices are created so that the design of the grant may
be effectuated and the existence of the corporation perpetuated by the due and regular election
of officers in accord with the rules and laws of their governance. Those who fill the offices are
alike amenable to the law of their origin. With respect to the manner of their creation, there is in
principle no difference between the office of mayor of a municipal corporation and that of
president of a state bank, created alike by special acts of the legislature, nor in principle is there
any difference between the office of director of a bank, created by special act of the legislature,
and the office of a director of manufacturing corporation created under the general provisions
of a law providing for the grant of corporate franchises. If the public character of the latter
offices, when the remedy by information is applied to them, is to be determined by the
character of the public offices that prevailed in England at the time of the adoption of the
remedy, then, indeed, the law is a stationary thing, and acts on precedent rather than upon
principle.

"The public character of a corporation and of its offices, when viewed with respect to the
remedy under consideration, and as distinguished from corporations and offices that are public
in a political sense, is not to be determined by the nature or purpose of its business, but is to be
determined by the character of its origin and the policy of the law. In the case of People ex rel.
Atty. Gen. v. Utica Ins. Co. (15 Johns, 386; 8 Am. Dec., 243), the Supreme Court of the State of
New York, in emphatic language, held: ’That every privilege or immunity of a public nature,
which cannot legally be exercised without legislative grant, is a public franchise.’ Followed in
State v. Asley (1 Ark., 513, 536). The privileges and immunities of a corporation, even in a
business of the most private character, cannot be exercised except by legislative grant. A
corporation is a franchise (Com. Digest, title, Corp. F), and when granted only by legislative
authority or by force of public will, it becomes a public franchise. In our system of government
all franchises repose in the people, and, when parted with, or granted by the people under an
established system of law, which directed the method of their use and provides against their
abuse. Corporations for private gain, whether created directly by act of the legislature, or
indirectly, under the general authority of a corporation law, differ in no essential that affects the
public character of the grant of the franchise, from corporations created for purely public
purposes. Their corporate powers spring alike from the same source, their organization is
directed by the same hand, their regulation and restrain are controlled by the same authority,
and they are answerable alike to the same sovereignty If a corporation is chartered by the state
to engage in what would otherwise be a private business, surely it is not thereby necessarily a
private corporation. Like a corporation for public purposes, it acts only upon license. Its
transactions are interlaced with the whole of business life as defined and controlled by law; it
can do lawfully only those things and can do them only in the manner prescribed by the law of
its charter and of the state; and whatever may be the purpose of its creation, whether for private
profit or public good, its offices are public in the sense that enables the state by proper remedies
to compel obedience and prevent disobedience of its laws.

"We are of opinion that the offices of a corporation created by special act of the legislature, or
under the provisions of the general corporation law of this state, are offices of public character
within the meaning that the remedy by information in the nature of a writ of quo warranto lies
against one who usurps such an office. (Angell, Corp., 476, 478, 480; Com. ex rel. Clements v.
Arrison, 15 Serg. & R., 127; 16 Am. Dec., 531; Atty. Gen. v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns, Ch., 371;
People ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns, 358; 8 Am. Dec., 243; Com. v. Union F. & M.
Ins. Co., 5 Mass., 231; 4 Am. Dec., 50; Gunton v. Ingle, 4 Cranch, C. C., 438; Fed. Cas. No. 5,870;
People ex rel. Israel v. Tibbets, 4 Cow., 388; State ex rel. Dunlap v. Stewart, 6 Houst. [Del. ], 359;
State ex rel. Danforth v. Hunton, 28 Vt., 594; Hullman v. Honcomp, 5 Ohio St., 237; State ex rel.
Kilbourn v. Tudor, 5 Day, 329; 5 Am. Dec., 162; 23 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law [2d ed. ], 640; 32 Cyc.,
1425; Spelling, Extr. Rem., secs. 1831, 1842, 1855.)"

According to Ruling Case Law, in the article on quo warranto, the view in England has been
that public offices are only those which were a part of the machinery of government, and that
offices in a private corporation are not of a public nature. This view has been followed in
Canada, and by a few of the American courts, but in nearly all the states of the latter country, it
is held that an office in a private corporation is a public office.

"In nearly all the states of this country it is held that the remedy by quo warranto or information
in the nature thereof lies against one who usurps on office in a private corporation. The general
principal underlying this conclusion is that corporations chartered by the state or organized
under the general statutes of the state are public franchises, regardless of the character of the
corporation, and that the usurpation of a privilege granted by the state." (22 Ruling Case Law, p.
666.)

Corpus Juris, vol. 51, p. 318, says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Apart from statute, an office in a private corporation, created and chartered by the state, is
deemed to be of a public character, or the public is deemed to have an interest therein, in such a
sense and to such an extent as to render the remedy available against a person who, not being
lawfully entitled to do so, holds the office."cralaw virtua1aw library

Fletcher’s Corporations (Rev. ed., vol. 5, pp. 813, 814), says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is quite well settled at present, however, that offices in a private corporation are sufficiently
public in character to warrant an information in the nature of quo warranto in case of
usurpation thereof, and to oust an incumbent who has no title thereto, . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Also in volume 2 of the same work, pages 128, 129, it is said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"When any corporate office is usurped by one who has no title thereto, . . . quo warranto will lie
to determine the title to the office, and to oust the incumbent from the exercise thereof. And the
proceedings may be instituted either by the person who claims to be entitled to the office, or by
a stockholder."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the case of Dennistoun v. Davis (179 Minn., 373; 229 N. W., 353), the Supreme Court of
Minnesota held as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Action by quo warranto to test the title to office in a private corporation may be brought in the
district court by other officers and stockholders of the corporation without application to, or
action by, the Attorney General."cralaw virtua1aw library

In Hornady v. Goodman (167 Ga., 555; 146 S. E., 173), the court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"If each citizen and taxpayer of any political subdivision of the state has such an interest in the
question of who shall hold public office therein as will authorize the writ of quo warranto to
issue at his instance, to inquire into the right of one holding a public office therein to function as
such, and if, as seen in McCarthy v. McKinney, Hussey v. Gallagher, and Harris v. Pounds,
supra, quo warranto is the remedy to test the title of one holding an office in a private
corporation, whether such corporation be one organized for gain to its stockholders, or for
benevolent, charitable, or religious purposes, then certainly the members of a civic and social
club have a similar right to have judicial inquiry made to determine the question of whether one
is legally assuming and exercising the function devolving upon the executive head of a civic
and social organization, whose members are socially upon a level, that owns exceedingly
valuable property, and receives large revenue from the use of certain of its property by
others."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the case of State ex rel. N. W. Colonization and Improv. Co. v. Huller (23 N. M., 306; 168 Pac.,
528; 1 A. L. R., 170), the court, distinguishing between quo warranto proceedings to dissolve a
corporation, or to try the right to a government office, and those to test the title to an office in a
private corporation, declared the doctrine to be that in the first case only the Attorney-General
may institute the proceedings while in the second case of private individual who has an interest
in the office may himself institute the proceedings, without the Attorney-General’s intervention;
the reason for this doctrine being that in the former case the interest is essentially with private
rights and private grievances. The court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"This brings us to the next phase of appellant’s objection, as to the right of relator to be heard.
This objection, as stated under point 2 in appellant’s brief, is that ’informations in the nature of
quo warranto, brought against individuals to inquire by what right they use and exercise the
liberties, privileges, and franchises of a corporation, must be brought by and in behalf of the
state, and filed and prosecuted by the attorney-general of the state.’

"In support of this contention appellants cite numerous authorities. The most succinct statement
of the entire question, however, we believe, is given in Bailey on Habeas Corpus, at sec. 343,
from which we quote as follows: ’At common law, private individuals, without the intervention
of the attorney general, cannot, either as of right or by leave of court, file an information in the
nature of a quo warranto. The abuse of a public franchise under color of a legislative grant is a
public wrong, as distinguished from a private grievance; hence, the remedy by quo warranto
must proceed from the attorney general, or some authorized agent of the sovereign power, to
dissolve it. In cases involving merely administration of corporate functions or duties which
touch practically only individual right, such as the election of officers, admission of a corporate
officer or member, and the like, the writ may issue at the suit of the attorney general, or of any
person desiring to prosecute the same, where such method has the sanction of statutory
permission; and where not, and such private person has an interest which is injuriously
affected, of such a character as will satisfy the proceedings, he may, upon leave of the court, in
the name of the state or attorney-general, prosecute such proceedings.’

"It is our opinion that the appellants have fallen into error in an assumption that the sole
question under consideration in the present case in one affecting public interest, such as might
be said to arise from the abuse of a public franchise, referred to by Mr. Bailey. We have already
pointed out in this opinion that, where the object of a suit is to dissolve a corporation or seize its
franchises, the action can only be prosecuted in the name of the state. This principle is well
stated by Mr. High, in his work on Extraordinary Legal Remedies, in the following language
(sec. 624): ’Since, under the American system, all power emanates from the people, who
constitute the sovereignty, the right to inquire into the authority by which any person assumes
to exercise the functions of a public office or franchise is regarded as inherent in the people in
the right of their sovereignty.’

"This case does not involve a public question, such as would arise were an attack made upon
the franchise of the corporation, but is a case involving a private right, and one such as referred
to by Mr. Bailey, when he speaks of a case involving merely the administration of corporate
functions or duties, which touch practically only individual rights, such as election of officers,
admission of a corporate officer or member, and the like; in which cases this author recognizes
the right of a private person, having an interest which is injuriously affected, to maintain
proceedings in the nature of quo warranto, upon leave of court, in the name of the state or
attorney general. (See also High, Extra. Leg. Rem., sec. 654.) Mr. Bailey supports his text by the
citation of the following authorities; Murphy v. Farmers’ Bank (20 Pa., 415); People ex rel. Jones
v. North Chicago R. Co. (88 Ill., 537); Kenney v. Consumers’ Gas Co., 142 Mass. (417; 8 N. E.,
138); State v. Paterson & H. Turnp. Co. (21 N. J. L., 9).

"Upon examination of the Pennsylvania case referred to, a first impression would seem to
warrant the conclusion that the case was no authority, because the opinion of the court is an
interpretation of a legislative act of 1836, conferring the right to maintain the action on ’any
person or person desiring to prosecute the same.’ A more careful examination of the case,
however, discloses that the same words appear in the Statute of Anne, and were evidently taken
from that statute. So that we may reasonably assume that the conclusion of the court would
have been the same had the Statute of Anne been alone under consideration. This case is so
instructive as pointing out the distinction between the use of the remedy of quo warranto in
cases involving public right only and in cases involving individual grievances, that we take the
liberty of quoting somewhat extensively therefrom. The court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Statute of Anne was enacted in 1710, and gave jurisdiction in quo warranto to the Queen’s
Bench. In 1722 our Supreme Court was authorized to issue habeas corpus, certiorari, writs of
error, and all remedial writs, and were clothed with the same jurisdiction and powers as the
justices of the court of king’s Bench, common pleas, and exchequer, at Westminster. This was a
sufficient warrant for this court to adopt in practice a rule prescribed in the Statute of Anne, and
justifies the remark of Judge Gibson in Burrell’s Case, 7 Pa., 34, that the substance of that statute
had been adopted before our Revolution, as part of our common law.

"‘These words have been the subject of judicial decisions, and the authorities show that they do
not give a private relator the writ of quo warranto in a case of public prerogative involving no
individual grievance. On this point the authorities are full, direct, and harmonious. The
usurpation of an office, established by the Constitution, under color of an executive
appointment, and the abuse of a public franchise under color of a legislative grant, are public
wrongs and not private injuries, and the remedy by quo warranto, in this court at least, must be
on the suggestion of the attorney general, or some authorized agent of the commonwealth.

"‘For the authorities, I refer myself to those cited in the argument of the respondent’s counsel.
They establish this as the uniform construction. In questions involving . . . merely the
administration of corporate functions, or duties which touch only individual rights, such as the
election of officers, admission of a corporate officer or member, and the like, the writ may issue
at the suit of the attorney general, or of any person or persons desiring to prosecute the same.’

"The Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of the People ex rel. Jones v. North Chicago R. Co., 88
Ill., 537, in a well-considered opinion, clearly pointed out the difference between an offense
against the public, where the state alone may punish or waive its right to do so, and cases
affecting private or individual rights, such as "those which merely affect the administration of
corporate functions without affecting the existence of the corporation.’ In the latter case it was
held that the courts may interpose on a proper showing.

"We therefore conclude that information in the nature of quo warranto, brought against
individuals to inquire by what right they use or exercise the liberties, franchises, and privileges
of a corporation, may be brought on behalf of the state, on the relation of any person or persons
having an interest injuriously affected."cralaw virtua1aw library

The following statement appears in a note appended to this case:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The reader may be interested to know that it is settled law that the right of a person assuming
to act as an officer or director of a private corporation may be tested upon the relation of any
one having a direct interest in the affairs of the corporation (Com. v. Union F. & M. Ins. Co.
[1809], 5 Mass., 230; 4 Am. Dec., 50) such as another director (Place v. People [1899], 83 Ill. App.,
84), or a stockholder (People ex rel. Matthiessen v. Lihme [1915], 193 Ill. App., 341, affirmed in
[1915], 269 Ill. App. 351; 109 N. E., 1051; Ann. Cas., 1916E, 959; Com. ex rel. Morris v. Stevens
[1895], 168 Pa., 582; 32 Atl., 111; Com. ex. rel. Lauffer v. Stevenson [1901], 200 Pa., 509; 50 Atl.,
91; State ex rel. Mitchell v. Horan [1900], 22 Wash., 197; 60 Pac., 135)."cralaw virtua1aw library

One of the cases cited in the above quoted note is that of Commonwealth v. Union Insurance
Co. (5 Mass., 230; 4 Am. Dec., 50). In that case a motion was filed on behalf of seventeen persons
alleging themselves to be members of the corporation, for an order directed to the defendants,
to show cause why an information in the nature of a quo warranto should not be filed against
them, dissolving the company, and adjudging void their corporate powers. The court
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Informations of this nature are properly grantable for the purpose of inquiring into the election
or admission of an officer or member of a corporation, when moved for by any person
interested in, or injured by, such election or admission, if the same was unduly made. . . .

"But an information for the purpose of dissolving the corporation, or of seizing its franchises,
cannot be prosecuted by the authority of the commonwealth, to be exercised by the legislature,
or by the attorney or solicitor general acting under its direction or ex officio in its behalf. For the
commonwealth may waive any breaches of any condition, expressed or implied, on which the
corporation was created, and we cannot give judgment for the seizure by the commonwealth of
the franchises of any corporation, unless the commonwealth be a party in interest to the suit,
and thus assenting to the judgment. This distinction between informations in the nature of a
quo warranto, to impeach any election or admission of a corporate officer or member, and
informations to dissolve a corporation is well settled, and upon sound principles of law: Rex v.
Corporation of Carmarthan, 2 Burr., 869."cralaw virtua1aw library

All of the above authorities hold that quo warranto lies against one who usurps an office in a
private corporation upon the ground that such an office is of a public character in such a sense
and to such an extent as to render this remedy available against a person who, not being
lawfully entitled to do so, holds an office in a private corporation. In the cases cited, which
consider the question as to who has a right to maintain quo warranto proceedings, it appears
that the right of a person assuming to act as an officer of a private corporation may be tested
upon the relation of anyone having a direct interest in the affairs of the corporation. Some of
these authorities hold, independently of statutory provisions, that a private person has a right
to test the title to an office in a private corporation by quo warranto proceedings.

It follows that the office of administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose is, at least, an office public
in character and that quo warranto will lie against one who usurps that office.

The defendant-appellee insists that section 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure refers only to
government offices and that section 197 of that Code is the "only one remaining section that
permits the filing of quo warranto action to try title to an office."cralaw virtua1aw library

The appellee also insists that, according to paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, the provincial
fiscal is the only person authorized to bring this action.

This paragraph establishes the procedure to be followed for the ousting of an administrator for
the reasons specified therein.

It provides for the approval of an administrator, who, as such, fails to comply with his
obligations; who, while acting in his official capacity, violates any of the provisions of Act No.
3239, such as discriminating in the admission of persons on account of religion; failing to insure
all of the property of the Home; admitting persons who are not destitute; selling real property
donated to the Home and failing to apply the income as provided in the law. This section also
provides for the removal of an administrator who becomes insane; who is inept or lacks the
aptitude or capacity to carry on the work assigned to him in Act No. 3239 and in the deed of
donation. In such cases the provincial fiscal of Cebu is the person authorized to bring an action
for the removal of the administrator under section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The procedure prescribed in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation is not available against one
who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds, the office of administrator of the Hospicio de
San Jose.

In this case there is a genuine controversy as to who has a right to the office of administrator of
the Hospicio de San Jose. The plaintiff, the intervenor and the defendant claim the right to that
office under paragraph 2 of the deed of donation. They all allege their reasons for making this
claim. The defendant is the actual administrator. If he has invaded or usurped the right of either
the plaintiff or the intervenor, as alleged, there should be a way by which they can bring their
grievance to the courts and have their rights, if they have any, restored to them. If there was no
provision in our statute books with respect to quo warranto proceedings, would a person
deprived of his right to an office in a private corporation, by force or fraud, have no recourse to
the courts for the enforcement of his right, because there was no law prescribing a procedure for
such action? The mere statement of the question gives the answer to it; for the right of every
citizen to his day in court inheres in him and exists independently of constitutional provisions.
As said in 12 C. J., 1287:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Among the most highly prized and hardly won of the rights conferred by Magna Charta were
those guaranteed by the brief but expressive clause: ’We will sell to no man, we will not deny to
any man either justice or right.’ In a large number of state constitutions provisions of like
import have been inserted to the effect that the courts shall be open to every person; that each
individual shall have a prompt and certain remedy by due course of law for injuries which he
may receive in his person, property, or reputation; that he shall obtain such remedy freely
without being obliged to purchase it; and that justice shall be administered impartially and
without prejudice. . . .

"These constitutional guarantees do not create any new right but are merely declarations of
fundamental principles. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is the duty of courts to so construe statutes as to do no one injustice and so as to avoid absurd
results. This court said In re Allen (2 Phil., 630, 643):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . it is the duty of courts in interpreting statutes to so construe them, if possible, as to do no

one injustice."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the case of Heydenfeldt v. Daney Gold and Silver Mining Company (93 U. S., 634-638) it was
said: "If a literal interpretation of any part of it (statute) would operate unjustly, or lead to
absurd results, or be contrary to the evident meaning of the Act taken as a whole, it should be
rejected."cralaw virtua1aw library

Should the phrase "public office" in section 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure be interpreted so
as to deny to an individual his inherent right to seek redress for his grievances in the courts of
the land? This court cannot lend itself to the accomplishment of such a result, particularly
where the only means thereto is by a resort to a technicality that is, at best, of doubtful
application, and is certainly not conducive to public interest or welfare. It must be borne in
mind that "it is principle in the construction of statutes that the legislature does not intend . . . to
interfere with the liberty or rights of the citizen . . . by doubtful language." (Sutherland’s
Statutory Construction, vol. 2, p. 502.)

Section 197 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not exclude an action by an individual and at
the most it is permissive in character.

"SEC. 197. Usurpation of an office or franchise. — A civil action may be brought in the name of
the Government of the Philippine Islands:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. Against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public civil
office or a franchise within the Philippine Islands, or an office in a corporation created by the
authority of the Government of the Philippine Islands;"

The government may waive any breaches of any condition, expressed or implied, on which a
corporation was created. If the Government of the Philippine Islands should decide not to bring
this action at the instance of the plaintiff or the intervenor, they would be left without recourse
to the courts. There would be no way by which the Solicitor-General could be compelled to aid
them in vindicating their alleged private or individual rights. This case does not involve a
public question, such as would arise were an attack made upon the franchise of a corporation,
but is a case involving a private right, and one such as referred to by Mr. Bailey, supra, when he
speaks of a case involving merely the administration of corporate functions or duties, which
touch practically only individual rights; in which cases that author recognizes the right of a
private person, having an interest which is injuriously affected, to maintain proceedings in the
nature of quo warranto.

This court held in the cases of Navarro v. Jimenez (10 Phil., 226), and Lino Luna v. Rodriguez
(36 Phil., 401), that a person entitled to a public office may maintain quo warranto without
intervention of the Attorney-General, or the fiscal, and without necessity of first obtaining leave
of the court.

In the case of A. L. Ammen Transportation Co. v. Golingco (43 Phil., 280), this court held: "If the
right which any public utility is exercising pursuant to lawful order of the Public Utility
Commissioner has been invaded by another public utility, it is not essential that an action be
maintained by the Government of the Philippine Islands under section 197 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, but, in appropriate cases, actions may be maintained by the complainant public
utility."cralaw virtua1aw library

Paraphrasing the above we hold that if the right of any person to an office in any corporation
created by the authority of the Government of the Philippine Islands has been invaded or
usurped by another, it is not essential that an action be maintained by that Government under
section 197 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but such action may be maintained under section 201
of that Code by a person having an interest which is injuriously affected.

The order of the lower court of April 4, 1933, sustaining the demurrer of the defendant-appellee
to the first and third causes of action of the complaint of the plaintiff-appellant is reversed. The
order is affirmed in so far as it applies to the second cause of action of that complaint. The
procedure provided in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation is applicable to the facts alleged in
that cause of action. The order sustaining the demurrer of the defendant-appellee to the
complaint in intervention filed by the intervenor-appellant is reversed and this case is
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance the court of origin for
further proceedings in accordance with law and this decision, without costs. So ordered.
 THIRD DIVISION

[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]

SOPHIA ALAWI, Complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a
District Court, Marawi City, Respondent.

DECISION

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B.
Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M.
Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi
City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm
(hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He
wrote:

" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate
the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as represented by your
Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan
de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said
contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and
unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and
interests."

He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the
"grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa
& Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically
state on record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to resort to any legal
action before said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was
actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post,
bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the description of the addressee, the
words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-
President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with
Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which
was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he
said:

" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and
voided, the 'manipulated contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner
Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and
fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab
initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation,
fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds
between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the
anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April
15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the
cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account
thereof.a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal
Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop
deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous
manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming
sales agent."b

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to
stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with
Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his)
payments."c

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with
this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy of the
letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage PD
26."1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may
properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc."
without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth,"
denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had
been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed
from the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with
established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk
of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan,
Assistant Division Clerk of Court.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"3 in which he questioned the authority of Atty.
Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a
mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the
District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the
Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He
also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not
only "the Executive Clerk of court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but
also "a scion of a Royal Family **."4

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even
obsequious tones,5 Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order
that he might comment thereon.6 He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good
faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co.
had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing
monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it
was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings
and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been
deducted from his salary.7 He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in
communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied
any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a
subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage
PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by
the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent
himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J);8 and as far as he knew, his subordinate
mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were
indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of
an honest mistake.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous"
with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he
prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or
the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does
not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured."10 He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a
classmate and friend.11 He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she
would show the completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided
him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property --
subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated;12 He
says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it
the next day, she did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with
his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as
those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary
deduction, none of which he ever saw.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless
allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her
complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan
(dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15,
1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he
does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and
libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident
bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established
reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to **
(his) rights and interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit,
fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and against ** (his)
will," and "concealed the real facts **."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense
of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who
had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial
suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his
salary.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA
6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service.16 Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and
employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary to
law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest."17 More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every
official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding
judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum
so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary."18

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public
policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed -- however
sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate. insulting or
virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia
Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or
vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."19 Righteous indignation, or vindication
of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member
of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more
stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use
language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.20 As a
judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at
all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint,
courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated,
but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare
that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence
may only practice law before Shari'a courts.21 While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a
Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing;
and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his
region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to
local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the
title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record
contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of

excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial
officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other
impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent
Office, respondent.

Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction
against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.

On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for
June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as
patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law
and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular,
members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and
technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore,
respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.

It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed
the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines
and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office,
and that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine
Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition
precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such as representing applicants in
the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is
in violation of the law.

In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the
prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes
the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter
of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also
engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the
prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not
prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or
qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which, as
stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical
knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the
respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of
the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the
United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by
respondent. . . .

Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America
authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who
practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so
by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.

Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been
holding tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to
practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the
Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned
formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful thought and consideration.

The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing
may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or
administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not
appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent
applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They
require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs,
and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
 question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves advice
and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public
that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices
(Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. )
179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).

In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their
applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent
cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use
and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to
be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but
practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and
legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of
evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention
shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare.
Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was known or
used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor named in any
printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year before the
application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for
more than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the
right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns.
Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the
grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation,
under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent.
Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide
for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in
case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of
three years from the day the patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as,
if the patented invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the
demand for the patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for
the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable
terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by
reason of the condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the patented article or
working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new trade or
industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine
or is necessary to public health or public safety. All these things involve the applications of
laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and
experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.

In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and
decisions of the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation
of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:
 . . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a
proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any
other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or
decision of the director.

In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent
Office and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly
technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not
to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which
is not the case.

Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts
of the Head of the Patent Office.

. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and

extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the
duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the
legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).

. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the
granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is
new and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or
refusing a patent is a judicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner
should decide not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has
been a prior public use or sale of the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis
supplied).

The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable

to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be
allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification.
Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that
members of the bar practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in
the preparation of papers and documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an
invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application
for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and
technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.

But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons
desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are
already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is
patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent
Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and
scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions of said Rules of Practice:

Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of an attorneys and a register agents are
kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as
entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and
 prosecution of applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the
provisions of these rules shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the
Patent Office.

(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before
any United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States
who fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be
admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register
of attorneys.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and register
unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form
supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and
shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character
and of good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications
necessary to enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is
otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of
their application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may
determine whether a person seeking to have his name placed upon either of the registers
has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute,
and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must be submitted and
an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of
an examination may be waived in the case of any person who has served for three years
in the examining corps of the Patent Office.

Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent
Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as
follows:

The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may
prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other
persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such
persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or
other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute,
are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other
persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or other
persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before the
Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing,
suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further practice
before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable,
or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and
regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or
threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or
prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective business before
the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any such
 suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be
reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused recognition or so suspended by the
district court of the United States for the District of Columbia under such conditions and
upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis
supplied)

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the
provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations
requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an
examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:

SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law,
for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the
United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the
qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law
authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the
necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist
their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form of a test or examination to be
held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our
attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority
to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.

Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe
forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the
harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect
the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act
1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the
Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the Department Head, makes all
rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the
Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall
promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of
the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the
Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to
govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law
giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination
prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would
be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where
the business in the same area are more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of
accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties,
seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any
lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients,
shall first pass an examination to qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by
this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the
Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation
and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as
well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the
Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and
decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is
hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or
tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office.
No costs.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.]

RENATO L. CAYETANO, Petitioner, v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R.

SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE in
his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, Respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions While ostensibly only legal
issues are involved, the Court’s decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect
on the political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-C:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners

who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for
any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution
which similarly provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for al least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law

as a legal qualification to an appointive office.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Black defines "practice of law" as:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be
an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting
fees for services rendered by his associate." (Black’s Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.).

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice
of law when he:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies
and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining
or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177)
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice,
as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jr. p.
262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside
of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity
for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part
of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public
that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
Vol. 3 [1953 ed.], p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in
Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new
lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as
advocacy, counseling and public service.

"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If
what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the
active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such
as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute." (Barr D. Cardell, 155
NW 312).

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree
of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23).

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do
during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section 1 is that ‘They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar’ — I am quoting from the provision — ‘who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.’"

"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are
now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification
that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or
involve actual practice of law outside the COA. We have to interpret this to mean that as long as
the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in
their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

"This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and
we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available
whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar
engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?"

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the
provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore,
the answer is yes.

"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of
law.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. OPLE. Thank you."cralaw virtua1aw library

. . . (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman
and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public
accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with
the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a
fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law
Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services."
(Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are
called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some
firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In
either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are
younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologies, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of
law is defined as "the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be
the practice of law. (State Bar Ass’n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d
863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A. 2d 623, 626 [1941]).
Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental
realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable. (Wolfram, op. cit.)

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar
role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little
time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case.
(Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer’s role
colors much of both the public image and the self-perception of the legal profession.
(Ibid.).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality.
(Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander Sycip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated
on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still
uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the
courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know
that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices
than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation
work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is]
loosely describe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been
described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be]
stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be
effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions,
clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized
practice will usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even
within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role
such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an
administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively
rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the
work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client
counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find
that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source
of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in
very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features
of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers’ work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in
which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of
these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends
in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in

corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members
participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the
major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate

understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need
for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and
contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing
of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in
situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting
the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized
and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education.
Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the
law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional contexts and
the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a
master’s or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal
policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical
techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex
decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services
of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every
necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de

campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of
the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is
that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large
corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house
counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most
legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research,
tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both
courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission),
and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy
and becoming involved in management. (Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one’s work actually fits into the work of the organization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate
lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the
business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer’s services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational

corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in
a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is
perceived by many as glamorous, this is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases,
however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25, 1990,
p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the
lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to
spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is
one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No
longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to
the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining
modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skills applicable to a corporate
counsel’s management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management
of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking
them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme
for the corporate counsel’s total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel’s role. For that matter,
the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic
repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think
about a corporation’s strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being
reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-
national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but
with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer’s participation in decision-making within the corporation is
rapidly changing. The modern corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stockholder — in
some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop
alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. (Emphasis supplied).

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that
differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe,
Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and
business Japan’s MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a
distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of
both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment, coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of
team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability
and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new
managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to
simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the systems dynamics principles more
accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied).

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and
uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value
of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing
a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by
parties and mediators in all kinds of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide
coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the
point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of
the general counsel’s responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights
for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and
made.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities
of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation’s
evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate
the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel’s Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm’s strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by
decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make
one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system
shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer’s aim is not the understand all of
the law’s effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution" or make-up of the modern corporation. "Business Star, The Corporate Counsel,"
April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jar. 11, 1989, p.
4).chanrobles law library : red

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position
of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod
does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as

Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations
of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees
as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo).

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970),
Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which
involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines
in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment
bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod’s work involved
being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings
before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former
Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen’s Conference for Human Development, has worked
with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating,
lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban
land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission,
Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions
with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately
constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top
officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the
finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the
contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating
Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the
Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country’s Constitution; it lays down the law as far
as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower’s
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13)

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside
from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries’ sovereignty. (Condensed
from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations,"
submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the
Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center
on August 26-31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied).

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely re negotiation policies,
demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in re
negotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist
or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract
agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted
and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of
adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External
Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). (Emphasis
supplied).

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both
parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a complete debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in
the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements — an adherence to the rule of
law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: ‘They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are,
men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery.’ (See
Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended
by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court
said:chanrobles.com : virtual law library

"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in

which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be
faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred.
This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide." (Emphasis supplied).

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment
in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It
also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be
an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law." (Emphasis
supplied).

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages:
(1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a
commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance
e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949;
Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article
C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without re appointment. Of those
first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years,
and the last Members for three years, without re appointment. Appointment to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity."cralaw virtua1aw library

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla’s separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the
modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended
by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla’s definition would
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practiced two or three times a week and
would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far
from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written
opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the
definition says that law practice." . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True
I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the
definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod
is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practicing law for over ten years.
This is different from the acts of persons practicing law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly
doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even
assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the
incumbent President?

We now proceed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required
by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged
power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only
where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
Commission’s judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s
corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been
clearly shown.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Additionally, consider the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme
Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer
is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed?
The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to
confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still
reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson’s beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

"No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins."cralaw virtua1aw library

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod
burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson’s eyes. This blinded the
man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with
anger, and fuming with righteous fury, Accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The
procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?"
The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement
 FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. NO. 5738 : February 19, 2008]

WILFREDO M. CATU, Complainant, v. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot1 and the building erected thereon located
at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio
Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu2 and Antonio Pastor3 of one of the
units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a
complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of
the 5th District of Manila4 where the parties reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation

meetings.5 When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a
certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as
counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant
administrative complaint,6 claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a
lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that
he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear
complaints referred to the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of
Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task
with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties,
however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the
ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request.
He handled her case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent
the commission of a patent injustice against her.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After
evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline
respondent.7

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the
conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and
Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed
against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings
including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By
so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section

7(b)(2) of RA 6713:8

SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official ands employee and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during
their incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx
(emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)

For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice
of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely.9 This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.10

We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former Government
Lawyers

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government
service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened while in said service."
In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from
accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had
intervened while in said service."
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of.
Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.

Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice of Profession of
Elective Local Government Officials

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency,
from engaging in the private practice of their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution
or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions." This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.

For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 716012 governs:

SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their
functions as local chief executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of
the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any
office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or
local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; andcralawlibrary

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interest of the Government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on
occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary
compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local
officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective
local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on
engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus
derogat generalibus.13

Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the
following: the governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for
provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang
panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of
the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of
the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.

Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited
from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their
functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time service.
They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official
duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang

panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike
governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions
only at least once a week.14 Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their
professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no
longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or
office for any of these purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial
board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to
practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on
the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius.15 Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are
allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to
serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice
a month.16

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession.
However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his
Department, as required by civil service regulations.

A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To Practice Law Must Secure Prior
Authority From The Head Of His Department

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at
the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written
permission of the head of the department concerned.17 Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation,
or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That
this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided,
further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so
devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair
in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real
or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him
in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or
become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of
the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for
Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service
Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of
the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and
promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as
the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission,
respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service
rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
(emphasis supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of
the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and
disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar.18 Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.19

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation
of the lawyer's oath20 and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional

misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any
repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the
records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall
furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance.
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 5582, January 24, 2017

ARTHUR O. MONARES, Complainant, v. ATTY. LEVI P. MUÑOZ, Respondent.

A.C. No. 5604, January 24, 2017

ALBAY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., Complainant, v. ATTY. LEVI P.

MUÑOZ, Respondent.

A.C. No. 5652, January 24, 2017

BENJILIEH M. CONSTANTE,1, Complainant, v. ATTY. LEVI P. MUÑOZ, Respondent.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J:

For resolution is the Joint Petition for Review with Prayer for Absolution and/or
Clemency2 (Joint Petition) dated May 14, 2009 filed by respondent Atty. Levi P. Muñoz (Muñoz)
, in connection with the complaints for disbarment filed by by Arthur O. Monares (Monares),
Atty. Oliver 0. Olaybal (Olaybal) purportedly representing Albay Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(ALECO), and Benjilieh M. Constante (Constante), dated January 17, 2002, February 4, 2002 and
March 21, 2002, respectively.

Monares is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 9923 filed against Ludolfo Muñoz (Ludolfo) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City. In his complaint, Monares alleged that Muñoz
represented his brother Ludolfo in the said case during regular government hours while
employed as Provincial Legal Officer of Albay City.3

Under the chairmanship of Olaybal, ALECO's old board of directors (BOD) engaged Muñoz as
retained counsel sometime in June 1998. Olaybal averred that Muñoz did not inform ALECO's
old BOD that he was employed as Provincial Legal Officer at such time. Olaybal raised that
after its administrator, the National Electrification Administration (NEA), deactivated the old
BOD on the ground of mismanagement, Muñoz served as retained counsel of the NEA-
appointed team which took over the management of ALECO. Moreover, Olaybal alleged that
Muñoz illegally collected payments in the form of notarial and professional fees in excess of
what was agreed upon in their retainer agreement.4

Constante is the Executive Assistant for Legal Affairs of Sunwest Construction and
Development Corporation (Sunwest). Constante claimed that Muñoz filed ten (10) cases against
Sunwest on Ludolfo's behalf before the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) while he was
serving as Provincial Legal Officer.5
All three (3) complaints prayed that Muñoz be disbarred for unlawfully engaging in private
practice. In addition, Olaybal sought Muñoz's disbarment for acts of disloyalty, particularly, for
violating the rule against conflict of interest.6

To support their position, the complainants raised that Muñoz had been previously disciplined
by the Ombudsman for two (2) counts of unauthorized practice of profession in OMB-ADM-
101-0462, and was meted the penalty of removal and dismissal from service. The complainants
further manifested that Muñoz had been convicted by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of Legazpi City in Criminal Case Nos. 25568 and 25569 for violation of Section 7(b)(2)
in relation to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6713.7 Muñoz's conviction has since become final
pursuant to the Court's Resolution dated June 14, 2004 in G.R. No. 160668.8

In his respective comments to the complaints,9 Muñoz claimed that he had requested Governor
Al Francis C. Bichara (Governor Bichara) for authority to continue his private practice shortly
after his appointment. This request was granted on July 18, 199510 Thereafter, Muñoz submitted
the same request to Rafael C. Alunan III, then Secretary of the Department of the Interior and
Local Government (DILG).11 On September 8, 1995, Acting Secretary Alexander P. Aguirre
granted Muñoz's request, under the following conditions:

1. That no government time, personnel, funds or supplies shall be utilized in

connection (sic) and that no conflict of interest with your present position as Provincial
Legal Officer shall arise thereby;chanrobleslaw

2. That the time so devoted outside of office hours, the place(s) and under what
circumstances you can engage in private employment shall be fixed by the Governor of
Albay to the end that it will not impair in any way your efficiency; and

3. That any violation of the above restrictions will be a ground for the cancellation and/or
revocation of this authority.12 (Emphasis supplied)

Pursuant to the DILG's authorization, Governor Bichara imposed the following conditions upon
Muñoz:

a. [Y]ou cannot handle cases against the Province of Albay;chanrobleslaw

b. [Y]ou will be on call and you will have no fix (sic) working hours provided that the
efficiency of the Provincial Legal Office shall not be prejudiced;chanrobleslaw

c. [Y]ou are exempted in (sic) accomplishing your Daily Time Record considering the
limitation already mentioned above; [and]

d. In addition to the above enumeration[,] you are to perform functions subject to

limitations in Sec. 481 of RA 7160.13

Muñoz emphasized that his authority to engage in private practice was renewed by Governor
Bichara on July 3, 1998 for his second term ending in July 2001, and again on July 5, 2001 for his
third term ending in July 2004.14
The complaints were separately referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.15 The complaints were then consolidated
through the Order dated January 16, 2003 issued by Commissioner Milagros V. San
Juan.16 Subsequently, the complaints underwent a series of re-assignments, until finally
assigned to Commissioner Dorotea B. Aguila.17

In his Report dated March 11, 200518 (IBP Report), Commissioner Aguila recommended that
Muñoz be found guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01, 6.02, 15.01 and 15.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). The penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for an aggregate period of four (4) years19 was recommended. On automatic review, the IBP
Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) approved and adopted Commissioner Aguila's recommendation
in a Resolution dated October 22, 2005.20

On December 22, 2005, Muñoz filed an Ex-Parte Appeal for Mercy, Clemency and Compassion
before the IBP-BOG, praying that the recommended penalty be reduced to one (1) year.21 This
appeal was denied on January 28, 2006.22

Muñoz filed before this Court an Ex-Parte Appeal for Mercy, Clemency, Forgiveness and
Compassion23 (Appeal) dated April 8, 2006 praying for the reduction of the recommended
penalty of suspension for four (4) years to one (1) year or less, and the dismissal of the
complaints for disbarment filed against him. As an alternative prayer, Muñoz requested that he
be granted special limited authority to practice law until all his pending cases are terminated.24

In his Appeal, Muñoz, insisted that when he served as Provincial Legal Officer from June 1995
to May 2002, he engaged in private practice pursuant to the three (3) written authorities issued
by Governor Bichara, and the written authority of the DILG issued during his first term, which
he claims had never been revoked. Muñoz also argued that no conflict of interest existed
between ALECO's old BOD and the NEA management team, since he was engaged as retained
counsel of ALECO as an institution, not its management teams.25

On August 28, 2006, the Court resolved to remand Muñoz's Appeal to the IBP for disposition.26

Acting on Muñoz's Appeal, the IBP-BOG issued a Resolution reducing the recommended
period of suspension from four (4) to three (3) years.27 Unsatisfied, Muñoz filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which the IBP-BOG denied on December 11, 2008.28

Aggrieved, Muñoz elevated his case anew to this Court through this Joint Petition. In fine,
Muñoz reiterates the allegations in his Appeal, with the additional assertion that the fees he
collected from ALECO were contemplated under their retainer agreement.29

The Court agrees with the IBP-BOG's findings and recommendations.

Muñoz violated the conditions of his

DILG authorization.

Munoz's DILG authorization prohibited him from utilizing government time for his private
practice. As correctly observed by Commissioner Aguila, Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws
(Omnibus Rules), requires government officers and employees of all departments and agencies,
except those covered by special laws, to render not less than eight (8) hours of work a day for
five (5) days a week, or a total of forty (40) hours a week.30 The number of required weekly
working hours may not be reduced, even in cases where the department or agency adopts a
flexible work schedule.31

Notably, Muñoz did not deny Monares' allegation that he made at least eighty-six (86) court
appearances in connection with at least thirty (30) cases from April 11, 1996 to August 1,
2001.32 He merely alleged that his private practice did not prejudice the functions of his office.

Court appearances are necessarily made within regular government working hours, from 8:00
in the morning to 12:00 noon, and 1:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon.33 Additional time is likewise
required to study each case, draft pleadings and prepare for trial. The sheer volume of cases
handled by Muñoz clearly indicates that government time was necessarily utilized in pursuit of
his private practice, in clear violation of the DILG authorization and Rule 6.0234 of the CPR.

Muñoz should have requested for

authority to engage in private practice
from the Secretary of DILG for his
second and third terms.

Acting Secretary Aguirre's grant of authority cannot be unreasonably construed to have been
perpetual. Moreover, Muñoz cannot claim that he believed in good faith that the authority
granted by Governor Bichara for his second and third terms sufficed.

Memorandum No. 17 dated September 4, 1986 (Memorandum 17) , which Muñoz himself cites
in his Joint Petition, is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. The power to grant authority
to engage in the practice of one's profession to officers and employees in the public service lies
with the head of the department, in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules which provides, in part:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of Department: Provided, That this prohibition
will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities
require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if an
employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, the time so devoted outside of
office hours should be fixed by the chief of the agency to the end that it will not impair in any
way the efficiency of the officer or employee x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Memorandum 17 was issued more than nine (9) years prior to Muñoz's appointment as
Provincial Legal Officer, hence, he cannot feign ignorance thereof. As a local public official, it
was incumbent upon Muñoz to secure the proper authority from the Secretary of the DILG not
only for his first term, but also his second and third. His failure to do so rendered him liable for
unauthorized practice of his profession and violation of Rule 1.0135 of the CPR.
Muñoz represented conflicting interests.

Muñoz cannot elude Olaybal's allegations of disloyalty. In Mabini Colleges, Inc. v. Pajarillo,36 the
Court explained the tests to determine the existence of conflict of interest, thus:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there
is conflict of interest if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to
perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his
first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney
from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

As Muñoz himself detailed in his Joint Petition, he acted as counsel for ALECO under the
management of the old BOD in the following cases:

A. Civil Case No. 10007 — ALECO (Petitioner) vs. Eleuterio Adonay, NEA Project Supervisor
and his team John Catral et. al., a case filed by Oliver O. Olaybal and his group. For:
Injunction, Accounting with Prayer for Writs of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order, seeking to stop the election of the new set of member (sic) of the Board of
Directors x x x.

B. Civil Case [N]o. 10066 entitled ALBAY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. as Petitioner, also
filed by Oliver O. Olaybal, a case for Prohibition, Mandamus and Receivership, with
Preliminary Prohibition and Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining and
Mandatory Orders. Among others, this Petition was filed to stop the second scheduled
election of the ALECO Board of Directors scheduled for February 23, and 24,
2002.37 (Underscoring omitted; additional emphasis supplied)

Muñoz thereafter served as retained counsel of ALECO under the direction of the NEA
management team. Muñoz could have easily anticipated that his advice would be sought with
respect to the prosecution of the members of the old BOD, considering that the latter was
deactivated due to alleged mismanagement. The conflict of interest between Olaybal's board on
one hand, and NEA and its management team on the other, is apparent. By representing
conflicting interests without the permission of all parties involved, Muñoz violated Rules 15.01
and 15.03 of the CPR.38

In Catu v. Rellosa,39 the Court imposed the penalty of suspension for six (6) months upon
a punong barangay who acted as counsel for respondents in an ejectment case without securing
the authority of the Secretary of DILG. In Aniñon v. Sabitsana, Jr.,40 the Court imposed the
penalty of one (1) year suspension upon a lawyer who accepted a new engagement that
required him to oppose the interests of a party whom he previously represented. In view of
Muñoz's multiple infractions, the Court finds the recommended penalty of suspension for an
aggregate period of three (3) years proper.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Levi P. Muñoz is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and violation of
Rules 1.01, 6.02, 15.01 and 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective upon
receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of any violation hereunder
shall be dealt with more severely.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF

SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with
the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991.
The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him
in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino
and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of
such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence.
This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the
fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging
from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with
the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993
issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two
(2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to
supervise him.

Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the
1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his
then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En
Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however,
allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.

On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the
attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T.
Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We
note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the
Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino
has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone
who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character,
with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.2 The essentiality of good
moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we
quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:

In Re Farmer: 3

xxx xxx xxx

This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the

applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of
which he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the
elements necessary to make up such a character. It is something more than an
absence of bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or
should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he
must have conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or
should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the
line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is
right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently
proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and
his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at
law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the
administration of justice. . . .

xxx xxx xxx4

In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis

359, 210 NW 710:

It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to
deviate from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of
circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For these reasons the
wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high
moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar
examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination to be
made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It
needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the highest
 degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who presents
himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very
source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued
his profession, and has established himself therein, a far more difficult situation
is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for
the recalling and annulment of his license.

In Re Keenan:6

The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right
to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and
continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in
moral character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will
attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair
to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are
allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are
allowed to remain in it.

Re Rouss:7

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and
professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not
to punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the examination into
learning, is merely a test of fitness.

Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8

Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not
only protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in
the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts could
such agents give? They are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents
and officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due
administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that both those
who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have
fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration
of justice.

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned,
than the possession of legal learning:

. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10
Ann./Cas. 187):

The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person
to the practice of the law unless he covered an upright moral
character. The possession of this by the attorney is more important, if
 anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice than
legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if
the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character
the chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will
become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling — a curse
instead of a benefit to his community — a Quirk, a Gammon or a
Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.9

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking
admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than
inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:

Re Stepsay: 10

The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his

admission to practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.

Re Wells: 11

. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the

California Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character
unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his
disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its
scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence
which tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and general
morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish his
guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to
the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of
the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the
legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such
a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts
of law and in our legal system as we know it.12

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the
required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or
inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the
unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those
who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral
duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the
fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would
not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged
and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of
that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that
the participant was then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is
prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged
himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good
moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time
of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the
time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration,
evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia,
of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good
reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show
to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the
family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other
words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become
morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.

Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers
and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this
Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
 EN BANC

B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for
membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than
possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit.
A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar
examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as
members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against
respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled
oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the
Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the
charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not
signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct.
Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC)
of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a
pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in
Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as
counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading
as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal

government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As
such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or
administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of
acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter
engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy
to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but
disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him.
In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against
him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him
before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a
lawyer but as a person who knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001
pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however,
that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the
pleading.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he

submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He
submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001
signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is
politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the
losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of
respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to
Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a
petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for
Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC,
complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath
as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant
administrative case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.

On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for
evaluation, report and recommendation.

OBCs Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the
May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively
participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the
MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that
respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar.
The OBC also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his
admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied
admission to the Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent
allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government
employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise,
respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that
respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the
lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in
Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for
George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was
the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T.
BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L.
Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies.

On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her
counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L.
Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the
candidate of the said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was
entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the
REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the
petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged
in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.

In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice,
as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262,
263). (Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by
members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service
which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings
before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly
supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel
knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel
knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a
member of the Philippine Bar.3cräläwvirtualibräry

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust4 since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does
not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law
is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the
person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.5cräläwvirtualibräry

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,6 a
candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of
Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the
Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the
unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.7cräläwvirtualibräry

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it
is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that
respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law.8 Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.9cräläwvirtualibräry

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent
to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts
complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001
addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon your acceptance.10 Vice-Mayor Relox
accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001.11 Thus, the evidence does not support
the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed
authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies.
While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 8010 June 16, 2009

KELD STEMMERIK, represented by ATTYS. HERMINIO A. LIWANAG and WINSTON

P.L. ESGUERRA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LEONUEL N. MAS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

Per Curiam:

Complainant Keld Stemmerik is a citizen and resident of Denmark. In one of his trips to the
Philippines, he was introduced to respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas. That was his misfortune.

In one visit to the Philippines, complainant marveled at the beauty of the country and expressed
his interest in acquiring real property in the Philippines. He consulted respondent who advised
him that he could legally acquire and own real property in the Philippines. Respondent even
suggested an 86,998 sq.m. property in Quarry, Agusuin, Cawag, Subic, Zambales with the
assurance that the property was alienable.

Trusting respondent, complainant agreed to purchase the property through respondent as his
representative or attorney-in-fact. Complainant also engaged the services of respondent for the
preparation of the necessary documents. For this purpose, respondent demanded and received
a ₱400,000 fee.

Confident that respondent would faithfully carry out his task, complainant returned to
Denmark, entrusting the processing of the necessary paperwork to respondent.

Thereafter, respondent prepared a contract to sell the property between complainant,

represented by respondent, and a certain Bonifacio de Mesa, the purported owner of the
property.1 Subsequently, respondent prepared and notarized a deed of sale in which de Mesa
sold and conveyed the property to a certain Ailyn Gonzales for ₱3.8 million.2 Respondent also
drafted and notarized an agreement between complainant and Gonzales stating that it was
complainant who provided the funds for the purchase of the property.3 Complainant then gave
respondent the full amount of the purchase price (₱3.8 million) for which respondent issued an
acknowledgment receipt.4

After the various contracts and agreements were executed, complainant tried to get in touch
with respondent to inquire about when the property could be registered in his name. However,
respondent suddenly became scarce and refused to answer complainant’s calls and e-mail
messages.
When complainant visited the Philippines again in January 2005, he engaged the services of the
Jimenez Gonzales Liwanag Bello Valdez Caluya & Fernandez Law Office to ascertain the status
of the property he supposedly bought. He was devastated to learn that aliens could not own
land under Philippine laws. Moreover, verification at the Community Environment & Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in
Olongapo City revealed that the property was inalienable as it was situated within the former
US Military Reservation.5 The CENRO also stated that the property was not subject to
disposition or acquisition under Republic Act No. 141.6

Thereafter, complainant, through his attorneys-in-fact,7 exerted diligent efforts to locate

respondent for purposes of holding him accountable for his fraudulent acts. Inquiry with the
Olongapo Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) disclosed that respondent was
in arrears in his annual dues and that he had already abandoned his law office in Olongapo
City.8 Search of court records of cases handled by respondent only yielded his abandoned office
address in Olongapo City.1avvphi1

Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent in the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the IBP.9 He deplored respondent’s acts of serious misconduct. In
particular, he sought the expulsion of respondent from the legal profession for gravely
misrepresenting that a foreigner could legally acquire land in the Philippines and for
maliciously absconding with complainant’s ₱3.8 million.10

Respondent failed to file his answer and position paper despite service of notice at his last
known address. Neither did he appear in the scheduled mandatory conference. In this
connection, the CBD found that respondent abandoned his law practice in Olongapo City after
his transaction with complainant and that he did not see it fit to contest the charges against
him.11

The CBD ruled that respondent used his position as a lawyer to mislead complainant on the
matter of land ownership by a foreigner.12 He even went through the motion of preparing
falsified and fictitious contracts, deeds and agreements. And for all these shameless acts, he
collected ₱400,000 from complainant. Worse, he pocketed the ₱3.8 million and absconded with
it.13

The CBD found respondent to be "nothing more than an embezzler" who misused his
professional status as an attorney as a tool for deceiving complainant and absconding with
complainant’s money.14 Respondent was dishonest and deceitful. He abused the trust and
confidence reposed by complainant in him. The CBD recommended the disbarment of
respondent.15

The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the findings and recommendation of the CBD with
the modification that respondent was further required to return the amount of ₱4.2 million to
respondent.16

We agree with the IBP.

Sufficiency Of Notice Of
The Disbarment Proceedings

We shall first address a threshold issue: was respondent properly given notice of the
disbarment proceedings against him? Yes.

The respondent did not file any answer or position paper, nor did he appear during the
scheduled mandatory conference. Respondent in fact abandoned his last known address, his
law office in Olongapo City, after he committed the embezzlement.

Respondent should not be allowed to benefit from his disappearing act. He can neither defeat
this Court’s jurisdiction over him as a member of the bar nor evade administrative liability by
the mere ruse of concealing his whereabouts. Thus, service of the complaint and other orders
and processes on respondent’s office was sufficient notice to him.

Indeed, since he himself rendered the service of notice on him impossible, the notice
requirement cannot apply to him and he is thus considered to have waived it. The law does not
require that the impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad impossibile.17 The law obliges no one to
perform an impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in
accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicality.18

In this connection, lawyers must update their records with the IBP by informing the IBP
National Office or their respective chapters19 of any change in office or residential address and
other contact details.20 In case such change is not duly updated, service of notice on the office or
residential address appearing in the records of the IBP National Office shall constitute sufficient
notice to a lawyer for purposes of administrative proceedings against him.

Respondent’s Administrative Infractions

And His Liability Therefor

Lawyers, as members of a noble profession, have the duty to promote respect for the law and
uphold the integrity of the bar. As men and women entrusted with the law, they must ensure
that the law functions to protect liberty and not as an instrument of oppression or deception.

Respondent has been weighed by the exacting standards of the legal profession and has been
found wanting.

Respondent committed a serious breach of his oath as a lawyer. He is also guilty of culpable
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the code of ethics of the legal profession.

All lawyers take an oath to support the Constitution, to obey the laws and to do no
falsehood.21 That oath is neither mere formal ceremony nor hollow words. It is a sacred trust
that should be upheld and kept inviolable at all times.22

Lawyers are servants of the law23 and the law is their master. They should not simply obey the
laws, they should also inspire respect for and obedience thereto by serving as exemplars worthy
of emulation. Indeed, that is the first precept of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain.

This Court has interpreted this provision, as early as the 1947 case Krivenko v. Register of
Deeds,24 to mean that "under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or agricultural
lands, including residential lands." The provision is a declaration of imperative constitutional
policy.25

Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional policy,

showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared
spurious documents that he knew were void and illegal.

By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell the property to complainant and that de
Mesa thereafter sold the property to Gonzales who made the purchase for and in behalf of
complainant, he falsified public documents and knowingly violated the Anti-Dummy Law.26

Respondent’s misconduct did not end there. By advising complainant that a foreigner could
legally and validly acquire real estate in the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the
property was alienable, respondent deliberately foisted a falsehood on his client. He did not
give due regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant. Instead, he
deceived complainant and misled him into parting with ₱400,000 for services that were both
illegal and unprofessional. Moreover, by pocketing and misappropriating the ₱3.8 million given
by complainant for the purchase of the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that
was criminal in nature.1avvphi1

Respondent spun an intricate web of lies. In the process, he committed unethical act after
unethical act, wantonly violating laws and professional standards.

For all this, respondent violated not only the lawyer’s oath and Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He also transgressed the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01. – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02. – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND

DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL
HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF

HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND

HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
(emphasis supplied)

A lawyer who resorts to nefarious schemes to circumvent the law and uses his legal knowledge
to further his selfish ends to the great prejudice of others, poses a clear and present danger to
the rule of law and to the legal system. He does not only tarnish the image of the bar and
degrade the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, he also betrays everything that the
legal profession stands for.

It is respondent and his kind that give lawyering a bad name and make laymen support Dick
the Butcher’s call, "Kill all lawyers!"27 A disgrace to their professional brethren, they must be
purged from the bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is
directed to immediately strike out the name of respondent from the Roll of Attorneys.

Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to complainant Keld Stemmerik the total amount of
₱4.2 million with interest at 12% per annum from the date of promulgation of this resolution
until full payment. Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of payment
of the amount within ten days from payment.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is ORDERED to locate Atty. Mas and file the
appropriate criminal charges against him. The NBI is further DIRECTED to regularly report the
progress of its action in this case to this Court through the Bar Confidant.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant who shall forthwith record it in the
personal file of respondent, the Court Administrator who shall inform all courts of the
Philippines, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines which shall disseminate copies to all its
chapters and members and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the
Philippines.
 EN BANC

[ A.C. NO. 6010, August 28, 2006 ]

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL (SLU-LHS) FACULTY AND STAFF,
COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint Louis University-
Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS,
predicated on the following grounds:

1) Gross Misconduct:

From the records of the case, it appears that there is a pending criminal case for child abuse
allegedly committed by him against a high school student filed before the Prosecutor's Office of
Baguio City; a pending administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents
before an Investigating Board created by SLU for his alleged unprofessional and unethical acts
of misappropriating money supposedly for the teachers; and the pending labor case filed by
SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal
deduction of salary by respondent.

2) Grossly Immoral Conduct:

In contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage; and

3) Malpractice:

In notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.

According to complainant, respondent was legally married to Teresita Rivera on 31 May 1982 at
Tuba, Benguet, before the then Honorable Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. He thereafter contracted
a subsequent marriage with one Mary Jane Pascua, before the Honorable Judge Guillermo
Purganan. On 4 October 1994, said second marriage was subsequently annulled for being
bigamous.

On the charge of malpractice, complainant alleged that respondent deliberately subscribed and
notarized certain legal documents on different dates from 1988 to 1997, despite expiration of
respondent's notarial commission on 31 December 1987. A Certification[1] dated 25 May 1999
was issued by the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, to the effect that
respondent had not applied for commission as Notary Public for and in the City of Baguio for
the period 1988 to 1997. Respondent performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by the
following documents:
 1. Affidavit of Ownership[2] dated 8 March 1991, executed by Fernando T. Acosta,
subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

2. Affidavit[3] dated 26 September 1992, executed by Maria Cortez Atos, subscribed and
sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

3. Affidavit[4] dated 14 January 1992, executed by Fanolex James A. Menos, subscribed and
sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

4. Affidavit[5] dated 23 December 1993, executed by Ponciano V. Abalos, subscribed and

sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

5. Absolute Date of Sale[6] dated 23 June 1993, executed by Danilo Gonzales in favor of
Senecio C. Marzan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

6. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinherited Parties[7] dated 5 March 1994, executed by Evelyn C.
Canullas and Pastora C. Tacadena, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

7. Sworn Statement[8] dated 31 May 1994, executed by Felimon B. Rimorin, subscribed and
sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

8. Deed of Sale[9] dated 17 August 1994, executed by Woodrow Apurado in favor of Jacinto
Batara, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

9. Joint Affidavit by Two Disinterested Parties[10] dated 1 June 1994, executed by Ponciano
V. Abalos and Arsenio C. Sibayan, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

10. Absolute Deed of Sale[11] dated 23 March 1995, executed by Eleanor D.Meridor in favor
of Leonardo N. Benter, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

11. Deed of Absolute Sale[12] dated 20 December 1996, executed by Mandapat in favor of
Mario R. Mabalot, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

12. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinterested Parties[13] dated 17 April 1996, executed by Villiam
C. Ambong and Romeo L. Quiming, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

13. Conditional Deed of Sale[14] dated 27 February 1997, executed by Aurelia Demot Cados
in favor of Jose Ma. A. Pangilinan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

14. Memorandum of Agreement[15] dated 19 July 1996, executed by JARCO represented by

Mr. Johnny Teope and AZTEC Construction represented by Mr. George Cham,
notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz.

Quite remarkably, respondent, in his comment, denied the charges of child abuse, illegal
deduction of salary and others which are still pending before the St. Louis University (SLU),
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Prosecutor's Office. He did not discuss
anything about the allegations of immorality in contracting a second marriage and malpractice
in notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.

After the filing of comment, We referred[16] the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP conducted the mandatory preliminary conference.

The complainants, thereafter, submitted their position paper which is just a reiteration of their
allegations in their complaint.

Respondent, on his part, expressly admitted his second marriage despite the existence of his
first marriage, and the subsequent nullification of the former. He also admitted having
notarized certain documents during the period when his notarial commission had already
expired. However, he offered some extenuating defenses such as good faith, lack of malice and
noble intentions in doing the complained acts.

After the submission of their position papers, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

On 30 March 2005, Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his report and recommended
that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be

administratively penalized for the following acts:

a. For contracting a second marriage without taking the appropriate legal steps to have the
first marriage annulled first, he be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year,
and

b. For notarizing certain legal documents despite full knowledge of the expiration of his
notarial commission, he be suspended from the practice of law for another one (1) year
or for a total of two (2) years.[17]

On 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors, approved and adopted the recommendation
of Commissioner Pacheco, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent
contracted a second marriage without taking appropriate legal steps to have the first marriage
annulled, Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year and for notarizing legal documents despite full knowledge of the expiration of his
notarial commission Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
another one (1) year, for a total of two (2) years Suspension from the practice of law.[18]
This Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to fault respondent well taken, except as to the
penalty contained therein.
At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the qualifications required by law
for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior, and
he can be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege
or right, an attorney's right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend, based
on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of
an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an
attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney and, thus, to
protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish an
attorney. Elaborating on this, we said on Maligsa v. Atty. Cabanting,[19] that the Bar should
maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer
brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts and to his clients. A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act
which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty and integrity of the legal profession. Towards this end, an attorney may be disbarred or
suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which
include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these
being broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or
private capacity.

Equally worthy of remark is that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of
standards among its members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is
committed in the lawyer's professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer
may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another.[20] Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter
may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may
at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.[21]

One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral
character. Possession of such moral character as requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege
of law practice must be continuous. Otherwise, "membership in the bar may be terminated
when a lawyer ceases to have good moral conduct."[22]

In the case at bench, there is no dispute that respondent and Teresita Rivera contracted
marriage on 31 May 1982 before Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. In less than a year, they parted
ways owing to their irreconcilable differences without seeking judicial recourse. The union bore
no offspring. After their separation in-fact, respondent never knew the whereabouts of Teresita
Rivera since he had lost all forms of communication with her. Seven years thereafter,
respondent became attracted to one Mary Jane Pascua, who was also a faculty member of SLU-
LHS. There is also no dispute over the fact that in 1989, respondent married Mary Jane Pascua
in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio City, Branch 68. Respondent even admitted this
fact. When the second marriage was entered into, respondent's prior marriage with Teresita
Rivera was still subsisting, no action having been initiated before the court to obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity or annulment of respondent's prior marriage to Teresita Rivera or a
judicial declaration of presumptive death of Teresita Rivera.

Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous second
marriage in 1989, having been admitted to the Bar in 1985. As such, he cannot feign ignorance of
the mandate of the law that before a second marriage may be validly contracted, the first and
subsisting marriage must first be annulled by the appropriate court. The second marriage was
annulled only on 4 October 1994 before the RTC of Benguet, Branch 9, or about five years after
respondent contracted his second marriage. The annulment of respondent's second marriage
has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. Firstly, as earlier emphasized, the
annulment came after the respondent's second bigamous marriage. Secondly, as we held in In
re: Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but
is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a
lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an
affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course, then neither will the
judgment of annulment of respondent's second marriage also exonerate him from a
wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear preponderance of
evidence - in disciplinary proceedings against members of the Bar is met, then liability
attaches.[23]

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as a ground for
disbarment.

The Court has laid down with a common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct, vis-à-
vis, grossly immoral conduct. Immoral conduct is "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community" and what is "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree."[24]

Undoubtedly, respondent's act constitutes immoral conduct. But is it so gross as to warrant his
disbarment? Indeed, he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as
a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while the first
marriage was still in place, is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.[25]

However, measured against the definition, we are not prepared to consider respondent's act as
grossly immoral. This finds support in the following recommendation and observation of the
IBP Investigator and IBP Board of Governors, thus:

The uncontested assertions of the respondent belies any intention to flaunt the law and the high
moral standard of the legal profession, to wit:

a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of almost
seven (7) years, he has not been romantically involved with any woman;

b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife,
whom he described to be very intelligent person;
 c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;

d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with relation to his
wife;

e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the mother
and child went to Australia;

f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.[26]

In the case of Terre v. Terre,[27] respondent was disbarred because his moral character was
deeply flawed as shown by the following circumstances, viz: he convinced the complainant that
her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio and that she was legally single and
free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage,
respondent went through law school while being supported by complainant, with some
assistance from respondent's parents. After respondent had finished his law course and gotten
complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support and without
the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely to a hospital.

In the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[28] respondent was also disbarred for his grossly immoral
acts such as: first, he abandoned his lawful wife and three children; second, he lured an
innocent young woman into marrying him; third, he mispresented himself as a "bachelor" so he
could contract marriage in a foreign land; and fourth, he availed himself of complainant's
resources by securing a plane ticket from complainant's office in order to marry the latter's
daughter. He did this without complainant's knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity
to assure complainant that "everything is legal."

Such acts are wanting in the case at bar. In fact, no less than the respondent himself
acknowledged and declared his abject apology for his misstep. He was humble enough to offer
no defense save for his love and declaration of his commitment to his wife and child.

Based on the reasons stated above, we find the imposition of disbarment upon him to be unduly
harsh. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and may be imposed only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could
accomplish the end desired.[29] In line with this philosophy, we find that a penalty of two years
suspension is more appropriate. The penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the
IBP is too light and not commensurate to the act committed by respondent.

As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized several documents during the years 1988-
1997 after his commission as notary public had expired, respondent humbly admitted having
notarized certain documents despite his knowledge that he no longer had authority to do so.
He, however, alleged that he received no payment in notarizing said documents.

It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act.
On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization of a private document converts
the document into a public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for
this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form
of conveyance would be undermined.[30]

The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a
mere casual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyer's act of notarizing documents
without the requisite commission to do so as "reprehensible, constituting as it does not only
malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of public documents."[31]

The Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by a member
of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the
offender may be subjected to disciplinary action or one, performing a notarial act without such
commission is a violation of the lawyer's oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial
Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all
legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer's oath similarly
proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By acting as a notary public without the proper
commission to do so, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs
every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.

In the case of Buensuceso v. Barera,[32] a lawyer was suspended for one year when he notarized
five documents after his commission as Notary Public had expired, to wit: a complaint for
ejectment, affidavit, supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale, and a contract to sell. Guided by the
pronouncement in said case, we find that a suspension of two (2) years is justified under the
circumstances. Herein respondent notarized a total of fourteen (14) documents[33] without the
requisite notarial commission.

Other charges constituting respondent's misconduct such as the pending criminal case for child
abuse allegedly committed by him against a high school student filed before the Prosecutor's
Office of Baguio City; the pending administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and
Parents before an Investigating Board created by SLU; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-
LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal deduction of
salary by respondent, need not be discussed, as they are still pending before the proper forums.
At such stages, the presumption of innocence still prevails in favor of the respondent.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of immoral conduct, in
disregard of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years, and another two (2) years for notarizing documents
despite the expiration of his commission or a total of four (4) years of suspension.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Court
Administrator, as well as the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal
records of the respondent.
 EN BANC

[ AC. No. 10021, Sep 18, 2018 ]

AAA v. ATTY. ANTONIO N. DE LOS REYES +

DECISION

PER CURIAM:
Before the Court are two administrative complaints filed by complainant AAA seeking the
disbarment of respondent Atty. Antonio De Los Reyes (respondent Atty. De Los Reyes) on the
grounds of sexual harassment and gross immoral conduct. AAA claims that respondent Atty.
De Los Reyes violated the Code of Professional Responsibility when he committed acts which
are unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful which warrant his disbarment.

The Factual Antecedents

In her undated Complainant's Position Paper, AAA narrated the following:

Sometime in February 1997, [AAA] was hired as secretary to [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes],
then Vice-President of the Legal and Administrative Group of [National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation] NHMFC.

[AAA] became a permanent employee with a plantilla position of private secretary 1, pay grade
11, on a co-terminus status with [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes]. She later learned that it was
[respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] who facilitated her rapid promotion to her position soon after
becoming his secretary.

Sometime in the last quarter of 1997, [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] offered to take [AAA]
home in his NHMFC issued service vehicle telling her that her residence on J.P. Rizal Street,
Makati was along his route. From then on it became a daily routine between them, which
continued even after [AAA] moved to Mandaluyong City.

Sometime in the last quarter of 1998, [AAA] began to feel very uncomfortable with the situation
when she realized that [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] was becoming overly possessive and
demanding to the extent that she could not refuse his offer to bring her home; her telephone
calls were being monitored by [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] who constantly asked her who
she was talking with on the telephone and would get mad if she told him that it was a male
person; she would be called to his office during office hours just to listen to his stories about his
life, how he was raised by a very strict father, a former NBI director, how unhappy he was with
his wife who treated him like a mere boarder in their house and sometimes just to sit there
doing nothing in particular, simply because he wanted to see her. He also sent or left her love
notes.

[AAA] tried to avoid [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] who vacillated between being verbally
abusive toward her, cursing and shouting invectives at her whenever she did, and overly
solicitous the next moment, apparently to placate her.

On 11 December 1998, when she refused his offer to take her home, he got angry with her and
shouted "putangina mo." She tried to get away from him but he blocked her path, grabbed her
arm and dragged her to the parking area and pushed her inside his service vehicle. He drove
off, ignoring her cries and pleas to stop and let her get off. He slapped her twice and she became
hysterical. She opened the car door and attempted to jump but he was able to grab her jacket
and dropped her off somewhere in Makati. She reported the incident to the police.

[AAA] did not file a formal report or complaint against [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] as she
thought that it would be futile. She told Atty. Fermin Arzaga [then Senior Vice-President for
Finance at NHMFC] what happened and showed him her bruises on her wrists. She told him of
her plan to resign and he asked her not to resign and instead to request for a transfer. Despite
his advice, she sent a resignation letter that was received by the Personnel Department on 22
December 1998.

On the same date, both the manager and the assistant manager talked to [AAA] and persuaded
her to reconsider her resignation by promising her that she would be re-assigned to the Office
of the President, as stated in an Office Order dated 21 January 1999.

On 22 January 1999, [AAA] reported to the Office of the President. But even before she could
start working in her new assignment, she was told to return to her former post as private
secretary of [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes].

[AAA] later learned from [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] that he had called up Atty. Arzaga
and told him not to interfere ("huwag kang makialam"). He told her that her position was co-
terminus with his, being his private secretary.

Much as she wanted to pursue her plan to resign, [AAA's] financial position at that time left her
with no choice but to continue working as [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes'] secretary.
[Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] knew that [AAA] was the sole breadwinner of her family, as
her father had deserted them when she was but 8 years old, leaving her to care for her sick
mother, a two-year-old niece and two sisters who were still in school.

[Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] exploited his knowledge to force [AAA] to continue working
for him as his secretary. He moved in on her steadily, making it plain to all that she was his
property, isolating her from the other people in the office who did not want to cross him,
dominating and humiliating her. He eventually made it clear to her that he was determined to
make her his mistress and overpowered her resistance by leaving her no choice but to succumb
to his advances or lose her job.
From then on, she became his sex slave who was at his beck and call at all times for all kinds of
sexual services ranging from hand-jobs in his vehicle to sexual intercourse in his office. She
could not even refuse him without risking physical, verbal and emotional abuse.

[AAA] become despondent with her situation, knowing that she was the object of gossip and
ridicule among her officemates. She felt so helpless and frustrated that she thought of
committing suicide on countless occasions. Coming to the office was such an ordeal that she
often suffered from all sorts of illnesses such as fever, stomachaches, sore throat, and migraine
which gave her a convenient reason to absent herself, but did not deter [respondent Atty. De
Los Reyes] from calling and texting her or even. coming to her house to personally check on her.

[AAA] attempted to put a stop to [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes's] obsession with her by
flaunting an American as her boyfriend. [Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] went into a jealous
rage when he learned about it.

xxxx

It seemed that [AAA] could never escape from the clutches of [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes]
who always found a way to ensure that she would always end up being re-assigned to his
office, even after she was assigned to other units. He continued to bring her home, no matter
that her residence was now in Canlubang, Laguna. He also continued to see her [in] his office at
least twice a day, even sending an assistant to fetch her when she refused to go.

In January 2003, [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] continued to keep a tight watch over her even
when [AAA] went on official study leave to attend her CGFNS review classes. He insisted on
personally bringing [AAA] to and from her classes or he made sure that his official driver took
her there using his official vehicle when he could not personally accompany her.

[AAA] failed to take her exam in March 2003 and requested a leave of absence to take the July
2003 exam. She stopped seeing [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] and refused to see or talk to
him completely.

[Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] kept sending [AAA] text messages that she ignored and even
requested for a change of number of her cell phone. After a month of not receiving anything
from him, she thought he had already given up on her but she was wrong.

He now trained his sight on [Ma. Victoria] Marivic Alpajaro, a good friend and officemate of
[AAA], who had now become the object of his ire and jealousy because of her apparent
closeness to [AAA].

His threats to fire Marivic compelled [AAA] to seek him out and plead with him to spare her
friends. On 10 July 2003, they met outside the office and he insisted that they go back together
to the office to show everyone that everything was still the same between them. She refused and
ran out of the restaurant. He followed and wrapped his arms around her but she evaded him.
He was shouting "mahal kita" in public, to her great embarrassment. He attempted to stop her
but she threatened that she will throw herself in the path of oncoming vehicles if he persisted.[2]
AAA filed another Complaint-Affidavit dated November 19, 2004, with the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), alleging that respondent Atty.
De Los Reyes still continued to harass her and her colleagues (Ma. Victoria Alpajaro and
Mercedita Lorenzana) who agreed to be her witnesses in her earlier complaint. According to
AAA, respondent Atty. De Los Reyes filed baseless charges against her and her sympathetic
officemates before the Office of the Ombudsman, and sought their preventive suspension
without affording them due process through an initial administrative investigation at the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). She added that because of what
respondent Atty. De Los Reyes did to her, she suffered from various illnesses, insomnia,
listlessness, suicidal feelings, and was diagnosed as suffering from Major Depressive Disorder
with manifested symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder by Dr. Norietta Calma-
Balderama, a psychiatrist at the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Medicine at the
University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital (UP-PGH).

In his defense, respondent Atty. De Los Reyes denied AAA's allegations relating to the alleged
sexual harassment and gross immorality for lack of factual and legal bases. In his Consolidated
Position Paper for the Respondent dated May 16, 2005, respondent Atty. De Los Reyes
contended that AAA's complaint-affidavits were not sufficient in form and substance as
required under the Rules of Court and should be dismissed for being mere scraps of paper.
According to respondent Atty. De Los Reyes, the complaints failed to state the ultimate facts or
particulars, approximate dates, and other details of the sexual acts or advances that he allegedly
committed, in violation of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations
against him. He averred that AAA's lame excuse for her omission allegedly due to her fear that
she would be exposing herself to shame and humiliation after her colleagues would know of the
details of her complaint is unbelievable.

Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes further stated that AAA's affidavits were replete with
inconsistencies and unrealistic statements that are contrary to human nature. Respondent Atty.
De Los Reyes denied her allegations and explained the following points:

(a) He offered his service vehicle not only to AAA but also to other employees of NHMFC who
lived along his route; and it was AAA herself who requested that she be brought home together
with other employees;

(b) NHMFC has corporate policies prohibiting the long use of telephones by the employees for
personal purposes;

(c) The incident reported by AAA that she was grabbed and dragged into his service vehicle is
highly incredible as it would have been readily noticed by many employees because it was
immediately after office hours;

(d) He did not ask for any sexual favors in his office or in his service vehicle considering the
location of the office which was very accessible to other employees including the security guard
by the door that is always open; and respondent Atty. De Los Reyes always sat on the front
passenger side of his service vehicle with his driver;
(e) The requests for transfer of assignment made by AAA did not mention that it was because of
respondent Atty. De Los Reyes or of any sexual harassment that she suffered at his hands; and

(f) The complaints for disbarment filed by AAA against respondent Atty. De Los Reyes were
purely in retaliation since he was conducting investigations against AAA and her two friends at
the NHMFC.

Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes also countered the Certification issued by Dr. Calma-Balderama
of the UP-PGH Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Medicine as a mere scrap of paper
and without any probative value since said certification was not made under oath or subscribed
to, and was not supported by any clinical or psychological report.

Finally, respondent Atty. De Los Reyes asserted that assuming the alleged grounds for
disbarment regarding the claim for sexual harassment were true, the same had already
prescribed since they occurred in 1999 or more than three years prior to the institution of the
complaints.

The Findings of the IBP

In the Report and Recommendation dated June 6, 2011, the CBD-IBP Commissioner found
respondent Atty. De Los Reyes guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended the penalty of one (1) year suspension. The Investigating
Commissioner opined that there was no indication that AAA was not telling the truth, and that
she acceded to the numerous incidents of sexual intercourse because of fear of reprisals or
consequences if she refused. The Commissioner explained thus:

We also take note that there is an apparent ambivalence or hesitancy in the use of the word
"rape" by herein complainant. This is because the numerous sexual intercourse occurred with
the complainant's seeming consent. However, such cannot be characterized as voluntary.
Complainant acceded to the sexual intercourse because of fear of reprisals or consequences if
she did not. Whether there is actual rape, as it is defined in the Revised Penal Code, would not
be relevant in this disbarment case since the sexual intercourse coupled with unspoken threats
of dire consequences would nonetheless constitute grave misconduct.

Respondent has also raised the argument of prescription. While there could be a prescriptive
period under the Anti-Sexual Harassment Law, there is no prescriptive period for grave
misconduct in disbarment proceedings and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Disbarment
proceedings are sui generis.[3]

In Resolution No. XX-2012-254 dated July 21, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A," and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Antonio De Los Reyes is hereby SUSPENDED [INDEFINITELY].[4]

Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the IBP
Board of Governors in Resolution No. XX-2013-311 dated March 21, 2013, thus:

RESOLVED to unanimously DENY [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes'] Motion for

Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the Resolution and it being a mere
reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration.
Thus, Resolution No. XX-2012-254 dated July 21, 2012 is hereby AFFIRMED.[5]

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether or not respondent Atty. De Los Reyes committed acts
amounting to sexual harassment and gross immoral conduct in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which would warrant his disbarment.

The Court's Ruling

After due consideration, we adopt the findings and conclusions of the Investigating
Commissioner, as sustained by the IBP Board of Governors.

The pertinent provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01. – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and support the activities of the integrated bar.
xxxx

Rule 7.03. – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.

In Valdez v. Dabon,[6] we explained that the possession of good moral character is both a
condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain
membership in the legal profession, to wit:

Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded by the Court that possession of good moral character
is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and
to retain membership in the legal profession. This proceeds from the lawyer's bounden duty to
observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar's integrity, and the legal
profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted
positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.

The Court explained in Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit that "as officers of the court, lawyers must not
only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and
leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. A member of
the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships
or keeping a mistress but must also behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards." Consequently, any errant
behavior of the lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or
disbarment.

Thus, lawyers are duty-bound to observe the highest degree of morality and integrity not only
upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their career in order to safeguard the reputation
of the legal profession. Any errant behavior, be it in their public or private life, may subject
them to suspension or disbarment. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly states
that members of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended for any deceit, grossly immoral
conduct, or violation of their oath.

In Ventura v. Samson,[7] we explained that immoral conduct involves acts that are willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and
respectable members of the community. It is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community's sense of
decency.

Here, we rule that the records of this administrative case sufficiently substantiate the findings of
the CBD-IBP Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, that indeed
respondent Atty. De Los Reyes committed acts of gross immorality in the conduct of his
personal affairs with AAA that show his disregard of the lawyer's oath and of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

A perusal of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) taken during the June 30, 2006 hearing
of the instant case shows AAA's straightforward testimony of her ordeal at the hands of
respondent Atty. De Los Reyes:

Atty. [Angelito] Lo [Counsel for respondent Atty. De Los Reyes]:

Q. You said that you were being raped twice a week by the respondent?

AAA:

A. Yes, sir.

COMM. FUNA:

Twice a week for how many weeks?

AAA:

I guess it's from 1999 to more or less 2000.

COMM. FUNA:

For clarification, what do you mean by rape?

AAA:

I was forced...he forced me to have sex with him.

COMM. FUNA:

In what sense? Conversation?

AAA:

Other than that, sir. Most of the time, I was not allowed...from the very start, I was not allowed
to use the C.R.

COMM. FUNA:

No, no, no. Do you know what rape is?

AAA:

Yes. I was forced to have sex with him. There [were] some instances that he would go inside the
C.R. while I'm still inside. He would push me and force me to have sex with him. Tinutulak nya
ako pababa.

COMM. FUNA:

I have to clarify this kasi it's vague. We need to know exactly what happened. Nagtinginan lang
kayo sa mata, what happened?

AAA:

I was inside the C.R. I'm using the restroom, pumasok sya.

COMM. FUNA:

Did he touch any part of your body?

AAA:

Yes.

COMM. FUNA:

Was there a sexual intercourse between you and the respondent?

AAA:

Yes.

COMM. FUNA:

There was?

AAA:

Yes.

COMM. FUNA:

How many times?

AAA:

At most is twice a week.

COMM. FUNA:

Now, you will be raped and yet you did not report to the police?

AAA:

I'm so scared and I don't know kung may maniniwala sa akin.

COMM. FUNA:

You will be raped and yet you continue to work.

AAA:

As I have mentioned in my Affidavit, I am the sole breadwinner in my family. I tried to leave

the office, I tried to look for a job.

COMM. FUNA:

So when you go to work, you know that you will be raped...

AAA:

Because I have to fend [for] my whole family. My mother is sick. I don't have a father. I have my
other siblings to support, I have my niece. It's really hard for me but...(Witness crying)

COMM. FUNA:

So, iyong subsequent rapes were done with your consent? Would you say that?

AAA:

It's an exchange to maintain my job.

COMM. FUNA:

So you consented because you believe that you will lose your job?

AAA:

That's what... kasi my position is co-terminus with him. It's permanent but still co-terminus with
him. Sabi nya nga, I'm working [at] his pleasure. It's up to him anytime if he wants to fire me. He
can do that.

COMM. FUNA:

Atty. Ambrosio, how would you characterize that?

ATTY. [MINERVA] AMBROSIO [Counsel for AAA]:

Which one, sir? She's raped, plain and simple, sir, sexual harassment.

COMM. FUNA:

Would you go to this office...(interrupted)

ATTY. AMBROSIO:

Sir, why are you laughing?

COMM. FUNA:

... if you know that you will be raped?

ATTY. AMBROSIO:

Sir...(unintelligible) to understand.

COMM. FUNA:

Tomorrow, you know that you will be raped ... (Comm. Funa and Atty. Ambrosio talking at
the same time)

ATTY. AMBROSIO:

[She's] telling you wala siyang choice. That's the whole essence of sexual harassment because a
woman is forced to continue working or to continue in this particular position because she has
no choice. If she doesn't consent to his sexual advances, she gets fired or she gets demoted or
she will get a deduction in her pay. See, that's plain and simple sexual harassment. This
is...(unintelligible) I do not understand. You're all laughing here. This is a woman crying telling
you... there's injustice being done to this woman.[8]

Clearly, the above-quoted excerpt from the TSN dated June 30, 2006, shows that respondent
Atty. De Los Reyes is guilty of "sextortion" which is the abuse of his position or authority to
obtain sexual favors from his subordinate, the complainant, his unwilling victim who was not in
a position to resist respondent's demands for fear of losing her means of livelihood. The sexual
exploitation of his subordinate done over a period of time amounts to gross misbehavior on the
part of respondent Atty. De Los Reyes that affects his standing and character as a member of the
Bar and as an officer of the Court. All these deplorable acts of respondent Atty. De Los Reyes
puts the legal profession in disrepute and places the integrity of the administration of justice in
peril, thus warranting disciplinary action from the Court.[9]

It bears emphasizing that an administrative case for disbarment is sui generis and not meant to
grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal
profession of its undesirable members for the protection of the public and of the courts. It is an
investigation on the conduct of the respondent as an officer of the Court and his fitness to
continue as a member of the Bar.[10]

This Court held in Pena v. Aparicio[11] that:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no
sense a criminal prosecution. x x x Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question
for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges
as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice
by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. x x x.

While we agree with the findings of the IBP, we, however, consider the recommended penalty
of indefinite suspension from the practice of law not commensurate with the gravity of the acts
committed by respondent Atty. De Los Reyes.

In a number of administrative cases involving illicit sexual relations and gross immorality, this
Court imposed upon the erring lawyers various penalties ranging from suspension to
disbarment, depending on the circumstances. In De Leon v. Pedreña,[12] we suspended the
respondent from the practice of law for two years for rubbing complainant's leg with his hand,
putting complainant's hand on his crotch area, and pressing his finger on complainant's private
part. In Tumbaga v. Teoxon,[13] the respondent was suspended for three years from the practice of
law for committing gross immorality by maintaining an extramarital affair with complainant.
This Court, in Zaguirre v. Castillo,[14] meted the penalty of indefinite suspension on Atty. Castillo
when he had an illicit relationship with a woman not his wife and sired a child with her, whom
he later on refused to recognize and support. In Dantes v. Dantes,[15] the respondent was
disbarred when he engaged in illicit relationships with two different women during the
subsistence of his marriage to complaint. We also ruled in Arnobit v. Arnobit,[16] that
respondent's act of leaving his wife and 12 children to cohabit ad have children with another
woman constitutes grossly immoral conduct, for which respondent was disbarred. Likewise,
in Delos Reyes v. Aznar,[17] we disbarred respondent, Chairman of the College of Medicine, for
his acts of enticing the complainant, who was then a student in the said college, to have carnal
knowledge with him under the threat that she would fail in all of her subjects if she refused
respondent.

In Ventura v. Samson,[18] this Court has reminded that the power to disbar must be exercised
with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment
should not be imposed where a lesser penalty may accomplish the desired goal of disciplining
an erring lawyer. In the present case, however, respondent Atty. De Los Reyes's actions show
that he lacks the degree of morality required of him as a member of the legal profession, thus
warranting the penalty of disbarment. Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes is disbarred for his gross
misbehavior, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not
only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of
law.[19]

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Antonio N. De Los Reyes GUILTY of gross
immoral conduct and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be made part of the records of respondent Atty. De Los Reyes in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Likewise, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994

JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and
JON DE YSASI, respondents.

F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.

Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case,
notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. It would indeed
have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent had reconciled
their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and with the grace of
reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead for judicial intervention despite the
inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with distaste, the Court cannot proceed
elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same reasoned detachment accorded any judicial
proceeding before it.

The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein private
respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental
sometime in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as sales manager of
Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations manager of Top Form Manufacturing
(Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator was on a fixed salary, with other allowances
covering housing, food, light, power, telephone, gasoline, medical and dental expenses.

As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and
operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding, fertilizing,
harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to the hacienda and attending to
such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on
the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there.

Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and
commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate
occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the
surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation which lasted over
four months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute
gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.

During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his medical
expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, without
due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written
demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary from Atty. Apolonio
Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as well as for the remittance of his
salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.

Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for
brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984, docketed
therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal dismissal with prayer
for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages, thirteenth
month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.

On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC,1 holding that
petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his employment was for a valid
cause, but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for
his failure to serve notice of said termination of employment to the Department of Labor and
Employment as required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling
in Wenphil Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.2 On appeal to the Fourth
Division of the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in toto.3

His motion for reconsideration4 of said decision having been denied for lack of merit,5 petitioner
filed this petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the petitioner
was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to reinstatement, payment of back
wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to
payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. The
discussion of these issues will necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented by private
respondent, such as the exact date when petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator, the
character of the pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from private respondent, that is,
whether the same are in the nature of salaries or pensions, and whether or not there was
abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator.

In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended a
modification of the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and
conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84,6 for which reason the
NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. In compliance with the Court's
resolution of November 16, 1992,7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12, 1992 largely
reiterating its earlier position in support of the findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter.8

Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor arbiter is worth
noting:
 This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact that because of
the special relationship of the parties and the nature of the action involved, this
case could very well go down (in) the annals of the Commission as perhaps the
first of its kind. For this case is an action filed by an only son, his father's
namesake, the only child and therefore the only heir against his own father.9

Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:

. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations were noted
that may justify why this labor case deserves special considerations. First, most
of the complaints that petitioner and private respondent had with each other,
were personal matters affecting father and son relationship. And secondly, if any
of the complaints pertain to their work, they allow their personal relationship to
come in the way.10

I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want of just
cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process. He also charges the
NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the executive labor arbiter
who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings thereof.

Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of his
functions as farm administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a ground to terminate
his employment at Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that it is wrong for petitioner to
question the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as only questions of
law may be appealed for resolution by this Court. Furthermore, in seeking the dismissal of the
instant petition, private respondent faults herein petitioner for failure to refer to the
corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic notes, erroneously citing Sections 15(d)
and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d],
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of page
references to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.

Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that technical
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling, and that every
and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts in each case shall be
availed of, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure in the interest of due process.

It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be rendered by a
judge, or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who conducted the hearing. The fact
that the judge who heard the case was not the judge who penned the decision does not impair
the validity of the judgment,11 provided that he draws up his decision and resolution with due
care and makes certain that they truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final dispositions
on the bases of the facts of and evidence submitted in the case.12

Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio, who
conducted the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11, 1985, and was later
transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually decided the case, presents
no procedural infirmity, especially considering that there is a presumption of regularity in the
performance of a public officer's functions,13 which petitioner has not successfully rebutted.

We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the application of
technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due process, ever mindful of the
long-standing legal precept that rules of procedure must be interpreted to help secure, not
defeat, justice. For this reason, we cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to nitpick
on trivial technicalities to boost his arguments. The strength of one's position cannot be hinged
on mere procedural niceties but on solid bases in law and jurisprudence.

The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker shall
be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due
process.14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which an employer may
validly terminate an employment, to wit:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the
employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him
by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the
employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his
duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.

The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of labor
saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of
operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a written notice on the
workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the
intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the corresponding separation pay rates provided
by law.15 Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the continued employment of the
employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his co-employee's health, is also a
ground for termination of his services provided he receives the prescribed separation pay.16 On
the other hand, it is well-settled that abandonment by an employee of his work authorizes the
employer to effect the former's dismissal from employment.17

After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent gravely erred
in affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner abandoned his
employment and was not illegally dismissed from such employment. For want of substantial
bases, in fact or
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to the factual
findings of an administrative agency, such as herein public respondent NLRC,18 as even
decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law are not exempt from
judicial review when so warranted. 19

The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve acceptance:

It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October 1982 to
December 1982, cannot be construed as abandonment of work because he has a
justifiable excuse. Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal
around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr. Patricio Tan of
Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19,
1986 at 20-44).

This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills sent to
Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, 1987 at 49-50).

During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in Bacolod City
upon the instruction(s) of private respondent to recuperate thereat and to handle
only administrative matters of the hacienda in that city. As a manager, petitioner
is not really obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao.

xxx xxx xxx

After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special circumstances
involved and basic human experience, petitioner's illness and strained family
relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be considered as justifiable reason
for petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence from work during the period of October
1982 to December 1982. In any event, such absence does not warrant outright
dismissal without notice and hearing.

xxx xxx xxx

The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee are as

follows:

(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or

justifiable reason; and (2) clear intention to sever the employer-
employee tie (Samson Alcantara, Reviewer in Labor and Social
Legislation, 1989 edition, p. 133).

This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute abandonment.

In Dagupan Bus Company v. NLRC (191 SCRA 328), the Court rules that for
abandonment to arise, there must be a concurrence of the intention to abandon
and some overt act from which it may be inferred that the employee has no more
interest to work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC (184
SCRA 25), for abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of
employment, there must be a deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to
resume his employment. . . Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be
accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee
simply does not want to work anymore.

There are significant indications in this case, that there is no abandonment. First,
petitioner's absence and his decision to leave his residence inside Hacienda
Manucao, is justified by his illness and strained family relations. Second he has
some medical certificates to show his frail health. Third, once able to work,
petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private respondent of his intention
 to assume again his employment. Last, but not the least, he at once instituted a
complaint for illegal dismissal when he realized he was unjustly dismissed. All
these are indications that petitioner had no intention to abandon his
employment.20

The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's confinement in
the hospital for his various afflictions which required medical treatment. Neither can it be
denied that private respondent was well aware of petitioner's state of health as the former
admittedly shouldered part of the medical and hospital bills and even advised the latter to stay
in Bacolod City until he was fit to work again. The disagreement as to whether or not
petitioner's ailments were so serious as to necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods
for recuperation is beside the point. The fact remains that on account of said illnesses, the details
of which were amply substantiated by the attending physician,21 and as the records are bereft of
any suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner, there was justifiable cause for
petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it is clear, deliberate and unjustified refusal to
resume employment and not mere absence that is required to constitute abandonment as a valid
ground for termination of employment.22

With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner unmistakably may be
classified as a managerial employee23 to whom the law grants an amount of discretion in the
discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner stated that "I assigned myself where I want
to go,"24 he was simply being candid about what he could do within the sphere of his authority.
His duties as farm administrator did not strictly require him to keep regular hours or to be at
the office premises at all times, or to be subjected to specific control from his employer in every
aspect of his work. What is essential only is that he runs the farm as efficiently and effectively as
possible and, while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model employee, in this regard he
proved to be quite successful, as there was at least a showing of increased production during
the time that petitioner was in charge of farm operations.

If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the years 1983 to
1984, this is because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating from illness and on
account of which his attendance and direct involvement in farm operations were irregular and
minimal, hence the supervision and control exercisable by private respondent as employer was
necessarily limited. It goes without saying that the control contemplated refers only to matters
relating to his functions as farm administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal
affairs and activities.

While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm administrator,
petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm, there really was no explicit contractual
stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to begin with) requiring him to stay
therein for the duration of his employment or that any transfer of residence would justify the
termination of his employment. That petitioner changed his residence should not be taken
against him, as this is undeniably among his basic rights, nor can such fact of transfer of
residence per se be a valid ground to terminate an employer-employee relationship.

Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his son's intention
of returning to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept petitioner on the payroll,
reported him as an employee of the hacienda for social security purposes, and paid his salaries
and benefits with the mandated deductions therefrom until the end of December, 1982. It was
only in January, 1983 when he became convinced that petitioner would no longer return to
work that he considered the latter to have abandoned his work and, for this reason, no longer
listed him as an employee. According to private respondent, whatever amount of money was
given to petitioner from that time until
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles from a
father to a son, and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were made therefrom. It
was only in April, 1984 that private respondent completely stopped giving said pension or
allowance when he was angered by what he heard petitioner had been saying about sending
him to jail.

Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral deposition
regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him, "(h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have
burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of petitioner's intention to abandon his job. In
addition to insinuations of sinister motives on the part of petitioner in working at the farm and
thereafter abandoning the job upon accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent takes
the novel position that the agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned the
administration of the farm legally converts the initial abandonment to implied voluntary
resignation.25

As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew about
petitioner's illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. The assertion
regarding abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his continued
performance of various services related to the operations of the farm from May to the last
quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his father's accountant and legal adviser about the
reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued since April, 1984, and his indication of
having recovered and his willingness and capability to resume his work at the farm as
expressed in a letter dated September 14, 1984.26 With these, petitioner contends that it is
immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are designated, whether as salary, pension or
allowance, with or without deductions, as he was entitled thereto in view of his continued
service as farm administrator.27

To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may justly be
made there must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to report for work or
absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-
employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being
manifested by some overt acts. Such intent we find dismally wanting in this case.

It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's plans of
returning to work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982, prolonged though it
may have been, was not without valid causes of which private respondent had full knowledge.
As to what convinced or led him to believe that petitioner was no longer returning to work,
private respondent neither explains nor substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at
such a conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as even after
January, 1983, when private respondent supposedly "became convinced" that petitioner would
no longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform services directly required by his
position as farm administrator. These are duly and correspondingly evidenced by such acts as
picking up some farm machinery/equipment from G.A. Machineries, Inc.,28 claiming and
paying for additional farm equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to
Bacolod through Zip Forwarders,29 getting the payment of the additional cash advances for
molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex Commodities, Inc.,30 and remitting to private
respondent through
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil.31

It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to the normal
activities and operations of the farm. True, it is a father's prerogative to request or even
command his child to run errands for him. In the present case, however, considering the nature
of these transactions, as well as the property values and monetary sums involved, it is unlikely
that private respondent would leave the matter to just anyone. Prudence dictates that these
matters be handled by someone who can be trusted or at least be held accountable therefor, and
who is familiar with the terms, specifications and other details relative thereto, such as an
employee. If indeed petitioner had abandoned his job or was considered to have done so by
private respondent, it would be awkward, or even out of place, to expect or to oblige petitioner
to concern himself with matters relating to or expected of him with respect to what would then
be his past and terminated employment. It is hard to imagine what further authority an
employer can have over a dismissed employee so as to compel him to continue to perform
work-related tasks:

It is also significant that the special power of attorney32 executed

by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating —

xxx xxx xxx

That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident of Hda.
Manucao, hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane
planter, BISCOM Mill District, and a duly accredited planter-member of the
BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;

That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with BIPA

representing payment for all checks and papers to which I am entitled to (sic) as
such planter-member;

That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these presents

I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT

JON de YSASI III

whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME and in my

name, place and stead, my check/checks aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-
 FACT being herein given the power and authority to sign for me and in my
name, place and stead, the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said
check/checks. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
cannot cash the said check/checks, but to turn the same over to me for my
proper disposition.

That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my

Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the receipts
therefor.

That I further request that my said check/checks be made a "CROSSED CHECK".

xxx xxx xxx

remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been terminated by
reason of abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests for an explanation
regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits,33 the issuance of withholding tax
reports,34 as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and readiness to go back to
work,35 and, specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal are hardly the acts of
one who has abandoned his work.

We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for private
respondent, ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the latter's intention to
abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of such deposition without the
presence of petitioner's counsel, and the failure of private respondent to serve reasonably
advance notice of its taking to said counsel, thereby foreclosing his opportunity to
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on the
Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative Assistant
Celestina G. Ovejera of said office.36 Fair play dictates that at such an important stage of the
proceedings, which involves the taking of testimony, both parties must be afforded equal
opportunity to examine and cross-examine a witness.

As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as salary,

pension, allowance or ex gratia handout, there is no question as to petitioner's entitlement
thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his capacity as farm administrator. The
change in description of said amounts contained in the pay slips or in the receipts prepared by
private respondent cannot be deemed to be determinative of petitioner's employment status in
view of the peculiar circumstances above set out. Besides, if such amounts were truly in the
nature of allowances given by a parent out of concern for his child's welfare, it is rather unusual
that receipts therefor37 should be necessary and required as if they were ordinary business
expenditures.

Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged abandonment
was converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the father's agreement to
support his son after the latter abandoned his work. As we have determined that no
abandonment took place in this case, the monthly sums received by petitioner, regardless of
designation, were in consideration for services rendered emanating from an employer-
employee relationship and were not of a character that can qualify them as mere civil support
given out of parental duty and solicitude. We are also hard put to imagine how abandonment
can be impliedly converted into a voluntary resignation without any positive act on the part of
the employee conveying a desire to terminate his employment. The very concept of resignation
as a ground for termination by the employee of his employment38 does not square with the
elements constitutive of abandonment.

On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private respondent
of the due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice and hearing.39 Private
respondent, in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases where the employer seeks to terminate the
services of an employee on any of the grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code,
but not to the situation obtaining in this case where private respondent did not dismiss
petitioner on any ground since it was petitioner who allegedly abandoned his employment.40

The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set out in Rule
XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this wise:

Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall
furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission(s) constituting
the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, notice shall be
served at the worker's last known address.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the allegations as stated
against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of
such notice. The employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard
and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.

Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately notify a worker in

writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.

Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. — Any decision taken by the employer shall be
without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of
his dismissal by filing a complaint with the Regional Branch of the Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. — The employer shall submit a monthly report to the
Regional Office having jurisdiction over the place of work at all dismissals
effected by him during the month, specifying therein the names of the dismissed
workers, the reasons for their dismissal, the dates of commencement and
termination of employment, the positions last held by them and such other
information as may be required by the Ministry for policy guidance and
statistical purposes.
Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that petitioner was
denied his right to due process since he was never given any notice about his impending
dismissal and the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be heard. Even as private respondent
controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin requirements of procedural due process in
this particular case, he in effect admits that no notice was served by him on petitioner. This fact
is corroborated by the certification issued on September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for
Region VI of the Department of Labor that no notice of termination of the employment of
petitioner was submitted thereto.41

Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be denied that
notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed, as the second sentence
of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires service thereof at the
employee's last known address, by way of substantial compliance. While it is conceded that it is
the employer's prerogative to terminate an employee, especially when there is just cause
therefor, the requirements of due process cannot be lightly taken. The law does not countenance
the arbitrary exercise of such a power or prerogative when it has the effect of undermining the
fundamental guarantee of security of tenure in favor of the employee.42

On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor General
rejoins as follows:

The Labor Arbiter held thus:

While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his

defense of implied resignation and/or abandonment, records
somehow showed that he failed to notify the Department of
Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic)
aba(n)donment as required by BP 130. And for this failure, the
other requisite for a valid termination by an employer was not
complied with. This however, would not work to invalidate the
otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for dismissal. The
validity of the cause of dismissal must be upheld at all times
provided however that sanctions must be imposed on the
respondent for his failure to observe the notice on due process
requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80587). (Decision
Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C" Petition), . . .

This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69.
In Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is dismissed for just
cause, he must not be rewarded
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe procedural
due process. The public policy behind this is that, it may encourage the employee
to do even worse and render a mockery of the rules of discipline required to be
observed. However, the employer must be penalized for his infraction of due
process. In the present case, however, not only was petitioner dismissed without
due process, but his dismissal is without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon
his employment because he has a justifiable excuse.43
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory
provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed employee to
reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed the imposition of the penalty of P5,000.00
on private respondent for violation of the due process requirements. Private respondent, for his
part, maintains that there was error in imposing the fine because that penalty contemplates the
failure to submit the employer's report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional office, as
required under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of the implementing rules, and not the
failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be dismissed by the employer.

Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of every
worker to security of tenure.44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory mandates, the
Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in case of its denial:

Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall
not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when
authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall
be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits of
their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of actual reinstatement.

Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the absence
of just cause for dismissal.45 The Court, however, on numerous occasions has tempered the rigid
application of said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing that in some cases certain events
may have transpired as would militate against the practicability of granting the relief
thereunder provided, and declares that where there are strained relations between the employer
and the employee, payment of back wages and severance pay may be awarded instead of
reinstatement,46 and more particularly when managerial employees are concerned.47 Thus,
where reinstatement is no longer possible, it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed
employee be given his fair and just share of what the law accords him.48

We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination, to wit:

As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be

entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages
computed from the time his compensation was withheld up to the time of his
reinstatement. (Morales vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement Company,
Inc. vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 192, this Honorable Court held that when it comes to
reinstatement, differences should be made between managers and the ordinary
workingmen. The Court concluded that a company which no longer trusts its
managers cannot operate freely in a competitive and profitable manner. The
NLRC should know the difference between managers and ordinary
workingmen. It cannot imprudently order the reinstatement of managers with
the same ease and liberality as that of rank and file workers who had been
terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement may not be appropriate or feasible in case
of antipathy or antagonism between the parties (Morales, vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA
295).
 In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated as
farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The present relationship of petitioner
and private respondent (is) so strained that a harmonious and peaceful
employee-employer relationship is hardly possible.49

III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his dismissal from
employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or was contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy. He further prays for exemplary damages to serve as a
deterrent against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other employers.

Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to compensate one for
diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social
humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act or omission of the
defendant which was the proximate cause thereof.50 Exemplary damages, under Article 2229,
are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. They are not recoverable as a matter of right,
it being left to the court to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.51

We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing recovery of
moral damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or
constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy,52 and of exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected in a wanton,
oppressive or malevolent manner.53 We do not feel, however, that an award of the damages
prayed for in this petition would be proper even if, seemingly, the facts of the case justify their
allowance. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and exemplary damages
were awarded, the dismissed employees were genuinely without fault and were undoubtedly
victims of the erring employers' capricious exercise of power.

In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be faulted
for fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this controversy, instead of
sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate claims. The records reveal how
their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and the undeniable enmity between them
negates the likelihood that either of them acted in good faith. It is apparent that each one has a
cause for damages against the other. For this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary
damages can rightfully be awarded to petitioner.

On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following recommendation of
the Solicitor General:

The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be modified. There
was no voluntary abandonment in this case because petitioner has a justifiable
excuse for his absence, or such absence does not warrant outright dismissal
without notice and hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty of illegal
dismissal. He should be ordered to pay backwages for a period not exceeding
three years from date of dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement, petitioner may
be paid separation pay equivalent to one (1) month('s) salary for every year of
service, a fraction of six months being considered as one (1) year in accordance
 with recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims for
damages should be dismissed, for both parties are equally at fault.54

The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely
disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded that their ethical
duty as lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as much
their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal
conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate
consanguineous ties between their clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a
lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement
or withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise
counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for
compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.56

Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall
encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement."
On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was expected of them, despite
their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that they took pains to
initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary,
their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as
they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.

In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been
less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall
exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction."57 If
he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this
controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.

One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to make.
The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family leaves a bad taste in
the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful and enduring resolution is
really achieved in such situations. While we are convinced that we have adjudicated the legal
issues herein squarely on the bases of law and jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are
saddened by the thought that we may have failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father
and son who figured as parties to this dispute, and that our adherence here to law and duty
may unwittingly contribute to the breaking, instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds. In
fine, neither of the parties herein actually emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope,
therefore, that with the impartial exposition and extended explanation of their respective rights
in this decision, the parties may eventually see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their
differences on more convivial terms.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby SET
ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not
exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction,58 and, in lieu of reinstatement,
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months
being considered as one (1) whole year.
 EN BANC

July 19, 2016

A.C. No. 6387

GABINO V. TOLENTINO and FLORDELIZA C. TOLENTINO, Complainants

vs.
ATTY. HENRY B. SO and ATTY. FERDINAND L.ANCHETA, Respondents

RESOLUTION

PERCURIAM, J.:

This resolves a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Henry B. So for neglect in handling a
case, and respondent Atty. Ferdinand L. Ancheta for extorting ₱200,000.00 from a client.

Complainant Flordeliza C. Tolentino was the defendant in Civil Case No. SC-2267
entitled "Benjamin Caballes v. Flordeliza Caballes," a case involving recovery of possession of a
parcel of land.1 On June 24, 1991, Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
rendered the Decision2 against complainant Flordeliza ordering her to vacate the land.

The case was appealed3 to the Court of Appeals through complainant Flordeliza's counsel, Atty.
Edilberto U. Coronado (Atty. Coronado). While the appeal was pending, Atty. Coronado was
replaced by Atty. Henry B. So (Atty. So), a lawyer of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of
the Department of Agrarian Reform.4

Complainants Flordeliza and Gabino V. Tolentino, her husband, afterwards learned that the
Court of Appeals affirmed5 the Regional Trial Court Decision against complainant Flordeliza.
Complainants contend that Atty. So did not inform them nor take the necessary action to
elevate the case to this Court.6 Thus, they were compelled to secure the legal services of Atty.
Ferdinand L. Ancheta (Atty. Ancheta), whom they paid ₱30,000.00 as acceptance fee.7

Atty. Ancheta allegedly promised them that there was still a remedy against the adverse Court
of Appeals Decision, and that he would file a "motion to reopen appeal case."8 Atty. Ancheta
also inveigled them to part with the amount of ₱200,000.00 purportedly to be used for making
arrangements with tlie Justices of the Court of Appeals before whom their case was pending.9

Initially, complainants did not agree to Atty. Ancheta's proposal because they did not have the
money and it was against the law.10 However, they eventually acceded when Atty. Ancheta told
them that it was the only recourse they had to obtain a favorable judgment.11

Hence, in January 2003, they deposited ₱200,000.00 to Atty. Ancheta's Bank Account No.
1221275656 with the United Coconut Planters Bank.12

Complainants were surprised to learn that no "motion to reopen case" had been filed,13 and the
Court of Appeals Decision had become final and executory.14
Hence, complainants sought to recover the amount of ₱200,000.00 from Atty. Ancheta. Through
a letter dated September 10, 200315 by their new counsel, complainants demanded for the return
of the ₱200,000.00. However, Atty. Ancheta did not heed their demand despite receipt of the
letter.

On May 17, 2004, complainants filed their Sinumpaang Sakdal16 praying for the disbarment of
Atty. So for neglect in handling complainant Flordeliza's case, and Atty. Ancheta for defrauding
them of the amount of ₱200,000.00.

Atty. So counters that he was no longer connected with the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance
of the Department of Agrarian Reform when the Court of Appeals Decision was promulgated
on July 16, 2001.17 He alleges that he worked at the Bureau from 1989 to 1997, and that he
resigned to prepare for the elections in his hometown in Western Samar.18 It was a procedure in
the Bureau that once a handling lawyer resigns or retires, his or her cases are reassigned to
other lawyers of the Bureau.19

Atty. Ancheta did not file a comment despite due notice. Hence, in this Court's Resolution
dated February 23, 2011,20 he was deemed to have waived his right to file a comment. This
Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and
recommendation.21

On June 8, 2011, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
directed the parties to appear for mandatory conference at 10:00 a.m. on July 6,
2011.22 However, on July 6, 2011, only Atty. So appeared.23 Since there was no showing on
record that complainants and Atty. Ancheta were notified, the mandatory conference was reset
to August 10, 2011 at 10:00 a.m.24

In the August 10, 2011 mandatory conference, complainant Flordeliza was represented by her
daughter, Arlyn Tolentino, together with counsel, Atty. Restituto Mendoza.25 Arlyn Tolentino
informed the Commission that complainant Gabino V. Tolentino had already
died.26 Respondents did not appear despite due notice.27

Hence, the mandatory conference was terminated, and the parties were directed to submit their
respective verified position papers within a non-extendible period of 10 days from notice. After,
the case would be submitted for report and recommendation.28

On September 19, 2011, complainant Flordeliza filed as her position paper, a Motion for
Adoption of the Pleadings and their Annexes in this Case,29 including the relevant
documents30 in Criminal Case No. SC-1191 (for estafa) against Atty. Ancheta, which she filed.

Atty. So filed his Position Paper31 on September 15, 2011. Atty. Ancheta did not file any position
paper.32

The Commission on Bar Discipline recommended33 that Atty. So be absolved of the charge
against him for insufficiency of evidence.34 As to Atty. Ancheta, the Commission found him
guilty of serious misconduct and deceit and recommended his disbarment.35
In the Resolution36 dated December 14, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors adopted and approved the findings and recommendations of the Investigating
Commissioner.

On January 11, 2016, the Board of Governors transmitted its Resolution to this Court for final
action, pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.37

This Court accepts and adopts the findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines correctly absolved Atty. So of the charge of negligence in
the performance of his duties as counsel of complainant Flordeliza.

Complainants fault Atty. So for failing to inform them about the Court of Appeals Decision and
for not taking the necessary steps to elevate their case to this Court.38 However, it is undisputed
that Atty. So was no longer employed at the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance when the
Court of Appeals Decision was rendered on July 16, 2001. Atty. So had resigned in 1997, four (4)
years before the Decision was promulgated.39

Atty. So handled the appeal of complainant Flordeliza in his capacity as a government-

employed legal officer of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of the Department of
Agrarian Reform. In his Notice of Appearance40 dated August 11, 1993 and Motion to Admit
Additional Evidence41 dated November 22, 1993 filed before the Court of Appeals, Atty. So
affixed his signature under the representation of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance.

Atty. So's appearance for complainant Flordeliza may be likened to that of a lawyer assigned to
handle a case for a private law firm's client. If the counsel resigns, _the firm is simply bound to
provide a replacement.42 Similarly, upon Atty. So's resignation, the Director of the Bureau
merely reassigned his case assignment to other lawyers in the Bureau even without
complainants' consent.

It would have been prudent for Atty. So to have informed complainants about his resignation
and the eventual reassignment of their case to another lawyer, although this was not required.
Still, Atty. So's omission is not of such gravity that would warrant his disbarment or
suspension. The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where
there is a clear preponderance of evidence of the respondent's misconduct affecting his standing
and moral character as an officer of the court and member of the bar.43

On the other hand, complainants were not entirely blameless. Had complainants been indeed
vigilant in protecting their rights, they should have followed up on the status of their appeal;
thus, they would have been informed of Atty. So's resignation. Atty. So resigned four (4) years
before the Court of Appeals Decision was promulgated.44 Thus, complainants had ample time
to engage the services of a new lawyer to safeguard their interests if they chose to do so. A party
cannot blame his or her counsel for negligence when he or she is guilty of neglect.45
 II

The same conclusion cannot be made with regards Atty. Ancheta. We agree with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines' recommendation that he should be disbarred.

Atty. Ancheta's repeated failure to comply with several of this Court's Resolutions requiring
him to comment on the complaint lends credence to complainants' allegations. It manifests his
tacit admission. Hence, we resolve this case on the basis of complainants' Sinumpaang Sakdal and
its Annexes.

It was established by the evidence on record that (1) Atty. Ancheta received the acceptance fee
of ₱30,000.00 on December 9, 2002;46 and (2) complainants deposited on January 17, 200347 the
amount of ₱200,000.00 to Atty. Ancheta's bank account. Atty. Ancheta made false promises to
complainants that something could still be done with complainant Flordeliza's case despite the
Court of Appeals Decision having already attained finality on September 22, 2001.48 Worse, he
proposed bribing the Justices of the Court of Appeals in order to solve their legal dilemma.

Atty. Ancheta should have very well known that a decision that has attained finality is no
longer open for reversal and should be respected.49 A lawyer's duty to assist in the speedy
administration of justice50 demands recognition that at a definite time, issues must be laid to rest
and litigation ended.51 As such, Ancheta should have advised complainants to accept the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and accord respect to the just claim of the opposite party. He
should have tempered his clients' propensity to litigate and save them from additional expense
in pursuing their contemplated action. Instead, he gave them confident assurances that the case
could still be reopened and even furnished them a copy of his prepared "motion to reopen case."
Despite his representation that he would file the motion, however, he did not do so.52

Atty. Ancheta's deceit and evasion of duty is manifest. He accepted the case though he knew
the futility of an appeal. Despite receipt of the ₱30,000.00 acceptance fee, he did not act on his
client's case. Moreover, he prevailed upon complainants to give him ₱200,000.00 purportedly to
be used to bribe the Justices of the Court of Appeals in order to secure a favorable ruling,
palpably showing that he himself was unconvinced of the merits of the case. "A lawyer shall
not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's
cause."53 Atty. Ancheta's misconduct betrays his lack of appreciation that the practice of law is a
profession, not a money-making trade.54

As a servant of the law, Atty. Ancheta's primary duty was to obey the laws and promote respect
for the law and legal processes.55Corollary to this duty is his obligation to abstain from
dishonest or deceitful conduct,56 as well as from "activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system."57 Atty. Ancheta's advice involving corruption of
judicial officers tramps the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and the judicial system
and adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.

Complainants eventually found out about his duplicity and demanded for the return of their
money.58 Still, Atty. Ancheta did not return the ₱200,000.00 and the ₱30,000.00 despite his
failure to render any legal service to his clients..59
Atty. Ancheta breached the following duties embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

CANON 7 - A LA WYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR.

....

CANON 15 -A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL

HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

....

Rule 15.05. - A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the
merits and probable results of the client's case, neither overstating nor understating the
prospects of the case.

Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official,
tribunal or legislative body.

Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles
of fairness.

....

CANON 16 -A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01. - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.

....

Rule 16.03. - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand ....

....

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL
BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.

....
Rule 18.03. - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

A lawyer "must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber, which are not only conditions
precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are likewise essential demands for his continued
membership therein."60 Atty. Ancheta's deceit in dealing with his clients constitutes gross
professional misconduct61 and violates his oath, thus justifying his disbarment under Rule 138,
Section 2762 of the Rules of Court.

Furthermore, his failure to heed the following Resolutions of the Court despite notice
aggravates his misconduct:

(1) Resolution63 dated June 21, 2004, requiring him to comment on the complaint;

(2) Resolution64 dated October 16, 2006, directing him to show cause why he should not
be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the June 21,
2004 Resolution;

(3) Resolution65 dated January 21, 2009, imposing upon him the penalty of ₱l,000.00 for
failure to comply with the June 21, 2004 and October 16, 2006 Resolutions;

(4) Resolution66 dated January 27, 2010, imposing an additional fine of ₱2,000.00 or a
penalty of imprisonment of 10 days for failure to comply with the January 21, 2009
Resolution; and

(5) Resolution67 dated January 12, 2011, ordering his arrest and directing the National
Bureau of Investigation to arrest and detain him for five (5) days and until he complied
with the previous Resolutions.

Atty. Ancheta's cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of this Court constitutes utter
disrespect of the judicial institution. His conduct shows a high degree of irresponsibility and
betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character. Indeed, his continued indifference to this Court's
orders constitutes willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which, under Rule
138, Section 2768 of the Rules of Court, is in itself a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment.

The maintenance of a high standard of legal proficiency, honesty, and fair dealing69 is a
prerequisite to making the bar an effective instrument in the proper administration of
justice.70 Any member, therefore, who fails to live up to the exacting standards of integrity and
morality exposes himself or herself to administrative liability.71

Atty. Ancheta's violations show that he is unfit to discharge the duties of a member of the legal
profession.1âwphi1 Hence, he should be disbarred.72

WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Henry B. So is DISMISSED for

insufficiency of evidence. On the other hand, this Court finds respondent Atty. Ferdinand L.
Ancheta GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility and hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law. The Office of
the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to remove the name of Ferdinand L. Ancheta from the Roll of
Attorneys.

Respondent Ancheta is ORDERED to return to complainants Gabino V. Tolentino and

Flordeliza C. Tolentino, within 30 days from receipt of this Resolution, the total amount of
₱230,000.00, with legal interest at 12% per annum from the date of demand on September 10,
2003 to June 30, 2013, and at 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment. Respondent
Ancheta is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court proof of payment of the amount within
10 days from payment.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts in
the country.

This Resolution takes effect immediately.

 THIRD DIVISION
[ A.C. No. 9067, January 31, 2018 ]
MARJORIE A. APOLINAR-PETILO, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. ARISTEDES A. MARAMOT,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer is a disciple of truth because he swore upon his admission to the Bar that he would do
no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court, and that he would conduct himself as a
lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to his clients. His violation of the Lawyer's Oath through the commission of falsehood
can be condignly sanctioned.

Antecedents
In hercomplaint-affidavit,[1] complainant Marjorie A. Apolinar-Petilo (Marjorie) alleges that the
respondent consented to, abetted and participated in the illegal act of falsifying a public
document in violation of Article 171(4) in relation to Article 172(2) of the Revised Penal Code; and
that he thereby violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The public document in question was the deed of donation[2] executed in favor of Princess Anne
Apolinar-Petilo (Princess Anne) and Ma. Mommayda V. Apolinar (Mommayda) who were only
12 years old and 16 1/2 years old, respectively, at the time of its execution.[3] Asserting that the
respondent had known of the minority of the donees, Marjorie insists that he was thereby guilty
of falsification first in his capacity as a lawyer by preparing the deed of donation and indicating
therein that both donees were then "of legal age"; and as a notary public by notarizing the
document. She claims that he, being Mommayda's counsel in the latter's adoption case, was
aware of the untruthful statements he made in the deed of donation because he thereafter
submitted the deed of donation as evidence therein.[4]
In his answer, the respondent states that Margarita Apolinar (Margarita) and her sister-in-law
Justina Villanueva-Apolinar (Justina) went to his law office sometime in 2000; that Margarita
was a grandaunt who owned a parcel of land in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro that she wanted to
donate to Princess Anne, Marjorie's own daughter, and Mommayda, the adopted daughter of
Justina; that upon learning of Princess Anne's minority, he advised that she had to be
represented by either parent;[5] that not one to be easily turned down, Margarita persisted, and
prevailed over him; that he thereupon prepared the deed of donation but left the date, the
document number and page number blank; that he reserved the notarization for later after the
parties had signed the document; that he allowed Margarita to bring the deed of donation to
Manila where she was supposedly proceeding in order to procure the signature of Princess
Anne thereon and as a way of avoiding additional travel expenses; and that Justina had
mentioned to him at the time that Margarita was then suffering from colon cancer and had only
a little time to live.
The respondent recalled that a month afterwards Margarita and Justina returned to him with
the signed deed of donation; that he then noticed that the document did not bear the signatures
of Princess Anne's parents; that Margarita again offered to procure the signatures on the
document; and that Margarita and Justina did not anymore return with the document until the
time when he had to enter the instrument in his notarial book for his monthly report.
Margarita eventually died on April 13, 2003. Later on, with issues about her properties left
unresolved, the relationship among her relatives quickly turned sour, and the deed of donation
again came to the fore. In 2004, Justina and her husband Tomas went to see the respondent and
confided to him that they were entangled in a court battle with Marjorie, their niece, over
Margarita's properties, including the apartment in Manila where they had been occupying since
1980. They then learned from the respondent that because Mommayda's birth certificate had
been simulated, they needed to legally adopt her in order to enable her to inherit from them.
Hence, they filed a petition for the adoption of Mommayda, which did not sit well with
Marjorie.

Claiming that her successional rights as a niece or heir to Tomas vis-a-vis would be adversely
affected by the adoption of Mommayda, Marjorie vigorously opposed the petition for adoption,
and argued for its dismissal on the basis that Tomas and Justina were not morally capable of
adoption as shown by their simulation of the birth of Mommayda. Marjorie also brought several
criminal cases in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on the ground of the simulation of the
birth and falsification of the birth certificate of Mommayda in violation of Articles 347, 359, 183
and 184 of the Revised Penal Code.
Marjorie's opposition to the petition for adoption and her criminal charges were dismissed. Also
dismissed were her opposition to the petition of Tomas and Justina for the correction of entry in
Mommayda's birth certificate, as well as Marjorie's motion to recall the social worker for cross
examination in the adoption case. The respondent claims that Marjorie -exasperated and
dissatisfied with the outcome - then turned against him and instituted the complaint for his
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.[6]
The respondent submits that there was nothing illegal in the deed of donation; that as the sole
owner of the donated land, Margarita had an absolute right to dispose of her property by
donation; that no law prohibited donations to minors; and that the filing of the petition for
judicial partition was an express if not implied ratification of the defect in the donation; and that
in regard to the submission of the simulated birth certificate in evidence, the purpose of filing
the petition for adoption was to rectify the simulation and to convert the relationship between
Mommayda and her adopting parents into a legal one.[7]
During the mandatory conference set by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission
on Bar Discipline, Marjorie admitted that a petition for judicial partition involving the donated
land was meanwhile filed; that a compromise agreement[8] was reached; and that Princess Anne
sold her share to Mommayda.[9]
In his position paper,[10] the respondent asserts that the complaint was pure harassment
calculated only to besmirch and malign his reputation; and that the complaint was also a
premeditated tactic to prolong or pre-empt the adoption case considering that a favorable ruling
thereat would adversely affect Marjorie's rights as an heir of Mommayda's parents.
In his resolution dated May 22, 2008,[11] the IBP Commissioner recommended that:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the undersigned Commissioner finds
respondent Atty. Aristedes A. Maramot to have violated the Notarial Law, his act having
undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents; and, respectfully recommends
his suspension from notarial practice for a period of one (1) year while the other complaints
against him are recommended dismissed for lack of merit.[12]
In his motion for reconsideration,[13] the respondent submitted that he did not employ any
falsity because it was only Margarita - the donor - who had in fact attested to the execution of
the deed of donation in the notarial acknowledgement of the deed of donation; that it was
inconsequential even if Princess Anne had signed the deed of donation not in his presence; that
in conveyances, only the person encumbering or conveying needed to personally appear, sign
and acknowledge the deed before the notary public; and that Princess Anne and Mommayda's
names were placed in the document merely for them to accept the donation.
The respondent pleads for the mitigation of his liability considering that he has exhibited
candor in admitting his offense. He represents that his act was not gross enough as to justify
suspension; that the complainant had thereby suffered no damage, but had actually benefitted
from the act; that he had notarized in good faith; and that with this offense being his first in his
12 years as a law practitioner and as notary public, humanitarian considerations should be
considered in his favor because he had children to support and had been his family's sole bread
winner.

In her comment on the respondent's motion for reconsideration,[14] Majorie avers that Princess
Anne could not have signed the instrument in Manila because her daughter was then studying
in Victoria, Oriental Mindoro.
In Resolution No. XVII-2008-337 dated July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the report and recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline, but modified
the penalty by recommending the immediate revocation of the respondent's notarial
commission and his disqualification from reappointment as a notary for two years, thus:[15]
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A";
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and for Respondent's violation of the Notarial Law, Atty. Aristedes Maramot is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, immediate Revocation of his
Notarial Commission if presently Commissioned and Disqualified from reappointment as
Notary Public for Two (2) years.[16]
The IBP Board of Governors denied the respondent's motion for reconsideration through
Resolution No. XIX-2011-424 dated June 26, 2011,[17] thus:
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no
cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Board and it being a mere reiteration of the matters
which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, for lack of substantial
ground or reason to disturb it, the Board of Governors' Resolution No. XVIII-2008-337 dated
July 17, 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED.[18]
On September 6, 2011, the respondent filed in this Court his Comment on the IBP Board of
Governor's Resolution No. XVII-2008-337 and No. XIX-2011-424 dated August 16, 2011.[19]
In its Report dated June 27, 2012,[20] the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended to treat the
comment as a petition for review.
On February 15, 2012, the respondent filed an amended comment dated December 5, 2011.[21]
On July 23, 2012, the Court resolved: (1) to direct the respondent to furnish the IBP a copy of his
amended comment and submit proof of its service within ten (10) days; and (2) to require the
complainant to file her comment thereon within 15 days from receipt.[22]
Accordingly, the complaint submitted her comment on November 9, 2012, opposing the
respondent's prayer for reconsideration and asking the Court to uphold the Resolutions of the
IBP Board of Governors.
 Ruling of the Court
We affirm the Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors.

A.
As a Lawyer
Every lawyer before entering his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Bar and an
officer of the Court, professes as a natural course the promises contained in the Lawyer's Oath,
to wit:

I do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, I will
support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to my clients, and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Emphasis supplied)
The letter and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath are oftentimes forgotten or taken for granted in the
course of the lawyer's practice of law. To give teeth thereto, the Court has adopted and
instituted the Code of Professional Responsibility to govern every lawyer's relationship with his
profession, the courts, the society, and his clients.
Pertinent in this case are Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of Canon 1; and Rule 10.1 of Canon 10, which
provide:

CANON 1 - x x x

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 10 - x x x

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

The respondent prepared the deed of donation. At the time of his preparation of the document,
he actually knew that Princess Anne was a minor; hence, his claim of having then advised that
her parents should represent her in the execution of the document. Mommayda was likewise a
minor. His awareness of the latter's minority at the time was not disputed because he was also
representing Mommayda in the latter's adoption proceedings aside from being Mommayda's
neighbor. Nonetheless, he still indicated in the deed of donation that the donees were of legal
age. His doing so, being undeniably dishonest, was contrary to his oath as a lawyer not to utter
a falsehood. He thereby consciously engaged in an unlawful and dishonest conduct, defying the
law and contributing to the erosion of confidence in the Law Profession.
The respondent's explanation that it was only Margarita who actually acknowledged that the
deed of donation was her own free act and deed does not extricate him from responsibility. The
deed of donation, whether or not acknowledged by the donees, should not bear any false
statement upon a material fact. The ages of the donees were material because they bore on their
capacities to render the donation efficacious. That neither Princess Anne nor Mommayda
acknowledged the deed of donation did not cure the defect.

The respondent justifies himself by stating that the persistence of the donor Margarita prevailed
upon him to prepare the deed of donation as he had done; and adverts to the donor's assurance
that she would herself procure the signatures of the parents of Princess Anne on the document.
He also submits that the execution of the deed had redounded to the advantage of the minors;
and that there was no law that prohibited the donation in favor of minors.

The respondent cannot be relieved by his justifications and submissions. As a lawyer, he should
not invoke good faith and good intentions as sufficient to excuse him from discharging his
obligation to be truthful and honest in his professional actions. His duty and responsibility in
that regard were clear and unambiguous. In Young v. Batuegas,[23] this Court reminded that
truthfulness and honesty had the highest value for attorneys, thus:
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to his clients. He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to
correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice
and arriving at correct conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only
complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the
solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of
his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth.[24]
The respondent posits that a donation could be made in favor of a minor. Such position was not
a factor, however, because whether or not a minor could benefit from the donation did not
determine the merits of the complaint for his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
Neither was his claim that the filing of the petition for judicial partition amounted to the
ratification of the deed of donation a factor to be considered in his favor. The decisive
consideration is whether or not he committed a falsehood in his preparation of the deed of
donation. Sadly for him, the answer is in the affirmative.

Relative to the respondent's submission of the false birth certificate of Mommayda in the
proceedings for her adoption, we adopt with approval the following findings and
recommendation made by the IBP Commissioner absolving the respondent, viz.:
The Certificate of Live Birth of Ma. Mommayda Villanueva Apolinar is certainly a simulated
one where it was made to appear that she was the biological child of Spouses Tomas V.
Apolinar and Justina P. Villanueva when she was not. It was not shown, however, that
respondent has a hand when its contents were given to the employee of the Local Civil
Registrar of Victoria, Mindoro Oriental. From the face of the document, it appears that Tomas
Apolinar himself gave the details and he signed the Certificate of Live concerned.

When the respondent used the document in the adoption case of Ma. Mommayda Villanueva
Apolinar by the Spouses Tomas and Justina Apolinar (docketed as Spec. Proc. No. R-04-5396,
RTC, Branch 40, Calapan City, Mindoro Oriental), the respondent did not misrepresent that Ma.
Mommayda V. Apolinar is the biological daughter of the petitioners. In fact, there was nothing
that was misrepresented in the allegations in the petition. This led to the filing of another case
for the correction of entry in the birth certificate of the same Ma. Mommayda V. Apolinar
docketed as Spec. proc. CV-05-5445. It was alleged therein that Leini Villanueva Guerrero and
Johnny Ortega are the biological parents of Ma. Mommayda Apolinar.[25]
B.
As a Notary Public
The respondent is also being hereby charged with having executed the notarial
acknowledgment for the deed of donation despite Princess Anne not having actually appeared
before him.

The respondent explains that he did not employ any falsity or dishonesty, and that he did not
make untruthful statements in executing the notarial acknowledgment.

In this respect, the IBP Commissioner observed that:

It cannot be denied that the respondent violated the Notarial Law when he, by his own
admission, notarized the Deed of Donation which was signed by at least one of the parties,
namely: the donee, Princess Anne Petilo, who signed not in the presence of the Notary Public
but somewhere in Metro Manila. This fact the respondent has admitted in his Answer (records,
P. 22 Statement of Facts, par. 3). For this reason, notaries public are once again reminded to
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise,
the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.
Hence a notary public should not notarized a document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to
the contents and truth of what are stated therein (Serzo vs. Flores, A.C. No. 6040 [formerly CBD
02-972, July 30, 2004] citing Fulgencio v. Martin, 403, 403 SCRA 216, 2200221).[26]
The IBP Commissioner obviously rendered his foregoing observations on the assumption that
Princess Anne had herself acknowledged the instrument not in the presence of the respondent
as the Notary Public. But, as borne out by the acknowledgment, only Margarita's name was
indicated as the person appearing before the respondent during the notarization of the
instrument, to wit:

BEFORE ME, on the date and at the place afore-cited personally appeared Margarita V.
Apolinar with her CTC indicated below her name and signature, issued at Victoria, Oriental
Mindoro, all known to me the same person who executed the foregoing instrument and she
acknowledged to me that the same is her own free act and deed (Emphasis supplied)[27]
Nonetheless, the respondent's denial of having employed any falsity or dishonesty, or of
making untruthful statements in executing the notarial acknowledgment does not necessarily
save the day for him. There is no question that a donation can be accepted in a separate
instrument. However, the deed of donation in question was also the same instrument that
apparently contained the acceptance.[28] The names of Princess Anne and Mommayda as the
donees, even if still minors, should have been included in the notarial acknowledgment of the
deed itself; and, in view of their minority, the names of their respective parents (or legal
guardians) assisting them should have also been indicated thereon. This requirement was not
complied with. Moreover, Princess Anne and Mommayda should have also signed the deed of
donation themselves along with their assisting parents or legal guardians.
The omission indicated that the deed of donation was not complete. Hence, the notarial
acknowledgment of the deed of donation was improper. Rule II Section 1 of the Rules on Notarial
Practice provides that:
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - "Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an individual on
a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally complete instrument
or document; x x x x
We cannot approve of the recommended penalty of suspension for one year. The circumstances
peculiar to the complaint call for lenity in favor of the respondent, but who must nonetheless be
sternly warned against a repetition of the offense at the risk of suffering a more stringent
penalty. We hold that the penalties commensurate to the offense is suspension from the practice
of law for six months.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. ARISTEDES

MARAMOT guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule
10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Rules on Notarial
Practice; SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for six months effective from notice of this
decision, with revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification from being re-
appointed as Notary Public for two years effective upon receipt; and warns him of a more
stringent penalty upon repetition of the offense.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. L-1117 March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.

OZAETA, J.:

The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:

Marriage

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity
avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any
matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said
advertisement; but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication
and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such
professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law
profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement was published only
once in the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by reason thereof.

Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of
the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25
of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It
is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his
wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them
to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities
as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for
the period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by
writing circular letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the
solicitations were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.

Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of
the opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
 FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 5299 August 19, 2003

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.

G.R. No. 157053 August 19, 2003

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his
capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000
issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667."1

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme
Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She
spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in
handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided
the case will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said
that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the
case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.

Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office
revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the
Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.2

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services,
in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court.3

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and
solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the
prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the
absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer
advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned.
Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court
promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to
law, public policy and public order as long as it is dignified.4

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution
No. XV-2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him
from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would
be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11,
2002.7

In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,8 which was denied by
the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 20029

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty.
Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr.,
Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents." This petition was
consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Court’s Resolution dated March 4, 2003.

In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they
were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.10 Complainant filed
his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or
evidence and is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records
thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.

We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business.

Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications
or legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.12 It is a profession in
which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits.13 The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration.14 The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the
primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they
owe to themselves.15 The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one
may attain the highest eminence without making much money;

2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving

thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and

unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on
their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.16

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that
he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the
Court’s indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal
services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to
violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in
the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.17 Ten months later, he caused
the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.18 Such acts of
respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court’s authority.

What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled
"Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not
only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the
contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients
that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the
case,19 he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would
have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for
solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is
made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the
bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and
residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing
the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now
acceptable.21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable.
As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:22
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer’s name and
the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended
with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public
offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in
bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities;
the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with
their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for
other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative
data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to
be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to
deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name
listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis
and italics supplied)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY

of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR
effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
 EN BANC

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, Petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., Respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition)
and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the
exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."chanrobles virtual law library

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.chanrobles virtual law library

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am- 6:00 pm 7-Flr.
Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSONchanrobles virtual law library

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota

Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call
Marivic.chanrobles virtual law library

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel.
521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community
in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at
its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal
services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7,
1977.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we
required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3)
Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women
Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas
(FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their
memoranda. 3The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services
and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and
gratitude.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either
case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained
of.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved
in this bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate
that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document
search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or business registration,
obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's
foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it
strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to
advertise one's legal services).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of
establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper
publications.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to
perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law
practice as aforedescribed. 4

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation
is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal
services.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The
Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is)
the effect that the advertisements have on the reading
public.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very
name being used by respondent - "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully
submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic
connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic"
connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes
doctors.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present
case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is
being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the
advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a
lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the
nature of the service or services being offered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as
claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice
does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal
support services," as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no
room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by
lawyers, whether true or not.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law,
morals, public order and public policy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only
meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements,
however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the
Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman entered into
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being
conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in
accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading,
but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be
considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in
Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just
Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not
suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the
inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to
emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to
encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of
applications for a marriage license.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the
above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The
Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest.
Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not
constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal
services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an
ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good,
thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of
the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted
that respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it
presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in
general.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of
evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but
instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar
encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such
business.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by
specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time
and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the
Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of
the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer
will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in
skill.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal
practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more
importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development in the profession may
be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal
practice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but
only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar.
Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the
more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the
public in general and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may
be undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of the factual
considerations involved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited

outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which
are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be
prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required
to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that
certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable
of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course
of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself
to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of

the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or
perform legal services.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to
represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or
regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law
practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before
allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and
By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Rules of Court. 5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal
support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd.
Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The
Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm
of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For
respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.
Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to
be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal
Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been
held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing
of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then take
them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation
cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously,
this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the
public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception,
especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business
conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as
members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to
the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and
the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession
open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is
a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that
not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons
engaged in unethical law practice. 6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:chanrobles virtual law library

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently
immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its
corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and
immoral advertising.

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders
"legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the
Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's
Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show
that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations
Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence
and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems;
the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other related
laws.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal
principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities
call for legal training, knowledge and experience.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the
practice of law." 7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:chanrobles virtual law library

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given
to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified
persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top
of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations.
Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of
justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify
these paralegals to deal with the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune
time to establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these
do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make
measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with
the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do
so.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may
be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited
under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant
case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by
"paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey
to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such services. 8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the

impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage,
immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which
are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's
name - The Legal Clinic, Inc. - does not help matters. It gives the impression again that
Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is,
as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are
lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only
"paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority
stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of
Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:chanrobles virtual law library

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of
gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of
Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is
illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the
celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly
fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers
authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting
marriage is not necessary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards
allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified
practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such
as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever
merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become
justifiable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and
divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly
reprehensible.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret
marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where
in this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the
Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the
public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals
should not be done.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by
an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character
justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services
rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not
unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent
(assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the
law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is

familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of
conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law,
and his use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend,
do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men know the law, but
it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . .
Our knowledge of the law - accurate or inaccurate - moulds our conduct not only when we are
acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen
generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or
profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building and
fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and
specification in harmony with the law. This is not practicing
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by
the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he
recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my
opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information,
and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law

library

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise
him and the architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an architect who
performed this function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved
for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by
lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not
the case. The most important body of the industrial relations experts are the officers and
business agents of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate
employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee
matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter,
and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the defendants
have the same service that the larger employers get from their own specialized
staff.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which
appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The court should be very cautious
about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of conducting business is
unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain function
have no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by
the graduates in their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any particular client or
customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law
defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the
practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts
are along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which he
must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the
architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does not transform
his activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed
services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance,
if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the adjustment of
grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly
skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the
employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an
exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by
brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way
and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and
persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept
the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men grows from differing
interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it.
But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the
proofs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal
government, especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency
of the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may
regulate the representation of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without
power to interfere with such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by one
whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the
right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther
representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever
the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d
800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may
involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:chanrobles
virtual law library

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal

problem;.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar;
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or

information.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a
whole.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:chanrobles virtual law library

Rule 15.08 - A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the
practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another
capacity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A"
Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and
making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if
the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the
practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of
marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials
may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer
buys materials on the subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what
courses of action to take.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal
Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal
advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text which
purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or
rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does
not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and
the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful
practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book
is sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual.
Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client.
THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE - THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING
OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to
offer general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a
specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's
publication does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person in a particular situation - in their publication and sale of
the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There
being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for
the injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons
seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed material or
writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of
the judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing his
manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact with any prospective
purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding that for the change of $75 or
$100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning
particular problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's
asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the
preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct
constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel
by the defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a
divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State
v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It
is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling,"
such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits
that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate
the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other
requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be
secret.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is
not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal
services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11chanrobles virtual
law library

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the
proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the
clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The
courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the
term, some of which we now take into account.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12chanrobles
virtual law library

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are
secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13chanrobles virtual law
library

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal
types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their
rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal
principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals
which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according
to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14chanrobles virtual
law library

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice
of law. 15One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing
law. 16Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the
conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17One who renders an opinion as to
the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing
law. 18chanrobles virtual law library

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid
down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:chanrobles virtual law library

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice
of law when he:

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies
and there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining
or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice,
as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p.
262, 263).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of
legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666,
citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and
observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised,
constitute "practice of law."chanrobles virtual law library

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the
services it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to
laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use
of computers and modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage,
transmission and reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized legal
research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or
lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact
finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other countries
that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of
preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve
representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or
software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and
other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20chanrobles virtual law
library

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical
and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the
efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials,
these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general
rule.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent
than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do
is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the
client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken
as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact
that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight
of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so
forth.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991
issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the
seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's
problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty.
Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take
care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal
problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law
firms.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing the
problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you,
they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we
operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our
specialists.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These
The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale
or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or
the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa
hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea,"
explains Atty. Nogales.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a
rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos
of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and
arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the
right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal
with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you
would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and
gather evidence to support the case. 21chanrobles virtual law library

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling.
What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the
services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against
the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this
proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts
for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22chanrobles virtual law library

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent
which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice
law. 23chanrobles virtual law library

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards
of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and
the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject
to the disciplinary control of the court. 24chanrobles virtual law library

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to
draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to
those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes
or rules specifically so provide. 25The practice of law is not a lawful business except for
members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules
of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments
previously acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as
possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect,
or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction,
interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26The justification for excluding from the practice of
law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but
in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by
incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little
control. 27chanrobles virtual law library

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first
be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has
done.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while
there are none in the Philippines. 28As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved
in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of
the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up
Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even
been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United
States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal
Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29chanrobles virtual law library

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to
practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render
legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission therefor. 30chanrobles virtual law library

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional
or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law
for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an
unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31That policy should continue to be
one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal
assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32chanrobles virtual law
library

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33He is not supposed to
use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory
or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34Nor shall he pay or
give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for,
publicity to attract legal business. 35Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not
resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes
in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like
self-laudation. 36chanrobles virtual law library

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A
lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37The prescription against advertising of
legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the
practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao
R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present
proceeding, 39was held to constitute improper advertising or
solicitation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of
the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25
of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It
is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his
wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them
to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities
as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).

We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as
the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a
normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer
needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda. 40chanrobles virtual law library

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the
profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the
extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely,
those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the
restrictions. 41chanrobles virtual law library
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with
the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data.
"Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and
the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended
with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public
offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in
bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities;
the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with
their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42chanrobles virtual law
library

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a
mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program.
Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or
contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower
the dignity or standing of the profession. 43chanrobles virtual law library

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name
listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44chanrobles
virtual law library

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do
not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
exceptions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at
bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a
lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a
statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written
schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in
the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any
state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46This goes to show that
an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made
only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the
prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision
in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was
found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of
lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to
allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to
aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity
has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point
in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times,
to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert
all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal
profession.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action,
to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48or to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 49Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator,
major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he
is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are
involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more
severely.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for
which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are
constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the
adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It
is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different
proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a
corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This
interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing
some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support
services.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo
warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of
respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the
instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under
the circumstances.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in
any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this
petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction
proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this
resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant
and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985

ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant

vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A.
TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS,
LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A.
CURAMMENG, JR., respondents.

Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.

Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought
to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker
& McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker
& McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release
of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to
Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie
"and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not having
received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.

We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines
(Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker
& McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members
and associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the
Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates
of Baker & Mckenzie.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie
constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services
of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade
and investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not
authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie.
 EN BANC

[A.C. NO. 5580 : June 15, 2005]

SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC., as represented by REBECCA V.

LABRADOR, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is a Petition1 for disbarment against Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos for allegedly representing
conflicting interests and for using the title "Judge" despite having been found guilty of grave
and serious misconduct in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos.2

The facts are as follows:

In 1985, respondent represented San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. (SJHAI) before the
Human Settlements Regulation Commission (HSRC) in a case3 against Durano and Corp., Inc.
(DCI) for violation of the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's Protection Act (P.D. No. 957).
SJHAI alleged that Lot No. 224 was designated as a school site in the subdivision plan that DCI
submitted to the Bureau of Lands in 1961 but was sold by DCI to spouses Ramon and Beatriz
Durano without disclosing it as a school site.

While still the counsel for SJHAI, respondent represented Myrna and Antonio Montealegre in
requesting for SJHAI's conformity to construct a school building on Lot No. 224 to be purchased
from Durano.

When the request was denied, respondent applied for clearance before the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in behalf of Montealegre. Petitioner's Board of Directors
terminated respondent's services as counsel and engaged another lawyer to represent the
association.

Respondent also acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-Rodriguez who substituted for DCI in Civil
Case No. 18014 entitled "San Jose Homeowners, Inc. v. Durano and Corp., Inc." filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134. Thus, SJHAI filed a disbarment case against
respondent for representing conflicting interests, docketed as Administrative Case No. 4783.

In her Report4 dated August 3, 1998, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) made the following
findings:

'Respondent failed to observe candor and fairness in dealing with his clients, knowing fully well
that the Montealegre case was adverse to the Complainant wherein he had previously been not
only an active board member but its corporate secretary having access to all its documents
confidential or otherwise and its counsel in handling the implementation of the writ of
execution against its developer and owner, Durano and Co. Inc.
Moreso, when Respondent acted as counsel for the substituted defendant Durano and Co. Inc.,
Lydia Durano-Rodriguez; the conflict of interest between the latter and the Complainant
became so revealing and yet Respondent proceeded to represent the former.

For his defense of good faith in doing so; inasmuch as the same wasn't controverted by the
Complainant which was his first offense; Respondent must be given the benefit of the doubt to
rectify his error subject to the condition that should he commit the same in the future; severe
penalty will be imposed upon him.5

The Investigating Commissioner recommended dismissal of the complaint with the admonition
that respondent should observe extra care and diligence in the practice of his profession to
uphold its dignity and integrity beyond reproach.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, which we noted in a resolution dated March 8, 1999.

Notwithstanding the admonition, respondent continued representing Lydia Durano-Rodriguez

before the Court of Appeals6 and this Court7 and even moved for the execution of the decision.

Thus, a second disbarment case was filed against respondent for violation of the March 8, 1999
Resolution in A.C. No. 4783 and for his alleged deceitful conduct in using the title "Judge"
although he was found guilty of grave and serious misconduct.

Respondent used the title "Judge" in his office letterhead, correspondences and billboards which
was erected in several areas within the San Jose Subdivision sometime in October 2001.

In his Comment and Explanation,8 respondent claimed that he continued to represent Lydia
Durano-Rodriguez against petitioner despite the March 8, 1999 Resolution because it was still
pending when the second disbarment case was filed. He maintained that the instant petition is a
rehash of the first disbarment case from which he was exonerated. Concerning the title "Judge",
respondent stated that since the filing of the instant petition he had ceased to attach the title to
his name.

On July 7, 2003, the matter was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation.9

Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. reported that respondent did not violate
the admonition because it referred to future cases only and not to cases subject of A.C. No. 4783.
Besides, petitioner never questioned the propriety of respondent's continued representation of
Lydia Durano-Rodriguez on appeal until the case was terminated.

The Investigating Commissioner, however, believed that respondent was deceitful when he
used the title "Judge", thus creating a false impression that he was an incumbent.

The Investigating Commissioner recommended thus:

In view of the foregoing considerations, this Commissioner respectfully recommends the
following penalty range to be deliberated upon by the Board for imposition on Respondent:
minimum penalty of reprimand to a maximum penalty of four (4) months suspension. It is
further recommended that in addition to the penalty to be imposed, a stern warning be given to
Respondent in that should he violate his undertaking/promise not to handle any case in the
future where the Complainant would be the adverse party and/or should he again use the title
of "Judge" which would create an impression that he is still connected to the judiciary, a more
severe penalty shall be imposed on him by the Commission.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

The IBP Board of Governors approved with modification the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering Respondent's violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Roberto Romanillos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
(6) months with a WARNING that should he violate his undertaking/promise a more severe
penalty shall be imposed against him.

Undoubtedly, respondent represented the inconsistent interests of SJHAI, DCI as substituted by

Lydia Durano-Rodriguez and the Montealegres. Respondent was admonished yet he continued
to represent Durano-Rodriguez against SJHAI.

It is inconsequential that petitioner never questioned the propriety of respondent's continued

representation of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez. The lack of opposition does not mean tacit consent.
As long as the lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two (2) or more opposing clients, he is
guilty of violating his oath. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically
mandates that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure. Incidentally, it is also misleading for respondent to insist
that he was exonerated in A.C. No. 4783.

We agree with the IBP that respondent's continued use of the title "Judge" violated Rules 1.01
and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in
deceitful conduct and from using any misleading statement or claim regarding qualifications or
legal services. The quasi-judicial notice he posted in the billboards referring to himself as a
judge is deceiving. It was a clear attempt to mislead the public into believing that the order was
issued in his capacity as a judge when he was dishonorably stripped of the privilege.

Respondent did not honorably retire from the judiciary. He resigned from being a judge during
the pendency of Zarate v. Judge Romanillos, where he was eventually found guilty of grave and
serious misconduct and would have been dismissed from the service had he not resigned.
In that case, respondent was found guilty of illegal solicitation and receipt of P10,000.00 from a
party litigant. We ruled thus:

Considering the foregoing, respondent Judge Roberto B. Romanillos is hereby found guilty of
grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and honesty. He deserves the supreme
penalty of dismissal. However, respondent, in an obvious attempt to escape punishment for his
misdeeds, tendered his resignation during the pendency of this case. 'Consequently, we are now
precluded from dismissing respondent from the service. Nevertheless, the ruling in People v.
Valenzuela (135 SCRA 712 [1985]), wherein the respondent judge likewise resigned before the
case could be resolved, finds application in this case. Therein it was held that the rule that the
resignation or retirement of a respondent judge in an administrative case renders the case moot
and academic, is not a hard and fast rule.'

ACCORDINGLY, in view of our aforestated finding that respondent Judge Romanillos is guilty
of grave and serious misconduct which would have warranted his dismissal from the service
had he not resigned during the pendency of this case, and it appearing that respondent has yet
to apply for his retirement benefits and other privileges if any; the Court, consistent with the
penalties imposed in Valenzuela (supra.), hereby orders the FORFEITURE of all leave and
retirement benefits and privileges to which herein respondent Judge Romanillos may be
entitled WITH PREJUDICE to reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of government, including government-owned or controlled agencies or
corporations.

SO ORDERED.10

The penalty imposed upon him in said case included forfeiture of all leave and retirement
benefits and privileges to which he may be entitled with prejudice to reinstatement and/or
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of government, including government-owned
or controlled agencies or corporations. Certainly, the use of the title 'Judge' is one of
such privileges.

We have previously declared that the use of titles such as "Justice" is reserved
to incumbent and retired members of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan and may not be used by any other official of the Republic, including those given
the rank of "Justice".11 By analogy, the title "Judge" should be reserved only to judges,
incumbent and retired, and not to those who were dishonorably discharged from the service. As
correctly pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the right to retain and use said title
applies only to the aforementioned members of the bench and no other, and certainly not to
those who were removed or dismissed from the judiciary, such as respondent.

Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions.12 It is

bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good
moral character.13 Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public's faith in the legal profession.14

To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but
such statement can never be overemphasized. Considering that, "of all classes and professions,
[lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law," it is imperative that they live by the law.
Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful conduct have no place in
the legal profession.15

Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction. We are mindful that the power to
disbar must always be exercised with great caution, for only the most imperative reasons,16 and
in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and as a member of the bar.17

This is not respondent's first infraction as an officer of the court and a member of the legal
profession. He was stripped of his retirement benefits and other privileges in Zarate v. Judge
Romanillos.18 In A.C. No. 4783, he got off lightly with just an admonition. Considering his
previous infractions, respondent should have adhered to the tenets of his profession with extra
fervor and vigilance. He did not. On the contrary, he manifested undue disrespect to our
mandate and exhibited a propensity to violate the laws. He is thus unfit to discharge the duties
of his office and unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed on him as an officer of the court.
His disbarment is consequently warranted.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos is DISBARRED and his name is

ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in
respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts
in the country.
 EN BANC

[A.M. NO. 07-3-13-SC : February 27, 2008]

IN RE: COMPLIANCE OF IBP CHAPTERS WITH ADM. ORDER NO. 16-2007, LETTER-
COMPLIANCE OF ATTY. RAMON EDISON C. BATACAN

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is the Letter of Atty. Ramon Edison C. Batacan, (Atty. Batacan), Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region, dated April 27, 2007, claiming
that the election of Atty. Rogelio Vinluan (Atty. Vinluan), IBP Governor for Southern Luzon, as
Executive Vice-President (EVP) for the term 2007 to 2009, is null and void on the ground that it
violated the "rotation rule."1

Atty. Batacan asserts that under the "rotation rule," embodied in Section 47, Article VII of the
IBP By-Laws, all IBP regions must take turns in having a representative as EVP, who shall
automatically succeed to the IBP Presidency. He posits that since Atty. Pura Angelica Y.
Santiago (Atty. Santiago) of IBP Southern Luzon was validly elected as EVP on June 13, 2005,
said region is disqualified from fielding another candidate for EVP until all the regions have
taken turns in holding the position. Considering that Atty. Vinluan comes from IBP Southern
Luzon and the other regions have not yet taken their turn in fielding an EVP, Atty. Vinluan's
election as EVP on April 25, 2007 is null and void as it contravened the rotation rule.2

Atty. Batacan further argues: The fact that Atty. Santiago was never able to assume the
presidency of the IBP is immaterial in the application of the rotation rule following the Court's
pronouncement in Velez v. De Vera3 that "the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-
assumption of Atty. De Vera to the IBP Presidency." Voluntary renunciation of the office will
not change the fact that Atty. Santiago was validly elected to the position which commenced the
new rotation representing the Southern Luzon Region. To hold otherwise would defeat the very
purpose of the rotation rule as any duly elected EVP would just conveniently resign before his
term ends thus qualifying his region again in the same round of rotation. Since he (Atty.
Batacan), as Governor of the Eastern Mindanao Region, was the remaining candidate who was
qualified and was voted upon to the position, he is rightfully entitled to assume the EVP
position. In any event, equity dictates that he, the Governor of the Eastern Mindanao Region, be
allowed to effectively act as EVP since the said region was denied meaningful participation in
the rotation rule when Atty. De Vera of Eastern Mindanao was removed as EVP in 2005.4

In its Comment, the IBP National Office through its Deputy General Counsel Atty. Rodolfo G.
Urbiztondo, stated that the election of Atty. Vinluan representing Southern Luzon is a violation
of the rotation rule since the election of Atty. Santiago of Southern Luzon began a new cycle of
rotation and it is only after the rotation is completed that a Governor from the Southern Luzon
Region can be elected again.5
In his Comment, Atty. Vinluan avers that his election as EVP on April 25, 2007 is valid for the
following reasons: Atty. Santiago never took her oath of office; she never assumed the position
of EVP; she did not function as EVP at any time; neither did she have the chance to serve out
her term as evidenced by the fact that 12 days after her election, Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar of
the IBP Bicol Region was elected EVP and eventually assumed the IBP Presidency beginning
2005. As stated in Atty. Batacan's letter, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP
Position through a letter addressed to the IBP Board. Then IBP President Atty. Jose Anselmo I.
Cadiz stated in the June 25, 2005 IBP Board of Governors Meeting that Atty. Santiago's letter is
clear that she is foregoing her assumption of the EVP position. Atty. Santiago herself made clear
that "considering that she has not taken her oath, she thinks that the more appropriate term to
use is to forego her assumption of the position." Thus, the election of Atty. Santiago cannot be
considered as one turn within the meaning of the "rotation rule."

Atty. Vinluan further maintains that the election of Atty. Santiago did not trigger the beginning
of a new rotation cycle and that it was only with the term of Atty. Salazar of IBP Bicol Region,
who was elected after Atty. Santiago, and who eventually served out his term for 2005 to 2007,
as EVP that the new cycle began. Atty. Vinluan argues that Atty. Batacan's invocation of the
Court's statement in Velez "that the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-
assumption by Atty. De Vera to the IBP Presidency" is misplaced since Atty. De Vera had in fact
served as EVP for the term 2003 to 2005, while the same cannot be said in the case of Atty.
Santiago. IBP Southern Luzon has not been represented yet in the new rotation cycle for EVPs.

Atty. Vinluan further asserts that he was elected pursuant to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws
where he obtained the majority of votes cast thereat. He also cites the Court's pronouncement
in Velez that Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase "as much as practicable" to indicate that
the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in compelling and
exceptional circumstances, such as this case. Finally, Atty. Vinluan claims that Atty. Batacan
contradicted himself when he said that equity dictates that the Governor of the Eastern
Mindanao Region be allowed to act as EVP since the region was denied meaningful
participation in the rotation rule when Atty. De Vera was removed as EVP; while in the instant
case, Atty. Batacan seeks to deny IBP Southern Luzon of meaningful participation.

Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP, as amended, provides:

Sec. 47. National Officers. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and
Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9)
regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex
officio Vice President for their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of
the Board of Governors to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board. (As
amended pursuant to Bar Matter 491).

The Executive Vice President shall automatically become President for the next succeeding
term. The Presidency shall rotate among the nine Regions. [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]

It is a product of Bar Matter No. 4916 dated October 6, 1989, In the Matter of the Inquiry into the
1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, where the Court, seeing the need to protect
the non-political character of the IBP and to reduce, if not completely eliminate, the expensive
electioneering practices of those who vie for the top IBP posts, ordered the repeal of Bar Matter
No. 287, dated July 8, 1985, which provided for the direct election by the House of Delegates of
the IBP President, EVP, as well as officers of the said House.

Bar Matter No. 491 restored the former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-
President elected by the Board of Governors from among themselves as well as the right of
automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of
their two-year term. It amended Sections 37 (Composition of the Board)7 and 39 (Nomination
and Election of the Governors), both of Article VI of the IBP By-Laws.8

As the Court explained in Garcia v. De Vera:9

The changes adopted by the Court simplified the election process and thus made it less
controversial. The grounds for disqualification were reduced, if not totally eradicated, for the
pool from which the Delegates may choose their nominees is diminished as the rotation process
operates.

The simplification of the process was in line with this Court's vision of an Integrated Bar which
is non-political and effective in the discharge of its role in elevating the standards of the legal
profession, improving the administration of justice and contributing to the growth and progress
of the Philippine society.10

Based on the foregoing, one can see that the Court introduced the rotation rule in order to give
all the regions and chapters their respective turns, each for a term of two years, in having a
representative in the top positions, with the aim of restoring the non-political character of the
IBP and reducing the temptation of electioneering for the said posts.

The principal question is whether the election on June 13, 2005 of Atty. Santiago of IBP Southern
Luzon for the term 2005 to 2007 as EVP constitutes one turn under the rotation rule; corollarily,
whether Atty. Vinluan who comes from the same IBP region is barred from being elected as
EVP for the term 2007 to 2009.

The Court's answer is in the negative.

On June 13, 2005, Atty. Santiago of Southern Luzon was elected as EVP.11 On June 20, 2005,
seven days after her election, she tendered her resignation, which resignation was approved by
the IBP in a Resolution dated June 25, 2005.12 On the same day, Atty. Salazar of the IBP Bicol
Region was elected as EVP, replacing Atty. Santiago.13

Based on these circumstances, one can readily see that the election of Atty. Santiago as EVP did
not result in any meaningful representation of the Southern Luzon Region which would satisfy
the spirit of the rotation rule. The proximity of the dates, from the time that she was elected to
the time she tendered her resignation (seven days) and the time the same was accepted by the
IBP (five days) shows that there was no sufficient opportunity for her to discharge the duties of
an EVP. Significantly, records do not show that Atty. Santiago took her oath of office.
There is no merit to Atty. Batacan's claim that in view of the removal of Atty. Leonardo de Vera,
IBP Eastern Mindanao Region was denied meaningful participation.

In Velez, the Court held that "the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-assumption
by Atty. De Vera to the IBP Presidency."14 Atty. De Vera's removal from the position of EVP
took place on the twenty-third month of his term for 2003 to 2005.15 Only a month short of
completing his term, it is clear that he had effectively exercised the functions of an EVP as
representative of the IBP Eastern Mindanao Region.

Moreover, the Court held in Velez that Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase "as much as
practicable" to clearly indicate that the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar
exceptions in compelling and exceptional circumstances.16

The Court agrees with Atty. Vinluan that the instant case is an exception to the rotation rule.

Atty. Batacan himself narrated that in the election on April 25, 2007, which was the first meeting
of the IBP Board of Governors for 2007 to 2009, he objected to the nomination of Atty. Vinluan
as EVP citing the rotation rule. Despite his objections, the Board of Governors proceeded with
the election of its EVP, pursuant to Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws and Atty. Vinluan
emerged as the winner.

The Board acted correctly in not upholding the objections of Atty. Batacan. It applied the
rotation rule with flexibility, an act that is valid, concommitant with the tenor of Section 47
which qualifies the application of the rotation rule with the phrase "as much as practicable."

There being no grave abuse of discretion or gross error in the conduct of said election, the Court
must uphold the election of Atty. Vinluan as EVP for the term 2007 to 2009.

As the Court held in Velez:

While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of supervision
over the IBP, it is axiomatic that such power should be exercised prudently. The power of
supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not preclude the IBP from exercising
its reasonable discretion especially in the administration of its internal affairs governed by
the provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated so
as to define the powers and functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its organizational
structure, and govern relations and transactions among its officers and members. With these
By-Laws in place, the Supreme Court could be assured that the IBP shall be able to carry on
its day-to-day affairs, without the Court's interference.

It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has been
vested in the Board of Governors. The members of the Board are elective and representative
of each of the nine regions of the IBP as delineated in its By-Laws. The Board acts as a
collegiate body and decides in accordance with the will of the majority. The foregoing rules
serve to negate the possibility of the IBP Board acting on the basis of personal interest or malice
of its individual members. Hence, the actions and resolutions of the IBP Board deserve to be
accorded the disputable presumption of validity, which shall continue, until and unless it is
overcome by substantial evidence and actually declared invalid by the Supreme Court. In the
absence of any allegation and substantial proof that the IBP Board has acted without or in
excess of its authority or with grave abuse of discretion, we shall not be persuaded to overturn
and set aside the Board's action or resolution.17 [Emphasis supplied]

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby RESOLVES to AFFIRM the election of Atty. Rogelio A.
Vinluan on April 25, 2007, by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as
its Executive Vice-President for the term 2007-2009.
 SECOND DIVISION

A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed
against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr.,
himself a member of the bar, alleged that:

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter
of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR
and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates
"IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three years already, as shown by the
following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals
available)

Annex A .......- "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1,

1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC

Annex B .......- "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13,

1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque,
MM

Annex C .......- "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File
Required Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in
CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a
duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice
law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual
dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default
in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent
member from the Roll of Attorneys."

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar
standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially
its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not indicate
any PTR for payment of professional tax.

Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be
done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court
(thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).

Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:

1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En
Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA )

2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br.
66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13,
1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears
to be respondents signature above his name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal
259060."1 Also attached was a copy of the order,2 dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge
Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondents
motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art.
316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then president
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondents "last
payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to
cover his membership fees up to the present."

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from
receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his comment-memorandum,4 dated June 3, 1998, respondent
alleged:5cräläwvirtualibräry

3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the
same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member in good
standing.

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is in
good standing is entitled to practice law.

The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing, were
as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14,
1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed
and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court
Judge of Makati, Br. 150.

Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the
Court of Appeals and is still pending.

Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge was
never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege
to practice law.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the
present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his
principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is
located at Calauan, Laguna.

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally
exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes,
income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment
from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of
dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights
as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to
show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with
such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges
and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not for
allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive
purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for
him to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary.

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution6 adopting and approving
the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent
guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he
pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied
by the IBP in a resolution,7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the
Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondents
suspension for three months.

The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication of the proper IBP O.R.
and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more
particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President
Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondents last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."

While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has
invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an
example."

....

The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent
admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992
have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to the present time that he had only a
limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondents Memorandum).

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his
standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and
therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having
paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by
complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at
least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter
membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims,
however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that
he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior
citizen since 1992.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a
Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased
members thereof.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default
in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by
paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A.
No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes:
provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by
the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does
not include payment of membership or association dues.

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the
public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR.

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor
shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in
court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his
express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law,8 we
believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP
dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this
decision be attached to Atty. Llamas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in
the land.