CASES ON CRIM 2-Title 4
authorized to issue permits to transport forest products pursuant to RA 7160
G.R. Nos. 186739-960 April 17, 2013
LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal seeking to nullify the December 19, 2008 Decision1 of the First Division of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259, which convicted
Leovegildo R. Ruzol (Ruzol), then Mayor of General Nakar, Quezon, of Usurpation of
Official Functions penalized under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004. Earlier in his term, he
organized a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly composed of civil society groups, public
officials and concerned stakeholders with the end in view of regulating and monitoring the
transportation of salvaged forest products within the vicinity of General Nakar. Among those
present in the organizational meeting were Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (PENRO) Rogelio Delgado Sr. and Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, the OCD-DD of the
Prelature of Infanta Emeritus of the Catholic Church and Chairperson of TIPAN, an
environmental non-government organization that operates in the municipalities of General
Nakar, Infanta and Real in Quezon province. During the said assembly, the participants
agreed that to regulate the salvaged forests products, the Office of the Mayor, through
Ruzol, shall issue a permit to transport after payment of the corresponding fees to the
municipal treasurer.2
Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to transport
salvaged forest products were issued to various recipients, of which forty-three (43) bore
the signature of Ruzol while the remaining one hundred seventy-eight (178) were signed by
his co-accused Guillermo T. Sabiduria (Sabiduria), then municipal administrator of General
Nakar.3
On June 2006, on the basis of the issued Permits to Transport, 221 Informations for
violation of Art. 177 of the RPC or for Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions were filed
against Ruzol and Sabiduria, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259.
Except for the date of commission, the description of forest product, person given the
permit, and official receipt number, the said Informations uniformly read:
That, on (date of commission) or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in General Nakar,
Quezon, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
Leovegildo R. Ruzol and Guillermo M. Sabiduria, both public officers, being then the
Municipal Mayor and Municipal Administrator, respectively, of General Nakar, Quezon,
taking advantage of their official position and committing the offense in relation to their
office, conspiring and confederating with each other did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and criminally, issue permit to transport (description of forest product) to (person given the
permit) under O.R. No. (official receipt number) under the pretense of official position and
without being lawfully entitled to do so, such authority properly belonging to the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, to the damage and prejudice of the of the
government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Considering that the facts are undisputed, the parties during Pre-Trial agreed to dispense
with the presentation of testimonial evidence and submit the case for decision based on the
documentary evidence and joint stipulation of facts contained in the Pre-Trial Order.
Thereafter, the accused and the prosecution submitted their respective memoranda. 6
Ruzol's Defense
As summarized by the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol professes his innocence based on following
arguments:
(1) As Chief Executive of the municipality of General Nakar, Quezon, he is
which give the LGU not only express powers but also those powers that are
necessarily implied from the powers expressly granted as well as those that
are necessary, appropriate or incidental to the LGU’s efficient and effective
governance. The LGU is likewise given powers that are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare of the inhabitants. The general welfare clause
provided in Section 16, Chapter 2, Title One, Book I of R.A. 7160 is a massive
grant of authority that enables LGUs to perform or exercise just about any
power that will benefit their local constituencies.
(2) In addition to the foregoing, R.A. 7160 has devolved certain functions and
responsibilities of the DENR to the LGU. And the permits to transport were
issued pursuant to the devolved function to manage and control communal
forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers.
(3) The Permits to Transport were issued as an incident to the payment of
Transport Fees levied by the municipality for the use of local public roads for
the transport of salvaged forest products. Under (a) Section 5, Article X of the
Constitution, (b) Section 129, Chapter I, Title One Book II of R.A. 7160, and (c)
Section 186, Article Five, Chapter 5, Tile One, Book II of R.A. 7160, the
municipality is granted the power to create its own sources of revenue and to
levy fees in accordance therewith.
(4) The only kind of document the DENR issues relating to log, timber or
lumber is denominated "Certificate of Timber Origin" or CTO for logs and
"Certificate of Lumber Origin" or CLO for lumber; hence, even if accused
issued the Transport Permits on his side, a person wanting to transport the said
forest products would have to apply and obtain a CTO or CLO from the DENR.
The Transport Permits issued by the accused were never taken as a substitute
for the CTO or CLO, and this is the reason why said permits contain the
annotation "Subject to DENR rules, laws and regulations."
(5) There is no proof of conspiracy between the accused. The Transport
Permits were issued by accused Sabiduria in his capacity as Municipal
Administrator and his mere issuance is not enough to impute upon the accused
Ruzol any transgression or wrongdoing that may have been committed in the
issuance thereof following the ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan (180 SCRA
309).
(6) The DENR directly sanctioned and expressly authorized the issuance of the
221 Transport permits through the Provincial Environment and natural
Resources officer Rogelio Delgado Sr., in a Multi-Sectoral Consultative
Assembly.
(7) The accused cannot be convicted of Usurpation of Authority since they did
not act "under the pretense of official position," accused Ruzol having issued
the permits in his capacity as Mayor and there was no pretense or
misrepresentation on his part that he was an officer of DENR.7
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
After due consideration, the Sandiganbayan rendered on December 19, 2008 a Decision,
acquitting Sabiduria but finding Ruzol guilty as charged, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves these cases as follows:
1. Against the accused LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, judgment is hereby rendered
finding him GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Two Hundred Twenty One
(221) counts of the offense of Usurpation of Official Functions as defined and
penalized under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences
him to suffer for each case a straight penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY.
However, in the service of his sentences, accused Ruzol shall be entitled to the
benefit of the three-fold rule as provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.
2. On the ground of reasonable doubt, accused GUILLERMO M. SABIDURIA is
ACQUITTED of all 221 charges. The cash bond posted by him for his
provisional liberty may now be withdrawn by said accused upon presentation of
the original receipt evidencing payment thereof subject to the usual accounting
and auditing procedures. The hold departure procedure issued by this Court
 dated 16 April 2008 is set aside and the Order issued by the Bureau of
Immigration dated 29 April 2008 including the name of Sabiduria in the Hold
Departure List is ordered recalled and cancelled.
SO ORDERED.8
The Sandiganbayan predicated its ruling on the postulate that the authority to issue
transport permits with respect to salvaged forest products lies with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and that such authority had not been
devolved to the local government of General Nakar.9 To the graft court, Ruzol’s issuance of
the subject permits constitutes usurpation of the official functions of the DENR.
The Issue
The critical issue having a determinative bearing on the guilt or innocence of Ruzol for
usurpation revolves around the validity of the subject permits to transport, which in turn
resolves itself into the question of whether the authority to monitor and regulate the
transportation of salvaged forest product is solely with the DENR, and no one else.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
Subsidiary Issue:
Whether the Permits to Transport Issued by Ruzol Are Valid
In ruling that the DENR, and not the local government units (LGUs), has the authority to
issue transportation permits of salvaged forest products, the Sandiganbayan invoked
Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD 705), otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of
the Philippines and in relation to Executive Order No. 192, Series of 1987 (EO 192), or the
Reorganization Act of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
Section 5 of PD 705 provides:
Section 5. Jurisdiction of Bureau. The Bureau of Forest Management shall have jurisdiction
and authority over all forest land, grazing lands, and all forest reservations including
watershed reservations presently administered by other government agencies or
instrumentalities.
It shall be responsible for the protection, development, management, regeneration, and
reforestation of forest lands; the regulation and supervision of the operation of licensees,
lessees and permittees for the taking or use of forest products therefrom or the occupancy
or use thereof; the implementation of multiple use and sustained yield management in
forest lands; the protection, development and preservation of national parks, marine parks,
game refuges and wildlife; the implementation of measures and programs to prevent
kaingin and managed occupancy of forest and grazing lands; in collaboration with other
bureaus, the effective, efficient and economic classification of lands of the public domain;
and the enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules, and
regulations.
The Bureau shall regulate the establishment and operation of sawmills, veneer and
plywood mills and other wood processing plants and conduct studies of domestic and world
markets of forest products. (Emphasis Ours.)
On the other hand, the pertinent provisions of EO 192 state:
SECTION 4. Mandate. The Department shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the
country’s environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands of the
public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as maybe
provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for
the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos.
xxxx
SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have
the following functions:
xxxx
(d) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposal
lands, and mineral resources and in the process of exercising such control the
Department shall impose appropriate payments, fees, charges, rentals and any
such revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such
resources.
xxxx
(j) Regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the
country’s forest, land and mineral resources;
(k) Assume responsibility for the assessment, development, protection,
conservation, licensing and regulation as provided for by law, where applicable,
of all natural resources; the regulation and monitoring of service contractors,
licensees, lessees, and permittees for the extraction, exploration, development
and utilization of natural resources products; the implementation of programs
and measures with the end in view of promoting close collaboration between
the government and the private sector; the effective and efficient classification
and sub-classification of lands of the public domain; and the enforcement of
natural resources laws, rules and regulations;
(l) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of co-
production, joint venture or production sharing agreements, licenses, permits,
concessions, leases and such other privileges and arrangement concerning the
development, exploration and utilization of the country’s natural resources and
shall continue to oversee, supervise and police our natural resources; to cancel
or cause to cancel such privileges and arrangement upon failure, non-
compliance or violations of any regulations, orders, and for all other causes
which are furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and supportive
of the national interests;
xxxx
(n) Implement measures for the regulation and supervision of the processing of
forest products, grading and inspection of lumber and other forest products and
monitoring of the movement of timber and other forest products. (Emphasis
Ours.)
Invoked too is DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-78 (DAO 2000-78) which mandates
that the permittee should secure the necessary transport and other related documents
before the retrieved wood materials are sold to the buyers/users and/or wood processing
plants.10 DAO 2000-78 obliges the entity or person concerned to secure a Wood Recovery
Permit––a "permit issued by the DENR to gather/retrieve and dispose abandoned logs,
drifted logs, sunken logs, uprooted, and fire and typhoon damaged tress, tree stumps, tops
and branches."11 It prescribes that the permittee shall only be allowed to gather or recover
logs or timber which had already been marked and inventoried by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer.12 To the Sandiganbayan, this mandatory
requirement for Wood Recovery Permit illustrates that DENR is the sole agency vested with
the authority to regulate the transportation of salvaged forest products. 1âwphi1
The Sandiganbayan further reasoned that the "monitoring and regulating salvaged forest
products" is not one of the DENR’s functions which had been devolved upon LGUs. It cited
Sec. 17 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) or the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991
which provides:
Section 17. Basic Services and Facilities. -
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising
the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall
also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved
to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other
powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary,
appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and
facilities enumerated herein.
xxxx
(2) For a Municipality:
xxxx
(ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR,
implementation of community-based forestry projects which include integrated social
forestry programs and similar projects; management and control of communal forests with
an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers; establishment of tree parks, greenbelts,
and similar forest development projects. (Emphasis Ours.)
According to the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 17 of the LGC has limited the devolved functions of
the DENR to the LGUs to the following: (1) the implementation of community-based forestry
products; (2) management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty
(50) square kilometers; and (3) establishment of tree parks, greenbelts and similar forest
development projects.13 It also referred to DENR Administrative Order No. 30, Series of
1992 (DAO 1992-30), which enumerates the forest management functions, programs and
projects of the DENR which had been devolved to the LGUs, as follows:14
Section 3.1 Forest Management
a. Implementation of the following community-based forestry projects:
i. Integrated Social Forestry Projects, currently funded out of
regular appropriations, except at least one project per province
that shall serve as research and training laboratory, as identified by
the DENR, and those areas located in protected areas and critical
watersheds;
ii. Establishment of new regular reforestation projects, except
those areas located in protected areas and critical watersheds;
iii. Completed family and community-based contract reforestation
projects, subject to policies and procedures prescribed by the
DENR;
iv. Forest Land Management Agreements in accordance with
DENR Administrative Order No. 71, Series of 1990 and other
guidelines that the DENR may adopt; and
v. Community Forestry Projects, subject to concurrence of
financing institution(s), if foreign assisted.
b. Management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding
fifty (50) square kilometers or five thousand (5,000) hectares, as defined in
Section 2, above. Provided, that the concerned LGUs shall endeavor to convert
said areas into community forestry projects;
c. Management, protection, rehabilitation and maintenance of small watershed
areas which are sources of local water supply as identified or to be identified by
the DENR; and
d. Enforcement of forest laws in community-based forestry project areas, small
watershed areas and communal forests, as defined in Section 2 above, such
as but not limited to:
i. Prevention of forest fire, illegal cutting and kaingin;
ii. Apprehension of violators of forest laws, rules and regulations;
iii. Confiscation of illegally extracted forest products on site;
iv. Imposition of appropriate penalties for illegal logging, smuggling
of natural resources products and of endangered species of flora
and fauna, slash and burn farming and other unlawful activities;
and
v. Confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances,
equipment and other implements used in the commission of
offenses penalized under P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277,
series of 1987 and other forestry laws, rules and regulations.
Provided, that the implementation of the foregoing activities outside the devolved areas
above mentioned, shall remain with the DENR.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that since the authority relative to salvaged forest products was
not included in the above enumeration of devolved functions, the correlative authority to
issue transport permits remains with the DENR15 and, thus, cannot be exercised by the
LGUs.
We disagree and refuse to subscribe to this postulate suggesting exclusivity. As shall be
discussed shortly, the LGU also has, under the LGC of 1991, ample authority to promulgate
rules, regulations and ordinances to monitor and regulate salvaged forest products,
provided that the parameters set forth by law for their enactment have been faithfully
complied with.
While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality charged with the
mandate of promulgating rules and regulations for the protection of the environment and
conservation of natural resources, it is not the only government instrumentality clothed with
such authority. While the law has designated DENR as the primary agency tasked to
protect the environment, it was not the intention of the law to arrogate unto the DENR the
exclusive prerogative of exercising this function. Whether in ordinary or in legal parlance,
the word "primary" can never be taken to be synonymous with "sole" or "exclusive." In fact,
neither the pertinent provisions of PD 705 nor EO 192 suggest that the DENR, or any of its
bureaus, shall exercise such authority to the exclusion of all other government
instrumentalities, i.e., LGUs.
On the contrary, the claim of DENR’s supposedly exclusive mandate is easily negated by
the principle of local autonomy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution16 in relation to the
general welfare clause under Sec. 16 of the LGC of 1991, which provides:
Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
(Emphasis Ours.)
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, municipal governments are clothed with authority to
enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and
discharge the responsibilities conferred upon them by law, and such as shall be necessary
and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and
order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality
and its inhabitants, and ensure the protection of property in the municipality.17
As held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,18 the right of the people "to a balanced and healthful
ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment." In
ensuring that this duty is upheld and maintained, a local government unit may, if it deems
necessary, promulgate ordinances aimed at enhancing the right of the people to a balanced
ecology and, accordingly, provide adequate measures in the proper utility and conservation
of natural resources within its territorial jurisdiction. As can be deduced from Ruzol’s
memoranda, as affirmed by the parties in their Joint Stipulation of Facts, it was in the
pursuit of this objective that the subject permits to transport were issued by Ruzol––to
regulate the salvaged forest products found within the municipality of General Nakar and,
hence, prevent abuse and occurrence of any untoward illegal logging in the area. 19
In the same vein, there is a clear merit to the view that the monitoring and regulation of
salvaged forest products through the issuance of appropriate permits is a shared
responsibility which may be done either by DENR or by the LGUs or by both. DAO 1992-30,
in fact, says as much, thus: the "LGUs shall share with the national government, particularly
the DENR, the responsibility in the sustainable management and development of the
environment and natural resources within their territorial jurisdiction." 20 The significant role
of the LGUs in environment protection is further echoed in Joint Memorandum Circular No.
98-01(JMC 1998-01) or the Manual of Procedures for DENR-DILG-LGU Partnership on
Devolved and other Forest Management Functions, which was promulgated jointly by the
DILG and the DENR in 1998, and provides as follows:
Section 1. Basic Policies
Subject to the general policies on devolution as contained in RA 7160 and DENR
Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 1992, the following basic policies shall govern the
implementation of DENR-DILG-LGU partnership on devolved and other forest management
functions:
 1.1. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) shall be
the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, protection, proper use and sustainable development of the
country’s environment and natural resources.
1.2. The LGUs shall share with DENR the responsibility in the sustainable
management and development of the forest resources within their territorial
jurisdiction. Toward this end, the DENR and the LGUs shall endeavor to
strengthen their collaboration and partnership in forest management.
1.3. Comprehensive land use and forest land use plans are important tools in
the holistic and efficient management of forest resources. Toward this end, the
DENR and the LGUs together with other government agencies shall undertake
forest land use planning as an integral activity of comprehensive land use
planning to determine the optimum and balanced use of natural resources to
support local, regional and national growth and development.
1.4. To fully prepare the LGUs to undertake their shared responsibilities in the
sustainable management of forest land resources, the DENR, in coordination
with DILG, shall enhance the capacities of the LGUs in the various aspects of
forest management. Initially, the DENR shall coordinate, guide and train the
LGUs in the management of the devolved functions. As the LGUs’ capacity in
forest management is enhanced, the primary tasks in the management of
devolved functions shall be performed by the LGUs and the role of the DENR
becomes assistive and coordinative.
1.5. To further the ends of local autonomy, the DENR in consultation with the
LGUs shall devolved [sic] additional functions and responsibilities to the local
government units, or enter into agreements with them for enlarged forest
management and other ENR-related functions.
1.6. To seek advocacy, popular support and ultimately help achieve community
empowerment, DENR and DILG shall forge the partnership and cooperation of
the LGUs and other concerned sectors in seeking and strengthening the
participation of local communities for forest management including
enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations. (Emphasis Ours.)
To our mind, the requirement of permits to transport salvaged forest products is not a
manifestation of usurpation of DENR’s authority but rather an additional measure which
was meant to complement DENR’s duty to regulate and monitor forest resources within the
LGU’s territorial jurisdiction.
This is consistent with the "canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute
against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to
reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve respect as the handiwork of
coordinate branches of the government." 21 Hence, if there appears to be an apparent
conflict between promulgated statutes, rules or regulations issued by different government
instrumentalities, the proper action is not to immediately uphold one and annul the other,
but rather give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible.22 Accordingly, although the
DENR requires a Wood Recovery Permit, an LGU is not necessarily precluded from
promulgating, pursuant to its power under the general welfare clause, complementary
orders, rules or ordinances to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest
products.
Notwithstanding, We still find that the Permits to Transport issued by Ruzol are invalid for
his failure to comply with the procedural requirements set forth by law for its enforcement.
Then and now, Ruzol insists that the Permit to Transport partakes the nature of transport
fees levied by the municipality for the use of public roads.23 In this regard, he argues that he
has been conferred by law the right to issue subject permits as an incident to the LGU’s
power to create its own sources of revenue pursuant to the following provisions of the LGC:
Section 153. Service Fees and Charges. – Local government units may impose and collect
such reasonable fees and charges for services rendered.
xxxx
Section 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. – Local government units may
exercise the power to levy taxes, fees or charges on any base or subject not otherwise
specifically enumerated herein or taxed under the provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended, or other applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees, or
charges shall not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared
national policy: Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or charges
shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose. (Emphasis
Ours.)
Ruzol further argued that the permits to transport were issued under his power and
authority as Municipal Mayor under Sec. 444 of the same law:
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the
conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or
ordinance;
xxxx
vii) Adopt adequate measures to safeguard and conserve land, mineral, marine, forest, and
other resources of the municipality; provide efficient and effective property and supply
management in the municipality; and protect the funds, credits, rights and other properties
of the municipality. (Emphasis Ours.)
Ruzol is correct to a point. Nevertheless, We find that an enabling ordinance is necessary
to confer the subject permits with validity. As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the
power to levy fees or charges under the LGC is exercised by the Sangguniang Bayan
through the enactment of an appropriate ordinance wherein the terms, conditions and rates
of the fees are prescribed.24 Needless to say, one of the fundamental principles of local
fiscal administration is that "local revenue is generated only from sources expressly
authorized by law or ordinance."25
It is likewise expressly stated in Sec. 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC that the authority of the
municipal mayor to issue licenses and permits should be "pursuant to a law or ordinance." It
is the Sangguniang Bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, which is mandated by
law to enact ordinances against acts which endanger the environment, i.e., illegal logging,
and smuggling of logs and other natural resources.26
In this case, an examination of the pertinent provisions of General Nakar’s Revised
Municipal Revenue Code27and Municipal Environment Code28 reveals that there is no
provision unto which the issuance of the permits to transport may be grounded. Thus, in the
absence of an ordinance for the regulation and transportation of salvaged products, the
permits to transport issued by Ruzol are infirm.
Ruzol’s insistence that his actions are pursuant to the LGU’s devolved function to "manage
and control communal forests" under Sec. 17 of the LGC and DAO 1992-3029 is specious.
Although We recognize the LGU’s authority in the management and control of communal
forests within its territorial jurisdiction, We reiterate that this authority should be exercised
and enforced in accordance with the procedural parameters established by law for its
effective and efficient execution. As can be gleaned from the same Sec. 17 of the LGC, the
LGU’s authority to manage and control communal forests should be "pursuant to national
policies and is subject to supervision, control and review of DENR."
As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the term "communal forest"30 has a well-defined
and technical meaning.31 Consequently, as an entity endowed with specialized competence
and knowledge on forest resources, the DENR cannot be discounted in the establishment
of communal forest. The DILG, on behalf of the LGUs, and the DENR promulgated JMC
1998-01 which outlined the following procedure:
Section 8.4 Communal Forest
8.4.1 Existing Communal Forest
The devolution to and management of the communal forest by the city and municipal
governments shall be governed by the following general procedures:
(a) DENR, through its CENRO, and the concerned LGU shall undertake the
actual identification and assessment of existing communal forests. The
assessment shall determine the suitability of the existing communal forests. If
these are no longer suitable, then these communal forests may be
disestablished. The Approval for disestablishment shall be by the RED upon
recommendation of the DENR-LGU assessment Team through the PENRO
and the RTD for Forestry;
(b) Existing communal forest which are found and recommended by the DENR-
LGU Assessment Team as still suitable to achieve their purpose shall be
maintained as such. Thereafter, the Sangguniang Panglungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan where the communal forest is located shall pass
resolution requesting the DENR Secretary for the turnover of said communal
 forest to the city or municipality. Upon receipt of said resolution, the DENR
Secretary shall issue an Administrative Order officially transferring said
communal forest to the concerned LGU. The DENR RED shall effect the official
transfer to the concerned LGU within fifteen (15) days from the issuance of the
administrative order;
(c) Within twelve months from the issuance of the Administrative Order and
turnover of said communal forest to the city or municipality, the LGU to which
the communal forest was transferred shall formulate and submit to the
Provincial ENR Council for approval a management plan governing the
sustainable development of the communal forest.
For the purpose of formulating the communal forest management plan, DENR shall, in
coordination with the concerned LGU, undertake a forest resource inventory and determine
the sustainable level of forest resource utilization and provide the LGU technical assistance
in all facets of forest management planning to ensure sustainable development. The
management plan should include provision for replanting by the communities and the LGUs
of the communal forests to ensure sustainability.
8.4.2 Establishment of New Communal Forest
The establishment of new communal forests shall be governed by the following guidelines:
(a) DENR, through its CENRO, together with the concerned city/municipal LGU
shall jointly identify potential communal forest areas within the geographic
jurisdiction of the concerned city/municipality.
(b) Communal forests to be established shall be identified through a forest land
use planning to be undertaken jointly between the DENR and the concerned
LGU. The ensuing forest land use plan shall indicate, among others, the site
and location of the communal forests within the production forest categorized
as such in the forest land use plan;
(c) Once the forest land use plan has been affirmed, the local chief executive
shall initiate the passage by the LGU’s sanggunian of a resolution requesting
the DENR Secretary to issue an Administrative Order declaring the identified
area as a communal forest. The required administrative order shall be issued
within sixty (60) days after receipt of the resolution;
(d) Upon acceptance of the responsibility for the communal forest, the
city/municipal LGU shall formulate the management plan and submit the same
to its ENR Council. The management plan shall include provision for replanting
by the communities and the LGUs of the communal forests to ensure
sustainability.
The communal forests of each municipality shall in no case exceed a total of 5,000
hectares. (Emphasis Ours.)
It is clear, therefore, that before an area may be considered a communal forest, the
following requirements must be accomplished: (1) an identification of potential communal
forest areas within the geographic jurisdiction of the concerned city/municipality; (2) a forest
land use plan which shall indicate, among other things, the site and location of the
communal forests; (3) a request to the DENR Secretary through a resolution passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan concerned; and (4) an administrative order issued by DENR Secretary
declaring the identified area as a communal forest.
In the present case, the records are bereft of any showing that these requirements were
complied with. Thus, in the absence of an established communal forest within the
Municipality of General Nakar, there was no way that the subject permits to transport were
issued as an incident to the management and control of a communal forest.
This is not to say, however, that compliance with abovementioned statutory requirements
for the issuance of permits to transport foregoes the necessity of obtaining the Wood
Recovery Permit from the DENR. As earlier discussed, the permits to transport may be
issued to complement, and not substitute, the Wood Recovery Permit, and may be used
only as an additional measure in the regulation of salvaged forest products. To elucidate, a
person seeking to transport salvaged forest products still has to acquire a Wood Recovery
Permit from the DENR as a prerequisite before obtaining the corresponding permit to
transport issued by the LGU.
Main Issue:
Whether Ruzol Is Guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions
The foregoing notwithstanding, Ruzol cannot be held guilty of Usurpation of Official
Functions as defined and penalized under Art. 177 of the RPC, to wit:
Art. 177. Usurpation of authority or official functions. — Any person who shall knowingly and
falsely represent himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or
agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government, or who, under pretense
of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public
officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof,
without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods. (Emphasis Ours.)
As the aforementioned provision is formulated, there are two ways of committing this crime:
first, by knowingly and falsely representing himself to be an officer, agent or representative
of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government; or
second, under pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in
authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any
agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so.32 The former constitutes the crime
of usurpation of authority, while the latter act constitutes the crime of usurpation of official
functions.33
In the present case, Ruzol stands accused of usurpation of official functions for issuing 221
permits to transport salvaged forest products under the alleged "pretense of official position
and without being lawfully entitled to do so, such authority properly belonging to the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources." 34 The Sandiganbayan ruled that all
the elements of the crime were attendant in the present case because the authority to issue
the subject permits belongs solely to the DENR.35
We rule otherwise.
First, it is settled that an accused in a criminal case is presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved and that to overcome the presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable
doubt must be established by the prosecution. 36 As held by this Court in People v. Sitco:37
The imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt has a vital role in our criminal justice
system, the accused, during a criminal prosecution, having a stake interest of immense
importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his freedom if convicted and
because of the certainty that his conviction will leave a permanent stain on his reputation
and name. (Emphasis supplied.)
Citing Rabanal v. People,38 the Court further explained:
Law and jurisprudence demand proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be
deprived of his life, liberty, or even property. Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the
petitioner to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and to overcome the
presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the
prosecution. The constitutional presumption of innocence requires courts to take "a more
than casual consideration" of every circumstance of doubt proving the innocence of
petitioner. (Emphasis added.)
Verily, an accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his or her guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt and it is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with
clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable
conclusion, with moral certainty.39 As explained by this Court in People v. Berroya:40
The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt lies in the fact that "(i)n a criminal
prosecution, the State is arrayed against the subject; it enters the contest with a prior
inculpatory finding in its hands; with unlimited means of command; with counsel usually of
authority and capacity, who are regarded as public officers, and therefore as speaking
semi-judicially, and with an attitude of tranquil majesty often in striking contrast to that of
defendant engaged in a perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not for life. These
inequalities of position, the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to be no conviction
when there is a reasonable doubt of guilt."
Indeed, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty; moral certainly only is required, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.41 However, contrary to
the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, We find that a careful scrutiny of the events surrounding
this case failed to prove that Ruzol is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the
crime of usurpation of official functions of the DENR.
We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the prosecution’s
theory that the DENR is the only government instrumentality that can issue the permits to
transport salvaged forest products. The prosecution asserted that Ruzol usurped the official
functions that properly belong to the DENR.
But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government agency vested with
the authority to issue permits relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products,
considering that, pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such
authority. Also, as can be gleaned from the records, the permits to transport were meant to
complement and not to replace the Wood Recovery Permit issued by the DENR. In effect,
Ruzol required the issuance of the subject permits under his authority as municipal mayor
and independently of the official functions granted to the DENR. The records are likewise
bereft of any showing that Ruzol made representations or false pretenses that said permits
could be used in lieu of, or at the least as an excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery
Permit from the DENR.
scarcity of natural resources, each of us is now obligated to contribute and share in the
responsibility of protecting and conserving our treasured natural resources.
Ruzol chose to exercise this right and to share in this responsibility by exercising his
authority as municipal mayor––an act which was executed with the concurrence and
cooperation of non-governmental organizations, industry stakeholders, and the concerned
citizens of General Nakar. Admittedly, We consider his acts as invalid but it does
necessarily mean that such mistakes automatically demand Us to rule a conviction. This is
in consonance with the settled principle that "all reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate
error and not crime should be indulged in for the benefit of the accused." 49
Under our criminal judicial system, "evil intent must unite with the unlawful act for a crime to
exist," as "there can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting." 50 Actus non facit reum,
nisi mens sit rea.

Second, contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol acted in good faith.
It bears stressing at this point that in People v. Hilvano, 42 this Court enunciated that good
faith is a defense in criminal prosecutions for usurpation of official functions. 43 The term
"good faith" is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting "honesty of intention,
and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry;
an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even
though technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or
belief of facts which render transaction unconscientious." 44 Good faith is actually a question
of intention and although something internal, it can be ascertained by relying not on one’s
self-serving protestations of good faith but on evidence of his conduct and outward acts. 45
In dismissing Ruzol’s claim of good faith, the Sandiganbayan reasoned as follows:
If it is really true that Ruzol believed himself to be authorized under R.A. 7160 to issue the
subject permits, why did he have to secure the approval of the various NGOs, People’s
Organizations and religious organizations before issuing the said permits? He could very
well have issued subject permits even without the approval of these various organizations if
he truly believed that he was legally empowered to do so considering that the endorsement
of these organizations is not required by law. That Ruzol had to arm himself with their
endorsement could only mean that he actually knew that he had no legal basis for issuing
the said permits; thus he had to look elsewhere for support and back-up.46 (Emphasis
Ours.)
In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
Ruzol possessed that "criminal mind" when he issued the subject permits. What is clear
from the records is that Ruzol, as municipal mayor, intended to regulate and monitor
salvaged forest products within General Nakar in order to avert the occurrence of illegal
logging in the area. We find that to hold him criminally liable for these seemingly noble
intentions would be a step backward and would run contrary to the standing advocacy of
encouraging people to take a pro-active stance in the protection of the environment and
conservation of our natural resources.
Incidentally, considering the peculiar circumstances of the present case and considering
further that this case demands only the determination of Ruzol's guilt or innocence for
usurpation of official functions under the RPC, for which the issue on the validity of the
subject Permits to Transport is only subsidiary, We hereby resolve this case only for this
purpose and only in this instance, pro hac vice, and, in the interest of justice, rule in favor of
Ruzol' s acquittal.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the December 19, 2008 Decision of the Sandiganbayan
First Division in Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259, finding Leovegildo R. Ruzol
guilty of violating Art. 177 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
Accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol is, thus, ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable doubt of the
crimes as charged.

SO ORDERED.
We, however, cannot subscribe to this posture as there is neither legal basis nor
established doctrine to draw a conclusion that good faith is negated when an accused
sought another person’s approval. Neither is there any doctrine in law which provides that
bad faith is present when one seeks the opinion or affirmation of others.

Contrary to the conclusions made by the Sandiganbayan, We find that the conduct of the
public consultation was not a badge of bad faith, but a sign supporting Ruzol’s good
intentions to regulate and monitor the movement of salvaged forest products to prevent
abuse and occurrence of untoward illegal logging. In fact, the records will bear that the
requirement of permits to transport was not Ruzol’s decision alone; it was, as earlier
narrated, a result of the collective decision of the participants during the Multi-Sectoral
Consultative Assembly. As attested to by Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, it was the
participants who agreed that the subject permits be issued by the Office of the Mayor of
General Nakar, through Ruzol, in the exercise of the latter’s authority as local chief
executive.47

The Sandiganbayan also posits the view that Ruzol’s good faith is negated by the fact that if
he truly believed he was authorized to issue the subject permits, Ruzol did not have to
request the presence and obtain the permission of PENRO Rogelio Delgado Sr. during the
Multi-Sectoral Assembly.48

The graft court’s above posture, however, does not commend itself for concurrence. If,
indeed, Ruzol willfully and deliberately intended to usurp the official functions of the DENR
as averred by the prosecution, he would not have asked the presence of a DENR official
who has the authority and credibility to publicly object against Ruzol’s allegedly intended
usurpation. Thus, the presence of PENRO Delgado during the Multi-Sectoral Assembly
does not negate, but strengthens Ruzol’s claim of good faith.

As a final note, We emphasize that the burden of protecting the environment is placed not
on the shoulders of DENR alone––each and every one of us, whether in an official or
private capacity, has his or her significant role to play. Indeed, protecting the environment is
not only a responsibility but also a right for which a citizen could and should freely exercise.
Considering the rampant forest denudation, environmental degradation and plaguing
 EN BANC
UNION BANK OF THE, G.R. No. 192565
PHILIPPINES and DESI
TOMAS, Present:
Petitioners, VS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
February 28, 2012
DECISION
BRION, J .:
We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 65, Makati City (RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No. 09-1038. The petition seeks to
reverse and set aside the RTC-Makati City decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of
petitioners Union Bank of the Philippines ( Union Bank) and Desi Tomas
(collectively, the petitioners). The RTC found that the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63,
Makati City (MeTC-Makati City) did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the
motion to quash the information for perjury filed by Tomas .
The Antecedents
Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The
Information against her reads:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements
under oath upon a material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said
accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a
complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin
docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same
issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that
said material statement was false thereby making a willful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood.[2]
The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two (2) complaints for
sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza
Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717,
was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to
the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and
signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of
deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate
against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other
action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash, [3] citing two grounds. First, she argued that the
venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against
Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury
case. Second, she argued that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because:
(a) the third element of perjury the willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood was not
alleged with particularity without specifying what the other action or proceeding commenced
involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency; (b) there was no other action or
proceeding pending in another court when the second complaint was filed; and (c) she was
charged with perjury by giving false testimony while the allegations in the Information make
out perjury by making a false affidavit.
The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has
jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized
in Makati City.[4] The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the allegations in the Information
sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury.[5] The MeTC-Makati City subsequently denied
Tomas motion for reconsideration.[6]
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul
and set aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The
petitioners anchored their petition on the rulings in United States v. Canet[7] and Ilusorio v.
Bildner[8] which ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false
document was presented.
The Assailed RTC Decision
In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:
[I]nsofar as the petitioners stance is concerned[,] the more recent
case of [Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy] (GR Nos. 174168 & 179438, March
30, 2009) however, reaffirms what has been the long standing view
on the venue with respect to perjury cases. In this particular case[,]
the high court reiterated the rule that the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where
the offense was committed, or where any of its essential ingredients
occurred. It went on to declare that since the subject document[,]
the execution of which was the subject of the charge[,] was
subscribed and sworn to in Manila[,] then the court of the said
territorial jurisdiction was the proper venue of the criminal action[.]
xxxx
x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not
amiss to state that the city court of Makati City has jurisdiction to try
and decide the case for perjury inasmuch as the gist of the
complaint itself which constitute[s] the charge against the petitioner
dwells solely on the act of subscribing to a false certification .
On the other hand, the charge against the accused in the case of
Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al., based on the complaint-affidavits therein[,]
was not simply the execution of the questioned documents but
rather the introduction of the false evidence through the subject
documents before the court of Makati City.[9] (emphasis ours)
The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave
abuse of discretion since the order denying the Motion to Quash was based on
jurisprudence later than Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati City also observed that the facts
in Ilusorio are different from the facts of the present case. Lastly, the RTC-Makati City ruled
that the Rule 65 petition was improper since the petitioners can later appeal the decision in
the principal case. The RTC-Makati City subsequently denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[10]
The Petition
The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and quash the
Information for perjury against Tomas. The petitioners contend that the Ilusorio ruling is
more applicable to the present facts than our ruling in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim. [11] They
argued that the facts in Ilusorio showed that the filing of the petitions in court containing the
false statements was the essential ingredient that consummated the perjury. In Sy Tiong,
the perjurious statements were made in a General Information Sheet ( GIS) that was
submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the petitioners view. In
his Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment (which we hereby treat as the Comment to
the petition), the Solicitor General also relied on Ilusorio and opined that the lis mota in the
crime of perjury is the deliberate or intentional giving of false evidence in the court where
the evidence is material. The Solicitor General observed that the criminal intent to assert a
falsehood under oath only became manifest before the MeTC-Pasay City.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of
the RPC should be Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the trial court.
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and
the proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.
Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction
Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not
only the place where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the
jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First , the
jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can only
hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction. [12] Second ,
laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of having an
accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for his
defense are available.[13]
Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries
jurisdictional consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be
instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted
and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the
offense was committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:
Place of commission of the offense . The complaint or information
is sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the
offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless
the particular place where it was committed constitutes an
essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its
identification.
Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal
cases not only in the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its
essential ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of
action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that
the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Information Charging Perjury
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, contains
the requirement for a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Certificate against Forum
Shopping can be made either by a statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory
pleading asserting a claim or relief; it may also be in a sworn certification annexed to the
complaint or initiatory pleading. In both instances, the affiant is required to execute a
statement under oath before a duly commissioned notary public or any competent person
authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she has not theretofore commenced any action
or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency
and, to the best of his or her knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the
present status thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter learn that the same or similar
action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall report that fact within five days
therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed. In relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a Certificate against Forum
Shopping is the truth of the required declarations which is designed to guard
against litigants pursuing simultaneous remedies in different fora.[14]
In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183 of the
RPC for making a false Certificate against Forum Shopping. The elements of perjury under
Article 183 are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or
executed an affidavit upon a material matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a
competent officer, authorized to receive and
administer oath.
(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made
a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the
falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose .
[15]
(emphasis ours)
Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the
ground of improper venue, the allegations in the complaint and information must be
examined together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. On this basis, we find that the allegations in the Information sufficiently support
a finding that the crime of perjury was committed by Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction
of the MeTC-Makati City.
The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate
against Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information to have been committed
in MakatiCity. Likewise, the second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against
Forum Shopping to be under oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in
the Information to have been made in Makati City:
That on or about the 13 th day of March 2000 in the
City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful
statements under oath upon a material matter before a competent
person authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit:
said accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit x x x.
[16]
We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also
sufficiently alleged to have been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated in
the last portion of the Information:
[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of
merit of a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of
replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has
not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same
issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that
said material statement was false thereby making a willful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood.[17] (underscoring ours)
Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown
when she made the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a
notary public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she
subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-
Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section
15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential
elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
Makati City, not Pasay City.
Referral to the En Banc
The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the seeming conflict
between the division rulings of the Court in the Ilusorio case that is cited as basis of this
petition, and the Sy Tiong case that was the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.
The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases
The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false statements
contained in verified petitions filed with the court for the issuance of a new owners
duplicate copies of certificates of title. The verified petitions containing the false statements
were subscribed and sworn to in Pasig City, but were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City.
The question posed was: which court (Pasig City, Makati City and/or Tagaytay City) had
jurisdiction to try and hear the perjury cases?
We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and Tagaytay City,
the places where the verified petitions were filed. The Court reasoned out that it was only
upon filing that the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the
alleged untruthful statement found relevance or materiality. We cited as jurisprudential
authority the case of United States. v. Caet[18] which ruled:
It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so
long as it appears from the information that the defendant, by
means of such affidavit, "swore to" and knowingly submitted false
evidence, material to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding
pending in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of
the offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in Manila, but
the intentional giving of false evidence in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such affidavit. [emphasis
and underscoring deleted]
In Sy Tiong , the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was
subscribed and sworn to in Manila. We ruled that the proper venue for the perjury charges
was in Manila where the GIS was subscribed and sworn to. We held that the perjury was
consummated in Manila where the false statement was made. As supporting jurisprudence,
we cited the case of Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice[19] that, in turn, cited an American
case entitled U.S. v. Norris.[20] We ruled in Villanueva that
 Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well
may affect the dearest concerns of the parties before a tribunal.
Deliberate material falsification under oath constitutes the crime of
perjury, and the crime is complete when a witness' statement has
once been made.
The Crime of Perjury: A Background
To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at the
historical background of how the crime of perjury (specifically, Article 183 of the RPC)
evolved in our jurisdiction.
The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false testimony for and
against the defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180 and 181, RPC); the second is false
testimony in a civil case (Article 182, RPC); and the third is false testimony in other cases
(Article 183, RPC). Based on the Information filed, the present case involves the
making of an untruthful statement in an affidavit on a material matter .
These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings cited by
the parties in their respective arguments. The cited Ilusorio ruling, although issued by this
Court in 2008, harked back to the case of Caet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before the
present RPC took effect .[21] Sy Tiong, on the other hand, is a 2009 ruling that
cited Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn cited United States v. Norris, a 1937 American
case. Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on rulings rendered after the
present RPC took effect.[22]
The perjurious act in Caet consisted of an information charging perjury
through the presentation in court of a motion accompanied by a false sworn affidavit. At
the time the Caet ruling was rendered, the prevailing law on perjury and the rules on
prosecution of criminal offenses were found in Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine
Commission, and in Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 [23] for the procedural
aspect.
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:
Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a
competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of
the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be administered, that
he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written
testimony, declaration, disposition, or certificate by him subscribed
is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any
material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of
perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than two
thousand pesos and by imprisonment for not more than five years;
and shall moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding any public
office or of giving testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands
until such time as the judgment against him is reversed.
This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections 5392 [24] and
5393[25] of the Revised Statutes of the United States.[26] Act No. 1697 was intended to make
the mere execution of a false affidavit punishable in our jurisdiction.[27]
In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that the
venue shall be the court of the place where the crime was committed.
As applied and interpreted by the Court in Caet, perjury was committed by the
act of representing a false document in a judicial proceeding .[28] The venue of action was
held by the Court to be at the place where the false document was presented since the
presentation was the act that consummated the crime.
The annotation of Justices Aquino and Grio-Aquino in their textbook on the
RPC[29] interestingly explains the history of the perjury provisions of the present RPC and
traces as well the linkage between Act No. 1697 and the present Code. To quote these
authors:[30]
Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code
and art. 154 of Del Pans Proposed Correctional Code, while art.
181 was taken from art. 319 of the old Penal Code and Art. 157 of
Del Pans Proposed Correctional Code. Said arts. 318 and 319,
together with art. 321 of the old Penal Code, were impliedly
repealed by Act 1697, the Perjury Law, passed on August 23,
1907, which in turn was expressly repealed by the Administrative
Code of 1916, Act 2657. In view of the express repeal of Act 1697,
arts. 318 and 321 of the old Penal Code were deemed
revived. However, Act 2718 expressly revived secs. 3 and 4 of the
Perjury Law. Art. 367 of the Revised Penal Code repealed Act
Nos. 1697 and 2718.
It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and
2718 includes false testimony, whereas, under the Revised Penal
Code, false testimony includes perjury. Our law on false testimony
is of Spanish origin, but our law on perjury (art. 183 taken from
sec. 3 of Act 1697) is derived from American statutes. The
provisions of the old Penal Code on false testimony embrace
perjury committed in court or in some contentious proceeding,
while perjury as defined in Act 1697 includes the making of a false
affidavit. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on false
testimony are more severe and strict than those of Act 1697 on
perjury. [italics ours]
With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC which
provides:
The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any
person, who knowingly makes untruthful statements and not being
included in the provisions of the next preceding articles,
shall testify under oath , or make an affidavit , upon any material
matter before a competent person authorized to administer an
oath in cases in which the law so requires. [emphasis supplied;
emphases ours]
in fact refers to either of two punishable acts (1) falsely testifying under oath in a
proceeding other than a criminal or civil case; and (2) making a false affidavit before a
person authorized to administer an oath on any material matter where the law requires an
oath.
As above discussed, Sy Tiong decided under Article 183 of the RPC essentially
involved perjured statements made in a GIS that was subscribed and sworn to
in Manila and submitted to the SEC in Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved
the making of an affidavit, not an actual testimony in a proceeding that is neither criminal
nor civil. From this perspective, the situs of the oath, i.e., the place where the oath was
taken, is the place where the offense was committed . By implication, the proper venue
would have been the City of Mandaluyong the site of the SEC had the charge involved an
actual testimony made before the SEC.
In contrast, Caet involved the presentation in court of a motion supported and
accompanied by an affidavit that contained a falsity. With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as
basis, the issue related to the submission of the affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This came
at a time when Act No. 1697 was the perjury law, and made no distinction between judicial
and other proceedings, and at the same time separately penalized the making of false
statements under oath (unlike the present RPC which separately deals with false testimony
in criminal, civil and other proceedings, while at the same time also penalizing the making
of false affidavits). Understandably, the venue should be the place where the submission
was made to the court or the situs of the court; it could not have been the place where the
affidavit was sworn to simply because this was not the offense charged in the Information.
The case of Ilusorio cited the Caet case as its authority, in a situation where the
sworn petitions filed in court for the issuance of duplicate certificates of title (that were
allegedly lost) were the cited sworn statements to support the charge of perjury for the
falsities stated in the sworn petitions. The Court ruled that the proper venue should be the
Cities of Makati and Tagaytay because it was in the courts of these cities where the intent to
assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement
finds relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of whether new owners duplicate copies
of the [Certificate of Condominium Title] and [Transfer Certificates of Title] may issue. [31] To
the Court, whether the perjurious statements contained in the four petitions were
subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury being the
intentional giving of false statement,[32] citing Caet as authority for its statement.
The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion on
venue because of its very categorical tenor in pointing to the considerations to be made in
the determination of venue; it leaves the impression that the place where the oath was
taken is not at all a material consideration, forgetting that Article 183 of the RPC clearly
speaks of two situations while Article 182 of the RPC likewise applies to false testimony in
civil cases.
The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis for the
charge been Article 182 of the RPC, on the assumption that the petition itself constitutes a
false testimony in a civil case. The Caet ruling would then have been completely applicable
as the sworn statement is used in a civil case, although no such distinction was made
under Caet because the applicable law at the time (Act No. 1697) did not make any
distinction.
If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in
the Ilusorio ruling, then only that portion of the article, referring to the making of an affidavit,
would have been applicable as the other portion refers to false testimony in other
proceedings which a judicial petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of a
Certificate of Condominium Title is not because it is a civil proceeding in court. As a perjury
based on the making of a false affidavit, what assumes materiality is the site where the
oath was taken as this is the place where the oath was made, in this case, Pasig City.

Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to various
changes from the time General Order No. 58 was replaced by Rules 106 to 122 of the
Rules of Court on July 1, 1940. Section 14, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court provided for the
rule on venue of criminal actions and it expressly included, as proper venue, the place
where any one of the essential ingredients of the crime took place. This change was
followed by the passage of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure, [33] the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, [34] and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which all
adopted the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedures expanded venue of criminal
actions. Thus, the venue of criminal cases is not only in the place where the offense was
committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place.

In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made
integral parts of two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against
the respondent spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a
complaint-affidavit against Tomas for violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in the
Information that followed, the criminal act charged was for the execution by Tomas of
an affidavit that contained a falsity .

Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable
provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of this article
which penalizes one who make[s] an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent
person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. The
constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit ; thus, the criminal act is
consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a
duly authorized person.

Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in

accord with Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of
perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is
committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at
that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is
committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor
civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as
supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a
written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn
statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the
submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination
of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime
committed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of

merit. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 163972-77
JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN,
Petitioner,
- versus –
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
March 28, 2008
DECISION
Joselito Raniero J. Daan (petitioner), one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 24167-24170, 24195-
24196,[1] questions the denial by the Sandiganbayan of his plea bargaining proposal.
The antecedents facts are laid down by Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated March 25, 2004, as follows:
Said accused,[2] together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were charged before this Court
for three counts of malversation of public funds involving the sums of P3,293.00, P1,869.00,
and P13,528.00, respectively, which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time
book and payrolls for given period making it appear that some laborers worked on the
construction of the new municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte and collected their respective
salaries thereon when, in truth and in fact, they did not. Thus, in addition to the charge
for malversation, the accused were also indicted before this Court for three counts of
falsification of public document by a public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of not guilty and substitute
the same with a plea of guilty, provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of
guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal
is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of not guilty to the
crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of guilty, but
to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a private individual. On the other
hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of not guilty thereto
with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render
accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as acceptable the
proposal of the accused to plead guilty to the lesser crime of falsification of public document by
a private individual. The prosecution explained:
With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of
the accused in pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by a private
individual defined and penalized under Article 172 of the Revised Penal code will
strengthen our cases against the principal accused, Municipal
Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of these criminal
acts.
Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution was likewise amenable to
the offer of said accused to plead guilty to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to
render accounts because:
x x x JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total amount
of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the provincial government
of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the damage caused to the
government has already been restituted x x x.[3]
The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution, [4] dated March 25, 2004, denied petitioners Motion to
Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent
reason was presented to justify its approval.[5]
The Sandiganbayan likewise denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated May 31,
2004.
This compelled petitioner to file the present case for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/ or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his plea bargaining
offer on the following grounds: first, petitioner is not an accountable officer and he merely affixed his signature
on the payrolls on a routinary basis, negating any criminal intent; and that the amount involved is
only P18,860.00, which he already restituted. [6]
The petition is meritorious.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty
to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter
sentence than that for the graver charge.[7]
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial,
the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea
of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2,
Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial
conference,[8] viz:
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. In all criminal cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after
arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or
circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a
lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil
aspects of the case.
SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. All agreements or admissions made or entered during the
pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused
and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements
covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the
court. (Emphasis supplied)
But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished presenting
its evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea bargaining was
not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the prosecution already presented
several witnesses.[9]
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining
may be made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, [10]and
that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. The rules however use word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an
exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea.[11] Trial
courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is
not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the
accused.[12]
In People of the Philippines v. Villarama,[13] the Court ruled that the acceptance of an offer to plead
guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is
addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court,[14] viz:
x x x In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the
Prosecutor with a yardstick within which their discretion may be properly exercised.
Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held
that the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient
evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged . In his concurring opinion in People
v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice
Antonio Barredo explained clearly and tersely the rationale or the law:
x x x (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which the
fiscal and the court could rightfully act in allowing the appellant to change his former plea
of not guilty to murder to guilty to the lesser crime of homicide could be nothing more
nothing less than the evidence already in the record . The reason for this being that
Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under which a plea for a lesser offense
is allowed was not and could not have been intended as a procedure for compromise,
much less bargaining.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
However, Villarama involved plea bargaining after the prosecution had already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the trial court's exercise of
its discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and whimsical exercise of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law.[16]
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground that petitioner
and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the benefit of the
public. The Sandiganbayan believes that approving the proposal would only serve to trivialize the
seriousness of the charges against them and send the wrong signal to potential grafters in public office
that the penalties they are likely to face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would have
merited or that the economic benefits they are likely to derive from their criminal activities far outweigh
the risks they face in committing them; thus, setting to naught the deterrent value of the laws intended
to curb graft and corruption in government. [17]
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea
offer. However, subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's
plea offer should be accepted. The present case calls for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity
jurisdiction -
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice
where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their
judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity
regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather
than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts. [18]
and of its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts, [19] in order to afford
equal justice to petitioner.
In People of the Philippines v. Estrada, [20] the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dated March 14,
2007, approved the Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into by the prosecution and one of the
accused, Charlie Atong Ang. The agreement provided that the accused undertakes to assist in the
prosecution of the case and promises to return the amount of P25,000,000.00. In approving the Plea
Bargaining Agreement, the Sandiganbayan took into consideration the timeliness of the plea
bargaining and whether the agreement complied with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court. The Sandigabayan noted that the accused had already withdrawn his earlier plea of
not guilty; and that the prosecution consented to the plea of guilt to a lesser offense; and the lesser
offense, which is Corruption of Public Officials in relation to Indirect Bribery, is necessarily included in the
offense charged, which is Plunder.[21]
The Court sees no reason why the standards applied by the Sandiganbayan to Estrada should not
be applied to the present case. Records show that there was a favorable recommendation by the
Office of the Special Prosecutor to approve petitioner's motion to plea bargain. Thus, in its
Memorandum dated August 16, 2002, the Office of the Special Prosecutor rationalized:
In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already
restituted the total amount of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the provincial
government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the damage caused to the
government has already been restituted by the accused.
There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in the instant
cases. Moreover, the accused is also willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense which to
our mind, merits consideration.
With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of the
accused in pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by private individual defined
and penalized under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code will strengthen our cases
against the principal accused, the Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to
be the master mind of these criminal acts. After all, the movants herein JOSELITO
RANIERO J. DAAN was merely designated as draftsman detailed as
foreman/timekeeper of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte.[22]
Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to Render Account by
an Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents
and Malversation of Public Funds, respectively, with which petitioner was originally charged.
Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for the crime of Falsification of Public
Documents through an untruthful narration of facts to be established, the following elements must
concur: (a) the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the
offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the
offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the
wrongful intent of injuring a third person. [23]
On the other hand, Falsification by Private Individuals penalized under Article 172, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code has the following elements: (a) the offender is a private individual or a public
officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; (b) the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and
(c) the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document. [24]
As regards the crime of Malversation of Public Funds defined and penalized under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, with which petitioner was also charged, the elements are as follows: (a) the
offender is a public officer; (b) he has custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of
his office; (c) the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable;
and (d) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment
or negligence permitted, the taking by another person of such funds or property.[25] Article 217 also
provides that the failure of the public officer to have duly forthcoming such public funds or property,
upon demand by a duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal use. In this regard, it has been ruled that once such presumption
is rebutted, then it is completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never deemed to have existed
at all.[26]
Meanwhile, under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code, Failure to Render Account by an
Accountable Officer, the lesser offense which petitioner seeks to plead guilty of, the following elements
must concur: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) the offender must be an accountable officer for
public funds or property; (c) the offender is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA
or to a provincial auditor; and (d) the offender fails to render an account for a period of two months after
such accounts should be rendered.[27]
Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states when an offense includes or is included in the other, to
wit:
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former as alleged in the complaint or information constitute the latter.
And vice versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.[28]
In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are sufficient to hold petitioner
liable for the lesser offenses. Thus, in the charge for Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may
plead guilty to the lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear
that petitioner took advantage of his official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll of
the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein, with regard to the crime of Malversation of Public
Funds, while the Informations contain allegations which make out a case for Malversation against
petitioner, nevertheless, absent the element of conversion, theoretically, petitioner may still be held
liable for Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer if it is shown that the failure to render
account was in violation of a law or regulation that requires him to render such an accounting within the
prescribed period.
Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case likewise
constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser offenses.
Finally, as propounded by petitioner, indeed, he is not an accountable officer in that the nature of his
duty as foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require possession or custody of local government
funds,[29] not to mention that petitioner has already restituted the amount of P18,860.00 involved in this
case. Unlike Estrada which involves a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death,[30] and a
whopping P25,000,000.00 taken from the public coffers, this case tremendously pales in comparison.
Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, where gross inequity will result in a
discriminatory dispensation of justice, the Court will not hesitate to intervene in order to equalize the
imbalance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 25, 2004 and May 31,
2004 are SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to grant petitioner's Motion to
Plea Bargain. Let records of this case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further
proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., et al., vs MAGDALENO M. PEÑA, et al., G.R.
No. 143591, November 23, 2007 and May 25, 2010.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals, in its Decision[1] dated
20 June 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666, is correct when it dismissed the petition
for certiorari filed by petitioners Teodoro C. Borlongan, Jr., Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo E.
Manuel, Jr., Benjamin de Leon, P. Siervo H. Dizon, Delfin C. Gonzales, Jr., Eric L. Lee and
Ben Yu Lim, Jr., and ruled that the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City, did not
gravely abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reinvestigation and recall of the
warrants of arrest in Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea (Atty. Pea) instituted a civil case for recovery of agents
compensation and expenses, damages, and attorneys fees [2] against Urban Bank and
herein petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros
Occidental, Bago City. The case was raffled to Branch 62 and was docketed as Civil Case
No. 754. Atty. Pea anchored his claim for compensation on the Contract of
Agency[3] allegedly entered into with the petitioners, wherein the former undertook to
perform such acts necessary to prevent any intruder and squatter from unlawfully
occupying Urban Banks property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City. Petitioners
filed a Motion to Dismiss[4] arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or
counsel. Attached to the motion were the following documents: 1) a Letter [5] dated 19
December 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of Isabela Sugar
Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the subject property; 2) an unsigned
Letter[6] dated 7 December 1994 addressed to Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn G. Ong; 3) a
Letter[7] dated 9 December 1994 addressed to Teodoro Borlongan, Jr. and signed by
Marilyn G. Ong; and 4) a Memorandum [8] dated 20 November 1994 from Enrique Montilla
III. Said documents were presented in an attempt to show that the respondent was
appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners.
In view of the introduction of the above-mentioned documents, Atty. Pea filed his Complaint-
Affidavit[9] with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City.[10] He claimed that said
documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their
signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and employees of
ISCI.[11] Worse, petitioners introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC knowing
that they were falsified.
In a Resolution[12] dated 24 September 1998, the City Prosecutor found probable cause for
the indictment of petitioners for four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified
Documents, penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code. The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents were falsified because the
alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the principal of the respondent; that
petitioners knew that the documents were falsified considering that the signatories were
mere dummies; and that the documents formed part of the record of Civil Case No. 754
where they were used by petitioners as evidence in support of their motion to dismiss, and
then adopted in their answer and in their Pre-Trial Brief. [13] Subsequently, the corresponding
Informations[14] were filed with the MTCC, Bago City. The cases were docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the
warrants[15] for the arrest of the petitioners.
On 1 October 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of
Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation. [16] Petitioners insisted that they were denied due process
because of the non-observance of the proper procedure on preliminary investigation
prescribed in the Rules of Court. Specifically, they claimed that they were not afforded the
right to submit their counter-affidavit. Then they argued that since no such counter-affidavit
and supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied
on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of
arrest, also in contravention with the Rules of Court. Petitioners further prayed that the
information be quashed for lack of probable cause. Moreover, one of the accused, i.e., Ben
Lim, Jr., is not even a director of Urban Bank, contrary to what complainant stated. Lastly,
petitioners posited that the criminal cases should have been suspended on the ground that
the issue being threshed out in the civil case is a prejudicial question.
In an Order [17] dated 13 November 1998, the MTCC denied the omnibus motion primarily on
the ground that preliminary investigation was not available in the instant case which fell
within the jurisdiction of the first-level court. The court, likewise, upheld the validity of the
warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules of Court. Besides,
the court added, petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant since they
already posted bail. The court also believed that the issue involved in the civil case was not
a prejudicial question, and, thus, denied the prayer for suspension of the criminal
proceedings. Lastly, the court was convinced that the Informations contained all the facts
necessary to constitute an offense.
Petitioners immediately instituted a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before the
Court of Appeals, ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC in issuing and not recalling the warrants of arrest,
reiterating the arguments in their omnibus motion. [18] They, likewise, questioned the courts
conclusion that by posting bail, petitioners already waived their right to assail the validity of
the warrants of arrest.
On 20 June 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. [19] Thus, petitioners filed the
instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the
following issues:
A.
Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court and not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, is the finding of probable cause
required for the filing of an Information in court?
If the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not establish probable cause, should not the
investigating prosecutor dismiss the complaint, or at the very least, require the respondent
to submit his counter-affidavit?
B.
Can a complaint-affidavit containing matters which are not within the personal knowledge of
the complainant be sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause?
C.
Where there is offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, and the record of the
preliminary investigation does not show the existence of probable cause, should not the
judge refuse to issue a warrant of arrest and dismiss the criminal case, or at the very least,
require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit in order to aid the judge in determining
the existence of probable cause?
D.
Can a criminal prosecution be restrained?
E.
Can this Honorable Court itself determine the existence of probable cause? [20]
On the other hand, respondent contends that the issues raised by the petitioners had
already become moot and academic when the latter posted bail and were already
arraigned.
On 2 August 2000, this Court issued a TRO[21] enjoining the judge of the MTCC from
proceeding in any manner with Criminal Case Nos. 6683 to 6686, effective during the entire
period that the case is pending before, or until further orders of, this Court.
We will first discuss the issue of mootness.
The issues raised by the petitioners have not been mooted by the fact that they had posted
bail and were already arraigned.
It appears from the records that upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners
immediately posted bail as they wanted to avoid embarrassment, being then the officers of
Urban Bank. On the scheduled date for the arraignment, despite the petitioners refusal to
enter a plea, the court a quo entered a plea of Not Guilty for them.
The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any
irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest, that has already been superseded by
Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure. The principle that the
accused is precluded from questioning the legality of the arrest after arraignment is true
only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking
his objections thereto.[22]
As held in Okabe v. Hon. Gutierrez:[23]
It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is
a new one, intended to modify previous rulings of this Court that an application for bail or
the admission to bail by the accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to assail
the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities thereon. The new rule has
reverted to the ruling of this Court in People v. Red. The new rule is curative in nature
because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in procedural rules.
Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by their
essence retroactive in application. Besides, procedural rules as a general rule operate
retroactively, even without express provisions to that effect, to cases pending at the time of
their effectivity, in other words to actions yet undetermined at the time of their effectivity.
Before the appellate court rendered its decision on January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure was already in effect. It behoved the appellate court to have applied the
same in resolving the petitioners petition for certiorari and her motion for partial
reconsideration.

Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it
cannot be argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to
assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by the respondent judge. There must be
clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right
to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what
a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to
voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his
conduct is possible. x x x.
Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For
Reinvestigation on the same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly
contained a stipulation that they were not waiving their right to question the validity of their
arrest.[24] On the date of their arraignment, petitioners refused to enter their plea due to the
fact that the issue on the legality of their arrest is still pending with the Court. Thus, when
the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for them, there was no valid waiver of their right
to preclude them from raising the same with the Court of Appeals or this Court. The posting
of bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to avert their incarceration; it should not
be deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their arrest. The ruling to which we have
returned in People v. Red[25] stated:
x x x The present defendants were arrested towards the end of January, 1929, on the
Island and Province of Marinduque by order of the judge of the Court of First Instance of
Lucena, Tayabas, at a time when there were no court sessions being held in Marinduque. In
view of these circumstances and the number of the accused, it may properly be held that
the furnishing of the bond was prompted by the sheer necessity of not remaining in
detention, and in no way implied their waiver of any right, such as the summary
examination of the case before their detention. That they had no intention of waiving this
right is clear from their motion of January 23, 1929, the same day on which they furnished a
bond, and the fact that they renewed this petition on February 23, 1929, praying for the stay
of their arrest for lack of the summary examination; the first motion being denied by the
court on January 24, 1929 (G.R. No. 33708, page 8), and the second remaining undecided,
but with an order to have it presented in Boac, Marinduque.
Therefore, the defendants herein cannot be said to have waived the right granted to them
by section 13, General Order No. 58, as amended by Act No. 3042.
The rest of the issues raised by the petitioners may be grouped into two, which are: (1) the
procedural aspect, i.e., whether the prosecution and the court a quo properly observed the
required procedure in the instant case, and, (2) the substantive aspect, which is whether
there was probable cause to pursue the criminal cases to trial.
THE PROCEDURAL ASPECT:
Petitioners contend that they were denied due process as they were unable to submit their
counter-affidavits and were not accorded the right to a preliminary
investigation. Considering that the complaint of Atty. Pea was filed in September 1998, the
rule then applicable was the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The provisions of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure relevant to the issue are Sections
1, 3(a) and 9(a) of Rule 112, to wit:
Section 1. Definition. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of
determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a
crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent
is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
Sec. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information
for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in
such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The
said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official
authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary public, who
must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts nor
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
(a) Where filed with the fiscal. If the complaint is filed directly with the fiscal or state
prosecutor, the procedure outlined in Section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. The fiscal
shall take appropriate action based on the affidavits and other supporting documents
submitted by the complainant. (underscoring supplied)
The crime to which petitioners were charged was defined and penalized under second
paragraph of Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. The penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more
than P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next
preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of
commercial document; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage,
shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next
preceding article.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the
damage of another or who, with the intent to cause such damage, shall use any of the false
documents embraced in the next preceding article or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of
this article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree.
Prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods translates to imprisonment of 2
years, 4 months and 1 day.[26] The next lower in degree to prision correccional is arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period which translates
to 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months [27] of imprisonment. Since the crime
committed is not covered by the Rules of Summary Procedure, [28] the case falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts but applying the ordinary rules. In such
instance, preliminary investigation as defined in Section 1, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure is not applicable since such section covers only crimes cognizable by
the RTC. That which is stated in Section 9(a) is the applicable rule.
Under this Rule, while probable cause should first be determined before an information may
be filed in court, the prosecutor is not mandated to require the respondent to submit his
counter-affidavits to oppose the complaint. In the determination of probable cause, the
prosecutor may solely rely on the complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents
submitted by the complainant. If he does not find probable cause, the prosecutor may
dismiss outright the complaint or if he finds probable cause or sufficient reason to proceed
with the case, he shall issue a resolution and file the corresponding information.
The complaint of respondent, verbatim, is as follows:
COMPLAINT AFFIDAVIT
I, MAGDALENO M. PEA, Filipino, of legal age, with address at Brgy. Ubay, Pulupandan,
Negros Occidental, after having been sworn in accordance with law hereby depose and
state:
1. I am the Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 754 pending with the Regional Trial Court of
Bago City entitled Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea v. Urban Bank, et al Impleaded therein as
defendants of the board of the bank, namely, Teodoro Borlongan, Delfin Gonzales, Jr.,
Benjamin De Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim Jr., Corazon Bejasa and Arturo
Manuel.(underlining ours)
2. I filed the said case to collect my fees as agent of Urban Bank, Inc.(hereinafter
referred to as the bank) in ridding a certain parcel of land in Pasay City of squatters and
intruders. A certified true copy of the Complaint in the said case is hereto attached as Annex
A.
3. In the Motion to Dismiss dated 12 March 1996 (a certified true copy of which
is attached as Annex B), Answer dated 28 October 1996 (Annex C), and Pre-Trial Brief
dated 28 January 1997 (Annex D) filed by the bank and the respondent members of the
board, the said respondents used as evidence the following documents:
a. Letter dated 19 December 1994 supposedly signed by a certain Herman Ponce and Julie
Abad for Isabela Sugar Company (ISC) (a copy of which is attached as Annex E), which
states:
December 19, 1994
Urban Bank
Urban Avenue, Makati
Metro Manila
Gentlemen:
This has reference to your property located among Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City which you
purchased from Isabela Sugar Company under a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on
December 1, 1994.

In line with our warranties as the Seller of the said property and our undertaking to deliver
to you the full and actual possession and control of said property, free from tenants,
occupants or squatters and from any obstruction or impediment to the free use and
occupancy of the property and to prevent the former tenants or occupants from entering or
returning to the premises. In view of the transfer of ownership of the property to Urban
Bank, it may be necessary for Urban Bank to appoint Atty. Pea likewise as its authorized
representative for purposes of holding/maintaining continued possession of the said
property and to represent Urban Bank in any court action that may be instituted for the
abovementioned purposes.
It is understood that any attorneys fees, cost of litigation and any other charges or
expenses that may be incurred relative to the exercise by Atty. Pea of his abovementioned
duties shall be for the account of Isabela Sugar Company and any loss or damage that may
be incurred to third parties shall be answerable by Isabela Sugar Company.
Very truly yours,
Isabela Sugar Company
By:
HERMAN PONCE
JULIE ABAD
b. Memorandum dated 7 December 1994 supposedly executed by a certain Marilyn Ong on
behalf of ISC, a copy of which is hereto attached as annex F, which states:
December 7, 1994
You are hereby directed to recover and take possession of the property of the corporation
situated at Roxas Boulevard covered by TCT No. 5382 of the Registry of Deeds
for Pasay City, immediately upon the expiration of the contract of lease over the said
property on 29 November 1994. For this purpose, you are authorized to engage the
services of security guards to protect the property against intruders. You may also engage
the services of a lawyer in case there is a need to go to court to protect the said property of
the corporation. In addition, you may take whatever steps or measures are necessary to
ensure our continued possession of the property.
ENRIQUE C. MONTILLA III
President
4. The respondent member of the board of the bank used and introduced the
aforestated documents as evidence in the civil case knowing that the same are falsified.
They used thae said documents to justify their refusal to pay my agents fees, to my damage
and prejudice.
5. The 19 December 1994 letter (Annex E) is a falsified document, in that the person
who supposedly executed the letter on behalf of ISC, a certain Herman Ponce and Julie
Abad did not actually affix their signatures on the document. The execution of the letter was
merely simulated by making it appear that Ponce and Abad executed the letter on behalf of
ISC when they did not in fact do so.
6. No persons by the name of Herman Ponce and Julie Abad were ever stockholders,
officers, employees or representatives of ISC. In the letter, Herman Ponce was represented
to be the President of ISC and Julie Abad, the Corporate Secretary. However, as of 19
December 1994, the real President of plaintiff was Enrique Montilla, III and Cristina Montilla
was the Corporate Secretary. A copy of the Minutes of the Regular Meeting of ISC for the
year 1994, during which Montilla, et al. Were elected is hereto attached as Annex I. On the
otherhand, a list of the stockholders of ISC on or about the time of the transaction is
attached as Annex J.

To: ATTY. CORA BEJASA 7. The same holds true with respect to the Memorandum dated 7 December 1994 and
From: MARILYN G. ONG athe letter dated 9 December 1994 allegedly written by a ceratin Marilyn Ong. Nobody by
the said name was ever a stockholder of ISC.
RE: ISABELA SUGAR CO., INC.
8. Lastly, with respect to the supposed Memorandum issued by Enrique Montilla, III his
Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea, who has been assigned by Isabela Sugar Company inc. to take signature thereon was merely forged by respondents. Enrique Montilla III, did not affix his
charge of inspecting the tenants would like to request an authority similar to this from the signature on any such document.
Bank to new owners. Can you please issue something like this today as he (unreadable)
this. 9. I am executing this affidavit for the purpose of charging Teodoro C. Borlongan,
Corazon M. Bejasa and Arturo E. Manuel, Delfin C. Gonzales Jr., Benjamin L. De Leon, P.
Siervo H. Dizon and Eric Lee, with the crime of use of falsified documents under Artilce 172,
b. Letter dated 9 December 1994 supposedly executed by the same Marilyn Ong, a paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.(underlining ours)
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex G, which states:
10. I am likewise executing this affidavit for whatever legal purpose it may serve.
December 9, 1994
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
Atty. Ted Borlongan
URBAN BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
MAKATI, METRO MANILA Sgd. MAGDALENO M. PEA

Attention: Mr. Ted Borlongan It is evident that in the affidavit-complaint, specifically in paragraph 1, respondent merely
Dear Mr. Borlongan introduced and identified the board of the bank, namely, Teodoro Borlongan, Jr., Delfin
Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin De Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim, Jr., Corazon Bejasa
I would like to request for an authority from Urban Bank per attached immediately as the and Arturo Manuel, Sr. However, in the accusatory portion of the complaint which is
tenants are questioning authority of the people who are helping us to take possession of the paragraph number 9, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was not included among those charged with the
property. crime of use of falsified documents under Article 172, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal
Code. The omission indicates that respondent did not intend to criminally implicate Mr. Ben
Lim, Jr., even as he was acknowledged to be a member of the board. And there was no
Marilyn Ong explanation in the Resolution and Information by the City Prosecutor why Mr. Ben Lim, Jr.
was included. Moreover, as can be gleaned from the body of the complaint and the specific
averments therein, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was never mentioned.
c. Memorandum dated 20 November 1994, copy of which is attached as annex H,
which states: The City Prosecutor should have cautiously reviewed the complaint to determine whether
there were inconsistencies which ought to have been brought to the attention of the
respondent or, on his own, considered for due evaluation. It is a big mistake to bring a man
MEMORANDUM to trial for a crime he did not commit.
To: Atty. Magadaleno M. Pea
Director Prosecutors are endowed with ample powers in order that they may properly fulfill their
assigned role in the administration of justice. It should be realized, however, that when a
From: Enrique C. Montilla III man is hailed to court on a criminal charge, it brings in its wake problems not only for the
President accused but for his family as well. Therefore, it behooves a prosecutor to weigh the
evidence carefully and to deliberate thereon to determine the existence of a prima facie
Date: 20 November 1994 case before filing the information in court. Anything less would be a dereliction of duty.[29]
Atty. Pea, in his Second Manifestation [30] dated 16 June 1999, averred that petitioners,
including Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., were already estopped from raising the fact that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr.
was not a member of the board of directors of Urban Bank, as the latter participated and
appeared through counsel in Civil Case No. 754 without raising any opposition. However,
this does not detract from the fact that the City Prosecutor, as previously discussed, did not
carefully scrutinize the complaint of Atty. Pea, which did not charge Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. of any
crime.
What tainted the procedure further was that the Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of the
petitioners, including, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. despite the filing of the Omnibus Motion to Quash,
Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation raising among others the issue that
Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., was not even a member of the board of directors. With the filing of the
motion, the judge is put on alert that an innocent person may have been included in the
complaint. In the Order [31] dated 13 November 1998, in denying the motion to quash, Judge
Primitivo Blanca ruled that:
Courts in resolving a motion to quash cannot consider facts contrary to those alleged in the
information or which do not appear on the face of the information because said motion is
hypothethical admission of the facts alleged in the information x x x. (citations omitted.)
We cannot accept as mere oversight the mistake of respondent judge since it was at the
expense of liberty. This cannot be condoned.
In the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the mandate of the Constitution is for the judge to
personally determine the existence of probable cause:
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Corollary thereto, Section 9(b) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts nor
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
(a) x x x.
(b) Where filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court. If the complaint or information is filed
directly with the Municipal Trial Court, the procedure provided for in Section 3(a) of this Rule
shall likewise be observed. If the judge finds no sufficient ground to hold the respondent for
trial, he shall dismiss the complaint or information. Otherwise, he shall issue a warrant of
arrest after personally examining in writing and under oath the complainant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the rule that [n]o x x x warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing x x x the persons x x x to be seized. [32] Interpreting the words personal
determination, we said in Soliven v. Makasiar[33] that it does not thereby mean that judges
are obliged to conduct the personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses
themselves. To require thus would be to unduly laden them with preliminary examinations
and investigations of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before them. Rather, what is emphasized merely is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the existence of probable
cause. To this end, he may: (a) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on
the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, disregard the prosecutor's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence. What he is never allowed to
do is to follow blindly the prosecutor's bare certification as to the existence of
probable cause. Much more is required by the constitutional provision. Judges have to
go over the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes if any, and
other documents supporting the prosecutor's certification . Although the extent of the
judge's personal examination depends on the circumstances of each case, to be sure,
he cannot just rely on the bare certification alone but must go beyond it . This is
because the warrant of arrest issues not on the strength of the certification standing alone
but because of the records which sustain it. [34] He should even call for the complainant and
the witnesses to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances warrant. [35]
An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the
privacy of persons which ought not to be intruded by the State.[36]
Measured against the constitutional mandate and established rulings, there was here
a clear abdication of the judicial function and a clear indication that the judge blindly
followed the certification of a city prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest with respect to all of the petitioners. The careless inclusion
of Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., in the warrant of arrest gives flesh to the bone of contention of
petitioners that the instant case is a matter of persecution rather than prosecution. [37]On this
ground, this Court may enjoin the criminal cases against petitioners. As a general rule,
criminal prosecutions cannot be enjoined. However, there are recognized exceptions which,
as summarized in Brocka v. Enrile,[38] are:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; [39]
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions;[40]
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;[41]
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;[42]
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; [43]
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; [44]
g. Where the court had no jurisdiction over the offense; [45]
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;[46]
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; [47] and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground has been denied.[48]
THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECT:
Petitioners were charged with violation of par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code or
Introduction of Falsified Document in a judicial proceeding. The elements of the offense are
as follows:
1. That the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person.
2. That the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any subdivisions Nos.
1 or 2 of Article 172.
3. That he introduced said document in evidence in any judicial proceeding. [49]
The falsity of the document and the defendants knowledge of its falsity are essential
elements of the offense. The Office of the City Prosecutor filed the Informations against the
petitioners on the basis of the Complaint-Affidavit of respondent Atty. Pea, attached to
which were the documents contained in the Motion to Dismiss filed by the petitioners in Civil
Case No. 754. Also included as attachments to the complaint were the Answers, Pre-Trial
Brief, the alleged falsified documents, copy of the regular meetings of ISCI during the
election of the Board of Directors and the list of ISCI Stockholders. [50] Based on these
documents and the complaint-affidavit of Atty. Pea, the City Prosecutor concluded that
probable cause for the prosecution of the charges existed. On the strength of the same
documents, the trial court issued the warrants of arrest.
This Court, however, cannot find these documents sufficient to support the existence of
probable cause.
Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or any offense
included therein has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining
probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances without restoring to
the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies
on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing
that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the
accused. Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that
would justify conviction.[51]
As enunciated in Baltazar v. People,[52] the task of the presiding judge when the Information
is filed with the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the arrest of the accused.
The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for the arrest of
the accused is to insulate from the very start those falsely charged with crimes from the
tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.[53]
We do not see how it can be concluded that the documents mentioned by respondent in his
complaint-affidavit were falsified. In his complaint, Atty. Pea stated that Herman Ponce,
Julie Abad and Marilyn Ong, the alleged signatories of the questioned letters, did not
actually affix their signatures therein; and that they were not actually officers or
stockholders of ISCI.[54] He further claimed that Enrique Montillas signature appearing in
another memorandum addressed to respondent was forged. [55] These averments are mere
assertions which are insufficient to warrant the filing of the complaint or worse the issuance
of warrants of arrest. These averments cannot be considered as proceeding from the
personal knowledge of herein respondent who failed to, basically, allege that he was
present at the time of the execution of the documents. Neither was there any mention in the
complaint-affidavit that herein respondent was familiar with the signatures of the mentioned
signatories to be able to conclude that they were forged. What Atty. Pea actually stated
were but sweeping assertions that the signatories are mere dummies of ISCI and that they
are not in fact officers, stockholders or representatives of the corporation. Again, there is no
indication that the assertion was based on the personal knowledge of the affiant.

The reason for the requirement that affidavits must be based on personal knowledge is to
guard against hearsay evidence. A witness, therefore, may not testify as what he merely
learned from others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony
is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.
[56]
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes
hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements.[57]

The requirement of personal knowledge should have been strictly applied considering that
herein petitioners were not given the opportunity to rebut the complainants allegation
through counter-affidavits.

Quite noticeable is the fact that in the letter dated 19 December 1994 of Herman Ponce and
Julie Abad, neither of the two made the representation that they were the president or
secretary of ISCI. It was only Atty. Pea who asserted that the two made such
representation. He alleged that Marilyn Ong was never a stockholder of ISCI but he did not
present the stock and transfer book of ISCI. And, there was neither allegation nor proof that
Marilyn Ong was not connected to ISCI in any other way. Moreover, even if Marilyn Ong
was not a stockholder of ISCI, such would not prove that the documents she signed were
falsified.

The Court may not be compelled to pass upon the correctness of the exercise of the public
prosecutors function without any showing of grave abuse of discretion or manifest error in
his findings.[58] Considering, however, that the prosecution and the court a quo committed
manifest errors in their findings of probable cause, this Court therefore annuls their findings.

Our pronouncement in Jimenez v. Jimenez[59] as reiterated in Baltazar v. People is apropos:

It is x x x imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused
from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient
to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as
to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the
determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the
conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon
the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not
disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reasons. The
judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some
credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a
basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives
up to its mission by visualizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been
before. It should continue to be so.
On the foregoing discussion, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the findings
of the prosecutor as well as the court a quo as to the existence of probable cause.The
criminal complaint against the petitioners should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 20 June 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Temporary Restraining Order dated 2 August 2000 is hereby made permanent. Accordingly,
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Negros Occidental, Bago City, is
hereby DIRECTED to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685 and 6686.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 142011 March 14, 2003
ALFONSO C. CHOA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LENI CHOA, respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J .:
Alfonso Chan Choa, petitioner, is a Chinese national. On April 25, 1989, he filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, Bacolod City, a verified petition for
naturalization,1 docketed as Special Proceeding No. 5395.
During the initial hearing of the case on August 27, 1990, petitioner testified on direct
examination but he was not able to finish the same. On August 29, 1990, he filed a motion
to withdraw his petition for naturalization. 2 The trial court granted the motion in its
Resolution dated September 28, 1990,3 which partly reads:
"The petitioner, Alfonso Chan Choa, has not yet finished testifying on direct-examination.
Although the petitioner has not stated in his said ‘Motion To Withdraw Petition’ the reason
why he is withdrawing his petition at this stage of the proceedings, the petitioner can not be
compelled to continue with his petition for naturalization.
"In view thereof, the petitioner, Alfonso Chan Choa, is allowed to withdraw his petition for
naturalization.
"SO ORDERED."
Meanwhile, on August 5, 1992, State Prosecutor Pedro D. Delfin on detail at Bacolod City,
acting upon the complaint of petitioner’s wife, Leni, filed an Information 4 with the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 3, Bacolod City, charging petitioner with perjury under
Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as Criminal Case No. 50322. The
Information reads:
"That on or about 30th day of March, 1989, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly made untruthful statements or falsehoods upon
material matters required by the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 473) in his verified
‘Petition for Naturalization’ dated April 13, 1989 (sic), 5 subscribed and sworn to before
Notary Public Felomino B. Tan, Jr., who is authorized to administer oath, which petition
bears Doc. No. 140, Page No. 29, Book No. XXIII, series of 1989, in the Notarial Register of
said Notary Public, by stating therein the following, to wit:
‘5.) I am married to a Filipino. My wife’s name is Leni Ong Choa and now resides at 46
Malaspina Street, Bacolod City. I have two (2) children whose names, dates and places of
birth, and residence are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
‘10) I am of good moral character, I believe in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution. I have conducted myself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of my residence in the Philippines in my relations with the constituted
government as well as with the community in which I am living.’
xxx xxx xxx
when in truth and in fact, said accused knew that his wife Leni Ong Choa and their two (2)
children were not then residing at said address at # 46 Malaspina Street, Villamonte,
Bacolod City, having left the aforesaid residence in 1984, or about five (5) years earlier and
were then residing at Hervias Subdivision, Bacolod City; that contrary to his aforesaid
allegation in his verified Petition for Naturalization, accused, while residing at 211 106
Street, Greenplains Subdivision, Bacolod City, has been carrying on an immoral and illicit
relationship with one Stella Flores Saludar, a woman not his wife since 1984, and begetting
two (2) children with her as a consequence, as he and his wife, the private offended party
herein, have long been separated from bed and board since 1984; which falsehoods and/or
immoral and improper conduct are grounds for disqualification to become a citizen of the
Philippines.
"Act contrary to law."
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued thereafter.
After trial, the MTCC rendered a Decision6 dated February 21, 1995 finding petitioner guilty
of perjury, as charged, thus:
"FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense which he is presently charged, and there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances that may be considered, the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six
(6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional and to pay the costs."
Petitioner filed a motion for a reconsideration, 7 contending, among others, that there is no
basis to convict him of perjury because almost two years prior to the filing of the
Information, his motion to withdraw the petition for naturalization containing the alleged
false statements was granted by the MTCC, hence, the alleged false statements were no
longer existing or had become functus officio.
The MTCC, in its Order 8 dated March 31, 1995, denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54, Bacolod City, in a Decision dated
September 12, 1996, affirmed the MTCC judgment.9
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. CR
No. 19968. In his comment, the Solicitor General recommended the acquittal of petitioner,
contending that the withdrawal of his petition for naturalization rendered the same functus
officio, thus making the questioned false statements inexistent.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated June 8, 1999, 10 affirmed the RTC Decision with
modification, thus:
"WHEREFORE, finding the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court to be in
accordance with law and evidence, we AFFIRM the same with the modification that
petitioner-accused-appellant Alfonso Choa is sentenced to suffer imprisonment, after
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law without any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, for a period of three (3) months of arresto mayor, to one (1) year and eight
(8) months of prision correccional.
"SO ORDERED."
In convicting petitioner, the Appellate Court adopted as its own the RTC’s findings as
follows:
"Evidence presented clearly proved that all the above-enumerated elements (of perjury)
have been duly executed by the accused. His allegations in his petition regarding his, his
wife’s and children’s residences and his positive averment of the fact that he is of good
moral character and had conducted himself in an irreproachable manner during his stay in
the Philippines are material matters in connection with his petition for naturalization as they
are essential facts required by Sec. 7 of C.A. No. 473 for one to fulfill for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship. They are the very facts which would be the subject of inquiry by the
court hearing the petition and the same would be the basis of the court’s ruling whether one
is qualified and granted Philippine citizenship .
"Paragraph 2 of Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the statement or affidavit
is to be made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath. The
information shows that the statement was duly subscribed and sworn to before Notary
Public Felomino B. Tan, Jr., a person competent and authorized by law to receive and
administer oath and the same was entered in his notary register as Doc. No. 140, Page No.
29, Book No. XXIII, Series of 1989.
"That the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood could be gleaned
from the discrepancies in his given addresses. In his petition for naturalization he gave No.
46 Malaspina Street, Villamonte, Bacolod City as his and his wife’s residence, while in the
birth certificates and the affidavit of admission of paternity of both Fonsella Kae Saludar and
Steve Albert Saludar, he gave No. 211, 106 Street, Greenplains Subdivision, Bacolod City
as his address besides from the fact that while may have been residing in the above-stated
addresses, his wife and children have been staying at Hervias Subdivision, Bacolod City
since the latter part of 1984. Furthermore, cohabiting openly with another woman not his
wife and siring (2) children with the same, in open defiance with the norm of morality of the
community where monogamy is the accepted practice, is very inconsistent with his
allegations of a moral life, proper and irreproachable, considering that the accused, by his
own admission is a graduate of the University of St. La Salle, a school known for its high
academic and moral standards. These assertions are not only willful and deliberate but a
perversion of truth which the law is mandated to punish.
"Section 7 of C.A. 473 provides:
‘Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with the competent Court, a
petition in triplicate, accompanied by two (2) photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his
name and surname; his present and former residence , his occupation; the place and date
of his birth, whether single or married, the name, age, birthplace and residence of the wife
and each of the children…x x x.’ (underscoring supplied)
"The above-cited provisions are the pertinent law which specifically requires any person
desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship to accomplish, thus complying with the fourth
element of the crime of perjury. (pp. 119-120, Original Records, Vol. II)" 11
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated February 22, 2000. 12
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.13
Both the petitioner and the Solicitor General in their respective pleadings contend that the
challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed because: (a) not all the
elements of the crime of perjury are present; and (b) the withdrawal of the petition for
naturalization which contains the alleged untruthful statements bars the prosecution of
petitioner for perjury.
Thus, the issue here is whether petitioner may be convicted of perjury based on the alleged
false statements he stated in his petition for naturalization withdrawn almost two years prior
to the filing of the Information for perjury.
The petition is unmeritorious. made a mockery not only of the Philippine naturalization law but the judicial proceedings as
Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code under which petitioner has been charged and well. And the petition for naturalization tainted with material falsities can be used as
convicted, provides: evidence of his unlawful act.
"Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation . – The penalty Petitioner then claims that since the petition for naturalization is a pleading, the allegations
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall therein are absolutely privileged and cannot be used for any criminal prosecution against
be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being him, citing Sison vs. David,20 People vs. Aquino21 and Flordelis vs. Himalaloan.22
included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an The argument is unavailing. Sison and Aquino both involve libel cases. In Sison, this Court
affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an categorically stressed that the term " absolute privilege" (or "qualified privilege") has an
oath in cases in which the law so requires. "established technical meaning, in connection with civil actions for libel and slander." The
"Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any purpose of the privilege is to ensure that "members of the legislature, judges of courts,
of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section, shall jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective
suffer the respective penalties provided therein." functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of
The elements of perjury are: damages. It is granted in aid and for the advantage of the administration of
1. The accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material justice."23 Certainly, in the present case, petitioner cannot seek refuge under the absolutely
matter; privileged communication rule since the false statements he made in his petition for
2. The statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer authorized to receive and naturalization has instead made a mockery of the administration of justice.
administer oath; The Flordelis case is likewise not in point. There, Flordelis was charged with perjury for
3. In that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a having alleged false statements in his verified answer. This Court held that no perjury could
falsehood; and be committed by Flordelis because "an answer to a complaint in an ordinary civil
4. The sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a action need not be under oath," thus, "it is at once apparent that one element of the crime
legal purpose.14 of perjury is absent x x x , namely, that the sworn statement complained of must be required
All these elements are present in the instant case. Petitioner willfully and deliberately by law."24
alleged false statements concerning his "residence" and "moral character" in his petition for Anent the alleged violation of petitioner's constitutional right to equal protection, suffice it to
naturalization. This was sufficiently proven by the prosecution, as succinctly noted by the state that such right cannot be invoked to protect his criminal act.
Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision. In People vs. Cainglet,25 this Court emphatically stressed that "every interest of public policy
The petition for naturalization was duly subscribed and sworn to by petitioner before Notary demands that perjury be not shielded by artificial refinements and narrow technicalities .
Public Filomino B. Tan, Jr., a person competent and authorized by law to receive and For perjury strikes at the administration of the laws . It is the policy of the law that judicial
administer oath. Also, petitioner started testifying under oath on his false allegations before proceedings and judgments be fair and free from fraud, and that litigants and parties be
the trial court. encouraged to tell the truth, and that they be punished if they do not."
The allegations in the petition regarding "residence" and "moral character" are material WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The appealed
matters because they are among the very facts in issue or the main facts which are the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
subject of inquiry15 and are the bases for the determination of petitioner's qualifications and SO ORDERED.
fitness as a naturalized Filipino citizen. Thus, C.A. No. 473 provides:
"SEC. 2. Qualifications. – Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following
qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:
xxx xxx xxx
"Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the
constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living;
xxx xxx xxx
"SEC. 7. Petition for citizenship. – Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall
file with the competent court, a petition in triplicate, accompanied by two photographs of the
petitioner, setting forth his name and surname; his present and former places of residence;
his occupation; the place and date of his birth; whether single or married and if the father of
children, the name, age, birthplace and residence of the wife and of the children; x x x; a
declaration that he has the qualifications required by this Act, specifying the same, and that
he is not disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of this Act ; x x x." (italics
supplied)
The necessity of declaring a truthful and specific information on the "residence" and "moral
character" in the petition for naturalization has been underscored by this Court in Chua
Kian Lai vs. Republic,16 thus:
"One qualification for Philippine citizenship is that the petitioner ‘must be of good moral
character.’ That circumstance should be specifically alleged in the petition.
xxx xxx xxx
"The law explicitly requires that the applicant should indicate in his petition ‘ his present and
former places of residence’ (Sec. 7, Com. Act No. 473). That requirement is designed to
facilitate the verification of petitioner’s activities which have a bearing on his petition for
naturalization, especially so as to his qualifications and moral character, either by private
individuals or by investigative agencies of the government, by pointing to them the localities
or places wherein appropriate inquiries may be made (Keng Giok vs. Republic, 112 Phil.
896). Moreover, the suppression of that information might constitute falsehood which
signifies that the applicant lacks good moral character and is not, therefore, qualified to be
admitted as a citizen of the Philippines." (italics supplied)
Fully cognizant of the truth surrounding his moral character and residence, petitioner
instead declared falsely in his verified petition for naturalization that "he has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualification under C.A. No. 473." 17 Clearly, he willfully
asserted falsehood under oath on material matters required by law.
We cannot go along with the submission of the petitioner and the Solicitor General that
petitioner could no longer be prosecuted for perjury in view of the withdrawal of the petition
for naturalization containing his false material statements. In this jurisdiction, it is not
necessary that the proceeding in which the perjury is alleged to have been committed be
first terminated before a prosecution for the said crime is commenced. 18 At the time he filed
his petition for naturalization, he had committed perjury. As discussed earlier, all the
elements of the crime were already present then. He knew all along that he wilfully stated
material falsities in his verified petition. Surprisingly, he withdrew his petition without even
stating any reason therefor.19 But such withdrawal only terminated the proceedings for
naturalization. It did not extinguish his culpability for perjury he already committed . Indeed,
the fact of withdrawal alone cannot bar the State from prosecuting petitioner, an alien, who

People vs. Estrada, G.R. NO. 164368, April 2, 2009
The People of the Philippines (the People) filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] to
seek the reversal of the Sandiganbayans Joint Resolution dated July 12, 2004, granting
respondent Joseph Ejercito Estradas ( Estrada) demurrer to evidence in Crim. Case No.
26565.[2]
THE FACTS
On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder (docketed as Crim. Case No. 26558) was
filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A
separate Information for illegal use of alias, docketed as Crim. Case No. 26565, was
likewise filed against Estrada. The Amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 reads:
That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being then President of the Republic of the Philippines, without having been duly
authorized, judicially or administratively, taking advantage of his position and committing the
offense in relation to office, i.e., in order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED
during his tenure and his true identity as THE President of the Republic of the Philippines,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS JOSE
VELARDE IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias Jose
Velarde which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing
documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26558 were subsequently consolidated for joint trial. Still
another Information, this time for perjury and docketed as Crim. Case No. 26905, was
filed with the Sandiganbayan against Estrada. This was later consolidated, too, with Crim.
Cases No. 26558 and 26565.
Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the
Sandiganbayan issued.
On January 11, 2005, we ordered the creation of a Special Division in the Sandiganbayan
to try, hear, and decide the charges of plunder and related cases (illegal use of alias and
perjury) against respondent Estrada. [3]
At the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the
allegations of the Informations for plunder, illegal use of alias, and perjury. The
Peoples evidence for the illegal alias charge , as summarized by the Sandiganbayan,
consisted of:
A. The testimonies of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) officers Clarissa
G. Ocampo (Ocampo) and Atty. Manuel Curato (Curato) who commonly declared that on
February 4, 2000, Estrada opened a numbered trust account ( Trust Account C-163) with
PCIB and signed as Jose Velarde in the account opening documents; both Ocampo and
Curato also testified that Aprodicio Lacquian and Fernando Chua were present on that
occasion;
B. (1) The testimony of PCIB-Greenhills Branch Manager Teresa Barcelan, who
declared that a certain Baby Ortaliza (Ortaliza) transacted several times with her; that
Ortaliza deposited several checks in PCIB Savings Account No. 0160-62502-5 under the
account name Jose Velarde on the following dates (as evidenced by deposit receipts duly
marked in evidence):
a. 20 October 1999 (Exh. MMMMM)
b. 8 November 1999 (Exh. LLLLL)
c. 22 November 1999 (Exh. NNNNN)
d. 24 November 1999 (Exh. OOOOO)
e. 25 November 1999 (Exh. PPPPP)
f. 20 December 1999 (Exh. QQQQQ)
g. 21 December 1999 (Exh. RRRRR)
h. 29 December 1999 (Exh. SSSSS)
i. 4 January 2000 (Exh. TTTTT)
j. 10 May 2000 (Exh. UUUUU)
k. 6 June 2000 (Exh. VVVVV)
l. 25 July 2000 (Exh. WWWWW)
(2) Documents duly identified by witnesses showing that Lucena Ortaliza was employed in
the Office of the Vice President and, later on, in the Office of the President when Estrada
occupied these positions and when deposits were made to the Jose Velarde Savings
Account No. 0160-62502-5.
The People filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits in the consolidated cases, which the
Sandiganbayan admitted into evidence in a Resolution dated October 13, 2003.[4] The
accused separately moved to reconsider the Sandiganbayan Resolution; [5] the People, on
the other hand, filed its Consolidated Comment/Opposition to the motions. [6] The
Sandiganbayan denied the motions in its Resolution dated November 17, 2003.[7]
After the People rested in all three cases, the defense moved to be allowed to file a
demurrer to evidence in these cases. [8] In its Joint Resolution dated March 10, 2004, [9]the
Sandiganbayan only granted the defense leave to file demurrers in Crim. Case Nos. 26565
(illegal use of alias) and 26905 (perjury).
Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence for Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26905. [10] His
demurrer to evidence for Crim. Case No. 26565 (illegal use of alias) was anchored on the
following grounds[11]:
1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the prosecution, only two (2) witnesses,
Ms. Clarissa Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato, testified that on one occasion (4 February
2000), they saw movant use the name Jose Velarde;
2. The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal and was prohibited only in late
2001 as can be gleaned from Bangko Sentral Circular No. 302, series of 2001, dated 11
October 2001;
3. There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the documents offered by the
prosecution are banking documents which, by their nature, are confidential and cannot be
revealed without following proper procedures; and
4. The use of alias is absorbed in plunder.
The People opposed the demurrers through a Consolidated Opposition that presented the
following arguments:[12]
1. That the use of fictitious names in bank transaction was not expressly prohibited
until BSP No. 302 is of no moment considering that as early as Commonwealth Act No.
142, the use of alias was already prohibited. Movant is being prosecuted for violation of
C.A. No. 142 and not BSP Circular No. 302;
2. Movants reliance on Ursua vs. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]) is
misplaced;
3. Assuming arguendo that C.A. No. 142, as amended, requires publication of the alias
and the habitual use thereof, the prosecution has presented more than sufficient evidence
in this regard to convict movant for illegal use of alias; and
4. Contrary to the submission of movant, the instant case of illegal use of alias is not
absorbed in plunder.
Estrada replied to the Consolidated Opposition through a Consolidated Reply Opposition.
THE ASSAILED SANDIGANBAYANS RULING
The Sandiganbayan issued on July 12, 2004 the Resolution now assailed in this
petition. The salient points of the assailed resolution are:
First the coverage of Estradas indictment. The Sandiganbayan found that the only relevant
evidence for the indictment are those relating to what is described in the Information i.e.,
the testimonies and documents on the opening of Trust Account C-163 on February 4,
2000. The Sandiganbayan reasoned out that the use of the disjunctive orbetween on or
about 04 February 2000 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto means that the
act/s allegedly committed on February 4, 2000 could have actually taken place prior to or
subsequent thereto; the use of the conjunctive was simply the prosecutions procedural tool
to guard against any variance between the date stated in the Information and that proved
during the trial in a situation in which time was not a material ingredient of the offense; it
does not mean and cannot be read as a roving commission that includes acts and/or
events separate and distinct from those that took place on the single date on or about 04
February 2000 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto. The Sandiganbayan ruled that the
use of the disjunctive or prevented it from interpreting the Information any other way.
Second the Peoples failure to present evidence that proved Estradas commission of the
offense. The Sandiganbayan found that the People failed to present evidence that Estrada
committed the crime punished under Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6085 (CA 142), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ursua v. Court of
Appeals.[13] It ruled that there is an illegal use of alias within the context of CA 142 only if
the use of the alias is public and habitual. In Estradas case, the Sandiganbayan noted,
the application of the principles was not as simple because of the complications resulting
from the nature of the transaction involved the alias was used in connection with the
opening of a numbered trust account made during the effectivity of R.A. No. 1405, as
amended,[14] and prior to the enactment of Republic R.A. No. 9160.[15]
Estrada did not publicly use the alias Jose Velarde:
a. Estradas use of the alias Jose Velarde in his dealings with Dichavez and
Ortaliza after February 4, 2000 is not relevant in light of the conclusion that the acts
imputed to Estrada under the Information were the act/s committed on February 4,
2000 only. Additionally, the phrase, Estrada did represent himself as Jose Velarde in
several transactions, standing alone, violates Estradas right to be informed of the nature
and the cause of the accusation, because it is very general and vague. This phrase is
qualified and explained by the succeeding phrase and use and employ the said alias Jose
Velarde which is neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing
documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities. Thus, Estradas
representations before persons other than those mentioned in the Information are
immaterial; Ortaliza and Dichavez do not fall within the Equitable PCI Bank and/or other
corporate entities specified in the Information. Estradas representations with Ortaliza and
Dichavez are not therefore covered by the indictment.
b. The Sandiganbayan rejected the application of the principle in the law of libel
that mere communication to a third person is publicity; it reasoned out that that the
definition of publicity is not limited to the way it is defined under the law on libel; additionally,
the application of the libel law definition is onerous to the accused and is precluded by the
ruling in Ursua that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be construed strictly against the
State and favorably for the accused. It ruled that the definition under the law on libel, even if
it applies, considers a communication to a third person covered by the privileged
communication rule to be non-actionable. Estradas use of the alias in front of Ocampo and
Curato is one such privileged communication under R.A. No. 1405, as amended. The
Sandiganbayan said:
Movants act of signing Jose Velarde in bank documents being absolutely confidential, the
witnessing thereof by bank officers who were likewise sworn to secrecy by the same law
cannot be considered as public as to fall within the ambit of CA 142 as amended. On
account of the absolute confidentiality of the transaction, it cannot be said that movant
intended to be known by this name in addition to his real name. Confidentiality and
secrecy negate publicity. Ursua instructs:
Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a
single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be knownby this
name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition in
C.A. No. 142 as amended.
c. The Sandiganbayan further found that the intention not to be publicly known
by the name Jose Velarde is shown by the nature of a numbered account a perfectly valid
banking transaction at the time Trust Account C-163 was opened. The opening, too, of a
numbered trust account, the Sandiganbayan further ruled, did not impose on Estrada the
obligation to disclose his real identity the obligation R.A. No. 6713 imposes is to file under
oath a statement of assets and liabilities. [16] Reading CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405 and R.A.
No. 6713 together, Estrada had the absolute obligation to disclose his assets including the
amount of his bank deposits, but he was under no obligation at all to disclose the other
particulars of the bank account (such as the name he used to open it).
Third the effect of the enactment of R.A. No. 9160.[17] The Sandiganbayan said that the
absolute prohibition in R.A. No. 9160 against the use of anonymous accounts, accounts
under fictitious names, and all other similar accounts, is a legislative acknowledgment that a
gaping hole previously existed in our laws that allowed depositors to hide their true
identities. The Sandiganbayan noted that the prohibition was lifted from Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP) Circular No. 251 dated July 7, 2000 another confirmation that the opening of
a numbered trust account was perfectly legal when it was opened on February 4, 2000.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the provisions of CA No. 142, as interpreted in Ursua, must
necessarily be harmonized with the provisions of R.A. No.1405 and R.A. No. 9160 under
the principle that every statute should be construed in a way that will harmonize it with
existing laws. A reasonable scrutiny, the Sandiganbayan said, of all these laws in relation to
the present case, led it to conclude that the use of an alias within the context of a bank
transaction (specifically, the opening of a numbered account made before bank officers) is
protected by the secrecy provisions of R.A. No. 1405, and is thus outside the coverage of
CA No. 142 until the passage into law of R.A. No. 9160.
THE PETITION
The People filed this petition raising the following issues:
1. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim.
Case No. 26565 and in holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias Jose
Velarde was not public despite the presence of Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando
Chua on 4 February 2000;
2. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim.
Case No. 26565 and in holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias Jose
Velarde was allowable under banking rules, despite the clear prohibition under
Commonwealth Act No. 142;
3. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim.
Case No. 26565 and in applying R.A. No. 1405 as an exception to the illegal use of alias
punishable under Commonwealth Act No. 142;
4. Whether the alleged harmonization and application made by the court a quo of R.A.
No.1405 and Commonwealth Act No. 142 were proper;
5. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in limiting the
coverage of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to the use of the alias Jose
Velarde by respondent Joseph Estrada on February 4, 2000;
6. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in departing from its
earlier final finding on the non-applicability of Ursua v. Court of Appealsand forcing its
application to the instant case.
THE COURTS RULING
The petition has no merit.
The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua Ruling
Sections 1 and 2 of CA No. 142, as amended, read:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally
accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was
registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the
first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration
upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court:
Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and
who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to
register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the
patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in
proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and
no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The
petition for an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and the name
recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his
pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the
reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the
Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil
registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name
unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.
How this law is violated has been answered by the Ursua definition of an alias a name or
names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habituallyusually in
business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or
baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority .There must
be, in the words of Ursua, a sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this
name (the alias) in addition to his real name from that day forth [for the use of alias to] fall
within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.[18]
Ursua further relates the historical background and rationale that led to the enactment of
CA No. 142, as follows:
The enactment of C.A. No. 142 was made primarily to curb the common practice among the
Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous
confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using
fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the
Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A.
No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly
authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register.[19]
Following the doctrine of stare decisis,[20] we are guided by the Ursua ruling on how the
crime punished under CA No. 142 may be committed. Close adherence to this ruling, in
other words, is unavoidable in the application of and the determination of criminal liability
under CA No. 142.
Among the many grounds the People invokes to avoid the application of the Ursua ruling
proceeds from Estradas position in the government; at the time of the commission of the
offense, he was the President of the Republic who is required by law to disclose his true
name. We do not find this argument sufficient to justify a distinction between a man on the
street, on one hand, and the President of the Republic, on the other, for purposes of
applying CA No. 142. In the first place, the law does not make any distinction, expressly or
impliedly, that would justify a differential treatment. CA No. 142 as applied to Estrada, in
fact allows him to use his cinema or screen name of Joseph Estrada, which name he has
used even when he was already the President of the Philippines. Even the petitioner has
acquiesced to the use of the screen name of the accused, as shown by the title of the
present petition. Additionally, any distinction we make based on the Peoples claim unduly
prejudices Estrada; this is proscribed by the Ursua dictum that CA No. 142, as a penal
statute, should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. [21] The
mode of violating CA No. 142 is therefore the same whoever the accused may be.
The People also calls our attention to an earlier Sandiganbayan ruling (Resolution
dated February 6, 2002) denying Estradas motion to quash the Information. This earlier
Resolution effectively rejected the application of Ursua under the following tenor:
The use of the term alias in the Amended Information in itself serves to bring this case
outside the ambit of the ruling in the case of Ursua v. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147
[1996]), on which the accused heavily relies in his motion to quash. The term alias means
otherwise known as (Webster Third New International Dictionary, 1993 ed., p. 53). The
charge of using an alias logically implies that another name has been used publicly and
habitually. Otherwise, he will not be known by such name. In any case, the amended
information adverts to several transactions and signing of documents with the Equitable PCI
Bank and/or other corporate entities where the above-mentioned alias was allegedly
employed by the accused.
The facts alleged in the information are distinctly different from facts established in the
Ursua case where another name was used by the accused in a single instance without any
sign or indication that that [sic] he intended to be known from that day by this name in
addition to his real name.[22]
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
applying Ursua notwithstanding this earlier final ruling on its non-applicability a ruling that
binds the parties in the present case. The People thus claims that the Sandiganbayan erred
to the point of gravely abusing its discretion when it resurrected the application
of Ursua,resulting in the reversal of its earlier final ruling.
We find no merit in this argument for two reasons. First, the cited Sandiganbayan resolution
is a mere interlocutory order a ruling denying a motion to quash [23] that cannot be given the
attributes of finality and immutability that are generally accorded to judgments or orders that
finally dispose of the whole, of or particular matters in, a case.[24] The Sandiganbayan
resolution is a mere interlocutory order because its effects would only be provisional in
character, and would still require the issuing court to undertake substantial proceedings in
order to put the controversy to rest .[25] It is basic remedial law that an interlocutory order is
always under the control of the court and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient
grounds shown at any time before final judgment. [26] Perez v. Court of Appeals, [27] albeit a
civil case, instructively teaches that an interlocutory order carries no res
adjudicata effects. Says Perez:
The Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415 having resolved only an interlocutory matter, the
principle of res judicata cannot be applied in this case. There can be no res
judicata where the previous order in question was not an order or judgment
determinative of an issue of fact pending before the court but was only an
interlocutory order because it required the parties to perform certain acts for final
adjudication. In this case, the lifting of the restraining order paved the way for the
possession of the fishpond on the part of petitioners and/or their representatives pending
the resolution of the main action for injunction. In other words, the main issue of whether or
not private respondent may be considered a sublessee or a transferee of the lease entitled
to possess the fishpond under the circumstances of the case had yet to be resolved when
the restraining order was lifted. [28]
Second, in the earlier motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan solely looked at the allegations
of the Information to determine the sufficiency of these allegations and did not consider any
evidence aliunde. This is far different from the present demurrer to evidence where the
Sandiganbayan had a fuller view of the prosecutions case, and was faced with the issue of
whether the prosecutions evidence was sufficient to prove the allegations of the
Information. Under these differing views, the Sandiganbayan may arrive at a different
conclusion on the application of Ursua, the leading case in the application of CA 142, and
the change in ruling is not per se indicative of grave abuse of discretion. That there is no
error of law is strengthened by our consideration of the Sandiganbayan ruling on the
application of Ursua.
In an exercise of caution given Ursuas jurisprudential binding effect, the People also argues
in its petition that Estradas case is different from Ursuas for the following reasons: (1)
respondent Estrada used and intended to continually use the alias Jose Velarde in addition
to the name Joseph Estrada; (2) Estradas use of the alias was not isolated or limited to a
single transaction; and (3) the use of the alias Jose Velarde was designed to cause and did
cause confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related
statutes seek to prevent. The People also argues that the evidence it presented more than
satisfied the requirements of CA No. 142, as amended, and Ursua, as it was also shown or
established that Estradas use of the alias was public.
In light of our above conclusions and based on the parties expressed positions, we shall
now examine within the Ursua framework the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution granting
the demurrer to evidence. The prosecution has the burden of proof to show that the
evidence it presented with the Sandiganbayan satisfied the Ursua requirements, particularly
on the matter of publicity and habituality in the use of an alias.
What is the coverage of the indictment?
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred and abused its discretion in
limiting the coverage of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to Estradas use
of the alias Jose Velarde on February 4, 2000. It posits that there was a main transaction
one that took place on February 4, 2000 but there were other transactions covered by the
phrase prior to or subsequent thereto; the Information specifically referred to several
transactions with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities. To the People, the
restrictive finding that the phrase prior to or subsequent thereto is absorbed by the phrase
on or about 04 February 2000 drastically amends the succeeding main allegations on the
constitutive criminal acts by removing the plurality of both the transactions involved and the
documents signed with various entities; there is the undeniable essential relationship
between the allegations of the multiplicity of transactions, on one hand, and the additional
antecedent of prior to or subsequent thereto, on the other. It argues that the
Sandiganbayan reduced the phrase prior to or subsequent thereto into a useless
appendage, providing Estrada with a convenient and totally unwarranted escape route.
The People further argues that the allegation of time is the least exacting in satisfying the
constitutional requirement that the accused has to be informed of the accusation against
him. Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that an allegation of the
approximate date of the commission of the offense will suffice, while Section 11 of the same
Rule provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise
date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the crime. This
liberality allegedly shaped the time-tested rule that when the time given in the complaint is
not of the essence of the offense, the time of the commission of the offense does not need
to be proven as alleged, and that the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the
offense was committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and before
the commencement of the action (citing People v. Bugayong [299 SCRA 528, 537] that in
turn cited US v. Smith [3 Phil. 20, 22]). Since allegations of date of the commission of an
offense are liberally interpreted, the People posits that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused
its discretion in disregarding the additional clause prior to or subsequent thereto; under the
liberality principle, the allegations of the acts constitutive of the offense finally determine the
sufficiency of the allegations of time. The People thus claims that no surprise could have
taken place that would prevent Estrada from properly defending himself; the information
fully notified him that he was being accused of using the alias Jose Velarde in more than
just one instance.
We see no merit in these arguments.
At its core, the issue is constitutional in nature the right of Estrada to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. Under the provisions of the Rules of Court
implementing this constitutional right, a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense in the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.[29] As to the cause of accusation, the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in
ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute, but
in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know the
offense charged and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances, and for the
court to pronounce judgment.[30] The date of the commission of the offense need not be
precisely stated in the complaint or information except when the precise date is a material
ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as
near as possible to the actual date of its commission.[31]
The information must at all times embody the essential elements of the crime charged by
setting forth the facts and circumstances that bear on the culpability and liability of the
accused so that he can properly prepare for and undertake his defense .[32] In short, the
allegations in the complaint or information, as written, must fully inform or acquaint the
accused the primary reader of and the party directly affected by the complaint or
information of the charge/s laid.
The heretofore cited Information states that on or about 04 February 2000, or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [did] willfully,
unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS JOSE VELARDE IN
SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias Jose Velarde
which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing
documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities .
We fully agree with the disputed Sandiganbayans reading of the Information, as this was
how the accused might have similarly read and understood the allegations in the
Information and, on this basis, prepared his defense. Broken down into its component parts,
the allegation of time in the Information plainly states that (1) ON February 4, 2000;
(2) OR before February 4, 2000; (3) OR sometime prior or subsequent to February 4,
2000, in the City of Manila, Estrada represented himself as Jose Velarde in several
transactions in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.
Under this analysis, the several transactions involving the signing of documents with
Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities all had their reference to February 4,
2000; they were all made on or about or prior or subsequent to that date , thus plainly
implying that all these transactions took place only on February 4, 2000 or on another
single date sometime before or after February 4, 2000. To be sure, the Information could
have simply said on or about February 4, 2000 to capture all the alternative approximate
dates, so that the phrase sometime prior or subsequent thereto would effectively be a
surplusage that has no meaning separately from the on or about already expressed. This
consequent uselessness of the prior or subsequent thereto phrase cannot be denied, but it
is a direct and necessary consequence of the use of the OR between the two phrases and
the THERETO that referred back to February 4, 2000 in the second phrase. Of course, the
reading would have been very different (and would have been clearly in accord with the
Peoples present interpretation) had the Information simply used AND instead of OR to
separate the phrases; the intent to refer to various transactions occurring on various dates
and occasions all proximate to February 4, 2000 could not be disputed. Unfortunately for
the People, the imprecision in the use of OR is the reality the case has to live with. To act
contrary to this reality would violate Estradas right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him; the multiple transactions on several separate days that the People
claims would result in surprise and denial of an opportunity to prepare for Estrada, who has
a right to rely on the single day mentioned in the Information.
Separately from the constitutional dimension of the allegation of time in the Information,
another issue that the allegation of time and our above conclusion raise relates to what act
or acts, constituting a violation of the offense charged, were actually alleged in the
Information.
The conclusion we arrived at necessarily impacts on the Peoples case, as it deals a fatal
blow on the Peoples claim that Estrada habitually used the Jose Velarde alias. For, to our
mind, the repeated use of an alias within a single day cannot be deemed habitual, as it
does not amount to a customary practice or use. This reason alone dictates the dismissal of
the petition under CA No. 142 and the terms of Ursua.
The issues of publicity , numbered accounts, and
the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405,
and R.A. No. 9160 .
We shall jointly discuss these interrelated issues.
The People claims that even on the assumption that Ocampo and Curato are bank officers
sworn to secrecy under the law, the presence of two other persons who are not bank
officers Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua when Estradas signed the bank documents
as Jose Velarde amounted to a public use of an alias that violates CA No. 142.
On the issue of numbered accounts, the People argues that to premise the validity of
Estradas prosecution for violation of CA No. 142 on a mere banking practice is gravely
erroneous, improper, and constitutes grave abuse of discretion; no banking law provision
allowing the use of aliases in the opening of bank accounts existed; at most, it was allowed
by mere convention or industry practice, but not by a statute enacted by the
legislature. Additionally, that Estradas prosecution was supposedly based on BSP Circular
No. 302 dated October 11, 2001 is wrong and misleading, as Estrada stands charged with
violation of CA No. 142, penalized since 1936, and not with a violation of a mere BSP
Circular. That the use of alias in bank transactions prior to BSP Circular No. 302 is allowed
is inconsequential because as early as CA No. 142, the use of an alias (except for certain
purposes which do not include banking) was already prohibited. Nothing in CA No. 142
exempted the use of aliases in banking transactions, since the law did not distinguish or
limit its application; it was therefore grave error for the Sandiganbayan to have done
so. Lastly on this point, bank regulations being mere issuances cannot amend, modify or
prevail over the effective, subsisting and enforceable provision of CA No. 142.
On the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1405 and its relationship with CA No. 142, that
since nothing in CA No. 142 excuses the use of an alias, the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion when it ruled that R.A. No. 1405 is an exception to CA No. 142s
coverage. Harmonization of laws, the People posits, is allowed only if the laws intended to
be harmonized refer to the same subject matter, or are at least related with one
another. The three laws which the Sandiganbayan tried to harmonize are not remotely
related to one another; they each deal with a different subject matter, prohibits a different
act, governs a different conduct, and covers a different class of persons, [33] and there was
no need to force their application to one another. Harmonization of laws, the People adds,
presupposes the existence of conflict or incongruence between or among the provisions of
various laws, a situation not obtaining in the present case.
The People posits, too, that R.A. No. 1405 does not apply to trust transactions, such as
Trust Account No. C-163, as it applies only to traditional deposits (simple loans). A trust
account, according to the People, may not be considered a deposit because it does not
create the juridical relation of creditor and debtor; trust and deposit operations are treated
separately and are different in legal contemplation; trust operation is separate and distinct
from banking and requires a grant of separate authority, and trust funds are not covered by
deposit insurance under the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation law (R.A. No. 3591,
as amended).
The People further argues that the Sandiganbayans conclusion that the transaction or
communication was privileged in nature was erroneous a congruent interpretation of CA No.
142 and R.A. No. 1405 shows that a person who signs in a public or private transaction a
name or alias, other than his original name or the alias he is authorized to use, shall be held
liable for violation of CA No. 142, while the bank employees are bound by the confidentiality
of bank transactions except in the circumstances enumerated in R.A. No. 1405. At most,
the People argues, the prohibition in R.A. No. 1405 covers bank employees and officers
only, and not Estrada; the law does not prohibit Estrada from disclosing and making public
his use of an alias to other people, including Ocampo and Curato, as he did when he made
a public exhibit and use of the alias before Messrs. Lacquian and Chua.
Finally, the People argues that the Sandiganbayan ruling that the use of an alias before
bank officers does not violate CA No. 142 effectively encourages the commission of
wrongdoing and the concealment of ill-gotten wealth under pseudonyms; it sustains an
anomalous and prejudicial policy that uses the law to silence bank officials and employees
from reporting the commission of crimes. The People contends that the law R.A. No. 1405
was not intended by the Legislature to be used as a subterfuge or camouflage for the
commission of crimes and cannot be so interpreted; the law can only be interpreted,
understood and applied so that right and justice would prevail.
We see no merit in these arguments.
We agree, albeit for a different reason, with the Sandiganbayan position that the rule in the
law of libel that mere communication to a third person is publicity does not apply to
violations of CA No. 142. Our close reading of Ursua particularly, the requirement that there
be intention by the user to be culpable and the historical reasons we cited above tells us
that the required publicity in the use of alias is more than mere communication to a third
person; the use of the alias, to be considered public, must be made openly, or in an open
manner or place, or to cause it to become generally known. In order to be held liable for a
violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who
shall publicly be known under that other name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the
alias must be manifest.
To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and
opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly
known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part
of the public who had no access to Estradas privacy and to the confidential matters that
transpired in Malacaan where he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with
whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-
friend bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and
secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose
Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also
inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estradas alleged representations with
Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations to be
admissible. All of Estradas representations to these people were made in privacy and in
secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.
The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords Estrada a
reasonable expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act related to the opening of a
trust account a transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely confidential in nature.
[34]
We previously rejected, in Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan, [35] the Peoples nitpicking argument
on the alleged dichotomy between bank deposits and trust transactions, when we said:
The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term deposits, as used in
R.A. 1405, by the mere fact that they do not entail a creditor-debtor relationship between
the trustor and the bank, does not lie. An examination of the law shows that the
term deposits used therein is to be understood broadly and not limited only to accounts
which give rise to a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank.

The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1:
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give
encouragement to the people to deposit their money in banking institutions and to
discourage private hoarding so that the same may be properly utilized by banks in
authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the country. (Underscoring
supplied)
determined, as the Sandiganbayan did, whether he may be made liable for the offense
charged based on the evidence the People presented. As with any other accused, his guilt
must be based on the evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt that a finding of
criminal liability requires. If the People fails to discharge this burden, as they did fail in this
case, the rule of law requires that we so declare. We do so now in this review and
accordingly find no reversible error of law in the assailed Sandiganbayan ruling.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
If the money deposited under an account may be used by bank for authorized loans to third
persons, then such account, regardless of whether it creates a creditor-debtor relationship
between the depositor and the bank, falls under the category of accounts which the law
precisely seeks to protect for the purpose of boosting the economic development of the
country.

Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust Agreement between
petitioner and Urban Bank provides that the trust account covers deposit, placement or
investment of funds by Urban Bank for and in behalf of petitioner. The money
deposited under Trust Account No. 858, was, therefore, intended not merely to remain with
the bank but to be invested by it elsewhere. To hold that this type of account is not
protected by R.A. 1405 would encourage private hoarding of funds that could otherwise be
invested by bank in other ventures, contrary to the policy behind the law.

Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that the term deposits was
intended to be understood broadly:

SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with bank or banking institutions in the
Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its
political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely
confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in
cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction
of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The phrase of whatever nature proscribes any restrictive interpretation

of deposits. Moreover, it is clear from the immediately quoted provision that, generally, the
law applies not only to money which is deposited but also to those which are invested. This
further shows that the law was not intended to apply only to deposits in the strict sense of
the word. Otherwise, there would have been no need to add the phrase or invested.

Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858.[36]

We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy.[37] Given the private
nature of Estradas act of signing the documents as Jose Velarde related to the opening of
the trust account, the People cannot claim that there was already a public use of alias when
Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We need not even consider here the impact of
the obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers; what is essentially significant
is the privacy situation that is necessarily implied in these kinds of transactions. This
statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy effectively negate a conclusion that the
transaction was done publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly.

The enactment of R.A. No.9160, on the other hand, is a significant development only
because it clearly manifests that prior to its enactment, numbered accounts or anonymous
accounts were permitted banking transactions, whether they be allowed by law or by a
mere banking regulation. To be sure, an indictment against Estrada using this relatively
recent law cannot be maintained without violating the constitutional
prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post facto laws.[38]

We hasten to add that this holistic application and interpretation of these various laws is not
an attempt to harmonize these laws. A finding of commission of the offense punished under
CA No. 142 must necessarily rest on the evidence of the requisites for culpability, as
amplified in Ursua. The application of R.A. No. 1405 is significant only because Estradas
use of the alias was pursuant to a transaction that the law considers private or, at the very
least, where the law guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy to the parties to the
transactions; it is at this point that R.A. No. 1405 tangentially interfaces with an indictment
under CA 142. In this light, there is no actual frontal clash between CA No. 142 and R.A.
No. 1405 that requires harmonization. Each operates within its own sphere, but must
necessarily be read together when these spheres interface with one another. Finally, R.A.
No. 9160, as a law of recent vintage in relation to the indictment against Estrada, cannot be
a source or an influencing factor in his indictment.

In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we simply looked at the totality of the
circumstances obtaining in Estradas use of the alias Jose Velarde vis--
vis the Ursua requisites. We do not decide here whether Estradas use of an alias when he
occupied the highest executive position in the land was valid and legal; we simply

G.R. No. 139857 September 15, 2006
LEONILA BATULANON, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
This petition assails the October 30, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 15221, affirming with modification the April 15, 1993 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court of General Santos City, Branch 22 in Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627,
convicting Leonila Batulanon of estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and
the July 29, 1999 Resolution3 denying the motion for reconsideration.
Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Batulanon as its
Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving
deposits from and releasing loans to the member of the cooperative.
During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release
of loans were discovered.4
Thereafter, four informations for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents were filed
against Batulanon, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 3625
That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1982 at Poblacion Municipality of Polomolok,
Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court
said accused being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc.,
(PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the aff[a]irs of the cooperative, receiving
payments to, and collections of, the same, and paying out loans to members, taking
advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely:
Cash/Check Voucher No. 30-A of PCCI in the name of Erlinda Omadlao by then and there
making an entry therein that the said Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan of P4,160,
Philippine Currency, and by signing on the appropriate line thereon the signature of Erlinda
Omadlao showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear that the said Erlinda
Omadlao was granted a loan and received the amount of P4,160 when in truth and in fact
the said person was never granted a loan, never received the same, and never signed the
cash/check voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and
fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the
same and received the loan of P4,160 and thereafter misappropriate and convert to her
own use and benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to
restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the aforementioned amount of
P4,160, Philippine Currency.5
Criminal Case No. 3626
That on or about the 24th day of September, 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok,
Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
said accused being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc.
(PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving
payments to, and collections of, the same, and paying out loans to members taking
advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely:
Cash/Check Voucher No. 237 A of PCCI in the name of Gonafreda Oracion by then and
there making an entry therein that the said Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan of
P4,000.00 and by signals on the appropriate line thereon the signature of Gonafreda
Oracion showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear that the said Gonafreda
Oracion was granted a loan, received the loan of P4,000.00 when in truth and in fact said
person was never granted a loan, never received the same, and never signed the
Cash/Check voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and
fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the
same and received the amount of P4,000.00 and thereafter misappropriate and convert to
her own use and benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to
restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the aforementioned amount of
P4,000, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Criminal Case No. 3453
That on or about the 10th day of October 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok,
Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the said accused being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc.,
(PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving
payments to, and collection of the same and paying out loans to members, taking
advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: an
Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one Ferlyn Arroyo with the PCCI by then and there
entering on the appropriate column of the ledger the entry that the said Ferlyn Arroyo had a
fixed deposit of P1,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount of
P3,500.00, thus making it appear that the said person made a fixed deposit on the
aforesaid date with, and was granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact Ferlyn
Arroyo never made such a deposit and was never granted loan and after the document was
so falsified in the manner set forth, said accused did then and there again falsify the
Cash/Check Voucher of the PCCI in the name of Ferlyn Arroyo by signing therein the
signature of Ferlyn Arroyo, thus making it appear that the said Ferlyn Arroyo received the
loan of P3,500, Philippine Currency, when in truth and in fact said Ferlyn Arroyo never
received the loan, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud
PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same, and received the
amount of P3,500, and thereafter, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate and convert to her own personal use and benefit the said amount, and
despite demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and
prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned amount of P3,500, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Criminal Case No. 3627
That on or about the 7th day of December, 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok,
Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the said accused being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc.,
(PCCI) entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving
payments to, and collection of, the same and paying out loans to members, taking
advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: an
Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one Dennis Batulanon with the PCCI by then and
there entering on the appropriate column of the ledger the entry that the said Dennis
Batulanon had a fixed deposit of P2,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan in the
amount of P5,000.00 thus making it appear that the said person made fixed deposit on the
aforesaid date with, and was granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact Dennis
Batulanon never made such a deposit and was never granted loan and offer the document
was so falsified in the manner set forth, said accused did then and there again falsify the
Cash/Check Voucher No. 374 A of PCCI in the name of Dennis Batulanon by signing
therein the signature of Dennis Batulanon, thus making it appear that the said Dennis
Batulanon received the loan of P5,000.00 when in truth and in fact said Dennis Batulanon
never received the loan and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to
defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same and receive the
loan of P5,000, and thereafter, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate and convert to her own personal use and benefit the said amount, and
[despite] demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same to the damage and
prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned amount of P5,000, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City and
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627.
Batulanon pleaded not guilty to the charges, afterwhich a joint trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented Maria Theresa Medallo, Benedicto Gopio, Jr., and Bonifacio
Jayoma as witnesses.
Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash
vouchers9 testified that on certain dates in 1982, Batulanon released four Cash Vouchers
representing varying amounts to four different individuals as follows: On June 2, 1982,
Cash Voucher No. 30A10 for P4,160.00 was released to Erlinda Omadlao; on September
24, 1982, Cash Voucher No. 237A 11 for P4,000.00 was released to Gonafreda 12Oracion; P3,
500.00 thru Cash Voucher No. 276A 13 was released to Ferlyn Arroyo on October 16, 1982
and on December 7, 1982, P5,000.00 was released to Dennis Batulanon thru Cash
Voucher No. 374A.14
Medallo testified that Omadlao, Oracion, and Dennis Batulanon were not eligible to apply
for loan because they were not bona fide members of the cooperative. 15 Ferlyn Arroyo on
the other hand, was a member of the cooperative but there was no proof that she applied
for a loan with PCCI in 1982. She subsequently withdrew her membership in
1983.16 Medallo stated that pursuant to the cooperative's by-laws, only bona fide members
who must have a fixed deposit are eligible for loans.17
Medallo categorically stated that she saw Batulanon sign the names of Oracion and Arroyo
in their respective cash vouchers and made it appear in the records that they were payees
and recipients of the amount stated therein. 18 As to the signature of Omadlao in Cash
Voucher No. 30A, she declared that the same was actually the handwriting of appellant. 19
Gopio, Jr. was a member of PCCI since 1975 and a member of its board of directors since
1979. He corroborated Medallo's testimony that Omadlao, Arroyo, Oracion and Dennis
Batulanon are not members of PCCI. He stated that Oracion is Batulanon's sister-in-law
while Dennis Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that
membership in the cooperative is not open to minors.20
Jayoma was the Vice-Chairman of the PCCI Board of Directors in 1980 before becoming its
Chairman in 1982 until 1983. He testified that the loans made to Oracion, Omadlao, Arroyo
and Dennis Batulanon did not pass through the cooperative's Credit Committee and PCCI's
Board of Directors for screening purposes. He claimed that Oracion's signature on Cash
Voucher No. 237A is Batulanon's handwriting.21 Jayoma also testified that among the four
loans taken, only that in Arroyo's name was settled. 22
The defense presented two witnesses, namely, Maria Theresa Medallo who was presented
as a hostile witness and Batulanon.
Medallo was subpoenaed by the trial court on behalf of the defense and was asked to bring
with her the PCCI General Journal for the year 1982. After certifying that the said document
reflected all the financial transactions of the cooperative for that year, she was asked to
identify the entries in the Journal with respect to the vouchers in question. Medallo was able
to identify only Cash Voucher No. 237A in the name of Gonafreda Oracion. She failed to
identify the other vouchers because the Journal had missing pages and she was not the
one who prepared the entries.23
Batulanon denied all the charges against her. She claimed that she did not sign the
vouchers in the names of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo; that the same were signed by the
loan applicants in her presence at the PCCI office after she personally released the money
to them;24 that the three were members of the cooperative as shown by their individual
deposits and the ledger; that the board of directors passed a resolution in August 1982
authorizing her to certify to the correctness of the entries in the vouchers; that it has
become an accepted practice in the cooperative for her to release loans and dispense with
the approval of Gopio Jr., in case of his absence; 25that she signed the loan application and
voucher of her son Dennis Batulanon because he was a minor but she clarified that she
asked Gopio, Jr., to add his signature on the documents to avoid suspicion of
irregularity;26 that contrary to the testimony of Gopio, Jr., minors are eligible for membership
in the cooperative provided they are children of regular members.
Batulanon admitted that she took out a loan in her son's name because she is no longer
qualified for another loan as she still has to pay off an existing loan; that she had started
paying off her son's loan but the cooperative refused to accept her payments after the
cases were filed in court. 27 She also declared that one automatically becomes a member
when he deposits money with the cooperative. 28 When she was Cashier/Manager of PCCI
from 1980 to 1982, the cooperative did not have by-laws yet.29
On rebuttal, Jayoma belied that PCCI had no by-laws from 1980-1982, because the
cooperative had been registered since 1967. 30
On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused Leonila Batulanon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in all the above-entitled case, she is sentenced in each of the four cases
to 4 months of ARRESTO MAYOR to 1 year and 2 months of PRISION CORRECTIONAL,
to indemnify the PCCI in the total sum of P16,660.00 with legal interest from the institution
of the complaints until fully paid, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.31
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Appellant LEONILA
BATULANON is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents
under Par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code; and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor maximum, AS MINIMUM, to four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, AS MAXIMUM; to pay a fine
of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos; and to indemnify the Polomolok Cooperative Credit ,
Inc. the sum of thirteen thousand one hundred sixty (P13,160.00), plus legal interests from
the filing of the complaints until fully paid, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.32
The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
Batulanon argues that in any falsification case, the best witness is the person whose
signature was allegedly forged, thus the prosecution should have presented Erlinda
Omadlao, Gonafreda Oracion and Ferlyn Arroyo instead of relying on the testimony of an
unreliable and biased witness such as Medallo. 33 She avers that the crime of falsification of
private document requires as an element prejudice to a third person. She insists that PCCI
has not been prejudiced by these loan transactions because these loans are accounts
receivable by the cooperative.34
The petition lacks merit.
Although the offense charged in the information is estafa through falsification of commercial
document, appellant could be convicted of falsification of private document under the well-
settled rule that it is the allegations in the information that determines the nature of the
offense and not the technical name given in the preamble of the information. In Andaya v.
People,35 we held:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what
is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a
defense on the merits. x x x That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he,
above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is
not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he
perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. x x x
The real and important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts alleged in the manner
alleged?" not, "Did you commit a crime named murder?" If he performed the acts alleged, in
the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty
therefor. x x x If the accused performed the acts alleged in the manner alleged, then he
ought to be punished and punished adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime
which those acts constitute.
The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph 2 36 of the
Revised Penal Code are: (1) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification,
except those in paragraph 7, Article 171; (2) that the falsification was committed in
any private document; and (3) that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at
least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage.37
In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626, and 3453, Batulanon's act 38 of falsification falls under
paragraph 2 of Article 171, i.e., causing it to appear that persons have participated in any
act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. This is because by signing the
name of Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo in Cash Voucher Nos. 30A, 237A, and 267A,
respectively, as payee of the amounts appearing in the corresponding cash vouchers,
Batulanon made it appear that they obtained a loan and received its proceeds when they
did not in fact secure said loan nor receive the amounts reflected in the cash vouchers.
The prosecution established that Batulanon caused the preparation of the Cash Vouchers
in the name of Omadlao and Oracion knowing that they are not PCCI members and not
qualified for a loan from the cooperative. In the case of Arroyo, Batulanon was aware that
while the former is a member, she did not apply for a loan with the cooperative.
Medallo categorically declared that she saw Batulanon forge the signatures of Oracion and
Arroyo in the vouchers and made it appear that the amounts stated therein were actually
received by these persons. As to the signature of Arroyo, Medallo's credible testimony and
her familiarity with the handwriting of Batulanon proved that it was indeed the latter who
signed the name of Arroyo. Contrary to Batulanon's contention, the prosecution is not duty-
bound to present the persons whose signatures were forged as Medallo's eyewitness
account of the incident was sufficient. Moreover, under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing
purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
Her insistence that Medallo is a biased witness is without basis. There is no evidence
showing that Medallo was prompted by any ill motive.
The claim that Batulanon's letter to the cooperative asking for a compromise was not an
admission of guilt is untenable. Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that in
criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or criminal negligence or those
allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
There is no merit in Batulanon's assertion that PCCI has not been prejudiced because the
loan transactions are reflected in its books as accounts receivable. It has been established
that PCCI only grants loans to its bona fide members with no subsisting loan. These alleged
borrowers are not members of PCCI and neither are they eligible for a loan. Of the four
accounts, only that in Ferlyn Arroyo's name was settled because her mother, Erlinda,
agreed to settle the loan to avoid legal prosecution with the understanding however, that
she will be reimbursed once the money is collected from Batulanon.39
The Court of Appeals40 correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are private documents and
not commercial documents because they are not documents used by merchants or
businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions 41 nor are they defined and
regulated by the Code of Commerce or other commercial law.42Rather, they are private
documents, which have been defined as deeds or instruments executed by a private person
without the intervention of a public notary or of other person legally authorized, by which
some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth. 43
In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It has the duty to prove each and every element of
the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for the said crime or for any
other crime necessarily included therein. 44 The prosecution in this case was able to
discharge its burden completely.
As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document, 45 it is
important to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with falsification of a private
document or with estafa. If the falsification of a private document is committed as a
means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be
committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime to be charged is
estafa. Thus, in People v. Reyes,46 the accused made it appear in the time book of the
Calamba Sugar Estate that a laborer, Ciriaco Sario, worked 21 days during the month of
July, 1929, when in reality he had worked only 11 days, and then charged the offended
party, the Calamba Sugar Estate, the wages of the laborer for 21 days. The accused
misappropriated the wages during which the laborer did not work for which he was
convicted of falsification of private document.
In U.S. v. Infante,47 the accused changed the description of the pawned article on the face
of the pawn ticket and made it appear that the article is of greatly superior value, and
thereafter pawned the falsified ticket in another pawnshop for an amount largely in excess
of the true value of the article pawned. He was found guilty of falsification of a private
document. In U.S. v. Chan Tiao,48 the accused presented a document of guaranty
purportedly signed by Ortigas Hermanos for the payment of P2,055.00 as the value of 150
sacks of sugar, and by means of said falsified documents, succeeded in obtaining the sacks
of sugar, was held guilty of falsification of a private document.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents in Criminal Case Nos. 3625,
3626 and 3453.
Article 172 punishes the crime of Falsification of a Private Document with the penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods with a duration of two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period, which is three (3)
years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten
(10) days. Taking into consideration the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulanon is entitled
to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which must be within the range of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or four (4)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. 49 Thus, in Criminal Case Nos.
3625, 3626 and 3453, the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as maximum, which is within the range of the allowed imposable penalty.
Since Batulanon's conviction was for 3 counts of falsification of private documents, she
shall suffer the aforementioned penalties for each count of the offense charged. She is also
ordered to indemnify PCCI the amount of P11,660.00 representing the aggregate amount of
the 3 loans without deducting the amount of P3,500.00 paid by Ferlyn Arroyo's mother as
the same was settled with the understanding that PCCI will reimburse the former once the
money is recovered. The amount shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the
filing of the complaints on November 28, 1994 until the finality of this judgment. From the
time the decision becomes final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% per annum
until its satisfaction.
However, in Criminal Case No. 3627, the crime committed by Batulanon is estafa and not
falsification. Under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, the acts that may constitute
falsification are the following:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they
did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other
than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original
document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to,
or different from, that of the genuine original; or;
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry,
or official book.
In Criminal Case No. 3627, the trial court convicted petitioner Batulanon for falsifying
Dennis Batulanon's signature in the cash voucher based on the Information charging her of
signing the name of her 3 year old son, Dennis. The records, however, reveal that in Cash
Voucher No. 374A, petitioner Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she
did was to sign: "by: lbatulanon" to indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in
behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of the modes of falsification under Article
171 because there in nothing untruthful about the fact that she used the name of Dennis
and that as representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The
essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or false statements, which is not
attendant in this case. As to whether, such representation involves fraud which caused
damage to PCCI is a different matter which will make her liable for estafa, but not for
falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold that petitioner Batulanon is
also guilty of falsification of private document with respect to Criminal Case No. 3627
involving the cash voucher of Dennis. 50
The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the
Revised Penal Code are:
(1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return, the same;
(2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender
or denial on his part of such receipt;
(3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
(4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. (Note: The 4th
element is not necessary when there is evidence of misappropriation of the goods by the
defendant)51
Thus in the case of U.S. v. Sevilla,52 the Court convicted the appellant of estafa by
misappropriation. The latter, a treasurer of the Manila Rail Road Company, took the sum of
P8,330.00 out of the funds of the company and used it for personal purposes. He replaced
said cash with his personal check of the same amount drawn on the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), with instruction to his cashier not to deposit the same in the current account of
the Manila Rail Road Company until the end of the month. When an audit was conducted,
the check of appellant was discovered to have been carried in the accounts as part of the
cash on hand. An inquiry with the PNB disclosed that he had only P125.66 in his account,
although in the afternoon of the same day, he deposited in his account with the PNB
sufficient sum to cover the check. In handing down a judgment of conviction, the Court
explained that:
Fraudulent intent in committing the conversion or diversion is very evidently not a
necessary element of the form of estafa here discussed; the breach of confidence involved
in the conversion or diversion of trust funds takes the place of fraudulent intent and is in
itself sufficient. The reason for this is obvious: Grave as the offense is, comparatively few
men misappropriate trust funds with the intention of defrauding the owner; in most cases
the offender hopes to be able to restore the funds before the defalcation is discovered. x x x
Applying the legal principles here stated to the facts of the case, we find all of the
necessary elements of estafa x x x. That the money for which the appellant's checks were
substituted was received by him for safe-keeping or administration, or both, can hardly be
disputed. He was the responsible financial officer of the corporation and as such had
immediate control of the current funds for the purposes of safe-keeping and was charged
with the custody of the same. That he, in the exercise of such control and custody, was
aided by subordinates cannot alter the case nor can the fact that one of the subordinates,
the cashier, was a bonded employee who, if he had acted on his own responsibility, might
also have misappropriated the same funds and thus have become guilty of estafa.
Neither can there be any doubt that, in taking money for his personal use, from the funds
entrusted to him for safekeeping and substituting his personal checks therefor with
instructions that the checks were to be retained by the cashier for a certain period, the
appellant misappropriated and diverted the funds for that period. The checks did not
constitute cash and as long as they were retained by the appellant or remained under his
personal control they were of no value to the corporation; he might as well have kept them
in his pocket as to deliver them to his subordinate with instructions to retain them.
xxxx
But it is argued in the present case that it was not the intention of the accused to
permanently misappropriate the funds to himself. As we have already stated, such intention
rarely exists in cases of this nature and, as we have seen, it is not a necessary element of
the crime. Though authorities have been cited who, at first sight, appear to hold that
misappropriation of trust funds for short periods does not always amount to estafa, we are
not disposed to extend this interpretation of the law to cases where officers of corporations
convert corporate funds to their own use, especially where, as in this case, the corporation
is of a quasi-public character. The statute is clear and makes no distinction between
permanent misappropriations and temporary ones. We can see no reason in the present
case why it should not be applied in its literal sense.
The third element of the crime with which the appellant is charged is injury to another. The
appellant's counsel argues that the only injury in this case is the loss of interest suffered by
the Railroad Company during the period the funds were withheld by the appellant. It is,
however, well settled by former adjudications of this court that the disturbance in property
rights caused by the misappropriation, though only temporary, is in itself sufficient to
constitute injury within the meaning of paragraph 5, supra. (U.S. vs. Goyenechea, 8 Phil.,
117 U.S. vs. Malong, 36 Phil., 821.)53
In the instant case, there is no doubt that as Cashier/Manager, Batulanon holds the money
for administration and in trust for PCCI. Knowing that she is no longer qualified to obtain a
loan, she fraudulently used the name of her son who is likewise disqualified to secure a
loan from PCCI. Her misappropriation of the amount she obtained from the loan is also not
disputed as she even admitted receiving the same for personal use. Although the amount
received by Batulanon is reflected in the records as part of the receivables of PCCI,
damage was still caused to the latter because the sum misappropriated by her could have
been loaned by PCCI to qualified members, or used in other productive undertakings. At
any rate, the disturbance in property rights caused by Batulaono's misappropriation is in
itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of Article 315.
Considering that the amount misappropriated by Batulanon was P5,000.00, the applicable
provision is paragraph (3) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, which imposes the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, where the amount defrauded is over P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00.
There being no modifying circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium
period. With the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulaon is entitled to an
indeterminate penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year
and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of
three counts of falsification of private documents and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum, for each count, and to indemnify complainant
Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated the amount of P11,660.00 with interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994 until finality of this judgment. The interest
rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction;
and
(2) In Criminal Case No. 3627, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of estafa and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one
(1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum. She is likewise ordered
to indemnify Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated the sum of P5,000.00 with interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994 until finality of this judgment. The
interest rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed from finality of this judgment until its
satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.

Dabu vs. Kapunan, A.M. RTJ-00-1600, February 1, 2011
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to the powers vested in the Court under Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution,[1] the Court acts upon these two consolidated administrative cases against [1]
Judge Eduardo Roden E. Kapunan (Judge Kapunan), then presiding judge of Branch 51
and acting judge of Branch 52, Regional Trial Court of Guagua,
Pampanga (RTC); [2] stenographer Ma. Theresa Cortez (Cortez); [3] stenographer Leila O.
Galo (Galo); and [4] Legal Researcher Suzette Tiongco (Tiongco), all of Branch 51, RTC,
Guagua, Pampanga.
In A.M. No. RTJ-00-1600, complainant Vivian T. Dabu (Dabu) claimed that she was
appointed 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor for Pampanga sometime in June 1999. In
October of the same year, from her station in San Fernando, Pampanga, she was
transferred and re-assigned to Guagua, Pampanga, to serve Branches 50, 51 and 52 of the
RTC therein.
According to Dabu, just a few months into her assignment, she noticed that unlike in Branch
50, she was not being called upon to intervene or investigate cases involving annulment of
marriages in Branches 51 and 52, both presided by Judge Kapunan, despite the fact that
the cases for annulment of marriage were being raffled equally among the five (5) branches
of the RTC, in Guagua, Pampanga.
Curious on what appeared to her as an oddity, and having previously learned that cases for
annulment of marriage were being fixed in the said station, Dabu went to the Office of the
Clerk of Court and got from its docket the list of annulment cases raffled to Branches 51
and 52 pertaining to the period from August 1, 1999 to March 2000. She then went to each
branch and requested the records of the cases in the list. She then found out that the
records were being falsified and made to appear that a prosecutor appeared during the
supposed hearings of the annulment cases, when, in truth, the prosecutors who supposedly
appeared were either on leave or had already been re-assigned to another station.
The other case, A.M. No. 01-3-138, stemmed from an article written by Atty. Emil P.
Jurado (Atty. Jurado) in the November 1, 2000 issue of the Manila Standard. It reported that
an RTC branch in Guagua, Pampanga, had been improperly disposing cases for annulment
of marriage in syndicated efforts involving court personnel and a public assistance office
lawyer.
Determined to ascertain the truth of the allegations made in the article, then Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. instructed Executive Judge Rogelio C. Gonzales (Judge Gonzales)of
RTC, Guagua, Pampanga to submit inventories of marriage annulment cases filed in
the five (5) branches of the RTC, Guagua, Pampanga, from January 1997 to November
2000.
In the evaluation[2] of the report and inventory submitted by Judge Gonzales, then Deputy
Court Administrator Jose P. Perez[3] recommended that the matter be joined with the
proceedings in A.M. No. RTJ-00-1600 so that a complete picture and history of the
anomalous treatment by Branches 51 and 52 of annulment of marriage cases would be
made.
In its Resolution[4] dated March 13, 2001, the Court ordered the consolidation of A.M. No. 1-
3-138-RTC and A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-1028-RTJ.
During the hearing of these cases, only Judge Kapunan and Tiongco participated. Cortez
manifested that she would not adduce evidence in her behalf and would submit the case for
disposition/recommendation on the basis of the records and evidence adduced during the
investigation. Respondent Galo, on the other hand, neither appeared nor filed any comment
or pleading.
The result of the investigation revealed something not expected of a proper judicial office.
As reported in detail by the Investigating Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos [5](Investigating
Justice) of the Court of Appeals:
On August 24, 2000, Complainant Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Vivian T. Dabu executed
an Affidavit citing several incidents wherein the court records of cases for annulment of
marriage, lost titles and declaration of presumptive death were being falsified. The Affidavit
was treated as a Complaint for falsification of court records against Judge Eduardo Roden
E. Kapunan and court stenographers Ma. Theresa Cortez and Leila O. Galo. Respondent
Suzette Tiongco was not included in the charge of falsification of court records as
complainant ha[d] no evidence linking her thereto but the Office of the Court Administrator
included her with the charge of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Complainant alleged that during the period between November 1999 and August 2000,
respondent Judge was the presiding judge of Branch 51 and the acting judge of Branch 52,
both of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, with three (3) of the personnel of
Branch 51, namely: Leila Galo, Ma. Theresa Cortez and Suzette Tiongco.
Respondent Judge and Galo were detailed to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48,
at the same time and were returned to their original assignment at the Regional Trial Court
of Guagua, Pampanga also at the same time x x x.
Respondents Galo and Cortez were appointed to the position of court stenographers for
Branch 51 x x x. However, respondent Galo, during the said period, did not perform the
duties of a stenographer but acted as a secretary for respondent Judge x x x. She received
all communications pertaining to respondent Judge or to cases pending before Branches 51
and 52 x x x. Respondent Judge gave specific instruction on this matter to the Courts
personnel x x x.
The other staff of Branch 51 (sic) holds office at the 3rd floor of Goseco hall, which is located
across the municipal hall of Guagua, Pampanga. On the other hand, all of the staff of
Branch 52 (sic) is holding office at the 2nd floor of Goseco Hall.
All the records of Branches 51 and 52 are being kept at the Goseco Hall except for the
records of cases which have pending incidents to be resolved, or an Order/Decision for
signature, or to be heard, or is needed by respondent Judge which are in the office of the
respondents at the municipal hall x x x.
Prior to November 1999, the assigned prosecutor for Branch 51 is Asst. Provincial
Prosecutor Domingo C. Pineda and for Branch 52 is former Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
Reyes D. Manalo. Beginning 10 November 1999 up to 31 August 2000, herein complainant
was the assigned prosecutor for Branches 51 and 52.
As evidence for the charge of falsification of court records, complainant presented the
following cases:
1. Civil Case No. G-3655
Nonito Vitug vs. Gracita Sangan
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-52, Guagua, Pampanga
On 3 November 1999, there was allegedly a hearing which was held in the presence of
former Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Reyes D. Manalo, wherein the plaintiff and the
psychologist testified and, thereafter, the counsel of record, Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo, offered
his evidence, and, without the objection of the public prosecutor, the case was deemed
submitted for decision x x x. The minutes and transcript of stenographic notes were
prepared by respondent Cortez.
On 9 November 1999, a Decision was rendered, which states on paragraph 3, page 1,
thereof that Prosecutor Reyes Manalo on November 3, 1999 submitted his Report that no
collusion exists between the parties but no such Report is attached to the records of the
case x x x.
Former Prosecutor Reyes D. Manalo testified that as early as 25 October 1999, when he
filed his Application for Leave for the month of November, he was already on leave and,
from then on, has never appeared before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua,
Pampanga until his retirement in June 2000 x x x. This was corroborated by the
stenographer of said Court, Zenaida A.C. Caraan x x x.
In the criminal cases heard on 3 November 1999, respondent Judge issued Orders
declaring the hearing on said date cancelled and resetting the same to another date in view
of the absence of the public prosecutor x x x.
Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo, on the other hand, testified that none of the parties is his client and
that he never appeared in the said case x x x.
2. Civil Case No. G-3675
Meriam Vitug vs. Edgar Faeldon
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga
On 12 November 1999, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Domingo C. Pineda allegedly issued a
Manifestation finding no collusion between the parties x x x. He, however, testified that he
did not issue any Manifestation in connection with this case x x x.
On 15 November 1999, a hearing was allegedly conducted in the presence of the said
public prosecutor wherein the plaintiff testified and the case was re-set on 29 December
1999 for the presentation of the psychologist x x x. The minutes and transcript of
stenographic notes were both prepared by respondent Cortez x x x.
However, the Orders in the criminal cases heard on the same date, 15 November 1999,
which were also prepared by respondent Cortez and signed by respondent judge, stated
that the hearing was cancelled in view of the absence of the public prosecutor x x x.
Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Domingo C. Pineda testified that he was, as of 8 November
1999, assigned to Branches 54 and 55 of the Regional [T]rial Court of Macabebe,
Pampanga, and from then on, never appeared before Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court
of Guagua, Pampanga x x x. This was corroborated by the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court of
the said Court, Eduardo P. Carlos x x x.
Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo again testified that none of the parties is his client and he never
appeared in such case x x x.
The Decision in this case was included in the cases reported as having been decided or
disposed of for the month of March 2000 x x x.
3. Civil Case No. G-3659
Ricardo Layug vs. Zerlina Arteta
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-52, Guagua, Pampanga
On 3 November 1999, a Manifestation was allegedly issued by former Asst. Provincial
Prosecutor Reyes D. Manalo x x x but he testified that he did not issue the same x x x.
On 5 November 1999, a hearing was allegedly held in the presence of the said public
prosecutor wherein the plaintiff and a psychologist testified, the counsel on record, Atty.
Ponciano C. Lobo, offered his evidence and without the objection of the public prosecutor,
the case was submitted for resolution x x x.
Again former Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Reyes D. Manalo and Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo
denied any participation in the case.
4. LRC Case No. G-73
In re: Petition for Issuance of
Owners Duplicate Copy of
TCT No. 217416-R,
Rev. Fr. Francisco R. Lansang,
Petitioner,
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga
5. LRC Case No. G-74
In re: Petition for Issuance of
Owners Duplicate Copy of
TCT Nos. 441074-R to 441089-R,
Beatriz Lansang, Petitioner.
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga
On 25 November 1999, a hearing was allegedly held wherein the petitioners were
presented, the counsel on record, Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo offered his evidence, and,
thereafter, these cases were deemed submitted for resolution x x x. The minutes of hearing
and transcript of stenographic notes were prepared by respondent Cortez x x x.
On December 6, 1999 separate Orders were issued granting the petitions favorably x x x.
These cases were reported in June 2000 to have been decided or disposed of x x x.
Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo proffered the same testimony x x x
6. Civil Case No. G-2579
Benito Samia, Jr. vs. Josephine L. Lorenzo-Samia
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga
On 21 February 2000, a Decision was rendered stating therein that a Psychological
Evaluation Report was submitted but none appears on the record x x x.
Likewise, between 13 December 1999 and 21 February 2000, no other hearing was
conducted despite the fact that the Order dated 13 December 1999 indicated the next
hearing on 17 January 2000 and the dorsal side of page 111 of the record states Reset
2/21/00 x x x. There was also no record that plaintiff offered his evidence, rested his case,
or submitted the case for resolution x x x.
The said Decision was included in the monthly report of cases disposed of in June 2000 x x
x.
7. Civil Case No. G-3717
Tomas Tamayo vs. Adoracion Sampang
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-52, Guagua, Pampanga
The plaintiff, Tomas Tamayo, testified that the case was filed by respondent Cortez before
the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, after the latter agreed to help him in the
processing of the annulment of his marriage; that he never appeared before any lawyer for
the notarization of his Verified Petition; that he was initially told that there would be no
hearing in his annulment case and it will be granted within three (3) months; that he gave
the amount of Php 15,000.00 in connection thereto which was returned to him after he
withdrew his case; that respondent Galo took from him Php4000.00 in payment of the
psychologist fee which amount was not returned to him; that he gave the amount to
respondent Galo after she identified herself as a court employee and even presented an
identification card of respondent Judge x x x.
In his testimony, Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo stated that the plaintiff is not his client x x x.
8. Civil Case No. G-3677
Joseph Voltaire Datu vs. Marissa S. Tamarez
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-52, Guagua, Pampanga
On 11 April 2000, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo denying
his signature appearing on the said Complaint and claiming it to be a forgery x x x.
On the witness stand, Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo reiterated that none of the parties is his client
and that the signature appearing in the Complaint is not his x x x.
9. Sum. Proc. No. G-1205
In re: Petition for Summary Proceeding
For Declaration of Presumptive Death of
Absentee Felicitas Jabilona,
Joselito Flores, Petitioner.
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga
On 27 July 2000, a hearing was allegedly held wherein the counsel on record, Atty. Romeo
B. Torno offered his evidence x x x.
Atty. Romeo B. Torno, however, testified that he did not appear before the said Court on the
said time and date as he was then appearing before Branch 50; that after his ex
parte presentation of evidence, the next hearing was scheduled on 27 July 2000 at 3:30
oclock in the afternoon but the same was cancelled since he has no witness to present; and
that, thereafter, there was no other hearing held or conducted in this case x x x.
On August 7, 2000, an Order was issued granting the Petition x x x.
Atty. Torno suspected that respondent Cortez prepared the same and when he confronted
her, she replied that everything is okay x x x.
10. Civil Case No. G-3730
Ofelia Enal vs. Francisco Enal Jr.
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga
On 30 June 2000, an Order was issued stating that a hearing was allegedly held wherein
the plaintiff testified, the Psychological Evaluation Report filed, and the case deemed
submitted for resolution x x x. The records of the case, however, bear an Order dated 9
June 2000 with the same contents x x x
On even date, 9 June 2000, a Decision was issued in favor of the plaintiff x x x.
Refuting the charges against him, respondent Judge averred in his Comment [6] that:
a) his signatures appearing in the records of Ofelia Enal vs. Francisco Enal, Jr., docketed
as Civil Case Nos. G-3730, and Meriam Vitug vs. Edgar Faeldon, docketed as Civil Case
No. G-3675, were forgeries;
b) after the said cases were made known to him during the latter part of July 2000 and
since he received complaints [from] litigants about the activities of respondent Galo, he
conducted a discreet investigation, but stopped the same upon the filing of this complaint;
c) he is a victim of falsification and did not conspire or connive with the other respondents in
the commission thereof.
On May 28, 2001, Judge Kapunan suffered from cardio-pulmonary arrest and died at the
age of fifty-four. According to his heirs, the evidence of the complainant was insufficient to
support the charges against their late father and, thus, sought the dismissal of the
complaint.
From a mere examination of the signatures of Judge Kapunan on the questioned court
records, it is clear that his signatures were not forged. As correctly pointed out by the
complainant and the Investigating Justice, except for the abovementioned cases
of Enal and Vitug, Judge Kapunan failed to specifically deny under oath his participation in
the anomalous cases or to challenge the genuineness of his signature appearing in the
court records of the questioned cases enumerated by Dabu. Thus, following Section 8, Rule
8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, [7] this amounts to an admission by Judge Kapunan
that he indeed signed the questioned orders, decisions and court records.
Also, in all the questioned cases pointed out by Dabu, including the cases
of Enal and Vitug, Judge Kapunan failed to offer any evidence to support his defense that
his signatures therein were forged. The rule is that he who disavows the authenticity of his
signature on a public document bears the responsibility of presenting evidence to that
effect.[8] Mere disclaimer is not sufficient. Under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
[9]
the genuineness of handwriting may be proved in the following manner: [1] by any
witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the
person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted
on or been charged; [2] by a comparison, made by a witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or
proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. At the very least, he should present
corroborating witnesses to prove his assertion. At best, he should present an expert
witness.[10] As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive
and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.[11] This,
unfortunately, Judge Kapunan failed to do.
At any rate, contrary to the assertions of Judge Kapunan, in the case of Vitug, the records
show that as early as May 31, 2000, he already issued an order granting the appeal of the
Solicitor General. He could not, therefore, claim that he was only made aware of the
anomalies in Vitug after it was decided.
Kapunan. In fact, she admitted to Dabu that she was processing one case where one of the
parties was a friend of Judge Kapunan, upon orders of the latter.
On the other hand, Cortez admitted preparing the questioned orders, decisions, minutes of
hearings, and transcripts. She tried to justify her actions by claiming that she only acted
upon the instructions of Galo. Unfortunately, these circumstances do not justify her acts at
all.
Taking all these into consideration, it is undeniable that Judge Kapunan, Galo and Cortez
acted together in issuing questionable orders and decisions through falsification of public
documents.
With regard to Tiongco, however, there is no evidence against her. The inclusion of Tiongco
in this case was only upon the initiative of the Office of the Court Administrator. As the
record is bereft of any evidence to hold her liable, her exoneration is in order.
Court employees, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, being public servants in an
office dispensing justice, should always act with a high degree of professionalism and
responsibility. Their conduct must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but
must also be in accordance with the law and court regulations. No position demands
greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its holder than an office in the judiciary.
Court employees should be models of uprightness, fairness and honesty to maintain the
people's respect and faith in the judiciary. They should avoid any act or conduct that would
diminish public trust and confidence in the courts. Indeed, those connected with dispensing
justice bear a heavy burden of responsibility.[13]
Falsification of an official document such as court records is considered a grave offense. It
also amounts to dishonesty. Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Administrative Code of
1987, dishonesty (par. a) and falsification (par. f) are considered grave offenses warranting
the penalty of dismissal from service upon commission of the first offense.
Furthermore, falsification of an official document is punishable as a criminal offense under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and dishonesty is an impious act that has no place in
the judiciary.
The penalty of dismissal, however, can no longer be imposed and carried out with respect
to the late Judge Kapunan. The administrative complaints against him have become moot
and academic and the case should be deemed closed and terminated following our ruling
in Loyao, Jr. v. Caube[14] and Apiag v. Cantero.[15]
WHEREFORE, finding respondents, Ma. Theresa Cortez and Leila O. Galo, GUILTY of
falsification of official documents and dishonesty, the Court hereby orders
their DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges,
except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
The case against respondent Judge Eduardo Roden E. Kapunan is hereby dismissed for
being moot and academic due to his untimely demise.
Respondent Suzette O. Tiongco is EXONERATED of the charges.
SO ORDERED.

Further, as noted by the Investigating Justice, Judge Kapunan himself confirmed in his June
2000 report of decided cases that the cases of Lansang and Samia were among those he
had decided. Thus, he could not claim that his signatures in the decisions of those cases
were forged.

The Court finds specious the allegation of Judge Kapunan that the processing of cases
were committed by Galo all by herself, and that he conducted a discreet investigation when
he learned of her activities. Judge Kapunan offered no plausible reason why he failed to
finish his investigation other than the lame excuse that he stopped his investigation due to
the filing of the complaint. The reason is clear. There was no investigation conducted. As
opined by the Investigating Justice,[12] had there been an investigation, Judge Kapunan
should have completed it, found the culprit, filed the appropriate charges, and cleared his
name.

With respect to Galo, she failed to appear in the proceedings below or file any comment, or
any pleading. The proceedings below established that she received payments from litigants
as psychologist fee. She even admitted to Dabu on at least two occasions that she had
processed certain cases involving annulment of marriage with the go signal of Judge