Frontline Snipers The Iron Fist Stellungsbau Battle of Britain

The dirty art of sniping from The Wehrmacht’s deadly WW2 Constructing the German Adolf Galland analyses the
the trenches in WW1 armoured assault artillery defence networks of WW1 Luftwaffe’s 1940 air war

Iron Cross
GERMAN
MILITARY
HISTORY
1914–45

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ISSUE 3

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25 MAR 2020

Predators of the Channel

The Kriegsmarine’s powerful killer torpedo boats of World War Two
HELMUT WEITZE
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Consulting Editor (Historical) Robin Schäfer
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W
Head of Design and Production
Lynn Wright elcome to this third juxtaposed against the terrifyingly
ADVERTISING issue of Iron Cross awesome Flammenwerfer of the same
Auction House Sales Executive magazine. period which we look at in some detail
Kristina Green
kristina.green@warnersgroup.co.uk The word ‘iconic’ in this issue of the magazine. It would
Tel: 01778 392096 is often bandied about in relation be difficult to find a more hideous
Multi Media Sales Executives to certain items of equipment example of the sheer horror of war -
Elizabeth Ridge
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Tel: 01778 395059 Wars. In this issue, we focus on two - than this ghastly weapon. Sobering
Advertising Production & Design pieces of machinery from the 1939 indeed.
Nicola Lock
nicola.lock@warnersgroup.co.uk – 1945 period: the Schnellboot and Again, if any reminder were needed
Tel: 01778 392420 Messerschmitt Bf 109. Additionally, we as to man’s inhumanity to man, then
MARKETING look at the steel helmet, or Stahlhelm, our piece looking at incendiary pellets
Marketing Executive
of the First World War. It would be and sharpened trench spades of the
Katherine Brown
katherine.brown@warnersgroup.co.uk hard to argue anything other than that First World War provides us with just
Tel: 01778 395092 all of those objects are iconic in terms such a reminder.
DISTRIBUTION of how they are remembered. On the other hand, we are also
Warners Distribution
Andy Perry Without any doubt, the S-Boot was reminded of the humanity and
Tel: 01778 391152 a remarkable piece of kit. In many compassion which was sometimes to
PUBLISHED BY respects, it was ahead of its time. be found in the midst of all the horrors
Warners Group Publications,
The Maltings, West Street, Bourne,
Like so much German equipment, of warfare through our heart-warming
Lincolnshire PE10 9PH it had a technological ‘edge’ over feature ‘Stille Nacht, Heilige Nacht.’
Tel: 01778 391000 its adversaries. At least, during the However, returning to the S-Boot
Fax: 01778 392422
early part of the war. Similarly, and Messerschmitt 109, both are
ISSN 2632-4725
the Messerschmitt 109 with its prime examples of wonderful pieces
Cover artwork by Keith Burns
depicting S-Boote in the English equally sleek and menacing look. Its of technology and machinery. It is
Channel under attack from RAF
Beaufighters. During the D-Day
association with leading fighter aces entirely appropriate that we should
operations, S-Boot flotillas often adds a further layer of interest. Add in examine them, admire the engineering
attempted to disrupt Allied shipping.
www.keithburns.co.uk colourful paint schemes and quirky and applaud efforts to restore
unit emblems and it is easy to almost surviving examples of such machinery.
This publication is
printed by Warners be seduced by the alluring beauty of But we should only do so by keeping
01778 395111
the machine itself. very firmly in mind the evil regime that
Certainly, many of our readers will such equipment had served during the
SUBSCRIBE TO IRON CROSS be greatly fascinated in the materiel Second World War.
For the latest offer call of war produced by Germany in both
01778 392489 conflicts. However, we are pulled Andy Saunders (Editor)
Save £2 an issue. up short in any fascination with the Robin Schäfer
See page 62 for details. Stahlhelm, for instance, when it is (Consultant Editor – Historical)
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Keep up to date on Facebook ANDY ROBIN

www.facebook.com/ironcrossmagazine Andy has been involved in Robin is a respected
Follow us on Twitter the world of military history German military historian,
@IronCrossMag for around 45 years and public speaker and
Reproduction in whole or in part without written permission is prohibited. is particularly well-known published author who has
All rights reserved. Dates, information and prices quoted are believed to
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in historic aviation circles. made his specialist study
responsibility is accepted for any errors or omissions. Neither the editor He has previously edited the life of the German
nor the publisher accept responsibility for any material submitted,
whether photographic or otherwise. While we endeavour to ensure that military history magazines, soldier in wartime. In this
firms and organisations mentioned are reputable, the Editor can give no was founder and first curator of a leading role, he acts on a worldwide basis as a
guarantee that they will fulfil their obligations under all circumstances.
Whilst every care has been taken to compile current valuations, the UK aviation museum, a published military historical consultant and advisor to both
publishers cannot accept liability for loss, financial or otherwise, incurred
by reliance placed on the information herein. Quoted prices are indicative
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regard to valuations.
DISCLAIMER: The views expressed by contributors and advertisers are not
necessarily those of the publishers. Every care is taken to ensure that the
contents of the magazine are accurate but the publishers cannot accept
responsibility for errors. While reasonable care is taken when accepting
advertisements, the publishers cannot accept any responsibility for any
resulting unsatisfactory transactions. They will however investigate any
written complaints. IRON CROSS ❙ 3
 IN THIS ISSUE
CONTENTS
ISSUE THREE
Features
CHANNEL PREDATORS
12  The dramatic Second World War
story of the Kriegsmarine’s feared and
highly successful S-Boot flotillas which
prowled the English Channel is covered
in detail by Robin Schäfer.
A DIRTY DUTY
24 This fascinating feature, with
colour by Richard J Molloy, looks at the
relatively unknown aspect of the ‘art’
of German trench sniping during the
First World War.
40 GALLAND’S BATTLE OF
BRITAIN
One of the Luftwaffe’s best-known
‘aces’, Adolf Galland, takes a look at
the Battle of Britain from the fighter
pilot’s perspective in a piece drawn by
Andy Saunders from Galland’s post-war
commentary.
64  ‘STILLE NACHT, HEILIGE
NACHT’
The extraordinary story of a valuable
religious artefact and how it played into
a highly unusual Christmas Truce event
on the Western Front of 1914.
THE IRON FIST
98  The Sturmgescütz was one
of the most versatile, ubiquitous and
4 ❙ IRON CROSS
valued pieces of weaponry in the
Wehrmacht’s armoury, as Dr Adrian
Wettstein explains.
ABOVE THE TRENCHES
116 (PART 2)
We conclude the fascinating diary
of First World War fighter pilot, Josef
Kister, accompanied by yet more
stunning colourisation by Richard J
Molloy.
Regulars
RESTORATION PROFILE
6  We get unique access to a Battle
of Britain Messerschmitt 109-E
40
restoration project which will return the
aircraft to flight.
READER’S LETTERS
50 BOOK REVIEWS
We review some of the latest
60 A selection of our reader’s
letters to the editor.
German military history titles.
SOLDAT – A STURMGESCÜTZ
54 NOTES FROM THE ARMOURY
In this issue, our regular look
70 ACE
A revealing interview with a Knight’s
at German weaponry examines in Cross holder who served with a
detail the infamous and dramatic Sturmgeschütz unit.
Flammenwerfer of the First World War.
OBJECTS IN FOCUS
59 MYTH BUSTERS 74 A selection of some exceedingly
In our occasional ‘myth busting’
series we look at the extraordinary
case of the Heinkel 113 deception.
rare battlefield artefacts from the ‘In
Flanders Fields’ Museum’ fall under the
spotlight in this issue.
EDITOR’S CHOICE
MUD, BLOOD AND GEOLOGY
80 If the trench systems and defences of the First World War might seem
almost random or haphazard in their positioning and structure, Peter Doyle
reveals that they were nothing of the sort. A great deal of thought, design,
engineering, science and understanding of geology went into the building of
defensive lines which stretched across a vast swathe of Western Europe during
the First Wold War.
 CONTRIBUTORS
Introducing you to some of our main
contributors for this issue:-
PETER DOYLE
Peter Doyle specialises
in the understanding of
military terrain, with special
reference to the two world
wars. He is also an author
specialising in the British
experience of war and the material culture
of war with a number of critically acclaimed
books to his name. He is a Professor of
History at London South Bank University.
GUY BLACK
Guy Black is an engineer and
restorer of historic aircraft
from both world wars. He is
passionate about ensuring
absolute authenticity,
in both a historical and
engineering context. He is also a director
of the Duxford-based Historic Aircraft
Collection which operates and flies historic
warplanes.
SIMON VERDEGEM
Simon Verdegem is a
professional conflict
archaeologist from Belgium

© Chris Cox
who has worked extensively
on the battlefields of the
First World War, including at
Messines, the Ypres Salient and as founder
and lead archaeologist for the remarkable
‘Dig Hill 80’ battlefield archaeology project
in Flanders.
CHRISTOPH HÖPFER
Christoph Höpfer is a
NEXT ISSUE
113 We reveal some of the
content in our next issue, on sale 25
German businessman with
a deep passion and interest
in all aspects of German
military history of the
March 2020. See page 62 to ensure
Great War. His specialist
you get your copy! knowledge of his subject area makes him
one of the leading experts in uniforms,
COMPETITION equipment and weaponry of the period and
115  This month a chance to win
one of four signed copies of ‘Stuka
especially in relation to Verdun.

SAVE £2
Attack!’ by Andy Saunders and a
piece of original artwork depicting the
Junkers 87 Stuka from the pencil of
70 James Baldwin.

COLLECTING MILITARIA
AN ISSUE
92 CONFLICT ARCHAEOLOGY
In this issue’s conflict
126 The truly iconic steel helmet,
or Stahlhelm, of the First World War is
Pay just £6.99 an issue
when subscribing for
the year PLUS receive
archaeology section, we cover the examined in detail by Robin Schäfer
a FREE copy of our
fascinating recovery of a Focke-Wulf looking at the various designs, 132-page special
190 aircraft wreck in Belgium. camouflage methods etc. A Guide to Collecting
German Militaria
PHOTOS FROM THE FRONT WAR POSTER worth £7.99. Offer
110 In this issue, we look at
a haunting but seasonal family
130 A German Home Front air
raid precautions poster of the Second
also available with our
digital editions!

photograph from the First World War World War is our chosen poster in this
sent to a soldier serving on the front. issue.
SEE PAGE 62 FOR DETAILS

IRON CROSS ❙ 5

Messerschmitt 109
E – 1, W.Nr 4034
The restoration to flight in the UK of a genuine Messerschmitt 109-E from the Battle of
Britain is outlined by Guy Black, the restorer of this unique airframe.
■ How the Messerschmitt 109 would have appeared
in 1940 and how it will be repainted post-restoration.
W
hen somebody
told me
during the late
1990s that a
Messerschmitt 109 was mouldering
away in the back yard of a technical
college in India, I could hardly believe
them. That said, I had already been
involved in recovering from India some
First World War DH9 aircraft, whilst
other parties had recovered a Hurricane
6 ❙ IRON CROSS
RESTORATION PROFILE
and, across the years, several Spitfires.
But…a Messerschmitt 109? The existence
in India of the First War aircraft,
and of Spitfires and Hurricanes, was
entirely understandable. But how did a
Messerschmitt end up there? And why?
The storyof the Messerschmitt in
question was unravelled after the
airframe was eventually brought back
to France by its new owner, who later
sold it to Rare Aero Ltd of Jersey. My
company, Retrotec, was later
comminisioned to restore the
aircraft.
The story began on 2 November
1940, just after the ‘official’ end of
the Battle of Britain, when W.Nr
4034, Black 6, of 8./JG53 made
a forced-landing in a ploughed
field at Lower Hardres Farm, near
Canterbury, Kent. As it skidded to
a halt, out stepped a shaken but
otherwise unhurt young pilot, Fw.
Xavier Ray, to begin over five years
■ The Messerschmitt 109 as it was
found in India, dumped amongst junk at a
technical college.
of incarceration as a POW. In the grand
scheme of things, this was just another
Me 109 which joined the many shot-
down examples littering the countryside
in south east England; like most of the
others, it would have ended its days in a
breaker’s yard were it not for a request
to the Air Ministry from His Excellency
the Nizam of Hyderabad.
The Nizam had funded several
Spitfires for the RAF in 1940, and 152
Squadron, a Spitfire squadron based
at Warmwell, Dorset, had been named
the ‘Nizam of Hyderabad’s Squadron’.
Now, the Nizam was asking for an
example to be sent to India of a German
aircraft that ‘his’ Spitfires had shot
down. Stepping up to the request, the
Air Ministry allocated 4034 and it was
duly despatched as requested. The
only problem, of course, was that it
hadn’t been shot down by the Nizam’s
squadron – although that rather
inconvenient detail was not disclosed
to His Excellency at the time. In fact,
the Messerschmitt had crash-landed
following combat with Spitfires of
74 and 92 Squadrons - a very long

way from the operating area of 152
Squadron. The fact is, however, that the
Messerschmitt fitted the bill. And it was
a representative shot-down German
aircraft.
‘NO AMMUNITION USED’
As to exactly why the Messerschmitt
ended up in a Kent field almost 80
years ago was a puzzle to RAF technical
intelligence officers at the time, who
reported that it hadn’t been shot
down: “Cause of this crash is unknown
but the pilot made a very good belly-
landing and aircraft is practically intact.
No trace of bullet strikes* or engine
overheating but cause of landing may
have been engine failure. Armament: 4 x
machine guns. No ammunition used.”
(*Interestingly, there are bullet holes
in the cockpit sides, but these have
entered and exited at exactly 90° to the
fuselage and are not consistent with
combat damage; it is likely these holes
were ‘added’ to give the impression it
was shot down.)
After its arrival in Kent, we know the
aircraft was transported by a civilian
haulage contractor, A V Nicholls of
Brighton, to the RAF’s 49 Maintenance
Unit at Faygate, Sussex. Incredibly,
the original A V Nicholl’s driver’s
delivery chit for 4034 turned up in the
collection of Iron Cross Editor, Andy
Saunders. A truly amazing coincidence.
Although the aircraft had been
involved in action with two Spitfire
■ Far left: The letter
authorising the collection
of the Messerschmitt
109 in 1940.
■ Left: An A V Nicholls
& Co lorry transporting
another Messerschmitt
109 during the Battle of
Britain.
■ Below: The fuselage
at the workshops of
Retrotec Ltd showing
traces of the fuselage
numbers. The wings
are stacked behind and
the racking holds a
cornucopia of original
Messerschmitt 109
parts.
squadrons, there was nothing to suggest
to the RAF why the pilot had landed.
However, it was a puzzle we were able
to solve over 75 years later when we
stripped down the DB 601A engine to
its component parts. But more of that
later.
CONSIGNED TO JUNK AREA
Having served its purpose promoting
the Nizam’s good works, and possibly
being used to raise funds for British
aircraft and armaments, the airframe
had eventually served out its intended
purpose. In India, of course, things tend
to be re-cycled, re-used or re-purposed
and in the case of 4034, the airframe
was passed to the Karnataka Technical
College for aeronautical engineering
students to examine and work on.
Ultimately, it served its purpose here,
■ The cockpit area of the Messerschmitt
too. Consigned to a junk area in the
showing ‘bullet holes’ in both sides.
college grounds, this extremely rare
aeroplane ended up dumped among
old classroom benches and desks.
And this is where it was when it was
eventually recovered to France, and
later to our works. I couldn’t believe my
eyes when I saw it.
When the Messerschmitt arrived in
Britain, literally nothing was known of
its back-story. However, I knew there
should be numbers or clues hidden
within the airframe and engine which
would allow the story to be pieced ■ The all-important number: 4034. This is the
together. aircraft Werke Nummer which unlocked its
▲
Back in England, it was possible to fascinating history.
IRON CROSS ❙ 7
RESTORATION PROFILE
■ Although the cockpit has been largely
stripped out, it will be restored and fitted with
genuine period equipment.
subject it to close examination and
conducted a full technical survey to
establish its underlying condition and
how best it could be restored - plus of
course, how much it would cost. At this
stage, the viability of the project was
uncertain and if we couldn’t tie down
the aircraft’s history (eg Werke Nummer
etc.) it was a doubtful starter in terms
of getting things past the UK’s Civil
Aviation Authority. But we were to be
in luck.
A ‘DNA’ MATCH
The first place to look was on the port
forward side of the fuselage. Here, all
Messerschmitt 109s had their build
plate attached. Unfortunately, that
had long ago been wrenched off the
fuselage skin by a souvenir hunter.
Frustratingly, there were rivet holes and
witness marks showing where the plate
had been. But no plate. Although from
its lozenge shape, we could tell it had
been a Focke Wulf built aircraft since
only that company used data plates of
that shape. There was also evidence
of some painted and overpainted
numerals on the fuselage side. Quite
clearly, we had a black figure six, but
this was painted over a black five. And
underneath was number eight. On their
8 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ A genuine radio set has been sourced which will also be restored to working condition.
own, these tactical numbers identified
aircraft within unit formations and
were useless in terms of providing any
airframe identification. At any one time
there could have been dozens of Black
■ Retrotec’s Simon Knight at work in October
2019 reconstructing 4034’s rudder.
■ This battle damage repair patch will be
retained in the restored rudder – a nice touch
of 1940 originality.
5s, 6s or 8s in the Luftwaffe.
Scouring the aircraft, the number
‘4034’ was found by well-known
Messerschmitt expert, Craig
Charleston, stamped into an engine
cowling remnant. This was certainly the
aircraft number, and by interrogating
historical data it didn’t take very long
to tie this into the aircraft which
Feldwebel Xavier Ray had landed in
Kent. Not only that, but now the Black 6
made sense as the aircraft was reported
by RAF intelligence to be marked with
such a figure. Furthermore, 4034 was a
Focke-Wulf built machine.
Just to round things off, the RAF had
recorded the engine number as 10256
and that number was found marked
into the engine main bearer caps.
Matching, too, was the capped-off
spinner cone which was recorded by
the RAF as having been painted red –
exactly as found.
HISTORICAL INTEGRITY AND
PROVENANCE
Although this was basically a 95%
intact airframe – fuselage, wings, tail
and even its engine – this was a very
long way from having an aircraft that
would be easily restorable. Whilst the
climate in which it had been stored
■ Guy Black indicates the original red paint on
the ‘capped’ propeller spinner cone.
had perhaps been relatively kind to it,
it had also suffered minor floodwater
damage before it could be recovered
from India. But this was superficial.
However, it soon became clear that a
considerable amount of the airframe
would be reusable. That is always a plus
when it comes to the reconstruction of
Second World War aircraft where, very
often, much of the skin and airframe
structure cannot be used – save for
patterns and ancillary odds and ends
like castings, bracketry etc, but in
the case of this aircraft, most cockpit
internals had been stripped out and
taken, across the period of three-
quarters of a century.
Whilst Retrotec are only just getting
into their stride with work on 4034,
we have already found, for example,
that large sections of the rudder
are reusable - 60% at least. We have
even included a part of it which still
carries an old German repair patch –
a repair patch to mend a bullet hole
which had come in from dead astern.
Keeping such original parts like this
is important if we are to preserve the
historical integrity and provenance of
the aircraft. In terms of provenance,
this brings me back to why the pilot
had to belly-land quickly in a Kent
field. The evidence being found in the
■ A Messerschmitt 109-E of JG53 during 1940 showing the painted over swastika.
■ Two original cockpit oxygen regulators are
amongst the spares stock. The best example
will be selected for use.
engine’s accessory gearbox.
When taken apart, we found that a
gear shaft had broken off and caused
the gear to go out of mesh as the shaft
had seized in the bearing, stopping
the engine instantly; the pilot had
reported problems with his engine
before he even took off and he was
right. It was incredible to have been
able to identify the exact cause of the
loss of 4034 all those years later. As
to the engine itself, we can use the
crankcase and cylinder blocks again
but, overall, we needed a large number
of replacement parts. Many items can
be machined or cast, and we were
lucky to be able to borrow a DB 601A
from the Berlin Technical Museum to
examine, measure and draw. Similarly,
another engine turned up buried under
concrete beneath an old Luftwaffe
hangar in Germany. However, literally
as I submit this feature to Iron Cross
magazine, I am about to fly to North
America to negotiate the purchase of
a near pristine example located there;
this would mean a considerable saving
in time and long-term costs.
PROFITABLE HUNTING
GROUNDS
Since taking on the restoration of 4034,
I have scoured the world looking for
genuine Messerschmitt 109 parts, and
it is surprising what has been found. A
good source has been internet auction
sites in Germany. So, too, have been
specialist collector’s sales events. These
are places we have found instruments,
wheels, oxygen apparatus, a control
column, wireless sets and things like
technical notes and manuals. Even
special toolkits for working on DB 601
engines have turned up. In some cases,
we have several examples of an item
which we will only need one of. For
example, the Dräger oxygen regulator.
This will enable us to either use (or
assemble from parts) the best example
▲
out of the choices in our extensive
IRON CROSS ❙ 9
RESTORATION PROFILE
holding of spares. It also gives us
flexibility to swap items for something
we need. After all, just as an example,
we won’t be needing ten sets of landing
gear legs, two tail oleos or 56 exhaust
manifolds.
So, at this stage, I’d say that we have
around 85% of all ‘fixtures and fittings’,
as it were, and there are a surprising
number of items we can re-use from
4034, such as the castings which
mounted the undercarriage legs or
the cockpit canopy and windscreen
framework - even one engine bearer
is reusable, and other usable ones
have been found. It is a myth that
these were made of magnesium - they
are an aluminium alloy with a small
proportion of magnesium. However, it
is almost alone in this respect as most
of the brackets are magnesium.
The frequent use of magnesium is
a big problem with German aircraft
of this period. Acknowledged, it is a
very light metal, which is why it was
used and long-term preservation
was never envisaged. However, it is a
nightmare for today’s conservation
and restoration community as many
parts were made of this metal and have
corroded beyond use. Engine castings
such as rocker box covers will often
have turned into a magnesium oxide or
simply disappeared.
■ Original DB601 engine tool kits are among
some of the astonishing items sourced for the
restoration project.
10 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ RetroTec’s John Whitehead works on one of
the newly manufactured rocker-box covers.
The originals had completely corroded away.
SWASTIKA REMOVED
Overall, this is an ambitious project.
We can’t return 100% of 4034 to the
air, but I would guess that between
60% to 70% of the airframe can be
used again. The engine is another
matter, but we will be able to include
the non-magnesium castings.
In terms of the fit of the aircraft
with instrumentation and cockpit
equipment, these will all be 100%
original right down to a Fug7 radio
installation – even complete with
recently found ‘new old stock’ glass
wireless valves. Four 7.92mm MG17
machine guns will also be fitted,
although they will be deactivated to
meet current firearms regulations.
Even a working Revi gunsight will
be part of the fit. We are, however,
missing a seat which is proving very
hard to find. Does anyone out there
know of one?
When the aircraft is completed,
it will be unique in its significant
originality as a Battle of Britain
Messerschmitt 109 E. Although
downed just after the Battle of Britain,
we know that it flew operationally
in that battle, though details are
sketchy. It will also be painted in the
finish it wore on 2 November 1940.
Interestingly, that excludes a swastika
on the tail fin. I’m sure many people
will imagine it has been deliberately
omitted out of political sensitivity, but
the truth of why there is no swastika is
rather strange.
When the aircraft was initially
recovered, there was clear evidence of
the swastika on the fin, but also faint
■ Newly manufactured reduction gear
housings for the DB601 engine.
evidence it had been painted over. In
fact, it had. The reason is fascinating.
During 1940, the Kommodore of
JG53 had fallen foul of the Nazi
party hierarchy with the result that
swastikas were removed from all the
unit’s aircraft and, instead, a broad
red band painted around the engine
cowlings. (Editor: We will cover the
intriguing story of the removal of
swastikas on JG53 Messerschmitt 109s
in a future issue)
Completion is some years away,
although Aero Vintage Ltd, a sister
company to Retrotec, is near
completing the purchase from Rare
Aero Ltd of the Messerschmitt to
eventually fly it alongside the Duxford-
based Historic Aircraft Collection’s
Spitfire and Hurricane. I can’t help but
be excited that we could end up with
all three main single-seat fighter types
of the Battle of Britain available as an
incredible airshow feature.
APPEAL TO IRON CROSS
READERS:
If any of our readers know of any items
which may be useful in this restoration
project, then Guy Black would be
interested to hear about them. He can
be contacted via the editorial contact
details on page three.
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 THE WAR AT SEA: SCHNELLBOOTE AT WAR
Channel Predators
Fighting from the first day of the war until the very last, the Schnellboote
COVER flotillas acquited themselves as “respectable adversaries”, becoming the
STORY very scourge of the English Channel as Robin Schäfer outlines.
I
t would be fair to say that at the start of the Second
World War the usefulness and capabilities of the
Kriegsmarine’s newest asset, the Schnellboot, had not
yet been properly recognised. On the outbreak of war,
the available vessels were concentrated into two Flotille: 1.
Schnellbootflottille in the Baltic with 2. Schnellbootflottile
in the North Sea, operating from Heligoland. Lacking any
operational concept, the boats were employed on work
for which they were not designed, including escort duties
and submarine hunting. On 1 September 1939, though,
1. Schnellbootflottille started patrolling in the Gulf of
Danzig. It was there, a few hours after the first shots of
the war had been fired, that S-23 (Oblt. Christiansen) sank
a Polish pilot vessel (formerly the trawler Lloyd Bydgoski)
with fire from its 20mm cannon after the crew had been
been given time to evacuate. It was the first vessel sunk by
S-Boot during the war.
Later, during Unternehmen Weserübung in April 1940,
with the capabilities of the S-Boote still not recognised,
the boats of both flotillas were used for reconnaissance,
high-speed landing craft or to dropping regular German
infantry on the coast near Bergen and Kristiansand. No
■ Forerunner of the classic S-Boot design of the Second World War, this was
the S.2, one of the vessels developed in the late 1930s. With a petrol engine,
later developments saw S-Boote fitted with powerful diesel engines which
reduced the fire risk.
12 ❙ IRON CROSS
boats were lost to enemy action, but one was damaged
by collision and some by gunfire. As war gathered pace,
so naval high command began to understand the value of
these little vessels. But it was not until May and June that
the pfennig finally dropped.
EARLY ACTIONS IN THE CHANNEL
On 9 and 10 May 1940, four Schnellboote launched
coordinated attacks on British ships of the Home Fleet in
the Skagerrak. Two boats were forced to withdraw in the
face of heavy gunfire, while S-33 lost part of its forecastle
in a collision with a destroyer. One boat, S-31 under Oblt.
Opdenhoff, managed to launch two torpedoes against
HMS Kelly, damaging it so badly that it had to be towed
back to the Tyne.
With the opening of the campaign in the west, though,
a new hunting ground opened up for the Schnellboote of
the Kriegsmarine. From Borkum, and later Den Helder
and Hoek van Holland, they attacked British and French
shipping and engaged evacuation vessels at Dunkirk.
Slowly, new and effective operational tactics were put into
play.
On 19 May, 1 and 2 Flotille were ordered to Nieuport
to intercept Allied shipping beginning to evacuate
Boulogne and Calais. Two days later, S-32, under Oblt.z.S.
Carl Eberhard, destroyed a 2,000-ton transport ship
off Nieuport in a gigantic explosion. On the night of
22 May, having intercepted Allied radio messages,
the Kriegsmarine ordered 1. Flottille into the Channel
around Dunkirk. Lying in wait for their prey, S-21 and
S-23 soon spotted the silhouette of the Jaguar, a French
torpedo-boat destroyer, heading slowly into the Channel.
Only minutes later, two torpedoes hit and the sound
of explosions shattered the night. The Jaguar, listing
dangerously, was towed to the beach at Malo-le-Bains and
grounded. At sunset on 28 May 1940, S-25, S-30 and S-34
sailed from Den Helder and employed the Lauertaktik (lit.
■ Right: ‘Always the Same Enemy - Fight With Us’ is the message
on this striking 1943 recruitment poster which appealed to 17th
century Dutch history in a call to enlist Dutch volunteers into the
Kriegsmarine, the Dutch warship accompanied by a German S-Boot.
▲
THE WAR AT SEA: SCHNELLBOOTE AT WAR

■ Left: A torpedo
is loaded aboard
an S-Boot. (BA)

■ Right: Despite
their relatively
diminutive scale,
and relatively
limited firepower,
the S-Boot was
a deadly weapon
against much
larger warships.
In May 1940, the
S-31 disabled the
destroyer, HMS
Kelly, in a torpedo
strike.

lurking tactic) in which boats, spaced one nautical mile
apart, slowly approached a presumed target in line before
breaking up and attacking at high-speed on a broad front.
While S-34 unsuccessfully engaged a British sloop
south of Fairy Bank, the commander of S-30 (Kptlt.
Zimmermann) spotted a British destroyer, HMS
Wakeful, which was transporting 640 British troops
from the beaches of Dunkirk. Using darkness as cover,
Zimmermann approached and launched two torpedoes
from a distance of 600 metres, one hitting Wakeful
■ Two S-Boote are prepared for sea.
amidships. The resulting detonation split her in two and,
trapped inside the sinking ship, 638 Allied troops and 85
members of the crew were lost. At about the same time,
the freighter SS Abukir was sunk by a torpedo fired by
S-34 under Oblt.z.S. Obermaier.
On 31 May, S-23 and S-26 attacked the French
Bourrasque-class destroyer Siroco heading to England
with British and French soldiers on board. Two torpedoes
hit its starboard stern. The resulting detonation tore into
the ship and very quickly the machine room was filling
with water. Siroco pitched over to starboard and sank
within two minutes, taking 660 of the 930 troops on board
down into the deep. At the same time, S-24 under Oblt.z.S.
Detlefsen, encountered the Cyclone, another Bourrasque-
class vessel. She was hit by one torpedo which ripped
a hole in her prow, killing two crew members. Severely
damaged, she limped back to Brest and was scuttled on 18
June. Up to 1 June, the S-34 managed to sink HMT Stella
Dorado, while S-35 sank HMT Argyllshire.
By June 1940, the Kriegsmarine had possession of all
Dutch, Belgian and several French ports on the English
Channel, giving direct access to the Atlantic and excellent
offensive bases from which to harass sea traffic and
convoys along the south and north-east coasts of Britain.
During the night of 19/20 June, SS Roseburn (3,103 tons)
was sunk off Dungeness in the first successful S-Boat
operation to the English south coast. On 23 June, during
an attack on another convoy south of Dungeness, S-36
under Oblt.z.S. Eberhard, sank SS Albuera (3,474 tons)
while S-19 sank the armed packet boat Kingfisher. By
25 June, 1. Flottille was based in Cherbourg from which
it could intercept sea traffic from the Isle of Wight to
Brighton, while 2. Flottille in Ostend could operate against
shipping along Britain‘s southeast coast. Rotterdam
housed 3. Flotille, while the port of Boulogne was being
prepared for its own contingent of Schnellboote.

14 ❙ IRON CROSS
 ■ The S-21 at speed. She was part of 1.Flotille
and on the night of 7/8 August 1940, under
command of Oblt.z.S. Bernd Klug, took part in
an attack on Convoy CW9 off Beachy Head and
Newhaven.

■ Below: Among the vessels sunk by the

S-Boote of 1.Flotille on 7/8 August 1940 was
the SS Holme Force. She was typical of the
targets singled out for attack by the S-Boote
flotillas.

BATTLE OF BRITAIN
On 4 July, convoy OA 178 was attacked by Rotten (pairs)
of S-Boote of 1. Flottille, damaging several vessels and
sinking the 6,000-ton freighter SS Elmcrest, while on
24 July another convoy was attacked by five S-Boote.
That same night, a Rotte of S-Boote (S-19 and S-27),
spotted a white light and headed towards it, believing it
to be a German flying boat reported as having made an
emergency landing. It soon became clear that the light
was from the brightly illuminated 18,000-ton French
liner, Meknes, travelling unescorted with 1,100 French
sailors on board who were being repatriated to France.
One torpedo hit the stern of Meknes and 374 men went
down with her.
With the beginning of the Battle of Britain, anti-convoy
operations took something of a back seat and 1. Flottille
were increasingly rescuing Luftwaffe personnel downed was their impact that British intelligence misjudged the
over the Channel. However, on 8 August, 1. Flottille operational capacities of the S-Boote Flotillas, estimating a
pounced on Convoy CW9 off Beachy Head under cover of combined force of 50 vessels in three operational flotillas.
darkness and sent the freighters Holme Force, Ouse and This was more than twice the number of serviceable
Fife Coast to the bottom. S-Boote actually available.
In early July, the Schnellboote started laying mines More important than these successes was the logistical
in the Thames Estuary and continued until September and operational fusion of all S-Boote units under the
with these operations achieving significant results. F.d.T., “Führer der Torpedoboote”, Kapitän zur See Hans
Faced with the threat of the sleek channel predators, Bütow. Under his command, the office coordinated
the RAF bombed Ostende and Vlissingen, sinking two operations with the Luftwaffe and mine-searching
S-Boote and damaging five others. In October, with formations.
weather conditions deteriorating, attacks on Allied Schnellboot crews faced strenuous tasks in harsh
shipping slowed down and 2. and 3. Flottille had only conditions and bad weather, moonlit nights and, from
seven S-Boote available. Then, on 20 November, in 1941, interdiction by MGBs which all made effective
zero visibility and stormy weather, S-38 (Oblt.z.S Hans operations difficult and risky. Effectiveness was furthr
Detlefsen) was sunk by the destroyers HMS Garth and hampered by the fact that, even though German
HMS Campbell. Nevertheless, when 1940 ended, the destroyers and torpedo boats were now operating from
Kriegsmarine could look back on positive results: its French bases, there was still no coordinated cooperation
S-Boote had claimed 26 Allied commercial vessels (49,985 between the flotillas and naval formations in any
▲

tons) and 10 destroyers sunk or badly damaged. Such combined arms approach.

IRON CROSS ❙ 15
THE WAR AT SEA: SCHNELLBOOTE AT WAR
■ An S-38 class vessel of 5 Flottille in the Baltic Sea in 1941.
THE BRITISH FIGHT BACK
With the beginning of 1941, Britain started reorganising
its coastal forces and began to turn out light attack
vessels which were delivered to different fleets. MTBs
and MGBs were now accompanying convoys in addition
to heavier escort vessels. At the same time, the threat
from aerial attack became more acute. In January 1941,
the Schnellbootwaffe could, on paper at least, line up
40 x S-Boote against Allied shipping. In reality, only 21
were operational. Throughout January, operations were
hampered by the weather but on 26 February, in rough
seas and low visibility, elements of 2. Flottille spotted
a convoy heading north. The S-30 (Oblt.z.S. Feldt),
supported by S-33, identified and engaged a Hunt-class
destroyer, firing two torpedoes from 700 metres. HMS
■ Successes by the men of the S-Boote flotillas were eagerly covered
by the German news media of the period. Here, a radio reporter
interviews men aboard one of the boats. (BA)
16 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ A Schnellboot crew member mans the boat’s 20mm cannon. (BA)
Exmoor was cut in two, disappearing beneath the waves
in seconds. Then, on 7/8 March, the three Schnellboot-
Flotillen, after Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft
reported two convoys (FN 26 and FN 29) off Cromer and
Southwold, attacked at night. The S-Boote claimed no less
than seven merchant ships with with a total tonnage of
13,134 tons.
During an attack on a convoy in April, German S-Boote
(S-57 and S-58) were for the first time effectively engaged
by their British counterparts. Attacking a convoy near
Haisborough Sand, the S-Boote suddenly spotted
three MTBs, opening up on them with all barrels. Both
S-Boote, though damaged, managed to return safely to
base. However, it had become clear that the British were
capable of responding to the S-Boot threat. Then, on 29
April, during mine-laying operations between Hammond
Knoll and Haisborough Tail in the Thames Estuary,
S-58 and S-61 were attacked by two MGBs. The ensuing
combat lasted nearly half an hour, the adversaries trying
to outmaneuver one another to bring firepower to
bear. S61 alone fired over 800 x 20mm shells during the
engagement, yet neither side managed to inflict serious
damage.
By the end of 1941, more encounters with heavily
armed MGBs forced the Kriegsmarine to upgrade
armour and weaponry of the Schnellboote. The new
boats (starting with S-38 to S-53) would not only
outclass their adversaries in firepower, but also in speed
and operational radius. Heavier and larger than their
predecessors, they had a top speed of 44 kts, sported a
fully armoured bridge (from the end of 1942) and were
armed with two 53.3 cm torpedo tubes and two 20 mm
guns. These were reinforced in 1943 by 37 mm cannon.
The new 92.5 ton vessels would set a technical standard
which would serve the Schnellbootwaffe well, right up
until D-Day.
On a tactical level, new attack methods like ‘Stichansatz’
■ A radio operator on board an S-Boot.
■ A group of Kriegsmarine officers, including members of 1.Flotille,
celebrate recent successes. Included in the photo are three officers
who took part in the attack on Convoy CW9 on 7/8 August 1940.
Oblt. z.S. von Mirbach (3rd from left), Oblt. z.S. Wuppermann (4th
from left) and KptLt Birnbacher (6th from left).
were introduced. This relied on accurate B-Dienst and
Luftwaffe reports to locate and engage convoys. The
S-Boote would proceed towards pre-calculated target
areas in Rotten (pairs) and disperse about 10 miles from
and parallel to the target convoy‘s course - keeping gaps
of about 2 miles between each Rotte. Having reached the
convoy lane, the boats cut their engines and lay adrift
waiting for their targets. If no target materialised within
a predetermined time, the boats continued their search
patterns. If a target was spotted, the Rotten launched
high speed attacks in line-abreast, trying to disperse the
convoy while leaving the escort ships no option but to
concentrate their force.
The Channel had been established as the main
battleground of the Schnellboote, and until the end of the
war operations against merchant shipping remained their
■ Above: Shell bursts fall close to the S-27. By 1942, the tide had begun to
turn against the unrivalled supremacy of the S-Boote as the Allies upped
their game against these dangerous vessels.
focal task. Yet, at the end of May 1941, three flotillas were
transferred to Swinemunde in preparation for the attack
on the Soviet Union although on 1 October, 2. Flottille
relocated back to the Channel while 1. Flottille transferred
to Kiel to prepare for relocation into the Black Sea. The
3. Flottille had already been relocated in September to
support the Italian Navy and Rommel’s Afrikakorps in
the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, 2., 4. and 5 Flottille were
operating in the English Channel where they were joined
by 6. Flottille.
S-Boats continued to inflict severe damage on shipping,
launching successful attacks on several convoys in
November and December. In total, during 1941, S-Boote
sunk 29 commercial ships at 58,854 tons. In addition, 12
commercial vessels with a tonnage of over 50,000 were
destroyed in December by mines alone.
OPERATION CERBERUS
Steadily, Britain’s coastal forces were now starting to
heavily outnumber their German adversaries and their
vessels had also improved in quality. New MTB types
started being delivered at the beginning of 1942, one
being the Fairmile Type D - heavily armed, fast, and more
stable than earlier models. The situation had gone from
one of almost uncontested mastery in the arena of fast
boat action in 1940 to a reversal of that position in 1942.
On 15 January, three Schnellboot-Flotillen were
transferred to Ostende, Boulogne and Ijmuiden to
participate in one of the biggest German naval operations
of the war: to bring back to Germany, via the English
Channel, the battleships Gneisenau and Scharnhorst and
▲
heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, which had been stationed
IRON CROSS ❙ 17
THE WAR AT SEA: SCHNELLBOOTE AT WAR
■ The S-102 on patrol, the low profile of these fast craft is clear to see in this photograph.
in the Atlantic port of Brest. It was named operation
‘Cerberus’.
To get the heavy vessels safely through the Channel and
Dover Strait and to port in Germany under the noses of
the British, the plan was to use maximum air and naval
cover. To draw naval
forces away, 6. Flottille,
with six x S-Boote,
launched a diversionary
attack off Dungeness and
Beachy Head. Meanwhile,
2. and 4. Flottille were
to escort heavy surface
vessels. On 11 February,
evading detection by the
submarine HMS Sealion,
the fleet crossed the Brest
passage. The following
day, it was spotted off
Le Touquet, escorted by
several destroyers and
S-Boot flotillas. Several air
attacks were unsuccessful
due to the fighter screen,
■ KKpt Werner Töniges, the most while in several attacks
successful S-Boot commander of by MGBs and destroyers,
the war, sinking eighteen ships on the S-Boote acquitted
281 combat patrols, for a total of
86,200 tons of Allied shipping. He
themselves well, the
was awarded the Knight’s Cross in convoy safely reaching
recognition of his success. Wilhelmshaven.
18 ❙ IRON CROSS
To deploy S-Boote with greater effect, the Kriegsmarine
took measures to create a fully independent Schnellboot
arm when the Führer der Schnellboote (F.d.S.) was created
in April, under Korvettenkapitän Rudolf Petersen, the
former commander of 2. Flottille. As a former S-Boot
and flotilla commander, Petersen understood all the
operational requirements necessary to effectively deploy
his boats. Well-liked by the crews, who considered
him one of their own, he avoided unnecessary risk and
wasn’t afraid to speak his mind, qualities that didn’t
particularly endear him to his superiors and resulted in
official rebukes for supposed lack of aggressiveness and
success.From his new HQ in Scheveningen, he oversaw
construction programmes and improvements in boat
design and armament and discussed and planned tactics
with his commanders. Together with the ‘Grey Wolves’,
the U-Boote, the boats under his command were the only
vessels capable of offensive operations in the North Sea
and English Channel.
Luftwaffe reconnaissance reports on 9 July led several
2. Flotille boats to Convoy WP 183, which - for unknown
reasons – had no escort. In minutes, seven vessels
had been sunk. That same month, the first boats were
equipped with ‘Funkmessbeobachtungsgeraete‘, or
FuMBs, which detected radar emissions from aircraft
of Coastal Command and emitted a humming sound
if one entered its range radius of about 60 kms. In
October, the first S-Boote of 5. Flottille were equipped
with Lichtenstein radar sets. At the end of 1942, S-Boote
operating in the west had sunk over 43,000 tons of

■ The British responded to the S-Boote threat with large numbers of MTBs and MGBs. Here, Vosper
MTBs are readied for sea and although they were not specifically designed to counter the S-Boote,
they often encountered them in battle.
shipping, including two destroyers (HMS Vortigern and
HMS Penylan), one MGB, one ML, four armed trawlers
and 19 freighters. In addition, 21 Allied vessels (including
two destroyers) had been sunk or damaged by mines - a
combined total of 86,465 tons of shipping.
By 1943, the Kriegsmarine had a nominal strength of 90
S-Boote: 16 for training purposes and of the remaining
74 only about 40 were operational. However, the S-Boote
were now up against 263 x modern vessels, including
MGBs and MTBs.
When, in mid February, 15 S-Boote of all flotillas went
mine laying off Sheringham and Great Yarmouth, the
British were waiting. After an attack by Fairey Albacores,
which failed to do any damage, S-71 was engaged by
destroyers HMS Garth and Montrose and a pack of MGBs.
S-71 received a number of hits, and after its engine stalled
it was rammed and sunk by HMS Garth. Seventeen sailors
went down with it. The tables had turned. The British had
the upper hand, and S-Boot operations became more
risky. Several boats were lost to mines, while several
convoy attacks were abandoned due to dense escort
screens. At the beginning of March, S-75 was sunk and
11 sailors killed in an attack by four Spitfires and two
Typhoons. S-74 lost an engine and had three men killed
in the same attack. By the middle of March, the combined
strength in the west was just 15 x S-Boote. Successes
against convoys remained rare, but on 13 April the
Norwegian destroyer Eskdale was sunk by S-90, S-65 and
S-112.
By the middle of the year, the RAF were chasing S-Boote
■ Right: Award
document for
the Schnellboot
Kriegsabzeichen
(S-Boat War
Badge).
■ Below: The
Schnellboot
Kriegsabzeichen.
up to and into their French ports. Under immense
pressure, S-Boot activity slowed down and because of
the threat of air attack, many boats received upgrades in
weaponry with the installation of 3.7 cm guns, in addition
to turrets housing rapid-fire 20mm quad Flak assembly,
or Flakvierling. With the addition of a fully armoured
bridge (Kalottenbrücke) and twin MG42 machine guns,
the vessels stood a better chance against attack. Yet the
larger, better-armed and more powerful German boats
still faced a numerically superior enemy. On 24 July, S-77
was sunk by a MGB patrol and in the coming week several
S-Boote were sunk or damaged in USAAF bombing raids
and RAF fighter-bomber attacks. Instead of engaging
them at sea, the Allies now targetted the S-Boote in their
bases, although during an unsuccessful en-masse attack
on convoy FN 1160, several boats were damaged, many
crew members killed or wounded and S-88 sunk. The
S-Boote would now revert to lightning attacks in small
groups.
At the end of 1943, the ball was firmly with the Allies.
More S-Boote were destroyed by Allied bombing, and
on 26 April, S-167 was damaged and S-147 sunk by the
Free French destroyer La Combattante, which spotted
the S-Boote on radar and opened fire before they could
engage. Yet there were still instances when Schnellboote
were able to inflict serious damage.
Early on 28 April 1944, eight LCTs, full of US servicemen
and equipment, converged on Lyme Bay, Devon, heading
towards Slapton Sands for D-Day training exercises,
▲
codenamed Exercise Tiger. However, the three-mile long
IRON CROSS ❙ 19
THE WAR AT SEA: SCHNELLBOOTE AT WAR
■ A view across the 2cm Flak 38 gun towards the fully armoured bridge section (Kalottenbrücke) which was introduced with S-100.
convoy was pounced on by a group of S-Boote, which had
been alerted by heavy radio traffic. The attack caught the
Americans completely unaware, costing the lives of 197
US sailors and 441 GIs.
On the debit side, and on 13 May, more S-Boote were
damaged and one (S-141) sunk - again by La Combattante.
Among the victims was Lt.z.S. Klaus Doenitz, son of
Admiral Doenitz.
■ The bow of the S-27, showing the port of one of her torpedo tubes.
20 ❙ IRON CROSS
OVERLORD
On the morning of 6 June, with the Normandy landings in
full swing, groups of S-Boote headed out from Boulogne
towards the invasion fleet. Immediately detected by radar
and attacked by swarms of MBTs and a British destroyer,
only their powerful engines saved them. Outnumbered, and
with the element of surprise lost, they returned to base.
This pattern continued over the following days and several
■ Another view of the S-27 at speed. She seems to wear the emblem
of a prancing stallion on the port side of the superstructure.

■ The sleek lines of a Schnellboot are clearly apparent in this photograph
taken off Norway in 1942.
attacks failed or were abandoned. Two S-Boote were also
lost to mines and only a few LSTs and small support vessels
were sunk.
On 12 June, S-138 (Oblt.z.S. Stohwasser) managed to
severely damage the destroyer USS Nelson off Utah Beach.
Taking on water and with 24 men killed, she was towed
back to Portsmouth. A day later, RAF Beaufighters of 143
and 236 Sqns sank S-178, S-179 and S-189. Several more
S-Boote were lost in an RAF raid on Le Havre when 1,300
tons of bombs were dropped and on 24 June, Cherbourg,
one of the most important S-Boot bases, was lost. A month
after D-day, S-Boot flotillas occupied only three French
ports with just 13 boats. Yet operations continued, and
on 30 July S-91, S-97 and S-114 cut off a convoy east of
Eastbourne, sinking a freighter and seriously damaging
four others.The fact that the S-Boots managed to evade
fire from the frigate HMS Thornbrough, which fired over
850 shells, shows how effective the powerful German boats
could be.
At the beginning of September, the last S-Boote in
■ A depth charge detonates in the wake of the S-47.
■ Mines have been loaded aboard this S-Boot which is moored in a
concrete bunker. Right up until the end of the war, mines sown by the
S-Boote flotillas were a major hazard for Allied shipping. (BA)
the Channel withdrew to Rotterdam and Ijmuiden. By
then, every offensive operation was spoiled by Allied air
superiority, but in mid-September a small force of S-Boote
managed to pierce the blockade around Dunkirk, delivering
badly needed supplies and evacuating Generalleutnant
Wolfgang Kluge, the CO of 226. Infanterie-Division, and his
staff. At the beginning of October, with only 21 operational
boats left, mine laying operations were launched from
Ijmuiden, Rotterdam and Hoek-van-Holland. It was risky
work, though the minefields along the coasts caused long-
term problems for Allied shipping.
December brought an end to a year of defeats and the
massive concrete bunker installations in the ports no
longer offered protection from new bombs deployed by the
RAF. Nevertheless, in the face of this, the Schnellboote sunk
33 ships with a combined tonnage of 40,475 tons, their
mines also accounting for 100,000 tons of shipping sunk or
damaged beyond repair, to the end of December 1944.
In 1945, the S-Boote went down fighting. In the face of
total technological and numerical superiority at sea and
in the air, Schnellboot command and crews could only
counter with increased tenacity, aggressiveness and daring.
Mining operations continued wherever possible, and
during the night of 18 February it was payback time when
La Combattante, vanquisher of S-141 and S-147, ran onto a
German mine off the Norfolk coast and was sunk. Convoy
FS1734 was hit hard by 9 x S-Boote on 22 February, sinking
two freighters and damaging a third. In addition, February
cost the Allies 19,551 tons of shipping to mines.
Up to the very last day of the war, the Channel predators
fought on. Outnumbered and outgunned, they formed a
serious threat to Allied shipping. This is nowhere better
expressed than in a report of the Home Fleet on 1 May 1945:
“Attacks by German motor torpedo boats against our
convoys have increased during the last three months,
notably by the use of more daring approach techniques.
Our enemies use two or three boats operating in small,
▲
independent groups, which makes the possibility of
IRON CROSS ❙ 21
THE WAR AT SEA: SCHNELLBOOTE AT WAR

interception by our escort ships difficult. The action

of the Coastal Command aircraft, in spite of regular
sorties and a total absence of enemy aircraft, is
unable to stem the offensives of these Kriegsmarine
units. In spite of a power ratio unfavourable to them,
they represent a constant threat to our maritime
traffic.”
While everything fell to pieces, the German Army
disintegrated, the Luftwaffe ceased to exist and
Allied armies moved into the heart of Germany, the
Schnellbootwaffe still had 21 boats operational in
its Dutch bases by mid-April 1945. At the end of the
month, they had sunk - mostly by mines – 88,971 tons
of Allied ships.
The final S-Boot sortie was launched on 13 May
1945 by S-204 and S-205, which crossed the North
Sea from Den Helder towards England. On board
S-204 was Konteradmiral Erich Breuning, on his
way to sign the surrender of German naval forces
in Holland. Ten MTB met the Germans at South Fall
Buoy before escorting them to their destination. A
number of British officers went on board S-205. One
was Captain Peter Scott, who later wrote:
“This was the first time I‘d ever sailed on an enemy
boat and I was immediately impressed by the size of
the S-Boot*. Its silhouette was hardly visible above
the surface of the water, and everything seemed to
have been designed to minimum resistance to the
elements and maximum protection for the crew
when the boat was travelling at full speed. In spite
of the rolling, we soon reached 30 knots. The MTB’s
behind us couldn’t keep up, and in spite of the speed
we kept perfectly dry, while my comrades on our
boats had to pull on their oilskins.” ■ “A respectable adversary”. An unidentified S-Boot officer in 1942. (BA)

■ At speed, as Captain Peter Scott RN later observed, the bow spray
from the S-Boote rose up and passed over the vessel, leaving the crew
dry. The opposite was the case on British MTBs!
THE COST
A total of 239 S-Boote of several types were put into
service between 1930 and 1945. Only 99 survived the war.
In total, 767 men of the Schnellbootwaffe had been killed,
620 wounded and 322 taken POW. Of the 99 surviving
boats, 34 were surrendered to Britain and 30 to the US
Navy which gave 27 to the Danish and Norwegian navies
in 1947. The Soviets received 28 as war reparations. Two
S-Boote were returned to the new Bundesmarine in 1951
and served as training boats.
The S-Boote served with distinction and in the words
of naval historian Stephen Roskill, their crews: “...fought
valiantly up until the end of the war. If they had been used
with efficient support vessels, and in tight collaboration
with the Luftwaffe, they could have caused much greater
losses to our shipping. The tenacity and crusading spirit of
their crews made them respectable adversaries”.
*Note: To the Allies, the German S-Boote were generally referred to
as E-Boats, the E standing for enemy.

22 ❙ IRON CROSS
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 WESTERN FRONT: SNIPING IN THE TRENCHES
A Dirty Duty
Much has been written about the dangerous world of sniping in the First World War, but
mostly focused on the Allied side. In this feature, Robin Schäfer takes a look at the men
involved, the ‘Zielfernrohrschützen’, how they operated and how Germany deployed them
while Richard James Molloy ofers us his regular input of colorised images.
B
y the end of 1914, the fluidity of battle on the
Western Front came to an end and the lines
solidified. Both sides dug in, seeking shelter from
the destructive power of modern weaponry in
systems of trenches, fortified strongpoints and barbed
wire entanglements stretching from the Belgian coast,
across north-eastern France to the border of Switzerland.
On the enormous length of the Eastern Front, armies
continued to manoeuvre in sweeping movements,
often achieving decisive breakthroughs which resulted
in enormous advances. In the East, trench warfare also
existed but it would never be the defining type of fighting.
Yet, on both fronts, soldiers facing the Germans soon
encountered the same new phenomenon. Only a few took
any account of it at first.
This phenomenon becomes very apparent when looking
at personal accounts of British soldiers published in
the newspapers during this early period of the war. For
instance, “My chum was struck at the back of the ear by
a stray bullet and killed on the spot”: “...the doctor then
told us that his case was hopeless, he had been hit in the
head by the stray bullet”: “...he was walking up and down
the support trench and was unfortunately struck by a stray
bullet which hit him at the back of his head”: “... the Lance-
Corporal, a Buxton man, was shot through the heart by
a stray bullet, whilst engaged with a working party some
distance behind the trench.” Random but otherwise pretty
accurate stray bullets were seemingly responsible for a
great number of British casualties. Yet the more static the
war on the Western Front became, the clearer it became
that the number of casualties (even in quiet parts of the
line) with shots to the head or body could not be explained
by stray bullets finding particularly unlucky targets. It is
clear that the French and the Belgians in the West suffered
from the same phenomenon, but their experiences are
less well known. And in the case of the Russian soldier in
the East, they were not documented at all.
By the Spring of 1915, most soldiers on the Allied side of
the barbed wire knew that there were German marksmen
armed with scoped rifles on the hunt for prey. And it was
also clear that these German marksmen did so with great
effect.
24 ❙ IRON CROSS
Major Hesketh-Prichard, who made a significant
contribution to the development of sniping practice in
the British Army, described this in his book Sniping in
France: ‘At this time, the skill of the German sniper had
become a by-word, and in the early days of trench warfare
brave German riflemen used to lie out between the lines,
sending their bullets through the head of any officer or
man who dared to look over our parapet (...) Only those
who have been in a trench opposite Hun snipers that had
the mastery, know what a hell life can be made under
these conditions. I don’t think the Germans are better
snipers than our men, except that they are more patient
and better organised and better equipped.’
Early in the war, British newspapers abounded with
stories propagating the prowess of soldiers of the BEF
who not only fired a lot faster than the Germans, but were
also a lot more accurate; it was only the sheer weight of
enemy numbers which had caused the professionals of
the BEF to withdraw in the face of the German advance
in 1914. Germans conscripts, often badly led, advanced in
solid blocks of men, making excellent targets for highly
accurate, rapid British rifle fire. They were generally
bad shots, often firing high and regularly missing their
targets, while in addition they were so blinkered that
they could not distinguish the sound of rifle fire from
that of machine guns. But that is a different story. Even
though one would think that these silly and often comical
statements would have been forgotten in the years
following the Great War, they have in many ways become
lore: accepted truths that continue to resurface. This
is not the place to discuss the ins-and-outs of German
leadership, doctrine and army training, yet it is important
to take a closer look at the importance the German
Army, in all its contingents, put on the rifle and on the
marksmanship training of its soldiers.
MARKSMANSHIP
Since 1871, every able-bodied German male between 17
and 45 was liable for compulsory military service. This
broadly followed a progression through various tiers of
service based on age. At the age of 17 or 18, young men
■ These are mostly older Reservists of 9th company, Bavarian 2. Reserve-
Infanterie-Regiment, posing for a group photograph, probably in May
1915 in the Artoi, France. In the background, next to a trench periscope,
a serious looking sniper armed with a telescopic sighted Gewehr 98
wears a marksman’s lanyard across his chest. (Brett Butterworth / RJM)

▲
WESTERN FRONT: SNIPING IN THE TREN CHES
■ Three men of the Bavarian Landsturm Infanterie Bataillon Schweinfurt,
posing with weapons and equipment. This is possibly during a training course
in 1917/18 on the Eastern Front. Though heavily armed in this photograph,
the older soldiers of the Landsturm units usually didn’t serve in the most
forward lines, being primarily employed in security duties behind the lines. LIB
Schweinfurt (II.19) suffered 86 casualties during the First World War, only 15 the
direct result of combat. The telescopic sight is probably a 3x Oigee Luxor, one of
the most common sniper scopes in the German Army. (Brett Butterworth / RJM)
were formally registered with the Landsturm which meant
that from that time they could, if needed, be called up
to defend home and hearth in times of war. Yet proper
military training started when they reached the age of
20 and entered the Aktiver Dienst period, which meant
“regular” army service for a two year stint (three in mounted
units). Upon finishing their active service time they were
discharged to civilian life and moved on to the reserve list
for 4-5 years when they would be regularly called up for
military training excercises to keep them in shape. Next,
the older soldiers would be transferred into the Landwehr
reserve pool for 7 years, where they would be called up twice
a year to refresh their military skills and finally, for another
7 years, into the Landsturm reserve in which no training
exercises were conducted. During those 21 years, a reservist
could be called-up to take up arms for his country.
26 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ Seemingly unspectacular at a first glance, this photo shows a
rarely seen detail. The well-built soldier in the centre holds a dummy
head made of stuffed fabric and painted with a comical face. This is
certainly a decoy to draw enemy fire. The men at the loopholes are
most probably snipers. Time, unit and location are unknown, but the
men appear to be from Württemberg and are probably on the Western
Front in 1915. (Michael Welch)
Great emphasis during training in active and reserve
service was placed on individual marksmanship. A recruit
soldier would not only be trained in combat shooting as
part of a platoon or company, but also undergo intense
individual rifle drill and dry and live-firing exercises
on static and moving targets. Company commanders
took great care to turn their soldiers into the best shots
of their regiment and were held personally responsible
for the marksmanship results of their men. In barracks,
soldiers were given constant access to their rifles which
were stored unlocked in racks close to their quarters.
During off-duty time it was taken for granted that the
men practiced drill and cared for their rifles. To control
performance, a company commander could always access
his soldiers marksmanship results as each was required to
keep a Schiessbuch (shooting book) into which he had to
enter results of a prescribed firing table which had to be
completed with at least minimum standards and which he
had to repeat until he managed to do so. The combined
results of all men were then entered in the Kompanie-
Schiessbuch. The results of this company‘s shooting were
closely monitored by the battalion and the regimental
commander.
From 1895 onwards, all regiments of the German
Army held shooting competitions on a corps basis and
had to participate in the so-called Kaiserschiessen,
or Königsschiessen as it was known in the armies of
Saxony, Württemberg and Bavaria. These were shooting
contests in which one regiment’s company with the best
marksmanship results in its respective Army Corps was
rewarded with the highly regarded Kaiserabzeichen (or
Königsabzeichen). The gilded metal wreath surrounding
two crossed rifles (for the infantry) would be worn by all
men of that company for one year up until the date of
the next annual shooting contest. Excellent individual
marksmanship was further rewarded by the award of a
Schutzenschnur (marksman lanyard) which was awarded
in 10 classes and worn on the uniform in the early stages
of the war.
RIFLE AND HUNTSMEN
In Britain, hunting was an exclusive sport and very
much the preserve of the upper class, but in Germany,
with its 32 million acres of forest (in 1913), forestry and
hunting were industries of major importance. Not
only were there enormous numbers of state employed
foresters and hunters to sustain such industry, but
private licensed hunting was common in all levels
of society. In more remote areas of Germany, young
men were required to learn the basics of fieldcraft,
stalking and shooting before becoming part of the adult
community. Meanwhile, in villages, towns and cities all
over Germany, Schützenvereine, Schützengilden and
■ Quite clearly staged is this otherwise dramatic photo of men of
RIR91 posing with a sniper rifle and trench mirror.
■ In the first months of the war, most German regiments made use of
hunting rifles obtained from civilian sources, such as that being used
by this sniper of an unidentified regiment in early Spring, 1915. (Peter
Reinhart)
Schützenbruderschaften (rifleman associations, guilds and
brotherhoods) drew many thousands of members.
It was a remnant of the medieval age, where settlements
formed crossbow-armed (later musket-armed) militias to
defend against outside intruders and rampaging men-at-
arms. These associations saw a peak in popularity at the
end of the Napoleonic Wars. The oldest were in continuous
existence since the 12th century, and although largely
ceremonial in modern times, the members still regularly
honed shooting skills on ranges and held competitions. In
addition, rifle associations took an active role in training
the reserves. On 19 May 1915, the Darmstaedter Tagblatt
reported on the important role of the local rifle association:
“On Sunday 100 future conscripts assembled on the seven
ranges of the rifle association where they received special
marksmanship training for more than five hours. A total of
15,000 rounds were fired, the cost of which was paid for by
the city of Darmstadt. All men were thoroughly motivated
by the knowledge that there is no skill more important in
the field than shooting. The training programme, which is
now being copied by many other cities, was a great success
and will in the future take place on every Sunday. At the
instigation of Commerce Councilor Hickler, another 115
scoped rifles have been made available by the war ministry
and will be sent to Hessian troops in the field very soon.”
When the reserves were called up in August 1914, and
Reserve and Landwehr regiments activated, it took the
German Army only 12 days to expand from about 840,000
to three and a half million soldiers. In addition to the
marksmanship training all these men would have had
during their army training, a large number of those called-
up, or already on active service, would have had additional
▲
marksmanship or fieldcraft skills honed in shooting guilds
IRON CROSS ❙ 27
WESTERN FRONT: SNIPING IN THE TREN CHES

Besides, I have been assigned a wonderful job. I am now a sniper and do a lot of
observing work. Whenever I feel like it, I walk to the observing post where there are so
called ‘scissor’ telescopes through which I can observe everything that is going on on
the English side. When I spot an Englishman who is bold enough to raise his nose, it is
my duty and obligation to shoot him. I do not need to do any sentry duty and am
allowed to sleep at night while everyone else is on their feet. I feel like I am in heaven!
Ignaz Hautumm, Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment 236, 21 April 1916. ”
or on the hunt. It would be men like these who, equipped and efforts were taken to make more available for army
with scoped precision rifles, would wreak havoc amongst use. The elderly Vikor Amadeus, Duke of Ratibor, then
the foe across the barbed wire. They would become the a member of the Prussian cabinet, personally funded a
menace of the trenches. programme to collect 20,000 scoped rifles for frontline
use. It is estimated that about 5,000-8,000 were gathered
before the end of December 1914, when the programme
STOP-GAP SOLUTION slowly fizzed out. Yet it was clear to the Army that these
Within the first days of war, the Germans quickly realised weapons could only form a stop-gap solution.
that to complement the mass destructive power of At about this time, the Prussian War Ministry ordered
machine guns and field artillery, a more discriminating the first 15,000 scoped Gewehr 98 combat rifles, known
weapon would be required. Almost as soon as the first as the Scharfschuetzen-, or Zielfernrohr-Gewehr 98. The
shots had been fired in anger, the first scoped hunting first batches of these rifles went to the Bavarian Army in
rifles were acquired to fill that role. These were weapons the winter of 1914. The G98, the German Army’s standard
made for the civilian market and mounting a variety rifle during the First World War, though long-barreled
of commercial telescopic sights made by Zeiss, Goerz and a bit cumbersome, was powerful and accurate against
and Gérard. These civilian rifles were chambered to fire man-sized targets up to a range of 600 meters, and still
the Patrone 88, rather than the new, powerful Mauser potentially lethal in ranges up to about 2,000 meters.The
S-Patrone which had become the standard cartridge of scoped versions of the G98 were specifically selected and
the German Army in 1904/05. Even though these weapons finished and were very accurate examples of the standard
were more delicate than a combat rifle and not ideal for rifle. The bolt handle was bent down, a recess to hold it
trench usage, their value in combat soon became apparent cut into the stock. Other rifles had the underside of the
bolt handle ground away to allow the stem to pass back
under the mounted optical sight. In fact, the German
Army never had a standard telescopic sight although it
was initially specified that 4x sights by Goerz and Zeiss
were to be used. As those two companies could never
satisfy demand, virtually any other available rifle scope
was pressed into service. Makers included Ernst Busch
in Rathenow, Voigtländer in Braunschweig, C.P. Goerz
in Berlin, M. Hensoldt in Wetzlar and Carl Zeiss in Jena.
Whereas most sights had 4x magnification, others ranged
from 2 ¾x to 6x. Each rifle was zeroed in and paired with
one specific rifle, and both were numbered together.*

■ The original caption to this image reads: “This photo shows you where I
stand on sentry duty for 5 hours each day.“ A trio of Landwehr soldiers from
an unidentified unit somewhere in Russia, June 1916. Two are armed with a
telescopic sighted Gewehr 98. All are equipped with Fernglas 08 binoculars.
(Brett Butterworth)
ZIELFERNROHRSCHÜTZEN
It is quite clear that differences existed in the way
snipers were employed within contingents and individual
divisions of the German Army. Yet all contingents except
the Bavarian Army seemed to have modelled their sniper
force after the Prussian model. Due to the limited scope
of this article, and because it generally seems that sniping
*For further information on the weapons and telescopic sights, the
works of Martin Pegler and Dieter Storz are recommended.

28 ❙ IRON CROSS
 TOOLS OF THE TRADE
1 solely on the Western Front.
2 the Prussian side. So far, historians have thus focused
3 In some Bavarian units, the number rose to three
4 waiting for their allotment. It is safe to say that by the
5 Ministry ordered all remaining civilian hunting rifles still
6
1: A Gewehr 98 sniper rilfe mounting a Goerz x4 Telescopic
sight.
2: Another G98, this time mounting a ‘Visar’ 2 3/4x made by
Emil Busch AG in Rathenow.
3: A ‘Dialyt’ 4x telescopic rifle sight made by Hensoldt in
Wetzlar.
4: 3x telescopic rifle sight made by Dr. Walter Gerard in
Charlottenburg, Berlin
5: G98 mounting a 3x Oigee Luxor telescopic sight with
hessian and leather eye cap.
6: This Hensoldt Wetzlar telescopic sight shows serial
numbers for two pairings. Inititally paired and zeroed in on
one rifle, it was later paired with another. This was done in
armouries far behind the lines, or when more complicated
repairs or maintenance was required, in Germany itself.
played a much lesser role in the East, the focus here is
A great deal of contradictory information exists on
the distribution and number of scoped rifles in German
regiments, mainly due to the lack of official records from
on distribution within the Bavarian army, and to a lesser
extent the army of Wurttemberg. It is safe to say that
distribution within state contingents differed widely.
Initially, scoped rifles seem to have been issued on the
scale of one per line of infantry or Jäger company. After
this, distribution among regiments becomes unclear.
per company in August 1916, while the 26 Infanterie-
Division reported in April 1915 that it had requested to
have six scopes and an extra two in reserve for each of
its regiment’s companies. A month later, the 26.,27.,28.
Division each reported 18 scoped rifles per Division, while
some Landwehr and other second rate units were still
end of 1916 or early 1917, each infantry company would
have had at least three rifles with telescopic sights at its
disposal. Initially, scoped rifles had to be returned to
the armoury after use. Here, one armourer, usually an
experienced NCO, was in charge of their care although
this practice seems to have been abandoned within the
first months of the war. In July 1916, the Prussian War
in service to be returned immediately.
How German snipers operated is still very much
unexplored and most published information today is
based on Allied wartime sources and speculation. A
fascinating insight into the world of mid-war German
sniping can be gained from a so-far unpublished report
compiled by the 87. Infanterie-Brigade in the summer of
1917 in a private collection in Germany.
“87. Inf. Brig. Abt. I, Nr. 6781
Zu Abt. I, Mun./Nr.7631/v. 15. 6. 1917
To the Generalkommando XVII. A.K.
Experiences from the work of telescopic rifle marksmen.
The Brigade currently has 110 scoped rifles of various
manufacturers available, of which those equipped with
telescopes made by the companies of Dr. Walter Gerard,
Charlottenburg and Voigtländer Braunschweig have proven
themselves best. Each company has a complement of
10-15 trained scoped rifle marksman. On operation it has
become clear that the men work best when divided into
Abschusskommandos (lit. ‘kill commands’) consisting
of two marksmen and two observers. The observers
are equipped with Gewehr 98, flare pistol and DF 03 6x
binoculars. The use of the pattern 08 binocular has to be
▲
refrained from due to its limited field of vision and low
IRON CROSS ❙ 29
WESTERN FRONT: SNIPING IN THE TREN CHES

Rifles with telescopic sights belong in the trenches and are only to be used for
precision shooting. The scoped rifle can only be successfully used by a trained
marksman who not only has a personal interest in precision shooting but also brings
with him the cold-bloodedness necessary to place a calm shot even when subjected
to enemy fire. As such, the men operating scoped rifles have to be chosen very
carefully. It is safe to say that there will be several in each company who are used to
this kind of calm, precision shooting from the hunt, and who take personal pleasure

”
and satisfaction from it. Generallkommando, XIII. Armeekorps, IIc, June 191

magnification. In addition to the standard load-out, the
ZF-Schützen (scoped rifle marksmen) carry an additional 15
K-cartridges to use for long distance shooting and against
hard targets. Members of the Abschusskommandos are
exempt from labour duties. The Abschusskommandos, in a
strength of 2 to 4 men, operate freely within the regimental
sectors, work closely with the troops in the trenches and are
subordinated to the KTK. Wherever possible, ZF-Schützen
cover one another during operations. Best success is still
achieved at dawn and dusk, with illumination by the moon
also at night. Today, scoped rifles remain in the trenches.
The responsibility of care and maintenance for the
weapons lies with the individual operator.
The main combat zone of the ZF-Schützen is the trench,
nevertheless good results have been achieved within the
forefield and in shell crater positions. Typical engagement
distances range between 100 and 400 metres. Although hits
have been scored on distances of over 800 metres, it is often
impossible to observe and confirm the actual effect of such
long range shots.
■ Clad in heavy fur coats, these men of an unidentified Landwehr formation
on the Eastern Front pose for the camera. Two are armed with the old
Gewehr 88, while their comrade to the left is armed with a brand new
Gewehr 98 with a telescopic sight. (RS)
For the Abschusskommandos operating in these
positions, good camouflage is of major importance.
In that regard, some of the men show great eagerness,
making use of specifically tailored tent squares, face
wrappings and individually dyed and painted pieces
of uniform. A kill can only be classed as confirmed
when observed by a witness. All kills, confirmed
and unconfirmed, are entered in the Abschussbuch
register with information on time, location, distance,
ammunition used, target identification and effect.
A notably successful and distinguished marksmen is
Gefreiter Anton Gaskowski of 5th company, IR 176. Since
the start of the Battle of the Somme, until today, he
has registered 79 confirmed kills. Some regiments pay
head bounties for confirmed kills from their regimental
coffers, which has notably increased the number of
confirmed kills (IR141 pays 10 Marks for every enlisted
man shot and 20 Marks for every officer shot). Yet this
is not well received by all of the men. Many consider it
dishonourable and beneath the dignity of the German
soldier.
A first selection and basic training of the ZF-Schützen
is nowadays already conducted with the replacement
battalions. There, men with hunting or similiar shooting
experience are chosen before they receive further
training by experienced marksmen in the field. For the
training of promising candidates within the regiment, the
Zielfernrohr-Kurse (telescopic sight courses) have proven
themselves greatly since their initiation in April 1915. One
main task is the annihilation of the enemy’s scoped rifle
marksmen, whose number and quality on the English
side have strongly increased during the previous months.
Even though the English optical sights are far inferior to
ours, some innovations of the enemy, like industrially
manufactured target dummies made of wood or Papier-
mâché, are noteworthy. The inferior quality of the
enemy’s optical devices can also be judged by the fact
that he usually ceases precision fire after dusk.
The experiences since the start of the war have shown
that amongst our foes the English are the best precision
shooters and come before the French who make little
use of scoped rifles. The Russians don’t seem to employ
scoped rifles at all.”

30 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ An unidentified soldier of Infanterie-Regiment
Nr. 185 from Baden. We have no explanation for
the alarm clock box, neither do we know where
exactly the photograph was taken although is
around 1915/16. The dugout, carved deep into
chalk, seems to be in a more secure part of the
line. One soldier in the background is cleaning
a standard G98 rifle; the soldier reading the
“Stockacher Tagblatt”, is probably the owner
of the sniper rifle which mounts a powerful
telescopic sight of 4x magnification made by
C.P. Goerz in Berlin. (RS / RJM)

IRON CROSS ❙ 31
WESTERN FRONT: SNIPING IN THE TREN CHES
■ Ersatz-Reservist Simon Lechner of the Bavarian Landwehr-Infanterie-
Regiment Nr. 3 in August 1915. He poses with a scoped G98, the case for
his 3x C.P. Goerz telescopic sight hanging across his chest. The photo was a
postcard inscribed: “Dear Centa, a photograph from the field as a souvenir. In
the background, the French are hardly 15 minutes away. I am now assigned
to the sharpshooters and am well up until now.” Simon Lechner seems to
have survived the war. (Michael Welch / RJM)
MEN BEHIND THE SCOPE
Even a cursory examination of available sources about the
First World War is enough to come up with the names of the
most successful snipers - men like Francis Pegahmagabow,
Billy Singh and Henry Norwest. Not a single German
name makes an appearance, but considering the fact
that the German Army was the first to deploy telescopic
rifle-armed marksmen on the battlefield, and developed
tactics and operational principles later forming the basis
for the creation and development of other nation‘s sniper
forces, this seems a bit odd. One reason is surely found in
disinterest, another in difficulties in accessing available
German sources while a third is the near complete
destruction of Prussian army records in the Second World
War. Yet the most interesting reason is the complete lack
of any mention of German sniping in German published
sources. In the hundreds of detailed regimental histories
published after war, in which all manner of prowess at
arms are celebrated, there are just a handful of mentions of
32 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ A sniper of an unidentified formation posing at the spot where his
observer had been killed by enemy fire, the location marked with a
plain wooden cross. The photograph is hard to date, but one detail
is interesting. The sniper has wrapped his rifle barrel in hessian in an
attempt to break up the rifles hard lines in an early example of rifle
camouflage. (Michael Welch / RJM)
successful German snipers. So why is that the case?
The answer might be found in a letter written by young
Leutnant Dietz von Saucken (GGR 3) to his friend Leutnant
Joachim von Kortzfleisch (IR43) on 22 November 1916 in
which he reports that: “During the period at Beuvraignes we
did our best to give those opposite a good spanking. Some
men of my company have become very proficient working
with telescopic rifle sights and merrily kept the Monsieurs
on their feet. One man in particular has done for over 20 of
them during only 5 days. A dirty duty, even if well performed,
doesn’t deserve an award from the Fatherland. So, I presented
him with a simple silver pocket watch instead (...).”
A silver pocket watch as reward for a “dirty duty well
performed” seems similar to mentions of head bounty
in cash which was paid by some regiments. The work of
the sniper, though important and valued, might not have
been considered honourable enough to deserve any high
award or to merit some mention in the press or post-war
literature.
■ The original caption of this fantastic photograph dated 16
February 1917 reads: “Snipers in the furthermost line”. The men
are soldiers of the Bavarian 23. Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment which
at this time saw service in Siebenburgen, deep in the Carpathian
borderlands. It is interesting to see that it shows a pair of snipers,
most probably working together and covering one another.
The sniper on the right seems to wear his steel helmet over his
Krätzchen (field cap), resulting in a rather untidy fit.

▲
WESTERN FRONT: SNIPING IN THE TREN CHES
A Tale of Two Snipers
T
wo interesting characters who became snipers very
early in the war were not only soldiers of the Royal
Bavarian Army, but they had also been poachers.
We tell their stories here.
The development of hunting rights is directly linked to
the relatively modern idea of exclusive private land. In
Bavaria, and no different from the rest of Europe from late
medieval times up to the present day, hunting and shooting
rights were enforced by gamekeepers and foresters. They
denied any shared usage of forests and the peasant’s right
to hunt and fish, while the sole right to hunt remained in
the hands of the nobility. However, by the end of the 18th
century, relatively easy access to firearms increasingly
allowed peasants, the poor and the low-paid to poach. This
interfered with not only the law of the land and property
rights, but clashed directly with the power of the nobility.
In the remote Alpine highlands of Bavaria and the Tyrol,
poaching was a necessity for many. Poor, hard-working and
often cut off from the rest of the world by ice and snow,
the men of small village communities climbed up into the
mountains and forests to shoot game for survival. This was
well-known, and the state did its utmost to end it. Between
1822 and 1848, more than 2,000 men were killed in Bavaria
during skirmishes between poachers and foresters.
Reform of hunting laws in 1849 limited legal hunting
to those rich enough to be able to pay the hunting fees,
leading to resentment in the rural population which
had hoped to see rights re-established. Illegal poaching
continued, the poachers often distributing cuts of their
prey to the poor and needy and thus gaineing adulation
and support in that community. A romantic cult formed
around the “gallant poacher” (the Wildschutz) who took on
the might of King and State while playing an often deadly
game of cat-and-mouse with foresters and hunters. In the
Alpine region, the Wildschütz (not to be confused with the
low, dishonourable and greedy “Wilderer”) honoured the
rules of the hunt, showed respect to their prey and took
from the rich and gave to the poor. Criminals by official
standards, they often reached saintly or heroic status
among the rural Alpine population.
■ Extract from Georg Herrnreiters Service file.
34 ❙ IRON CROSS
Whereas the deeds of wartime snipers might not have
been considered honourable enough to mention in
publications of the day, at least in Bavaria the romanticaly
heroic image of the Wildschütz was powerful enough to
turn two men into heroes as soon as they fired their first
shots.
GEORG HERRNREITER
Published by the German army newspaper ‘Liller
Kriegszeitung’ in early October 1914 was what was one of
the first descriptions of a man who would achieve near
legendary status - not only in Bavaria, but throughout
Germany. That man was Georg Herrnreiter:
“There are tales about a man of the Bavarian regiment
‘Kronprinz’ who distinguished himself through his most
successful and specialised work on the French front. His fame
reaches far, turning him into a kind of mystical being. Like all
heroes, he is a man of little words. Unlike most heroes, he has
the physique of a bear. Truly handsome he certainly isn’t, but
with his sharp eyes, short neck and blonde war beard then I,
for one, would not like to run into him when he is on the trail
of a good six-pointer and if I was a forest warden.
He made a name for himself at Lihons, where much
good German and Kronprinz blood has been shed. He was
annoyed that some Frenchmen, sitting in the crowns of the
trees, were taking pot shots at our brave men below. “I can
do that, too” he said and climbed up a tree about 200 metres
in front of our lines and began to work. And he worked
well. With 48 confirmed and witnessed direct hits scored
so far, I‘m happy to believe he will score 120, maybe even
150. He shot everything that was worth shooting: officers,
cyclists, patrols, artillery horses. With eyes like a hawk,
he had a talent for spotting enemy artillery positions. He
even tried his luck with mapping. I would like to see these
works, drawn by his clumsy farmer’s hand, placed in the
army museum. But it wasn’t long until the French got to
know about him. One time, they shot his rifle to pieces and
then put a shot through his trouser pocket close to where he
carried his Knicker (short Bavarian dagger), and finally they
honoured him by shelling his
tree. “That made me quickly
slip down onto a branch on
the third floor” he said. Yet he
didn’t climb down, and they
failed to hit him. That way,
Herrnreiter spent his weeks -
from the morning‘s first light
until dusk. Then he climbed
down and walked back to his
company, or to the garden
 ■ Infanterist Vitus
Heiß served with the
Bavarian 16. Reserve-
Infanterie-Regiment,
the unit in which
Adolf Hitler served
during the First World
War. Heiss even
served in the same
company as Hitler
and it is safe to say
that they would have
known one another.
In this stunning
photograph, Heiß
poses with his G98
Zielfernrohrgewehr in
a studio photograph
taken between
March 1915 and
November 1916.
The telescopic sight
is a 4x Voigtländer
Skoparette, one of
the models preferred
by the Bavarian
Army. The telescopic
sight‘s leather case
is hanging around
his shoulder. Vitus
Heiß was decorated
with the Prussian
Iron Cross, 2nd Class,
on 16 November
1916. He was killed
in action on 12 May
1917 - ironically, by
a rifle bullet to the
head – quite possibly
becoming the victim
of a sniper himself.
(Brett Butterworth,
Colour by Richard
James Molloy)

▲
WESTERN FRONT: SNIPING IN THE TREN CHES

which was home to the regimental staff, and sat down

quietly in the small kitchen next to a small stove, drinking
his coffee. And never bragging, because he is a quiet hero.
Only when one asks him about his day‘s work will one get a
brief, factual statement, such as: “Today I got three”.He will
shortly be decorated with the Iron Cross.”
The hunting references throughout the piece are based
on the fact that in civilian life Georg Herrnreiter might
well have been a farm worker, but to beef-up his meagre
earnings he‘d also been a poacher. Born in Reisbach near
Dingolfing, Bavaria, in May 1891, and in employment as
a farm worker when the war broke out, he joined the 2.
Bayerisches Infanterie Regiment on 8 August 1914. Only a
month later, he laid the foundation stone of his reputation
as a sniper.
Strapping himself into the crowns of trees, or firing from
the undergrowth with a scoped civilian hunting rifle, he
racked-up an impressive score in a very short time. On 15
October 1914, he was decorated with the Prussian Iron Cross
2nd Class and, at the end of November, with the highest
gallantry award his home kingdom, Bavaria, had to bestow:
the Golden Military Merit Medal, or Golden Bravery Medal.
The citation reads:
“On 26 September 1914, Gefreiter Herrnreiter, of 3rd
company, 2. b. Inf. Reg, volunteered for sentry position in a
tree, from where he successfully shot everything that moved
- whatever target showed itself in the trench ahead, and ■ Portrait photo of Georg Herrnreiter taken in the former French Army
further on towards Lihons. Meanwhile, he delivered valuable Barracks, Peronne, shortly after the award ceremony of the Bavarian
reports about proceedings on the French side. Day after Golden Military Medal. (Klaus Herrnreiter, colour by RJM)
day, during the period his regiment was at Lihons from 26
September to 15 October 1914, he moved into his position and
held it, keeping up his fire even though continuously shot at War when hit by a stray artillery shell splinter. His regiment
by individual fire, whole salvoes and by artillery. Even though memorialised him thus in its history, published in 1924:
wounded by a grazing shot, and even though two rifles were “Gefreiter Herrnreiter was a true hero, the old Bavarian
shot to pieces in his hands and a third heavily damaged, he poacher, who was killed near Neuville. He is dead, but his
still shot a mass of foes, reported enemy artillery positions memory lives on in the ranks the regiment. His comrades
and guided our own artillery onto them.” thought him bullet-proof as he faced each projectile directed
In the Winter of 1915/1916, at him with a smile. Deeds of honour have been performed
the “Kronprinz” Regiment by him and he has long been wearing both crosses, Prussian
clung to a series of muddy, and Bavarian, on his chest. When the 2. Infanterie-Regiment
loose positions on the far was in a different sector of the front (Vermandovillers), the old
eastern slopes of Vimy Ridge. poacher and hunter built himself a hunting seat in the crown
On 28 January 1916, following of a lonely tree. He remained up that tree while gunfire kept
the great mine detonations whistling and howling around him. Over the course of many
under the French lines, a days, and whatever they threw at him, they couldn’t get him.
great attack was launched During the time in his elevated position above the French
in which the Bavarians took positions, he felled 121 enemies with his telescopic sight
a 2 kilometre long stretch equipped rifle. Wherever patrols had to be conducted,
of enemy trenches and Herrnreiter was there. It was not possible to promote him
captured 340 prisoners. to the rank of Unteroffizier, but this was not because of
During the following night, his civilian criminal record but because his rather simple
Georg Herrnreiter, who had grade of education didn’t allow it. When the glorious soldier
carefully picked his victims had again proven himself in combat, and when decorated
■ The grave of Georg
before dealing out death, with the Golden Bravery Medal in the old French barracks
Herrnreiter, sniper fell to the undiscriminating at Peronne, his regiment granted him an honour which has
extraordinaire. (P. Redmond) mass killer of the First World remained unique ever since. The whole regiment paraded

36 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ Georg Mühlberger as hunting assistant (right) in the Summer of 1918. Next to him the district hunters and foresters - men who would have been his
opponents 10 years earlier.
past Gefreiter Herrnreiter. When it was over, Herrnreiter
remarked: “Well, I have seen better parade marches!”
Newspapers in Bavaria and central Germany eventually
reported his death:
“Munich: Painful regret has been caused by news of the
death of Gefreiter Georg Herrnreiter, one of the best shots of
the Bavarian Army and a simple worker from Lower Bavaria.
He was not only a cold-blooded master marksman, about
whom we reported when he bagged his 86th Frenchman,
but he was also an audacious soldier much valued by his
superiors. Everyone in Bavaria knows his name. Much has
been written about him, and in addition to the Iron Cross he
held several other awards. Once, he was allowed to take the
salute of his regiment standing next to his General. It is said
that at the feast which followed, paid for by his regiment’s
officers, he prefered to consume Bavarian beer and snuff
tobacco instead of expensive Champagne. In Herrnreiter
there lived a piece of the hero Siegfried, and with it a firm
belief in his own indestructibility.”
Georg Herrnreiter was holder of the Prussian Iron Cross
2nd Class (15 October 1914), the Bavarian Military Merit Cross
3rd Class with Swords (22 January 1916) and Bavarian Golden
Military Merit Medal (30 November 1914).
He is buried in the German Military Cemetery of Neuville
St. Vaast, Block 2, Grave 196.
GEORG MÜHLBERGER
Georg ( Josef) Mühlberger was legendary in the Chiemgau
region of Upper Bavaria long before the start of the war.
Born in Pollersham on 29 July 1880, he learned the trade
of shoemaker but started poaching in his late teens. He
served his compulsory military service between 1901 and
1903, but for more than a decade made a name for himself
as a skillful and cunning poacher who assisted those in
need and who had a highly successful track record of
evading the law. In addition, he was known to be a regular
instigator of brawls in local taverns and guest houses.
By 1912, though, when the government put a bounty of
400 Marks on his head, which was about 4-5 times what
the average worker earnt in a month, the noose around
Mühlberger was tightening and he disappeared from the
face of the earth.
News of his whereabouts first became known again
shortly before Christmas 1914, when the following was
published in a side column of a local newspaper:
“ News from a Bavarian ‘Poacher’. News about a man
who is well known in the whole of the Inn and Chiemgau
regions, shoemaker Georg Mühlberger, has arrived
from France in a letter addressed to his cousin, Johann
Mühlberger, a farmer in Ried. It appears that the once
▲
feared poacher, now war volunteer, has been awarded the
IRON CROSS ❙ 37
WESTERN FRONT: SNIPING IN THE TREN CHES

Iron Cross and Bravery Medal for his heroic deeds in enemy
territory when, during an assault, he shot dead or disabled
50 Frenchmen.”
Chased by the law, Mühlberger had fled across the
border to Switzerland where, under a false name, he took
up work in his trade of shoemaker. When war broke out
in Summer of 1914, he made his way back to Bavaria and
volunteered for service. After a few weeks, he ended up
serving in the ranks of 12. Königlich Bayerisches Reserve-
Infanterie-Regiment.
The citation of his Golden Military Merit Medal stated:
“During trench fighting near Ecurie, Arras, the 9th
company of b.Res.Inf.Rgt 12 held possession of a line of ■ Extracts from Mühlberger’s service files, listing him as
French trenches and was tasked to take the other half as Scharfschuetze (sniper) and as ‘trained on the Gewehr 98 as
well. Yet a well positioned sniper of the Chasseur d’Alpine telescopic sight sniper’.
made every advance impossible, having already shot dead
11 of our men within two days. When he was finally taken
out on 25 November 1914, he was immediately replaced by appears again in the June 1916 records of Ballonzug 261 of
another. This one was quickly silenced by Mühlberger firing Luftschiffer-Abteilung 66b - a balloon observation unit of
over the parapet. The way being clear for a brief moment, the Luftstreitkräfte.
some courageous men charged forward. To support them, How this highly unusual transfer came about is
Mühlberger climbed onto the parapet and shot dead no less impossible to say, but it may be that his wound caused
than 25 Frenchmen, including one officer. This deed greatly complications which ruled out further service in an
aided the advance of his comrades.” infantry unit.
The story of this infamous poacher spread rapidly in In 1918, his story took an even more unusual twist
the south German press, turning him into a war hero and when Georg Mühlberger’s war suddenly ended on
instantly clearing his substantial criminal record. “After the 17 April. A brief handwritten note in his service files
war, there will hopefully be an estate owner who offers the states: “Order Number 49349, 1st Bavarian Army Corps,
dashing fellow a legal way to satisfy his hunting passion”, Temporarily released from service to take up work duties
stated a newspaper in Chiemgau a few weeks later. as gamekeeper to Baron Cramer-Klett, Forestry Office
Mühlberger’s story continued to follow an unusual Hohenaschau, until 1 August 1918.”
path and in June 1915 he was released from hospital after We can be fairly certain that this was due to chronic
being wounded in the head by a shell splinter. Briefly health problems. This happened to many soldiers who
transferred to the replacement battalion of the German were unable to fulfill their duties for medical reasons.
Alpine Corps, he received official sniper training in the What is more noteworthy is the fact that the Forestry
use of the scoped rifle. After rotating through various Office Hohenaschau, and the land of Baron Cramer-Klett,
replacement formations, were precisely the area where Mühlberger had successfully
and a stint of service in poached for over a decade. The only surviving photo of him
the Bavarian 1. Reserve- was taken about this time and shows him in his new role as
Infanterie-Regiment, he gamekeeper. Next to him on the photo are the state hunters
and foresters who would once have been his adversaries.
What exactly led to this we will never know, but it was truly
■ Guidelines on distance
estimation, created by Landsturm
a case of poacher turned gamekeeper.
Hauptmann-Oberförster His service exemption was renewed in August 1918 but he
Feddersen for Armeegruppe died ten years later in unknown circumstances. By then, he
Gallwitz in May 1915. The was a highly respected member of the community.
scope used is a C.P. Goerz,
Serial No. 6493. It is interesting
that Hauptmann Feddersen, in
command of Landsturm Battalion
Woldenberg, not only uses his NOTE: Colourised
images throughout
military rank but also his official
this feature are by our
civilian rank of Oberförster, or
colourisation artist,
Senior Forester. Three months
Richard James Molloy,
later, his battalion would play
as his regular contribution of coloured period images which
a key role during the Siege of
will appear in each of our issues showcasing his work.
Novogeorgievsk (now Modlin).
(Via F. Wein)

38 ❙ IRON CROSS
 EXHIBITION
ABOUT AVIATION

WHEN DEATH
CAME FROM ABOVE

MUSEUM WITH 22 FLOORS

PANORAMIC ROOFTOP VIEW
IJzerdijk 49 - 8600 Diksmuide
t +32 (0)51 50 02 86
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 WAR IN THE AIR: JAGDFLIEGER ÜBER ENGLAND

Galland’s Battle of Britain

Much has been written of the Battle of Britain, and mostly from the British perspective.
Andy Saunders looks at a commentary on Luftwafe ighter operations during the battle
which was written in the early 1950s by one of Germany’s most famous ighter aces,
Adolf Galland.

G
eneralleutnant operational aspects
Adolf Galland relating to RAF Fighter
needs no Command. However, it
introduction must be borne in mind
to the readers of Iron that this was written
Cross, most of whom will entirely from his own
be more than familiar memory of events during
with his best-selling 1953 that period, probably
autobiography, The First without access to archive
and the Last. Prior to that, material and certainly
however, Galland had without the benefit of
written a treatise based retrospective historical
on his experiences during research.
the Battle of Britain which
included his observations
as to the successes, along A ‘GIFT’ FROM
with the failings and DESIGNER
shortcomings, of the “Study of the relationship
Luftwaffe fighter arm between various branches
during that critical period of the Luftwaffe reveals
across the summer and the insignificant provision
autumn of 1940. that had been made for
After surrendering to fighters. The reason for
Allied forces in May 1945, this is to be found in the
Galland was flown to accepted doctrines of
England on the 14th for the time: that the new
interrogation by the RAF ■ Adolf Galland wearing the rank patches of Oberstleutnant and Luftwaffe should be
in relation to Luftwaffe wearing the Knight’s Cross with Oakleaves. (Colour by RJM) organised as an attacking
organisational and force in accordance with
technical issues before the strategic concept much
being returned to Germany and initial imprisonment. He in favour at that time: that mastery of the air should be
was later brought back to England on 7 October for further obtained in the initial operations of a war through the
interrogation. destruction on the ground of the enemy’s air power.
By the end of April 1947, Galland had been released “I personally believe that Germany could not have
and it wasn’t long before he was encouraged to move to lost the war if the production of fighters in 1940 or 1941
Argentina and work for the Argentinian Air Force where had been on the same scale as it was in 1944. In this
he acted as consultant and trained and lectured new pilots connection, it is interesting to examine the production
before finally returning to Germany in 1955. It was during figures for fighter aircraft during the war, where we can
his time in Argentina that he penned a study on the Battle see that the output of the German aircraft industry was
of Britain, excerpts of which we reproduce in this feature. stepped up little at the beginning of the war. It was not
Adolf Galland’s work, originally written in Spanish, until after a very long delay – in the autumn of 1944 – that
does contain several historical and technical inaccuracies peak production was attained.
- along with misunderstandings as to tactical and “It was believed for some time that in the case of

40 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ The Luftwaffe’s
fighter force was
concentrated in France
along the English
Channel coast in the
early summer of 1940.
Mostly, the airfields
were impromptu affairs
▲

which utilised cornfields

and meadows. Here, the
Messerschmitt 109-Es
of JG27 wait for action
in the Pas-de-Calais.
WAR IN THE AIR: JAGDFLIEGER ÜBER ENGLAND
■ As the Luftwaffe evolved, pre-war, the single-seat fighter arm
suffered in its development as a tranche of the best pilots were
transferred to Messerschmitt 110 units.
daylight attacks, bombers would be able to master enemy
fighters and would thus not need to be escorted. In any
case, fighters would not be able to accompany bombers
owing to the speed disparity.
“However, the construction of the new Messerschmitt
109 - of completely revolutionary design – put the
problem back in a proper perspective.
“It is of interest to mention here that the Bf 109 was
actually a gift from its designer, Prof. Willi Messerschmitt,
in the proper sense of the word. It was not ordered by the
Air Ministry. On the contrary, many of the men who had
been fighter pilots during the First World War, and who
now occupied positions of authority in the Luftwaffe,
rejected the new aircraft on technical grounds.
“They did not understand that the close-turn combat
was only an exception among the various kinds of tactics
in aerial fighting between aircraft of high performance,
and that in a fighter with a closed cockpit a pilot could fly,
see, fire and fight just as well as in the old type of fighter
with an open cockpit. The sceptics asserted that the new
42 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ A further tranche of fighter pilots also found themselves
transferred from fighters to Junkers 87 ‘Stuka’ units before the war,
further weakening and undermining the effectiveness of the fighter
arm in the view of Adolf Galland.
Bf 109 was not suitable for service due to high take-off
and landing speeds, which would lead to insurmountable
handling difficulties.
“But they were wrong. The Bf 109 not only possessed
superior features but caused a revolution in fighter design.
However, its short operational radius (about 200km) played
a decisive part in the outcome of the Battle of Britain.
PHYSICAL STRAIN
“Vexed by this perceived weakness, Goring had already
demanded a fighter of greater endurance which resulted
in the production of the Messerschmitt 110 ‘Zerstorer’.
And this caused a problem for the embryonic fighter
force from 1938 because the best fighter pilots were
assigned to them. And this wasn’t the first drain on the
pool of pilots from the fighter force. First, during 1934
and 1935, when bomber units were being established, the
young fighter force put large numbers of its best pilots
at their disposal. And it was the same in 1936 when the
■ An original colour photograph showing Messerschmitt 110s of 8./ZG76 low over the English Channel in 1940. Galland was scathing about the
usefulness of the type.
first Junkers 87 units were being formed. This reduction
of fighter pilots in the period between 1934 and 1939 had
a knock-on impact which I believe adversely affected
outcomes in 1940.
“It was said then, that: ‘The air force is a strategic,
offensive weapon’. Those words sum up the concept that
dominated this period, as I have already indicated.
“As to the Messerschmitt 110 in 1940, when units had
originally been formed, it was intended that they should
be used to escort bombers. The 110 was unable to give a
good account of itself in combat with British fighters, and
it was for this reason that the enemy singled them out
for attack. When they were attacked, they were obliged to
■ Adolf Galland taxies his Messerschmitt 109-E at Audembert,
France, during 1940.
make a series of very tight turns – or ‘Abwehrkreis’. (Editor:
known to the RAF as a ‘defensive circle’) Though nobody
was willing to admit it, this was essentially a defensive
measure and the twin-engine fighters had to rely on Bf
109s coming to their assistance. Otherwise, they had to
escape as best they could and consequently suffered heavy
losses. As a result, from this time onwards, when 110s were
used to escort bombers they were accompanied by single-
engine fighters. But even so, whatever the value of the 110
in combat, they were of little use.
“During the summer of 1940, I served as Kommodore
of Jagdgeschwader 26. Normally, each unit made three
sorties per day and the physical strain on pilots was heavy.
Airframes and engines also suffered in these efforts and
on occasion I was called upon to carry out four freelance
fighter sweeps (frei Jagd) over England in a single day.
“Our missions were carried out in the following
manner: once airborne, the units assembled as quickly
as possible at an altitude of more than 5,000 metres
over the Continent. The approach flight was begun from
this height, the altitude being gradually increased to
somewhere between 6,500 to 8,000 metres.
“It took an average of 30 minutes to reach the English
coast from the time of take-off, and this left no more than
20 minutes for penetration into enemy airspace. In order
to be able to attack British fighters from higher altitude,
this meant that our time over England was reduced simply
by fuel consumption during the act of climbing. Combats
would then take place, progressively downwards, from our
maximum altitude. The disadvantage of not having drop
tanks on the Bf 109s also became apparent. Had they been
▲
so equipped, then endurance would have been increased
IRON CROSS ❙ 43
WAR IN THE AIR: JAGDFLIEGER ÜBER ENGLAND

■ Left: This Propaganda

Kompanie (PK) photograph
shows a Messerschmitt
109-E flying up the English
Channel with the Chain Home
radar masts behind Dover
visible above the White Cliffs.
The masts appear to have
been enhanced in ink on the
wartime original.

■ Right: The English Channel

became almost as feared as
were encounters with enemy
fighters. On 18 August 1940,
Hptm Horst Tietzen (left) and
Lt Hans Lessing of 5./JG51
were lost off Whitstable.

by 30 – 40 minutes. Again, this may have had a significant
impact on eventual outcomes.
“Our opponents were directed by radio until they
intercepted us and had an apparatus that automatically
transmitted an intermittent signal called ‘Pip-Squeak’.
These signals indicated the position of the aircraft,
direction of flight etc. and enabled proper control from
the ground. In any case, the flights could be plotted and
directed by radar. (Editor: In fact, the coastal Chain Home
and Chain Home Low radar stations of the RAF could only
detect aircraft approaching the coast and thus alert the
command and control organisation to enable RAF fighters
to be ‘scrambled’ towards incoming raids. What they could
not do was to see behind the stations, inland. Thus, they
could not be used to precisely ‘control’ RAF fighters onto
German formations as Galland had supposed.)
“On the other hand, the Luftwaffe had no exact
information regarding the position and direction of flight
of its units over England and did not have the necessary
technical equipment that would have enabled it to locate
and control its fighters. Such a need had not been foreseen.
This demonstrated the poverty of tactical and technical
ideas about the use of the fighter arm, both offensively
and defensively. And it was very soon realised that fighters
controlled from the ground held a distinct advantage over
those governed by instructions issued before take-off, or by
situations encountered once over enemy territory.
“Insofar as it worked at all, the system of escorting
bombers functioned very poorly. There were neither special
tactical rules nor uniformity of any concept; each fighter
squadron carried out its operations as it thought best.
Hence, the quality of performance attained on these sorties
was extremely variable. Some squadrons executed their
missions in a highly efficient manner. Others did very badly.
“In fact, it was not until late in this period of air fighting
that tactics were standardised - although conferences
were held between the various fighter commanders before
and after every mission. All the experiences gained were
analysed immediately and thus new tactics could be
evolved for methods of attack.

■ Ground personnel admire the victory tallies on the rudder of Adolf ■ Fighter leaders gather on the Channel coast with Ernst Udet,
Galland’s Messerschmitt 109 -E during the autumn of 1940. centre. To Udet’s right is Galland, on his left, Mölders.

44 ❙ IRON CROSS

GERMAN AIR SUPERIORITY
“Unfortunately, our intelligence about the relative size
and strength of the British fighter force, and its capacity
for replacing losses of aircraft or pilots, proved to be
completely false – as our pilots soon discovered on
operations! And there is no doubt that the number of
aircraft shot down was exaggerated. According to Göring,
the British fighter force should have been practically
obliterated towards the middle of the summer of 1940.
The facts, though, told a different story. There should not
and cannot be any doubt that Germany had air superiority
at this time. But the British pilots put up a tenacious and
valiant defence. And, of course, the great majority of
British pilots whose aircraft had been put out of action
could take up the fight again the next day in another
aircraft. Additionally, German estimates of British reserves
were very far from correct. (Editor: Intelligence analysis was
often watered down to reach conclusions more acceptable
to the intended reader. Thus, the reputation of the 5th
Abteilung’s chief, Generalleutnant “Beppo” Schmid, evolved
as one renowned within the Luftwaffe for garnishing his
reports to make them more palatable to Göring.)
“Over Britain, we either flew as direct escort, indirect or
■ Apart from
exhaustion on the
part of the fighter
pilots, airframes and
engines also took
a toll due to the
excessive number
of sorties flown
daily, with ground
personnel also
worked hard. Here, a
Messerschmitt 109-E
is maintained at a
French airfield during
the summer of 1940.
(Colour by RJM)
deployed escort, freelance patrols, supplementary escorts
to pick up and cover returning formations or protection for
air-sea rescue operations. The most difficult mission was
direct escort, when we were tied closely to the bombers.
“In order to avoid British anti-aircraft fire, which was
generally effective, bomber units flew higher than their
ideal service ceiling and were thus much slower than they
should have been. This compounded the problem for the
faster escorting fighters who had to reduce speed until it
corresponded with the bombers and, at the same time, try
to retain manoeverability. It also limited time the fighters
could spend over England.
“Usually, particular fighter units were always assigned
to escort the same bomber units. Whenever possible, the
leaders of the fighter escorts and leaders of the bomber
formations would confer beforehand – usually by telephone.
This was important, because in most cases any radio contact
between fighters and bombers was not technically possible
owing to dissimilarity of equipment used in the two types of
aircraft. And this could cause big problems.
“In the course of a mission to London from the Pas-
de-Calais, a bomber formation with its escort could be in
▲
the air for two hours and had to return by the most direct
IRON CROSS ❙ 45
WAR IN THE AIR: JAGDFLIEGER ÜBER ENGLAND
■ Luftwaffe fighter losses began to mount in 1940, and even if a pilot was ‘safe’ after arrival in England he was a total loss to the fighter arm. On the
other hand, RAF pilots might live to fight another day. Here, one of Galland’s JG26 pilots has landed in a field at Ulcombe, Kent, with Lt Willi Fronhöfer of
9./JG26 having been taken POW. (Colour by RJM)
■ If Luftwaffe pilots did have the misfortune to come down in the English
Channel during 1940, a relatively efficient air-sea rescue service existed
to go to their aid. Here, an exhausted Luftwaffe pilot is hauled to safety on
board a Heinkel 59 seaplane.
46 ❙ IRON CROSS
route. If not, the escorting fighters would be short of fuel
and have to abandon the bombers or risk coming down in
the Channel.
“Experience showed that a pilot who got into difficulty
over the Channel had more chance of surviving if he
ditched his aircraft than if he came down by parachute. It
took 40 – 60 seconds for the aircraft to sink. Time enough
to get out. And our air-sea rescue services were good. Also,
thanks to the initiative of General Udet, we had rescue
buoys anchored in the Channel in the hope that pilots
who got in trouble could swim to them. Inside there was
bedding, food, first aid kits, books and games and a radio
transmitter. The idea of this means of rescue was good,
but I never heard of a single instance of one of them ever
being used by a downed pilot. Also, the British sank them
whenever they found them.
A FEEBLE PRETENCE
“As the battle wore on, the idea of fighter-bombers
was implemented. One Staffel of each Gruppe, or one
Gruppe of each Geschwader, were equipped with a 250kg
bomb rack in conjunction with bomb release gear in the
cockpit. These new bits of equipment were manufactured
in a few weeks thanks to the exceptional efforts of the
aircraft industry, but there was no time to train the pilots
in bombing. Most pilots dropped their first bombs over
London when flying their newly converted fighters.
“These daytime fighter-bomber attacks took place after
the night raids by the bomber force had begun but was not
 ■ Above: The use of some
Messerschmitt 109-E Staffeln
on fighter-bomber units was
unpopular with the pilots.
The pilot’s performance in
this role was also met with
criticism by Göring. Here,
a 250kg bomb slung under
a Messerschmitt 109-E in
late 1940 bears the chalked
slogan: “Dear Tommy, best
regards from Hein – wishing it
finds its target”

■ Left: Rescue floats, or

‘Udet Buoys’, were moored
in strategic positions along
the English Channel. Painted
yellow, and bearing the Red ■ Conferences were regularly held between fighter leaders on the Channel
Cross symbol, the idea was coast during 1940. Here, Galland confers with another leading ace of the
that downed pilots could seek period, Werner Mölders. Werner’s brother, Viktor, was shot down on one of
refuge in them until rescued. the hated fighter-bomber (Jabo) operations in October 1940 and taken POW.

a continuation of the daylight bombing offensive. Rather,
just a feeble pretence of continuing it. But apart from their
nuisance value, they achieved little of military value. Also,
the pilots had no heart for missions of this type and their
morale was affected. Also, this type of operation made
it difficult for fighter pilots to preserve the aggressive
attitude that should characterise them.
“On top of all of this, Göring made a scathing protest
about the ineffectiveness of these operations. He objected
to the way the operations were being carried out and
added this to a list of what he felt were the fighter’s other
shortcomings, declaring profound bitterness that the
fighters had failed in their task of protecting the bombers.
Now, it couldn’t even do this job properly. The young
commanders of fighter units, convinced they had done
all they could, accepted severe losses without complaint
and now, having no idea where the air war was leading,
once again had grave accusations levelled at them. For the
first time, discussions at unit commander’s conferences
became heated and it was possible to detect the first signs
were greatly offended by both the tone and manifest
exaggeration of the accusations. Moreover, the way in
which the newspapers and radio handled the news of the
air war bore no relation to the severity of the struggle that
was taking place, or the grim reality the fighter units had
to face up to almost every day during the operations.
“Now, of course, attention was turning to Russia. It was
expected that Russia would fall quickly. Then, attention
could be turned once again on Britain in what would be
the real Battle of Britain which we were told would make
the campaign of 1940 appear as only a rehearsal.
What actually happened, however, was quite different…”
THE BLAME GAME
Without doubt, the reasons for the Luftwaffe’s failure
to absolutely wrest air superiority from the RAF were
legion – not least of all the constant change in tactics and
objectives.
On the other hand, when interviewed by the author in
▲

of criticism of those in authority. The unit commanders 1977, Galland was emphatic when asked what he thought

IRON CROSS ❙ 47
WAR IN THE AIR: JAGDFLIEGER ÜBER ENGLAND

■ Right: Uffz Paul

Lege of 5./JG27 was
one of the fighter
pilots exhausted
by the pace of
operations in 1940.
He regularly flew
three sorties per
day as his log-book
shows. He was shot
down and killed on
7 October 1940, his
third operation that
day. It was also his
■ Uffz Paul Lege poses by his Messerschmitt 109 with 82nd war flight and
his groundcrew personnel a few days before he failed to his 48th over the
return from a flight over England. Channel.

the major reason to have been for failure in 1940 to secure
the subjugation of the RAF: “Fighters” he said without
hesitation, echoing what he had written during the 1950s.
“We should have had more fighters. If we’d flooded
the defending fighters with more of ours – overwhelmed
them – then it might have been different. The Luftwaffe
had suffered in its formative years with a lack of
investment in the fighter arm – or even lack of insight
into its value. I can only reiterate that Germany could not
have lost the war if we’d had more fighters. In fact, in 1940
German fighter production was outstripped by bombers
(Editor: 2,776 fighters against 3,239 bombers). We needed
more fighters. But then, we also would have needed pilots
to fly them. As the RAF already knew, it wasn’t any good
having new aircraft if there were no new pilots.”
For the Luftwaffe, the Battle of Britain had seen a
campaign which clearly demonstrated both its capabilities
and its limitations. In 1940, total air war was only a
theoretical concept and the Luftwaffe lacked both quality
and quantity to achieve the desired outcome because
Göring failed to understand that the Luftwaffe needed to
have been used in a clear and decisive way in the Battle of
Britain. However, it had neither the size, technical capacity
nor means at its disposal to fulfil this mission.
Responsibility for failure rested with Göring, although
he chose to blame his air force for letting him down.
Unfairly, he attributed much of that blame to the fighter
arm.

■ Post-war, Adolf Galland was in demand for

■ Major Helmut Wick, the Kommodore of JG2,
was another of the Luftwaffe’s ‘Oberkannone’
of 1940 but he did not survive the air war over
the Channel, being shot down and killed on 28
November.
seminars, lectures, documentaries and signing
artwork and books. Here, he poses with his
friend, the British ‘ace’ Wing Commander Robert
Stanford Tuck DSO DFC, alongside the RAF
Museum’s preserved Messerschmitt 109-E.
■ Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring who,
unfairly, was highly critical of his fighter
pilot’s performance during 1940. However,
responsibility for failure rested with him.

48 ❙ IRON CROSS
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 NEW BOOKS AND PRODUCTS

BOOK REVIEWS
attack aircraft. In several
years of further research, the
author has accumulated new
information and photographs
relating to the operational
use and development of the
Hs 129 - not only in German,
but also in Romanian service.
And it is refreshing to see a
quality work like this one, a
book covering a type rather
less well-known than the
more familiar ‘mainstream’
Luftwaffe aircraft of the
period.
It is reported that a
supplemented by a total of 13
wonderfully executed colour
profiles. With such a level
of highly detailed content,
this is a book which will
have appeal to those who
study Luftwaffe aircraft of
the period as well as being a
publication which will be of
great value to modellers.
Production values are to
an equally high standard
and the photographs and
artwork are crisp and the
colours beautifully vivid.
Furthermore, and without
always stand as absolutely
the definitive work on this
striking and important
aircraft of the Second World
War. This is a truly fantastic
and authoratative book
which can only be most higly
recommended.
The editorial team had no
hesitation in nominating this
remarkable publication as
Editor’s Choice for this issue.
Reviewed by Robin Schäfer
Illustrations: ✔.
References/Notes: ✔.
Appendices: ✔.

EDITOR’S CHOICE
HENSCHEL Hs 129
PANZERJÄGER
By Martin Pegg
Publisher: www.
chandospublications.co.uk
ISBN: 978-1-99931-650-1
Hardback: 296 pages
RRP: £60
Only rarely does a book
come along for review
which can be described in
superlatives only. One such
book is the second edition
of Martin Pegg’s ‘Henschel
Hs 129 Panzerjager’, recently
re-published by Chandos
Publications.
I can say that Pegg’s book
is, without doubt, one of
the finest of its kind and
certainly the best ever
written on this particular
type of aircraft. It is a fully
updated and revised edition
of Martin Pegg’s classic
1997 study of one of the
Luftwaffe’s primary ground-
Henschel factory manager any doubt, this volume will Index: ✔.
once described the Hs
129 as being “Ten years
ahead of its time” and this
certainly becomes more than
abundantly clear in Pegg’s
work when he describes the
aircraft's operational use
in Africa and Russia and its
continuous development
- not only of the machine
itself but also its associated
weaponry, both experimental
and operational. With
numerous pilot accounts,
information on examples
captured and in Allied
hands, a stunning section on
camouflage and markings
featuring superb quality
digital artwork by Janusz
Swiatlon, Martin Pegg’s
book has all the qualities
which one so often misses
in rather less ‘intense’ and
shorter publications of this
kind. In his astounding
work, Pegg has included
300 photographs along with
maps, technical drawings
and appendices which are

50 ❙ IRON CROSS

HITLER’S LAST
WITNESS
The Memoirs
of Hitler’s
Bodyguard
By Rochus Misch
Publisher:
www.frontline-books.com
ISBN: 978-1-47389-902-5
Paperback: 254 pages
RRP: £14.99
With enduring interest
regarding the fate of Adolf
Hitler and the last days of
the Third Reich, the release
of a paperback edition of
Rochus Misch’s biography
was well timed. In this work,
Misch provides a detailed and
convincing account of Hitler’s
last moments - the main
selling point of this book.
Misch was selected for the
Führerbegleitkommando
(Hitler’s personal bodyguard)
in May 1940, remaining by
the Führer’s side until the
end of April 1945. This saw
him on duty at the Berghof,
the Wolfsschanze and
the Wehrwolf, on board
Hitler’s personal train, the
Führersonderzug, and of
course in the Berlin bunker.
In August 1940, he received
a document signed by the
Führer, which read:
‘Herr Rochus Misch is a
member of my personal
bodyguard. I request all
military, political and civilian
authorities to provide him
with all possible assistance
in the execution of his
duties. Misch is authorised
to pass through all barriers
and has access to the Führer
apartments.’
Misch was, therefore, in
a privileged position, able
to watch the momentous
decisions Hitler made at first
hand.
Misch’s account of his
time as Hitler’s bodyguard
provides insight into the daily
life of the Führer and his
entourage, only rarely passing
judgement on any of those
around Hitler; he simply
explains his duties and that of
the man he swore to protect
with his life.
Misch was able to see
and hear many of the
conversations Hitler had
with his generals, particularly
noting the deepening
mood as the war on the
Eastern Front turned against
Germany. When Hitler
moved into the Führerbunker
in Berlin for the last time,
Misch was placed on the
switchboard, handling
communications from the
bunker. He provides an
incontrovertible account of
Hitler’s suicide and details
Goebbels’ last words before
his own suicide. ‘We knew
how to live,’ Goebbels said
‘and now we have to know
how to die. I do not need you
any longer, Misch. Clear up
here.’ With that, Goebbels
shook Misch’s hand and
withdrew into his room.
Hitler’s Last Witness stands
as a detailed account of daily
life with Hitler, but must be
read with an eye to Misch's
later attitude towards the
Nazi party and its crimes .
Reviewed by Robert Mitchell
Illustrations: ✔.
References/Notes: ✘.
Appendices: ✔.
Index ✔.
UNTERNEHMEN ILSE
By Douglas E Nash & Remy Spezzano
Publisher: RZM Publishing • Web: www.rzm.com
ISBN: 978-0-97483-899-1 • Hardback: 328 pages • RRP: £130
This is not a book for the
fainthearted – both in
terms of the nature of
some of the content and in
respect of the hefty price
tag. But then, it is a hefty
book!
Despite all of that, this is
an utterly fascinating study
of the 5.SS-Panzer Division,
“Wiking”, in Poland during
the battles around Kovel
on 27 April 1944. As such,
it is surely a unique photo
coverage of the battles
(across the period of just
one single day) to break
through the Russian
encirclement of the city
and to relieve the trapped
German garrison.
During those fierce
engagements, three official
photographers recorded
all that they observed.
Collectively, the pictures
present an intimate and
dynamic visual chronicle
of this military operation,
the images not having been
published elsewhere before
now.
In putting the book
together, Nash and
Spezzano have produced
a fascinating and fast
paced narrative of events
that day, all of it brought
to life through the vivid
and utterly compelling
photographs, taking the
reader through the action
almost as if they were
there.
At first glance, and
owing to its 'look', style and
format, one is drawn to
the conclusion that this is
perhaps a very expensive
coffee table book. But it is
very much more than that.
And that becomes apparent
immediately on turning the
first page.
As a historical record
detailing just one event
of the Second World War,
this volume is invaluable
as a research and study
tool. As a book which will
appeal to those with an
interest in the subject, it
is an absolute must. Its
stunning imagery is simply
remarkable.
It is expensive, but the
reviewer thinks it worth the
outlay. It would also make
an ideal Christmas gift for
an enthusiast.
Reviewed by Robert Barnes
Illustrations: ✔.
Reference Notes: ✔.
Appendices: ✔.
▲
Index: ✘.
IRON CROSS ❙ 51
PANTHER TANK
Enthusiasts’ Manual
Mark Healy
Publisher: Haynes Publishing
Web: www.haynes.com
ISBN: 978-1-78521-214-7
Hardback: 172 pages
RRP: £25.00
Ever popular, the
Haynes Manuals
series continues
to provide the
military history
enthusiast
with a wealth
of valuable
bookshelf material. And this
latest offering, on the SdKfz 171
‘Panther’, is another little gem to
add to the collection.
What is so nice about these
Haynes publications is the mass
of fascinating information, data,
photographs and drawings which
are all presented in a manner
which appeals widely across
the board – whether the reader
is a tank enthusiast, modeller,
historian or researcher. Here, in
the standard and very readable
style of Haynes, is a valuable
reference work which not only
tells the story of the development
and use of the Panther but also
provides us with an in depth ‘up
close and personal’ series of highly
detailed photographs of a restored
example and showing the reader
almost every nook and cranny. This
includes engine, tracks, interior,
guns, ammunition, hull etc. For
modellers, this is especially useful.
And after reading this book, one
realises how little about the
Panther one actually knew.
Of course, all the Panther’s
leading specifications, particulars
and comparisons can be found in
a book which gives as rounded a
picture of the tank as one could
ever hope for.
As ever, Haynes have excelled
themselves with this further
addition to their wide range
of volumes examining military
machinery and equipment. Always
presenting their subject matter in
a readable and absorbing manner,
this volume is no exception to
Haynes' attention to detail.
Truly, this is a very nice
production and it now fills a gap
on the shelves in the Iron Cross
editorial office!
Reviewed by Andy Saunders
52 ❙ IRON CROSS
ATLAS OF THE
BLITZKRIEG
1939 – 41
Robert Kirchhubel
Publisher: Osprey
Web: www.ospreypublishing.com
ISBN: 978-1-47283-499-7
Hardback: 217 pages
RRP: £45.00
The study of
military history,
and especially
of battles and
campaigns, can
be regarded as
dependent on
the availability of
intelligible maps to help understand
and interpret such events, or to
simply put them into context. And
it seems all too often the case that
military history books fail miserably
on the inclusion of maps – either
at all, or else in an unsatisfactory
and perfunctory manner. And that
is why this book is so useful and
refreshing.
Whilst the content is limited
in its scope to just the Blitzkreig
period, it is certainly an extremely
handy reference tool for anyone
reading about or studying that era
of military history. Put simply, this
is a handy reference compendium
to reach for, say, when reading
about Eben Emael, or Narvik or
maybe Dunkirk. Here, through
clear and concise maps – using
easily understood symbols –
one can find the position as it
existed at particular moments
in time. Dispositions, units and
movements are charted beautifully
in wonderful cartography.
The broad section headings
in the book are: Pre-War Europe,
Poland, Soviet Aggression,
Scandinavia, Western Campaign,
Air War over Britain and Germany,
Naval Warfare and The Balkans.
Each section is then broken down
into a series of maps which all
follow the same style, key etc.
To say that this is a useful book
is not really doing it justice. In fact,
several times during the period it
sat on the reviewer’s desk it was
reached for to check some detail
or another; to find where a unit
was, where a town was in relation
to another and to check on the
attack route on one specific day.
Highly recommended – and a
rather nice gift idea, too!
Reviewed by James Hegarty
DUEL UNDER THE
STARS
The Memoir of a
Luftwaffe Night Fighter
Pilot in WW2
Wilhelm Johnen
Publisher: Greenhill Books
Web: www.greenhillbooks.com
ISBN: 978-1-78438-258-2
Hardback: 320 pages
RRP: £19.99
This is a totally
absorbing account
written by one of
the Luftwaffe’s
high-scoring night
fighter aces on his
experiences during
the air war over
the Reich between 1941 and 1944.
Having enlisted in 1939 at the
age of 19, Johnen traces his career
from training through to the last
days of the war in 1945 with a
candour and honesty as to his
thoughts and feelings as he flew,
night after night, defending his
homeland. What comes across more
than anything else is his desire
to fly, and the close comradeship
engendered by the extremes of
fear and danger which he and his
colleagues endure. What we do
not get any glimpse of, however, is
any sense of his political leanings
and whether or not Johnen was
a man who blindly or slavishly
followed Nazi ideology. Instead,
we see a man who is driven to
defend his kith, kin and homeland
with a fervent patriotic duty. It is,
perhaps, as well that Johnen avoids
‘the elephant in the room’ in a very
readable biographical account of his
night fighting days.
As a personal account of what
it was to be night fighting in the
dangerous skies over Germany, this
is a valuable addition to our sum of
knowledge of Luftwaffe operations
in defence of the Reich. As such, it
is a rare account of the experiences
of a leading night fighter ace who
went on to achieve 34 victories and
be awarded the Knight’s Cross. Many
of his contemporaries, of course,
did not survive. And those who did,
mostly didn’t feel much inclined to
write of their experiences.
This is a nice little book, and
although the quality and selection
of the photographs is a tad
disappointing this doesn’t spoil what
is an exceptionally good read.
Reviewed by David J Hitchings
THE GERMAN ARMY
GUERRILLA WARFARE
POCKET MANUAL
1939 – 45
Charles D Melson
Publisher: Casemate UK
Web: www.casematepublishers.co.uk
ISBN: 978-1-61200-797-7
Hardback: 160 pages
RRP: £8.99
.Recommended.
Presented avoiding
any political biases,
this ‘re-discovered’
manual is presented
in English as
a publication
examining a purely
military problem as
viewed by professionals, and with
annotations by Charles D Melson,
former Chief Historian for the US
Marine Corps.
How small wars should be fought
by a modern industrialised nation
is set out in this intriguing little
volume through the experiences of
a power which once encountered
the problems posed by such
conflict. This pocket manual
examines the German analysis of
the problem, covering experiences
from the Napoleonic era through
to the Third Reich and based
upon the historical analysis,
Kleinkrieg, presented to the
German High Command by Arthur
Erhardt in 1935 and, later, in the
Bandenbekampfung document
provided to the OKW in 1944 - the
latter dealing with the aspect of
fighting guerrilla bands. In both,
conditions that were specific to
broader military operations were
separated from circumstances in
campaigns of occupation and the
new background in the German
experience of supressing rebellion.
Whilst not exactly a highly
readable book, per se, it is an
extremely valuable contribution
to a wider understanding of this
aspect of the German military
experience during the Second World
War and provides a useful insight
into German thinking in respect of
this area of combat.
As such, it is a useful reference
work for those studying this area
of German military operations in
the field and a highly accessible
introduction and overview of a
frequently neglected aspect of
German military history.
Reviewed by Mark Ferridge

The Flammenwerfer
The Flammenwerfer was one of the more infamous weapons of the First World War.
Christoph Höpfer examines its development and its use by the Garde-Pionier- Regiment.
■ A Kleif in action during a training
course in the summer of 1917.
(Brett Butterworth, colour by RJM)
he father and inventor of
the modern flamethrower
is Richard Fiedler, who
patented a device for
delivering large quantities of flame
(“Verfahren zur Erzeugung grosser
Flammenmassen”) on 25 April 1901.
In the same year, he offered the
patent to the OHL, the Oberste
Heeresleitung, which in turn
granted him sufficient financial
support to develop his idea further
and he presented his inventions to
the Prussian engineering
committee at the Garde-Pionier-
Bataillon in Berlin in 1905. His
projectors were man-portable
All period images: Brett Butterworth Collection.
devices, comprising a horizontally
divided and vertical cylinder 1.2
meters long. On depressing a lever,
pressurized gas in the lower section
of the cylinder forced flammable oil
into in the upper section in a
rubber tube and distributed it over
an ignition wick in a steel nozzle.
The weapon would then project a
lance of flame and enormous black
54 ❙ IRON CROSS
NOTES FROM THE ARMOURY
clouds of smoke to a range of about 20
metres. Field trials were successfully
conducted by the Pionier-
Versuchskompanie, and in 1909 two
models, a small backpack version
known as the ‘Kleif’ (kleiner
Flammenwerfer, kF) and a larger
device, the grosser Flammenwerfer or
‘Grof’ (gF), were demonstrated to the
Prussian War Ministry.
The liquid container of the ‘Grof’
held 100 litres of oil, pressurized to
215 psi by liquid nitrogen. This was
sufficient to project burning oil to a
distance of 45 metres for an effective
duration of 45 seconds. The hot and
toxic gas was found to be effective
(depending on the wind) to a range of
100 metres. The heavy and immobile
weapon had to be operated by at least
three men, and only in static defence.
The ‘Kleif’ in its first version (M.1912)
could be carried by one man and with
a 10 litre tank could project a stream of
flame up to 20 metres for 15 seconds. It
had no waist belt, so could be dropped
quickly if the weapon ignited itself or
was ignited by enemy fire. While
carried by one man, it was handled
by at least two. The carrier operated
the valve, while a man in front
took aim with the steel tube. The
model was further developed and
refined in the following years as the
M.1914, M.1915, M.1916 and M.1917
respectively.
The weapons passed their test
with flying colours and were
judged superior to other pioneer
incendiary weapons previously
used. In 1912, the Kleif became
part of the arsenal of pioneer
siege trains and these weapons
would be used during the initial
stages of the First World War. At
about the same time Fiedler first
presented his invention to the
army, another party was working
on similar idea. The commander
of a Landwehr-Pionier-Kompanie,
and head of the Posen fire brigade,
Bernhard Reddemann, had begun
to experiment with different
compositions of flame oils at about

■ On 22 February 1916, the second wave of soldiers of RIR37 advance towards the Fôret de
Haumont. A Kleif operator group can be seen in the foreground, traversing the fence.
■ A Doppelgrof and two portable Kleif M.1915s. The
cumbersome Dopelgrof was a large capacity flamethrower
that could have multiple additional propellant and fuel
containers added to increase range and usage time.

the same time Fiedler presented his
first devices. He came up with the plan
to convert steam and hand pumps used
by fire brigades into flame throwers.
DRAGON BREATH
The first ever recorded use of a
Flammenwerfer took place on 5
October 1914 at Bagatelle-Pavillon,
Argonne. It was conducted by the 4th
company of Pionier-Bataillon Nr. 29
(PB 29), attached to 27. Division and
resulted in failure. The device wasn’t
popular with the men and there
were no tactics tailored to their use.
The second company of PB 29 was
under command of none other than
Hauptmann Bernhard Reddemann
himself who, motivated by his
evaluations of the experiences gathered
in the attack, travelled to Berlin on 10
October to lobby for the creation of a
specialised flamethrower formation.
In the meantime, the Flammenwerfer
was more or less fully withdrawn from
service when, on 16 October 1914, all
flamethrowers and other specialised
pioneer weaponry was put at the
disposal of the respective Army Corps.
According to the OHL, the weapon
was inadequate for use at the front,
any understanding of its capabilities.
Reddemann, who had a powerful
patron in the form of Crown Prince
Wilhelm (commander of 5. Armee)
now approached the OHL directly. On
18 January 1915, the Kriegsministerium
ordered the formal establishment of
Flammenwerfer-Abteilung Reddemann,
the first unit to be exclusively armed
with flamethrowers. It would not
only use the weapon in action, but
would be responsible for formulating
tactical guidelines and development
of the technology. The 48 men of the
detachment were mostly former fire-
fighters, hand-picked men who were
used to being close to the destructive
powers of fire. Assigned to 5. Armee,
the detachment was subordinated to
VI Reserve Corps. On 26 February 1915,
at Romagne sous Montfaucon near
Verdun, the Flammenwerfer-Abteilung
fought its first action.
Reddemann’s target was a French
held section of trench, about 700
metres wide, in an area where the
forward saps of both sides were only 12
to 30 metres away from one another.
Fully focussed on exploring the tactical
capabilities of the Flammenwerfer,
Reddemann chose not to use the
Fiedler designed Kleif as their limited
them useless. He decided to make use
of two Grofs (grosse Flammenwerfer)
and in addition fielded 10 modified
hydrophores made by the fire-fighting
equipment manufacturer, Ewald of
Kuestrin. These hand pump cylinders
were small and could easily and quickly
be refilled. With a distance of 50
metres between each flamethrower,
Reddemann positioned the 10 hand
pump projectors and two Grofs
opposite the enemy trenches. Three
men operated the small projectors,
one holding the hand pump, another
holding the rubber hose and a third
operating the valve and hand pump.
The effect was enormous, and
Reddemann later described it thus:
“On behalf of the engineering
committee, ten portable hand pump
fire hoses of special design had been
ordered. They were powerful and
suitable for trench warfare, allowing
them to be manhandled through the
constrictions of a trench. For each hose,
there was a narrow iron cylinder feeding
it and which could, for the duration of
the firing process, be refilled with flame
oil by means of special pitchers. With
these hoses, one could throw, for any
desired amount of time, powerful jets
of flame to a range of 30 to 35 metres
▲

there being no doctrine for its use or effective duration seemed to make into the enemy trenches. When 12

IRON CROSS ❙ 55
NOTES FROM THE ARMOURY
loudly hissing jets of fire project right
behind the parapet of the enemy trench,
success is immediate. Loud screams
of pain come from the enemy side.
Whoever isn‘t caught by the flames,
jumps backwards out of the trench.”
In the general assault following
the flame attack, Reddemann’s men
joined the infantry attack, some with
borrowed rifles and some without any
weapon at all. The whole of the line
was taken and the success was total.
Importantly, though, were the lessons
learned from it. Enemy resistance
fully crumbled after only 15 seconds,
meaning the hand pump projectors
were redundant as the effective
fire duration of the gas-powered
Kleif would be sufficient. Another
important conclusion was that the
hot gas produced by the projectors,
in combination with immense smoke
cloud, caused even personnel in
trenches further to the rear, and not
subjected to the actual flames, to
retreat or surrender. Reddemann’s
conviction that the flamethrower was
best used to add to the shock effect of
an infantry assault had been proven.
After a second flamethrower attack
was conducted at Vauquois, the OHL
recognised the potential of the new
weapon. On 15 March, it ordered a
Flammenwerfer battalion be raised
under Reddemann’s command.
Raised in Berlin, it’s nucleus was
personnel of the Garde-Pionier-Ersatz-
Bataillon and designated III. Garde-
Pionier-Bataillon. It had a strength
of 800 men drawn from different
Pionier formations, fire brigades and
other service branches. Most were
volunteers and, as in all Guard units,
men were recruited from all over the
Germany. On 15 May 1915, the new
formation assembled at Douai and
would remain under control of the
OHL while Reddemann was under
orders to present regular written
and oral reports to General Gerhard
Tappen and the Operationsabteilung
(operational detachment) of the OHL
- a fact underlining the importance
given to the Flammenwerfer-Truppe.
At about the same time, some divisions
on the Western Front begun to create
56 ❙ IRON CROSS
and deploy Sturmtrupps. Created
ad-hoc, these formations - meant to
overcome and roll-up enemy strong
points - usually comprised a number of
heavily armed regular infantry groups
and one pioneer group which was often
allocated a Kleif flame projector.
On 22 May 1915, III. Garde-Pionier-
Bataillon saw its baptism of fire west of
Douai. This time, the attack was carried
■ British humour directed at the
Flammenwerfer with a spoof advert in the
‘Wipers Times’ of 20 March 1916.
forward over a wide stretch of open
fields and although it achieved its goals,
it ended with many German casualties.
New tactical methods needed to be
developed for such an attack and
subsequently Reddemann set these
down on paper.
The Flame-Pioneers were equipped
with additional machine guns and
portable mine throwers which would
be used in the centre of an attack, while
on both flanks Kleif-equipped flame
squads would slowly work their way
forward in a wide arc using all available
cover. Meticulous care would be taken
to not bring flamethrowers into action
too quickly. When the flame squads
reached effective range they were to
fire a so called “Deckungsstrahl” (lit:
covering jet) diagonally onto the target.
While the enemy in the trench were
temporarily blinded and confused,
flame squads of the central attack
group would advance quickly, covered
by machine gun fire, before initiating
flame combat. This method of attack
relied on perfect timing and required
much training but would prove to
be highly successful - even at target
distances up to 1,000 metres. Up until
October, the basic tactical and strategic
principles of Flammenwerfer operation
had been defined but their use would
henceforth be purely offensive and
any defensive use and permanent
■ Left: French
postcard depicting
a captured Kleif
M.1916. The 5ft hose
was sheathed in fabric
and wire-wrapped in
steel wire to prevent
kinking and the 3ft
6in lance made the
flamethrower easier
to use in the trenches.
■ This photograph,
taken late in the war,
shows the clouds of
dense black smoke
created by the
Flammenwerfer.
installations of flame projectors in
trenches was prohibited.
The tactical disposition of the
flamethrowers was to be the
responsibility of the commander of
the attacking infantry unit, while the
leader of the flamethrower formation
would be responsible for technical and
tactical leadership. After a series of
successful attacks, including the first
use of flamethrowers against British
troops at Hooge in July 1915, more and
more infantry commanders demanded
support from Flammenwerfertruppen
and Reddemann’s formation grew
further to a usual strength of eight
companies. Each company received
12 (later 20) grosse Flammenwerfer
of the the Fiedler design. In addition,
they were equipped with 18 Kleifs
to add a mobile offensive element
to carry attacks forward. The unit
also possessed its own development
workshop in which teething problems
with the first Flammenwerfer models
were rooted out. In October 1915, the
Flamm-Pioniere joined with another
elite unit when a flamethrower
troop was permanently attached to
Sturmabteilung Rohr and remained
part of it throughout the war. While
serving with Rohr, the Garde-Pioniere
retained their uniforms, but with an
additional number ‘5’ attached to their
shoulder straps.
VERDUN
The Battle of Verdun saw new
dimensions of Flammenwerfer
deployment. The attack plan of 5.
Armee set aside one company of
flamethrower pioneers to support
each attacking infantry division. In
addition to this, a major operation was
planned for he forest of Consenvoye
with two additional companies. At
the same time, another flamethrower
company was requested for operations
in Champagne. The company strengths
were raised to 200 men, every man
being hand-picked. In addition, the
number of Kleifs was raised from 18
to 54 per company. For this, 150 new
flamethrowers were ordered and, to
speed up proceedings, Reddemann
sent 12 of his battalion technicians
to Germany to oversee things and to
control production quality.
Technicalities aside, Reddemann’s
most important duty was formulating
how the Flammenwerfer would be
deployed operationally. Assuming
an attack carried forward in a
closed line of infantry against well
entrenched field fortifications would
have little chance of success, AOK
5 decided to follow Reddemann‘s
proposal which foresaw a mixed
troop of Flammenwerfer-Pioniere
and regular infantry armed with rifles,
handgrenades and one light machine
gun advancing ahead of the regular
Sturmkompanie (assault companies).
These “Stosstrupps” comprised 16 to
20 men, each armed with a G98 rifle
and three hand grenades, one pioneer
group equipped with sharpened
spades, axes, saws, pick axes, wire
cutters and explosive charges and one
Kleif squad with two flamethrowers
and hand and incendiary grenades.
These shock formations were to crush
the strongest nests of resistance
and roll up enemy positions from
the flanks while the infantry attack,
following behind, would hit a hammer-
like frontal blow.
On 20 April, the Garde-Reserve-
Pionier Regiment was created,
comprising two battalions with four
companies each, two individual
companies, an experimental company,
a recruit depot, staff and a workshop.
Each company had a nominal strength
of 200 men, subdivided into three
Flammenwerfer-Züge (flamethrower
platoons) each of which consisted
of five Flammenwerfer-Abteilungen
(flamethrower detachments) of two
Kleif-Trupps (Kleif squads) each.
In addition, there was an infantry
detachment. Each flame platoon had
access to up to eight Grofs and 54
Kleifs. By now, flame pioneers found
themselves in a teaching role, being
▲
responsible for the training on the
IRON CROSS ❙ 57
NOTES FROM THE ARMOURY
Flammenwerfer-Züge, part of the
newly raised Sturmbataillone which
began to be raised at about this time.
Flamethrowers were also used during
the Battle of the Somme, at Mouquet-
Ferme, Thiepval, Delville and High
Wood and it was there when, for the
first time, they were successfully
deployed in a defensive role.
TOTENKOPF-PIONIERE
In a Royal Order of 28 July 1916,
Wilhelm, Crown Prince of Prussia,
decreed that:
“His Majesty the Kaiser and King has,
at my recommendation, decreed that
the Guard Reserve Pioneer Regiment,
which has been developed under my
supervision, should wear during the
war on the left sleeve of its uniform
a insignia in the form of a death’s
head. In recognition of its outstanding
achievements I wish to congratulate
the flame projector regiment on the
award of this insignia. Always placed in
action in the most difficult places, both
officers and men everywhere brought
their arm into play effectively and
quickly and became one of the most
fearful opponents for the French. I am
convinced that the insignia of the young
arm will always be an exhortation to
continue to develop in the spirit of
death-defying joy of combat.”
With the establishment of
the death’s head badge, the
Flammenwerfer Pioniere would soon
and inevitably become known by a
new name giving their grisly work on
58 ❙ IRON CROSS
Galicia to Russia. New tactics and
equipment were adopted to increase
speed and mobility. Noteworthy is the
attack of 3rd, 4th and 7th company
against the Toboly bridgehead on the
western bank of the Stochod in Russia.
Ten Flammenwerfer-Stosstrupps, with
64 Kleifs, spearheaded the assault
on a front 4 km wide, penetrated the
Russian lines and advanced nearly 3
km further. Over 10,000 POW were
taken and over 9,000 Russian soldiers
killed. Another successful attack,
commanded by Leutnant Hornung
of 11th company on 15 April 1917, was
launched from the Hindenburg Line
and succeeded in capturing the villages
of Demicourt and Douveries, while
bringing in many prisoners.
In May 1917, a new Flammenwerfer
(the so-called Wechselapparat, or
exchange apparatus, shortened to
■ Pionier Conrad
“Wex”) was fielded. This doughnut-
Muller, 10 Kompanie shaped flamethrower consisted of an
Garde-Reserve- outer cylinder ring filled with flame oil,
Pionier-Regiment in surrounded by a nitrogen filled central
September 1917 with
container. Its ignition was constantly
his Totenkopf badge
visible on his sleeve. on, could be operated by one man and
■ Left: Totenkopf
was lighter than the Kleif and about 2.5
sleeve badge, awarded kilos lighter than the standard load-out
to Flammenwerfer of an attacking infantryman. For the
Pioniere in 1916. first time, a Flammenwerfer operator
could keep up with the assault speed
of the infantry. The Wex was the first
the battlefield a new resonance: the truly modern flame projector, and a
Totenkopf-Pioniere, or Death’s Head highly prized trophy during the war.
Pioneers. Captured examples were sometimes
In 1917, Totenkopf Pioniere saw pressed into Allied service. The
action on several fronts, from the British Flamethrower, Portable, No 2
Western Front to the Tyrol and from (nicknamed Lifebuoy from the shape
of its fuel tank) introduced in 1943 was
a near 1:1 copy of the First World War
Wechselapparat.
Throughout the war, Totenkopf-
■ The Wex- Pioniere launched 653 flame attacks of
Wechselapperat which 535 were successful. Taking into
M.17. account that the men with a death’s
head on their sleeves were usually
only employed on operations in which
regular units had already failed and
were regarded as hopeless causes,
the 82% success rate becomes even
more impressive. Equally, the casualty
rate was relatively ‘low’, with only 19%
of Totenkopf-Pioniere men killed in
action.
 MYTH BUSTERS

The ‘Heinkel 113’ Fighter

We take a look at the extraordinary story of the Heinkel 113 and the Battle of Britain.

A
mistake frequently made
by RAF pilots and aircrew
in 1940 was to identify the
Messerschmitt 109 as a
Heinkel 113. The latter aircraft did not
technically exist but was, in reality,
the He 100 D-1. The type was built in
very small numbers, mostly pre-
production models, and the aircraft
never went into full-scale production
or front-line Luftwaffe service.
Although it was comparable in many
respects to the Messerschmitt 109, the
He 100 had rather ‘missed the boat’
since Messerschmitt 109 production
was already fully underway. As a
result, no more than 20 He 100s were
built. Nevertheless, these few aircraft
would serve the German Propaganda
Ministry well and the existing He
100s were given the pseudonym ‘He
113’. German propaganda in 1940
showed the few aircraft that had been
built, grouped together, and with
■ This photograph, produced by the German Propaganda Company, (PK), depicts ‘He 113’ fighters
differing and spurious unit markings allegedly at a dispersal point on their airfield in northern France during 1940. This carefully staged
in different settings and billed as the picture was widely circulated and helped convince the RAF that they were facing a new enemy
Heinkel 113. The intention was that the aircraft type.
Allies would believe that a new type
was both in production and in service.
The ploy worked perfectly. part, the RAF airmen involved in these RAF Fighter Command, had written
The German Propaganda Ministry combats had actually been engaging of the type in his 1946 despatch to
boastfully described the type’s success Messerschmitt 109s. Unfortunately, the London Gazette on the Battle of
in the Norwegian campaign and there is also fairly convincing evidence Britain.
its use across Europe. This claim, pointing to Hurricanes sometimes In it, he said:
coupled with photographs seemingly being shot down in error by other “The Heinkel 113 fighter made its
showing the aircraft ‘on the front line’, RAF pilots who claimed their hapless appearance in limited numbers during
resulted in RAF Intelligence becoming victim to have been a ‘He 113’. Thus, the Battle. It was a single seater,
convinced that the Luftwaffe had an unintended consequence of the generally resembling the Me 109. Its
the type in service in France during German deception. main attributes were high performance
1940. Often, RAF Combat Reports of Only when the battle was over and and ceiling, so that it was generally
the period are filled with accounts of it became apparent that not a single used in the highest of the several layers
engagements with ‘He 113 fighters’ and He 113 had been found on the ground in which attacking formations were
some of these first engagements were - despite the numbers claimed as shot usually built up.”
claimed by Hurricanes of 56 Squadron down - did the RAF finally realise it The deception had gone right to
off Dover on 13 July 1940. In truth, had been duped. However, this was the very top of the RAF’s Fighter
none of these aircraft were ever in not before even Air Chief Marshal Sir Command. It had been the perfect
operational service and, for the most Hugh Dowding, the former C-in-C of ruse.

IRON CROSS ❙ 59

FELDPOST
The author of the Editor’s Choice letter may select a book of their choice (maximum value £25.00) from either Frontline Books or Pen & Sword Books from
the extensive range of titles available at www.pen-and-sword.co.uk.
Modelling
the Kister
Albatros
EDITOR’S As a long-time
CHOICE
modeller and
painter, I’d been looking for
a suitable First World War
project to compliment the
ever-growing array of high-
quality kits now available
on the market. Inspiration
came by way of the Josef
Kister diary published in Iron
Cross and the remarkable
detective work to determine
the colours of Jasta 1 aircraft.
Seeing the photographs in all
their glory prompted me to
The ‘Greif’ Badge of Kampfgeschwader 55
I read with interest your
feature on the griffon emblem
of KG55.
Most references, including
artwork representations,
show the shield behind the
griffon as white just as your
artist represented it. However,
research has proven the shield
was actually painted gold. That
said, the usual presentation
of the shield as white is an
understandable mistake for
several reasons.
First, the emblem of the
town of Giessen (on which the
badge was based) has a white
shield. Second, monochrome
images reflect light in a way
that the shield appears white.
60 ❙ IRON CROSS
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
Send your letters to:
Post: ‘Iron Cross’ Magazine, PO Box 4984,
Windsor, Berkshire SL4 9FN
Email: andy.saunders@warnersgroup.com
Our Editor’s Choice letter is sponsored by Frontline Books – www.frontline-books.com
track down a suitable kit with
which I could replicate those
colours.
My first choice was the
stunning Wingnut Wings
Albatros (1/32 scale) but it had
long sold out. Second choice
was the 1/48 scale Albatros by
the Czech company, Eduard
Models. That too was out of
production, but I managed to
track one down via eBay.
I admit that the project
tested my resolve on many
occasions - from hand-painting
the fuselage to replacing the
supplied lozenge pattern
decals with more accurate ones
from the excellent Aviattic
range. I also had to call on
fellow modeler, Dave Crosby,
light is not so highly reflected.
It is also described as gold in
RAF Air Intelligence reports.
Also, a rare colour photograph
of the emblem clearly shows
it as gold. However, looking
at late war images, the shield
may have then been white –
perhaps because gold paint
became harder to source? So,
white could
be correct
for the late
war period.
I would add
that the wings
are described
However, evidence for as blue by RAF
it being gold is shown in intelligence –
period images where the again, conflicting
to cut me a set of scaled masks
with his Silhouette Cameo 3
cutter for the number ‘6’ on the
fuselage sides.
The two figures depicting
pilot and mechanic were
sourced from America. They
pay homage to Josef Kister and
his mechanic as depicted in
one of your photographs.
The photos attached
hopefully speak for
themselves. Thank you for
allowing me this opportunity
to share my efforts with your
readers.
David Ulke (By email)
Editor: This truly is a stunning
model and far too good not
to share with our readership.
with the Giessen emblem.
Additionally, a KG55 stick pin
has the wings in black, albeit
that the ground is gold.
Adding further confusion,
reports state the fishes of the
8th Staffel badge were blue.
That said, the surviving 8./
KG55 emblem in your article
clearly shows they were yellow
in 1941.
Interpreting colours from
period images can be tricky.
There were clearly wide
variations and your analysis of
the First World War Albatros
colours was fascinating.
Thank you for an excellent
magazine.
Clint Mitchell, Kent (By email)

A German
Family at
War
By chance, I came across
the second issue of Iron
Cross Magazine and read it
with great interest. I greatly
enjoyed all the features, but
especially that on German
fighter pilot Otto Kissenberth.
In October 1916 he took part
in the air battle over Colmar
and Freiburg. I was interested
in this feature particularly
because the attacking British
and French aircraft were
targeting the Mauser factory
there. Both my grandmother
and great grandmother
Transatlantic Flight by ‘Alles Kaputt’
I was fascinated by your
feature ‘Broken Eagles’ in Iron
Cross magazine. I picked the
magazine up at Heathrow and
read it on my transatlantic
flight.
The feature reminded me of
a photograph passed to my late
originate from the area and
I‘ve been researching this
air raid for many years. The
attack can be regarded as the
first strategic bombing raid in
history.
There is a great deal of
interest in German military
history in my family and
together with my father I
have been travelling to the
battlefields of the First World
War and to German and
French fortifications of both
World Wars nearly all my life.
During the First World War,
one of my great-grandfathers
fought as a soldier in IR125
and took part in the capture
of Messines in 1914. Later, he
fought in the Battle of Verdun
when he was serving in IR126.
mother by her cousin, Edwin
D Maxfield, a USAAF captain
with Air Service Technical
Command who examined and
sometimes test flew captured
enemy machines.
In the case of this aircraft,
a Junkers 290, named by the
He survived the war, holding
the rank of Leutnant. We still
have many items belonging to
him along with photographs
relating to his war service.
Additionally, my grandfather
served as a Panzergrenadier
in the 12. SS-Panzerdivision
“Hitlerjugend” from late 1944
until the end of the Second
World War. He has also seen
your magazine and if you are
interested he has told me
that he would be willing to
be interviewed about his war
experiences.
As a family, we have a
great deal of material
from both World Wars
relating to family
members. We would
happily share these with
USAAF as ‘Alles Kaputt’, it
made a record-breaking flight
across the Atlantic in July 1945.
Captain Maxfield was one of
the crew members. Hence, it
was appropriate that I should
think about this when flying
over the Atlantic myself.
you and your readers if there is
any interest?
I wish you every success
with future editions of your
truly excellent magazine.
Best regards from Germany
Florian Wein (By email)
Editor’s Note: As a result of
Florian contacting us at Iron
Cross, we will be featuring
his grandfather’s experiences
when he was serving as a
Panzergrenadier. We will run
this in issue number four
which will be on sale from 25
March 2020.
The maritime patrol and
transport aircraft, one of only
65 built, was test flown in the
USA but scrapped in 1946.
It had originally served with
KG200 as A3 + HB, Werke
Nummer 110165.
Much later, an unexploded
German demolition device
was found hidden inside a
wing. Had it exploded mid-
Atlantic then the loss of ‘Alles
Kaputt’ would have remained
a mystery – especially as it
had transited the infamous
‘Bermuda Triangle’!
Thanks for a terrific read.
Alvin J Wade, Jr.,
Hartsville, South Carolina
(By email)
IRON CROSS ❙ 61
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 From the Editor
Welcome to Issue 3 of Iron
Cross – the UK’s only magazine
specialising in German military
history and spanning the period from 1914
– 1945. Each issue features unique content,
including articles from leading historians
together with previously unpublished photos.
The magazine covers land, sea and air
operations during both World Wars.
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 WESTERN FRONT 1914: CHRISTMAS TRUCE

‘Stille Nacht, Heilige Nacht’

Tales of spontaneous fraternisations between German and British soldiers during
December 1914 are well known. However, this wasn’t limited to sectors where ‘Fritz’
and ‘Tommy’ faced one another. Peter Verplancke and Robin Schäfer tell the
touching story of Belgian-German Christmas fraternisation on the Yser.

O
n 3 August 1914, Belgium
found itself in the middle
of a war which, after three
generations of neutrality,
most Belgians thought impossible.
Its army, though mobilised on 31 July,
stood mostly unprepared in the face of
the gigantic German military machine
opposing it. One day later, around the
time that General Otto von Emmich’s
Army of the Meuse forced its way into
Belgium around Liege, King Albert I of
All images (if not otherwise stated) courtesy of ‘Yser Tower Museum’ and ‘Beeldbank Westhoek Verbeeldt en Stadsarchief ’ Diksmuide.

Belgium announced Belgium’s entry

into war before Parliament. Having
decided not to violate Dutch neutrality,
the German Armies were forced to
take the forts of Liege quickly and by
16 August, using the latest state-of-
the-art heavy artillery, the Germans
succeeded. Yet, much to the surprise
of the invaders, progress was slower
than expected. The Belgian Army,
having been ordered to perform a
fighting retreat instead of letting itself
be annihilated, fell back on Antwerp.
In the south-east, British and French
troops fell back after battling German
forces at Mons and Charleroi while
Belgian troops launched a series
of sorties from Antwerp to harass
German communication and supply
lines.
In response, the III. Reserve-Korps
under General Hans von Beseler and
supporting divisions and brigades
began laying siege to Antwerp on 28
September, the city finally falling on
6 October 1914. In total, 26,000 men
■ German soldiers of the 80,000 strong garrison escaped
celebrate Christmas
by singing carols
to Holland, where they were interned.
around a tree, Meanwhile, 4,000 Belgian soldiers
December 1914. (RS) were taken POW although the main
body of the Belgian Army managed

64 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ The frozen Yser, winter 1914. (L. de Hooch)
to escape via pontoons across the
River Scheldt, retreating to western
Flanders and forming up for a final
stand along the banks of the river Yser.
What followed became known as the
Battle of the Yser, the northernmost
of battles during the so-called “Race
to the Sea”, battles which would define
the ultimate location of the Western
Front, the lines frozen in deadlock in
early September 1914.
For the depleted Belgian Field
■ A pair of sterographic images of Diksmuide, 1914.
Army, it began inauspiciously with
heavy fighting along the 30 km stretch
of the Yser between Nieuport and
Diksmuide. Nevertheless, the Belgians
prevailed. Using the low-lying region’s
ancient system of sluices and canals
to inundate the battlefield by opening
the floodgates at Nieuport, the German
advance was halted and ended the
battle on 2 November 1914. Along the
Yser, and elsewhere on the Western
Front, German and Allied armies dug
in. The men of the Belgian Army, now
only about 52,000 strong, were in a bad
shape and mostly cut off from loved
ones at home and lacking resources
and supplies. Germany now occupied
95% of Belgian territory, while in the
largest exodus of the Low Countries
1.5 million Belgians had fled. Yet by
securing victory at the Yser, stubborn
and hard-fighting Belgian soldiers
allowed their country to retain control
of a tiny portion of territory, which not
only turned King Albert into a national
hero but also sustained and bolstered
morale and national pride. Now, winter
was coming fast and living conditions
in newly dug defence lines worsened.
Operations on both sides were limited
to patrolling and minor skirmishes and
on Christmas Day 1914, German and
Belgian troops faced one another in
the wet and cold positions along the
the Yser.
In the area of the ruins of the ‘Hoge
Brug’, the bridge that once spanned
the river at the border of the towns
of Kaaskerke and Diksmuide, the
▲
German side was lined by worn out
IRON CROSS ❙ 65
WESTERN FRONT 1914: CHRISTMAS TRUCE
■ St John’s Church, Diksmuide.
■ The monstrance of Diksmuide, returned to
Belgian hands by Major John William Anderson,
Christmas 1914.
66 ❙ IRON CROSS
and depleted elements of the German
13. Ersatz-Brigade, subordinated to
the 4. Ersatz-Division. The unit had
seen heavy fighting during the ‘Race
to the Sea’, and on the Belgian side
the bank near the ruined bridge was
defended by a company of the elite 1st
Belgian Grenadier Regiment. During
the night of 25/26 December, the 5th
company of the Belgian 1st Regiment
of Carabineers was en-route to replace
the Grenadiers the following morning.
During their approach, they heard
the most unlikely rumours which
spread through the ranks like wildfire:
‘There is no more fighting at the Hoge
Brug’, ‘..we heard singing from the
trenches’. Impatiently, the men waited
for day break to find out if the rumours
were true.
A ceasefire between with the
Germans? Fraternisations even? After
what the German Army had done to
Belgium and its people, things like
that would surely be impossible? Yet
in less than half the range of a rifle
bullet, German and Belgian soldiers
had indeed ceased firing and left their
trenches to meet and exchange gifts by
climbing up the ruins of the Hoge Brug,
barely 30 feet away from one another.
CIGARS, CHOCOLATES AND
TRINKETS
What happened on that day has been
passed on in the memoirs of Jozef van
Ryckeghem, the chaplain of the Church
of Saint Nicolas in Diksmuide: “A biting
easterly wind whipped over the hard-
frozen dykes of the Yser. In the sky, grey
clouds, heavy with snow, occasionally
allowed the light of a pale moon to
shine through. All was quiet, rifles and
machine guns were silent. Not a single
gunshot could be heard. But suddenly
there were voices! Singing voices, first
wavering, then firmer, before swelling
into a mighty Christmas Carol. And yes,
they came from the trenches across the
Yser. From our side, silent at first, came
general applause and then a Christmas
Carol echoed from Flemish soldiers
breasts. Rejoicing from the German
side! More singing. Jointly singing ‘Silent
Night’, then a shout of ‘Christmas night!
- The night of peace, don’t shoot’. One of
us climbs onto the parapet, followed by
another, and more. There is fraternalism
and cigars, chocolates and all kind of
trinkets are exchanged”
Another witness of the events at
the Hoge Brug was Belgian Carabinier
Julien Smet who later remembered that
suddenly a German shouted from the
bank: “Is there a priest? We would like
to present you with a memento!”
THE GOLDEN MONSTRANCE
Since May 1847, the monastic sisters
of St. Vincent in Deftinge had run St.
John’s Hospital (and from 1850 a girl’s
orphanage) in Diksmuide. During the
Battle of the Yser, the Hospital, under
the firm leadership of Superior Pauline,
served as a Red Cross post but when
German troops came close in October
the sisters were forced to flee to
Izenberge, and later to Cayeux sur Mer.
Before they left, they hid the order‘s
cumbersome valuables as carefully as
they could. One of them, a beautiful
golden and neo-Gothic monstrance
was hidden under a heap of coal in the
hospital cellar. Here, it was discovered
by German soldiers of Brigade-Ersatz-
Bataillon Nr. 16 of the 13. Ersatz-Brigade
in December. This battalion had been
raised from elements of 16. Infanterie-
Brigade on mobilisation in August 1914,
and under command of a Prussian
Major with the unusual ‘German’ name
of John William Anderson.
JOHN WILLIAM ANDERSON
Born in Angermünde, Brandenburg
in 1872, John William Anderson was
a Prussian of Scottish descent. It is
unclear if the first Andersons came to
Prussia in the 18th century or earlier,
or if they came as traders, clergymen
or soldiers. We do know that by the
time John William was born, his
family operated a rather successful
apothecary shop and his father and
grandfather had been apothecaries.
John William, though, decided to
become a soldier and joined the army
in 1891, receiving his officer’s patent
in 1893. Anderson saw his baptism of

■ This painting, now in the
town archive in Diksmuide,
shows Major John William
Anderson in late 1915.
fire in 1900 during the Boxer Rebellion
in China, during which he served as
Adjutant of II. Seebataillon, a formation
of naval troops roughly equivalent to
the Royal Marines.
In 1910, we find him serving in the
rank of Hauptmann in Infanterie-
Regiment Nr. 72, a line infantry
regiment in which he ended his active
army service in 1911. Transferred into
the Reserve as a highly decorated
veteran after over two decades of
service he was reactivated on the
outbreak of war and promoted to
command Brigade-Ersatz-Bataillon
Nr. 16 of 4. Ersatz-Division. When
Anderson was killed in 1916, he was
acting as battalion commander in
Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 362.
The medal bar he wore before
outbreak of the First World War still
exists, comprising the Prussian Order
of the Crown 4th Class with Swords,
Officer‘s Long Service Award, the
China Medal with two battle clasps, the
Prussian Centenary Medal of 1897 and
the Honour Cross of the Oldenburg
House and Merit Order 3rd Class with
Swords.
During the First World War, he was
awarded both Classes of the Iron
Cross. He was not, as so often stated,
a Bavarian and neither was the unit
under his command a Bavarian one.

■ The Iron Crosses and Kronenorden of John William Anderson.

■ Anderson’s pre-war medal bar (left) with the ribbons for the
Prussian Order of the Crown 4th Class with Swords, Officer’s
Long Service Award, the China Medal with two battle clasps, the
Prussian Centenary Medal of 1897 and the Honour Cross of the
▲

Oldenburg House and Merit Order, 3rd Class, with Swords.

IRON CROSS ❙ 67
WESTERN FRONT 1914: CHRISTMAS TRUCE

GESTURE OF PEACE
On 26 December 1914, at about 2:30
pm, Major John William Anderson,
accompanied by an orderly, slowly
walked to the Yser where German and
Belgian soldiers were busy sliding little
trinkets over the thin ice to the other
side, or just jovially talking and smoking.
For a moment, war was forgotten. In
stark contrast to the popular image of
the typical Prussian officer, Anderson
was unconcerned. Only two days earlier,
he sent a letter to his wife in which he
wrote: “We‘ve been lying low for a few
days under heavy fire. All windows are
broken and the cold is terrible. We‘ve
been sleeping in a cellar for eight days
and tomorrow is Holy Night. Everyone is
quiet and melancholic.”
Now, Anderson was determined
to revive the spirit of Christmas by
returning the golden monstrance
which one of his men had found in The request was relayed by Belgian must have been sad do you say? Well, I
the convent cellars a few days earlier. soldiers and soon afterwards Kapitein- am not sorry to have spent it there and
The beautiful piece of ecclesiastical Commandant Guillaume Lemaire of the recollection of it will ever be one of
art, now wrapped in a linen bag and the 1st Carabiniers and other Belgian imperishable beauty. At midnight, a
clutched tightly by Anderson’s orderly, officers appeared on the bank. After baritone stood up and in a rich resonant
was virtually undamaged. Only the a brief exchange in which Anderson voice sang: “Minuit Chretiens.” The
little golden cross on its top had outlined his intentions, Lemaire called cannonade ceased, and when the hymn
disappeared. for Assistant Army Chaplain Sabinus finished applause broke out from our
Reaching the bank, Anderson Eduardus Vander Meiren who was side and from the German trenches! The
addressed the Belgians opposite in serving in a first aid post at a soap Germans were celebrating Christmas
French - calling that he wanted to factory where Yser Tower Museum is too, and we could hear them singing two
see a priest to hand over a memento. today situated. hundred yards from us. Now I am going
When Vander Meiren arrived, to tell you something which you will
a cord was slid over the frozen think incredible, but I give you my word
Yser and the monstrance in its it is true.
bag was attached to the cord and At dawn, the Germans displayed a
carefully pulled to the Belgian placard over the trenches on which was
side. Here, Vandermairen took written Happy Christmas. Then, leaving
possession of it. The gesture left their trenches, unarmed, they advanced
the Belgians deeply impressed. towards us singing and shouting:
The officers saluted and “Comrades!” No one fired. We also left
returned to their lines. Not long our trenches and separated only by the
afterwards, fighting resumed. half frozen Yser, we exchanged presents.
They gave us cigars, and we threw them
chocolate. Thus, almost fraternising, we
PEACE AT THE YSER passed the morning. Unlikely indeed,
Although it didn’t mention but true. I saw it, but thought I was
the story of the monstrance, a dreaming. They asked us to spend
letter from a Belgian soldier was Christmas without firing and the whole
published in the Dublin Evening day passed without fighting.
■ “Christmas Night at the Yser” was painted in 1930 News on 4 January 1915 and At eight o’clock in the evening we were
by Samuel De Vriendt, a soldier in the Belgian Army
at the Yser, December 1914. He did not personally
outlined the remarkable events of relieved by other soldiers, and returned
witness the event but was told about it shortly that first Christmas of the war: to the rear without being disturbed. Was
afterwards. “Christmas in the trenches. It it not splendid? Think you that we were

68 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ In 1974, on the 60th anniversary of the
Christmas Truce at the Yser, Hubertus Anderson,
John William’s son, was invited to Diksmuide to
symbolically hand over the monstrance to Belgian
First World War veteran, Rene Pil, in the presence
of the brothers of Guillaume Lemaire and Sabinus
Vander Meiren.
■ Left: The Yser Tower in Diksmuide holds a
fascinating collection of First World War items,
including the Golden Montrance and personal
possessions of John William Anderson.
wrong? We have been criticised here. It
is said we ought to have fired. But would
it not have been dastardly? And then,
why kill one another on such a festive
day? ”
Even though fraternisation took
place all along the Yser, the story of the
golden monstrance became quickly
forgotten. Many who witnessed it
were killed shortly afterwards. Belgian
soldiers who had been only a few
hundred metres away, like Grenadier
Petrus de Man, never heard of it. De
Man had been singing Christmas
Carols and patriotic songs with the
Germans, when one of his comrades
stated that he had never seen a
German and now would be the best
time to change this. Just like the golden
monstrance, the grenadier was pulled
across the Yser on scratch built raft
attached to a cord. Disembarking on
the German side he stood, as de Man
put it, ‘like a cock among the hens’ for
a long time before being pulled back to
the Belgian side, loaded with German
Christmas presents consisting of
chocolates, alcohol and trinkets.
NO MORE WAR
With the death of Major Anderson,
who is buried in the German Military
Cemetery at Neuville St. Vaast, France,
■ The Monstrance was handed to the Museum in 1998.
■ The monstrance as displayed at Yser Tower
Museum.
the story of the monstrance also
died, although he had described what
happened during Christmas 1914 in a
letter to his wife and for decades, any
knowledge of the story was limited to
the Anderson family. This ended about
60 years later, when Anderson’s widow
showed the letter to Pater Werenfried
van Straaten, a Roman Catholic priest
and founder of the international
Catholic charity: “Aid to the Church
in Need”. With this, the story became
public knowledge.
On the 60th anniversary of the
Christmas Truce on the Yser, Hubertus
Anderson, John William’s son, was
invited to Diksmuide to symbolically
hand over the monstrance to a Belgian
First World War veteran, Rene Pil, in
the presence of Sabinus Vandermairen
and the brother of Guillaume Lemaire.
Since 1998, when the sisters of
St. Vincent were persuaded there
was no better place to display it,
the monstrance can be admired on
the ground floor of the Yser Tower
Museum, Diksmuide, just a stone’s
throw from where Anderson handed it
over and right in the centre of the Yser
battlefields.
It is fitting to end with the words of
Grenadier Petrus de Man. When asked
what he thought about the war for a
radio programme in 1973, he replied:
“You quickly realise how little sense
it all makes. Fighting against somebody
you have never seen before, or shooting
someone. Is there anything more stupid
in the world? Having to shoot dead
someone you‘ve never seen before? We
should live as the Flemish say: “Nooit
meer oorlog!”, or “No more war!” ”
Peter Verplancke is Curator of the Ijzer
Tower Museum, Diksmuide, Belgium.
IRON CROSS ❙ 69
 SOLDAT – GERMAN SOLDIER PROFILE

Georg Bose - Sturmgeschütz Ace

In this issue, our study of a German soldier is based on extracts from an extensive
interview with a Sturmgeschütz veteran conducted by Robin Schäfer during 2004.

G
eorg Bose was born at Forst
in the Lausitz on 20 October
1921. After service in the
Reichsarbeitsdienst (Reichs
Labour Service), he volunteered for
service in the Wehrmacht where he
was trained and served as a gunner in
an artillery unit. In this role, he served
during the campaigns in Poland and in
the West, in Yugoslavia and then from
1941 on the Eastern Front in Russia.
Having volunteered to join
the Sturmartillerie in the Winter
of 1942/43, Bose became one of
the most decorated assault gun
commanders of the Second World
War. On 21 September 1944, serving in
Sturmgeschütz-Brigade 177, he received
the Knight’s Cross for preventing a
Soviet breakthrough in the sector of
the 292. Infanterie-Division. By March
1944, he had destroyed 44 Soviet tanks
and hundreds of soft skinned vehicles,
artillery pieces and anti-tank guns. He
was taken prisoner by the Soviets on 11
May 1945 and released more than three
years later on 18 July 1948.
In addition to the Knight’s Cross, Bose
was also holder of: both classes of the
Iron Cross, the Panzerkampfabzeichen
(Panzer Badge) for 50 engagements,
the Allgemeines Sturmabzeichen
(General Assault Badge) for 25
assaults, the Nahkampfspange (Close ■ Leutnant
Combat Clasp) in bronze, the silver Georg Bose.
Panzervernichtungsabzeichen
(tank destruction badge) and the
Verwundetenabzeichen (Wound Badge) later, while in Panzerjäger-Abteilung class as ‘the most dangerous’?
in black. 69, we received the Jagdpanzer IV, Looking back today, how do
Georg Bose passed away on 26 which was technically also an assault you rate the general quality of
September 2011. gun, armed with the L48 7.5 cm gun, enemy tank crews?
the same type of gun which we had on “All tanks are dangerous, there is no
What types of assault guns did our StuGs.” such thing as a ‘non-dangerous’ tank.
you command during the war? But if you ask which types we had the
“I trained on a short barreled StuG III, What types of armoured vehicles most respect for, then it was probably
but at the front I had the long-barreled and tanks did you face on the the KV and the later the Stalin (IS). The
version. I briefly used a Stug IV and battlefield and which do you T-34/85 was also a very, very good tank.

70 ❙ IRON CROSS
 ■ Column of Jagdpanzer IVs armed with the 7.5cm L48 gun.
■ Right: The Panzervernichtungsabzeichen
in silver.
■ Far right: The Panzerkampfabzeichen for
50 engagements.
The major problem of the Josef Stalin,
and also that of the ISU 152, to take
another example, was that their rate of
fire was slow.
The Soviet tank crews were not
bad, but they were often let down by
their equipment. I know that modern
books often tell you a different story,
but when the first T-34s appeared at
the front, our tanks outclassed them.
It is true that they were better armed
and armoured, and that it was difficult
to effectively engage them with our
3.7cm and even the 5cm guns, but they
had one important weakness: the T34
commander also acted as gunner. In
addition, the gun-sight he had to rely
on was of low quality and once he had
identified a target he had to switch
position to aim and to fire. During
the time necessary to do all this, we
could fire four to five shots. In my
experience, even though there were
rare exceptions, Soviet tank gunners
tended to be bad shots up until the
end of the war.
We also sometimes faced
American Shermans and Lees sold
to the Russians under the Lend-
Lease Agreement. They were far
less dangerous than most Soviet
tanks, and more easily destroyed.
In some instances, our shells
passed right through a Sherman; into
the front, and out of the back. They
also burned a lot quicker than the T34,
and their main gun was very weak. In
1943 we encountered several American
made Lee tanks, which by that time
were totally obsolete.”
What can you tell us about the
quality of German tank guns and
optics?
“All of my tank kills were made with
the Sturmkanone 40, that’s the 7.5cm
L/48 which was mounted in both
the StuG III and IV but also in the
Jagdpanzer IV we received in late
1944. The Jagdpanzer IV with the long
L/70 gun mostly went to Waffen-SS
formations. I would have loved to try
one of them out. The Sturmkanone 40
was sufficient to destroy any type of
tank. It was very accurate and its shell
only started to drop after about 1,000
metres. That meant that when firing at
a target below that range, you only had
■ The muzzle brake of a Sturmkanone 40.
(Panzermuseum Munster)
to point the gun directly at it and fire.
Our gunsights were excellent as well
and they allowed us, when facing heavy
tanks like the KV and the Stalin, to aim
for weak spots like the turret ring. I
remember destroying a moving T-34
in September 1944 at a range of about
1,400 metres with the first shot.
Like me, most gunners of the
Sturmartillerie were former
artillerymen. We knew how to handle
a gun and the StuG was an excellent
gun platform. The Jagdpanzer IV
wasn’t very popular at first as all the
crews were used to the StuG III. I was
the first in the unit to convert to the
Jagdpanzer, and even I was sceptical at
first. This changed when I took a direct
hit of an 8.5cm shell from a distance
of about 600 metres. This glanced off
the heavy frontal armour. In a StuG, I
would not have survived such a hit.”
Do you remember the first tank
you destroyed?
“Yes, that was on my second day
during ‘Unternehmen Zitadelle’
(Battle of Kursk) in July 1943.
On that morning, my StuG and
another, commanded by Leutnant
Specht, were engaged in the area
of Hill 253.5, in support of our
infantry. When we arrived at our
destination we saw that our infantry
was already falling back in the face of
▲
a Soviet attack. We knew that speed
IRON CROSS ❙ 71
SOLDAT – GERMAN SOLDIER PROFILE
was now of the essence, so we drove
forward, directly into the groups of
the attacking Soviet infantry and
going through them until we reached
their supporting machine gun and
mortar positions. When we opened
up on them, the effect of our shells
were terrible to behold, ripping into
the Soviets sending body parts and
weapons flying. It took only seconds
until the Soviets began to retreat.
Then, a T-34 suddenly appeared in a
hollow, about 800 metres to our right
and came directly towards us. I gave
orders to load an AP shell and my gunner
acknowledged that he had the target
lined up. I waited until the T-34 was
about 600 metres away and then gave
the order to fire. I will never forget how
incredibly loud the report of the gun was,
and the sudden pressure on one’s ears it
generated. I never got used to it.
I had my eyes glued to the scissor
telescope, while my gunner was
watching through the gun sight, but we
both cursed aloud when we saw our
shell ricocheting upwards into the sky.
This should not have happened, but
in this case it did. The T-34 still rolled
towards us as if the crew hadn’t even
noticed it. It then suddenly halted,
and instead of firing on us, it turned
sideways. Immediately, we loaded a
second AP shell and fired. The effect was
spectacular. An enormous explosion
■ A knocked-out and burning Russian T-34 tank.
72 ❙ IRON CROSS
ripped through it, fire shot out of the
compartment and the whole turret was
lifted out of the turret ring. This was not
only my first tank kill, it was also the
first for the Abteilung 177 after its re-
establishment in March 1943. ”
In addition to your 44 tank kills,
did you keep a record of other
targets destroyed?
“Yes, we all did. The accumulated
results were regularly passed on in
our monthly reports. Next to tanks,
we liked to keep a tally of anti-tank
and artillery guns we destroyed. I have
forgotten how many I got, but it was
certainly more than 120. Also, many
unarmoured vehicles like cars and
trucks. In some cases, where possible,
even the numbers of infantry we
annihilated was recorded. But I am
happy that I don’t know this total.
Anti-tank guns were probably our
most dangerous enemy as they were
hard to spot and were often well
hidden as well. During Unternehmen
Zitadelle, I once destroyed five of them
in a matter of three to five minutes,
the last two by crushing them beneath
the StuGs tracks.”
What was the comradeship
within your crew like?
“We were like a family. Rank didn’t
really come into it. One took care of
our fellow men. We
lived together, fought
together and all knew
that we might all die
together. A good crew
worked together like
clockwork. In combat,
the crew would
operate without the
need of orders and it
was always difficult
when a crew member
had to be replaced. In
addition, we were all
men of the artillery
and we knew that
when it came to
gunnery we were the
best. This changed
when Abteilung 177
was redesignated
Panzerjäger-Abteilung 69. This was
far more than just a name change, as
from then on we received crewmen
from the Panzerjägertruppe. They were
not artillerymen. Most of them had
never sat in a self-propelled gun and
were used to operating wheeled anti-
tank guns. Their gunnery skills were
not bad, but they were far inferior to
ours. We had to train these men in the
basics of artillery gunnery.”
So would you say the
Sturmartillerie was an elite
force?
“It certainly was! The men of the
Panzertruppe often looked down on
us, as we were tied to the infantry and
were not issued with ‘real’ tanks. Yet it
was the Sturmartillerie which destroyed
over 30,000 enemy tanks during the
war. We were all volunteers and our
gunnery was far superior to theirs. In
Hungary, I once witnessed a Panzer IV
trying to finish off a stationary T-34
which was about 1,600 metres away.
The Panzer gunner fired 11 shells at it
which all missed. I said to my gunner:
“Maybe we should show him how to do
it?” and we scored a direct hit into its
side with our second shot. Using the
bracketing technique, which all artillery
gunners knew, we could score hits even
at very long ranges. In 1943, we took
out a KV-1 tank at a range of about
2,000 metres using hollow charge
shells. Tank and anti-tank gunners
were not trained in that technique. If
used correctly, the StuG was just as
effective as any tank - possibly more
so. It had a low profile, and as such was
harder to spot and hit. It was simpler
in design and technically more reliable
than a tank. Only in urban areas and
convoluted spaces was it inferior
because you had to turn the whole
vehicle to engage an enemy. And that
required room. Today, you hear a lot
about the heavy tank destroyers and
tanks like the Tiger and the Panther, but
it was the Sturmartillerie which formed
the backbone of every successful attack
and later served as a kind of armoured
fire brigade working in defence. The
Sturmartillerie was the real ‘Königin der
Waffen’, the Queen of Arms... ”
 CO S
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 OBJECTS IN FOCUS: THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Battlefield Rarities
In each issue of Iron Cross we take a close look at objects from the First or Second
World Wars. Here, we examine three unusual artefacts in the third of our four-part
series as the editorial team continue their visits to museums in Flanders.

F
or the third in our ‘Battlefield
Rarities’ series we have worked
with the ‘In Flanders Fields’
All images courtesy of ‘In Flanders Fields’ Museum.

Museum in Ypres. Situated

at the medieval Cloth Hall in the
town centre, the museum offers
spectacular multimedia, video and
sound installations and is also home to
excellent displays of First World War
militaria.
We are indebted to Dr. Dominiek ■ The Thermite
Dendooven, curator and scientific incendiary pastilles
consultant of the museum, and to Mr. displayed in the
Ypres museum at
Philippe Oosterlinck, collector and
Cloth Hall.
one of the world’s leading specialists
of First World War militaria, for
assistance in allowing us to get up
close and personal with some of the on the 25 August 1914, destroying fuel into the rooms with handfulls of
collection‘s items. 300,000 historic books and 1,000 black incendiary pellets before igniting
manuscripts. This was seen as a direct the whole mixture with grenades.”
attack on learning and culture, causing First described in Belgian and French
THERMITE PASTILLES outrage worldwide from international publications days afterwards as “Pastille
During the German invasion of academic institutions. The same Ostwald” or “pastille incendiare”, they
Belgium and France in 1914, a large happened at Senlis and Orchies in are often wrongly described as being
number of atrocities were committed September. made of nitrocellulose, better known
against the civilian population. In the A small glass cabinet in the as guncotton, but are actually made of
first months of the war, about 6,500 museum contains a handful of tiny Thermite. Small, square-shaped nitro
Belgian and French civilians were objects which are rare reminders cellulose tablets were also carried by
killed by German troops and numerous of this terrible opening chapter of a the German Army. It is these which
cities, towns and villages were put catastrophic war. should be described as “Pastille
to the torch in reprisal actions The torching of Orchies was Ostwald”. Wilhelm Ostwald was the
following armed resistance of irregular recorded by a German soldier: inventor of the process of developing
combatants or ‘franc-tireurs’ (lit. free “On September 25, Orchies had a nitric acid, but the the small black
shooters). This is not the place to memorable day - reminding us of the discs described in publications of the
discuss civilian resistance or the exact tragically infamous scenes playing day and on display in the museum are
reasons for the escalation of violence. out in Louvain and Dinant. I was this made of a pyrotechnic composition of
Suffice to say, the German reaction morning at the Hotel de Commerce, finely powdered aluminium and iron
was excessive in moral and legal terms. when a German officer said to me: “We oxide and a small amount of barium.
At the end of August 1914, the city of are going to burn Orchies”. And indeed If ignited, the “pills” caused a thermite
Louvain (Leuven) was partly destroyed pioneers, under the orders of Major Dittel reaction generating immense heat
by a fire caused by the German Army and loaded with incendiary material, (up to 3,000 degrees) for a very short
in the wake of similar reprisals. The left Valenciennes by tramway for Saint- period.
14th century University Hall and 18th Amand and from there to Orchie. In each The thermite reaction was
century library wing were devastated house, they smashed the windows, flung discovered (and later patented) by

74 ❙ IRON CROSS
Dr. Hans Goldschmidt in 1893. It was
immediately clear that it would have
great value in welding and the first
commercial application of thermite
was the welding of tram tracks in
1899. By the start of the First World
War, thermite welding had become
commonplace in the construction of
artillery and ships.
The “pastilles incendiare” on
display are some of the last remaining
examples. Little is known about their
history, use or distribution in the army
- except that they were produced in
the Essen works of the ‘Chemische
Werke Theodor Goldschmidt’ and
issued to the Pioneers. A little more
than 2cm in diameter, they have a hole
in the middle allowing them to be
threaded onto a fuse. In the field, they
were transported in metal cylinders
with a cramped lid. In addition to
railway and pipe welding, thermite
could also be used to disable weaponry
(artillery pieces etc) to prevent them
from falling into enemy hands.
SHARPENED SPADE
In April 1874, the German Army trialled
a spade which had been introduced
into the Danish Army known as the
Linneman Spade. Subject to results, it
was planned to introduce this spade
as an entrenching tool on a large scale.
This idea wasn’t generally greeted
with open arms and officers started to
argue against the introduction of such
a tool. They argued that the Feldspaten,
or field spade, was only of use in
■ The
Feldspaten
displayed at
In Flanders
Fields
Museum. Not
the leather
wrist strap.
defence, and that its introduction
would rob the army of its offensive
spirit. In addition, it would add weight
to a soldier’s load and thus reduce
the mobility of infantry formations
as a whole. It would be too small to
use effectively; a number of normal
size spades issued to only a few men
would work better and not encumber
all of the men with additional weight.
In contrast to those officers who
■ A period French
Postcard showing the
accoutrements of a
German soldier including
a canister for incendiary
pastilles.
correctly saw the need for a small field
spade in future engagements fought
with modern weaponry, the old-school
officers still lived in the world of
infantry-of-the-line and linear battles
of old. Nevertheless, the spade after
the Linnemann System was introduced
as a portable entrenching tool on 26
November 1874 for infantry and Jäger
formations.
The Feldspaten M1874, made of ash
and cast hardened sheet steel, weighed
around 0.7 kilos and was worn on a
strap over the right shoulder.
It’s successor was the Feldspaten
M1887, identical to the M1874 but with
a redesigned leather carrying assembly
which could be worn attached to the
belt next to the bayonet. In 1898, the
Feldspaten M98 was introduced, and
would became the standard and most
commonly encountered spade of the
German Army during the First World
War. It had a redesigned blade, which
made digging into hard soil easier and
a simplified and more sturdy sleeve
assembly.
The Feldspaten gave the German
soldier a distinct edge over the infantry
of other nations (especially during
the first months of the war) not only
allowing him to dig-in, but also serving
as a handy tool to cleave wood, open
tins and in some recorded instances
to even cut barbed wire. It doesn’t
come as a surprise that it was soon
discovered that the spade, if handled
like an axe, also made a powerful
close-combat weapon. Even though
specialised close combat daggers and
trench-clubs were issued to frontline
formations, the spade remained the
German soldiers weapon of choice
on patrols and in trench combat.
Sharpened further around the edges,
it had a fearsome cutting power.
This is described in gruesome detail
in an account about a trench raid,
conducted by Leutnant Bierwisch of
Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 56 in 1916:
“...only an old, and grizzled NCO was
left standing afterwards. He was still
holding a revolver, but I approached
him slowly with my hands raised in a
peaceful gesture to calm him down.
▲
When I was only about a meter away he
IRON CROSS ❙ 75
OBJECTS IN FOCUS: THE FIRST WORLD WAR
suddenly raised his revolver and fired
at my head. Much to my delight the
bullet missed its intended target and
went through my left hand instead. The
sudden pain made me recoil backwards,
and at the same moment Unteroffizier
Linke, who was right behind me, pushed
forward and with a wide swing buried his
spade into the neck of the Frenchman.
I have seen a lot of spade work in the
trenches, but never to such effect. The
blade cutting the Frenchman’s chest
open down to his sternum, spraying me
and Linke with blood.”
Another unnamed German soldier
also wrote chillingly of the Feldspaten:
‘The light of my torch fell on
Riedel’s sharp-edged spade which
confronted me with a brutal, silvery
glitter. Involuntarily, I bent down and
touched the rough handle and counted
the notches in it. The feel of them
brought memories back to me: Ypres,
Loretto, and the Hartmannsweilerkopf
mountain. Riedel’s spade was deadlier
than my rifle had ever been, or would
be; that spade was something immense
- a furious annihilator.’
In the museum’s collection one
can see a fine example of a fully
‘weaponised’ M98 spade, the blade
extensively sharpened on two sides. To
leave no doubt about its purpose, it is
furnished with a leather lanyard to slip
over the wrist while using it. Mundane
at first glance, it is ignored by most
visitors as just a spade. Yet there are
few objects which speak so powerfully
of the reality of trench combat as this
piece does.
POUR LE MERITE
- RUDOLF LANGE
Another piece easily overlooked among
larger and visually striking objects in
the museum is an original Order of the
Pour le Merite, colloquially known as
the ‘Blue Max’. This particular example
forms part of the estate of Major
Rudolf Lange.
Throughout the war, Major Lange
kept a diary about his experiences.
Born in 1887 into a bourgeois family
which for more than a century had
supplied officers for the Prussian
76 ❙ IRON CROSS
Army, Lange was professional, factual
and rigorous. An excellent soldier who
served on the frontline for nearly four
years while leading his men with a stern
hand but extolling their efforts and
commemorating them in death. He was
a man of culture who loved art, music
and history. Beauty affected him. Even
at the front he took delight in colours,
dramatic landscapes and picturesque
villages and buildings behind the lines.
Whenever he saw beauty, he took to his
sketchbook with pen and colours and
captured it quickly and skillfully. He
had no room to express emotion, but
elucidated the conditions he and his
men found themselves in. His 15 diaries
and over 300 sketches today form a
unique insight into the life of a German
officer in the trenches of the Western
■ Major Rudolf Lange.
■ Close-up of the Feldspaten
blade, showing the sharpened edge.
and Eastern Fronts. The collection is
accessible in the research centre of the
museum.
In 1914, Rudolf Lange was a
Hauptmann in IR55 of the Prussian
army based in Höxter on the Weser. At
the outbreak of war he was assigned
to the staff of VII. Reserve-Korps (VII.
RK) which included 13. and 14. Reserve
Divisions and arrived in Belgium
after the fall of Liege. The army was
ripe with rumours about Belgian
‘franc-tireurs’ and German atrocities
against the civilian population were
explained as justifiable self-defence
against attacks by Belgian irregulars.
Lange noted this, but didn’t comment
on it. He waited impatiently until he
could join in the action. Namur and
Maubeuge had fallen, but he was still at
his desk in a staff role. An entry in his
diary on 1 September 1914 reads: “Will
the members of general command be
given the opportunity of distinguishing
themselves?”
This opportunity arose at the Battle
of the Aisne, and at Chemin des Dames
the VII.RK launched a counteroffensive
where Rudolf Lange, still a staff
officer, was right in the middle of the
action. He described the fighting on
14 September near Cerny, but also
put his own analysis on paper and
demonstrated great insight. He also
began to illustrate the places where
historic confrontations took place. By
doing so, he became chronicler and
illustrator of his own war experience.
For a long time, Lange propagated
the opinion that Reserve formations
■ The diary and sketchbook of Rudolf Lange with its beautiful
annotations and watercolours, along with his Pour le Merite
▲

medal displayed in Ypres.

OBJECTS IN FOCUS: THE FIRST WORLD WAR
should be commanded by enterprising
officers from the active army, and this
was finally heeded.
After failure at Langemark, where
thousands of young and inexperienced
troops of the Fourth Army had fallen,
Lange was transferred to Flanders
on 24 October 1914. As company
commander in the first battalion of
Reserve Infantry Regiment 213 (I./
RIR213) he managed to bring order
to the prevailing chaos. Exhausted,
and with little protection afforded by
trenches, his men men lay dispersed in
fields northwest of Langemark. Within
days, Lange rallied them. Leading
the battalion during an assault on 30
October, when French positions were
seized, Lange was seriously wounded.
Evacuated to Germany, he took five
months to recover - the injury leaving
a deep impression on him.
One week after the first German gas
attack on 22 April 1915, in the north
of the Ypres salient, he returned to
the front as commanding officer of a
company (and later the whole battalion)
of II./RIR236 near Sint-Juliaan, 5 km NE
of Ypres. With his new formation, he led
attacks during four consecutive days
between Sint-Juliaan and Wieltje where
Van Heule farm fell after major losses
with 190 dead, missing and wounded.
The battalion made preparations for
the last attack of the Second Battle of
Ypres (22 April – 24 May 1915), but didn‘t
take part. Ypres was within reach, but
remained unattainable.
For Hauptmann Lange, trench
■ One of Major Lange’s remarkable battlefield paintings.
78 ❙ IRON CROSS
warfare then began and under his
command the battalion systematically
strengthened its positions. With each
day in the trenches, Lange drew the
places the battalion fought. At the end
of June, RIR 236 was briefly transferred
to the SE of the Ypres salient where
the woods and picturesque villages of
this hinterland inspired Lange to paint
them in watercolour.
A month later, the regiment returned
to the northern side of the Ypres
salient where he remained another
year. His command skills did not go
unnoticed, and at the end of November
he was transferred to Pilkem Height
and to the neighbouring battalion, II./
RIR237, which didn’t enjoy the same
good reputation. Lange found it hard
to leave, but had joined the formation
he would remain with until the end of
the war, shaping it into an outstanding
combat unit.
In August 1916, RIR 237 was
transferred to the Eastern Front,
subordinated to the 199. Infanterie-
Division. After a train journey lasting
four days, the regiment arrived in
Bednarów in Galicia (today Western
Ukraine), where a German army
corps fought in support of the often
unreliable Austro-Hungarian allies
against Russia.
Eventually, Lange and his unit
were transferred back to the Western
Front and served during the Battle of
Arras and later at Passchendaele and
Westrozebeke during the Third Battle of
Ypres. Together with Second Lieutenant
Aloïs Zimmer, who later became state
minister of North-Rhine-Westphalia,
Major Lange occupied a command
position at Collie Molenhoek. The
winter was hard, and in his sketchbook
he documented the seemingly endless
destruction as well as Christmas
celebrations in Wijnendale and Gitsberg.
On 9 March 1918, RIR 237 left for
France to take part in the Spring
Offensive and attacked between Arras
and Laon with the intention of driving
a wedge between the British and
French and to end the war before the
Americans could get involved. On 23
March the division commenced the
assault and good progress was made,
although Lange was wounded in the left
shoulder and evacuated to Germany.
On his return, the offensive had
reached deadlock and chances of a
quick victory evaporated. In July, RIR
237 participated in the last major attack
to the east of Reims when Major Lange
was grievously wounded, eventually
dying in Bonn on 9 September.
In his hospital bed, he was decorated
with the Pour le Merite now displayed
in the museum.
IN FLANDERS FIELDS
MUSEUM
We are indebted to the In
Flanders Fields Museum for
their assistance with this
feature.
www.inflandersfields.be
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 WESTERN FRONT: THE SCIENCE OF TRENCH CONSTRUCTION

Mud,
Blood and
Geology
Whilst the trench systems and fortified
positions of the Great War might seem to
have been randomly created, they were
mostly nothing of the sort. Peter Doyle
explains the science that often went behind
their design and construction.

I
n Flanders, the weight of the German invasion
that commenced on 4 August 1914 was such that
the French and British troops fell back. Low-lying,
Flanders stretches from the uplands of Artois and
Picardy to the strip of sand dunes at the North Sea coast.
On the line of the Marne in September 1914, the Germans
were held; counterattacks followed, and out-flanking
positional warfare developed as both sides attempted to
trap their enemies and ‘turn their flanks’ in the ‘Race to
the Sea’. With the armies locked in a fierce struggle, the
battles moved inexorably closer to the Belgian Coast. By
November, both armies in the west had ground to a halt
in parallel lines that stretched from the North Sea to the
Swiss Frontier.
At the Belgian city of Ypres, the Allies faced the German
lines that swung around in a great arc – The Ypres Salient.
The beleaguered city would be held by the Allies for
the rest of the war; but it was the German stronghold
constructed according to the principles of their military
manual, Stellungsbau – the construction of field positions
– that was to hold the Allies in place. Central to these
positions was the ridge stretching from Wytschaete to
Messines – Wytschaete-Bogen.
Yet, while most accounts concentrate on Allied efforts
to break through and capture the ridge, little credit is
given to the defenders who constructed their lines with
the greatest attention to detail – until now. It is fortunate
that over the past ten years, two major archaeological
investigations, at Messines and last year at Wytschaete
(with the crowd-funded Dig Hill 80 excavation) have
revealed the strength and tenacity of the German defence
and the skills employed in constructing an enduring
fortress.
■ An excellent view of the typical German wicker revetment work.
(Brett Butterworth)

80 ❙ IRON CROSS
▲
WESTERN FRONT: THE SCIENCE OF TRENCH CONSTRUCTION

■ Dug in! German soldiers in a sandbagged trench with parapet. ■ A German concrete bunker in the bleak, muddy and waterlogged
(Brett Butterworth) landscape of Flanders in 1917. (Brett Butterworth)

STALEMATE CONDITIONS noted: ‘No precise rules can be laid down as to the
The idea of digging trenches was sound, of course, and it manner in which a defensive position is to be occupied
was not just to satisfy the soldiers’ desire to ‘go to ground’ or entrenched… The only reliable guides are a thorough
under fire. Trenches would stop invading armies in their knowledge of the effects of fire, and a practiced eye for
tracks, creating a barrier against further progress. Yet ground.’
with all the advantages of digging trenches, all too often Such ‘practiced eyes’ demanded experience, and in 1914
it was a matter of circumstance – rather than planning that experience hadn’t been gained. A new term emerged,
– that led to their construction. Early on, this was to be ‘the front’, which embodied the stalemate conditions of a
expected. As the British military manual on field defences new type of warfare, of mutual siege, where small matters
of geography assumed
great importance. Here, the
‘practiced eye for ground’
would attempt to pick out
the most suitable conditions
for the trenches that snaked
across Europe. By 1918, the
war of position assumed
great levels of sophistication.
For the BEF, sandwiched
between what remained
of the Belgian armies
(reinforced by the French)
at the coast, and the French
in Artois, Flanders became
the place of battle for four
years of a hard war. The First
Battle of Ypres (November–
December 1914) was a
component of the ‘Race to
the Sea’, with British troops
holding on grimly in the face
of a determined German
army. For their part, the
■ Wytschaete Bogen. This map shows the position of the German frontline around Wytschaete in June 1917. German engineers were clear
The German line followed the ridge top – formed by the Paniselian sands – for the majority of its length, providing they must consolidate their
views of the city of Ypres on the clay plain below. German engineers created strongpoints from destroyed
positions. Facing them, the
villages and farms; both Wytschaete and Messines were made into ‘fortress villages’. The strongpoints were
targeted by the British miners, and the Battle of Messines was won by co-ordinated mine explosions and artillery. British toiled in and around
The Germans were to recapture all they had lost in 1918. the clay plain of Ypres, while

82 ❙ IRON CROSS

the Germans set about holding the high ground that faced
the town on three sides, in what became known as the
Ypres Salient.
A ‘salient’ is a bulge in the front line, usually jutting
forward into enemy held territory. Such bulges are
dangerous as they are easier to attack and observe. The
Ypres Salient was particularly dangerous, formed in the
early days of the German drive towards the coast. As one
post-war commentator noted: ‘The Germans had driven
in wedges towards Ypres until our lines had fallen back
closer to the city, and the ground was a bastion thrust out
dangerously in a wide arc, like an English bow full-drawn,
and encompassed by the enemy whose skill and strength
had seized the high ground everywhere’.
Following the low hills to the east of the town, the
Salient defined an arc of trenches running approximately
north–south, facing east–west. Running around the
hills, the German line, and British line following it,
passed south over its saddleback, and down to the damp
Lys valley and on to Armentières. ‘Understanding the
ground’ was an important task in the development of this
underground war, and a sophisticated science of ground
engineering was deployed in its development.
■ Above: Smoking, eating and working
soldiers in a deep and bomb-proof
dugout somewhere on the western
front, 1915. One can almost imagine
the smell of sweat and tobacco.
(Brett Butterworth)
■ Far left: German soldiers man a
pump to drive oxygen into deep
dugouts. (Brett Butterworth)
■ Left: Walter Kranz pictured in later
life. Hauptmann Kranz was the ‘father’
of military geology (militargeologie) in
1913, which became Kriegsgeologie in
wartime. The military applications of
geology were many and varied.
KRIEGSGEOLOGIE
In 1913, military fortification engineer Hauptmann Walter
Kranz coined the phrase Militärgeologie – later, with the
outbreak of war, it became simply Kriegsgeologie, or war
geology. Yet his original idea – that geology would have a
large role to play in warfare, and particularly in the type
of fortress or static warfare that would be enacted just a
year later – was taken seriously only when war broke out
in Europe.
It was natural that Kranz’s approach should take root,
however. After all, geology dealt with the nature of the
land surface over which men, animals and machines
travelled. It also gave answers to the kind of obstacles
they may face and controlled the way fortifications were
built, above and below ground, and provided answers
for resourcing armies – particularly water supplies. A
wartime lecture – Kriegs-Geologie (1915) – by W. Salomon
of Heidelberg University, explained: ‘Geology is practical
and necessary: to prove the stability of parapets and
trenches and the stability of dug-outs; to identify the speed
of digging excavations; to identify water supplies; to assist
in rain water and waste water removal; to supply building
▲
materials; and to identify mineral raw materials’.
IRON CROSS ❙ 83
WESTERN FRONT: THE SCIENCE OF TRENCH CONSTRUCTION
■ Hooge Crater. Caused by a British mine, it was turned into a fortress by the
Germans. (Brett Butterworth)
Though Walter Kranz first advised a geological service
for the Imperial German Army be established in 1912,
it took the outbreak of war for this to be properly
considered. As late as April 1914, the Inspector General of
the Imperial German Engineer Corps wrote to the Prussian
minister of war: ‘The Inspector General sees no need for the
establishment of military geologist positions. In the field,
events proceed so rapidly that even in trench warfare the
employment of a geologist is out of the question…’
MILITARY MINING
Just a year later, the geological support provided to the
German Army after its slow start grew to be impressively
organised and was embodied directly into army structure
by 1916. Then, each of the 28 field survey companies
contained geological sections (Geologen Stellen), with
requests for geological
assistance made directly to
them. There would be some
250 geologists employed in
the German army by the end
of the war (and a further 60
with the Austro-Hungarian
army). Though the actual
number of geologists in
German service during
the Great War grew to be
relatively large, their impact
was reduced as many served
in lowly positions; they were
expected simply to advise,
not supervise. But at least
they were actively engaged
on the ground.
And then there was
military mining. Such
■ Friedrich ‘Fritz’ von Lossberg. activity involves the
84 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ A mine crater near Ypres, very well fortified by the Germans and
sporting - right centre - a half torso sniper decoy. (See our article on
sniping on page 24.) (Brett Butterworth)
■ A surviving German concrete bunker on the so-called
‘Sehenstellung’ south of Wytschaete. (RS)
excavation of tunnels, galleries and dug-outs – in fact, any
subsurface excavation that aids the army, whether in an
offensive or defensive sense. The use of military mines is
centuries old. Arguably, the greatest success for military
miners and their geological advisors was to come in June
1917, when the Messines–Wytschaete Ridge was captured
by the British in what could be considered one of the most
effective and successful battles of the war.
Not surprisingly, a deep understanding of geology played
a major role in prosecuting the coordinated mine offensive
that launched the first attacks. Writing in 1935, Walter
Kranz commented ruefully on what might have been:
‘If German geologists with military training had,
immediately after the beginning of mining operations,
at the latest in 1915, made a thorough survey of the whole
Wytschaete salient, and if our miners from the beginning
would have checked their advice tactically and technically,
and if found correct would have followed this with all
available means, the British would never have been so
successful with their Wytschaete explosions…’.
Artwork by Battlefield Design
■ Modern Geological map of the Wytschaete–Messines ridge, showing
the extent of the dry sands (known as ‘Wytschaete Sands’ to the
British in 1917), delicted in the darker ochre, the ‘Paniselian’ sands
(light ochre), and the ‘Ypres Clay’ (green). These layers have different
names today, but the geological principles still apply. Where the
sands met the clay, water pooled and made digging trenches difficult,
as at Messines.
BOTTOMLESS MUD
From Ypres southwards, Flanders comprises an extensive
plain: its flatness relieved only by a series of low hills no
greater than 50 metres high that partially embrace the city
of Ypres.
The plain itself is mostly made up of clays that were
once called ‘Ypres Clay’, a material that became a blessing
and a curse to the soldiers and engineers who worked
with it, and in it, during the war. In Flanders, the striking
colour of freshly cut clay was a major issue, particularly
from deep mining. With the blue colour visible from the
air, it gave away the fact that tunnels and mines were in
the process of being dug, even when put into sandbags to
reinforce parapets. Fortunately, this startling colour did
not last because its minerals very quickly change in the
presence of air, soon becoming a brownish colour – surely
a metaphor for the whole Ypres Salient.
The Ypres Clay acted as a barrier for the downward
movement of water, leading to a tendency for it to pool.
Thus, it is not surprising that soils on top of the clay are
■ German trench at Messines showing the plank flooring and the
‘Paniselian’ sand trench sides.
very likely to be waterlogged. Consequently, drainage
from the fields of Flanders is slow. To describe the
soils during wet periods as ‘heavy going’ is more than
an understatement. Mud became the norm; in military
parlance, it became ‘bottomless’.
Friedrich ‘Fritz’ von Lossberg, mastermind of the
German defence-in-depth strategy, described its nature:
‘The ground in Flanders consists of a very soft and fertile
layer of humus with a thickness of 1–3 metres. Under this
layer … there is an impenetrable layer of clay about 1 metre
thick. If this is perforated by artillery fire the groundwater
oozes upwards into the shell craters and fills them to
the brim…After showers of rain, which in Flanders are a
common occurrence, the humus is turned into a swamp-
like pulp which gives an advantage to the defender.’
A SODDEN QUAGMIRE
Rising slowly up from the clay plain is a low range of
▲
hills that gained such gigantic importance in the war,
IRON CROSS ❙ 85
WESTERN FRONT: THE SCIENCE OF TRENCH CONSTRUCTION

■ A German trench at Messines showing duck-boarding and the use of ■ Brushwood hurdles in place within the trenches at Messines. Note
salvaged timber to revet – or hold back – the trench sides. the flooded trench floor.

and which curve to the east of the city of Ypres creating

a ‘bastion’ on the otherwise featureless plain. Occupied
by the Germans from 1914, the ridges became a thorn in
the side of the British. Every movement and suspicious
activity was logged – and shelled if necessary. With
the Germans on the ridge tops, the British struggled
under four years of direct observation through the Zeiss
field-glasses of their opponents. As General Ludendorff
commented: ‘The high ground between Ypres and the
Roulers–Menin line…affords an extensive view in both
directions. These heights were also exceptionally important
for us, as they afforded us ground observation posts and a
certain amount of cover from hostile view.’
This put severe strain on the Allied troops who toiled in
the Ypres Salient, as one commentator noted: ‘Because the
enemy could see every move on our part in the Salient, all

movements had to be carried out in the dark. Ammunition,

■ Concrete shelter constructed within the Messines trench system.
Concrete gave good protection and was drier underfoot in damp
conditions.
rations and building materials were carted up by night
as far as the road went and laboriously manhandled into
position. The work was bad enough in the summer, but
when the ground was one sodden quagmire of trodden and
re-trodden slimy mud, the task was appalling.’
These ridges are composed of what geologists called
‘Paniselian’, mixed layers of sand, clay and silt. With sand
layers closest to the top, rain soaks away into the land
until it meets the clay, and then sits there. This means
that some layers are perpetually water-rich, such as the
geological level the British called the ‘Kemmel Sands’ – a
particularly wet layer sandwiched between clay. These
sands caused many problems for the German defenders.
Oberstleutnant Otto Füsslein, Kommandeur des
Mineure, 4th German Army, was well aware of the
difficulties: ‘Do you know the terrain of Flanders? The
trench lines weaved their way over long and gently rolling

86 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ A concrete
reinforced trench
with Alarm Reserven
(emergency
reserves) of rifle
ammunition and
hand grenades.
(Brett Butterworth)

■ Left: The
author during
an excavation in
Messines, pictured
next to an Alarm
Reserven container
of stick grenades.
These are perfectly
preserved, as is the
rest of the trench
after 100 years.

ridges, through shallow depressions and across wide
expanses of almost flat countryside. In the rich alluvial and
sedimentary deposits forming the upper strata of earth
and clay, water collected in the trenches, especially in the
winter, and even more so in the mine galleries, initially only
one or two metres below the surface and later four metres
deep, progressively transforming them into quagmires.’
THE TRENCH FORTRESS
Perched on the Messines–Wytschaete ridge, the German
positions dominated the Allied lines, and it was to the field
manual Stellungsbau that the German engineers turned
for guidance on constructing their positions:
‘Field positions when constructed afford considerable
advantages to the defence. The important points to
be borne in mind by the defence in a war of positions
are: 1, Economy for forces; 2, Diminution of losses and
increase of enemy losses; 3, Utilisation of ground so that
conditions favourable for combat are obtained, while made
unfavourable to the enemy.’
This last part was the most significant; a commitment
to ensuring the German trench lines were the strongest, as
noted by the British General Staff in 1917:
‘Great use has been made by the Germans of natural
villages, the borders and interior have been strongly
organised, generally for all round defence, and a particularly
desperate resistance has been offered in them.’
This was particularly the case at Wytschaete and
Messines. When the men of Das Infanterie-Regiment
“Kaiser Wilhelm von Preußen” (2. Württemb.) Nr. 120 arrived
in the sector they were impressed: ‘At first glance the
men, who were not spoiled when it came to the quality
of defensive works and dug-out construction, were quite
pleased with what they found in it. The main combat line
ran in a slight curve along the foot of a hilltop crowned
with the ruins of Wytschaete and was in a relatively tidy
condition…A number of well made communication trenches,
well furnished with direction and warning signs, ran from
the furthermost eastwards and up the slope, crossing
through the forest of Wytschaete and the first and second
reserve position before ending within the village on the hill.
The village itself was quite shot up, although the layout of
the streets was still discernible and numerous surviving
cellars offered satisfying accommodation for troops ...’.
ARCHAEOLOGY OF A FORTRESS
German front-line trenches at Messines at the southern
extremity of the Ypres Salient (south of St Eloi) were
▲

strong points, such as villages, farms, and woods. In the excavated in 2012–13 as part of a major replacement of

IRON CROSS ❙ 87
WESTERN FRONT: THE SCIENCE OF TRENCH CONSTRUCTION

water mains in the region. In 2018, a further opportunity

■ Cellars of the old mill buildings at Hill 80 that have been reinforced
with concrete blocks to withstand the Allied bombardment.
■ A Bavarian soldier wearing Dräger 1903 self-contained breathing
apparatus prepares to be lowered into a vertical shaft in a mine crater
position with the assistance of a windlass and muscle-power.
(Brett Butterworth)
was granted when a unique crowd-funded rescue
excavation was carried out at Hohe 80 at the heart of the
German fortress of Wytschaete.
What the British called the Messines ridge – and the
Germans Wytschaete-Bogen – is a spur of the main
ridge east of Ypres, forming part of a wider plateau with
Wytschaete to the northwest, Messines to the south.
This plateau had seen hard fighting in 1914, with the
Germans wresting control of the high ground from the
Allies. Stabilising its position in early 1915, the Germans
developing a dominant fortress that was at the heart of the
Salient. It comprised a frontline system of strongpoints
that were designed to break up any attempt to take the
ridge top by frontal assault, and with strongholds in the
rear built around the two villages that defined the ridge
top. With the Germans occupying the high ground, with
every spur and building built into the line as a fortress (as
laid down in Stellungsbau), the British were forced to build
trenches that were effectively 10 metres lower, facing the
forward slopes of the ridge.
A British manual summarised German expertise in 1917:
‘Great attention is paid to drainage of trenches, as on
the success or non-success of the measures taken may
depend whether this position can or cannot be held in the
wet season. It is laid down that the drainage must be done
on a definite plan which must be carried out in good time.
Drainage engineers and geologists are to be consulted, and
use made of existing maps and plans. Wherever possible,
drainage water is to be led in the direction of the enemy,
pipes being put through the parapet for this purpose.’
Capping the ridge top at Wytschaete are dry sands,
known to the British (not surprisingly) as the ‘Wytschaete
Sands’. These bright yellow to ochre-coloured sands
were encountered during excavations at the hilltop of
the village that gave the sands its name, and must have
been relatively easy to excavate. At Hohe 80, the German
defenders made use of the destroyed mill that had marked
the hill-top, strengthening the cellars with concrete to
protect them from Allied artillery intent on dislodging
them. Connected with these fortifications were trenches
cut through the sands, interupted here and there with
hard levels of pebbles - problematic to men having to dig

All that had just been made could cave in and collapse within half an hour. In many
positions the shell-ploughed earth gave in so that entrenching baskets and fascines
had to be worked in for stabilisation. Sacks of sand were in short supply and those
sacks filled with blue Ypres clay were not allowed to be used on the parapets so as not
to alert the enemy of our mining activities. Even more difficult was the construction
of concrete bunkers, as the high water levels did not allow the construction of deep
foundations. All trenches were furnished with wooden grids because of the

”
groundwater. Württembergische Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 127

88 ❙ IRON CROSS

■ Soldiers prepare a detonator in a boarded tunnel. (Brett Butterworth)
trench lines to their greatest depth.
At the very top of the ridge, water was less of an issue
– but as the lines sloped away towards the forest of
Wytschaete and the British lines, the written advice of
Walter Kranz was to be heeded, the Germans making sure
their trenches drained downslope to their enemies. This also
affected the defenders, with a trench line close to the clay
layers that needed special treatment. Here, the defenders
deployed the bricks of the destroyed village to provide drier
footing, and a central wooden drainage channel.
SHELL BLASTED LANDSCAPE
Away from Hill 80, the rest of the ridge comprises various
levels of ‘Paniselian’, overlying, as always, Ypres Clay. At
Messines, the excavation site of 2012-13 uncovered part of
the trench system located on the slopes of the Messines
Ridge, just above the Douve valley. Here are found the
waterlogged Kemmel Sands, sandwiched between clay-
rich layers, and there were even wetter soils, typical of
river valleys, that thicken to considerable depth in the
Douve valley at the foot of the ridge.
The trench system at Messines was constructed as
a strongpoint in the German front line. In fact, the
excavations disturbed what was the German second line
in the defensive system constructed here. By fate, the
German lines almost exactly follow the junction of the
Kemmel Sands, between the 50 and 60 metre contours.
While the centre of Messines sits on drier ground,
trenches in front of the village sit squarely within the
water-rich Kemmel Sands - once again with a threat of
flooding from the ever-present impervious clay beneath.
Evidence of periodic flooding from the sands was
■ Shallow tunnel at Messines, possibly used
for storage. This was close to the water-
logged layers.
provided by successive layers and levels of timber flooring
and duckboarding – not unsurprising given the geological
conditions.
Also exposed in the archaeological investigations at
Messines were narrow trenches, boarded throughout and
revetted with a variety of means. This included doors
and timbers from buildings in the village. Timber used
in trenches in this way was potentially dangerous – it
could create splinters that would add to the problems of
men tightly packed in the line. Also, in situ brushwood
hurdling commonly seen in German trenches. This type
of revetment was the preferred means of protection – but
was difficult to replace in the shell-blasted landscape of
Flanders. Stellungsbau was clear on this point:
‘The sides of trenches must not be revetted with any
material that may make traffic in the trench impossible or
difficult after bombardment. Planks and timber should not
be used if possible. Hurdles are not so objectionable. The
best revetting material is sods or thin loose brushwood.’
The trench system at Messines also included a concrete
shelter with room for six or seven men. While the
concrete found in the drier conditions of the ridge top at
Hohe 80 was predominantly blockwork used to support
and protect the ancient cellars of the mill buildings, this
was cast in situ. The cast concrete at Messines must have
been a response to damp conditions, as the soldiers
struggled with the water-logging of the Kemmel Sands
– water-rich Schwimmsande – beneath their feet. There
was no hope of a mined dug-out here. Concrete was the
solution. From its entrance was a carefully prepared
rifle rack along with a recess with hinged lid containing
German stick-grenades, found just as they had been left
▲
by the last German occupants in June 1917.
IRON CROSS ❙ 89
WESTERN FRONT: THE SCIENCE OF TRENCH CONSTRUCTION

■ Excavated trench in ‘Wytschaete Sands’ at Hill 80.

■ The orange/ochre ‘Wytschaete Sands’ that cap Hill 80, here comprising yellowish sands The dry conditions mean that preservation is poorer,
and layers of pebbles; both are free-draining and dry. archaeologically.

STORAGE AND CONCEALMENT constructed as ‘cut-and cover’. Each tunnel was constructed
At Hohe 80, the defenders had the chance to dig into the using a ‘mining case’ timber revetment, supported by bridle
dry sand and construct a dugout as part of the fortifications joints and pegs. The tunnels have no inclined stairways
– defended and re-inforced cellars, fire trenches and to access them – just simple entrances from the trench
communication trenches were all interlinked. Even here, line to the south of Messines. Most likely, the purpose of
where the driest sands cap the ridge top, clay is not far these tunnels was strorage and concealment, rather than
away. As the slope falls away towards the German lines, so protection from artillery fire. Naturally, the tunnels sit
this material returns and with it, flooding and a need for between the 45 and 50 metre contours, in the sandy-clays
drainage. underlying the waterlogged Kemmel Sands – a factor
Shallow mined tunnels were also uncovered in suggesting that, in winter at least, these tunnels had to be
excavations at Messines. At just 2–3 metres, the protection drained effectively, either by drains running downslope, or
from howitzer shells was likely to have been limited by pumping.
headcover, though it appears there is a rubble ‘burster The Battle of Messines of June 1917 is hailed as a triumph
course’ of building waste, suggesting the tunnels were of military engineering, with the simultaneous explosion
of some 19 mines (though 24 were laid) and an effective
barrage leading to the Allied destruction of the German
frontline positions encompassing the Wytschaete-Bogen
fortess. This story is well known and rightly celebrated. Less
well understood is the effectiveness of German ridge-top
fortress positions. The archaeological investigations of 2012-
13 and 2018 revealed the complexity of this fortress of trench
lines contouring the top of the ridge which had the villages
and other features built into it. It was this fortress that held
the Allies at bay, from the capture of the ridge in 1914, to the
loss of the fortress in the aftermath of the 1917 battle – only
■ Brick-floored trench at
to be regained in the spring of 1918.
Hill 80. This trench line is
closer to the clay layers that These archaeological opportunities provided a unique
lie beneath the Wytschaete insight into the complexities of the construction of a
Sands and presented wetter trench fortress; the need for a detailed understanding of
conditions. Bricks salvaged Kriegsgeologie; the vision of engineer and geologist, Walter
from the ruined buildings of
the village were used to floor
Kranz, and of adherence to military guidance provided by
the trench, with a central an evolving guide, Stellungsbau, which was so successful at
wooden drainage channel. holding the Allies at bay for three long years.

90 ❙ IRON CROSS
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 CONFLICT ARCHAEOLOGY

‘Gelbe 13’
For our conflict archaeology feature in this issue, Cynrik De Decker and
Simon Verdegem unravel the story of a downed Focke Wulf 190 fighter in
Belgium. Archaeology revealed much more than just the wreckage of a warplane,
uncovering the sad tale of its unfortunate pilot.

n 14 May 1943, Willi Lück
and his comrades with 3./JG1
were scrambled to intercept
yet another USAAF bomber
stream heading in over the North Sea.
For the 23-year old from Stettin, a
relatively inexperienced fighter pilot, it
was to be his last mission flying Focke
Wulf 190 A-4, ‘Gelbe 13’ (Yellow 13).
American B-17s, along with P-47
fighters, had been plotted heading for
the General Motors factory in Antwerp.
Before the war, this American company
was manufacturing trucks and cars,
but after the occupation the Germans
took over the factory to continue the
construction of vehicles for the
German Army - many of them for use
on the Eastern Front.
Led by Major Fritz Losigkeit, the
Geschwader was speeding towards the
coast hoping to catch the Americans
before their deadly cargo could be
dropped. Near Ghent, 3. Staffel broke
into smaller formations of two to three
fighters to intercept the Boeings. By
then, every Jagdflieger on the Western
front already knew the weak spot of
the bombers. As B-17’s had not yet
been equipped with chin turrets,
the German fighters positioned
themselves in one line, attacking the
bombers head-on from the front of the
formation. Seconds later, they would
be flying through the formation in the
opposite direction, at nerve-racking
speeds, hoping to hit the nose sections
of the bombers with cannon fire.
Willi, lacking the combat experience
of the others, flew as rear cover behind
his two comrades. One can only
assume his eyes were fixed on the
tails of the leading FW 190s and on the
sleek frontal profile of the four-engine
bombers as they grew larger in his
windscreen. Some .50 calibre flashes
were flickering ahead as the American
gunners fired frantically from all
positions on the Flying Fortresses, but
Willi didn’t see what was coming down
on him from behind.
‘OUT OF CONTROL’
The B-17s, however, were not alone and
were escorted by P-47 Thunderbolts
of the 78th Fighter Group. For the
first time since the Group was in
frontline service, the CO of the unit
saw a unique opportunity to strike
the Luftwaffe defenders. Around 13.15
GMT, his altimeter indicating 27,000
ft, Major James J. Stone Jr. (of Clifton,
Staten Island, New York) pushed his
stick forward and the aircraft pitched
into a dive. What happened next was

■ Focke Wulf 190 A-4 aircraft

of 3./JG1 in 1943. (Chris Goss)

set out in his combat report:
“Ten miles before the bombers
reached their target, my squadron
which I was leading, was approaching
the bombers from the rear right,
approximately 4,000 feet above. A
few miles off to my right, below the
level of the bombers, I saw three
unidentified fighters coming in for a
front quarter attack on the bombers.
I started my dive at approximately
27,000 feet. As I dove down, I identified
the approaching fighters as FW.190’s.
I followed them around towards
the bombers, until they were within
range. I estimate the deflection as
approximately 20 degrees.
I gave a two second burst on the
third fighter but observed no results.
I increased my lead and gave another
two second burst. I believe my range
was approximately 250 yards. A sheet
of flame burst from directly behind
the cockpit and the FW.190 spun to the
right. As I went by, I noticed the FW.190
■ Geophysical survey of the crash site is undertaken prior to the excavation.
spinning straight down, apparently out
of control.
I broke off the attack by pulling
straight up.”
Stone was still too high to see his
victim (in fact, the first ‘kill’ by the
78th Fighter Group) crashing into the
Flemish soil, the dogfight ending with
a ‘draw’ and both sides losing three.
The Americans lost three pilots (two
POW’s, one evader), thus making
the unit’s first encounter with the
Luftwaffe a sour one. Two JG1 pilots
had to make belly landings, but Willi,
the third loss, probably hoped to
achieve the same and maybe he tried
to gain control over the spinning ‘Gelbe
13’. Finally, he apparently decided it
was impossible and baled-out. Due
to centrifugal forces in the violently
spinning fighter, it was very likely
extremely difficult for him to get out
of the narrow cockpit, but he finally
succeeded. Unfortunately, it was too
late and too low. According to the diary
■ A view of the excavation underway at the crash site. The original
impact crater is clearly defined.
■ Left: A formation of 97 Bomb Group
B-17s head towards occupied Europe. It
was a formation such as this which 3./JG1
intercepted.
■ The magnetometer survey of the crash site,
with the red area indicating a concentration of
buried metal.
of German forces stationed locally (the
Kriegstagesbuch), his body was found
near Bontinckstraat in Kalken, a village
to the north of Ghent, and now part of
the community of Laarne.
Willi Lück was initially buried in
Ghent, but after the war his remains
were transferred to the German
cemetery at Lommel, near the border
with Germany. But exactly where his
aircraft had crashed was unknown. Its
▲
IRON CROSS ❙ 93
CONFLICT ARCHAEOLOGY

■ Left:
location was perhaps unimportant to A team
anybody (including the Germans) in member
the midst of a war. examines
the pilot’s
armoured
seat back.
CONCENTRATION OF BURIED
METAL
After interviewing several elderly
■ Below:
people in the village of Kalken, local Portions of
enthusiast Pieter Janssens was led to airframe
some fields along the Dienstweg. With still bearing
his metal detector, he found several paintwork
and traces of
small pieces of aircraft wreckage the German
scattered over a large area. Taking his cross and
interest one stage further, he had no swastika.
problem convincing the owner of the
land, Marc Bollaert, to sign-up to a
fascinating project. At this point, Pieter
informed the Archaeology Team of the
Belgian Aviation History Association
and their metal detection specialist,
Dany Saey, found a large spot which
seemed to show a concentration of
buried metal. Then, a geophysical
survey gave more precise answers and,
with magnetometers, the Unexploded
Ordnance Company, Bom-Be, made an
analysis and pointed out two large iron
objects at a depth of about 3 metres.
In Flanders, the carrying out of ‘digs’,
including on aircraft sites, is prohibited
without a formal license from the
Flemish Government. This can only
be awarded to a suitably qualified
archaeologist. The project team
fortunately received full support from
renowned battlefield archaeologist ■ A team member with one of the recovered
Simon Verdegem and the company guns.
he works for (Ruben Willaert BVBA)
along with five other archaeologists -
including Simon’s colleague, Maarten
Bracke. Both had already gained
significant experience on First World ■ Crumpled but still recognisable, this is the
War battlefield archaeology (eg Hill tailwheel and tyre crumpled inside a portion of
80) but retrieving the remains of a rear fuselage.
German Second World War fighter in a
scientific manner was a new challenge.
Based on results from the
geophysical survey, and a manual scan
on the day of the eventual excavation
in October 2015, the centre of the
anomaly was determined. Around this
centre, a large ‘window’ of about 10m ■ In remarkable condition, this Luftwaffe issue
x 10m was marked out. Within this gravity knife was a fascinating discovery.
boundary, the digger started to peel of ■ Right: A team member examines the
the topsoil, layer by layer, and under remnants of the BMW 801 engine.

94 ❙ IRON CROSS

■ The BMW badge from the engine.
supervision of the archaeologists. This
quickly showed that the pinpointing
was correct as a large irregular feature
started to appear. After recording the
first layer, the feature, as a whole, was
deepened layer by layer. At regular
intervals the excavation was cleaned
in order to be able to observe the
size and shape of the impact crater
properly. When noteworthy changes
were observed, new layer recording
was conducted. The archaeological
results can certainly be described as
successful.
IMPACT CRATER
In the first layer, the impact crater
had a more irregular shape which can
be explained by the immense impact
of the plane during the crash when
the earth was blasted out and away
from the epicentre. At a lower level,
however, and at a depth at which
the fighter made its way through the
ground, it had pushed the earth away
rather than scattering it. As a result, the
ground track no longer had a random
appearance but it literally took on the
shape of the aircraft; a clear distinction
could be made between the fuselage
of the aircraft and the wings. Thanks
to this consecutive recording of the
archaeological layers, it was possible to
determine how the aircraft penetrated
the ground.
■ The spherical-type oxygen bottles recovered
from the wreckage.
Up to the third archaeological
level, the excavation was deepened
in layers and, after each step, a visual
check was carried out in order to
collect any objects that had become
visible. If the objects were relevant
and recognizable, the position was
recorded three-dimensionally. Below
this third level, the concentration of
objects became very high and so it
was decided to dig the items out in
larger volumes, still trying to measure
relevant finds. The final three-
dimensional image of the position of
the artefacts confirmed that the guns
were on a line corresponding to the
position of the aircraft which, in turn,
related to the shape of the impact
crater. In addition, this image provided
additional information with regard to
the position of the aircraft on impact.
Firstly, it was established that the top
of the aircraft was facing northwest.
And that was where most of the objects
were found. In addition, it could be
determined that the aircraft must have
descended almost vertically. This was
proven by the starboard outer gun
which had penetrated the soil almost
perpendicularly.
BULLETS AND SHELLS
As we were dealing with a warplane,
it had to be taken into account that
weapons and ammunition were likely to
■ This rather ghostly image is a portrait of
Willi Lück himself, discovered amongst the
paperwork.
be found - and indeed they were. Many
7.92mm bullets and 20mm shells were
handed over to the Police, to be later
picked up by the Belgian EOD. (Note: the
FW 190 A-4 had two wing root-mounted
20 mm MG151 cannons, two fuselage-
mounted 7.92 mm MG 17s - all four
were synchronised to fire through the
propeller arc - and two outboard wing-
mounted 20 mm MGFFs cannon.)
During the dig, it was clear the
impact must have been huge, the
final item recovered being the BMW
801 engine, embedded at a depth of
3 metres. The BMW 801 was an air-
cooled radial engine, with 14 cylinders,
in a twin row, producing between
1,500 and 2,000 hp, but the impact had
caused all the BMW’s cylinder heads to
separate from the crankcase.
All the larger parts of the aircraft
were close together at the deepest
point of the impact crater. Not only
was the engine found there- at a
depth of approximately 260 cm- but
also the tail with the tail wheel. Due
to the forces of the crash, the aircraft
had been pushed together like an
accordion and reduced to a tangle of
twisted metal. Between all this metal,
however, dozens of well-preserved
and significant remains of the Focke
Wulf were found. The remains of the
fuselage, on which original paint had
been preserved, appeal most to the
▲
imagination. It was here that parts of
IRON CROSS ❙ 95
CONFLICT ARCHAEOLOGY

■ Service personnel
have always been fond
of risqué songs and
■ Laid out for examination and conservation, some of the hundreds of documents, poems. Clearly, Willi ■ Staring from the past, these are
letters etc. discovered in Willi Lück’s briefcase. was no exception! presumed to be the parents of Willi.

the “Gelbe 13” numeral were found, as
well as a fragment of the German cross
and pieces of the Swastika. (Our artist,
Alexander Vandenbohede, was later
able to create an accurate profile of the
aircraft which is reproduced as part of
this feature.) However, it soon became
clear that besides the parts of the
aircraft itself, there were also personal
effects of the pilot amongst the tangled
wreckage. However, the extent of
this only became apparent after the
cleaning of artefacts had taken place.
DIRTY LYRICS
When Willi and his comrades had
scrambled from the Dutch airfield
Deelen that fateful day in May, he
had thrown his briefcase with all his
personnel belongings in the stowage
locker behind the seat – all his pictures,
song books, money, manicure set and
even his side cap. With the route in the
briefing room pointing south, he knew
that after the mission he might well
have to land at another base, outside
Holland. Therefore, Dutch and French
money he had with him could have
been useful that same evening.
The snippets of paper retrieved
three quarters of a century later from
the torn leather briefcase led to a
reconstruction of this fighter pilot’s
story, not mentioned in the official
archives. All his pictures, postcards
and letters were carefully examined
and pieced together. Some documents,
like his Flugzeugführersschein (pilot’s
licence) and Soldbuch (paybook) neatly
documented his military career.
Willi Lück had left Stettin, now in
Poland, to join the Luftwaffe during the
early part of the war. It seems around
that at 1941-1942 he received his initial
flying training, probably in Germany.
Looking at the pictures found in his
wallet, it is clear he remained a family
man. Willi must have been fond of his
grandparents, his sister, his parents
– and after removing the mud, so
their fading faces emerged from the
emulsion in the wet photographs.
During his service, he kept up a very
busy correspondence and stored all the
letters in his briefcase. Unfortunately,
all the German wartime ink had
washed out during its decades long
stay in the wet soil. But, when holding
the letters towards the light, one can
reveal the words like “Mein Lieber…”,
but unfortunately no more details
have yet been found. The handsome
airman certainly loved swimming. And
girls. And it seems that he may having
enjoyed singing songs with dirty lyrics
with his friends. He kept two pages of
these in his wallet!
BROKEN HEART
It was in southern France that Willi
received his combat training and he
must have had fond memories of his
stay in Bordeaux, as he cherished a
postcard from the marketplace of
that city. Whilst off duty from the
training airfield at Cazeaux, it is
clear that he had a good time in the
bars surrounding the airfield, but,
in the spring of 1943, he headed to
Amsterdam. Little is known about
Willi’s short operational career in the
3rd Staffel of JG1, but he quite probably
took part in several interceptions and
must have experienced the danger
of being a fighter pilot. In fact, he
attended the funeral of a fellow pilot in
a hangar of the airfield and kept some
pictures of the guarded coffin besides
a Focke Wulf.
We can also learn from another
document that on 29 March 1943,

96 ❙ IRON CROSS
Willi went to Deelen airfield by train.
But one letter, written and posted in
Holland a few weeks before the combat
of 14 May, is still legible. Seemingly,
Dutch ink had a different composition
than that used by the family in
Germany. Strangely enough, the
two-page letter is addressed to a man
named ‘Peter’. Was Willi known under
another name? Or did he promise to
hand over the letter to the relatives of
a fallen comrade? However, during his
stay in Holland, the addressee clearly
broke the heart of a Dutch girl (G)erry,
who lived in Amsterdam. She wrote
him a letter – but from the syntax it
is clear she was not a native German
speaker:
“My dear Peter,
This morning I received your long-
awaited letter. I thought you had
forgotten me.
My German is not so good, since I
am Dutch, but you must learn Dutch as
well...
You asked me if we can meet again.
Of course. I suggest Sunday 25 April,
at 2 o’clock at the railway station of
Utrecht - we can meet there.
I hope you receive this letter in time
- Feldpost takes a long time. If you’re
unable to join, call me at 0.2900.25784.
(Editor: The phone number prefix 2900
indicates Amsterdam). My master hears
everything and opens all my letters. So,
call me only when it’s really necessary.
It’s almost midnight, and I’m going
to bed.
Sunday 25 April, at the railway
station at 2 o’clock!
Many kisses,
Yours, (G)erry.
P.S. - Whatever my parents think - I
couldn’t care less.”
Whatever the story, it is clear that the
young Dutch girl faced understandable
opposition from her family over her
relationship with a German airman.
FINALE
Until Willi’s relatives are found, all his
documents and his sidecap are kept in
storage, hoping that one day that his
belongings can return to their rightful
owners. Like all German families,
the Lücks paid a huge price during
the war years - some 400 men with
the same surname are mentioned in
the list of the Volksbund Deutsches
Kriegsgraberfursorge. (German War
Graves Service)
And there is yet a grim and utterly ■ Still legible, Willi’s Soldbuch also emerged
sad story behind the family pictures. from the Focke Wulf 190s muddy tomb.
In May 1945, almost to the day two
years after the message of Willi’s death
arrived in Stettin (Silezia), the family
became just some of the millions of
German citizens who now lived inside
the Soviet occupation zones and were
forcibly expelled from their homes.
Those who survived the mass killings,
or harsh conditions as an evacuee, had
to establish another life within the new
borders of post-war Germany.
As a finale to the project, we were
able to reconstruct just a part of Willi
Lück’s story, and to even put a face ■ Although rather battered, this is Willi Lück’s
to the man whose history we were field cap found in the wreckage.
searching for. On the one hand, we
now know so much about him. On the
■ Below: Unlucky thirteen.
other hand, the mystery remains: what An artist’s rendering of
happened to his family? And what is how ‘Gelbe 13’ originally
the final part of this sad story relating appeared.
to an otherwise forgotten casualty of
the war?
IRON CROSS ❙ 97
 WEAPONS OF WAR: THE STURMARTILLERIE

The Iron Fist

The development, use and deployment of one of the Wehrmacht’s most versatile and
ubiquitous weapon systems of the Second World War, the Sturmgeschütz, is charted by
Dr Adrian Wettstein.

or the German Army, the Sturmartillerie or
assault artillery arm, was a timely solution to the
problem of providing fire support to infantry
formations. Inititally, the tactical idea (armoured
and motorised artillery), the weapon system (the
Sturmgeschütz), and the service branch (Sturmartillerie)
formed an indivisible unit. Yet questions of authority and
priorisation of tank production hampered the buildup
of the Sturmartillerie and from the middle of the war it
increasingly found itself in a new role - that of anti-tank
defence.
The roots of the Sturmartillerie were grown in the
First World War, where indirect firing became the
almost exclusive mode of combat for the artillery. This
brought a number of tactical problems during attacks.
Due to a lack of flexible means of communication,
contact between the attacking troops and artillery
was quickly interrupted, making fire control difficult.
When the infantry moved out of the effective range
of its artillery, its positions needed to be shifted,
often leaving the infantry without artillery support.
Fire accuracy was still too low to guarantee effective
shelling of point targets and also often endangered
one’s own troops. What the infantry needed was direct
fire support and an ability to engage and subdue enemy
positions with speed and precision. In a first step, the
German Army improvised with mountain and field guns.
While maneuverable small caliber weapons lacked the
necessary destructive power, the more powerful and
largely horse drawn guns could not follow-up in difficult
terrain. A common problem was the lack of protection
for gun crews, but the solution to this drawback
arrived in 1916: the tank. However, due to mechanical
unreliability, certain vulnerabilities and a lack of
communicative means between tank and infantry, the
potential of the new weapon system was limited.

98 ❙ IRON CROSS
 ■ Left: Bringing heavy fire support
forward with the infantry before
the advent of self-propelled
artillery was a slow and strenuous
process.

■ Commander in Chief of the

Army, Werner von Fritsch. (BA)

■ Left: Generalfeldmarschall Erich

In the 1920s, hampered by restrictions imposed by von Manstein. (BA)
the Treaty of Versailles, the Reichswehr introduced
specifically designed infantry guns as a stop-gap
solution. Yet the problem of maneuverability and crew would be support
protection remained unresolved. A disguised development of the infantry, with
order issued in 1927 for a 7.7 cm gun mounted on a secondary tasks of
commercially available crawler tractor was abandoned anti-tank defence
in 1933 in favour of other means of motorsation. As part and indirect artillery
of tank development, the need for infantry fire support support.
was addressed in the designs of the ‘Großtraktor’, the Due to this
‘Neubaufahrzeug’ and, ultimately, the Panzer IV. However, orientation it was
with a shift of doctrine towards the use of tanks it soon clear, that in regard
became clear that the infantry could not hope to see such to training, the
vehicles among its ranks. Sturmartillerie would
closely align itself
with the infantry.
STURMARTILLERIE On 15 June 1936,
In 1935, Erich von Manstein, head of the operational parallel to Manstein’s concept, the Inspection office of
department of the Army’s General Staff, suggested the the Artillery issued an order for the development for a
creation of a Sturmartillerie branch to his superiors. In “corollary armoured artillery for infantry and anti-tank
June 1936, after his suggestion had been approved, he defence” (Begleitartillerie unter Panzer für Infanterie
started to formulate the concept of armoured vehicles und Panzerabwehr) - the Sturmgeschütz, or assault gun,
in the German Army. During breakthrough operations, or StuG for short. Other influencers were Oberst Walter
the infantry would now be linked up to composite tank Model and Major Hans Röttiger, later the first Inspector
formations, but also to homogenous Panzer brigades of the Bundeswehr. In 1937, the Commander in Chief
which concentrated on focal points of attack. As a third of the Army, Werner von Fritsch, signed an armament
component, the Sturmartillerie would be organically programme which planned to equip each infantry division
allocated to infantry divisions where the primary function with Sturmartillerie-Abteilung by 1940. By this point,

■ Left: Oberwachtmeister Karl Heinz Banze of 1./Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 244 and his crew pose for the camera of the PK propaganda photographers,
Summer 1942. Banze was awarded the Knight’s Cross on 27 May 1942 for engaging a large concentration of heavy and medium Soviet tanks and
▲

destroying 13 without any support. Banze was taken prisoner by the Red Army in 1943. Missing since that time, he was declared dead in 1945.

IRON CROSS ❙ 99
WEAPONS OF WAR: THE STURMARTILLERIE
■ Two early production Stug III G of 5. SS-Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung (Wiking) in the frozen wastelands near Lysyanka in February 1944, protecting German
troops who escaped the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket.
infantry and armoured troops had shown little interest in
the new weapon system, which resulted in its placement
in the hands of the artillery. Although not initially planned,
this made sense in terms of organisation and training.
Nevertheless, changes of specifications began to cause
delays from 1937 onwards but the first five prototype
Sturmgeschütze were successfully tested by the Artillerie-
Lehr-Regiment in Jüterbog in the winter of 1937/38.
Other promising assault gun tests were conducted by the
Infanterie-Lehr-Regiment in Döberitz. The commander
of this unit, later Generaloberst Hans-Valentin Hube,
propagated to detach the Sturmgeschütze from the
artillery and closely incorporate them into the infantry by
forming a 15th company within regiments. This suggestion
was rejected by the artillery.
In the end, both sides lost when problems in production
delayed the order of the first series of assault guns, which
■ Stug III of Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 270 with winter tracks.
100 ❙ IRON CROSS
would only be fully delivered by May 1940. These delays
arose because leading initiators of the Sturmartillerie
programme had been removed or replaced by the end
of 1938 as a result of their criticism against Hitler’s path
towards war. With the outbreak of war, any further
expansion of the programme was halted - if nothing else
by advocates of a strong Panzer force. The build-up of the
Panzer forces made use of the same armament capacities
required by the Sturmartillerie - the chassis and guns of
the StuGs were needed for the production of the Panzer III
and IV. When war broke out, only a single assault artillery
formation was operational - a shortfall that quickly
became apparent during the Wehrmacht’s campaign in
Poland. Eight months later, the march into France was
accompanied by two batteries of the Sturmartillerie
and two more were raised during the campaign. Their
success in combat, as well as the solution to production
problems, finally paved the way for the extension of the
assault artillery arm. By 22 June 1941 this had grown to
twelve operational Sturmgeschütz-Abteilungen and five
independent Sturmgeschütz-Batterien with a total of 250
assault guns. Nevertheless, the German Army was still far
away from Manstein’s aim of a Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung
for each infantry division. For now, the Sturmgeschütz-
Abteilungen remained Heereseinheiten, or independent
army units.
WEAPON SYSTEM OF CHOICE
Up until March 1942 the backbone of assault artillery was
formed by the Sturmgeschütz III (Ausf. A to E). The main
armament of each variant consisted of the short 7,5 cm
Sturmkanone 37 mounted into a casemate-like structure
 Artwork by Dawn Monks Military Art

IRON CROSS ❙ 101

▲
WEAPONS OF WAR: THE STURMARTILLERIE
■ Collar tabs of the Sturmartillerie.
The Panzertruppe skulls are mounted
on grey with bright red piping. ■ The StuG III Ausf.C-D showing its low and squat profile.
which sported a concentration of armour towards the
front (50mm). The Sturmkanone was suitable to effectively
engage soft targets and field positions. Against bunkers
and tanks it was largely ineffective due to its low muzzle
velocity, a problem partially solved with the arrival of
hollow charge shells at the end of 1941. Having no rotating
turret, the StuG had a low silhouette, sported strong
armour facilitated by its favourable shape and carried a
large supply of ammunition. In addition, it was about 20%
cheaper to produce than a Panzer III.
After the fall of Poland, the Panzerwaffe, Germany’s
tank arm, sought to acquire similar vehicles to lend
HE fire support to its formations, but without making
itself independent of the artillery. A heavy 15cm sIG
33 infantry gun was mounted on the obsolete chassis
of the Panzer I, complete with carriage and wheels, in
place of the turret and superstructure. Thin plates of
armour were used to form a tall, open-topped fighting
■ The rather cumbersome looking Sturmpanzer.
102 ❙ IRON CROSS
compartment on the forward part of the hull. This
protected little more than the gun and the gunner
himself from small arms fire and shell fragments, the
loaders being completely exposed. The Sturmpanzer I
suffered from an overstressed chassis and was reliant on a
seperate vehicle to carry its ammunition, problems which
coined successive developments like the Sturmpanzer
II and the Sturmpanzer 38. A more weighty problem
was the fact that with the Sturmpanzer I, foundations
for parallel development of Sturmgeschütze (assault
guns) and Sturmpanzer (assault tanks) had been laid,
which put a strain on production and development
resources. The Sturmpanzer remained the support
weapon system of choice of the Panzerwaffe until
1943, offering high firepower with limited mobility and
weak armour protection. The StuG, on the other hand,
offered a mixture of all important parameters, especially
after the installation of a long-barreled gun. A second
problematic development, which watered down the basic
idea of organisational unity between Sturmgeschütz and
Sturmartillerie, was laid with the allocation of the 5th
battery of the Sturmartillerie to the motorised Infanterie-
Regiment ‘Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler’. Success of the
Sturmartillerie soon resulted in other service branches
announcing an interest in the Sturmgeschütz, while first
batches were exported to Germany’s allies. This slowed
down the build-up of the Sturmartillerie and began to
deplete its strength in the second half of the war.
ELITE FORCE
The German attack on the Soviet Union marked the first
large-scale use of Sturmartillerie and its actual baptism
of fire. The Eastern Front would remain the main field
of operations for the Sturmartillerie and only a few
formations fought in other theatres of war. In the summer
and autumn 1941, the Sturmartillerie built its reputation
as a reliable and efficient partner of the infantry. It
■ A Sturmgeschütz flanked by a Sd.Kfz. 250/6 light ammunition carrier.
■ Oberleutnant Walter Oberloskamp of 3. Batterie/Sturmgeschütz-
Abteilung 667 received his Knight’s Cross on 10 May 1943 for his
40th tank kill. He was killed in action on 25 June 1944.
supported it in the battle for field positions, fortification
lines, in urban terrain and, in spite of the aforementioned
technical limitations of its guns, offered an additional
anti-tank capacity. An evaluation report published by the
training department of the Army’s General Staff in the
autumn of 1942 stated that: ‘Next to their actual impact,
the influence on the morale of our own infantry is not
to be underestimated’. In 1943/44, in the face of massed
attacks of Soviet armour, the factor of morale increased in
importance. Due to high levels of training and motivation
of crews, coupled with the well equipped Sturmgeschütz,
the Sturmartillerie turned into an elite force. Better
optics, coupled with artillery training, meant that in
long distance engagements the Sturmartillerie gunners
generally achieved much better accuracy than those of the
Panzertruppe.
The perception in which Sturmartillerie was seen as
a supporting weapon for the infantry was an important
factor which facilitated their cooperation. Yet this
■ An atmospheric shot of StuG III of Abt.185 on
operations in Riga, 1941.
cooperation didn’t always run smoothly, partly because
the infantry rarely had the chance to train with StuGs.
This also applied to formations to which Sturmgeschütze
were allocated as an organic element. A combat report
of Sturmgeschütz-Kompanie 1253, the tank-hunting
element of the 253. Infanterie-Division, remarked that:
‘Due to its precipitous deployment and disengagement
which followed, the company had no time left to practice
cooperation with the infantry. In addition, respective
situations neither allowed for an extensive debate between
leaders, nor did they leave time for necessary contact
with the Unterführer.’ Friction like this could result in
tactical errors, unnecessary casualties and, in the end,
failure. To improve cooperation, training aids were issued,
summarising the basic principles of joint operations in
short, mnemonic sentences such as: “If you are supported
by assault guns and tank hunters, then don’t stick to them
like a limpet. This will only cause you casualties, as these
armoured combat vehicles draw enemy fire and offer little
protection for yourself.” Training aids were frequently
published, indicating that cooperation standards remained
unsatisfactory until the end of the war.
EXCELLENT ANTI-TANK PERFORMANCE
The spring of 1942 formed a turning point in
Sturmartillerie history when, with the introduction of
the long-barreled 7,5cm Sturmkanone 40, the scope of
duty shifted from infantry support to anti-tank defence.
This development has to be illuminated against the
background of the anti-tank crisis - a lingering problem
since the summer of 1941 caused by the advent of new
medium and heavy Soviet tanks. When the anti-tank
guns then fielded had proven unable to combat the new
threat, the German Army begun fielding long-barreled
7,5cm anti-tank guns on a broad front from the beginning
of 1942. Next to the 7,5cm PAK 40, they were mounted
▲
on new models of the Sturmgeschütz and also on the
IRON CROSS ❙ 103
WEAPONS OF WAR: THE STURMARTILLERIE
■ Oberwachtmeister Richard Schramm of 1./Sturmgeschuetz-Abteilung 202
posing on his personal vehicle christened “Seeteufel” - the Sea Devil.
■ Sturmgeschütz-StuG IIIs roll into action.
104 ❙ IRON CROSS
Panzer IV and self-propelled guns (Marder family). As a
stop-gap solution, captured guns like the Soviet 76mm
divisional gun (fielded as 7,62cm Pak 36r) and the French
M1897 75mm field gun (fielded as 7,5cm Pak 38/97)
were also employed in large numbers. Soon, it became
apparent that the StuG III Ausf. F, not only because its
firepower, maneuverability and armour protection, but
also because of the general quality of its crews, produced
excellent results in the anti-tank role. The sole criticism -
especially on the Eastern Front - was insufficient mobility
in open terrain: “Sturmgeschütz good, yet cross-country
performance anything but sufficient” stated a laconic
report by the 28. Jäger-Division in 1943.
Considering the performance of the Sturmgeschütze,
it is not surprising that voices from the Eastern Front
demanded more of these weapon systems. Even though
production numbers increased by 50% in 1942, the 824
vehicles built were far from the numbers needed to equip
each infantry division with an organic Sturmgeschütz-
Abteilung. Until the end of 1942, 27 Abteilungen had been
deployed in the East, while their nominal strength was
raised from 22 to 31 assault guns (of which, on average,
only 12 were operational at any given time). Larger
numbers would have been possible, but excellent anti-
tank performance had sparked increased desires. Thus
10% of annual production output went to formations
of the Waffen-SS, while one battery of four StuGs went
to Luftwaffe field divisions which had been raised in
the autumn of 1942 - much to the dismay of the Heer,
whose own infantry were still being denied organic
Sturmgeschütz formations. Also, the performance of these
Sturmgeschütz-Batterien lagged far behind the successes
of the Sturmartillerie. A survey made after winter battles
south of Ladoga Lake at the start of 1943 concluded: “The
four Sturmgeschütz-Batterien of the Luftwaffe with a
total of 20 StuGs, with 5 losses, had destroyed a total of
17 enemy tanks. In the same period and same operational
area, the Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 226 with 41 vehicles
had destroyed not less than 210 Soviet tanks while losing
13 vehicles.”
KNIGHT’S CROSSES
As the number of enemy tanks destroyed served as
a marker for the issuing of medals, the increasing
deployment of Sturmartillerie in the anti-tank role
was also mirrored in the award practice. No less than
124 Knight’s Crosses and 15 Oak Leaves were awarded
to men of the Sturmartillerie. On 19 September 1942,
for example, Oberwachtmeister Hubert Primozic (2./
Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 667), received his Knight’s
Cross after the destruction of 45 tanks. Four months later,
for his 60th tank kill, he became the first Unteroffizier
of the army to be decorated with the Oak Leaves to the
Knight’s Cross. Not atypical for an experienced NCO of
the Sturmartillerie, he was pulled out of the line shortly
■ Leutnant Bodo Spranz, one of the most successful assault gun aces, was decorated with the Oak Leaves to the Knight’s Cross in October 1943. He is
credited with the destruction of 74 enemy tanks, four of which he destroyed single-handedly with hand-held weapons.
afterwards and relegated to train new Sturmartillerie
crews. In a very similar case, Wachtmeister Fritz Amling
(3./Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202) was decorated with the
Knight’s Cross on 11 December 1942 after his 40th tank kill
(24 of them scored on a single day) and was transferred to
a training role shortly after.
Massed tank kills often decided the course of battle, and
on 14 August 1942, III./Infanterie-Regiment 429, supported
by two batteries of Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 201, attacked
the so-called ‘Artilleriewäldchen’ (artillery copse) west
of Voronezh. When, after only 200 meters, the attack
started to stall in strong flanking fire, Zugführer (platoon
leader) Oberwachtmeister Johannes Kochanowski,
spotted a group of Soviet armour at the edge of the forest.
Identifying a focal point of the enemy defence he took
on the 12 Soviet tanks (eight of them T-34s), even though
he was on his own. After having destroyed two of them,
he had to exit his vehicle to clear his jammed gun under
enemy fire, after which he destroyed the remaining
Soviet tanks within 20 minutes. The Soviet defenders
were shocked, while the German infantry renewed its
attack and managed to occupy the ‘Artilleriewäldchen’.
Kochanowski was decorated with the Knight’s Cross, but
for the decisive character of his actions rather than the
total of 31 tank kills he had accumulated.
HITLER’S DEMANDS
The fighting in Stalingrad made clear that the infantry was
still dependent on mobile, armoured fire support. On 22
September 1942, Hitler himself stated that: “The fight for
Stalingrad has resulted in the clear necessity of having
the heaviest possible gun in the heaviest possible vehicle,
with the ability to fire high-explosive projectiles which
can destroy whole buildings with a few shots. It doesn’t
have to fire at long range, neither does it have to be fast.
Decisive, on the other hand, is good armour protection.”
This demand led to three lines of development: based
on the existing StuG III chassis were the Sturmhaubitze
42 armed with a short 10,5 cm howitzer and the Sturm-
Infanteriegeschütz 33B, in which the sIG33 was mounted
into a new armoured superstructure. While the first
Sturmhaubitzen were inexplicably sent to Heeresgruppe
Nord (Army Group North), the Sturm-Infanteriegeschütze
were sent to Stalingrad. Even though the crews had not
been trained on the new vehicles, some had not been
fully furnished with equipment and not even been zeroed
in, the reviews were generally favourable. Nevertheless,
production ceased after only 24 vehicles had been built
- mainly because the artillery - in charge of development
- voted in favour of the Sturmhaubitze 42, and up to April
▲
1945 more than 1,300 were built.
IRON CROSS ❙ 105
WEAPONS OF WAR: THE STURMARTILLERIE
■ Leutnant Bodo Spranz.
■ Grenadiers posing on a Zimmerit
covered StuG IV.
Hitler’s demand also led to a new design for the
Panzertruppe. As the weight of the heavy infantry gun
had overstressed the older chassis and engines (even
without a serious amount of armour) it was decided to
design a well-armoured vehicle on the basis of the Panzer
IV, this time in a fully enclosed superstructure. The
resulting Sturmpanzer IV, or Stupa as it was known, was
an excellent vehicle, but with production numbers rarely
rising over 20 per month, its general effect remained
marginal.
■ Wachtmeister Fritz Amling of 3./Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 202. He
was decorated with the Knight’s Cross on 11 December 1942 after his
40th tank kill.
106 ❙ IRON CROSS
A third result of Hitler’s demand was the Sturmpanzer
VI, better known as the ‘Sturmtiger’. This super-heavy
vehicle mounted a 38,5 cm rocket launcher (38-cm-
SturmMörser RW61 L/5,4) on the chassis of a Tiger I
and was surrounded with heavy armour (up to 150mm
at the front). The projectile it fired contained 125 kg
of explosives, enough to bring down a whole housing
block with one hit. A special hollow charge rocket could
pierce 2.5 metres of ferro-concrete. Even though only 18
Sturmtiger were built, a new service branch was created:
the Panzermörsertruppe (tank mortar troop). In April
1945, this transferred from the Panzertruppe to the
artillery. The new weapon system was only once used in
the role for which is had been designed, and during the
suppression of the Warsaw Uprising it demonstrated great
psychological impact, notwithstanding the inaccuracy of
its mortar projectile which made effective cooperation
with the infantry virtually impossible.
BACKBONE OF THE INFANTRY
1943 brought a further expansion of the Sturmartillerie.
By the end of the year, 39 Abteilungen with a total of
1,006 Sturmgeschütze were deployed on the Eastern
Front alone, yet nearly a third of formations were in
need of being refreshed. ‘The Sturmartillerie is truly
the backbone of our infantry, which often faces near-
unresolvable tasks. In those engagement where it
makes an appearance, it usually proves decisive’ stated
a report in 1943. With the creation of the office of

Generalinspekteur of the Panzertruppen, a role filled by
no other than Generaloberst Heinz Guderian, a strong
counterweight to the Sturmartillerie was formed in
the apparatus of German military bureaucracy. From
early on he demanded the fusion of Sturmartillerie with
that of the Panzerjägertruppe, the anti-tank troops.
Subsequently, Guderian endeavoured without success to
bring the Sturmartillerie under his control. Crucial for
his motivation, at least initially, were high Sturmgeschütz
production numbers with which he hoped to bolster the
critical tank production output. While tank production
slipped fully into crisis, Sturmgeschütz production
didn’t. Guderian managed to achieve at least partial
success when, by direct orders of Hitler, 100 StuGs of the
running production were allocated to his Panzertruppe
on a monthly basis. These were first were used to equip
Panzer- and Panzergrenadier Divisions in the west, while
later Sturmgeschütze were introduced in all types of
armoured formations depending on where they were
needed.
Within Panzer-Divisions, the StuGs caused quite a
headache. In October and November 1943, Panzer-
Regiment 36 of 14. Panzer-Division used StuGs for a
variety of tasks. “Their use in the Panzer-Regiment” it
stated, “...as spearhead or flank protection, cannot be
recommended. The proven method for success is the
cooperation of Sturmgeschütz with the Panzergrenadiers.
The Sturmgeschütze offer a strong feeling of security to
the Grenadiers, especially during attacks by enemy tanks.
Attacking with Panzergrenadiers, the Sturmgeschütz can
■ A StuG crew pose
with their vehicle
as ammunition is
loaded.
engage heavy weapons (...), while the Panzergrenadiers
can keep infantry and anti-tank rifles away from
the Sturmgeschütze.” The basic principles remained
unchanged: The Sturmgeschütz was an infantry support
weapon, not a tank replacement.
From the summer of 1943, a few of the StuGs delivered
to the Panzerwaffe were allocated to the Panzerjäger-
Abteilungen of selected infantry divisions, a total of seven
companies with about 100 StuGs. With this, single infantry
divisions received organically attached Sturmgeschütze.
The output of about one and a half months of massively
increased production (3,411 vehicles) in 1943 went to
the Waffen-SS and Luftwaffe. A record compiled in the
same period shows that only 54% of Sturmgeschütze
were allocated to the Sturmartillerie, 25% were with the
Panzertruppe, 13% with the Waffen-SS, only 5,5% with
infantry divisions and about 2% with the Luftwaffe. Up
to January 1944, the numbers further disadvantaged the
Sturmartillerie with more StuGs serving outside than
inside the Sturmartillerie. This trend got even worse in the
Summer of 1944, not only due to increased losses but also
due to increased allocation of StuGs to other branches.
Technically, the StuG III G with increased armour
(80mm) and Topfblende gun-mantel, was the final version
on the basis of the Panzer III chassis. To buffer production
bottlenecks caused by Allied aerial bombing in November
1943, Krupp took on the existing idea of mounting a StuG
superstructure on a Panzer IV chassis. From December
1942 up until the end of the war, the Gruson works in
▲
Magdeburg assembled over 1,100 StuG IVs.
IRON CROSS ❙ 107
WEAPONS OF WAR: THE STURMARTILLERIE

■ Most of the StuG force was deployed on the Eastern Front, although they
did serve in other theatres. Here, a heavily camouflaged and Zimmerit-
pasted StuG IV sits in a Normandy lane during the summer of 1944 shortly
after the Allied landings.

GUDERIAN THE NEMESIS

Up until the beginning of 1944, Sturmartillerie personnel
were drawn solely from the recruit pool of the artillery.
This changed when, at the beginning of the year, the
Sturmartillerie was granted the right to directly recruit
volunteers. On one hand, this took the strain off the
artillery and on the other drew fresh applicants. These
new recruitment opportunities and increased production
numbers facilitated further growth in the Sturmartillerie
arm in the first half of 1944. The Summer formed a
major turning point for the Wehrmacht as a whole. Mass
casualties, caused by the double-blow in Normandy
and Belarus, could not be buffered anymore. In quick
succession, new formations with low combat value were
raised, and insufficiently
trained personnel were
pumped into existing
formations. Within this
crisis, the Sturmartillerie
was additionally affected
by a shift of power in
command.
In the wake of the
unsuccessful attempt on
Hitler’s life on 20 July 1944,
its Nemesis, Guderian,
became Chief of Staff
of the Army. In his new
position, Guderian limited
expansion plans of the
Sturmartillerie restricting
it to a strength of 45
■ Generaloberst Heinz Abteilungen (although with
Guderian. (BA) 45 instead of 31 StuGs). Due
■ A StuG rolls through the streets of Vilnius.
to this, the Sturmartillerie received fewer vehicles than
in prior months, sometimes even fewer than promised,
and making it impossible to rebuild after the catastrophic
Summer of 1944. On the other hand, the anti-tank troops,
the Panzerjäger-Abteilungen, were allocated more than
1,300 StuGs, nearly 30% of the total 1944 production.
In contrast, the personnel situation of the
Sturmartillerie was excellent. With a field strength of
22,500 men (1 December 1944) it received 9,000 recruits
in 1944; fresh troops meant to be used to raise the
Infanterie-Begleitkompanien (infantry escort companies)
which had been approved in February that year. Due to
the material situation, especially the lack of motorised
transport, this had become impossible. Repair and
maintenance facilities were insufficient and specialist
technicians and recovery vehicles were not available in
sufficient numbers. A report written in May 1944 stated:
‘Sturmgeschütz-Brigade 259: Losses in March: 7 guns
lost due to enemy action. 34 guns blown up because of
impossibility of repair or recovery. Sturmgeschütz-Brigade
286: 31 guns lost during withdrawal movement, 7 due to
enemy action. Remainder bogged down in the mud or

108 ❙ IRON CROSS

■ A knocked-out StuG is examined by British soldiers. Note the impact marks on the sloping glacis armour.
due to lack of means of recovery. 10 guns of 24 lost due to
transmission damage.”
DANGEROUS OPPONENTS
1945 saw the downfall of the Third Reich and its armed
forces and, just as in other areas, StuG production broke
down completely in March 1945. At this point, in the East
and West, 37 Abteilungen of the Sturmartillerie were
deployed and on 15 March 1945 had 606 Sturmgeschütz
available - an average of 16 operational StuGs in each
Abteilung. Due to planned reductions of vehicle types,
it was intended to equip the whole Sturmartillerie arm
with Jagdpanzer 38(t), a step which would probably have
resulted in the total fusion of the Sturmartillerie with the
Panzerjägertruppe. The Stug had also reached the limits of
performance capabilities. Its firepower, armour thickness
and maneuverability were by then outclassed by the latest
Soviet tanks and SPGs. What this meant is described by
Leutnant Alfred Regeniter of 3./Sturmgeschützbrigade 276:
‘I spot a tank “Josef Stalin 122” at 2,000 metres. I fire 8 AP-
shells, the tracer lines of which are well visible. All ricochet
off the target, even though the gun hits tremendously well.’
Using correct tactics, and led by experienced commanders,
Sturmgeschütze remained dangerous opponents until
the end of the war as shown during an engagement at
Möderath, west of Cologne, on 3 March 1945, when three
StuG of 1. Kompanie/Panzer-Abteilung 103, skillfully led
by Oberleutnant Walz, destroyed 24 American armoured
vehicles with only one loss.
The Sturmartillerie was born from tactical needs
encountered during the First World War. Always under-
strength, it fought successfully in the first half of the Second
World War, but in the middle of the conflict, the changed
logic of war forced on it a new role in which it continued
to perform successfully until the final days of the war.
Sturmgeschütze have been credited with the destruction of
over 20,000 tanks, but just like the rest of the German war
machine suffered from questions of authority, bottlenecks
in production and lack of resources. That it remained a
successful tool of war is explained by the quality of its
material and the high quality of training and strong will of its
crews. In the end, they were who turned the Sturmartillerie
into the much lauded “Iron Fist” of the infantry.
IRON CROSS ❙ 109
 PHOTOS FROM THE FRONT
Colour by RJM
 M T
RO

OS F

HE
#2

F RO
OT
NT PH

A Family Christmas
in Wartime

T
his unnamed family from Cologne-Ehrenfeld pose
for the photographer on Christmas Day 1916. It is
an image typical of the period.
One member of the family, the husband of the
young woman on the right and also the father to the two
children, is away serving in the Army and possibly at the
front. However, the husband and father is still ‘present’
in the form of two photographs showing him in uniform,
both having been positioned on a chair in the centre of the
group. Families on both sides of the conflict found enforced
seperation especially difficult at this time of the year.
For families in Germany, and for all soldiers at the front,
Christmas was – and remains - an important time. For
soldiers, Christmas served as some kind of anchor - a
tiny bit of normality in the chaos of war which reminded
them of the life they left behind and of the life they hoped
soon to return to. It is likely that a copy of this photograph
would have been sent to the unknown German soldier
wherever he was serving.
In the months and weeks ahead of Christmas, the
number of postal shipments to the front and back
home to Germany increased massively. Early in the war,
Christmas shipments to the front often included clothing,
and equipment such as electric torches and pocket knives
along with luxury comfort goods including chocolate
and other confectionary. In the last years of the war, it
was alcohol, tobacco and books which were among the
more popular Christmas presents. However, during the
period of the first Christmas of the war in 1914, parcels
sent from the front and back home to Germany often
included war souvenirs. These not only included enemy
helmets, foreign money, cap badges and other insignia,
but also live ammunition such as bullets and shell fuses.
After several accidents were
recorded, this practice was
banned. It would certainly
have been the case that as
the war progressed so any
appetitie or interest in warlike
gifts would have diminished.
When looking at this
photograph, one is left to
ponder and to wonder, did
the soldier concerned ever
make it back to his family for
happier post-war Christmas
celebrations?
■ German soldiers celebrate Christmas 1915 in the
trenches. Huddled around a Christmas tree they display
welcome gifts from home, including Tobler chocolate,
gloves and alcohol. (B. Butterworth) IRON CROSS ❙ 111
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 ISSUE 4

Next Issue
The next issue of Iron Cross (Issue No.4) will be on sale 25 March 2020 and the
following features will be included as just some of the magazine’s exciting content.

I
n each issue of Iron Cross, the
editorial team and some of the
world’s leading experts specialising
in German military history subjects
bring you a diverse selection of articles
along with an impressive range of
unique and fascinating imagery.
BATTLE OF PROCHOROVKA -
FACTS VERSUS FABLES
In this EXCLUSIVE feature for Iron Cross
magazine, Dr. Roman Töppel, one of the
world’s leading experts on the Battle of
Kursk, presents the fascinating story of
the Battle of Prochorovka with all the
latest available research - controversially
disproving much that has previously
been written on the subject. (1)
UNDEFEATED IN THE AIR?
When the Great War ended with the
defeat of Germany, its air arm – the
Luftstreitkraefte – remained a powerful
and potent fighting force. In this
thought-provoking and compellingly
interesting piece, Dr. Niklas Napp
asks the question: Were the German
Luftstreitkraefte really undefeated
1
when war ended in November 1918? (2)
THE POWER OF INITIATIVE
“Everything in war is very simple,
but the simplest thing is difficult”. In
this informative feature, Dr. Marco
Sigg explains the successful German
phenomenon of ‘Auftragstaktik’, or
mission command, where subordinate
leaders are given clearly defined
objectives which they must implement
3
independently. (3)
SINKING THE EMPRESS
In 1940, the 42,348 Gross Registered
Ton luxury passenger liner Empress of
Britain was Britain’s second largest ship
and the tenth largest merchant vessel
in the world. When she was crippled in
an air attack on 26 October, and sunk
two days later by a U-boat, her loss was
a propaganda coup for Germany. This
intriguing piece by Luftwaffe historian
Chris Goss unravels the story. (4)

2 4 4

GUARANTEE YOUR COPY OF ISSUE 4. SEE P62 FOR DETAILS.

IRON CROSS ❙ 113

 Limited Edition
Collector’s
Magazine JUST
A 132-page magazine celebrating
the 100th anniversary of the RAF
TH E HI ST
ORY OF
TH E RA F  OR LD WA
£7.99
R II

and Hurrican
England had e reinforcements
L  


over Dun only enou lying from
kirk for 10 gh fuel to remain
minutes. Y OF THE RAF
Batle of Brit
ain and
THE HISTOR
By 4 June
1940, mos the Blitz
evacuated t
from Dun of the BEF had been
Britain had kirk and the
one of exub changed from blac mood in
k
soon tem erant cheerfulness. despair to
pered this
when he wave of optiChurchill
delivered
Common a speech in mism,
s the House
that, “We on 4 June, remindi
must be very ng the Brit of
to this deliv careful ish
Wars are erance the attributenot to assign
not won by s
On the 18 evacuations.”of a victory.
plainer, sayi June he made mat
called the ng, “What General ters even 1
Battle of Fran Weygand
of Britain
is about to ce is over. he Batthas
Hitler had begin.” le
ater the inva made a number 1
of
peaceful settl sion of Poland, to attempts, 3
he ordered ement with Britainarrive at a
of raids on the Lutwafe to begi and when e
marine Spitir
indicate that26 June 1940, his Diren their cycle e of a Super
it 1. Early pictur 2. RAF
settlement, was done to secu ctive s 602 Squadron
1 atached to graphed in
1941,
the British rather than an occu re a peaceful MkII, photo 3.
Beauighter nightighter
was initiallyIsles. Consequently pation of the main RAF antial
, the Battle when it was ing the subst
incapacitate one of attrition, inten tower , show
lt for the
Chain Home
defence agai the RAF, leaving ded to proved diicu
Britain no structure which cantly damage
begin peac nst air attack and signii
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publicised ons. 2
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RAF
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sion of Brit diiculties inhe ive operations 1. A row of newly of tracer ammunition
ge tion (Used under
GFDL)
Messerschmit Specialist opertions were also con-
ain. rent day of ofens showing passa ic Aircraft Collec Messerschmit Bf 110 C-4 Specialist operathis period including;
The Batle (Eagle Day). Day until of the Histor g
delayed Eagle is FVBBM597 Hawker Bf 109E ducted durin s raid by 617 Squadron
Five main of Britain Bad weather gh attacks on the radar Supermarine Hurricane Mk.IIC 348mph
phases in 2 cant problems Spitire Mk V B 354mph the Dambuster’ ise) and the raid on
identiied
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are 13 August, althou 12 Augu st, resulting one of their most signii le amongst Characteristics 340mph 1,500mi (Operation Chast n, Den-
difer as to historians, although usually on the was in Copenhage
stations began air briely, targets in singly poor mora , 370mph 411mi
Gestapo HQ e target
originate the actual dates. ho authorities taken of the six st non-military in aircrat as was increa general. By 7 September Maximum speed 35,000 ft Carthage).h
again within
600mi
in three being being sent again s the Lutwafe
in
e to destroy
the 36,089ft mark (Operationraid was Gestapo
from the
Royal Air se given here were working of practical Midlands. Losse t lties and failur ing to abandon
470mi
er
26 June –
16 Force Mus although all led the lack Essex and the , with 102 German aircra aircrew casua Combat radius 36,000ft Pilot and observ of the Carth
age yed,
Raids), scatt July: Störangrife eum: hours. his revea ble to the Lutwafe, since ground led Goer the Blitz on 36,500ft Pilot hit and destro
(Nu were about equal ged for the loss of 110 RAF on the Service ceiling Pilot HQ, which was tunately, the raid also
involving ered, relatively light isance Number of squadr
intell igenc e availa tower s and yed or dama 40 of these attack s and begin
to recover. Pilot gh, unfor Catholic
small num raids ons 3
the robust radar the destro
rs, although
nearly the airield RAF stations s althou ed a nearby
both day
and night. bers of aircrat duri
Aircraft type they targeted and telephone lines from British ighte on the ground. Aircrew on, leaving the reements Crew of Britain ighter mistakenly attackin the deaths of 86
8
r Lond been disag teristics of Batle
17 July –
12
ng Fairey Batle not the powe which would have made were destroyed with the have
Although there the danger this period Performance charac ing
school, result and 39 adults.
(Shipping) August: Daylight 2 Role
sector statio
ns, s. Between more disparity, rs insisted
losses showed 160 aircrew and the RAF t of
and, modern schoolchildren
strategic target afe attacked over the exten

WIN A RIDE IN A h senior oice

Kan
attacks agai attacks now intensiie alkampf
Bristol Blenh Light bomb
6 eim sent on thes much better losing Fighter Comm RAF never Lutwafe, Britis ped formations based
nst port d, as
er
in some casee operations were st, the Lutw te Lutwafe only 29 casualties. presented to s to be that the NS
night raid s,
s on RAF coastal airields and
did Hawker Hurri Medium bomb 13 and 15 Augu some of the smaller satelli sustaining ned of in the
following
consensus seem to the destruction plann
ed
tactics upon tight V-sha t, which only allowed OF OPERATIO
CASUALTIES CARTHAGE
cane shot dow

LANCASTER
er s whole
manufacturin stations and RAF to the Bf
109s. How squadrons being lost
n, lds,
coastal airie made further raids on Operations slacke and bad weath
er
really came close Fighter Command’s Fighters and in performance between er upon three aircra t any degree of all-ro
und
13 August g centres. aircrat aircraft deplo Fighter
air stations and as well as mounting the pilot fatigue he diferences the Spitire and the Hawk st CHASTISE AND
– 6 Sept
Number of squadr
ons
yed to Fran
ce in 1940
the threat ever
of invasion , on 7 September day week due to suppl ied with inferi
or
by the Lutwafe. sed betwe en 3 August and gh the leading aircra d fatally lawed again tise
Operation Chas
chain again prove
(Eagle Atta emb er: Adle Aircraft type Bomber and caused both the radar
er of sorties
on a single and Goering, s on the radar aircrat actua
lly increa 1,906 the Bf 109 were marginal,
althou visibility and ienced Lutwafe afe. Many in
to to dest ck), the main assa rangrif 5 attacks on Coastal Comman highest numb 15 August. his includ ed abandoned attack from 1,769 to Hurricane MkIIighters were slightly more the more experciated the limitations of
this Aircraft on operat
ion:
roy the RAF ult intended Westland Channel ds to begi on
1. Mem ber of Obse intelligence, ing its huge
strategic value and 7 September r pilot numbers grew h
with inten
sive daylightin southern England 4 Lysander Role more succ port
essful, over s and these were
n of the Battle otte 5 (Air Fleetin Cent
5) on
ral Londonchain Corprealis
rver, not
s on duty st, concentrate
d
ines and ighte June and August the two Britis One major disadvantage the RAF appre new pilots now seeing 19 Lancasters
his prov Bristo
Tactical recon by Lutl loss of from 24 Augu mach en euvra ble. ed from with been on operation:
attacks l Blenheim naissance invasion 200 barges an attack in theBritain. Late duriinstea
ng thed,Bat and RAF 30% betwe nually mano h ighters sufer cut out system but it would have Aircraft lost
ed
to draw the unsuccessful, so on airields. 4 and photo leet nd, resulting and le of t factories to by over ely 1,400 conti
graphic surve helped pers being sunk, whic of the northern Englaof total of 150 sent were the r in the
onsupp war OC. s on aircra
personneld attacks proved costly with approximatst and the irst weeks which both Britis e to for the irst time,to re-train them, 8 Lancasters
bombing ighters out, heav an attempt
in Hawker Hurri Strategic recon y
indeinitely. uade Hitler to canc h may have anlied withhis attack ines 1940, for the engin action
to attempt ties
of y
cane naissance 23 aircrat out underestimateJunk by Germers Ju 88, unifolds.
rmshe airiel
men and mach available durin
g Augu
never had was a tendency a steep dive because fuel problematic ication of the Aircrew casual
followed, ports and industrianight had also beguAttacks on British Sealion
el er
raid. In anoth was suggested that bomthe RAF twinairie 2.
terms of both . he Germans ency of up to into
when going of the carburettor under
the 1941, a modi killed
begi Total Fighter ber. With -engRAF
the ined in mediumof some Fleet Air Arm of September although by had been adopt
ed. Some 53
7 Septemb nning on 19 Aug l cities Total Luftw aircraft deployed to
AASF n alongsid ship
e the nuis ping Intelligence,
it by 17 the sam pilots, a deici rd Overy: was forced out ive-g, something which
did in hage
with cont er – 2 October: he ust.
afe aircra France by
but from
the middle serviceable ighte
Hers111letbut a1438beter bom the addit
bute rang
ion
e as the alth pilots as well as
the
more than 1,200 Richa German system were introduced as well, Operation Cartion:
ft deployed RAF: 680 ighte intensiie of July thes ance raids had only 300 gh the actual igure aircraftwas b load onwe d Czech according to efects of negatthe fuel-injected Bf 109. y
Both
tactical chang
es pt proposed Aircraft on operat Mustangs
inua
London and l day and night Blitz begins,
during the
Batle of Franc rs and 392 bombers. d
ships and and produced a stea e raids
provble ed usefuland
Comm , this y experience one-third and he Few, the Big Wing conce implemented
raids agai e: 5,100 ighte Augu st, althou of
ines, twice those
availa
1940 3. Mes in theraine d and highl
quickly overc
ame
‘If Fighter Comm
and were not happen to Hurricane were also poorl particular the 20 Mosquitos,
30 P51
3 October other cities.
raids on thei
Overesti r covering aircrat. drain of
dy well-t raids
contingents fewer.’ -Mallory and on operation:
nst Britain rs and bomb
serviceable mach d by thisG10 optim istic serschmidt Bf
ans were less
r pilots were the Spitire and Browning .303 machine Traford Leigh . Keith Parkes, who Aircraft lost
bombing – 31 October: Larg
give their on
bomber crew 5 May, in order
ers.
Lutwafe mates of British losse Misle park ed on the y grasand Polish 109
fall. he Germ German ighte by and 2 P51
raid under batt to in July 1940. lands tostrip
aorder destro s bord short
ering obtaining replacemen
t pilots armed, the eight ng inefective against by Douglas Baderthe battle and Dowding Four Mosquitos
e
daylight attac s, mostly on Lon scale night le condition s the chance to train space betw intel
believe that ligence now led s by Goering gavevers ing . Thiss is this
guns oten provi over ties
don best bom s and disc een Dunkirk intelligence, airields in Kent ionand
attack
of the aircr a fortun
later, fasteate and Aircraft ing that
t, trials show destroy an led 11 Grou p in ver, and his Aircrew casual
ighters into ks intended to lure , also b
efect, such load which achieved over the
of larger raid and the shipping both the nuisance
Goering to 4
the RAF’s main aternoon August. aft r Aircraft destroyed German aircra this tactic howe is said to have 9 aircrew killed
anti-aircrat s to train their own beginning
agaiof nst18 the Alliesthe which operated red to were against
dogi
he Lutwaf ghts.
RAF
intensity small raids increasin maximum
batt
suiciently les had reduced
raids and
began in the
early both during the Dead/wounded/ in service s were requi Leigh-Mallory step down in
assess Ger crews as well as bein pilots and RAF num succe ssesinin
of Brita Batle Participating missing or captured 1,744 4,500 round opposition to Dowding to
e began cond from 18 May g target. Con to make their airi bers some German Prod (Usedthe unde Bfr 1,963 ine.
enemy mach RAF’s biggest disadvanta
ge
ucting nuis attac , in man g able to elds Desp ite
ensuing dogi uctio
ghts, when GFD L) 4. aircrew been what forced
ance Brit ked Kent and York when 100 bombers he RAF tactics.
implemented sequently
, on 6 Aug an easy air raids and
n line build
their
ater using all so ing the Bf 109
1612/422/0 1,977
Perhaps the d of using
ish were also shire. military objealso began night a strat ust he withd raw 5,000 2,550
r tactics. Instea October 1940.
able to use However, the ctives and raids to destroy egy which 109s began to shooting down RAF 2,585/735/ 925 ber 1940 lay in its ighte inger formation of the

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IRON CROSS ❙ 115
 ■ Josef Kister poses with
the unsuccesful Pfalz DXII
when serving with Jasta 1.
(Colour by RJM)

WAR IN THE AIR: A FIGHTER PILOT’S DIARY

Above The Trenches

Part two of what it was like to fly and fight as an NCO pilot in the German Air Service is
brought to life in the diary of Josef Kister, translated by Rob Schäfer by kind permission
of Josef Kister’s granddaughter.
I
n the first part of Josef Kister’s diary, in Issue No 2 of
Iron Cross, we left him at the point of the scrap Jasta
1 had with French Spads of Escadrille N.87 on 3 July
1918 which ended in the death of Gefreiter Jakob Lux.
Until the middle of the month, things were relatively quiet
for Jasta 1 after their drubbing by the Spads – an event
which was partly attributable to the now unsuitable and
outclassed Albatros fighters. Across the few days following
the 3 July episode, Josef’s diary entries (set out below)
were somewhat sparse before activity began to pick up
again from the middle of the month:-

5 JULY:
Firing from the air.

6 JULY:
Lux buried in Magneux.

8 JULY:
Having just arrived at the front I already had to turn back
as the radiator had ruptured and was losing lots of water.

10 JULY:
Quiet. Today in the evening we had guests (of Jasta 39).
We NCO pilots got nicely fueled up afterwards. I wasn’t
completely drunk, but couldn’t drink anymore.

11 JULY:
We move to Foufry. First I fly Leutnant Stein’s machine
over, then I return by car and fetch mine which is still
under repair. On our old field, I meet the “Kanone” Thom
and see my comrade Kühn from Lindenthal once again.

Leutnant Karl Thom and Vizefeldwebel (later Leutnant)

Max Kühn both served in Jasta 21, and both ended the war
as aces. Thom with 27 and Kuhn with 12 confirmed victories.
Leutnant Karl Thom was one of only four airmen to be
decorated both with the Prussian
Golden Military Merit Cross and
the Pour le Merite - the highest
gallantry awards for NCOs and
officers.

12 JULY:
Quiet. Practice shooting from
the air.

13 JULY:
The great “Kanone” Menkhoff
is with us as a guest. In the
evening, I want to fly a front
sortie but my engine is broken
again. Now the old kite is finally
thrown on the scrap heap.
Admittedly, I did have the worst
▲

■ Leutnant Karl Thom. machine of the Staffel.

IRON CROSS ❙ 117

WAR IN THE AIR: A FIGHTER PILOT’S DIARY
■ Pour le Merite holder Carl Menckhoff,
of Jasta 72, became one of the more
prolific German aces of the war with a
total score of 39 confirmed victories.
Twelve days after his visit to Jasta 1 he
was shot down and taken prisoner.
■ Fokker D.VII aircraft of Jasta 72, this line-up of machines was at
Bergnicourt in 1918. The D.VII in the foreground is the personal mount
of Carl Menckhoff.
118 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ Carl Menckhoff poses with his personal Albatros.
Pour le Merite holder Carl Menkhoff of Jasta 72 became one
of the more prolific German aces of the war, with a total
score of 39 confirmed victories. Twelve days after his visit to
Jasta 1, he was shot down and taken POW. He was released
from French captivity on 23 August 1919.
17 JULY:
I am a bit lazy in terms of diary keeping. I guess that the
oppressive heat is to blame. Two days ago, we went onto
the offensive between Reims and Chateau-Thierry. Our
Staffel was tasked to secure the region from Chateau-
Thierry to Dorman. Actually one can’t really speak of
“securing”, as it is laughable to fly to the front in our
Albatros crates. If there were not so many Staffeln with
their Fokkers around here, then the French, or rather the
Americans, would already have taken care of us.
Yesterday, we were at the front with eight machines and
no matter how hard I tried, I couldn‘t keep up. At least
60-70 machines buzzed around at the front. At one time I
found myself below five Americans about 200-300 metres
above me. Bold as brass, I kept circling below them in
the hope that the approaching Fokkers would drive one
down in front of my nose where I could take care of him.
This favour wasn‘t granted to me. The party then quickly
moved elsewhere and I decided to rejoin our Kette. Even
though the enemy has better machines, we‘re still far
superior. Today or tomorrow, I will finally exchange my
oldie for a new one.
18 JULY:
Yesterday evening, I got myself a new machine from
Magneux. I flew back in a thunderstorm. The machine
met with my approval. This evening, at 7:30, I could
 Albatros D.V / D.Va
By mid-July 1918, Jasta 1 was operating
a mix of Albatros D.Va and even a handful
of the earlier D.V fighters. Even though
these models still formed the backbone
of German fighter units, they had already
been described as obsolete in the spring
of the previous year by none other than
Manfred von Richthofen, the legendary
Red Baron, when he wrote in April 1917:
“It is so obsolete and so ridiculously
inferior to the English that one can’t do
anything with this aircraft”. Richthofen
wrote this specifically about the Albatros
D.V, although the improved D.Va, in
the hands of a skilled and experienced
pilot, could still perform well in combat.
However, by June 1918 experienced
fighter pilots were becoming a rare
commodity.

already take-off with the others. I flew on the right behind Finally, after having spent nearly all my ammunition, a big
the Rottenführer (Lt. Bussmann) and behind me was trail of smoke erupted from the machine. I was so close
Unteroffizier Borm whose flying was so abysmal that that I was shrouded in it and when I threw my machine
there were at least 10 times when I thought he would ram around, I had another of those big carts in front of my
me. We steered towards the front where the French had guns. I tapped this one as well, while it was at the same
broken through by about 8 to 10 kilometres. time being worked on by Vizefeldwebel Belz. After several
After we shipped around there for a while, 5 or 6 French shots my guns jammed. At this time ‘Monsieur’ Borm
twin-engined machines flew over our front in line abreast. positioned himself in front of my nose, so that I had to
We headed directly towards the gentlemen’s flank. break off to save myself from him.
Leutnant Bussmann though flew in a way which made it Thank God I found a few others from the Staffel
clear that he intended to attack them from the rear. We and hung myself on their tail. Due to all the turning
were at about 2,500 metres when I had one going past about, I didn’t know where I was anymore. Now I saw
my engine snout. So favourable was the opportunity that our Geschwader commander, Leutnant Bußmann, dive
I could not allow myself to miss it. I threw my machine down on a twin-seater which crashed into a forest. At
around and while pushing it down raced towards the this moment, my engine began to vomit and I realised
fellow hell bent for in horror that the main fuel tank had run empty. I only
leather. At about 100 had 25 litres in the emergency tank, which I switched to
metres I opened fire. immediately. Fifteen frightful minutes followed. I circled
They were not lazy, up to gain enough height to allow for a long gliding flight.
and tried to hit me No one felt more joy than me when I saw the home field
as well. That didn’t in the distance where I performed a safe landing. It then
end well for them. I became clear I had taken seven hits in the machine. One
pushed closer while pierced the first upper main spar. This could have been
shooting into the dangerous. Due to this, I have to take a break today.
observer seat. Soon,
their fire stopped. The machine he collected at Magnuex was most probably a
Like one possessed, brand-new Albatros D.Va
I kept shooting, but Kister’s victory on that day was a Caudron R.11 of
■ Leutnant Hans von Freden in the big kite was tough. Escadrille R.46 piloted by an American volunteer, Adjutant
the cockpit of his blue and red Turning all the time, Glenn Nelson Sitterly, who managed to land his badly
Albatros. He scored four victories
while flying for Jasta 1. He died
he tried to get away. mauled machine behind French lines. One of his gunners
after contracting influenza in But it was to no avail, (whose name is unknown) survived – albeit wounded. The
▲

October 1919. I stayed on his tail. rear gunner, Sergeant Marcel Faivre, had been killed by

IRON CROSS ❙ 119

WAR IN THE AIR: A FIGHTER PILOT’S DIARY
■ A German observation balloon pictured by Josef Kister. His brother, Karl,
served with a balloon unit and it is possible that Josef took this photograph
when he visited him.
Kister’s fire. For his actions on 18 July, Sitterly was mentioned
in French Dispatches on 12 August: “Pilote de grande valeur,
remarquablement adroit, courageux et calme. Attaqué par une
patrouille de quinze appareil ennemis, a vaillamment soutenu
le choc, permettant aux avions qu’il protégeait d’accomplir leur
mission. Ayant eu, au cours du combat, ses deux mitrailleurs
blessés et son aéroplane croblé de balles, est parvenu néanmoins
à regagner nos lignes.”
Leutnant Bußmann was credited with a victory over a Spad
fighter, his third and final victory of the war.
19 JULY:
I hope my luck keeps up.
Move from Foufry to
Bazoches near Fismes. We
receive new Pfalz D.XIII. The
machine proves itself to be
unsuited for the front.
■ Adjutant Glenn Nelson Sitterly
was assigned to Escadrille C.
46 and flew combat missions
at the front. He was shot down
by Josef Kister near Villers-
Cotterets in July 1918, but
remained uninjured. A fellow pilot
said: “Sitterly is reticent about
recounting his experiences, and it
is only by seeing his uniform, torn
by shrapnel and bullets, that one
can realise the narrow escapes he
has had.”
120 ❙ IRON CROSS
Pfalz D.XII
The Pfalz D.XII first appeared on the western front in the First World
War shortly after the June 1918 fighter trials held at Adlershof,
Germany, and was built as a replacement for the outdated Albatros
and Pfalz D.III fighters and Fokker Dr.I triplane. Powered by a six-
cylinder, 180-horsepower, water-cooled, in-line Mercedes D.IIIa engine
it climbed well and performance in level flight was comparable if
not up fully equal to that of the Fokker D.VII. Because of its sturdy
construction, it could dive faster and steeper than the D.VII, but could
not turn as well and was sluggish in combat. Furthermore, it was
difficult to land, and many accidents were caused by a weakness of
the landing gear. The first five examples reached German Flugparks
on 30 June 1918, with numbers rising to 168 machines by August
1918. Yet the machine failed to impress. Early models had a tendency
overheat in summer temperatures and ground crews found it difficult
to service and repair. Due to it’s flight characteristics it was turned
down by some Jastas. While Kister fails to explain what made the
Pfalz D.XII ‘unsuitable’, there an account by the technical officer of
Jasta 71, Joachim von Hippel, who evaluated the Pfalz thoroughly
with devastating results. According to him, the aircraft had a poor rate
of climb. It lost speed too quickly in a turn, losing too much altitude
as a result. During climbing turns it was prone to slip into a spin from
which it was difficult to recover. Take-off was too long and landing
was difficult. In addition, the undercarriage was weak - a fault that was
fixed from late October 1918.
26 JULY:
Move to Maizy and Ausne. We are in the former location
of a French observation balloon which had had its home
here before the offensive. It‘s very nice here. After we
return from the front, we take a bath in the canal. I
receive the Flugzeugführer-Abzeichen (pilot’s badge). I
led a Rotte to the front. When I decide to head home in a
glide, the engine loses so much oil that it splatters all over
my goggles and I can’t see anything anymore. I lose my
orientation and land at the field of the Bavarian Flieger-
Abteilung 246 in Nizy le Comte. As I have not a single
drop of fuel left, I asked for some and then flew home
where I had already been put down as missing.
Move to Sissone. Our quarters are good, but the rations
are most mediocre. We return seven Pfalz D. XII and
receive Fokker D.VII instead. The machine is exceptional.
Sadly, we have six new pilots who have yet no clue about
Geschwader flying. We are expected to keep an eye on the
enemy while orientating ourselves. Yet with pilots such as
this, that is virtually impossible.
9 AUGUST:
I led a Rotte of six machines to the front. It was very
cloudy. Because of this, I tried to wiggle my way through
the cloud banks and had just arrived at the front when
I realised I‘d lost all my companions. Only Leutnant
Retzbach was still with me. We had flown too far behind
the French lines and now received good and strong Flak
fire. Leutnant Retzbach pulled his machine upwards
and disappeared into the clouds. I was now alone and
had no idea where I was. I used my compass and flew

stubbornly to the north where I passed our lines east of
Reims. I thanked my creator when I regained orientation.
One after the other, everyone returned home - except
Leutnant Retzbach who only arrived at five in the
morning after having landed at Verdun.
11 AUGUST:
We move to Emericourt near Douai. At about 8 o’clock,
we left from Sissonne and arrived at 9 o’clock. During
landing, Unteroffizier Borm rammed his Fokker into a
closed hangar door, wrecking the nice machine. With
this location, we‘ve made a good deal. Our landing field
is only two minutes from the chateau in which we‘re
living. Never before have we lived in more comfort and
tranquillity. No disturbance from columns of lorries and
troops.
Unteroffizier Gustav Borm, who doesn’t come off very well
in Kister’s diary, would score his first victory (RE 8) on 22
August 1918. On 27 September, he shot down two enemy
aircraft - one of them a Sopwith Dolphin of 19 Sqn, piloted
by Captain Cecil Vernon Gardner DFC, by this time an ace
with 10 confirmed victories. Borm ended the war with a
total of five victories. Promoted to Leutnant in November
1918, he rejoined the Luftwaffe in 1933, briefly in command
of 10.(N)/ Jagdgeschwader 72 in October and November
1939. In April 1941, now holding the rank of Major, he
was given command of the Frontflieger-Sammelstelle
in Quedlinburg. On 1 March 1944, he was promoted to
Oberstleutnant (Lt.Col.). He was registered missing in
action in the vicinity of Dresden in May 1945.
■ Josef Kister posing for the camera after his
promotion to Offiziers-Stellvertreter, or Acting
Officer. In this photograph he is wearing his
Flugzeugführerabzeichen (pilot’s badge) which
was awarded to him on 26 July 1918. German
pilots did not automatically receive the badge
on qualification as a pilot, but only after having
completed a period of operational service.
13 AUGUST:
Around 11 o’clock in the morning, we take off a second time
to catch the bomber squadrons which unload their big
boulders in the area. When I was at 3,600 metres, I saw the
shell bursts of our Flak batteries when the first Geschwader
of six machines was coming towards us. At a distance of
about 1,000 metres, the second Geschwader of six machines
followed. Our Rottenführer (Lt. Bussmann) pushed past
the first Geschwader heading towards the second. I was
in the last position of our Rotte. I pulled my machine up,
and began spraying the first three machines of the leading
Geschwader - even though I was still 300 to 400 metres
away. After not more than 100 rounds, one of them tumbled
■ Kister, Veddeler (left) and an unidentified comrade relaxing on
▲
folding chairs on the airfield at Maizy, July 1918.
IRON CROSS ❙ 121
WAR IN THE AIR: A FIGHTER PILOT’S DIARY
downwards to my altitude. I concentrated on him until I‘d
fired all of my ammunition. As he was swaying alarmingly, I
kept behind him to await his crash. The observer was either
dead or wounded as he did not fire anymore. I followed the
Englishman to the north of Cambrai when I was attacked by
a second one. I could only just throw my machine around
when smoke trails of incendiary munitions whizzed past
me. I had just shaken him off when I had the next one on
my back. I shook him off as well. During all this turning, I‘d
lost orientation and my goggles were so smeared with oil
that I couldn‘t see anything. After two emergency landings
on abandoned airfields, I arrived home two hours after the
others.
14 AUGUST:
Four of us flew to the front. At Arras, an enemy two-seater
attacked us. It was seemingly coming from behind our
lines. We turned the tables, and after a brief fight he was
shot down in flames by Unteroffizier Staudacher. This
Englishman I can only describe as a big idiot. Foolhardy
taking on a Kette of four single-seaters with a two-seater
carrying valuable intelligence.
Even though he claimed to have shot down a Bristol F.2b, it is
more probable that Staudacher’s victim (his first confirmed
victory) was Lt. Richard Alexander Hewat of 87 Sqn who went
missing flying Dolphin E4434. It was common for German
122 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ NCO pilots of Jasta
1 pose in front of
their elegant billet at
Chateau Mericourt.
pilots to misidentify Sopwith Dolphin fighters as two-
seaters. So far, it was thought that he had been shot down by
Hermann Leptien of Jasta 63. At the time of his death, Hewat
had 6 victories to his credit.
17 AUGUST:
At about 11:30 we took of with six machines towards the
front. The Rotte flew together quite well until Unteroffizier
Schneider, like a maniac, kept switching positions - flying on
the left, then on the right, sometimes above and then again
below the Rotte. One was kept busy enough keeping an eye
on a man like him, before even thinking about an enemy or
orientation. Single enemy flyers took quickly to their heels.
Above Douai, Unteroffizier Staudacher left the formation
and flew home. Soon afterward, Leutnant Dreese headed
back as well. When I was in the process of taking his position
I saw a Geschwader below us and Leutnant Bußmann was
already heading towards it. I was on his side and had set my
sights on one of them. As my goggles were full of oil I could
not see the machine clearly. Leutnant Bußmann finally broke
off the attack when the enemy machines disappeared in
the cloud bank below us where everything was completely
overcast. Bußmann had lost orientation, so we made a
intermediate landing south of Lille at Jasta 23. Here, we
fuelled-up and flew home. Sadly Leutnant Dreese had
smashed-up his nice Fokker during an emergency landing.
 ■ Although not mentioned by Kister, Jasta 1 was one of the first Jastas to receive a
number of Fokker E.V monoplanes in August 1918. Later redesignated D.VIII, and dubbed
the “Flying Razor” by Allied pilots, it was a powerful and modern design. Those of Jasta
1, such as this one piloted by Leutnant Liebig, were painted in lozenge camouflage and
sported a red engine cowling.

18 AUGUST: 22 AUGUST 1918:

At around 10 o’clock, we received orders from the
Jagdgruppe to take off as there were enemy flyers
loitering about at the front. It was very stormy weather
with heavy cloud. Behind Cambrai, Leutnant Braming, on
his first flight to the front, left the Rotte and flew home.
Now there were only three of us. Leutnant Retzbach,
Unteroffizier Staudacher and me. Behind Arras, we were
at an altitude of about 4,500 metres when Staudacher
initiated a steep dive. We followed, but I couldn‘t see
anything. Soon, were were down to 500 metres and 10
km behind enemy lines. Staudacher claimed to have
forced down an enemy machine. I have seen nothing
of the sort. What I saw, though, is that we received an
infernal amount of Flak. I could just see the other two
pull up to disappear into cloud. For a while, I continued
to fly around at the front without meeting the others.
When I returned home, they had already landed, but
each on his own. Leutnant Braming had lost his way
heading deep into Belgium, only returning at 9 o’clock in
the evening.
Even though Kister saw nothing, Staudacher was credited
with shooting down an R.E.8. His victim was a DH.4 of 107
Sqn crewed by Lieutenant Herbert Cecil Curtis and 2nd
At half past ten, we start on a hunting flight with six
machines. Near Bapaume we were at about 4,500
metres. Wherever one looked, everywhere over the
front, Englishmen were buzzing around. Most of them in
Geschwaders of seven to 15 machines. This cheered my
heart, as it meant there would certainly be combat. In
front of us, there was a swarm of 15 to 20 machines. We
flew straight at them. In the mirror, I saw that the man
behind me tried to push past and on my left Unteroffizier
Staudacher, in the process of attacking, zoomed across
the Geschwader leader. I always found Staudacher to be
a sympathetic partner in combat, so I followed him at
maximum speed. Soon we were sitting right within the
English party.
Staudacher, staying ahead, had already engaged one of
them and I came just in time to see an Englishman trying
to get at him from the rear. He had not even seen me and
so stayed nicely still. I fixed my sights on him, and had
only briefly activated my bullet injector when he burst
into flames. Immediately, I threw my machine around and
could not believe my eyes as suddenly another champion
of the same kind dangled in front of my nose. I opened fire
again. This one made more trouble and wriggled around
like an eel, but it was to no avail. After some to-and-fro,
▲

Lieutenant Frederick George Davies. Both were killed. he somersaulted downwards. By then I‘d gone down 500

IRON CROSS ❙ 123

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 WAR IN THE AIR: A FIGHTER PILOT’S DIARY
Artwork by Dawn Monks Military Art
metres and now pulled up with all my might, as above me
battle was still raging.
Soon, I attached myself to one of them and in my mind
I could already see my third opponent fall, when suddenly
the first and then the second machine gun jammed. I
quickly buggered off, having been robbed of my means of
combat. Finally, I managed to get one to shoot again and
just as I fired the first trial rounds, it suddenly hails down
heavily onto my machine. Instinctively, I pull up and find
myself between about eight Englishmen. With my single
gun, I let rip as much as I can. Then, suddenly, one dives
in from above towards my flank - coming very close and
firing all the time. Before I can take evasive action, I feel
a massive blow against my right knee and a hear a nasty
smacking sound. I know I‘m hit.
I let myself fall vertically downwards. This way, I get
down to about 1,000 meters when I pull up again before
throwing some right and left turns to shake off potential
followers. Up until then, I had no time to look behind as I
had to concentrate on handling the machine which took
all the skill I could muster. When I looked back, I saw they
had broken off the chase. About 1,000 metres away, though,
I saw a machine heading directly towards me. As it was
alone, and I had the advantage of height, I headed towards
it - even though I was in severe pain. When I came closer, I
recognized my Staffel commander. Now I tried to orientate
myself and as I looked at the compass I found it was filled
with blood. When I saw all that blood, the pain got so bad
that I nearly lost consciousness. But I clenched my teeth as
I wanted to reach the airfield. Every moment I thought: now
it is over! Only by mustering all my willpower did I manage
to land on the airfield about 30-35 kms away. Shortly
afterwards, a car pulled up and 10 minutes later I was on the
operating table in Aniche. From here, I was taken to Germany
in an ambulance train that same evening.
Even though Kister claimed two victories during the
engagement, he was credited with only one - a Bristol F.2b over
Courcelles. His comrade, Staudacher, was credited with the
destruction of a SE 5a, while Gustav Borm shot down an RE.8.
REVOLUTION
On 6 November 1918, I was released from the Reserve
Hospital in Essen and drove to Grossenhain. The whole
German Reich was swaying along its seams. Our fronts
were withdrawing everywhere. We were facing the break
up of Germany. When I wanted to continue my journey
to Berlin, train traffic had been halted. On the following
evening, I only got as far as Dresden where I arrived at
midnight. On the platform, revolutionary soldiers entered
the waggons, disarming officers and soldiers and tearing
off their cockades and shoulder boards. Some nasty scenes
were played out, as many tried to resist. These so-called
“Red Guards” were mostly boys, still wet behind the ears,
who had seen nothing of war. With a comrade, I managed,
unscathed, to reach the Hotel Continental at the station.
The following morning, fulfilling the wishes of the hotel
director, we left our weapons in the hotel and drove to
Grossenhain. Here, a soldier’s council had been formed
and everything went haywire. After eight days I was granted
leave from which I never returned”.
IRON CROSS ❙ 125
 COLLECTING MILITARIA: THE STEEL HELMET

Stahlhelm
The German steel helmet is arguably one of the most iconic objects from both of the
World Wars. Here, Robin Schäfer looks at the First World War Stahlhelm.

parked by the fact that the
French Army began to be
equipped with steel helmets on
a large scale, and after a number
of unsuccessful attempts to come
up with an efficient helmet design,
German efforts to equip its troops with
better head protection were reinitiated
in the summer of 1915 when the
Gewehr Prüfungskommission (Rifle
Testing Commission) was ordered to
start trials. Meanwhile, on 14 August
1915, C.E.Juncker of Berlin was ordered
to manufacture a helmet made of
special Krupp steel.
A major force in the development
of the iconic German Stahlhelm
(or Stahlschutzhelm) came in the
person of Privy Medical Officer Prof.
Dr. August Bier. Bier served as naval
Marine-Generalarzt (equivalent to
brigadier general in the medical corps)
and was also the advising surgeon in
the XVIII Army Corps. On 13 August
1915, a report on his experiences with
brain trauma and cranial injuries
caused by metal shell splinters was
passed on to the Prussian Ministry of
War. In it, he urged the development
of a new kind of protective helmet
and recommended the use of
Professor Friedrich Schwerd as an
expert on the subject matter. Bier’s
request, supported by Professor von
Schjerning, the Surgeon-General
of the Army, and General Erich von
Falkenhayn, Chief of General Staff
of the Field Army, was immediately
taken into account by the War Ministry
and, on 1 September 1915, Professor
Schwerd, tenured professor of the
Technical University of Hannover, was
called to Berlin to serve as a metallurgy
expert.
TRIALLED AT VERDUN
Soon, it became clear that the Juncker
company was unable to work with
the modern chrome nickel steel
that Schwerd’s helmet design was
supposed to be made from and so
production work had to be taken
over by Eisenhüttenwerk Thale,
an arms producer that had mainly
been working to supply the Navy.
A few weeks later, a batch of 100
new steel helmets were ready to be
trialed on the army shooting ranges
of Kummersdorf near Berlin where,
subjected to the effects of shrapnel
artillery fire, they performed far better
than a number of French and British
helmet designs tested for comparison.
After a further X-Ray evaluation, the
Prussian War Ministry decided to put
the Schwerd design into production
on 23 November 1915. In the first

■ This group of German soldiers occupy a shell crater position near Arras
in 1917 and display an interesting early attempt to camouflage the
Stahlhelm. (Brett Butterworth)
■ A drawing of a soldier wearing the M16 ■ An original sturmriemen and fastener for the
helmet by the artist Wilhelm Hoeck. (RS) liner of the M16 helmet. (Christoph Höpfer)
During the fighting at Verdun, the helmet was worn by the Sturmabteilung with
great confidence and has protected many from head injury. The infantry envied the
Sturmabteilung for the helmets. A number of helmets were stolen from the
”
Sturmabteilung by the infantry. From the field experience report of Sturmabteilung (later
Sturmbataillon) Rohr
step, an order of 30,000 helmets was
placed. These were to be trialed by
German troops in the lines at Verdun,
their experiences to then decide the
uptake, or not, of mass production.
With feedback from the frontline
being more than positive, 1.2 million
helmets were duly ordered in April
1916.
From April 1916 to the end of July
■ A faked ‘mimikri’ helmet which has been 1916, the first 260,000 helmets were
perfectly executed and ‘aged’. (Christoph Höpfer)
distributed on the Western Front,
the majority going to 2. Armee on the
Somme and to 5. Armee at Verdun.
By then, not every German soldier
received a Stahlhelm. They were
made part of the fixed equipment in
the trenches: those troops manning
a trench could make use of them
and when they left, the helmets were
left behind for new units moving
in. On 4 August 1916, another batch
was delivered, but it would take until
February 1918 until all frontline and
■ A rare original ‘mimikri’ (mimicry) steel
replacement units could be thoroughly
helmet, this example sporting a rare three- supplied. But even then, troops serving
colour scheme. (Philippe Oosterlinck) in Germany had to make do to without.
■ Detail of an original fastener for the M16.
(Christoph Höpfer)
THE MODELS
STAHLSCHUTZHELM M.1916
The helmet introduced in the German
Army featured two hollow suspension
bolts (horns) which served two
purposes: they aided ventilation and
air circulation inside the helmet and
served as hinges for the Stirnschild
(brow shield). Inside, it sported the
Innenausstattung 16 (Liner 16) which
was attached to the helmet shell by
three splints. The liner consisted of a
leather ring which had three leather
flaps attached to it. The lower side
of each flap had a small pillow (filled
with horsehair or straw) sewn onto
it. Two metal buttons on the inside
of the helmet (Knopf 91 or Button 91)
allowed the attachment of the leather
chin strap which was also used on the
leather helmet (or Pickelhaube).
STAHLSCHUTZHELM M. 1917
The outer shell of the M.17 was
identical to the M.16 model, the only
difference being found in the liner.
▲
With leather supplies running short,
IRON CROSS ❙ 127
COLLECTING MILITARIA: THE STEEL HELMET

the leather ring was replaced with one

made from steel.

STAHLSCHUTZSCHELM M. 1918
Certain complaints made by the troops
were addressed with the 1918 model
of the Stahlhelm. On this example,
and to offer a more secure fit, the
Button 91 assembly was dropped and
the chinstrap directly fixed to the
steel liner ring. The factory paint was
improved and changed to a lighter tone
which was less reflective and offered
better camouflaging properties. ■ Front and rear views of the M17 stahlhelm. (Christoph Höpfer)
The third and most noticeable
improvement came in the form of a
variant of the M18. PAINT AND PAINT SCHEMES (like those used on the leather helmet)
The standard colour of the M16 and were never generally issued and
STAHLSCHUTZHELM MIT M17 helmets was field grey, which limited production ceased quickly
OHRENAUSSCHNITT M. 1918 in the First World War was in fact due to material shortages. Textiles
Introduced in limited numbers in a grey-green rather than pure grey. also soaked up water and aided
August 1918, this version of the helmet This was found to be highly reflective, the formation of rust. A certain
(with ear cut-outs) is today commonly and so troops often modified their number of white snow camouflage
described as a cavalry or signals helmets by applying a further thin covers were issued in January 1917.
helmet. This is incorrect. layer of paint mixed with sand or by German High Command ordered
Starting with the introduction of the smearing it with mud. Cloth covers trials of various forms of paint and
helmet in 1916, complaints were heard
regarding the impaired hearing of
the wearer and auricle sounds (sound
reverberating on the inner side of MANUFACTURERS CODES AND MARKS
the helmet which were projected and MAKER NAME/CITY MAKER CODE SIZES
enhanced by the outer ear). To counter INSIDE HELMET PRODUCED
this, the new version of the helmet ■ Gebrüder Bing A.G., Nürnberg G.B.N 64
featured a crescent-shaped cut out
■ F.C. Bellinger, Fulda B.F. 62,64
over the area covering the wearer’s ear.
■ J. & H. Kerkmann, Ahlen/Westfalen K. 64
Even though the few helmets of this
type to see service in the First World ■ Gebrueder Gnüchtel A.G., Lauter i./Sa. G. 62

War were primarily issued to men ■ Vereinigte Deutsche Nickelwerke,

serving on sentry duty, or on observing Schwerte i/Westf. – N.J. N.J 62

or listening posts (who would change
back to the ‘regular’ M16/17/18 during
normal service), it was planned to issue
this version to all troops replacing all
previous models. This version also
sported a totally new kind of paint,
created by mixing it with wood dust
which created a durable and non-
reflective coating.
NOTES ON TYPES
Nearly all M18 cut-out helmets on the
market today are fakes. Originals are
marked with a maker‘s stamp of ET64 in
Gothic script. The lot number inside the
helmet dome should start with an R.
■ R. Lindenberg A.G., Remscheid-Hasten “Bell” logo 64
■ Körting & Mathiesen, Leutsch /Leipzig K&M 66,68
■ Hermann Weissenburger & Co.,
Stuttgart-Canstatt W. 66
■ C. Thiel & Söhne, Luebeck T.J. 66, 68
■ Eisenhüttenwerke Thale A.G., Thale /Harz E.T. 60-68
■ Siemens & Halske A.G., Siemenstadt Berlin superimposed S over H 60
■ Eisenhütte Silesia, Paruschowitz Oberschlesien Si 62,66
■ F.W. Quist, Esslingen/Neckar Q 66
NOTES: • Helmets were made in sizes 60 to 68. A few size 70 helmets are known to exist.
• Inside the dome of every helmet will be found a lot code indicating the steel
supplier. Each helmet passing rigorous inspection protocols was marked with
an ink stamp inside the rear flange. It consists of cojoined letters, A and K, (for
Abnahmekommando – or Proofing Command). Today, these have often faded or
worn-off completely. Inside the rear flange, some soldiers marked their name and
unit designation, making them wonderful objects for further research.

128 ❙ IRON CROSS

■ An original liner for the M17 stahlhelm. ■ This near-perfect M17 stahlhelm has the impact
(Christoph Höpfer) mark from a shrapnel ball. (Christoph Höpfer) ■ An original fabric cover for the stahlhelm. (RS)

The drawback that the steel helmet is shiny, especially when wet in the light of
the moon and in that of signal flares, has been known here for while. Yet the wish
for helmet covers cannot be granted at the moment due to current shortages of
fabric. Trials of various paints are currently being conducted. Until a solution is
found, the troops have to help themselves by covering the helmets with soil. This
has been successfully done numerous times.
” Prussian War Ministry 23 March 1917

camouflage schemes on machine
guns and artillery pieces in May 1918,
while at the same time new paint
types were developed which would
find use on the few M18 helmets
distributed in the final months of the
war. The results of the camouflage
trials were used to formulate a new
and generalised paint scheme which
found widespread use from July 1918
onwards for steel helmets, machine
guns and artillery. The new three-
colour scheme, or Buntfarbenanstrich
(ochre, green and brown) was found
to be effective even at close range.
Fields of colour had to be separated
by a black line, one finger-wide,
to avoid them blending into one
another. On the front side of a
helmet, not more than four fields of
colour were to be visible.
Variations of the official
Buntfarben scheme are also known
to exist and the colour scheme of a
Stahlhelm greatly influences its price
and collectability. Here, the basic rule
of “the more original paint remains
the better” applies. Yet there are a few
important remarks to make here.
German helmets used during the
First World War were, from the start,
designed to aid camouflage. They
never sported rank or unit insignia. All
helmets found on the market today
sporting machine gunners badges,
skulls or eagles are modern creations.
They continue to fool the collecting
world and often fetch premium
prices. The only exception to that
rule are some Prussian Guard units
who certainly used a black and white
shield (Hohenzollern coat of arms)
on the side of their helmets from late
1916 onwards. How widespread this
modification was it is hard to tell, yet
a lack of surviving photographic and
documentary evidence implies that it
was a rare occurrence.
The same applies to the
Buntfarbenanstrich. When this new
three-colour scheme was introduced
in July 1918, only four months before
the end of the war, and even although
the scheme was widespread, the
majority of frontline troops retained
helmets issued to them before that
date and in the old field grey schemes.
In general terms, and looking at the
millions of helmets of issued from
1916 onwards, camouflage pattern
steel helmets are a rarity. Yet the
collector‘s market of today seems to
imply the opposite, as Buntfarben
helmets seem to be easily available.
It is important to know, though,
that from the end of the war, Allied
soldiers’ demands for this type of
helmet was enormous. Troops of the
AEF were especially fond of them,
so fond in fact that they were willing
to pay premium prices for their
acquisition. This led to the creation of
war-trophy counterfeits where - in the
case of helmets - camouflage patterns
were applied onto the less ‘collectable’
field grey versions. This was done by
local French and Belgian civilians,
but also by soldiers themselves. The
most famous being none other than
the young Walt Disney, the future
father of Mickey Mouse, who served
in France with the Red Cross. The
appeal of camouflage helmets has not
lessened, and neither have forgeries
stopped being made. Collectors have
to take the greatest of care and should
only buy from trusted sources.

IRON CROSS ❙ 129


Quite literally, this poster proclaimed that ‘Light
Is Your Death’ and depicted a bomb falling from
an Allied bomber onto a house showing a light.
Meanwhile, a skeleton representing Death looks
on menacingly.
This dramatic poster reinforced the message
as to the importance of maintaining a blackout
– something which was universal on both sides
of the conflict. For the British, the equivalent
message would have been: ‘Put That Light Out!’
For the German population, however, it was a
message that had special resonance given the
devastating scale of the Allied air attacks on
towns and cities with an estimated 410,000
German civilians being killed during air raids.
In Hamburg alone, for instance, about 49,000
people died and another 35,000 perished in
Berlin, while in Dresden between 1st and 14th
February 1945 some 20,000 died with the
130 ❙ IRON CROSS
WAR POSTERS
Licht Dein Tod!
average death toll across Germany between
July 1944 and January 1945 being a staggering
13, 536 per month. Little wonder, then, that air
raid precautions were matters of the utmost
importance in Germany. Indeed, it wasn’t just
cities which fell victim to the Allies’ strategic
bombing, with medium and small-sized towns
also targeted, including places like Darmstadt,
Magdeburg, Chemnitz, Aschersleben and
Freudenstadt and even villages like Dollbergen,
the latter because of a nearby oil refinery.
Of course, the Allied strategic bombing
campaign ultimately involved the USAAF’s 8th Air
Force by day and the RAF’s Bomber Command by
night, thus creating an almost round-the-clock
air offensive against the German homeland.
To those on the ground, the attackers were
understandably portrayed by the powers-
that-be as ‘Terrorflieger’ (terror fliers), and this
poster succinctly portrays that ‘terror’ element
through the sinister skeletal enemy raining
down death and destruction. In this context, of
course, the specific nocturnal adversary would
have been aircraft of RAF Bomber Command
since the USAAF bombers operated only by day.
Nevertheless, the aircraft depicted in this image
might loosely be intended to represent a B-17 of
the USAAF – particularly given the star emblem
beneath the aircraft’s wings.
Attributed to the artist ‘Schmitt’, the poster
was issued specifically in the Gau Oberrhein
region rather than more widely across Germany.
It was published in 1942 by Oberrheinischer
Gauverlag und Druckerei.
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