Topic: Cruel, Degrading and Inhuman punishments
Georgia,
PEOPLE vs. ECHEGARAY 267 SCRA 682 (1997)
Accused-apellant Leo Echegaray was charged
and convicted for the crime of raping his ten-year old
daughter. The crime having been committed in April,
1994, during which time RA 7659, commonly known as
the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-
appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme
penalty of death.
In appealing the conviction, it raised the
constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law as being
severe and excessive, cruel and unusual in violation of
the constitution. He invokes the ruling in Furman vs.
Georgia wherein the US Supreme Court categorically
ruled that death penalty is cruel and degrading. He also
argues that death is an excessive and cruel punishment
for a crime of rape because there is no taking of life in
rape. He invokes the ruling in Coker vs. Georgia which
said that while rape deserves serious punishment, it
should not involve the taking of human life. In rape, life
is not over for the victim. Death penalty should only be
imposed where the crime was murder.
Issue: Is DeathPenalty is cruel and unusual punishment?
Holding: No.
The penalty is neither cruel, unjust nor
excessive. In the US case of Kemmler, it was held that
punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death. It implies there something inhuman,
barbarous, something more than the extinguishment of
life. It is degrading if it involves public humiliation. The
severity is not sufficient, but must be disproportionate
to the crime committed. Excessiveness is measured by
1) seriousness of the crime, 2) policy of the legislative,
3) perversity of the accused.
The issue in Furman vs. Georgia is not so much
the death penalty itself, but the arbitrariness pervading
the procedures by which the death penalty was
imposed by the jury. It was nullified because the
discretion in which the statute vested in trial judges and
sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any
parameters, guidelines, or standards.
With regard to the case of Coker vs.
the SC held that this case has no bearing on Philippine
experience and culture. Such a premise is in fact an
ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of
"an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth". But, the
forfeiture of life simply because life was taken, never
was a defining essence of the death penalty in the
context of our legal history and cultural experience;
rather, the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes
because the perpetrators thereof have committed
unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply
dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely
destructive effects, and because they have so caused
irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim
and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose
actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival
of government, they must be permanently prevented
from doing so.
RA 7659 already sufficiently defined what are
heinous crimes – crimes punished with death are those
that are grievous, odious, and hateful by reason of
inherent viciousness, atrocity and perversity, those that
are repugnant and outrageous to common standards of
norms and decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society. They also include crimes which are
despicable because life is callously taken, or the victim is
treated as an animal or dehumanized.
PEOPLE vs. TONGKO290 SCRA 595 (1998)
Accused Roberto Tongko was found guilty of
estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal
Code. He was sentenced to suffer 27 years of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify Carmelita V. Santos by way
of actual damages in the sum of P100,000.
Accordingly, the accused opened savings and
current accounts with Amanah Bank. In the morning of
August 20, 1993, Marites Bo-ot brought the accused to
the office of Carmelita V. Santos to borrow money. The
accused asked for P50,000 to be paid not later than
December 1993 and assured Santos that his receivable
would come in by November 1993. He persuaded
Santos to give the loan by issuing 5 checks, each in the
sum of P10,000, postdated December 20, 1993 and by
signing a promissory note.
 The promissory note was co-signed by Bo-ot. In
the afternoon of the same date, the accused returned
to Santos and borrowed an additional P50,000. Again,
he issued five (5) checks, each worth P10,000 postdated
December 20, 1993. He also signed a promissory note
together with Bo-ot. On September 14, 1993, Amanah
Bank closed accused's current account for lack of funds.
On October 1993, accused himself requested for the
closing of his savings account.
Estafa has the following elements: (1)
postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time the check was issued;
(2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and
(3) damage to the payee thereof.
Accused contends that the penalty of twenty
seven (27) years of reclusion perpetua is too harsh and
out of proportion to the crime he committed. He
submits that his sentence violates section 19(1) Article
III of the Constitution which prohibits the infliction of
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
Issue: WON said punishment is cruel and inhuman?
Holding: No.
In People v. de la Cruz, the Court held that the
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is
generally aimed at the form or character of the
punishment rather than its severity in respect of
duration or amount. In People v. Estoista, the Court
further held that it takes more than merely being harsh,
excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to
be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the
punishment authorized by the statute is severe does
not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms,
it has been held that to come under the ban, the
punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive,"
"Wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense
as to shock the moral sense of the community."
The legislature was not thoughtless in imposing
severe penalties for violation of par. 2(d) of Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code. The history of the law will
show that the severe penalties were intended to stop
the upsurge of swindling by issuance of bouncing
checks.
ECHEGARAY vs. SECRETARY 297 SCRA 754 (1998)
The Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner
Leo Echegaray for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old
daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition
upon him of the death penalty for the said crime. He
assailed the constitutionality of RA 7659 (the death
penalty law) and the imposition of the death penalty for
the crime of rape.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to
change the mode of execution of the death penalty
from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed RA.
8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL
INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE
81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY
SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.
Echegaray filed a Petition for Prohibition,
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to
enjoin respondents Secretary of Justice and Director of
the Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution
by lethal injection of petitioner under R.A. 8177 and its
implementing rules as these are unconstitutional and
void for being: (a) cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment per se as well as by reason of its being (b)
arbitrary, unreasonable and a violation of due process,
(c) a violation of the Philippines' obligations under
international covenants, (d) an undue delegation of
legislative power by Congress, (e) an unlawful exercise
by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and
(f) an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the
Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.
The Office of Solicitor General stated that (1)
this Court has already upheld the constitutionality of
the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared
that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or
unusual punishment; (2) execution by lethal injection,
as authorized under R.A. 8177, is constitutional, lethal
injection being the most modern, more humane, more
economical, safer and easier to apply than electrocution
or the gas chamber; (3) the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly
prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; (4)
R.A.8177 properly delegated legislative power to
respondent Director.
Issue: WON said punishment is cruel and inhuman?
Holding: No.
In lethal injection, the condemned inmate is
strapped on a hospital gurney and wheeled into the
execution room. A trained technician inserts a needle
into a vein in the inmate's arm and begins an
intravenous flow of saline solution. At the warden's
signal, a lethal combination of drugs is injected into the
intravenous line. The deadly concoction typically
includes three drugs: (1) a nonlethal dose of sodium
thiopenthotal, a sleep inducing barbiturate; (2) lethal
doses of pancuronium bromide, a drug that paralyzes
the muscles; and (3) potassium chloride, which stops
the heart within seconds. The first two drugs are
commonly used during surgery to put the patient to
sleep and relax muscles; the third is used in heart
bypass surgery.
It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death
penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment. In the oft-cited case of Harden v. Director
of Prisons, this Court held that punishments are cruel
when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of
that word as used in the constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more
than the mere extinguishment of life.
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of
"wanton pain" in case of possible complications in the
intravenous injection, considering that respondent
Director is an untrained in administering the lethal
injection. Such supposition is highly unsubstantiated.
Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely
incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty
and does not fall within the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.
LIM vs. PEOPLE 390 SCRA 194 (2002)
Spouses Lim issued to Wilson Cham two
postdated checks in the amount of P365,750 and
P429,000. The first check was dishonored upon
presentment for having been drawn against insufficient
funds while the other check was not presented for
payment upon request of Spouses Lim who promised to
replace the dishonored check. When they reneged on
their promise to cover the amount of the first check,
Cham filed a complaint affidavit before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City charging them with the
crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by P.D. 818. A warrant of
arrest was subsequently issued.
Spouses Lim filed an “Urgent Motion to Quash
Information and Warrant of Arrest” which was denied
by the trial court. Their motion for bail was also denied.
They filed a petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse
of discretion, arguing that P.D. 818 violated the
constitutional provisions on due process, bail and
imposition of cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
They contend that, inasmuch as the amount of
the subject check is P365,750, they can be penalized
with reclusion perpetua or 30 years of imprisonment.
This penalty is too severe and disproportionate to the
crime they committed and infringes on the express
mandate of Article III, Section 19 of the Constitution
which prohibits the infliction of cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment. They argue that while PD 818
increased the imposable penalties for estafa committed
under Article 315, par. 2 (d), RPC, it did not increase the
amounts corresponding to the said new penalties.
Issue: WON said punishment is cruel and inhuman?
Holding: No.
P.D. 818, a decree increasing the penalty for
estafa by means of bouncing checks, is constitutional.
The increase in the penalty, far from being cruel and
degrading, was motivated by a laudable purpose,
namely, to effectuate the repression of an evil that
undermines the country’s commercial and economic
growth, and to serve as a necessary precaution to deter
people from issuing bouncing checks. The fact that PD
No. 818 did not increase the amounts corresponding to
the new penalties only proves that the amount is
immaterial and inconsequential. What the law sought to
avert was the proliferation of estafa cases committed by
means of bouncing checks. Taking into account the
salutary purpose for which said law was decreed, the
court concluded that PD 818 does not violate Section 19
of Article III of the Constitution.
Topic: Indefinite Imprisonment
PEOPLE vs. DACUYCUY 173 SCRA 90 (1989)
Recall the facts. Section 32 of RA 4670 provides for an
indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a
minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by
the legislative authority. The courts are thus given a
wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of
imprisonment without even the benefit of any sufficient
standard, such that the duration thereof may range, in
the words of respondent judge, from one minute to the
lifespan f the accused. It cannot be allowed.
It vests in the courts a power and duty
essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied in
this case, does violence to the rules on separation of
powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative
powers. This time, the presumption of constitutionality
has to yield. By virtue of separability clause in Section
34 of RA 4670, the penalty of imprisonment provided in
Section 32 should be declared unconstitutional.
Topic: Protection against Double Jeopardy
PEOPLE vs. RELOVA 148 SCRA 292 (1987)
On February 1975, members of the Batangas
City Police together with personnel of the Batangas
Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant
issued by a city judge of Batangas City, searched and
examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice
Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by the
private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police
discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions
had been installed, without the necessary authority
from the city government, and architecturally concealed
inside the walls of the building owned by the private
respondent. These electric devices and contraptions
were, in the allegation of the petitioner designed
purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric
current consumption in the electric meter of the said
electric [ice and cold storage] plant.
On November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of
Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas
City an information against Manuel Opulencia for
violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas
City. A violation of this ordinance was, under its terms,
punishable by a fine "ranging from P5 to P50 or
imprisonment, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days,
or both, at the discretion of the court."
14 days later, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas
City filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
Branch II another information against Manuel Opulencia
for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation
to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code.
That without knowledge and consent of the Batangas
Electric Light System, accused feloniously take, steal and
appropriate electric current valued of P41,062.
Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel
Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash alleging that he had
been previously acquitted of offense charged in second
information and that the filing thereof was violative of
his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Issue: WON there was double jeopardy?
Holding: No.
The basic premise of the petitioner's position is
that the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is protection against a second or later
jeopardy of conviction for the same offense. The
petitioner stresses that the first information filed before
the City Court of Batangas City was one for unlawful or
unauthorized installation of electrical wiring and
devices, acts which were in violation of an ordinance of
the City Government of Batangas. Only two elements
are needed to constitute an offense under this City
Ordinance: (1) that there was such an installation; and
(2) no authority therefor had been obtained from the
Superintendent of the Batangas City Electrical System.
The offense under the City Ordinance is the
installing of electric wiring and devices without
authority from the proper officials of the city
government. To constitute an offense under the city
ordinance, it is not essential to establish any mens rea
or intent to appropriate and steal on the part of
offender. In contrast, the offense of theft under Article
308 of RPC has quite different essential elements. The
petitioner alleged that theft of electricity can be
effected even without illegal or unauthorized
installations of any kind.
 The petitioner concludes that the unauthorized
installation punished by the ordinance of Batangas City
is not the same as theft of electricity under RPC; that
the second offense is not an attempt to commit the first
or a frustration thereof and that the second offense is
not necessarily included in the offense charged in the
first information.
The above arguments are correct. This is clear
both from express terms of constitutional provision
involved - which reads as follows: "No person shall be
twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act."
Our Bill of Rights deals with 2 kinds of double
jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20, section 1,
Article III, ordains that "no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." The
second sentence of said clause provides that "if an act is
punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act."
Thus, the first sentence prohibits double
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas
the second contemplates double jeopardy of
punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence,
one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the
same act, provided that he is charged with different
offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not
included in, or does not include, the crime charged in
the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the
offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact
that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the
other a violation of a statute. If the two charges are
based on one and the same act conviction or acquittal
under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a
prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such
conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain
the plea of double jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. So long as jeopardy has attached under one of
the information charging said offense, the defense may
be availed of in the other case involving the same
offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor
acquittal in either case.
In the instant case, the relevant acts took place
within the same time frame: from November 1974 to
February 1975. During this period, the accused Manuel
Opulencia installed or permitted the installation of
electrical wiring and devices in his ice plant without
obtaining the necessary permit or authorization from
the municipal authorities. The accused conceded that
he effected or permitted such unauthorized installation
for the very purpose of reducing his electric power bill.
This corrupt intent was thus present from the very
moment that such unauthorized installation began. The
immediate physical effect of the unauthorized
installation was the inward flow of electric current into
Opulencia's ice plant without the corresponding
recording thereof in his electric meter. In other words,
the "taking" of electric current was integral with the
unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices.
While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits
prosecution for the same offense, it seems elementary
that an accused should be shielded against being
prosecuted for several offenses made out from a single
act. Otherwise, an unlawful act or omission may give
use to several prosecutions depending upon the ability
of the prosecuting officer to imagine or concoct as
many offenses as can be justified by said act or omission
by simply adding or subtracting essential elements. It
remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas
City Court of the information for violation of the
Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that such
offense had already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal
of the accused of that offense.
PEOPLE vs. CITY OF COURT 154 SCRA 195 (1987)
Agapito Gonzales and Roberto Pangilinan was
accused of violating Section 7 of RA 3060 (An Act
Creating the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures) in
relation to Article 201 (Immoral doctrines , obscene
publications and exhibitions and indecent shows) of the
RPC. On April 07, 1972, two information were filed
against the accused. The first one, filed for violation of
RA 3060, alleged that the accused, without having
previously submitted to the Board of censors for Motion
Pictures for preview and examination, exhibited a
motion film in a public place.
 The second one, filed for violation of Article
201, alleged that the accused exhibited motion pictures
“depicting and showing scenes of totally naked female
and male persons with exposed private parts doing the
sex act in various lewd and obvious positions, among
other similarly and equally obscene and morally
offensive scenes, in a place open to public view, to wit:
at Rm 309, DeLeon Bldg, Raon St. corner Rizal Avenue.”
Accused Gonzales moved to quash the
information in the criminal case for ground of double
jeopardy as the case pending against him for violation
of RA 3060, allegedly contains the same allegations in
the criminal case. Respondent City Court (City Court of
Manila, Branch 6) dismissed the criminal case on the
basis that the allegations in the two information are
identical and the plea entered in one case by the
accused herein can be reasonably seen as exposing him
to double jeopardy in the other case.Petitioner
contends that the accused could not invoke the
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, when
there had been no conviction, acquittal, dismissal or
termination of criminal proceedings in another case for
the same offense.
Issue: WON there was double jeopardy?
Holding: No.
It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of
double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a
first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for
the same offense, or the second offense includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a
frustration thereof. All these requisites are absent.
The 2 informations with which the accused was
charged, do not make out only one offense, contrary to
private respondent's allegations. The offense defined in
section 7 of Rep. Act No. 3060 punishing the exhibition
of motion pictures not duly passed by the Board of
Censors for Motion Pictures does not include or is not
included in the offense defined in Article 201 (3) of the
Revised Penal Code punishing the exhibition of indecent
and immoral motion pictures.
The two (2) offenses do not constitute a
jeopardy to each other. A scrutiny of the two (2) laws
involved would show that the two (2) offenses are
different and distinct from each other. It is evident that
the elements of the two (2) offenses are different. The
gravamen of the offense defined in Rep. Act No. 3060 is
the public exhibition of any motion picture which has
not been previously passed by the Board of Censors for
Motion Pictures. The motion picture may not be
indecent or immoral but if it has not been previously
approved by the Board, its public showing constitutes a
criminal offense. On the other hand, the offense
punished in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code is
the public showing of indecent or immoral plays,
scenes, acts, or shows, not just motion pictures.
The crime punished in Rep. Act No. 3060 is a
malum prohibitum in which criminal intent need not be
proved because it is presumed, while the offense
punished in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code is
malum in se, in which criminal intent is an indispensable
ingredient. Considering these differences in elements
and nature, there is no Identity of the offenses here
involved for which legal jeopardy in one may be invoked
in the other. Evidence required to prove one offense is
not the same evidence required to prove the other. The
defense of double jeopardy cannot prosper.
Topic: Rules of Court Provisions, Sec. 7 of Rule 117
MELO vs. PEOPLE
Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged with
frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon
Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to
kill, several serious wounds on different parts of the
body, requiring medical attendance for a period of more
than 30 days. The accused pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged. However, Obillo died and so an
amended information was filed charging the accused
with consummated homicide. The accused filed a
motion to quash the amended information alleging
double jeopardy but it was denied by the respondent
court; hence, the instant petition for prohibition to
enjoin the respondent court from further entertaining
the amended information.
Issue: WON there is double jeopardy?
Holding: No.
Rule 106, section 13, 2d paragraph, provides:
"If it appears at any time before judgment that a
mistake has been made in charging the proper offense,
the court may dismiss the original complaint or
information and order the filing of a new one charging
the proper offense, provided the defendant would not
be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also
require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance
at the trial."
Under this provision, it was proper for the court
to dismiss the first information and order the filing of a
new one for reason that the proper offense was not
charged in the former and the latter did not place the
accused in a second jeopardy for the same or identical
offense.
The rule of "double jeopardy" meant that when
a person is charged with an offense and the case is
terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any
other manner without the consent of the accused, the
latter cannot again be charged with the same or
identical offense. There is identity between the two
offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for
one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction
for the other. This so- called "same-evidence test"
which was found to be vague and deficient, was
restated by the Rules of Court in a clearer and more
accurate form.
Under said Rules there is identity between two
offenses not only when the second offense is exactly
the same as the first, but also when the second offense
is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration
thereof, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information.
In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily
include another when some of the essential ingredients
of the former as alleged in the information constitute
the latter. And vice-versa, an offense may be said to be
necessarily included in another when all the ingredients
of the former constitute a part of the elements
constituting the latter (Rule 116, sec. 5.)
In other words, one who has been charged with
an offense cannot be again charged with the same or
identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater
than the former.
This rule of identity does not apply, however,
when the second offense was not in existence at the
time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that
in such case there is no possibility for the accused,
during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an
offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the
accused was charged with physical injuries and after
conviction the injured person dies, the charge for
homicide against the same accused does not put him
twice in jeopardy. In this case, there was no double
jeopardy because the death was a supervening event.
PEOPLE vs. CITY OF COURT 121 SCRA 637 (1983)
This case involves the dismissing of information
for homicide thru reckless imprudence filed against
private respondent, Francisco Gapay y Mallares, on the
ground of double jeopardy. Respondent court held that
the private respondent having been previously tried and
convicted of serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence for the resulting death of the victim would
place the accused in double jeopardy.
Issue: WON a person who has been prosecuted for
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and
convicted thereof may be prosecuted subsequently for
homicide thru reckless imprudence if the offended
party dies as a result of the same injuries he had
suffered?
Holding:
In Melo vs. People, this Court held that "where
after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for
which the defendant is responsible, which changes the
character of the offense and, together with the facts
existing at a time, constitutes a new and distinct
offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second
jeopardy if indicted for the second offense."
However, the trial court held that the doctrine
of Melo vs. People does not apply in the case at bar in
view of this Court's ruling in People vs. Buan, that
Article 365 of the Penal Code punishes the negligent
state of mind and not the resulting injury. The trial court
concluded that once prosecuted for and convicted of
negligence, the accused cannot again be prosecuted for
the same negligence although for a different resulting
injury.
In the case at bar, the incident occurred on
October 17, 1971. The following day, October 18, an
information for serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence was filed against private respondent driver
of the truck. On the same day, the victim Diolito de la
Cruz died.
Well-settled is the rule that one who has been
charged with an offense cannot be charge again with
the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser
or greater than the former. However, as held in the case
of Melo vs. People, supra, the rule of identity does not
apply when the second offense was not in existence at
the time of the first prosecution, for the reason that in
such case there is no possibility for the accused, during
the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that
was then inexistent.
"Thus, where the accused was charged with
physical injuries and after conviction, the injured person
dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused
does not put him twice in jeopardy." Stated differently
where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes
for which the defendant is responsible, which changes
the character of the offense and, together with the facts
existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct
offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second
jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.
As stated above, the victim Diolito dela Cruz
died on the day the information was filed, and the
accused was arraigned two (2) days after, or on October
20, 1972. When the information for homicide thru
reckless imprudence was, therefore, filed on October
24, 1972, the accused-private respondent was already
in jeopardy. ACCORDINGLY, the order of dismissal of the
lower court is affirmed.
PEOPLE vs. YORAC
Rodrigo Yorac was prosecuted for frustrated
murder arising allegedly from having assaulted with a
piece of wood the offended party (Lam Hock), for which
he had been previously tried and sentenced for slight
physical injuries, his plea being one of guilt. He started
serving his sentence forthwith. The later information for
frustrated murder was based on a second medical
certificate after the lapse of one week from the former
previously given by the same physician who, apparently,
was much more thorough the second time, to the effect
that the victim did suffer a greater injury than was at
first ascertained.
A motion to quash was filed by the accused on
the ground that, having been previously convicted of
slight physical injuries and having already served the
penalty imposed on him for the very same offense, the
prosecution for frustrated murder arising out of the
same act committed against the same offended party,
the crime of slight physical injuries necessarily being
included in that of frustrated murder, he would be
placed in second jeopardy if indicted for new offense.
Issue: WON the defendant, who had already been
convicted of slight physical injuries and had served
sentence therefor, may be prosecuted anew for
frustrated murder for the same act committed against
the same person?
Holding: No. There was double jeopardy. A defendant in
a criminal case should therefore be adjudged either
guilty or not guilty and thereafter left alone in peace, in
the latter case the State being precluded from taking an
appeal. If the X-ray examination discloses the existence
of a fracture on January 17, 1957, that fracture must
have existed when the first examination was made on
December 10, 1956. There is no new or supervening
fact that could be said to have developed or arisen since
the filing of original action. The wound causing the
delay in healing was already in existence at the time of
the first examination, but said delay was caused by the
very superficial examination then made. No
supervening fact had occurred which justifies the
application of the rule in Melo vs. People, for which
reason we are constrained to apply the general rule of
double jeopardy.
IVLER vs. MODESTO – SAN PEDRO 635 SCRA 191 (2010)
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004,
Jason Ivler was charged before the MeTC, with two
separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for
injuries sustained by Evangeline L. Ponce and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage
to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of
Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
On 7 September 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to
the charge and was meted out the penalty of public
censure. Invoking this conviction, Ivler moved to quash
the Information for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless
imprudence. However, it was denied.
Ivler submits that the two cases concern the
same offense of reckless imprudence. He argues that his
constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution
in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously
convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same
offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case
No. 82366. He submits that the multiple consequences
of such crime are material only to determine his
penalty.
Respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to
jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight
physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave
felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was
obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No.
82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case
No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.
Issue: Is there double jeopardy?
Holding: Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless
Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under
Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means to commit other crimes such that
conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this
Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double
jeopardy as applied to Article 365. These cases
uniformly barred the second prosecutions as
constitutionally impermissible under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal
negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act
that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless
act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the
consequence is only taken into account to determine
the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several
persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one
and the same, and cannot be split into different crimes
and prosecutions.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its
Consequences on Persons and Property are Material
Only to Determine the Penalty. The two charges against
Ivler, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted
under the same provision of RPC, as amended, namely,
Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the
Revised Penal Code) that “reckless imprudence” is not a
crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and
merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is
too broad to deserve unqualified assent.
Article 365 of RPC fixes the penalty for reckless
imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision
correccional [medium], if the willful act would
constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the
penalty for the latter could range all the way from
prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be
seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence
bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is
set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crime.
YSIDOROvs.LEONARDO–DECASTRO 665 SCRA 89 (2012)
Ysidoro, as Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte,
was charged before the Sandiganbayan for failure to
give to Nierna S. Doller, Municipal Social Welfare and
Development Officer (MSWDO) of Leyte without legal
basis her RATA for the months of August, September,
October, November and December, all in the year 2001
amounting to P22,125 and her Productivity Pay in the
year 2000 amounting to P2000. Ysidoro filed an
omnibus motion to quash the information and for
judicial determination of probable cause but it was
denied by the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan preventively suspended
Ysidoro for ninety (90) days in accordance with Section
13 of R.A. No. 3019, which states that “Any incumbent
public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under this Act or under Title
7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as complex offense and
in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended
from office.”
Issue: Is there double jeopardy?
Holding: No.
The Constitution has expressly adopted the
double jeopardy policy and thus bars multiple criminal
trials, thereby conclusively presuming that a second trial
would be unfair if the innocence of the accused has
been confirmed by a previous final judgment. Further
prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal
is likewise barred because the government has already
been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the
criminal defendant’s culpability.
However, the rule against double jeopardy
cannot be properly invoked in a Rule 65 petition,
predicated on two (2) exceptional grounds, namely: in a
judgment of acquittal rendered with grave abuse of
discretion by the court; and where the prosecution had
been deprived of due process.
There was no double jeopardy because it was
two different offenses.
BAUTISTAvs.CUNETA-PANGILINAN 684SCRA521 (2012)
Two informations were filed against against
Pete G. Ampoloquio, Jr. (Ampoloquio), and petitioners
Bautista and Alcantara, for the crime of libel, committed
by publishing defamatory articles against respondent
Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan in the tabloid Bandera. It says
MAGTIGIL KA, SHARON! Sharon Cuneta, the mega-taba
singer-actress, I’d like to believe, is really brain-dead.
Magsalita ka, Cuneta, at sabihin mong hindi ito totoo.
Dios mio perdon, what she gets to see are those
purportedly biting commentaries about her katabaan
and kaplastikan but she has simply refused to
acknowledge the good reviews we’ve done on her.
Respondent’s undated Complaint-Affidavit
alleged that Bautista and Alcantara were Editor and
Associate Editor, respectively, of the publication
Bandera, and their co-accused, Ampoloquio, was the
author of the alleged libelous articles which were
published therein, and subject of the two informations.
Petitioners allege that the Order of the RTC,
dated April 25, 2008, granting the Demurrer to Evidence
was tantamount to an acquittal. As such, the
prosecution can no longer interpose an appeal to the
CA, as it would place them in double jeopardy.
Petitioners contend that respondent's petition for
certiorari with the CA should not have prospered,
because the allegations therein, in effect, assailed the
trial court's judgment, not its jurisdiction. In other
words, petitioners posit that the said Order was in the
nature of an error of judgment rendered, which was not
correctible by a petition for certiorari with the CA.
Respondent counters that petitioners failed to
show special and important reasons to justify their
invocation of the Court's power to review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. She avers that the acquittal of
petitioners does not preclude their further prosecution
if the judgment acquitting them is void for lack of
jurisdiction. Further, she points out that contrary to
petitioners’ contention, the principle of double jeopardy
does not attach in cases where the court's judgment
acquitting the accused or dismissing the case is void.
Issue: Is there double jeopardy?
Holding: No. The granting of a demurrer to evidence should,
therefore, be exercised with caution, taking into
There is no liberl because Sharon was not consideration not only the rights of the accused, but
actually named in the article. It was in fact a blind item.
also the right of the private offended party to be
Under Section 23,29 Rule 119 of the Rules of vindicated of the wrongdoing done against him, for if it
Court on Demurrer to Evidence, after the prosecution is granted, the accused is acquitted and the private
terminates the presentation of evidence and rests its complainant is generally left with no more remedy. In
case, the trial court may dismiss the case on the ground such instances, although the decision of the court may
of insufficiency of evidence upon the filing of a be wrong, the accused can invoke his right against
Demurrer to Evidence by the accused with or without double jeopardy.
leave of court. If the accused files a Demurrer to
Evidence with prior leave of court and the same is
denied, he may adduce evidence in his defense.
However, if the Demurrer to Evidence is filed by the
accused without prior leave of court and the same is
denied, he waives his right to present evidence and
submits the case for judgment on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution.

Corollarily, after the prosecution rests its case,

and the accused files a Demurrer to Evidence, the trial
court is required to evaluate whether the evidence
presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough to
warrant the conviction of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. If the trial court finds that the
prosecution evidence is not sufficient and grants the
accused's Demurrer to Evidence, the ruling is an
adjudication on the merits of the case which is
tantamount to an acquittal and may no longer be
appealed. Any further prosecution of the accused after
an acquittal would, thus, violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy.

Nevertheless, petitioners could no longer be

held liable in view of the procedural infirmity that the
petition for certiorari was not undertaken by the OSG,
but instead by respondent in her personal capacity.
Although the conclusion of the trial court may be
wrong, to reverse and set aside the Order granting the
demurrer to evidence would violate petitioners’
constitutionally-enshrined right against double
jeopardy. Had it not been for this procedural defect, the
Court could have seriously considered the arguments
advanced by the respondent in seeking the reversal of
the Order of the RTC.