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Consciousness, Theories of
Uriah Kriegel
University of Arizona/University of Sydney
Abstract
Phenomenal consciousness is the property mental states, events, and processes have
when, and only when, there is something it is like for their subject to undergo
them, or be in them. What it is like to have a conscious experience is customarily
referred to as the experience’s phenomenal character. Theories of consciousness attempt
to account for this phenomenal character. This article surveys the currently
prominent theories, paying special attention to the various attempts to explain a
state’s phenomenal character in terms of its representational content.
I will now turn to a very summary survey of the merits and demerits of
each of these theories. I will present what I take to be the strongest line of
argument in favor, and then the strongest line against, each of the theories
just sketched. For all these arguments and counter-arguments, there are
innumerable objections, rejoinders, comebacks, modifications, and
complications that have been explored in the literature, but which we will
not have occasion to discuss here.
The main argument for dualism is the argument from the conceivability of
zombies. We can readily imagine, in all seriousness, creatures that are
physically indistinguishable from us but are not conscious, in the sense that
they do not have conscious experiences. If such perfect “zombies” are indeed
possible, it would mean that our consciousness is something “extra,”
something over and above all the physical facts about us. For we could have
been physically exactly the same and yet have no consciousness. (See
Chalmers 1996. For a different key argument, see Jackson 1984.)
The main argument against dualism is the argument from causal efficacy. The
charge is that dualism entails the thesis that conscious states do not have the
power to affect the physical domain. The thought is that the physical domain
is “causally closed” – every physical event is fully caused by some physical
event – and therefore, on the assumption that physical events are unlikely
to be systematically fully caused by two independent sets of causes,
non-physical events would normally be deprived of any causal efficacy
vis-à-vis the physical domain. This consequence is however extremely
unintuitive: it certainly seems that when I consciously decide to raise my
arm, my conscious decision causes my arm’s subsequent motion (Kim 1989,
2001).
The main argument for physicalism is the fact that science has managed
over and again to account for initially mysterious and apparently recalcitrant
phenomena in purely (micro)physical terms. It would be odd if consciousness
stood out, all said and done, as the only phenomenon defying the trend
(Smart 1959). The arguments against physicalism are basically the arguments
for dualism.
We may call the main argument for functionalism “the argument from
everything we always wanted.” On the one hand, we want to believe that
there are no non-physical phenomena in the world; on the other, we want
to believe that consciousness is in some way independent of brute physical
matter. If phenomenal character were just functional role, this might just
be the case. Functional roles, being roles, must be occupied. It is possible
to hold that, on the one hand, the functional role that defines phenomenal
consciousness could in principle be occupied by any number of different
physical features, so consciousness is independent of – is “something more”
than – any one of them; but that, on the other hand, all the possible
occupants of that functional role must be physical features, and therefore
there are no non-physical features in the world (Putnam 1967).
to rule out the emergence of new contenders on the scene. As the debate
intensifies, it is likely to become more and more technical, as well as make
ever-increasing contact with empirical work in the cognitive sciences. Yet
the persistent dissatisfaction in the philosophical community with extant
theories of consciousness suggests that the debate is unlikely to proceed only
on the technical level.
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