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Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 39, No. 3 (2017), pp.

470–90 DOI: 10.1355/cs39-3d


© 2017 ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute ISSN 0129-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic

Peasants and Politics:


Achievements and Limits of
Popular Agency in Batang,
Central Java
MUHAMMAD MAHSUN

This article presents an analysis of popular political agency in


Indonesian electoral politics by way of a close study of the district
of Batang in Central Java. While many analyses suggest that local
democratic government in Indonesia is unconsolidated and dominated
by oligarchs, the experience of Batang shows that civil society groups
representing poor and disenfranchised Indonesians can also play
an important role in local politics. In 2011 a well-organized local
peasant-based social movement, Omah Tani, supported a charismatic
former military man who won an election as bupati, or district head,
and subsequently delivered on promises to improve local governance
and resolve land disputes in favour of farmers. It is argued that this
was not an unqualified victory for social movement politics but rather
a hybrid form of politics involving a cross-class coalition and reflected
in the partial nature of delivery of programmatic gains, continued
purchase of clientelistic patterns, and, above all, the movement’s
disorientation when the district head decided not to recontest in 2017
and the movement was unable to put forward a successor candidate.
Even so, the Batang experience points to the potential of “democratic
political block” in Indonesian local politics.

Keywords: local elections, social movement, peasants, vote buying.

Muhammad Mahsun is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science,


Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Walisongo State Islamic
University. Postal address: Jl. Walisongo No. 3-5 Semarang, Indonesia,
50185; email: muhammad.mahsun@walisongo.ac.id.

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Peasants and Politics: Popular Agency in Batang, Central Java 471

At the outset of the twenty-first century — and after having been


consigned to history by many observers — peasant movements
began to profoundly impact democratic politics in several developing
nations. Above all, in Latin American countries including Bolivia,
Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Ecuador and Peru, peasant-based social
movements challenged ruling parties and dominant elites, promoted
agrarian reform, endeavoured to change economic structures and
engaged actively in electoral politics.1 Famously, the Movimiento al
Socialismo (Movement for Socialism, MAS), a movement founded
as an alliance of indigenous coca farmers, succeeded in having
Evo Morales elected as president of Bolivia in 2006.2 In Brazil,
the Partido Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party, PT), came to power in
2002 as an alliance of labour unions, the urban poor, and left-wing
intellectuals, but also drew on support of rural movements such
as the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (Landless
Workers’ Movement, MST).
In Indonesia, there has been nothing approaching the scale of
Latin American rural politicization. Nevertheless, over the past decade
or so of electoral politics, there have been signs of engagement by
popular movements based among farmers and, especially, workers
in electoral politics. Such signs have thus far been visible mostly
in provincial and, especially, district elections, and have seen some
victories by candidates representing lower-class groups, especially in
legislative elections where it is possible, under Indonesia’s proportional
representation system, to gain seats by winning only a small slice
of the electorate.3 For example, Amalinda Savirani’s study of the
2014 legislative election in Bekasi, West Java, showed that two out
of the five labour union candidates who stood won their seats.4
A study of village head elections in Batang, Central Java, in 2007
detailed how activists from a local peasants’ movement won nine
out of the ten elections in which they competed. 5 Though such
experiences hardly amount to an electoral wave, they do suggest we
need to take electoral engagement by social movements representing
disenfranchised groups seriously.
This article takes up that challenge by focusing on one of the
more successful cases of electoral engagement by social movements,
that of the peasant movement in Batang, Central Java. In doing so,
it provides a different perspective to the mainstream interpretation
of local democracy in contemporary Indonesia. The dominant view
is that democratization has largely stalled, as a result of the capture
of decentralized structures of power by local oligarchs and predatory
elites.6 This oligarchic dominance has, so this interpretation goes,

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472 Muhammad Mahsun

largely forestalled the ability of grassroots civil society forces to


effectively challenge elite control. There is no denying that we can
find much evidence to support this “oligarchy thesis”. Politics in
many regions has been dominated by local oligarchs and predators,
especially early in the reformasi period.
However, as Edward Aspinall has argued, this thesis also misses
many instances of popular agency, and pessimistically rules out the
possibility of change.7 Even if political institutions have, on the
whole, been captured by predators, there is also much evidence of
policy lobbying and electoral mobilization by grassroots movements.
Decentralization has, since the early 2000s, allowed labour and
peasant leaders to learn that it is possible to engage in contestation
for governmental power and affect public policy through democratic
means.8 Accordingly, scholars such as Aspinall, Surya Tjandra
and Michele Ford have discerned reasons for optimism in the
democratic potential of local politics.9 Likewise, one large research
effort, coordinated from 2007 by the Jakarta-based research institute
Demos, under the guidance of the Oslo-based academic Olle
Törnquist, analysed the limitations of local-level democracy
in Indonesia and proposed as a solution the creation of local
“democratic political blocs” (blok politik demokratik) involving
coalitions among workers, farmers and other democratic groups. The
organization then went on to advocate the formation of such blocs
in 15 regions as a pilot project.10
This article supports this more optimistic interpretation of
local politics by analysing the engagement by a peasant movement
in the 2011 and 2017 district head elections in Batang, Central
Java. In a movement which peasant activists dubbed “go politics”,
a social movement based among farmers, supplemented its past
repertoire of protest activities with a move into electoral politics.
The movement came to play a significant electoral role. Coordinated
by an organization called Omah Tani (The Farmers’ House), it
strove to form a “democratic political block” under the inspiration
of the Demos initiative mentioned above, and in so doing, resolve
the critical problem of democratic popular representation, which
Olle Törnquist argues has bedevilled Indonesian democracy since
the transition from authoritarian rule began two decades ago.11
Omah Tani supported the nomination of an alternative candidate,
Yoyok Riyo Sudibyo, who won election as Batang’s district head
(bupati) in 2011. As a result of this success, farmers had access to
local executive government for the first time, and in alliance with
an array of liberal reformers, they used this access to push forward

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Peasants and Politics: Popular Agency in Batang, Central Java 473

a process of local agrarian reform, improve governance and counter


the influence of local predators.
However, the movement had difficulty capitalizing on this
success and maintaining its momentum. Its champion, Bupati
Yoyok, had his eyes set on higher office and did not run for
re-election in 2017, causing disorientation in the peasant movement
which was unable to come up with a replacement candidate. Thus
rather than representing an unadulterated triumph of popular
agency and grassroots politics, the outcome of the Batang
experiment suggests that participation by grassroots movements
in local politics in contemporary Indonesia involves complex
coalitions with liberal and establishment political forces. The Batang
experience was an experiment in political hybridization, combining
elements of conventional and grassroots politics, clientelistic and
programmatic delivery. This hybridization limited the ability for
this experience to be either sustained or scaled up. Nevertheless,
it is important to analyse experiences such as those in Batang in
order to provide concrete examples of successful popular agency in
Indonesian local electoral politics and to derive lessons about how
to construct more democratic local governance.

Peasant Movements and the Rise of Popular Politics in Batang


Batang is a rural district on the north coast of Central Java, with
a population of approximately 740,000. About 166,000 residents,
or 38 per cent of the total labour force, work in agriculture and
plantations. About 83,000 are classified as poor.12 The population
is overwhelmingly ethnically Javanese and Islamic, with most
practising the syncretic or abangan variant of Javanese Islam.13
Many of the population express sympathy with Marhaenism, the
old egalitarian-populist ideology espoused by Indonesia’s first
president Sukarno, and many have family connections with former
members of the now-banned Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian
Communist Party, PKI), which was very strong in Batang before the
rise of the New Order regime in 1965–66.14
Both rice farmers and plantation workers in Batang have a long
history of conflicts over land, both with private and state-owned
companies. Most of these conflicts date back to the New Order
period (1966–98), typically involving land that was provided to
plantations or other business interests by the state, contravening
what local farmers believed were their long-established usage
rights. Conflicts that in some cases stretched over decades was the

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474 Muhammad Mahsun

context for the emergence of various local peasant organizations


in the district. These had their origins in the late Soeharto years,
but they began to emerge openly after his downfall in 1998,
at a time when many such groups were being formed around
the country.15 The most important is Omah Tani (“The Farmers’
Home”), a coordinating organization that is based in the village
of Tumbreb in Bandar subdistrict. Founded in 1998, Omah Tani
is an umbrella organization for some 34 local-level farmer
organizations scattered through a majority of Batang’s subdistricts.
In 2017, a total of some 20,000 households were registered as
Omah Tani members.
When it was founded in 1998, the organization was called the
Forum Perjuangan Petani Batang (Struggle Forum of Batang Farmers,
FPPB). Its members, however, were not just farmers who worked
in wet-rice fields (sawah), dry fields (ladang) and plantations
(producing crops such as cloves, tea and teak), but also fishers
who lived along the northern coast of the district and who were
experiencing land conflicts of their own. Over time, the organization
also attracted affiliates in the neighbouring district of Pekalongan,
so much so that in the year 2000 FPPB briefly changed its name
to Forum Paguyuban Petani Nelayan Batang Pekalongan (Forum
of Associations of Farmers and Fishers of Batang and Pekalongan,
FP2NBP) before reverting to its original name. At first, much of the
organization’s activity focused on attempts by local farmers to gain
formal titles to unused state lands, using such methods as street
protests and land occupations. From 2007 the organization also
began to engage in court challenges and negotiations, progressively
gaining a series of local victories by which blocks of land, sometimes
amounting to several hundred hectares in total, were handed out
under certificates to farmers.16
In 2008, the organization experienced an internal conflict,
triggered when some of its leaders — supported by university
graduates from the city of Yogyakarta who had been helping the
organization — planned to run for legislative seats in 2009 under
the banner of the Partai Bintang Reformasi (Reform Star Party),
and to rally FPPB members behind them, without first engaging
in a consultative process within the organization. This led to a
split, with most FPPB leaders, including Handoko Wibowo, the
movement’s highly influential legal advisor, sponsor and financial
backer, changing the group’s name to Omah Tani and adopting a
collective leadership structure. Most local organizations affiliated
themselves with Omah Tanah, while Handoko made available his

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Peasants and Politics: Popular Agency in Batang, Central Java 475

private home and its padepokan, or pavilion, as a meeting place


and organizational headquarters for the group.17
The leaders and members of Omah Tani now meet on a monthly
basis in this pavilion, expanding their knowledge about agrarian
and political issues, discussing problems of rural life and planning
their activities. They frequently hold formal training sessions and
bring in outside resource persons to give lectures. Members also
frequently travel to other parts of Indonesia, and even overseas,
to participate in meetings on social movements, human rights and
agrarian issues.18 Despite the movement’s emergence in an area that
was, 50 years earlier, a PKI base area, and despite having land
reform goals that are in some ways similar to those of the old
PKI peasant affiliate, Barisan Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Peasants’
Front, BTI), Omah Tani does not promote a revolutionary agenda.
On the contrary, it aims to bring about a local government that is
democratic, accountable, corruption-free, and which fosters popular
participation in policy making and development. This orientation is
inseparable from Omah Tani’s links to external civil society networks
of human rights and anti-corruption NGOs, such as Indonesia
Corruption Watch (ICW), Transparency International Indonesia (TII),
KontraS (Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence)
and Demos.
Omah Tani’s links to such external movement actors were
facilitated above all by Handoko Wibowo — a senior lawyer of
ethnic Chinese descent who had been involved with human rights
advocacy and agrarian issues during the New Order era, and who
was very close to disenfranchised peasants in the district from the
start. At his initiative, in 2007 Omah Tani (at that time still called
FPPB) changed its strategy, supplementing the tactics it had hitherto
used — namely land occupations and street demonstrations — with
active participation in electoral politics. They called this switch
“petani go politics” or “farmers go politics”, a term later adopted
by worker activists elsewhere.19
This change of strategy was prompted by several factors. First,
activists had learned that their traditional movement strategies, such
as land occupations, had mostly led to only temporary improvements
in the plight of their members, because they had been unable to
ensure secure legal status over land in the form of ownership
certificates for the occupiers. As a result, the land occupiers
continued to be vulnerable to displacement by local government
or companies using private security or local preman (“toughs”).
Second, both executive and legislative arms of government at the

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476 Muhammad Mahsun

local level had shown little commitment to resolving land conflicts


in the farmers’ favour, despite them having organized numerous
large-scale street demonstrations. Third, there had been a decline
in momentum because traditional methods of direct action had
been pursued for a long period without producing secure land
tenure.20 Moreover, farmers using these methods frequently had to
confront threats or actual physical violence from preman hired by
the companies they opposed. These factors prompted Omah Tani,
along with its grassroots affiliates, to change strategy and attempt to
create a “democratic political bloc” as an instrument for negotiating
with political parties and the local government.
The first experiment was attempted at the lowest level of
the government structure: the villages. In 2007, farmers’ groups
affiliated to Omah Tani nominated members to compete in village
head elections in ten villages in three subdistricts (Tulis, Blado,
and Subah) which had significant histories of agrarian conflict. As
candidates, they were instructed to compete without using vote
buying — a common technique in village head elections in rural
Java.21 As noted earlier, they won in nine out of these ten contests.22
In seeking to elect sympathetic village officials, the aim was to
assist in the resolution of land conflicts, in a context in which
village officials and civil servants had typically been hostile to
the goals of peasant organizations.23 While one of those elected
subsequently became close to the plantation company the villagers
he represented had been battling against, effectively being coopted
by it, the rest consistently supported movement goals.
The success of this initiative resulted in many activists,
including some from labour unions in Bekasi, Tangerang and
elsewhere, visiting Batang to learn from it and helping to broaden
Omah Tani’s networks with like-minded progressive labour and
peasant organizations. At the same time, the initiative was itself
in part facilitated by Demos, which from 2008 began its campaign
to support the formation of “democratic political blocs” involving
labour unions and peasant organizations in 15 provinces and
districts.24 This campaign was itself a result of an earlier Demos
study which found that the political openness of the post-Soeharto
period had mostly benefited new elites who collaborated with
established, Soeharto-era elites to form new oligarchic power
structures at the local level. The goal of establishing new democratic
political blocs was to encourage a new politics of representation
and direct participation in local government to challenge these
elite monopolies.25 As a result of this effort, various civil society

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Peasants and Politics: Popular Agency in Batang, Central Java 477

and grassroots movement activists tried to build alliances with


political parties to nominate their agents as candidates in the 2009
Indonesian legislative election. Omah Tani members decided against
taking this step in 2009, believing that they lacked both the network
and personal resources to engage directly in this level of electoral
competition, and would fail if they did so. Indeed, failure was the
outcome of most of the electoral experiments that did go ahead at
this time, including the campaign by the FPPB activists who had
split from Omah Tani in 2009.

Peasants Go Politics in the 2011 Local Election:


Strategy and Machine
Despite Omah Tani’s success in having nine members elected as
village heads, the organization still had difficulty promoting its
agenda of agrarian reform because it lacked support from the district
government. The incumbent bupati, Bambang Bintoro, was first elected
in 2002 and was in a strong position politically, being backed by
the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesia Democracy
Party–Struggle, PDI-P) which had won the most seats in Batang’s
district parliament in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections. Bambang
was also closely connected to local business networks, and tended
to take their side in conflicts with local farmers. For example, he
had extended the land use permit of PT Pagilaran, a tea plantation
and processor, which had long been locked in conflict with local
farmers over the use of 1,113 hectares of farm land. He was also
involved in various corruption scandals, some of which came to
light only after his term in office ended, resulting in him being
convicted to 18 months in jail in late 2012.26
In this context, from the beginning of 2010, Omah Tani opted
to play an active role in the 2011 local election (pilkada), hoping
it would be able to gain control over the district government or at
least ensure the election of a more sympathetic bupati. Omah
Tani leaders decided that none of them possessed the personal
skills, district-wide reputation or financial resources to run for
office themselves. Instead, they decided to look for an alternative
candidate, from outside the established local political elite, who
would be willing to support the farmers’ agenda. In this context,
Yoyok Riyo Sudibyo visited Omah Tani to seek support and offer
himself as a candidate. Yoyok was a native of Batang and former
military man who had served in the intelligence services and
taken early retirement with the rank of major in 2009, becoming

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478 Muhammad Mahsun

a businessman and owning a string of textile and garment shops,


many of which were located in Papua. After some negotiations,
Yoyok accepted the conditions laid down by Omah Tani and signed
a “political contract” with the organization, among other things
promising to maintain a simple lifestyle as leader, to be merakyat
(close to the people), to reject corruption and, importantly, to resolve
the various land conflicts experienced by farmers. From this point,
Yoyok, assisted by the Omah Tani leaders, reached out to various
political parties to nominate himself as a candidate in the 2011
pilkada. To fund his campaign Yoyok drew on his own funds, as
well as several donations, notably from a local construction contractor,
Edi Kristiadi, and from Handoko, the Omah Tani patron.
In the 2011 election, Yoyok chose Soetadi as his running
mate. He was a senior local public servant who was supported by
a coalition of the Golkar Party (Partai Golongan Karya, Party of
the Functional Groups), Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate
Party, PAN), Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development
Party, PPP) and the Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party), at least
some of which supported him when they believed it was likely
he would otherwise run as a strong independent candidate. With
the support of these parties, and with the backing of Omah Tani,
Yoyok won with 40 per cent of the vote, defeating Susi Iriani, the
wife of outgoing bupati, Bambang Bintoro, and backed by the PDI-P
(she won 23 per cent), and Dhedy Irawan (37 per cent) who was
backed by a different coalition of parties.27 The resounding defeat
of Susi Iriani was particularly noteworthy given that her husband
had seemed so entrenched and well-resourced, and that she had the
backing of much of the bureaucracy as well as the most powerful
party in the district.28
Yoyok’s victory was partly attributable to the strong support
he received from Omah Tani. Through much of Bambang’s second
term, and with growing intensity in the two years leading up to
the 2011 poll, Omah Tani led a sustained campaign to delegitimize
the bupati and what they depicted as the corrupt regime over
which he presided. They engaged in this effort not only through
local print media and radio, but also by holding virtually weekly
demonstrations throughout Bambang’s final two years in office,
attacking him on the corruption issue and for his support for the
PT Pagilaran tea plantation. At the same time, Omah Tani cadres
relentlessly promoted Yoyok and Soetadi as “alternative candidates”
who supported democracy, backed ordinary people and were in turn
supported from the grassroots. For almost two years, Yoyok would go

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Peasants and Politics: Popular Agency in Batang, Central Java 479

with Omah Tani leaders to regular informal meetings and gatherings


organized by local-level farmer groups, workers and other community
groups. They called this approach “anjangsana politics”, using a
term that suggests a nostalgic meeting of old friends or some other
occasion in which emotional bonds are renewed and strengthened.29
On these occasions, Yoyok would provide simple snacks, and the
community members had the opportunity to appraise his personal
qualities. He and the Omah Tani leaders were also able to discuss
at length the problems experienced by citizens in the district. As
Handoko Wibowo explained:
One of our strategies for mobilizing votes was that I took Yoyok to
visit communities that were experiencing cases [of land conflicts
and other disputes]. I told them that if we make this man bupati
then he will help you on your case, like the Tratak case which
involved redistribution of 90 hectares of land. ... Yoyok was also
really good at giving speeches, and funny, on how tough it was
to be a farmer; he could even recite verses about the farmers’
problems. And then I would try and get people’s spirits worked
up about Marhaenism, which the farmers believe in. And so these
events were a real investment for Yoyok. So when we [later] held
formal campaign events, or socialization events, I could mobilize
thousands of peasants to come, and they would then attract others,
they would be like a magnet. That’s how he won.30

This lengthy period of campaigning did not focus only on promoting


Yoyok’s merits, however. Campaign workers also did what they could
to delegitimize Bambang Bintoro and his chosen successor. At all
the “anjangsana” meetings, Omah Tani leaders would call on those
attending not to vote for Susi Iriani:
The strategy was to make Bintoro into a real enemy. [We would tell
them that] if the farmers did not support Yoyok, and if Bintoro’s
wife was elected, then their cases would get even tougher and there
would be no point in even hoping for a solution to the agrarian
conflicts. So, in the end, they realized, “whatever happens let’s
make sure that candidate no. 2 [Susi] is not elected”. Although
the farmers here are almost all PDI-P supporters, in the end they
supported us. Back in the 1960s, Batang people, if they weren’t
PKI, they were PNI [Partai Nasional Indonesia, the Indonesian
National Party and predecessor to the PDI-P]. But we consolidated
their support and almost all of their votes went to Yoyok, almost
without using any money.31

Omah Tani fully committed its resources to support Yoyok’s campaign.


It instructed members of its 34 local-level affiliates to become actively

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480 Muhammad Mahsun

involved as campaign volunteers or “success team” members, working


outside the political parties and formal campaign structure.
Omah Tani also instructed its members to appeal to people
in their communities not to vote for Yoyok’s rivals, even if they
received cash payments from them. According to most informants,
there was mass-scale vote buying in the 2011 election, in keeping
with what we would expect in a rural Javanese constituency like
Batang.32 And while Omah Tani campaigners were warning voters
against being swayed by cash gifts distributed by Yoyok’s rivals,
this did not mean that Yoyok’s camp had not engaged in vote
buying. In fact, Yoyok’s supporters also distributed cash payments
to voters, but not on the massive scale of his competitors, who,
it was said, spent up to 20 billion rupiah (US$200,000). Yoyok’s
supporters spent approximately only one-tenth of that amount.
Omah Tani members targeted poor voters, both farmers and workers,
who were not members of the organization and who did not have
a clear preference for any particular candidate, for payments. 33
However, they gave them only relatively trivial sums, 15,000 rupiah
(US$1.50) per voter, and distributed to relatively limited numbers,
whereas rival candidates were paying 30–40,000 (US$2.20–$3)
rupiah to many more voters.34 Intriguingly, at least some of the
funds for vote buying and other campaign expenses were donated
by small-time businesspeople and other supporters who wanted to
see socioeconomic and political change in Batang. Handoko himself
donated the proceeds of a harvest of cloves from an eight-hectare
garden he owned to pay for campaign events at Omah Tani, and
members of the organization also donated agricultural products for
meals to accompany such events.35

Achievements in Government: Popular Representation,


Transparency and Agrarian Reform
Omah Tani’s investment in electoral politics paid off. During
Yoyok and Soetadi’s five-year term (2012–17), Handoko Wibowo,
representing Omah Tani, A.S. Burhan, a young Nahdlatul Ulama
(NU) activist, along with other civil society activists participated
actively in designing and monitoring government programmes and
performance in the district. They initiated various policy changes
in relation to government administration and public services, with
the goal of increasing accountability and transparency. Many of
these changes were drawn from the menu of good governance
policies pioneered by reforming regional heads in other parts of the

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Peasants and Politics: Popular Agency in Batang, Central Java 481

country, but some were specific to Batang. For example, the district
increased transparency in its financial management and planning by
introducing e-budgeting and bureaucratic reforms with the goal, in
Yoyok’s terms, of creating “entrepreneurial bureaucrats” oriented to
community service. Yoyok himself, given his military background,
lacked specialist knowledge in governance reform, but he was willing
to listen to advice on the topic.
On the initiative of Handoko and A.S. Burhan, Yoyok worked
with outside organizations such as the well-known NGOs Indonesia
Corruption Watch (ICW) and Transparansi Internasional Indonesia
(TII), as well as the main anti-graft agency Komisi Pemberantasan
Korupsi (Corruption Eradication Commission, KPK) to advance
this clean government programme. He also initiated a programme
which he called a “Budget Festival” under which all 60 units in
the government made presentations in the town square about their
successes and failures, allowing members of the public to learn
directly how the budget was being used, and find out also about
how much of their allocations had not been used by each budget
unit at the end of the year. From 2012, important bureaucratic
posts, from subdistrict heads up to bureau (dinas) heads were
appointed on the basis of competitive bidding in which the
qualifications and competencies of the candidates were compared.
A Unit Peningkatan Kualitas Pelayanan Publik (Unit for Increasing
the Quality of Public Service, UPKP2) was created, enabling online
complaints by citizens about government services. Bupati Yoyok
opened up his official residence on a 24-hour basis, allowing
ordinary citizens to visit and meet with him without having
to pass through formal procedures or protocols, making good on
his campaign promises of a new open and populist leadership
style. 36 He also worked hard to improve health and education
services, and introduced a popular new policy renovating the homes
of poor residents.
Yoyok declared that Batang district would be a “zone of
integrity”, free of corruption, the first in Java. He reduced government
expenditure, making savings amounting to many billions of rupiah in
government expenditure, especially by cutting back on expenditure on
the bureaucracy, and helped to raise regional revenue to 14.4 billion
rupiah (US$1 million).37 In 2015 he was awarded the Bung Hatta
Anti-Corruption Award along with the famous mayor of Surabaya,
Tri Rismaharini. In the same year, Batang also won the Adipura
award for having the country’s tidiest small town, a prize previously
also won by the district in 2013. Yoyok was also listed as a model

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482 Muhammad Mahsun

local government leader by Tempo magazine, along with five other


district heads, in 2017.38
With regard to the core concern of Omah Tani — land —
Yoyok delivered on many, but not all, of his promises. For example,
the government finally resolved the longstanding dispute between
Omah Tani supporters and PT Tratak, which had formerly ran a
clove plantation in Bandar subdistrict, resulting in the redistribution
of 90 hectares of disputed land and the issuing of land certificates
to the farmers in 2015. Of the land, 12 hectares was set aside for
housing, and the government provided heavy equipment to help
prepare it.39 In 2016, Yoyok also helped Omah Tani members reach
a memorandum of understanding with the local government and
Perhutani (the state forestry company) granting access to farmers to
300 hectares in Blado subdistrict, but not transferring ownership.
Although he facilitated several other memoranda of understanding
between companies and farmers over disputed land, and though
some redistribution was promised, most other efforts did not bear
fruit. As Yoyok’s term came to an end, several large-scale disputes
involving Omah Tani members remained unresolved.40 On the other
hand, during his five years in office, Yoyok also helped Omah
Tani and its members in more personalized ways, for example
granting three motorized tricycles and a tractor to the organization,
lending government vehicles when Omah Tani needed them for its
activities, and providing emergency assistance to members who
suffered from misfortune.
Overall, the electoral strategy adopted by Omah Tani in 2011
can thus be said to have succeeded, if modestly, when compared
to the more confrontational approach the organization had pursued
previously. The Batang farmers achieved some of their goals, and
they participated in a coalition that helped to challenge the corrupt
and collusive practices that had characterized local government in
the district. The Batang experiment thus illustrates that grassroots
forces, provided they are well organized, supported by other
democratic actors and able to make alliances with reforming elites,
can exercise some control over governmental authority at the local
level and steer it in directions that accord with lower-class interests,
precisely as explained by Törnquist in his writings on democratic
popular representation.41 Though obviously far less advanced or
consolidated than the experiences of lower-class political agency in
places like Bolivia and Brazil, the Batang experience thus points
to the fact that poor and marginalized groups in Indonesia have
significant democratic political potential, and can be at least as

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Peasants and Politics: Popular Agency in Batang, Central Java 483

significant as the middle classes that are so lionized in many liberal


traditions.42
At the same time, the Batang experience was fragile, in part
because it was greatly dependent on the charismatic and, at times,
unpredictable leadership provided by one man. As bupati, Yoyok
was popular among farmers, but his inflexibility stirred up enmity
among many leading figures in the local business community and
among party elites, including from some who had backed him in
2011. His background in intelligence culminated in him adopting
a one-man-show leadership style where he often failed to consult
or cooperate with those close to him, including his deputy bupati
and the regional secretary, the most senior bureaucrat in the
district.43 But his public reputation and popular support were strong,
and he probably would have been elected for another term. In the
end, the Batang experiment proved hard to sustain when it lost its
figurehead.

The 2017 Elections and the Absence of Alternative Leaders


Although the reforms he had begun in local government were far
from being entrenched, Yoyok decided in the end not to stand
for re-election in 2017. In late 2016, he instead decided to back
A.S. Burhan, one of the activists who had worked closely with him,
and who was nominated by Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National
Awakening Party, PKB) and Partai Nasdem (National Democratic
Party). Also running in the February 2017 poll were three other
candidates, each backed by various combinations of political
parties. The winner was Wihaji, who was nominated by the Golkar
Party and PPP, and won resoundingly with 57 per cent of the vote.
Wihaji was in fact not a particularly well-known figure locally, but
was well-connected at the national level. He was a national leader
of Ansor, the youth arm of the Nahdlatul Ulama traditionalist
Islamic organization, and a deputy secretary general of the Golkar
party. He was strongly backed by that party’s wealthy national
leader, Setya Novanto and Nusron Wahid, a former Ansor general
chairperson and Golkar politician. A.S. Burhan came in third, with
only 15 per cent of the vote, despite receiving support from Yoyok
as the incumbent. The 2017 election, not unlike that in 2011, was
run in an atmosphere of intensive money politics, in which both
members of the candidates’ success teams and gamblers, or botoh,
delivered cash payments varying between 30,000–70,000 rupiah
(US$2.25–$5.20) to voters in the lead-up to voting day.44 Wihaji’s

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484 Muhammad Mahsun

victory was also reportedly a result of massive vote buying (as


many as 400,000 envelopes containing cash were distributed by his
supporters), with Nusron Wahid playing a key role in mobilizing
village heads behind this effort. In short, electoral politics in Batang
returned to a fully clientelistic pattern, in which candidates competed
mainly on their ability to distribute cash to voters, rather than on
the basis of offering alternative programmes.
Many explanations for Yoyok’s decision not to stand for re-election
circulated, some of which were not convincing. The most likely
explanation was that Yoyok had received an offer from a senior party
figure to stand as the running mate of then-Jakarta Governor Basuki
Tjahaja Purnama (also known as Ahok), who was in the midst of
preparing his own re-election effort. National media also speculated
that Yoyok would be the running mate of Sandiaga Uno, who was
planning a run as Jakarta governor (in the end Sandiaga teamed
up with the eventual victor, Anies Baswedan, as his deputy).45 In
considering this move, Yoyok was following the path already laid
out by the most successful reformist local politicians in Java — Joko
Widodo who went from Solo mayor to Jakarta governor and then
president, as well as Djarot Saiful Hidayat, the former Blitar mayor
who became Ahok’s deputy. However, when he was asked about his
intentions, Yoyok was coy, explaining that he simply believed it
was “enough to lead Batang for five years”.46 His former supporters,
however, were clear about his goal, and why he could not stand
again for re-election in Batang:
The problem is that he had already promised he wouldn’t stand.
Pak Yoyok kept going to Jakarta, designing his image in such a
way that he would keep getting onto television, the newspapers
and online media, because he wanted to be Ahok’s deputy, but
that failed. And then he wanted to be Ahok’s opponent, and that
failed too. Pak Yoyok did a lot of image building in front of the
Jakarta elite so he would be nominated in Jakarta.47

Yoyok’s decision understandably caused great disappointment among


Omah Tani members, who felt that they had not had the chance to
prepare anyone with the skills or profile to be a credible successor.
Moreover, Yoyok did not run by his decision with Omah Tani or
discuss potential successors with them. It was only late in 2016
that he signalled his support for Burhan.48
Yoyok’s reluctance to seek a second term, or to prepare a
transition plan, indicated the limits of his support for the lower-
class interests that had helped him win office, especially given

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Peasants and Politics: Popular Agency in Batang, Central Java 485

that many of the agrarian disputes which lay at the heart of Omah
Tani’s concerns were still not resolved. In the end, his ambitions
for higher office trumped such considerations, and underlined the
limitations of the Omah Tani experience and how far short it fell
when compared to examples of more institutionalized peasant agency
such as those seen in Bolivia and Brazil, where political leaders
were produced by social movements rather than merely forming a
temporary alliance with them.
In this context, in 2017 Omah Tani decided that as an institution
it would not repeat its 2011 strategy of electoral engagement.
Instead, it allowed grassroots leaders and members of its various
local affiliates to choose for themselves which of the four candidates
they would support. The organization did not openly back Yoyok’s
chosen candidate, Burhan, though Handoko privately did so, on the
basis of their longstanding friendship. Only a minority of Omah
Tani members followed him down this path.
The decision not to endorse Burhan was based on two main
factors. First, Burhan left the declaration of his candidacy too late,
only four months before the election, leaving Omah Tani with
insufficient time to carry out the necessary consultative meetings.
These may have been difficult anyway, given that some local groups
were unhappy that their land conflicts had not been resolved during
Yoyok’s tenure. Second, the experience of mass-scale vote buying
during the 2014 legislative election made Omah Tani leaders fearful
that the 2017 bupati election would also involve massive distribution
of cash, especially given that it was widely known that two of the
candidates were very wealthy. Burhan, in contrast, was not financially
well resourced, so Omah Tani leaders worried they might end up
backing an unsuccessful candidate, leading to demoralization within
the organization. They were especially keen to protect Omah Tani’s
authority in light of their future plans, including to participate in
the 2019 legislative election:
Into the future we are going to reorganize ourselves, fix up our
cooperative and improve the use of the land that’s already been
distributed in order to improve the economic situation of our
members. Why? Well, because many of the “go politics” failures by
movement organizations were because we lack economic resources.
So all of this is also to help prepare for another “go politics”
in the 2019 legislative election. If, just because we lacked other
options and fully supported Burhan but lost, that would make it
hard to avoid demoralization in 2019. It’s extremely hard to raise
the spirits of the members after a defeat.49

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486 Muhammad Mahsun

In fact, part of the thinking behind allowing the local-level affiliates


to endorse different candidates in the 2017 bupati race was the hope
that they would later be able to ask for payback in the form of
support for their agrarian reform agenda from whoever was elected
as bupati.

Conclusion
The analysis of the peasants’ “go politics” experiment in Batang
presented here ultimately leaves us with a mixed picture with respect
to the potential for lower-class political agency in contemporary
Indonesia. Batang was in some ways a highly supportive location
for this experiment, given the long history of social movement
activism there, and the relatively high level of institutionalization of
movement politics around a leading organization, Omah Tani. Even
before getting involved in the 2011 bupati election, Omah Tani was
well known in activist circles around the country as a particularly
strongly rooted and effective peasant organization.
Omah Tani’s success in supporting the election campaign of a
sympathetic district head, who later delivered on several key promises
to the group’s rural constituency, provides an indication that post-
reformasi politics have not always been dominated by oligarchs and
predatory elites, as the conventional view would have it. There can
be space for political engagement, and even political victories, by
civil society groups representing popular interests.
On the other hand, the experiment also points to the limitations
of such political experimentation. Omah Tani ultimately failed to
ensure that Yoyok resolved all the issues of concern to its members,
and also did not persuade him to run for a second term. The
inability to even agree upon a sympathetic candidate as a potential
successor further underlines the movement’s own limitations. Omah
Tani was able to gain some measure of control over local government
only in coalition with a strong elite ally. Omah Tani needed the
charismatic appeal of Yoyok and, as we have seen, he proved not
to be a completely reliable ally. Most social movements representing
lower-class groups in Indonesia have similar weaknesses, lacking
high-capacity actors and networks able to win election campaigns
in their own right.50 Ultimately, rather than representing a pure
victory of lower-class agency and a new form of programmatic
politics, the Batang experience instead points towards a form of
political hybridization. Not only did it involve cross-class coalition
building between elite and social-movement actors, even Yoyok’s

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Peasants and Politics: Popular Agency in Batang, Central Java 487

mode of governance, in which he dispensed personalized benefits to


his Omah Tani supporters, may be viewed as an adaptation of the
predominant clientelist model found in Indonesian local politics —
in which political patrons disburse projects, jobs and other favours
to their supporters in exchange for their backing at election times
— rather than as signifying the emergence of an entirely novel form
of programmatic politics.
To be sure, viewed in an optimistic light, we can see the
Omah Tani experience in Batang as the first stage in a long process
in which social movements engage in “learning by doing”. This
experiment was itself a form of valuable political education for
participants, who learned the value of active engagement in the
political process and community involvement in the making and
implementation of public policy. Further experimentation in the
building of local democratic political blocs of this sort may yet push
forward democratic consolidation at the local level.

NOTES
1
Cliff Welch and Bernardo Mançano Fernandes, “Peasant Movements in Latin
America: Looking Back, Moving Ahead”, Latin American Perspectives 36, no. 4
(July 2009): 3–8.
2
George Junus Aditjondro, Ketika Petani Angkat Bicara Dengan Suara dan Masa:
Belajar dari Sejarah Gerakan Petani di Indonesia dan Amerika Selatan [When
the Peasants Speak with Voice and Masses: Learning from the History of Peasant
Movements in Indonesia and Latin America] (Sulawesi Tengah: Yayasan Tanah
Merdeka, 2006).
3
Teri L. Caraway, Michele Ford and Hari Nugroho, “Translating Membership into
Power at the Ballot Box? Trade Union Candidates and Workers Voting Pattern
in Indonesian National Election”, Democratization 22, no. 7 (December 2015):
1296–1316; Michele Ford, “Learning by Doing: Trade Unions and Electoral Politics
in Batam 2004–2009”, South East Asia Research 22, no. 3 (September 2014):
341–57; Arie Putra, Inggrid Silitonga and Tyas Wardhani, Menuju Demokrasi
Bermakna: Persoalan-Persoalan Perbaikan Representasi Politik di Indonesia
[Towards Meaningful Democracy: Problems of Improving Political Representation
in Indonesia] (Jakarta: Demos, 2014).
4
Amalinda Savirani, “Bekasi, West Java: From Patronage to Interest Group
Politics?”, in Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia: Money Politics, Patronage and
Clientelism at the Grassroots, edited by Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2016), p. 198.
5
Rizza Kamajaya, Transformasi Strategi Gerakan Petani [The Transformation of
the Strategy of Peasant Movements] (Yogyakarta: PolGov Press-JPP FISIPOL
UGM, 2010).
6
Many studies advance this thesis, including Vedi R. Hadiz, Localising Power in
Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective (Stanford, California:

04 Muhammad-2P.indd 487 6/11/17 3:10 pm


488 Muhammad Mahsun

Stanford University Press, 2010); Vedi R. Hadiz, “A Political Sociology of


Institutional Change: Local Power in Indonesia”, in States of Democracy: Oligarchic
Democracies and Asian Democratization, edited by Hee Yeon Cho Hee-Yeon,
Lawrence Surendra and Eunhong Park (Mumbai: Earthworm Books, 2008), pp.
103–15; Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz, Reorganising Power in Indonesia:
The Politics of Oligarchy in An Age of Markets (London: RoutledgeCurzon,
2004); Jeffrey A. Winters, “Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia”, Indonesia
96 (October 2013): 11–34; Vedi R. Hadiz and Richard Robison, “The Political
Economy of Oligarchy and The Reorganization of Power in Indonesia”, Indonesia
96 (October 2013): 35–57.
7
Edward Aspinall, “Popular Agency and Interests in Indonesia’s Democratic
Transition and Consolidation”, Indonesia 96 (October 2013): 102.
8
Surya Tjandra, “Gerakan Serikat Buruh Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru” [The Trade
Union Movement in Post-New Order Indonesia], in Merancang Arah Baru
Demokrasi Indonesia Pasca-Reformasi [Designing a New Direction for Post-
Reformasi Indonesian Democracy], by A.E. Priyono and Usman Hamid (Jakarta:
Kepustakaan Populer Gramidia, 2014), p. 799.
9
See Aspinall, “Popular Agency and Interests”, op. cit., p. 102; Tjandra, “Gerakan
Serikat Buruh Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru”, op. cit., p. 799; Ford, “Learning by
Doing”, op. cit.
10
See Arie Putra, Inggrid Silitonga and Tyas Wardhani, Menuju Demokrasi
Bermakna: Persoalan-Persoalan Perbaikan Representasi Politik di Indonesia
[Toward Meaningful Democracy: Problems of Improving Political Representation
in Indonesia] (Jakarta: Demos, 2014); Olle Törnquist, “The Downside of
Indonesia’s Successful Liberal Democratisation and the Way Ahead: Notes from
the Participatory Surveys and Case Studies 2000–2016”, Journal of Current
Southeast Asian Affairs 36, no. 1 (2017): 123–38.
11
Olle Törnquist, “Introduction: The Problem is Representation! Towards an
Analytical Framework”, in Rethinking Popular Representation, edited by Olle
Törnquist, Neil Webster and Kristian Stokke (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2009), pp. 1–23.
12
Kabupaten Batang Dalam Angka 2016 [Batang District in Figures] (Batang: Badan
Pusat Statistik, 2017). According to numerous studies, it is generally poor voters
who are most susceptible to vote buying. See Susan C. Stokes, “Is Vote Buying
Undemocratic?”, in Election for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote
Buying, edited by Frederic Charles Schaffer (Manila, Philippines: Ateneo De
Manila University Press, 2007).
13
Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1960).
14
Author interview with Handoko Wibowo, 30 January 2017.
15
Edward Aspinall, “Indonesia: Civil Society and Democratic Breakthrough”, in
Civil Society and Political Change in Asia. Expanding and Contracting Democratic
Space, edited by Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, California: Stanford University
Press, 2004), pp. 61–96.
16
Author interview with Tahroni, leader of Omah Tani, 11 February 2017.
17
Author interviews with Surono, Omah Tani treasurer, 14 February 2017 and
Tahroni, Omah Tani chairperson, 11 February 2017.

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Peasants and Politics: Popular Agency in Batang, Central Java 489

18
Author interview with Surono, Omah Tani treasurer, 14 February 2017.
19
Savirani, “Bekasi, West Java”, op. cit.
20
Rizza Kamajaya, Transformasi Strategi, op. cit., pp. 149–50.
21
See Edward Aspinall and Noor Rohman, “Village Head Elections in Java: Money
Politics and Brokerage in the Remaking of Indonesia’s Rural Elite”, Journal of
Southeast Asian Studies 48, no. 1 (February 2017): 31–52.
22
Rizza Kamajaya, Transformasi Strategi, op. cit., p. 163.
23
Author interview with Surono, Omah Tani leader, 14 February 2017.
24
Putra, Silitonga and Wardhani, Menuju Demokrasi Bermakna, op. cit., p. vi.
25
Willy Purna Samadhi, Blok Politik Kesejahteraan Merebut Kembali Demokrasi
[The Welfare Political Bloc Recapturing Democracy] (Yogyakarta: PolGov Press,
2016), p. 12. See also A.E. Priyono, Willy P. Samadhi and Olle Törnquist,
Menjadikan Demokrasi Bermakna [Making Democracy Meaningful] (Jakarta:
Demos, 2007).

26
See for example, Achmad Zaenal M., “Korupsi, Mantan Bupati Divonis 1, 5
Tahun Penjara” [Corruption, Former District Head Sentenced to 1.5 Years in
Jail], Antara Jateng, 24 September 2012, available at <http://www.antarajateng.
com/detail/korupsi-mantan-bupati-batang-divonis-15-tahun-penjara.html>.

27
Fitriyah Hermini Susiatianingsih and Supratiwi, “Faktor Determinan Kemenangan
Kandidat pada Pemilukada Kabupaten Batang 2011” [The Determining Factor
in Candidate Victory in the Batang District Direct Election in 2011], Politika:
Jurnal Ilmu Politik 4, no. 1 (2013), available at <http://ejournal.undip.ac.id/
index.php/politika/article/view/6065/5173>.

28
Fitriyah et al., “Faktor Determinan”, op. cit.

29
This method of holding small, intimate gatherings to enable a politician to
develop close bonds with constituents is in fact widely practised by politicians
throughout Indonesia. See, for example, Caroline Paskarina, “Bandung, West
Java: Silaturahmi, Personalist Networks and Patronage Politics”, in Electoral
Dynamics in Indonesia: Money Politics, Patronage and Clientelism at the
Grassroots, edited by Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati (Singapore: NUS
Press, 2016), pp. 203–16.

30
Author interview with Handoko Wibowo, 30 January 2017.

31
Author interviews with Handoko Wibowo, 30 January 2017 and 11 February
2017.

32
For more information, see Edward Aspinall, Noor Rohman, Ahmad Zainul
Hamdi, Rubaidi and Zusiana Elly Triantini, “Vote Buying in Indonesia: Candidate
Strategies, Market Logic and Effectiveness”, Journal of East Asian Studies 17,
no. 1 (March 2017): 1–27.

33
Author interview with Tahroni, Omah Tani leader, 11 February 2017.

34
Author interviews with Lukman Hakim, Omah Tani member, 11 February 2017;
Handoko Wibowo, 30 January 2017; Agus Condro, PDI-P politician, 16 February
2017.

35
Author interviews with Edi Kristian, a prominent artist and leading businessman
in Batang, 16 February 2017 and Handoko Wibowo, 14 February 2017.

04 Muhammad-2P.indd 489 6/11/17 3:10 pm


490 Muhammad Mahsun

36
Based on author interviews with various sources in Batang, January–February
2017.
37
“Bupati Komit Antikorupsi” [A District Head Committed to Anti-Corruption],
6 November 2015, available at <www.tokohindonesia.com>.
38
“Kepala Daerah Teladan: Jejak-Jejak Inspirasi” [Model Regional Heads: Traces
of Inspiration], Majalah Tempo, 31 January–5 February 2017, pp. 84–91.
39
On the Tratak case, see Achmad Mitha Talaklaan Ridlwan, Gerakan Forum
Perjuangan Petani Batang (FPPB) dalam Konflik Hak Milik Tanah di Kabupaten
Batang [The Batang Farmers’ Struggle Forum (FPPB) Movement and Conflicts
over Land Ownership Rights in Batang District], Undergraduate thesis (skripsi)
Department of Political Science, Universitas Jendral Soedirman, Purwokerto,
Central Java, 2016.
40
Author interview with Tahroni, 11 February 2017.
41
Törnquist, “Introduction: The Problem is Representation”, op. cit., p. 10.
42
George Junus Aditjondro, “Ketika Petani Angkat Bicara Dengan Suara dan Masa”
[When the Peasants Speak with Voice and Masses], op. cit., p. 3.
43
Author interviews with Handoko Wibowo, 30 January, 12 and 14 February 2017;
and Edi Kristian, 16 February 2017.
44
The information here is based on author interviews with various local politicians
and activists in February 2017.
45
See for example, “Yoyok Sudibyo Pernah Dipinang Tiga Partai untuk Pilgub DKI”
[Yoyok Sudibyo has been Approached by Three Parties for the Gubernatorial
Election in Jakarta], Republika, 24 August 2016, available at <http://nasional.
republika.co.id/berita/nasional/hukum/16/08/24/ocep1c361-yoyok-riyo-sudibyo-
pernah-diajak-tiga-partai-menuju-dki-1>.
46
“Bupati Yoyok Takut Bicara Pilkada DKI” [District Head Yoyok is Afraid to
Talk about the Jakarta Election], Vivanews, 23 April 2016, available at <http://
www.viva.co.id/berita/metro/764474-bupati-yoyok-takut-bicara-pilkada-dki>.
47
Author interview with Handoko Wibowo, 30 January 2017.
48
Burhan was personally close to Yoyok and Handoko and had played a major
role in Yoyok’s 2011 election campaign and assisting his bureaucratic reform
agenda between 2012 and 2017.
49
Author interview with Handoko Wibowo, 30 January 2017.
50
See Willy Purna Samadhi, Blok Politik Kesejahteraan Merebut Kembali Demokrasi
[The Welfare Political Bloc Recapturing Democracy] (Yogyakarta: PolGov Press,
2016).

04 Muhammad-2P.indd 490 6/11/17 3:10 pm

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