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470
country, but some were specific to Batang. For example, the district
increased transparency in its financial management and planning by
introducing e-budgeting and bureaucratic reforms with the goal, in
Yoyok’s terms, of creating “entrepreneurial bureaucrats” oriented to
community service. Yoyok himself, given his military background,
lacked specialist knowledge in governance reform, but he was willing
to listen to advice on the topic.
On the initiative of Handoko and A.S. Burhan, Yoyok worked
with outside organizations such as the well-known NGOs Indonesia
Corruption Watch (ICW) and Transparansi Internasional Indonesia
(TII), as well as the main anti-graft agency Komisi Pemberantasan
Korupsi (Corruption Eradication Commission, KPK) to advance
this clean government programme. He also initiated a programme
which he called a “Budget Festival” under which all 60 units in
the government made presentations in the town square about their
successes and failures, allowing members of the public to learn
directly how the budget was being used, and find out also about
how much of their allocations had not been used by each budget
unit at the end of the year. From 2012, important bureaucratic
posts, from subdistrict heads up to bureau (dinas) heads were
appointed on the basis of competitive bidding in which the
qualifications and competencies of the candidates were compared.
A Unit Peningkatan Kualitas Pelayanan Publik (Unit for Increasing
the Quality of Public Service, UPKP2) was created, enabling online
complaints by citizens about government services. Bupati Yoyok
opened up his official residence on a 24-hour basis, allowing
ordinary citizens to visit and meet with him without having
to pass through formal procedures or protocols, making good on
his campaign promises of a new open and populist leadership
style. 36 He also worked hard to improve health and education
services, and introduced a popular new policy renovating the homes
of poor residents.
Yoyok declared that Batang district would be a “zone of
integrity”, free of corruption, the first in Java. He reduced government
expenditure, making savings amounting to many billions of rupiah in
government expenditure, especially by cutting back on expenditure on
the bureaucracy, and helped to raise regional revenue to 14.4 billion
rupiah (US$1 million).37 In 2015 he was awarded the Bung Hatta
Anti-Corruption Award along with the famous mayor of Surabaya,
Tri Rismaharini. In the same year, Batang also won the Adipura
award for having the country’s tidiest small town, a prize previously
also won by the district in 2013. Yoyok was also listed as a model
that many of the agrarian disputes which lay at the heart of Omah
Tani’s concerns were still not resolved. In the end, his ambitions
for higher office trumped such considerations, and underlined the
limitations of the Omah Tani experience and how far short it fell
when compared to examples of more institutionalized peasant agency
such as those seen in Bolivia and Brazil, where political leaders
were produced by social movements rather than merely forming a
temporary alliance with them.
In this context, in 2017 Omah Tani decided that as an institution
it would not repeat its 2011 strategy of electoral engagement.
Instead, it allowed grassroots leaders and members of its various
local affiliates to choose for themselves which of the four candidates
they would support. The organization did not openly back Yoyok’s
chosen candidate, Burhan, though Handoko privately did so, on the
basis of their longstanding friendship. Only a minority of Omah
Tani members followed him down this path.
The decision not to endorse Burhan was based on two main
factors. First, Burhan left the declaration of his candidacy too late,
only four months before the election, leaving Omah Tani with
insufficient time to carry out the necessary consultative meetings.
These may have been difficult anyway, given that some local groups
were unhappy that their land conflicts had not been resolved during
Yoyok’s tenure. Second, the experience of mass-scale vote buying
during the 2014 legislative election made Omah Tani leaders fearful
that the 2017 bupati election would also involve massive distribution
of cash, especially given that it was widely known that two of the
candidates were very wealthy. Burhan, in contrast, was not financially
well resourced, so Omah Tani leaders worried they might end up
backing an unsuccessful candidate, leading to demoralization within
the organization. They were especially keen to protect Omah Tani’s
authority in light of their future plans, including to participate in
the 2019 legislative election:
Into the future we are going to reorganize ourselves, fix up our
cooperative and improve the use of the land that’s already been
distributed in order to improve the economic situation of our
members. Why? Well, because many of the “go politics” failures by
movement organizations were because we lack economic resources.
So all of this is also to help prepare for another “go politics”
in the 2019 legislative election. If, just because we lacked other
options and fully supported Burhan but lost, that would make it
hard to avoid demoralization in 2019. It’s extremely hard to raise
the spirits of the members after a defeat.49
Conclusion
The analysis of the peasants’ “go politics” experiment in Batang
presented here ultimately leaves us with a mixed picture with respect
to the potential for lower-class political agency in contemporary
Indonesia. Batang was in some ways a highly supportive location
for this experiment, given the long history of social movement
activism there, and the relatively high level of institutionalization of
movement politics around a leading organization, Omah Tani. Even
before getting involved in the 2011 bupati election, Omah Tani was
well known in activist circles around the country as a particularly
strongly rooted and effective peasant organization.
Omah Tani’s success in supporting the election campaign of a
sympathetic district head, who later delivered on several key promises
to the group’s rural constituency, provides an indication that post-
reformasi politics have not always been dominated by oligarchs and
predatory elites, as the conventional view would have it. There can
be space for political engagement, and even political victories, by
civil society groups representing popular interests.
On the other hand, the experiment also points to the limitations
of such political experimentation. Omah Tani ultimately failed to
ensure that Yoyok resolved all the issues of concern to its members,
and also did not persuade him to run for a second term. The
inability to even agree upon a sympathetic candidate as a potential
successor further underlines the movement’s own limitations. Omah
Tani was able to gain some measure of control over local government
only in coalition with a strong elite ally. Omah Tani needed the
charismatic appeal of Yoyok and, as we have seen, he proved not
to be a completely reliable ally. Most social movements representing
lower-class groups in Indonesia have similar weaknesses, lacking
high-capacity actors and networks able to win election campaigns
in their own right.50 Ultimately, rather than representing a pure
victory of lower-class agency and a new form of programmatic
politics, the Batang experience instead points towards a form of
political hybridization. Not only did it involve cross-class coalition
building between elite and social-movement actors, even Yoyok’s
NOTES
1
Cliff Welch and Bernardo Mançano Fernandes, “Peasant Movements in Latin
America: Looking Back, Moving Ahead”, Latin American Perspectives 36, no. 4
(July 2009): 3–8.
2
George Junus Aditjondro, Ketika Petani Angkat Bicara Dengan Suara dan Masa:
Belajar dari Sejarah Gerakan Petani di Indonesia dan Amerika Selatan [When
the Peasants Speak with Voice and Masses: Learning from the History of Peasant
Movements in Indonesia and Latin America] (Sulawesi Tengah: Yayasan Tanah
Merdeka, 2006).
3
Teri L. Caraway, Michele Ford and Hari Nugroho, “Translating Membership into
Power at the Ballot Box? Trade Union Candidates and Workers Voting Pattern
in Indonesian National Election”, Democratization 22, no. 7 (December 2015):
1296–1316; Michele Ford, “Learning by Doing: Trade Unions and Electoral Politics
in Batam 2004–2009”, South East Asia Research 22, no. 3 (September 2014):
341–57; Arie Putra, Inggrid Silitonga and Tyas Wardhani, Menuju Demokrasi
Bermakna: Persoalan-Persoalan Perbaikan Representasi Politik di Indonesia
[Towards Meaningful Democracy: Problems of Improving Political Representation
in Indonesia] (Jakarta: Demos, 2014).
4
Amalinda Savirani, “Bekasi, West Java: From Patronage to Interest Group
Politics?”, in Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia: Money Politics, Patronage and
Clientelism at the Grassroots, edited by Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2016), p. 198.
5
Rizza Kamajaya, Transformasi Strategi Gerakan Petani [The Transformation of
the Strategy of Peasant Movements] (Yogyakarta: PolGov Press-JPP FISIPOL
UGM, 2010).
6
Many studies advance this thesis, including Vedi R. Hadiz, Localising Power in
Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective (Stanford, California:
18
Author interview with Surono, Omah Tani treasurer, 14 February 2017.
19
Savirani, “Bekasi, West Java”, op. cit.
20
Rizza Kamajaya, Transformasi Strategi, op. cit., pp. 149–50.
21
See Edward Aspinall and Noor Rohman, “Village Head Elections in Java: Money
Politics and Brokerage in the Remaking of Indonesia’s Rural Elite”, Journal of
Southeast Asian Studies 48, no. 1 (February 2017): 31–52.
22
Rizza Kamajaya, Transformasi Strategi, op. cit., p. 163.
23
Author interview with Surono, Omah Tani leader, 14 February 2017.
24
Putra, Silitonga and Wardhani, Menuju Demokrasi Bermakna, op. cit., p. vi.
25
Willy Purna Samadhi, Blok Politik Kesejahteraan Merebut Kembali Demokrasi
[The Welfare Political Bloc Recapturing Democracy] (Yogyakarta: PolGov Press,
2016), p. 12. See also A.E. Priyono, Willy P. Samadhi and Olle Törnquist,
Menjadikan Demokrasi Bermakna [Making Democracy Meaningful] (Jakarta:
Demos, 2007).
26
See for example, Achmad Zaenal M., “Korupsi, Mantan Bupati Divonis 1, 5
Tahun Penjara” [Corruption, Former District Head Sentenced to 1.5 Years in
Jail], Antara Jateng, 24 September 2012, available at <http://www.antarajateng.
com/detail/korupsi-mantan-bupati-batang-divonis-15-tahun-penjara.html>.
27
Fitriyah Hermini Susiatianingsih and Supratiwi, “Faktor Determinan Kemenangan
Kandidat pada Pemilukada Kabupaten Batang 2011” [The Determining Factor
in Candidate Victory in the Batang District Direct Election in 2011], Politika:
Jurnal Ilmu Politik 4, no. 1 (2013), available at <http://ejournal.undip.ac.id/
index.php/politika/article/view/6065/5173>.
28
Fitriyah et al., “Faktor Determinan”, op. cit.
29
This method of holding small, intimate gatherings to enable a politician to
develop close bonds with constituents is in fact widely practised by politicians
throughout Indonesia. See, for example, Caroline Paskarina, “Bandung, West
Java: Silaturahmi, Personalist Networks and Patronage Politics”, in Electoral
Dynamics in Indonesia: Money Politics, Patronage and Clientelism at the
Grassroots, edited by Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati (Singapore: NUS
Press, 2016), pp. 203–16.
30
Author interview with Handoko Wibowo, 30 January 2017.
31
Author interviews with Handoko Wibowo, 30 January 2017 and 11 February
2017.
32
For more information, see Edward Aspinall, Noor Rohman, Ahmad Zainul
Hamdi, Rubaidi and Zusiana Elly Triantini, “Vote Buying in Indonesia: Candidate
Strategies, Market Logic and Effectiveness”, Journal of East Asian Studies 17,
no. 1 (March 2017): 1–27.
33
Author interview with Tahroni, Omah Tani leader, 11 February 2017.
34
Author interviews with Lukman Hakim, Omah Tani member, 11 February 2017;
Handoko Wibowo, 30 January 2017; Agus Condro, PDI-P politician, 16 February
2017.
35
Author interviews with Edi Kristian, a prominent artist and leading businessman
in Batang, 16 February 2017 and Handoko Wibowo, 14 February 2017.
36
Based on author interviews with various sources in Batang, January–February
2017.
37
“Bupati Komit Antikorupsi” [A District Head Committed to Anti-Corruption],
6 November 2015, available at <www.tokohindonesia.com>.
38
“Kepala Daerah Teladan: Jejak-Jejak Inspirasi” [Model Regional Heads: Traces
of Inspiration], Majalah Tempo, 31 January–5 February 2017, pp. 84–91.
39
On the Tratak case, see Achmad Mitha Talaklaan Ridlwan, Gerakan Forum
Perjuangan Petani Batang (FPPB) dalam Konflik Hak Milik Tanah di Kabupaten
Batang [The Batang Farmers’ Struggle Forum (FPPB) Movement and Conflicts
over Land Ownership Rights in Batang District], Undergraduate thesis (skripsi)
Department of Political Science, Universitas Jendral Soedirman, Purwokerto,
Central Java, 2016.
40
Author interview with Tahroni, 11 February 2017.
41
Törnquist, “Introduction: The Problem is Representation”, op. cit., p. 10.
42
George Junus Aditjondro, “Ketika Petani Angkat Bicara Dengan Suara dan Masa”
[When the Peasants Speak with Voice and Masses], op. cit., p. 3.
43
Author interviews with Handoko Wibowo, 30 January, 12 and 14 February 2017;
and Edi Kristian, 16 February 2017.
44
The information here is based on author interviews with various local politicians
and activists in February 2017.
45
See for example, “Yoyok Sudibyo Pernah Dipinang Tiga Partai untuk Pilgub DKI”
[Yoyok Sudibyo has been Approached by Three Parties for the Gubernatorial
Election in Jakarta], Republika, 24 August 2016, available at <http://nasional.
republika.co.id/berita/nasional/hukum/16/08/24/ocep1c361-yoyok-riyo-sudibyo-
pernah-diajak-tiga-partai-menuju-dki-1>.
46
“Bupati Yoyok Takut Bicara Pilkada DKI” [District Head Yoyok is Afraid to
Talk about the Jakarta Election], Vivanews, 23 April 2016, available at <http://
www.viva.co.id/berita/metro/764474-bupati-yoyok-takut-bicara-pilkada-dki>.
47
Author interview with Handoko Wibowo, 30 January 2017.
48
Burhan was personally close to Yoyok and Handoko and had played a major
role in Yoyok’s 2011 election campaign and assisting his bureaucratic reform
agenda between 2012 and 2017.
49
Author interview with Handoko Wibowo, 30 January 2017.
50
See Willy Purna Samadhi, Blok Politik Kesejahteraan Merebut Kembali Demokrasi
[The Welfare Political Bloc Recapturing Democracy] (Yogyakarta: PolGov Press,
2016).