CASE NO. 1
VICENTE DELA CRUZ ET AL vs HON. EDGARDO PARAS
G.R. No. L-42571-72; 123 SCRA 569
July 25, 1983
C.J. Fernando
This is a Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction to
review the Decision of the CFI of Bulacan.
Ordinance No. 84 Series of 1975, a prohibition and closure
ordinance of night clubs, was issued by the municipality of Bocaue
Bulacan. It provides for the prohibition in the issuance, renewal, and even
revocation of licenses and permits of night club owners. Respondents aver
that the enactment of the ordinance is to curtail the principal cause of the
decadence of morality and the other adverse effects on the community of
the continued operations of night clubs. Petitioners are owners of night
clubs that were previously issued licenses by the Municipal Mayor. They
argue that Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a municipality has no
authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling and that it is
violates their rights to due process and equal protection of the law, as the
license previously given them was withdrawn without judicial hearing.
They also argued that under P.D. 189, as amended by P.D. 259, the power
to license and regulate tourist-oriented businesses including night clubs has
been transferred to the Department of Tourism. Respondent Judge Paras of
CFI of Bulacan dismissed the petitions and upheld the validity and
constitutionality of the assailed ordinance in the name of police power. He
also said that “Those who lust cannot last.”
WHETHER OR NOT A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, BOCAUE,
BULACAN, REPRESENTED BY RESPONDENTS (i.e. Matias Ramirez –
Mayor, Mario Mendoza – Vice Mayor, and Municipal Council of Bocaue,
Bulacan) CAN PROHIBIT THE EXERCISE OF A LAWFUL TRADE,
THE OPERATION OF NIGHT CLUBS, AND THE PURSUIT OF A
LAWFUL OCCUPATION, SUCH CLUBS EMPLOYING HOSTESSES?
NO, the reliance on police power is insufficient to justify the
enactment of Ordinance No. 84 and should be therefore declared null and
void.
In United States vs Abendan, Justice Moreland said that an
ordinance enacted by virtue of police power is “valid, unless it contravenes
the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an act of the Philippine
Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable,
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oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of a common right.
Where the power to legislate upon a given subject, and the mode of its
exercise and the details of such legislation are not prescribed, the ordinance
passed pursuant thereto must be a reasonable exercise of the power, or it
will be pronounced invalid.” In United States vs Salaveria, Justice Malcolm
discussed the 2 branches of the general welfare clause. The firs branch
attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority, and relates to such
ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by
law. The second branch of the clause is more independent of the specific
functions of the council which are enumerated by law. It is a general rule
that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general
welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and
purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws of policy of
the State. These two cases stressed reasonableness, consonant with the
general powers of and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as
consistency with the laws The objective of fostering public morals, a
worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not
encompass too wide a field. The ordinance on its face is characterized by
overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained
by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. In the
guise of police regulation, there was a clear invasion of personal or property
rights, personal in the case of individuals desirous of patronizing those night
club and property in terms of investments made and salaries to be earned by
those therein employed.
CASE NO. 2 was ruled that police power is not capable of exact definition but has been,
JEJOMAR BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensiveness.
vs HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT Its scope, over expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
G.R. No. 92389; 201 SCRA 508 anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
September 11, 1991 efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
J. PARAS assuring the greatest benefits. The police power of a municipal corporation
is broad and it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition
This is a Special Civil Action of Certiorari to Review the Decision which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power. As to COA’s
of the Commission on Audit. subsequent argument, public purpose is not deemed unconstitutional merely
The Municipality of Makati, through its council, approved because it incidentally benefits limited number of persons. The care for the
Resolution No. 60 which provides for a Burial Assistance Program to poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has
bereaved families by extending five hundred pesos to be taken out of long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the
unappropriated available funds existing in the municipal treasury. Qualified common good. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in
beneficiaries are those families whose gross family income does not exceed classifying paupers as subject of legislation.
2,000 pesos a month. The Municipal Secretary certified a disbursement Petition Granted
fund of 400, 000 pesos for the implementation of the Burial Assistance
Program. The resolution was referred to respondent COA for its expected
allowance in audit. COA disapproved it and disallowed in audit the
disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof. The reason for mere
assertion of the legislature that a statute relates to the public health, safety
or welfare does not in itself bring the statute within the police power of a
state for there must always be an obvious and real connection between the
actual provisions of a police regulation and its avowed purpose, and the
regulation adopted must be reasonably adapted to accomplish the end
sought to be attained. It also posits that Resolution No. 60 is still subject to
limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be for a public
purpose for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority of the inhabitants of
the municipality of Makati and not for the benefit of only a few individuals
as in the present case. In order to pursue the program, the Municipal
council passed Resolution No. 243 reaffirming resolution no. 60. The
program has been stayed by COA Decision No. 1159. Hence this petition.

WHETHER OR NOT RESOLUTION NO. 60, RE-ENACTED UNDER

RESOLUTION NO. 243, OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI IS A
VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER UNDER THE GENERAL
WELFARE CLAUSE?

YES, it is a valid exercise of police power. COA tries to redefine

the scope of police power by circumscribing its exercise to “public safety,
general welfare, etc.” of the inhabitants of Makati. In Sangalang vs IAC, it

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CASE NO. 3
TANO ET AL vs GOV. SOCRATES OF PALAWAN ET AL
G.R. No. 110249278; SCRA 154
August 21, 1997
J. DAVIDE Jr.
This is a Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court for Certiorari
and Prohibition.
On December 15, 1992, the Sanggunniang Panglungsod ng Puerto
Prinsesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 (which took effect on January
1, 1993) entitled “An Ordinance Banning the shipment of live fish and
lobster outside Puerto Prinsesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1,
1998 and providing exemptions, penalties and for other purposes thereof”.
To implement said ordinance, then Acting Mayor Amado Lucero issued
Office Order No 23 (dated January 22, 1993) wherein authorities are
authorized and directed to check or conduct necessary inspection on cargoes
containing live fish and lobster if it complies with the ordinance and the
mayor’s permit requirement. On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan enacted Resolution No. 33 which prohibits the catching,
gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral
dwelling aquatic organisms. By virtue of such resolution Ordinance No. 2
was enacted. It is an “Ordinance Prohibiting the catching, gathering,
possessing, buying and selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms…for a period of five years in and coming from Palawan
Waters”. Petitioners in the instant case totaling to seventy seven are
composed of two sets: the first were charged with violating the ordinances
and the second claims that they are fishermen or marine merchants that are
adversely affected by the ordinances.
WHETHER THE ASSAILED ORDINANCES ARE CONSIDERED A
VALID EXERCISE POLICE POWER?
YES. Under the general welfare clause of the Local Government
Code, LGUs have the power to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology. It likewise vests municipalities the power to
grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or
charges therefor, to penalize by appropriate ordinances the use of
explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and
other deleterious methods of fishing and to prosecute any violation of the
applicable fishery laws. It also imposes upon the sangguniang
bayan/panglungsod/panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to protect the
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environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the
environment.
DISCUSSION
Petitioners clearly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by invoking
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction despite the fact that both the RTC
and the CA have concurrent jurisdiction with it to issue writs of certiorari
etc. But due to the lifetime of the ordinances being assailed, the Court opted
to resolve the case. Laws, including ordinances enacted by LGUs, enjoys
the presumption of constitutionality and to overthrow it, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative contradiction. Petitioner argues that they have been deprived
of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from
practice of their trade, in violation of the 1987 Constitution. The provisions
invoked by petitioners provides for the State’s duty to protect the nation’s
marine wealth (Sec. 2 of Art. 12), the promotion of social justice (Sec. 2 of
Art. 13) and the State’s duty to protect the rights of subsistence fishermen
(Sec. 7 of Art. 13). There is absolutely no showing that any of the
petitioners qualify as a subsistence or marginal fishermen. A marginal
fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or
reward in his harvest of fish as measured by exiting price levels is barely
sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering fish while a
subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible
minimum for his livelihood. It is important to point out that Section 7 of
Article XIII not only speaks of communal marine and fishing resources but
also of their protection, development and conservation. The so called
preferential right is not absolute. One of the devolved powers of a LGU is
the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters which necessarily
includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery
laws within the municipal waters. In addition, the ordinances finds support
under R.A. 7611 or the Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan Act
approved on June 19, 1992 which adopts a comprehensive framework for
the sustainable development of Palawan. The objectives of the Ordinances
are: (1.) to establish a “closed season” for the species of fish or aquatic
animals covered therein for a period of five years; and (2.) to protect the
coral in the marine waters of City of Puerto Prinsesa and the Province of
Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities. The
accomplishment of the first is within the devolved power to enforce fishery
laws in municipal waters while the second one falls within the general
welfare clause and the express mandate to cities and provinces to protect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the
environment. Petition is dismissed.

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CASE NO. 4
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and
STA. MESA TOURIST AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs
CITY OF MANILA
G.R. No. 122846; 576 SCRA 416
January 20, 2009
J. TINGA
This is a Petition for review on Certiorari of a decision of the Court
of Appeals.
Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time
Admission,, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in
Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses and Similar
Establishments in the City of Manila was signed into law by then Mayor
Alfredo Lim on December 3, 1992. Short-Time Admission, as defined in
Section 4 of the Ordinance, means “the admittance and charging of room
rates for less than 12 hours at any given day or the renting out of rooms
more than twice a day or any other term that maybe concocted by owners or
managers of said establishments but would mean the same or would bear
the same meaning.” Petitioner companies are components of the Anito
Group of Companies which owns and operates several hotels and motels in
Metro Manila. Petitioners argue that the ordinance in question is
unconstitutional and void for it is an invalid exercise of police power for it
unlawfully interferes with their business and that the rights of their clients
are also being interfered with. Respondent argue that the prohibition of
wash rate admissions and renting out of a room more than twice a day roots
from the police power of the LGUs and such is aimed to curb immoral
activities.
WHETHER ORDINANCE NO. 7774 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF
POLICE POWER?
NO. Individual rights may be affected only to the extent that may
be fairly be required by legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an
arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as
well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the operations of
businesses of petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons
without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates
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and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without
accommodating innocuous intentions.
DISCUSSION
It must be stated that petitioners have the requisite standing to
plead for protection of their patron’s equal protection rights. Locus standi is
the ability of the party to demonstrate to the Court sufficient connection to
and harm from the law or action challenged to support the party’s
participation in the case. In Allen vs Wright, there are three constitutional
standing requirements: injury, causation and redressability. Nonetheless,
there are exceptions to the general rules on standing such as overbreadth
doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing, and especially in the
Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance. In the instant case,
the concept of third party standing and overbreadth doctrine are applicable.
In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect
permitted to raise the rights of third parties. It is generally applied to
statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the doctrine applies when a
statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights. In the
case at bar, Ordinance No. 7774 suffers from overbreadth.
Test of a valid ordinance:
1. It must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
2. It must not be unfair or oppressive;
3. It must not be partial or discriminatory;
4. It must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5. It must be general and consistent with public policy; and
6. It must not be unreasonable
A. POLICE POWER is based upon the concept of necessity of the
State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people.
The awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the
fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s legal
system, its use has been rarely been denied. The goal of the
Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and the like.
The goals fall under the police power of the state but the
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for its
achievement.
B. The purpose of DUE PROCESS is to prevent arbitrary
governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property
 of individuals. There are two types: procedural due process, which Petition Granted. Ordinance No. 7774 is declared unconstitutional.
refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it
deprives a person life, liberty or property such as notice and
hearing; and substantive due process, which inquires on the
whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a
person, life, liberty or property. Police power, traditionally
awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous
level of analysis before it can be upheld.
C. The GENERAL TEST OF THE VALIDITY OF AN
ORDINANCE ON SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS GROUNDS
is best tested when assessed with the evolved Footnote 4 test laid
down in U.S. vs Carolene Products. Two standards of judicial
review were established: (1.) Strict Scrutiny for laws dealing with
freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the (2.)
Rational Basis Standard of review for economic legislation. A third
standard, Heightened or Immediate Scrutiny Standard, was later
adopted by U.S. Courts for evaluating classifications based on
gender and legitimacy. In Rational Basis test, laws or ordinances
are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental
interest. In Strict Scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of
compelling rather than substantial governmental interest and on the
absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
D. The primary animus of the Ordinance is the curtailment of sexual
behavior but it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior
among consenting married or consenting single adults, which is
constitutionally protected, will be curtailed as well.
E. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference with private right and the means must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. A reasonable connection must exist
between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for
its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. The
ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by
patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in
legitimate actions. The behavior which the ordinance seeks to
curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished
simply by applying existing laws.

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CASE NO. 5 and 6
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the September 11,
2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New
York, City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of
Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case
of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. There are three cases, 2
of which are assigned by Atty. Pascasio, which deals with the Pandacan
Terminals and the different Ordinances passed by the City of Manila to
address the issue.
1. Decision: SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs ATIENZA G.R. No.
156652; 517 SCRA 657
March 5, 2007 J. Corona – assigned by Atty. Gallant
2. Resolution: SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs ATIENZA G.R. No.
156652; 545 SCRA 92
February 13, 2008 J. Corona
3. Sequel: SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs LIM G.R. No. 187836;
742 SCRA 1
November 25, 2014 J. Perez
Decision
This is a Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court for Mandamus.
Petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS), Cabigao and Tumbokon
(Cabigo and Tumbokon are residents of Manila) seek to compel then
Mayor Jose Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 which was enacted
by the Sangguniang Panglungsod on November 20, 2001, approved on
November 28 and became effective on December 28. Ordinance No.
8027 is entitled an “Ordinance Reclassifying the Land Use of Portions
of Land Bounded by the Pasig River In the North, PNR Railroad Track
in the East, Beata St. in the South, Palumpong St. in the Southwest, and
Estero de Pandacan in the west, PNR Railroad in the Northwest Area,
Estero de Pandacan in the Northeast, Pasig River in the Southeast and
Dr. M.L. Carreon in the Southwest, the Area of Punta, Sta. Ana
Bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 Street and
the F. Manalo Street from Industrial II to Commercial I”. Ordinance
No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses
disallowed in Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their
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businesses within 6 months from the date of effectivity of the
ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called
Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies Caltex, Petron and Shell. On
June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and Department of Energy entered
into a Memorandum of Understanding with the oil companies in which
they agreed that the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals was the
most viable and practicable option. The Sangunniang Panglungsod
ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. Petitioners argue that
respondent Mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce the
Ordinance and to order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals hence
the petition for Mandamus.
WHETHER RESPONDENT CAN BE COMPEELED VIA
MANDAMUS TO ENFORCE ORDINANCE NO. 8027?
YES. As the Chief Executive of the City, as imposed by the Local
Government Code, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as
long it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the
courts. The MOU entered into by the City of Manila and DOE with the
oil companies has full force and effect only until April 30, 2003 and as
of the writing of the decision, there is nothing that legally hinders
respondent from enforcing the ordinance.
Petition Granted.
Resolution
These are Motions for Leave to Intervene and for Reconsideration
of a Decision of the Supreme Court.
The intervenors in the case at bar are Chevron Philippines, Inc.,
Petron Corporation, and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation and the
Department of Energy. The oil companies called the attention of the
Court to the fact that they filed petitions in RTC Manila which seeks
the annulment of Ordinance No. 8027 and prayed for the issuance of
writs of preliminary injunction etc.
The City Council of Manila enacted on June 16, 2006 Ordinance
No. 8117 also known as the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and
Zoning Ordinance of 2006. The Ordinance reclassified the area
covering the Pandacan Terminals to “High Density Residential/Mixed
Use Zone (R3-MXD)” which means that it should be primarily used for
high-rise housing/dwelling purposes and limited
complementary/supplementary trade, services and business activities. It
also designated the Pandacan Oil Depot area as a “Planned Unit
Development Overlay Zone (O-PUD)” wherein the area was made a
project site comprehensively planned as an entity via unitary site plan
which permits flexibility in planning/design, building siting etc.
WHETHER ORDINANCE NO. 8027 IS A VALID EXERCISE
OF POLICE POWER (RELEVANT ISSUE)?
YES.
The summary of the discussion of Justice Corona is presented
below.
 Intervention of the Oil Companies and the DOE should be allowed
in the interest of justice. The oil companies have a direct and
immediate interest in the implementation of Ordinance No. 8027
for they claim that they will spend billions of pesos if they need to
relocate their oil depots out of Manila. The case was filed on
December 4, 2002 and the decision was promulgated on March 7,
2007 but the oil companies did not intervene neither did they offer
any worthy explanation to justify the late intervention. Regardless
of such fact, the Supreme Court still permitted them to intervene in
light of the novel issues and arguments not considered in the
March 2007 decision. The DOE alleges that its interest in the case
is also direct and immediate for Ordinance No. 8027 encroaches
upon its exclusive and national authority over matters affecting the
oil industry.
 The Injunctive Writs are not impediments to the enforcement of
Ordinance No. 8027. Ordinance No. 8027 enjoys the presumption
of validity and as such it cannot be restrained by injunction.
Nevertheless, when the validity of the ordinance is assailed, the
courts are not precluded from issuing an injunctive writ against its
enforcement. The issuance of a writ is only proper when petitioner
assailing the ordinance has made out a case strong enough to
overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of validity.
The ordinance on its face does not appear to be unconstitutional for
it merely reclassified the area. The injunctive writs issued in the
RTCs of Manila had no leg to stand on.
 Ordinance No. 8027 was not superseded by Ordinance No. 8119.
Both ordinances have a common objective i.e to shift the zoning
classification from industrial to commercial (Ord. No. 8027) or
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mixed residential/commercial (Ord. No. 8119). There is no implied
repeal either as provided in the Latin maxim Generalia specialibus
non derogant or a general law does not nullify a special or specific
law. The alleged conflict can be reconciled by the fact that
Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law for it only deals with the
Pandacan area while Ordinance No. 8119 is a general law for it
deals with the entire City of Manila.
 Mandamus lies to compel respondent Mayor to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027
 Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional and valid. For an ordinance to
be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
LGU to enact and be passed according to the procedure prescribed
by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements:
It must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, it must not
be unfair or oppressive; it must not be partial or discriminatory; it
must not prohibit but may regulate trade; it must be general and
consistent with public policy; and it must not be unreasonable
 The City of Manila has the power to enact Ordinance No. 8027.
The Ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Panglungsod by
the exercise of its police power. Police power is the plenary power
vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety
and general welfare of the people. Section 16 of the Local
Government Code, known as the general welfare clause,
encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments. As
provided in Section 458 of the Code, the Sangguniang
Panglungsod shall enact ordinances… for the general welfare of
the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code. The
police power was also provided in Section 18 of R.A. 409 or the
Revised Charter of Manila wherein it is provided that the City
Council has the legislative powers “to enact all ordinances it may
deem necessary and proper for the… general welfare of the city
and its inhabitants…”
 The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is a legitimate exercise of
police power. Local governments may be considered as having
properly exercised their police power if there is concurrence of a
lawful subject (the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from a particular class, require its exercise) and a
lawful method (the means employed are reasonably necessary for
 the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. The Ordinance was enacted “for the purpose of
promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety
and general welfare” of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian
was impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila
from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack. Lawful
subject and lawful method concurred in the assailed Ordinance.
 Ordinance No. 8027 is not unfair, oppressive or confiscatory which
amounts to taking without compensation. Compensation is
necessary only when the state’s power of eminent domain is
exercised. In Eminent Domain, the property is appropriated and
applied to some public purpose. Property condemned under the
exercise of police power is noxious or forbidden purpose and is not
compensable. The restriction imposed to protect lives public health
and safety is not taking.
 Ordinance No. 8027 is not partial and discriminatory. The
requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: It must
rest on substantial distinctions; it must be germane to the purposes
of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and it
must apply equally to all members of the same class. Unlike the oil
depot, the surrounding community is not a high-value terrorist
target.
 Ordinance No. 8027 is not inconsistent with R.A. 7638 (DOE Act
of 1992) and R.A. 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation
Law of 1998).
 The DOE cannot exercise the Power of Control Over LGUs.
Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution confines the power
of the President to one of general supervision only.
 Ordinance No. 8027 is not invalid for failure to comply with R.A.
7924 (An Act Creating the MMDA…) and E.O. 72. MMDA does
not have the authority to review land use plans and zoning
ordinances of cities and municipalities. This was only found in its
implementing rules which made a reference to EO 72.EO 72
expressly refers to comprehensive land use plans (CLUPs) only.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not a CLUP.
 Conclusion. The oil companies are fighting for their right to
property. They allege that they stand to lose billions of pesos if
forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence
over the right to property.
9
SEQUEL: SJS vs LIM
These consolidated petitions are special civil actions in the
Supreme Court for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.
The assailed ordinance in the instant case is Ordinance No. 8187
which is entitled an “Ordinance amending Ordinance No. 8119… by
creating a medium industrial zone (1-2) and heavy industrial zone (1-3) and
providing for its enforcement”. This was enacted on May 14, 2009. The
creation of a medium industrial zone and heavy industrial zone effectively
lifted the prohibition against owners and operators of businesses including
intervenor oil companies from operating in the designated commercial zone
which is an industrial zone prior to the enactment of Ordinances no. 8027
and no. 8119. Petitioners seek the nullification of Ordinance No. 8187 for it
contains contrary provisions to those found in Ordinance No. 8027. The
instant case merely summarized the Resolution on SJS vs Atienza and it
also included pages of footnotes and the full text of the ordinance.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ENACTMENT OF THE ASSAILED
ORDINANCE ALLOWING THE CONTINUED STAY OF THE OIL
COMPANIES IN THE DEPOTS IS, INDEED INVALID AND
UNCONSTITTIONAL?
YES, it should be stricken down insofar as the presence of oil depots in
Pandacan is concerned. In 2001, the Sangguniang Panglungsod found the
relocation of the Pandacan oil depots necessary hence the enactment of
Ordinance No. 8027. In 2009, when the composition of the Sanggunian had
already changed, Ordinance No. 8187 was passed in favor of the retention
of the oil depots. In 2012, again when some of the previous members were
no longer reelected, but with the Vice Mayor (Domagoso aka Isko Moreno)
still holding the same seat, and pending the resolution of these petitions,
Ordinance No. 8283 was enacted to give the oil depots until the end of
January 2016 within which to transfer to another site. Former Mayor Lim
stood his ground and vetoed the ordinance. The council alleged that the
assailed ordinance is to alleviate the economic conditions of its constituents.
The determination of the general welfare of the city does not gear towards
the protection of the people in its true sense and meaning, but is, one way or
another, dependent on personal preference of the members who sit in the
council as to which particular sector among its constituents it wishes to
favor. In G.R. No 156052 (Resolution), the validity and constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 8027 was declared as a guarantee for the protection of the
constitutional right to life of the residents of Manila. It is a valid exercise of
police power. Ordinance No. 8187 is declared unconstitutional. The
incumbent Mayor of the City of Manila is ordered to cease and desist from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8187.Intervenor oil companies are required to
submit within a non-extendible period of 45 days to the RTC of Manila an
updated comprehensive plan and relocation schedule, which relocation shall
be completed not later than 6 months from the date the required documents
are submitted.

10
CASE NO. 7
Manila International Airport Authority vs Court of Appeals, City of
Parañaque et al
G.R. No. 155650; 495 SCRA 591
July 20, 2006
J. Carpio
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the
Court of Appeals.
Petitioner MIAA operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City under Executive Order No. 903 or the
Revised Charter of the Manila International Airport Authority. It was issued
on July 21, 1983 by then President Marcos and was subsequently amended
by Executive Orders No. 909 and 298. As operator, MIAA administers the
land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA
Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land, including
runways and buildings then under the Bureau of Transportation. The MIAA
Charter further provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA
shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode unless specifically
approved by the President of the Philippines. On March 21, 1997, the Office
of the Government Corporate Council opined (Opinion No. 061) that the
Local Government Code withdrew the exemption from real estate taxes
granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA Charter. Thus, MIAA
negotiated with the City of Parañaque to pay the real estate tax imposed by
the city. MIAA already paid some of the real estate taxes already due. On
June 28, 2001, MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax
delinquency from the City for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. The amount
totaled to 624,506,725.42 pesos. Notices of levy and warrants of levy were
then issued on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City then
threatened MIAA that the City will sell the Airport Lands and Buildings at a
public auction should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency.
WHETHER THE AIRPORT LANDS AND BUILDINGS ARE EXEMPT
FROM REAL ESTATE TAX UNDER EXISTING LAWS?
YES. First, MIAA is not a government owned or controlled
corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government and thus
exempt from local taxation. Second, the real properties of MIAA are owned
by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax.
11
Discussion
 MIAA is not a GOCC. A GOCC refers to any agency organized as
a stock or non-stock corporation but MIAA is not organized as
such. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital
stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting
shares. It is also not a non-stock corporation for it has no members.
MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate
powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions.
Instrumentality, as defined in the Administrative Code, refers to
“any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter.” Similar government
instrumentalities that are vested with corporate powers are the
Mactan International Airport Authority, the Philippine Ports
Authority, the University of the Philippines and Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas. These instrumentalities are loosely called government
corporate entities. Section 133 of the Local Government Code
provides for the common limitations on the taxing powers of
LGUS. It provides that the exercise of the taxing powers shall not
extend to the levy of “taxes, fees or charges of any kind to the
National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities and local
government units”. When local governments invoke the power to
tax on national government instruments, such power is construed
strictly against local governments. Moreover, there is no point in
national and local governments taxing each other, unless a sound
and compelling policy requires such transfer of public funds from
one government pocket to another.
 Airport lands and buildings of MIAA are owned by the Republic.
o Airport lands and buildings are of Public dominion
pursuant to Article 420 of the New Civil Code which
provides that “those intended for public use, such as
roads…ports and bridges constructed by the State” are
property of public dominion. The term ports include sea
ports and airports. The terminal fees MIAA charges to
passengers, as well as the landing fees MIAA charges to
airlines does not change the character of MIAA as an
airport for public use. Such fees are often termed as user’s
 tax which means taxing those among the public who
actually use a public facility instead of taxing all the
public including those who never use the particular public
facility.
o Airport lands and buildings are outside the commerce of
men.
 MIAA is a mere trustee of the Republic. Only the President can
sign the Deed of Conveyance.
 Transfer to MIAA was meant to implement a reorganization.
 Real property owned by the Republic is not taxable. This is
provided in Section 234 of the Local Government Code. However,
portions of Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases to
private entities are not exempt from real estate tax.
Petition Granted. Airport lands and buildings of the Manila
International Airport Authority are exempt from real estate tax imposed
by the City of Parañaque. Real estate tax assessments, including the
final notices of real estate tax delinquencies, issued by the City are
declared void except for the portions leased to private parties. The
assailed auction sale and all its effects are also declared void.

12
MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FERDINAND J. MARCOS, in his capacity as the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Cebu City, THE CITY OF CEBU, represented by its
Mayor HON. TOMAS R. OSMEÑA, and EUSTAQUIO B.
CESA, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA) was created by virtue of Republic Act No. 6958,
mandated to "principally undertake the economical, efficient
and effective control, management and supervision of the
Mactan International Airport in the Province of Cebu and the
Lahug Airport in Cebu City, and such other Airports as may be
established in the Province of Cebu. Since the time of its
creation, MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from
payment of realty in accordance with Section 14 of its Charter.
On Oct 11, 1994, Mr. Eustaquio B. Cesa, Officer-in-Charge,
Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu, demanded
payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging
to MCIAA. MCIAA objected to such demand for payment as
baseless , claiming in its favor the aforecited Section 14 of RA
6958 which exempt it from payment of realty taxes. It was
also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government
performing governmental functions
Respondent City refused to cancel and set aside petitioner's
realty tax account, insisting that the MCIAA is a government-
controlled corporation whose tax exemption privilege has been
13
withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of the Local
Governmental Code.
As the City of Cebu was about to issue a warrant of levy
against the properties of MCIAA, the latter was compelled to
pay its tax account "under protest" and thereafter filed a
Petition for Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu, Branch 20, on December 29, 1994. MCIAA insisted that
while it is indeed a government-owned corporation, it
nonetheless stands on the same footing as an agency or
instrumentality of the national government by the very nature
of its powers and functions.
Respondent asserted that MCIAA is not an instrumentality of
the government but merely a government-owned corporation
performing proprietary functions.
The trial court dismissed the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not MCIAA is liable to pay real property taxes to
the City of Cebu
Held:
The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress; however,
in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local legislative
bodies, no longer merely by virtue of a valid delegation as
before, but pursuant to direct authority conferred by Section
5, Article X of the Constitution. 22 Under the latter, the exercise
of the power may be subject to such guidelines and limitations
as the Congress may provide which, however, must be
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.
There can be no question that under Section 14 of R.A. No.
6958 the petitioner is exempt from the payment of realty
taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its
political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities.
Nevertheless, since taxation is the rule and exemption
therefrom the exception, the exemption may thus be
withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. The only
exception to this rule is where the exemption was granted to
private parties based on material consideration of a mutual
nature, which then becomes contractual and is thus covered
by the non-impairment clause of the Constitution

Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally

withdrew, upon the effectivity of the LGC, exemptions from
real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons,
including government-owned or controlled corporations,
except as provided in the said section, and the petitioner is,
undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it necessarily
follows that its exemption from such tax granted it in Section
14 of its charter, R.A. No. 6958, has been withdrawn

14
THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, DR. VICTOR B.
ENRIGA, Petitioners,
vs.
BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC., Respondent.
Facts:
Respondent Bayan Telecommunications is a legislative
franchise holder under RA 3259 to establish radio stations for
domestic telecommunications, radiophone, broadcasting and
telecasting.
On January 1, 1992, Rep. Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), took effect.
Section 232 of the Code grants local government units within
the Metro Manila Area the power to levy tax on real
properties. Section 234 of the Code withdrew any exemption
fromrealty tax enjoyed by all persons.
On July 20, 1992, Congress enacted Rep. Act No. 7633,
amending Bayantel’s original franchise. The amendatory law
(Rep. Act No. 7633) provides that the same, its successors or
assigns shall be liable to pay the same taxes on their real
estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of this
franchise, as other persons or corporations are now or
hereafter may be required by law to pay.
Bayantel owned several properties within the territorial
boundary of Quezon City.
In 1993, the government of Quezon City enacted City
Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93, otherwise known as the Quezon
City Revenue Code (QCRC), imposing, under Section 5
15
thereof, a real property tax on all real properties in Quezon
City, and, reiterating in its Section 6, the withdrawal of
exemption from real property tax under Section 234 of the
LGC. Furthermore, much like the LGC, the QCRC, under its
Section 230, withdrew tax exemption privileges in general.
New tax declarations for Bayantel's real properties in Quezon
City were issued by the City Assessor which were received by
Bayantel. Bayantel wrote the office of the City Assessor
seeking the exclusion of its real properties in the city from the
roll of taxable real properties. With its request having been
denied, Bayantel interposed an appeal with the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals (LBAA). And, evidently on its firm belief
of its exempt status, Bayantel did not pay the real property
taxes assessed against it by the Quezon City government.
The Quezon City Treasurer sent out notices of delinquency ,
followed by the issuance of several warrants of levy against
Bayantel’s properties preparatory to their sale at a public
auction.
Bayantel immediately withdrew its appeal with the LBAA and
instead filed with the RTC of Quezon City a petition for
prohibition with an urgent application for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
The Regional Trial Court declared exempt from real estate
taxation the properties of Bayantel.
Issue: Whether or not Bayantel's real properties are exempt
from real property tax
Held:
No.
The taxing power of local governments under both the 1935
and the 1973 Constitutions solely depended upon an enabling
law. Absent such enabling law, local government units were
without authority to impose and collect taxes on real
properties within their respective territorial jurisdictions.
While Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 may be validly
viewed as an implied delegation of power to tax, the
delegation under that provision, as couched, is limited
to impositions over properties of the franchisee which
are not actually, directly and exclusively used in the
pursuit of its franchise. Necessarily, other properties of
Bayantel directly used in the pursuit of its business are beyond
the pale of the delegated taxing power of local governments.
In a very real sense, therefore, real properties of Bayantel,
save those exclusive of its franchise, are subject to realty
taxes. Ultimately, therefore, the inevitable result was that all
realties which are actually, directly and exclusively used in the
operation of its franchise are "exempted" from any property
tax.
While the system of local government taxation has
changed with the onset of the 1987 Constitution, the power of
local government units to tax is still limited. For as the Court
stressed in Mactan, "the power to tax is [still] primarily vested
in the Congress." The grant of taxing powers to local
government units under the Constitution and the LGC does not
affect the power of Congress to grant exemptions to certain
persons, pursuant to a declared national policy. The legal
effect of the constitutional grant to local governments simply
means that in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal
taxing powers, doubts must be resolved in favor of municipal
corporations

However, with the LGC’s taking effect on January 1, 1992,

Bayantel’s "exemption" from real estate taxes for properties of
whatever kind located within the Metro Manila area was, by
force of Section 234 of the Code, supra, expressly withdrawn.
But, not long thereafter, however, or on July 20, 1992,
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 7633 amending Bayantel’s
original franchise. In concrete terms, the realty tax
exemption heretofore enjoyed by Bayantel under its
original franchise, but subsequently withdrawn by
force of Section 234 of the LGC, has been restored by
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 7633.

16
Hon. Franklin Drilon in his capacity as Secretary of
Justice v. Mayor Alfredo Lim
GR 112497
August 4, 1994
Facts:
The principal issue in the case is the constitutionality of
Section 187 of the Local Government Code which provides:
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax
Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory
Public Hearings. — The procedure for approval
of local tax ordinances and revenue measures
shall be in accordance with the provisions of
this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall
be conducted for the purpose prior to the
enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any
question on the constitutionality or legality of
tax ordinances or revenue measures may be
raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from
the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of
Justice who shall render a decision within sixty
(60) days from the date of receipt of the
appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal
shall not have the effect of suspending the
effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and
payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied
therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30)
days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of
the sixty-day period without the Secretary of
17
Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved
party may file appropriate proceedings with a
court of competent jurisdiction.
The Secretary of Justice, on appeal to him of four oil
companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794 also
known as the Manila Revenue Code null and void for non-
compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of
tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary
to law and public policy.
The City of Manila filed a petition for certiorari. RTC
revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the
ordinance. RTC also declared unconstitutional Section 187 of
the Local Government Code because its vesture in the
Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local
governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy
mandated in the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 187 is unconstitutional
Held:
No.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to
review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax
ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of
these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax
ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local government that
enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila
Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the
of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected
ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax
annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad measure.
law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in
reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners
were performing their functions in accordance with law, that
is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax
ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government
under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an
act not of control but of mere supervision.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of

an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion,
order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may
even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such
authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it
that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down
such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or
replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the
work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed
rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of
the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it
that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court,
Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than
this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere
supervision.

Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code

only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of

18
Petitioners: BATANGAS CITY, MARIA TERESA
GERON, IN HER CAPACITY AS CITY TREASURER OF
BATANGAS CITY AND TEODULFO A. DEGUITO, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS CITY LEGAL OFFICER OF
BATANGAS CITY, v.
Respondent: PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION
DOCTRINE:
Although the power to tax is inherent in the State, the
same is not true for the LGUs to whom the power must
be delegated by Congress and must be exercised within
the guidelines and limitations that Congress may provide.
The power to tax "is an attribute of sovereignty," and as
such, inheres in the State. Such, however, is not true for
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays as they
are not the sovereign; rather, there are mere "territorial
and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines."
FACTS:
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC) operates
an oil refinery and depot in Tabagao, Batangas City,
which manufactures and produces petroleum products
that are distributed nationwide.
Batangas City, through its City Legal Officer, sent a
notice of assessment to respondent demanding the
payment of P92,373,720.50 and P312,656,253.04 as
business taxes for its manufacture and distribution of
petroleum products.
19
PSPC filed a Petition for Review pursuant to Section 195
of the LGC of 1991 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Batangas City. PSPC maintained that petitioners have
no authority to impose the said taxes and fees, and
argued that the levy of local business taxes on the
business of manufacturing and distributing gasoline and
other petroleum products is contrary to law and against
national policy.
ISSUE:
Whether a LGU is empowered under the LGC to impose
business taxes on persons or entities engaged in the
business of manufacturing and distribution of petroleum
products.
RULING:
NO. Per Section 5, Article X of the 1987
Constitution, "the power to tax is no longer vested
exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now
given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and other
charges." Nevertheless, such authority is "subject to
such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may
provide."
In conformity with Section 3, Article X of the 1987
Constitution, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the local Government Code of 1991.
Book II of the LGC governs local taxation and fiscal
matters.
First, Section 130 provides for the following fundamental
principles governing the taxing powers of LGUs:
 1. Taxation shall be uniform in each LGU.
2. Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:
a. be equitable and based as far as practicable
on the taxpayer's ability to pay;
b. be levied and collected only for public
purposes;
c. not be unjust, excessive, oppressive
orconfiscatory;
d. not be contrary to law, public policy,
national economic policy, or in the
restraint of trade.
3. The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other
impositions shall in no case be left to any private
person.
4. The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of
the LGC shall inure solely to the benefit of, and be
subject to the disposition by, the LGU levying the
tax, fee, charge or other imposition unless otherwise
specifically provided by the LGC.
5. Each LGU shall, as far as practicable, evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
Second, Section 133 provides for the common limitations
on the taxing powers of LGUs.
Among the common limitations on the taxing powers of
LGUs under Section 133 of the LGC is paragraph (h)
which states:
SECTION 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local
Government Units. - Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise
of taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays
shall not extend to the levy of the following:
XXXX
From the foregoing, Section 133(h) clearly specifies the two kinds of
taxes which cannot be imposed by LGUs: (1) excise taxes on articles
enumerated under the NIRC, as amended; and (2) taxes, fees or
charges on petroleum products.
Indisputably, the power of LGUs to impose business
taxes derives from Section 143 of the LGC. However, the
same is subject to the explicit statutory impediment
provided for under Section 133(h) of the same Code
which prohibits LGUs from imposing "taxes, fees or
charges on petroleum products." It can, therefore, be
deduced that although petroleum products are subject to
excise tax, the same is specifically excluded from the
broad power granted to LGUs under Section 143(h) of
the LGC to impose business taxes.
Section 133 of the LGC is a specific provision that
explicitly withhold from LGUs the power to impose taxes,
fees and charges on petroleum products.
On the contrary, Section 143 of the LGC defines the
general power of LGUs to tax businesses within its
jurisdiction. Thus, the omnibus grant of power to LGUs
under Section 143(h) of the LGC cannot overcome the
specific exception or exemption in Section 133(h) of the
same Code. This is in accord with the rule on statutory
construction that specific provisions must prevail over
general ones.

(h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal

Revenue Code, as amended, and taxes, fees or charges on
petroleum products.;

20
Petitioners: THE CITY OF CEBU
vs.
Respondents: SPOUSES APOLONIO and BLASA
DEDAMO
G.R. No. 142971. May 7, 2002
DOCTRINE:
Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is
inseparable from sovereignty. It is the Governments right
to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the
State, private property for public use or purpose.
However, the Government must pay the owner thereof
just compensation as consideration therefor.
FACTS:
City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain
against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa
Dedamo. The petitioner alleged therein that it needed the
parcels of land of respondents for a public purpose, i.e.,
for the construction of a public road which shall serve as
an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the
General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan
International Hotel Roads in Cebu City. The total area
sought to be expropriated is 1,624 square meters with an
assessed value of P1,786,400. Petitioner deposited with
the Philippine National Bank the amount of P51,156
representing 15% of the fair market value of the property
to enable the petitioner to take immediate possession of
the property pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No.
7160.Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint because the purpose for which their property
21
was to be expropriated was not for a public purpose but
for benefit of a single private entity, the Cebu Holdings,
Inc.Petitioner could simply buy directly from them the
property at its fair market value if it wanted to, just like
what it did with the neighboring lots. Besides, the price
offered was very low in light of the consideration
of P20,000 per square meter, more or less, which
petitioner paid to the neighboring lots.
Petitioners:
- filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the
commissioners report was inaccurate since it included an
area which was not subject to expropriation.
- it contended that Lot No. 1528 contains 793 square meters
but the actual area to be expropriated is only 478 square
meters.
- alleged that the lower court erred in fixing the amount of just
compensation at P20,826,339.50.The just compensation
should be based on the prevailing market price of the
property at the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings.
Respondent:
- maintain that the Court of Appeals did not err in
affirming the decision of the trial court because:
(1) the trial court decided the case on the basis of the
agreement of the parties that just compensation shall be
fixed by commissioners appointed by the court;
(2) petitioner did not interpose any serious objection to the
commissioners report of 12 August 1996 fixing the just
compensation of the 1,624-square meter lot
 at P20,826,339.50; hence, it was estopped from attacking
the report on which the decision was based; and
(3) the determined just compensation fixed is even lower
than the actual value of the property at the time of the actual
taking in 1994.
ISSUE:
Whether just compensation should be determined as of
the date of the filing of the complaint
RULING:
NO. The point of reckoning for the determination
of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160,
which expressly provides that just compensation shall be
determined as of the time of actual taking. The Section
reads as follows:
SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. -- A local government unit may,
through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose or
welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of
just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent
domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has
been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may
immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the
expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the
proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value
of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to
be expropriated: Provided finally, That, the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based
on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
22
The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National
Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals.[10] We did not
categorically rule in that case that just compensation
should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. We
explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in
determining just compensation in eminent domain is the
value of the property as of the date of the filing of the
complaint, the rule admits of an exception: where this
Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was
taken and not at the date of the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings.
Also, the trial court followed the then governing
procedural law on the matter, which was Section 5 of
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which provided as follows:
SEC. 5. Ascertainment of compensation. -- Upon the
entry of the order of condemnation, the court shall
appoint not more than three (3) competent and
disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and
report to the court the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall
designate the time and place of the first session of the
hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the
time within which their report is to be filed with the court.
Petitioners: CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY
and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY,
vs.
Respondents: HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA
as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO,
INC.
G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983
DOCTRINE:
The power to regulate does not include the power to
prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include
the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not
only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a
memorial park cemetery.
FACTS:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled
"ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE
MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION
THEREOF" provides:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the
memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity
burial of deceased persons who are paupers and
have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5
years prior to their death, to be determined by
competent City Authorities. The area so designated
shall immediately be developed and should be open
23
for operation not later than six months from the date
of approval of the application.
For several years, the aforequoted section of the
Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven
years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon
City Council passed the following resolution.
Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang
Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No.
6118, S-64 would be enforced
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino:
- filed a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to
annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question.
- alleged that the same is contrary to the
Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local
Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative
Code.
- taking or confiscation of property is obvious
because the questioned ordinance permanently
restricts the use of the property such that it cannot
be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives
the owner of all beneficial use of his property.
Petitioners:
- taking of the respondent's property is a valid and
reasonable exercise of police power and that the
land is taken for a public use as it is intended for
the burial ground of paupers.
 - alleged that the Quezon City Council is authorized
under its charter, in the exercise of local police
power
ISSUE:
whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a
valid exercise of police power
RULING:
NO. There is no reasonable relation between the
setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of
an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals,
good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people.
The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation
of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation.
Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for
this purpose, the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of
private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of
Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City
which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of
the dead within the center of population of the city and to
provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and
cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a
Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of
the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed
24
by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to
provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate
private properties to construct public cemeteries. This
has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to
the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of
just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different
from laws and regulations requiring owners of
subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks,
playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they
sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of
public safety, health, and convenience are very clear
from said requirements which are intended to insure the
development of communities with salubrious and
wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the
regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision
developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners.
As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the
general welfare clause or on implied powers of the
municipal corporation, not on any express provision of
law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The
clause has always received broad and liberal
interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this
particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance
was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had
incorporated. received necessary licenses and permits
and commenced operating. The sequestration of six
percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as
having been impliedly acknowledged by the private
respondent when it accepted the permits to commence
operations.
REPUBLIC of the PH vs. CA and HEIRS OF LUIS
SANTOS
G.R. No. 146587 July 2, 2002
FACTS: Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on September
19, 1969 covering a total of 544,980 square meters of contiguous land
situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the
continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for
the Voice of the Philippines project. Petitioner, through the Philippine
Information Agency (PIA), took over the premises after the previous lessee,
the Voice of America, had ceased its operations thereat.
On Feb. 26, 1979, after the institution of the expropriation
proceedings, the trial court issued an order ordering the plaintiff to pay
the defendants (heirs) the just compensation for said property which is
the fair market value of the land condemned computed at the rate of
P6.00 per square meter, with legal rate of interest. The bone of
contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square meter property
previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-in-interest of herein
respondents, which forms part of the expropriated area. The national
government failed to pay to herein respondents the compensation
pursuant to the foregoing decision.
In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued
Proclamation No. 22, transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property
to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and
another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the
Philippine carabao. The Santos heirs remained unpaid, and no action was
taken on their case until petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to
permit the deposit in court of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way of just
compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis Santos subject
to such final computation as might be approved by the court. This time,
the Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and motion, submitted a
counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6.00 per square meter
previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged
25
at P5,000.00 per square meter or, in the alternative, to cause the return
to them of the expropriated property. RTC ruled in favor of respondents
and issued the assailed order.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner may appropriate the property. W/N respondents
may recover such property.
HELD: YES. The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an
ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within
its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. However, the power is not
without its limits: first, the taking must be for public use, and second, that
just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property. In
determining “public use,” two approaches are utilized - the first is public
employment or the actual use by the public, and the second is public
advantage or benefit. The expropriated property has been shown to be for
the continued utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof being
ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and
for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the
requirements of public purpose. The property has assumed a public
character upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and
as the owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter and decide
the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public use,
which, decidedly, it is.
NO. In insisting on the return of the expropriated property,
respondents would exhort on the pronouncement in Provincial
Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya where the unpaid
landowners were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the
property there in question. It might be borne in mind that the case
involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to which the power of
eminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited
application. The grant of the power of eminent domain to local
governments under Republic Act No. 7160 cannot be understood as being
the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the legislative branch
of government. For local governments to be able to wield the power, it
must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the national legislature, but
even then, this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictly
speaking, a power of eminent, but only of inferior, domain or only as broad
or confined as the real authority would want it to be.

Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic where the private landowners had

remained unpaid ten years after the termination of the expropriation
proceedings, this Court ruled -

The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if
so, in what amount. Said lots have been the subject of expropriation
proceedings. By final and executory judgment in said proceedings, they
were condemned for public use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold to
the government. x x x It follows that both by virtue of the judgment, long
final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title
certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their
expropriated lots - which are still devoted to the public use for which
they were expropriated - but only to demand the fair market value of the
same.

The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the expropriation

proceedings provides not only for the payment of just compensation to
herein respondents but likewise adjudges the property condemned in
favor of petitioner over which parties, as well as their privies, are bound.
Petitioner has occupied, utilized and, for all intents and purposes,
exercised dominion over the property pursuant to the judgment.
PETITION GRANTED.

26
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, vs. SARANGANI
AGRICULTURAL CO., INC., ACIL CORPORATION, NICASIO
ALCANTARA and TOMAS ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 165547 January 24, 2007
FACTS: The Province of Sarangani was created pursuant to Republic Act
No. 7228 on March 16, 1992, composed of seven (7) municipalities. Under
said Act, the Municipality of Alabel was made the capital of the new
province where the capitol building and all other national and provincial
offices shall be established.
On February 14, 1997, the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel passed
Resolution No. 97-08 or "Resolution Adopting and Endorsing the Ten-Year
Municipal Comprehensive Development Plan (MCDP 1995-2005) of the
Municipality of Alabel and Its Land Use Development Plan and Zoning
Ordinance for Adoption and Approval of the Provincial Governor,
Honorable Priscilla L. Chiongbian, Thru The Honorable Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Sarangani Province." Pursuant to Municipal Zoning
Ordinance No. 08, Series of 1997, and to accelerate the development and
urbanization of Alabel, the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel passed
Resolution No. 98-03 reclassifying lots that were located within the built-
up areas, based on the 1995-2005 Land Use Plan of the municipality, from
agricultural to non-agricultural uses. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Sarangani approved Resolution No. 98-018 and Resolution No. 97-08. A
portion of the area involving 376.5424 hectares, however, was covered by
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657) commercial farms
deferment scheme.
The Zoning Certification issued by the office of the Municipal Planning and
Development Council (MPDC) showed that respondents’ properties
located at Barangay Maribulan, Alabel were among those reclassified from
agricultural and pasture land to residential, commercial institutional, light
industrial and open space in the 1995-2005 land use plan of Alabel.
On July 2, 1998, respondent Sarangani Agricultural Company, Inc. (SACI)
filed an application for land use conversion of 13 parcels of land with an
27
aggregate area of 1,005 hectares. Meanwhile, members of the Sarangani
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (SARBAI) filed an Urgent
Petition for the Denial of Land Use Conversion Application of Banana
Commercial Farm of SACI" oppposing the application for land use
conversion filed by SACI. The committee agreed to recommend the
disapproval of 158.0672 hectares that had been planted with bananas and
coconuts. The committee noted that said portion of the property was still
viable for agriculture, irrigated, with Notice of Coverage, and under protest
or with opposition from SARBAI. On its part, SACI contended, among
others, that its projects were aligned to address the current and
anticipated commercial and residential needs of Sarangani province, and
the removal of any portion of its property included in its comprehensive
development plan will affect the viability of the plan; and at the time the
application for land use conversion was filed, no Notice of Coverage was
ever issued by DAR, and the subsequent issuance of such notice was highly
irregular because the same may be issued only after the final resolution of
the application for land use conversion. DAR denied SACI’s application for
land use conversion. SACI filed petition for review in CA. CA grant the
petition.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred when it ruled that DAR should use the
Comprehensive Land Use Plans and accompanying ordinance of the Local
Sanggunian as primary reference so as not to defeat the very purpose of
the LGU concerned in reclassifying certain areas to achieve social and
economic benefits in pursuance to its mandate towards general welfare.
HELD: NO. Hence, with regard to agricultural lands that have been
reclassified for non-agricultural uses by the local government unit
concerned, the CA is correct in declaring that DAR should refer to the
comprehensive land use plans and the ordinances of the Sanggunian in
assessing land use conversion applications, thus:
Construing Sec. 20 of the Local Government Code and the subsequent
administrative issuances implementing the same, we are of the opinion
that while the DAR retains the responsibility for approving or
disapproving applications for land use conversion filed by individual
landowners on their landholdings, the exercise of such authority should
be confined to compliance with the requirements and limitations under
existing laws and regulations, such as the allowable percentage of
agricultural [area] to be reclassified, ensuring sufficient food production,
areas non-negotiable for conversion and those falling under
environmentally critical areas or highly restricted for conversion under
the NIPAS law. Definitely, the DAR’s power in such cases may not be
exercised in such a manner as to defeat the very purpose of the LGU
concerned in reclassifying certain areas to achieve social and economic
benefits in pursuit of its mandate towards the general welfare. Precisely,
therefore, the DAR is required to use the comprehensive land use plans
and accompanying ordinances of the local Sanggunian as primary
references in evaluating applications for land use conversion filed by
individual landowners. In this case, petitioners have already complied with
the standard requirements laid down under the applicable rules and
regulations of the DAR.

The conversion of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses shall be

strictly regulated and may be allowed only when the conditions prescribed
under R.A. No. 6657 are present. In this regard, the Court agrees with the
ratiocination of the CA that DAR’s scope of authority in assessing land
use conversion applications is limited to examining whether the
requirements prescribed by law and existing rules and regulations have
been complied with. This holds true in the present case where, because of
the creation of the Province of Sarangani and in view of its thrust to
urbanize, particularly its provincial capital which is the Municipality of
Alabel, the local government has reclassified certain portions of its land
area from agricultural to non-agricultural. Thus, to reiterate, in accordance
with E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and subject to the limitations prescribed
by law, DAR should utilize the comprehensive land use plans in evaluating
the land use conversion application of respondents whose lands have
already been reclassified by the local government for non--agricultural
uses.

28
(Note: Guys may prior case pa talaga bago tong case na to kasi
motion for reconsideration na to. Ung first case dated Dec. 22, 1988
same case title. Pero kasi dun sa binigay ni sir na list ang nakalagay
na date August 25, 1989 kaya eto ung dinigest ko )
(Facts nung prior case: The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village
Association (BAVA) to opening of several streets to the general
public, after a series of developments in zoning regulations. All but
Jupiter St. was voluntarily opened. The strong opposition later gave
way when the municipal officials force-opened the gates of said
street for public use. The area ceased to be purely residential.
Action for damages was brought against Ayala Corporation and
BAVA for alleged breach of contract, to maintain the purely
residential status of the area. Other similarly situated also filed their
respective cases. All of them were dismissed in the trial court. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the said dismissals. SC ruled in favor of
the respondents.)
JOSE D. SANGALANG and LUTGARDA D. SANGALANG vs. IAC and
AYALA CORPORATION
G.R. No. 71169 August 25, 1989
FACTS: Before the Court are: (1) two motions for reconsideration
(G.R. No. 71169) of SC’s Decision, promulgated on December 22,
1988, the first one having been filed by Atty. J. Cezar Sangco on
behalf of the spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang, and the second,
by Atty. Raul Sison, counsel for Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA); and
(2) a motion for reconsideration and/or motion for clarification filed by
Atty. Richard Funk (G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281) of
the said Decision.
The motion for reconsideration (G.R. No. 71169), filed by the
Sangalangs, is anchored on two grounds: (1) that contrary to SC’s
decision, Jupiter Street is for the exclusive use of Bel-Air Village
residents; and (b) that the Ayala Corporation did contrive to
29
acquire membership at the Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA)
purposely to bargain for access to Jupiter Street by the general
public. Subsequently, BAVA informed the Court that it was adopting
the Sangalangs’ motion for reconsideration. The motion for
reconsideration (in G.R. Nos. 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281) raises
more or less the same questions and asks furthermore that we delete
the award of damages granted by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: WON the opening of Orbit Street to traffic by the mayor was
warranted by the demands of the common good and a valid exercise of
police power.
HELD: YES. As SC asserted in Sangalang, the opening of Jupiter Street
was warranted by the demands of the common good, in terms of traffic
decongestion and public convenience. SC also uphold the opening of Orbit
Street for the same rationale.
There is no merit in BAVA’s claims that the demolition of the gates at
Orbit and Jupiter Streets amounts to deprivation of property without due
process of law or expropriation without just compensation. There is no
taking of property involved here. The act of the Mayor now challenged is,
rather, in the concept of police power. In the case of Philippine
Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 15 we said:
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has
been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare."
As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or
property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an
exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
assuring the greatest benefits."MMDA vs Bel-Air Village Association
 G.R.No. 135962; March 27, 2000
FACTS: Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery
of basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association,
Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are
homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City.
Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside
Bel-Air Village.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its
Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to
open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996.
Actions Filed:
1. BAVA – applied for injunction; trial court issued temporary restraining
order but after due hearing, trial court denied the issuance of a preliminary
injunction.
2. BAVA – appealed to CA which issued preliminary injunction and later
ruled that MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street,
a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls.
It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by
ordinance.
3. MMDA – filed motion for reconsideration but was denied by CA; hence
the current recourse.
ISSUES:
1. Has the MMDA the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic
pursuant to its regulatory and police powers?
2. Is the passage of an ordinance a condition precedent before the MMDA
may order the opening of subdivision roads to public traffic?
HELD: The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development
authority." All its functions are administrative in nature.
30
The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration.
There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power,
let alone legislative power.
The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the local government units, acting through their
respective legislative councils that possess legislative power and police
power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did
not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune
Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the
respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling.
The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan
transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter
are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of
a private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The
promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of
the rule of law.
Dispositive IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
 LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. vs. JAC LINER, INC.
G.R. No. 148339; February 23, 2005
FACTS: Respondent JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses
which ply various routes to and from Lucena City, assailed City Ordinance
Nos. 1631 and 1778 as unconstitutional on the ground that these
constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private
property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against
monopolies.
Ordinance No. 1631
AN ORDINANCE GRANTING THE LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC.,
A FRANCHISE TO CONSTRUCT, FINANCE, ESTABLISH, OPERATE AND
MAINTAIN A COMMON BUS-JEEPNEY TERMINAL FACILITY IN THE CITY OF
LUCENA
Ordinance No. 1778
AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ENTRANCE TO THE CITY OF LUCENA OF
ALL BUSES, MINI-BUSES AND OUT-OF-TOWN PASSENGER JEEPNEYS AND
FOR THIS PURPOSE, AMENDING ORDINACE NO. 1420, SERIES OF 1993,
ANDORDINANCE NO. 1557, SERIES OF 1995.
The above-mentioned ordinances, by granting an exclusive franchise for
twenty five years, renewable for another twenty five years, to Lucena
Grand Central Terminal, Inc., its successors or assigns, for the construction
and operation of one common bus and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena
City, to be located outside the city proper, were professedly aimed
towards alleviating the traffic congestion alleged to have been caused by
the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city.
Further, the subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and
jeepney terminalswithin Lucena, including those already existing, and
allow the operation of only onecommon terminal located outside the city
proper, the franchise for which was granted topetitioner. The common
31
carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelledto close
down their existing terminals and use the facilities of petitioner.
Respondent, who had maintained a terminal within the city, was one of
those affected bythe ordinances.The petitioner via petition for review,
sought the wisdom of Supreme Court, assailing theDecision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power
when it enacted City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778
HELD: As with the State, the local government may be considered as
having properly exercised its police power only if the following requisites
are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the
means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the
object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful
subject and lawful method.
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of
relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, involve public interest
warranting the interference of the
State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus
present.
But the ordinances go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the
traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal
operated by petitioner would subjectthe users thereof to fees, rentals and
charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, ascorrectly found by the
appellate court.
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of
traffic. How theoutright proscription against the existence of all terminals,
apart from that franchised topetitioner, can be considered as reasonably
necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been
enlightened.

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between

authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of
the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.

As for petitioner’s claim that the challenged ordinances have actually been
proven effective in easing traffic congestion: Whether an ordinance is
effective is an issue different from whether it is reasonably necessary. It is
its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its
constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were measured by its
effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they
happen to be effective.

Hence, Ordinance No. 1631 is valid, having been issued in the exercise of
the police power of the City Government of Lucena insofar as the grant of
franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., to construct, finance,
establish, operate and maintaincommon bus-jeepney terminal facility in
the City of Lucena.

Sec. 4(c) of Ordinance No. 1631 is illegal and ultra vires because it
contravenes the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
“The Local Government Code”.

City Ordinance No. 1778 is null and void, the same being also an ultra vires
act of the City Government of Lucena arising from an invalid, oppressive
and unreasonable exercise of the police power.

Affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition of Lucena

Grand CentralTerminal, Inc. is DENIED by the Supreme Court.

32
 invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant
City of Manila vs. Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguo, Jr. to general law.
G.R. No. 118127; April 12, 2005

FACTS: On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN
ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke
bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was
notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate
Tourist Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it
includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering
amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market
such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers
that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit
their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of
Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized
that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted
that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must
not be unreasonable. The police power of the City Council, however broad
and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon;
and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for
the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an

33
REPUBLIC v. RAMBUYONG
G.R. No. 167810
 HELD:
 No.
October 4, 2010
FACTS:
 Alfredo Chu filed a case for collection against the National
Power Corporation (NPC). Appearing as counsel for Chu is Atty.
Richard Rambuyong who was then the incumbent Vice-Mayor. NPC
then filed a motion for inhibition of Rambuyong arguing that he is
prohibited under Section 90 (b)(1) of the Local Government Code.
The RTC ruled that GOCC are expressly excluded from Section
90(b)(1) of the LGC. They held that if it were the intention of the
framers of the LGC to impose obligations or give rights and
privileges to LGUs, agencies, instrumentalities and corporate
entities, then they would have explicitly stated so. Thus, petition was
denied. It ruled that Sec. 90 of the LGC does not include GOCCs as
among the political units against which lawyer members of the
Sanggunian cannot appear as counsel of the adverse party and that
Atty. Rambuyong is not disqualified to continue acting as counsel for
NPC.
Petitioner contends that the trial court refused to apply the disputed
provision and that the courts are not authorized to distinguish where
the law makes no distinction. They alleged that RTC gravely abused
its discretion when it failed to recognized that the RAC and the LGC
are in pari materia in defining the terms used in the latter, 1 such as
“office, agency, or instrumentality.” Petitioner argues that NPC is an
instrumentality of government and that there is no cogent reason to
exclude GOCCs from the operation of Sec. 90(B)(1) of LGC.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not Rambuyong can represent NPC as counsel.
34
Sec. 90 (b)(1) of the LGC provides that the Sanggunian members
who are also members of the Bar shall not appear as counsel before
any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any
office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse
party.
Sec. 5 (e) of the LGC provides that in the resolution of controversies
arising under this Code where no legal provision of jurisprudence
applies, resort may be had to the customs and traditions in the place
where the controversies take place.
Sec. 2(4) of the RAC defines AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT as
any of the various units of the Government, including a department,
bureau, office, instrumentality or GOCC, or a local government or a
distinct unit therein.
Sec. 2(10) of the RAC defines INSTRUMENTALITY as an agency of
the National Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some of not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions
and GOCCs.
With the foregoing provisions, it is clear without any ambiguity that
NPC is a government instrumentality tasked in undertaking
development hydroelectric generation of power and production of
electricity from other sources.

Finally, Sec. 446 of the LGC provides that “the sanggunian bayan,
the legistlative body of the municipality, shall be composed of the
municipal vice mayor as the presiding officer.” Hence, Atty.
Rambuyong, as Vice Mayor and Sanggunian Member cannot appear
as counsel of party adverse to the NPC, an instrumentality of the
government.

35
WILFREDO M. CATU vs. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality
towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to
A.C. No. 5738 amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the
February 19, 2008 ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal
assistance. He acceded to her request.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

FACTS: Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. , The IBP-CBD
building erected thereon located in Malate, Manila. His mother and recommended the respondents suspension from the practice of law
brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of for one month for violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pastor of one of the units in the Responsibility:
building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the
premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in
the Lupong Tagapamayapa of their Barangay. Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after
leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, with any matter in which he intervened while
summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties in said service.
failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a
certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent
contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713:[8]
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for
ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the MTC. Respondent
entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and
Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative Transactions. In addition to acts and
complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety omissions of public officials and employees
as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the now prescribed in the Constitution and
defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation existing laws, the following shall constitute
proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay. prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official ands employee and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties
as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the
barangays Lupong Tagapamayapa. As head of the Lupon, he xxx xxx xxx

36

(b) Outside employment and other activities
related thereto. Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice
of profession unless authorized by
the Constitution or law, provided
that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with their official
functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent may be suspended.
HELD: Yes. However, the Court modified the foregoing findings
regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty.
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule
applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in
connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said
service. Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time
he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered
by that provision.
SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)(2) OF RA
37
6713, GOVERNS THE PRACTICE OF PROFESSION OF
ELECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and
employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the private
practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions. This is the general law which applies to all
public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA
7160 governs. Certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors,
provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to
a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in
any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong
barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius. Since they are excluded from any
prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their
profession.
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not
forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have
procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his
Department, as required by civil service regulations.
A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO IS NOT
PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE LAW MUST SECURE PRIOR
AUTHORITY FROM THE HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT.
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do
not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can
engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission
of the head of the department concerned.

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore

obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior and
Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for
Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule

XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his
oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. In acting as counsel for a party
without first securing the required written permission, respondent not
only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated
civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

38
ROBERTO A. FLORES vs.
 HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON
G.R. No. 104732
June 22, 1993
FACTS: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A.
7227, 1 otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard
J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is
challenged in this original petition with prayer for prohibition,
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order "to prevent
useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds by way of
salaries and other operational expenses attached to the office. The
said provision provides that the President shall appoint a
professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with a
compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval
of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the
Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic
Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations
from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo
shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the
Subic Authority.
Petitioners, maintain that the mentioned provision infringes
on the following constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7,
first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective
official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," 3 because
the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject
posts are public offices; and (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution,
which provides that "[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint", 4 since it was Congress through the
questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor
39
to the subject posts.
ISSUE: Whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which
states, "Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations
from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo
shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the
Subic Authority," violates the constitutional proscription against
appointment or designation of elective officials to other government
posts.
HELD: Yes. Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides that no
elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions
of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
In any case, the view that an elective official may be
appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording
of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. 
 IX-B, of the Constitution.
While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by
an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions
of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by
not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or
designation of an elective official to the government post, except as
are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself.
Moreover, when Congress clothes the President with the
power to appoint an officer, the Congress cannot at the same time
limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Once the
power of appointment is conferred on the President, such
conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint.
Even on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the officer,
Congress may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing
authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion to pick his own
choice. Consequently, when the qualifications prescribed by
Congress can only be met by one individual, such enactment
effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to
choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of
appointment. 24

In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject

posts be filled with a presidential appointee for the first year of its
operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso nevertheless
limits the appointing authority to only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent
Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only one can qualify for the posts in
question, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to
choose whom to appoint. The provision is manifestly an abuse of
congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one,
and no other, can qualify. Accordingly, while the conferment of the
appointing power on the President is a perfectly valid legislative act,
the proviso limiting his choice to one is certainly an encroachment on
his prerogative.

40
G.R. No. 193237 October 9, 2012
JALOSJOS, JR. v ComElec
Petitioner: DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR.
Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
AGAPITO J. CARDINO
Petitioner Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. and three (3)
others were found guilty of robbery and sentenced
them to suffer the penalty of prision correccional
minimum to prision mayor maximum.
Both Peitioner Jalosjos and Respondent Cardino were
candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del
Norte in the May 2010 elections.
Respondent Cardino filed a petition to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Petitioner Jalosjos because the
latter made a false material representation in his
certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that
he was eligible for the Office of Mayor. Respondent
Cardino claimed that Petitioner Jalosjos had already
been convicted by final judgment for robbery and
sentenced to prisión mayor by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18 (RTC) of Cebu City.
Petitioner Jalosjos admitted his conviction but stated that
he had already been granted probation.
This prompted Cardino to call the attention of the
Commission on the decision of the Sandiganbayan dated
September 29, 2008 finding Gregorio F. Bacolod, former
Administrator of the Parole and Probation Administration,
41
guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for issuing a
falsified Certification on December 19, 2003 attesting
to the fact that Petitioner Jalosjos had fully complied
with the terms and conditions of his probation.
Ruling of COMELEC: Jalosjos "is not eligible by reason
of his disqualification having been convicted by final
judgment, following Sec. 401 of Local Government Code.”
The penalty imposed on Jalosjos was the indeterminate
sentence of one year, eight months and twenty days of
prisión correccional as minimum, to four years, two
months and one day of prisión mayor as maximum.
Issue: Whether Jalosjos should be disqualified to run as
candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del
Norte.
Held: Yes. The perpetual special disqualification against
Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction by final
judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a
proper ground for a petition under Section 78 2 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos’ certificate of
candidacy was void from the start since he was not
eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed
his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a
candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were
stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate of
candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only
qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number
of votes for the position of Mayor.
Section 743 requires the candidate to state under oath in
his certificate of candidacy "that he is eligible for said
office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for
the public office. If a candidate is not actually eligible
because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal case
from running for public office, and he still states under
oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to
run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a
false material representation that is a ground for a
petition under Section 78.
Agapito J. Cardino ran unopposed in the May 2010
elections and thus received the highest number of votes
for Mayor. The COMELEC En Bane is DIRECTED to
constitute a Special City Board of Canvassers to proclaim
Agapito J. Cardino as the duly elected Mayor of Dapitan
City, Zamboanga del Norte.
1) Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence;
be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election.
3) Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The
certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it
is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein
and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its
component cities, highly urbanized city or district or
sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to
which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence;
his post office address for all election purposes; his
profession or occupation; that he will support and defend
the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws,
legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the
obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and
that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are
true to the best of his knowledge.

2) Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a

certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
42
G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013
JALOSJOS v ComElec
Petitioner: ROMEO G. JALOSJOS
Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MARIA
ISABELLE G. CLIMACO-SALAZAR, ROEL B.
NATIVIDAD, ARTURO N. ONRUBIA, AHMAD NARZAD
K. SAMPANG, JOSE L. LOBREGAT, ADELANTE
ZAMBOANGA PARTY, AND ELBERT C. ATILANO
On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its
Decision “People v. Jalosjos,” convicting petitioner by
final judgment of two (2) counts of statutory rape and six
(6) counts of acts of lasciviousness. He was sentenced to
suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and
reclusion temporal for each count, respectively, which
carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).
On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo issued an order commuting his prison term to
sixteen (16) years, three (3) months and three (3) days
(Order of Commutation). After serving the same, he was
issued a Certificate of Discharge From Prison on March
18, 2009.
On April 26, 2012, petitioner applied to register as a voter
in Zamboanga City. However, because of his previous
conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City
Election Officer of the Election Registration Board (ERB),
43
prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion in the
Permanent List of Voters (Petition for Inclusion) before
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Zamboanga City,
Branch 1 (MTCC).
On October 5, 2012Pending resolution of the same, he
filed a CoC seeking to run as mayor for Zamboanga City
in the upcoming local elections scheduled on May 13,
2013 (May 2013 Elections). In his CoC, petitioner stated,
inter alia, that he is eligible for the said office and that he
is a registered voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga
City.
Ruling of MTCC: Denied his Petition for Inclusion on
account of his perpetual absolute disqualification which in
effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election.
RTC: Affirmed MTCC.
COMELEC: resolved “to CANCEL and DENY due course
the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Romeo G. Jalosjos
as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013
National and Local Elections” due to his perpetual
absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply
with the voter registration requirement.
Petitioner Jalosjos’ submission that Article 30 of the RPC
was partially amended by Section 40(a) of the LGC and
thus, claims that his perpetual absolute disqualification
had already been removed.
Issue: Whether petitioner’s perpetual absolute
disqualification to run for elective office had already been
removed by Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the “Local Government Code of
1991” (LGC).
Held: No. Court holds that Section 40(a) of the LGC has
not removed the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification which petitioner continues to suffer.
Thereby, he remains disqualified to run for any elective
office pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC.
The petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal
penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal
which, pursuant to Article 411 of the RPC, carried with it
the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification and in turn, pursuant to Article 30 2 of the
RPC, disqualified him to run for elective office. As
discussed, Section 40 (a)3 of the LGC would not apply
to cases wherein a penal provision such as Article 41
in this case directly and specifically prohibits the
convict from running for elective office. Hence,
despite the lapse of two (2) years from petitioner's
service of his commuted prison term, he remains bound
to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him to
run as mayor for Zamboanga City.
It is well to note that the use of the word "perpetual" in
the aforementioned accessory penalty connotes a
lifetime restriction and in this respect, does not depend
on the length of the prison term, which is imposed as its
principal penalty. The Court explained the meaning of the
term "perpetual" as applied to the penalty of
disqualification to run for public office.
44
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute
disqualification disqualified the convict for public office
and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only
during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph
3, 4 & Article 30,2 Revised Penal Code).
1) ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion
temporal – Their accessory penalties. - The
penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion
temporal shall carry with them that of civil
interdiction for life or during the period of the
sentence as the case may be, and that of
perpetual absolute disqualification which the
offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to
the principal penalty, unless the same shall have
been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
2) ART. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or
temporary absolute disqualification. - The
penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification for public office shall produce the
following effects:cra
xxx
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any
election for any popular office or to be elected
to such office.
3) Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons
are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
 (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence;

4) Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — Any person

sentenced to any of the perpetual penalties shall
be pardoned after undergoing the penalty for thirty
years, unless such person by reason of his
conduct or some other serious cause shall be
considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of
pardon.

45
G.R. No. 195229 October 9, 2012
ARATEA vs.ComElec
Petitioner: EFREN RACEL ARA TEA
Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ESTELA D. ANTlPOLO
Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Respondent
Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor
of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and
Local Elections. Lonzanida.
Lonzanida and Antipolo ran for Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales in 2010. Rodolfo filed a petition under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) to disqualify
Lonzanida and to
deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of
candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected,
and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for
four (4) consecutive terms.
The COMELEC Second Division cancelled Lonzanida’s
certificate of candidacy.
Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc remained pending during said
elections. Lonzanida and Aratea garnered the highest
number of votes and were proclaimed Mayor and Vice-
Mayor, respectively.
46
Vice-Mayor elect Aratea took his oath of office as Acting
Mayor.
Subsequently, the COMELEC En Banc disqualified
Lonzanida from running for Mayor based on two grounds:
(1), Lonzanida had served as Mayor for more than three
consecutive terms without interruption; and (2) Lonzanida
had been convicted by final judgment of ten counts of
falsification under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Second-placer Antipolo intervened and claimed her right
to be proclaimed as Mayor because Lonzanida ceased to
be a candidate when the COMELEC Division ordered the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and the striking
out of his name from the list of official candidates.
Aratea asserted that Antipolo could not be proclaimed as
the winning candidate. He reasoned that since
Lonzanida’s disqualification was not yet final during
election day, the votes cast in his favor could not be
declared stray. Lonzanida’s subsequent disqualification
resulted in a permanent vacancy in the Office of Mayor,
and Aratea, as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor was
mandated to succeed as Mayor.
Issues:
1) Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section
68 of the OEC, or made a false material
representation under Section 78 of the OEC that
resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void
ab initio.
 2) Whether the second-placer or the Vice-Mayor
elect should succeed as Mayor in this case.
Held:
1) The Court ruled that Lonzanida was disqualified
under Sec. 78 of the OEC. It also held that
Antipolo, the "second placer," should be
proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificate
of candidacy was void ab initio. In short,
Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes
for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo
actually garnered the highest number of votes for
the position.
The qualifications and disqualifications are laid by
Sections 39 and 40 of the Local
Government Code. Section 40 expressly provides,
among others:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The
following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment
for an offense involving moral turpitude
or for an offense punishable by one (1)
year or more of imprisonment, within
two (2) years after serving sentence;
xxx
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
47
Sec. 12. Disqualification. — Any person who
has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced
by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or for any offense for which he was
sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty
Section 78 of the OEC states that a certificate of
candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there is
false material representation of the contents of the
certificate of candidacy.
Section 74 of the OEC details the contents of the
certificate of candidacy. This included among others a
statement that the person filing it is eligible for said office.
The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the
penalty of prisión mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from
holding any public office, or from being elected to any
public office. This perpetual disqualification took effect
upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before
Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy.
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it,
by operation of law, the accessory penalties of temporary
absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the RPC, temporary
absolute disqualification produces the effect of
"deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any
popular elective office or to be elected to such office.”
The duration of temporary absolute disqualification is the
same as that of the principal penalty of prisión mayor. On
the other hand, under Article 32 of the RPC, perpetual
special disqualification means that "the offender
shall not be permitted to hold any public office
during the period of his disqualification,” which is
perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification
and perpetual special disqualification constitute
ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person
suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run
for elective public office, and commits a false
material representation if he states in his certificate
of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
Lonzanida became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run
for, any elective public office from the time the judgment
of conviction against him became final. The judgment of
conviction was promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became
final on 23 October 2009, before Lonzanida filed his
certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009.
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a
petition under Section 78 of the OEC because this
accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that
the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary
to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state
under oath in his certificate of candidacy. As this Court
held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, the false
material representation may refer to "qualifications or
eligibility.” One who suffers from perpetual special
disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a
48
person suffering from perpetual special disqualification
files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he
is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly required
under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material
representation that is a ground for a petition under
Section 78.
The dissenting opinions place the violation of the three-
term limit rule as a disqualification under Section 68 as
the violation allegedly is "a status, circumstance or
condition which bars him from running for public office
despite the possession of all the qualifications under
Section 39 of the LGC." In so holding the dissenting
opinions write in the law what is not found in the law.
Legal Duty of COMELEC to Enforce Perpetual Special
Disqualification
Even without a petition, the COMELEC is under a legal
duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone
suffering from perpetual special disqualification to run for
public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction.
The final judgment of conviction is judicial notice to the
COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from
running for public office.
2) Consequently, the second-placer, Intervenor
Antipolo should now be proclaimed as the duly
elected Mayor. A cancelled certificate of candidacy
void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy,
and much less to valid votes. Lonzanida’s
disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated
the constitutional fiat on the three-term limit; and
second, he is known to have been convicted by
final judgment for ten (10) counts of Falsification.
In other words, on election day, respondent
Lonzanida’s disqualification is notoriously known
in fact and in law. Ergo, since respondent
Lonzanida was never a candidate for the
position, the votes cast for him should be
considered stray votes.

49
MANUEL B. JAPZON, Petitioner,
-vs-
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
JAIME S. TY, Respondents
G.R. No. 180088
January 19, 2009
Facts:
On 15 June 2007, Japzon field before the COMELEC a
Petition to disqualify and/or cancel The Certificate of
Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation.
Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-
born Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in what was
then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter Samar) to spouses
Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a
Filipino). Ty eventually migrated to the America USA and
became a citizen thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for
the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy
on 28 March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he
was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May
2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any
foreign country. While Ty may have applied for the
reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually
resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one year
immediately preceding the date of election as required under
Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991. In fact, even after filing his
application for reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, Ty
continued to make trips to the USA, the most recent of which
was on 31 October 2006 lasting until 20 January
2007. Moreover, although Ty already took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to
50
comport himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel
records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship
as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related
laws. Hence, Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the
COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from running for
public office and the cancellation of the latters Certificate of
Candidacy.
In the 14 May 2007 elections were already held. Ty
acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor
of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by
the Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May 2007.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC has gravely abused it
discretion in its ruling by disregarding the parameters for the
acquisition of a new domicile of choice and residence?
Held:
There is no dispute that Ty was a natural-born
Filipino. He was born and raised in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. However, he left to
work in the USA and eventually became an American
citizen. On 2 October 2005, Ty reacquired his Philippine
citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the
Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA,
in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No.
9225.[16] At this point, Ty still held dual citizenship, i.e.,
American and Philippine. It was only on 19 March 2007 that Ty
renounced his American citizenship before a notary public
and, resultantly, became a pure Philippine citizen again.
It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the
manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or
retain[17] his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign
citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under
such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would
reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of
the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its
provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency
requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition
or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence
of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act
No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is
only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to
allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may
hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign
citizenships, he may establish residence either in
the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a
citizen.
Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the
natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run for
public office.
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 reads:
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and
Liabilities. Those who retain or reacquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy
full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office
in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications
for holding such public office as required by the
51
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.
Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born
Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must:
(1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath.
That Ty complied with the second requirement is beyond
question. On 19 March 2007, he personally executed
a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary
public. By the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already
effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely
his Philippine citizenship.
The other requirement of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No.
9225 pertains to the qualifications required by the Constitution
and existing laws.

TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M. BAUTISTA,
ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P.
PAGADUAN,Respondents.
G.R. No. 198742 August 10, 2012
Facts:
The petitioner, Condon, is a natural-born Filipino citizen
having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On
December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian
citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas
Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy
in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225
otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The application was approved and the
petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the
Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra,
Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27,
2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.6
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba,
La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again
sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time
for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers
of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took
her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar,
Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M. Bautista, (private respondents)
all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for
quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the
RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification
from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual
citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section
5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred
that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an
Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in
Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225
and that her act of running for public office is a clear
abandonment of her Australian citizenship.
The RTC ruled that Condon, petitioner, is hereby
disqualified and ineligible to hold the office of Vice-Mayor of
Caba, La Union.
The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC but the appeal
was dismissed by the Second Division in its Order.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner disqualified from running for
elective office due to failure to renounce her Australian
Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225
Held:
Petitioner is disqualified from running for elective office for
failure to renounce her Australian citizenship in accordance with
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino
citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores
one’s Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and

52
obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions
imposed in Section 5.

Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:

"(2) Those seeking elective public office in the

Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an
oath."

On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially

sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian
citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same
was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2)
that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before
an officer authorized to administer oath.
The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her Australian
citizenship was invalid due to it was not oath before any public
officer authorized to administer it rendering the act of Condon
void.

53
GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GUSTAVO S.
TAMBUNTING, Respondents.
G.R. No. 176947 February 19, 2009
Facts:
. In the complaint by Corodora an affidavit is filed before
the COMELEC Law Department, Cordora asserted that
Tambunting made false assertions in the following items:
"That Annex A [Tambunting’s Certificate of Candidacy for
the 2001 elections] and Annex B [Tambunting’s Certificate
of Candidacy for the 2004 elections] state, among others, as
follows, particularly Nos. 6, 9 and 12 thereof:
1. No. 6 – I am a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen
2. No. 9 – No. of years of Residence before May
14, 2001.
36 in the Philippines and 25 in the Constituency
where I seek to be elected;
3. No. 12 – I am ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to
be elected."
Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local
public office because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship
and residency requirements.
To disprove Tambunting’s claim of being a natural-born
Filipino citizen, Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau
of Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting
claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines on
16 December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines on
17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates
confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship through
naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2 December 2000.
Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did
not make any misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy.
To refute Cordora’s claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born
54
Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate
which showed that he was born of a Filipino mother and an
American father. Tambunting further denied that he was
naturalized as an American citizen.
The COMELEC Law Department recommended the
dismissal of Cordora’s complaint against Tambunting because
Cordora failed to substantiate his charges against Tambunting.
Cordora’s reliance on the certification of the Bureau of
Immigration that Tambunting traveled on an American passport is
not sufficient to prove that Tambunting is an American citizen.
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the
resolution of the COMELEC Law Department.
Issue:
Whether or not Tambunting is not disqualified for running
in an elective office/position
Held:
Yes, he is not disqualified.
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino
mother and an American father. Neither does he deny that he
underwent the process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for
Relative) because of his father’s citizenship. Tambunting claims
that because of his parents’ differing citizenships, he is both
Filipino and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists
that Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen.
We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s observation
that Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the
circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for
Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire
American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130
only served to confirm the American citizenship which
Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau of
Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where
Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same
certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed
that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual
citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before
the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship
did not disqualify him from running for public office.

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

discussion/ additional notes:

Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.

Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result of

the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states,

a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said

states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose

parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus

sanguinis* is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus

soli.** Such a person, automatically and without any voluntary act on

his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.

Given the provisions on citizenship under the 1987 Philippine

Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the

Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries

which follow the principle of jus soli;

55
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if public office must (apart from meeting the qualifications under

by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that Philippine law) swear to an Oath of Allegiance and execute a

country; Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225.

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the
former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are
deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines
may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a
* A child’s citizenship is determined by its parents’ citizenship, as in
the Philippines.
** A child’s citizenship is determined by its place of birth, as in the
United States of America.
*** The Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.

person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or

more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is

the result of an individual’s volition – his active participation in

the naturalization process.

Under Republic Act No. 9225,*** a Filipino who becomes a naturalized

citizen of another country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by

swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines.

The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a

naturalized citizen’s foreign citizenship.

Dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for

elective position. Like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for

a person with dual citizenship who seeks public office to file his

certificate of candidacy and swear to the Oath of Allegiance contained

therein. On the other hand, a person with dual allegiance who seeks

56
 ABUNDO VS. COMELEC
G.R No. 201716, January 8, 2013
Facts: For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the
2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections,
Abelardo Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of
Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he
emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty
candidate and accordingly served the corresponding terms as
mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga
municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner
one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the
functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres’
election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared
the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the
way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the
end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of
a little over one year and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and
Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his
certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this
electoral contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s
disqualification to run. Comelec First Division on June 2010,
ruled in favor of Abundo who incidentally won the said 2010
elections.
Meanwhile, while the disqualification case (May 2010) was
pending, Ernesto Vega filed a petition to unseat Abundo in the
RTC of Virac, Catanduanes on exactly the same ground as
Torres. RTC ruled against Abundo, declaring him ineligible to
run. The COMELEC in February 2012, upheld the decision of
the RTC citing that first, there was no involuntary interruption
of Abundo’s 2004-2007 term service which would be an
exception to the three-term limit rule as he is considered never
57
to have lost title to the disputed office after he won in his
election protest; and second, what the Constitution prohibits is
for an elective official to be in office for the same position for
more than three consecutive terms and not to the service of
the term.
Issue: Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three
consecutive terms
Held: NO. As provided for in Section 8, Article X of the 1987
Constitution and Sec. 43(b) of the Local Government Code,
the three-term limit rule constitutes a disqualification to run for
an elective local office when an official has been elected for
three consecutive terms in the same local government post
and has fully served those three consecutive terms.
There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the
successive terms of the official after his or her third term. An
interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a
fourth term, immediately following the third. Of course, the
basic law is unequivocal that a "voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall NOT be considered an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official concerned was elected." This
qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local
official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by merely
resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary
interruption as distinguished from involuntary interruption
which may be brought about by certain events or causes.
Abundo did not serve three consecutive terms as Mayor of
Viga, Catanduanes due to an actual involuntary interruption
during the 2004-2007 term. This was because he assumed the
mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served a little over
one year and one month only. Thus, “the two-year period
which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be
considered as an interruption, which effectively removed
Abundo’s case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule,”
ruled the Court.
The Court further ruled that the COMELEC erred in
applying Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, which held
that “service of the unexpired portion of a term by a protestant
who is declared winner in an election protest is considered as
service for one full term within the contemplation of the three-
term limit rule” as the doctrine refers to a situation where the
elected official is under preventive suspension and is only
temporarily unable to discharge his functions yet is still entitled
to the office as compared to the situation of Abundo where he
did not have title to the office. The Court emphasized that
pending the favorable resolution of Abundo’s election protest,
he was relegated to being an ordinary constituent and private
citizen since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004
elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. While awaiting
the pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from
exercising power or authority over the constituents of Viga and
cannot be said to have retained title to the mayoralty office as
he was at that time not the duly proclaimed winner. It stressed
that Abundo’s case differs from other cases involving the
“effects of an election protest because while Abundo was the
winning candidate, he was the one deprived of his right and
opportunity to serve his constitutents.”

58
 BORJA VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998
Facts: Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of
Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30,
1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation
of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May
11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three
years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was
reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June
30, 1998.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a
certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the
May 11, 1998 elections. Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also
a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the
theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for
three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore
be ineligible to serve for another term after that.
Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in
favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Capco
disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros.
Borja won the elections. This is a petition for certiorari to
declare Borja as disqualified to occupy such position.
Issue: Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of
mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the
term is considered to have served a term in that office for the
purpose of the three-term limit.
Held: NO. the term limit for elective local officials must be
taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to
serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not
enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms
in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to
the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.
59
Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election
because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first
term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law.
Neither had he served the full term because he only continued
the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor.
The vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of
the vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence,
his service in that office should not be counted in the
application of any term limit.
The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X,
Sec. 8) is not only to prevent the establishment of political
dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the
people. A consideration of the historical background of Art. X,
Sec. 8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the
Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with
preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were
with preventing the monopolization of political power. In
discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on
the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by
reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the first
term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for
reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly
restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to
govern them.
 ALDOVINO VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009
Facts: Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of
Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001,
2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September
2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the
Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in
relation with a criminal case he then faced. The SC, however,
subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order;
hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and
finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for
the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr.,
Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong sought to deny
due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on
the ground that he had been elected and had served for three
terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the
three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
The COMELECs Second Division rule in favor of Asilo. It
reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as
Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term
because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether preventive suspension of an elected local
official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule
Held: No. Asilo’s 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the
Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive suspension in 2005, as
preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective officials
term.
60
The interruption of a term exempting an elective official from
the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the
involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have
involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short,
for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if
the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be
faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous
stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using
voluntary renunciation as an example and standard of what
does not constitute an interruption.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the
office holder lost the right to hold on to his office, and cannot
be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs
during an office holders term when he retains title to the office
but cannot exercise his functions for reasons established by
law. Of course, the term failure to serve cannot be used once
the right to office is lost; without the right to hold office or to
serve, then no service can be rendered so that none is really
lost.
The provision should be read in the context of interruption of
term, not in the context of interrupting the full continuity of the
exercise of the powers of the elective position.
Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates
under closely-controlled conditions and gives a premium to the
protection of the service rather than to the interests of the
individual office holder. Even then, protection of the service
goes only as far as a temporary prohibition on the exercise of
the functions of the officials office; the official is reinstated to
the exercise of his position as soon as the preventive
suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the
exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public
official is preventively suspended. This was what exactly
happened to Asilo.
Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly
different aspects of an elective officials service in office and
they do not overlap. Preventive suspension involves
protection of the service and of the people being served, and
prevents the office holder from temporarily exercising the
power of his office. Term limitation, on the other hand, is
triggered after an elective official has served his three terms in
office without any break. Its companion concept interruption of
a term on the other hand, requires loss of title to office. If
preventive suspension and term limitation or interruption have
any commonality at all, this common point may be with respect
to the discontinuity of service that may occur in both. But even
on this point, they merely run parallel to each other and never
intersect; preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary
incapacity to render service during an unbroken term; in the
context of term limitation, interruption of service occurs after
there has been a break in the term.
A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption
because the suspended official continues to stay in office
although he is barred from exercising the functions and
prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The
best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is
the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of
the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.

Thus, Asilo is disqualified to run for another term as it

violates the three-term rule.

61
 Adormeo vs COMELEC (February 4, 2002)
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order, to nullify and set aside the
resolution of public respondent COMELEC, which granted the motion for
reconsideration and declared private respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr.,
qualified to run for Mayor in Lucena City for the May 14, 2001 election.
Petitioner and private respondent were the only candidates for
Mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections. Talaga, Jr. was
elected mayor in May 1992. He served the full term. Again, he was re-
elected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998, he lost to Bernard G.
Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and served
the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001.
Subsequently, a petition to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or
Disqualification of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. was filed with the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor in Lucena City. Such petition was filed on
the ground that Talaga was elected and had served as city mayor for three
(3) consecutive term already, as manifested in the following factual
circumstances: (1) in the election of May 1992, he served the full term; (2)
in the election of May 1995, where he again served the full term; and, (3) in
the recall election of May 12, 2000, where he served only the unexpired
term of Tagarao after having lost to Tagarao in the 1998 election which
shall be considered as a full term.
Petitioner contended that Talaga’s candidacy as Mayor constituted a
violation of Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
The private respondent responded that he was not elected City Mayor
for three (3) consecutive terms but only for two (2) consecutive terms. He
pointed to his defeat in the 1998 election by Tagarao, hence, because of his
defeat the consecutiveness of his years as mayor was interrupted, and thus
62
his mayorship was not for three consecutive terms of three years each.
Respondent added that his service from May 12, 2001 until June 30, 2001
for 13 months and eighteen (18) days was not a full term, in the
contemplation of the law and the Constitution.
COMELEC decided in favor of Tagarao, however, the motion for
reconsideration was granted in favor of the private respondent, then
decision was renderedh in favor of the latter. The COMELEC ruled that 1)
respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms because he did
not win in the May 11, 1998 elections; 2) that he was installed only as
mayor by reason of his victory in the recall elections; 3) that his victory in
the recall elections was not considered a term of office and is not included
in the 3-term disqualification rule, and 4) that he did not fully serve the
three (3) consecutive terms, and his loss in the May 11, 1998 elections is
considered an interruption in the continuity of his service as Mayor of
Lucena City.
Issue: Whether or not Talaga, already served three consecutive terms in
that office.
Held: No. The issue before us was already addressed in Borja, Jr. vs.
COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157, 169 (1998), where we held:
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to
refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have
been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply. This point can be made clearer by considering
the following case or situation:
Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is
twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected
after that, can he run for one more term in the next election?
Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the
understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the people
should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may
bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly
curtailed.
Likewise, in the case of Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, 311 SCRA
602, 611 (1999), we said,
This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did
disqualification must concur: a) that the official concerned has been elected not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he
has fully served three consecutive terms.
Accordingly, COMELEC’s ruling that private respondent was not
elected for three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two
years he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was
disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.
Patently untenable is petitioner’s contention that COMELEC in
allowing respondent Talaga, Jr. to run in the May 1998 election violates
Article X, Section 8 of 1987 Constitution. To bolster his case, respondent
adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a Constitutional Commission
member, stating that in interpreting said provision that “if one is elected
representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired, no
matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing
the number of successive terms allowed.”
As pointed out by the COMELEC en banc, Fr. Bernas’ comment is
pertinent only to members of the House of Representatives. Unlike local
government officials, there is no recall election provided for members of
Congress.
Neither can respondent’s victory in the recall election be deemed a
violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as “voluntary
renunciation” for clearly it is not.

In Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, we said:

…The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states,
“Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which he was elected.” The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to
bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and
grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision.
Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from
office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts
to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a
few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary
renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution
issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from

63
 Socrates vs Comelec (November 12, 2002)
Facts: From 1992 to 2001, Mayor Edward Hagedorn has already served for
three consecutive terms. On the following regular elections he did not run
for the mayoralty position. On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the
then incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa convened
themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall of
Victorino Dennis M. Socrates who assumed office as Puerto Princesas
mayor on June 30, 2001. The PRA decided to pursue the recall election as
they lost their confidence upon Socrates. Respective petitions were filed by
several petitioners for the disqualification of Edward Hagedorn. The
petitioner filed for the cancellation of the latter’s Certificate of Candidacy
for the reason that he is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive
term as it is a contravention of the 3 consecutive year term limit conferred
by the constitution particularly Article X Section 8 of the Constitution.
Hagedorn is believed to have served and elected as mayor for three (3)
consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998 immediately prior to the
instant recall election for the same post.
Subsequently, Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall
election with 20,238 votes. Rival candidates Socrates and Sandoval
obtained17,220 votes and 13,241 votes, respectively. Hagedorn filed
motions to lift the order restraining the COMELEC from proclaiming the
winning candidate and to allow him to assume office to give effect to the
will of the electorate. On October 1, 2002, the Court granted Socrates
motion for leave to file a petition for intervention.
Issue: Whether or not Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall
election of Puerto Princesa on September 24, 2002.
Held: The court ruled that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September
24, 2002 recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa because:
It has been provided in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, that:
“Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.”
It can be inferred from the aforementioned provision that an elective local
official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent
64
is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit
rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is
that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts
continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the
interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or
consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot
seek immediate re-election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers
to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no
longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent
election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after
three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which provides:
“Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.”
Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the
Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term
following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not
prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the re-election
is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall
election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a
subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate
re-election to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term
of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September
24, 2002 is not an immediate re-election after his third consecutive term
which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate re-election that the
Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections
in 2001.
 Latasa vs Comelec (December 10, 2003)
FACTS: Arsenio A. Latasa was elected mayor of the municipality of
Digos, Davao del Sur in the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections. In a plebiscite,
the voters of Digos ratified RA 8798 – the Digos City Charter, hence,
transforming the Municipality of Digos to City of Digos. Upon such
happening, Latasa’s position ceased to exist. However, he took his oath as
mayor of Digos City in a holdover capacity under Art. IX, Section 53 of the
Digos City Charter. On Feb. 28, 2001, Latasa filed a certificate of
candidacy for the Digos city mayoralty position for the May 14, 2001
elections. In his CoC, after the phrase "I am eligible", Latasa inserted a
footnote and indicated: *Having served three (3) term[s] as municipal
mayor and now running for the first time as city mayor.
Latasa’s rival candiate, Romeo M. Sunga, filed before the Comelec a
petition for the cancellation of CoC and disqualification of Latasa, on the
ground that Latasa misrepresented his eligibility to run for city mayor as he
had admitted that he had been elected Digos municipal mayor thrice. Then,
Latasa filed an answer, stating that he did not misrepresent his eligibility as
he had fully disclosed that he was the incumbent three-term municipal
mayor of Digos, a fact which does not bar him from running in the May
2001 elections because it is the first time he will be running for city mayor.
The Comelec 1st Division issued a resolution which declared that Latasa’s
CoC was cancelled for violating the 3-term limit. The latter filed a motion
for reconsideration. On May 14, 2001, the elections proceeded.
Subsequently, Sunga filed a motion for Temporary Restraining Order to
restrain the City Board of Canvassers from counting Latasa’s votes and
from proclaiming him as the mayor if he wins the election. With 25,335
votes, Latasa was proclaimed winner. Sunga received 13, 650 votes. Sunga
filed a Supplemental Motion to annul Latasa’s proclamation and suspend its
effects. Latasa sworn in and assumed office as Digos City Mayor on July 1,
2001. On Aug. 27, 2002, COMELEC en banc denied Latasa’s May 4, 2001
Motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the
position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he
served for 3 consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos.
HELD: No. Petition dismissed. The Court discussed six pertinent topics to
further make a decision in this case.
65
First, the Court mentioned that in the case of Mamba Perez v. COMELEC:
COMELEC loses jurisdiction to pass upon a candidate’s qualifications once
proclamation has been made. The proper remedy is to file a petition for quo
warranto within 10 days after the proclamation.
However, the case presents
“a novel issue with respect to an explicit Constitutional mandate”, and
Latasa himself was unsure of his eligibility, hence the Supreme Court
considered the case of paramount interest and proceeded to rule upon the
merits.
Second, the court also mentioned that the three year term rule is an
exception to the rule of free choice. In a representative democracy, the
people should be allowed to freely choose those who will govern them. An
example of such is the Art. X, Section 8, which limits elective local officials
to 3 consecutive terms, limits the choice of the electorate to the extent that
those who have come under the provision are barred from running. The
Constitutional Commission sought to balance the free choice of the
electorate with the prevention of electoral dynasties. A proposal to bar any
further re-election after three consecutive terms was rejected. The final
result was Art. X, Section 8, such that a local elective official who has been
elected to 3 consecutive terms will not be allowed to run in the next
election.
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again for
the same local government post, unless two conditions concur:
1. that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms to the same local government post
2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Third, the court also explained that the conversion of Digos into a city is
immaterial in this case. Under Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
a municipality can only be converted into a city if it meets the established
criteria with respect to population size, land area, annual income level, and
possible diminution of mother LGU. Creation or conversion is done mainly
to help assure the economic viability of the LGU. A city has political and
economic rights which a municipality does not have; thus Art. X, Section
10 of the Constitution requires an approval by plebiscite for the conversion
of a municipality into a city. However, Section 2 of the Digos City Charter
provides that the City of Digos shall comprise exactly the same territory as
that of the Municipality of Digos. The present elective officials of the
Municipality were also made holdover officials of the new City. Digos City
has indeed acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from
the Municipality of Digos, but this does not change the fact that the territory
and population of the new city is exactly the same as that of the
municipality which Latasa governed as mayor from 1992-2001. For
purposes of Art. X, Section 8, therefore, the post of municipal mayor cannot
be construed as a different post as that of the city mayor.
Fouth, the court also distinguished this case from other jurisprudence on
Art. X, Section 8 and they are as follows:
Borja v. COMELEC: Elected vice mayor became mayor by operation of
law and served the remainder of the deceased mayor’s term. He was
subsequently elected for two more terms. SC did not count as a full term
under Art. X, Section8 the unexpired portion of the deceased mayor’s term
which the vice-mayor filled. “The term served must be one "for which [the
official concerned] was elected.” Also, the responsibilities and duties of a
vice-mayor are very different from that of the mayor. Latasa, in the case at
bar, was mayor of both the city and of the municipality. His authority as
chief executive did not change with the conversion of Digos into a city.
Lonzanida v. COMELEC: Two-term mayor won a third term in the May
1995 elections, but the COMELEC declared a failure of election and
vacated his post. He ran again in the May 1998 elections, but his candidacy
was opposed. SC held that the 3rd term was not served, because there was a
failure of election and an involuntary relinquishment of office. Latasa, on
the other hand, was duly elected and served 3 consecutive full terms.
Although Latasa was also forced to involuntary relinquish his office by
virtue of its abolition, he became city mayor at the very instant he vacated
the municipal mayoralty. In contrast with Lonzanida, where the petitioner
therein had to cease functioning as the chief executive, Latasa never did so.
Adormeo v. COMELEC: Two-term mayor lost to petitioner therein in the
1998 election. A recall election was held in 2000, which the two-term
mayor won. He served the remainder of the unexpired term. SC held that
the term served after winning the recall election did not count toward the 3-
term limit since the defeat in the 1998 election must be considered an
66
interruption in the continuity of service. Latasa’s service on the other hand,
was never interrupted in a similar sense.
Socrates v. COMELEC: Edward Hagedorn had already served 3
consecutive terms prior to the 2001 election, so he did not run. When Mayor
Socrates was recalled in 2002, Hagedorn ran in the recall election. The SC
allowed him to run, holding that the principle behind the 3-term rule is to
prevent consecutiveness of service of terms, and that there was a break
between the third term and before the recall election.In Lonzanida,
Adormeo, and Socrates, there was an interruption in the service of the local
elective official. “Indeed, the law contemplates a rest period during which
the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise
power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a
particular local government unit.”
Fifth, the court further argued that allowing Latasa to run defeats the intent
of the provision The framers of the Constitution specifically included an
exception to the people’s freedom of electoral choice in order to avoid a
single person from accumulating power over a territory by virtue of an
extended stay in the same elective office. Allowing Latasa to run for city
mayor after serving three terms as municipal mayor could possibly result in
him being mayor of Digos for 18 years. This is the very scenario sought to
be avoided by the Constitution.
Sixth, the court firmly decided that Sunga cannot fill the vacancy left by
Latasa. Sunga made as a basis the ruling in Labo v. COMELEC, that he
must be proclaimed as the candidate who won the highest number of votes.
However, the Supreme Court ruled in such case that the disqualification of
the winning candidate does not automatically entitle the second-highest vote
getter to proclamation. The obiter in that case simply stated that the rule
would have been different if the electorate fully and notoriously knew of the
winner’s disqualification but still voted for him. This, it was said, amounts
to a waiver or throwing away of votes such that the eligible candidate who
wins the next highest number of votes may be deemed elected. The
disqualification only nullifies the election of the winning candidate but does
not entitle the second-placer to proclamation. The vacancy must be filled by
succession (Reyes v. COMELEC).
Ong vs Alegre
FACTS:
Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre and
petitioner Francis Ong were candidates who filed
certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. Francis
was then the incumbent mayor.
Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office
a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy of Francis, predicated on the
three-consecutive term rule, Francis having, according to
Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001
mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor
and discharged the duties thereof for three (3)
consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.
On May 1998 elections both Alegre and Francis
ran for the office of mayor of San Vicente, Camarines
Norte, where Francis was proclaimed winner. Alegre
subsequently filed an election protest. RTC declared
Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty
contest. However, the decision came out only on July 4,
2001, when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001
mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve
the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of
San Vicente.
Acting on Alegre’s petition to disqualify and to
cancel Francis’ certificate of candidacy for the May 10,
2004 elections, the First Division of the COMELEC
67
rendered on March 31, 2004 a resolution dismissing the
said petition of Alegre. However, the COMELEC en
banc reversed the said resolution and thereby declaring
Francis as disqualified to run for mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004, among others.
Nationalist People’s Coalition immediately
nominated his older brother, Rommel Ong (Rommel), as
substitute candidate. Rommel filed his own certificate of
candidacy at about 5:05 p.m. which is past the deadline
for filing, as substitute candidate for his brother Francis.
A day before the May 10 elections, Alegre filed
a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of
Rommel Ong. COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillan issued a Memorandum, ordering PES Liza D.
Zabala-Cariño to implement the resolution of the
COMELEC en ban. Owing to the aforementioned
Garcillano Memorandum, the Chairman of the Municipal
Board of Canvasser issued an order enjoining all
concerned not to canvass the votes cast for Rommel,
prompting the latter to file a protest with that Board.
Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Alegre as the
winning candidate.
Thereafrer, Francis filed before the Court a petition
for certiorari. His brother Rommel’s petition followed
barely a week after.
Meanwhile, on June 4, 2004, the COMELEC
issued an order dismissing private respondent
Alegre’s Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy of Rommel Ong, for being moot
and academic.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Francis’s assumption of office as Mayor
of San Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to
June 30, 2001, may be considered as one full term
service in the context of the consecutive three-term limit
rule.
RULING:
YES. We hold that such assumption of office
constitutes, for Francis, "service for the full term", and
should be counted as a full term served in contemplation
of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and
statutory provisions, supra, barring local elective officials
from being elected and serving for more than three
consecutive term for the same position.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials
is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code restates
the same rule. For the three-term limit for elective local
government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites
must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same
local government post, and (2) that he has fully served
three (3) consecutive terms.
With the view we take of the case, the
disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus
68
effectively barring petitioner Francis from running for
mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10,
2004 elections.It is true that the RTC ruled that it was
Francis’ opponent (Alegre) who "won" in the 1998
mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected
mayor of San Vicente. However, that disposition was
without practical and legal use and value, having been
promulgated after the term of the contested office has
expired. Petitioner Francis’ contention that he was only a
presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his
proclamation was under protest did not make him less
than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the
duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election
coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous
exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the
term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in
contemplation of the three-term rule.
Here, there was actually no interruption or break in the
continuity of Francis’ service respecting the 1998-2001
term. Unlike Lonzanida, Francis was never unseated
during the term in question; he never ceased discharging
his duties and responsibilities as mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte for the entire period covering the 1998-
2001 term.
MENDOZA VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the post of
Governor of Bataan province a number of times:
TERMS & MANNER OF ASSUMPTION
a) 1986–1988: Appointed OIC Governor of Bataan by
former President Corazon Aquino and served up to 1988.
b) 1988–1992: Elected Governor and served up to1992.
c) 1994–1995: Elected Governor during the RECALL
election in 1993, assumed office on 28 June 1994 and
served up to 1995.
d) 1995–1998: Elected Governor and served up to 1998.
e) 1998–2001: Elected Governor and served up to 2001.
On 22 February 2001, private respondent Roman
again filed a certificate of candidacy for the same post in
the 14th May 2001 regular elections. He was then
proclaimed as winner.
Petitioners now seek the disqualification of
respondent Roman on the ground of his having
transgressed the three-term limit under Section 8, Article
X, of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43 of Republic
Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent Roman exceeded the
three-term limit for elective local officials OR should
respondent’s incumbency to the post of Governor
following the recall elections be included in determining
the three-consecutive term limit fixed by law
69
RULING:
NO. A winner who dislodges in a recall election an
incumbent elective local official merely serves
the balance of the latter's term of office; it is not a full
three-year term. The law evidently contemplates a
continuous full three-year term before the proscription
can apply.
If involuntary severance from the service which
results in the incumbent’s being unable to finish his term
of office because of his ouster through valid recall
proceedings negates "one term" for purposes of applying
the three-term limit, it stands to reason that the balance
of the term assumed by the newly elected local official in
a recall election should not also be held to be one term in
reckoning the three-term limit. In both situations, neither
the elective local official who is unable to finish his term
nor the elected local official who only assumes the
balance of the term of the ousted local official following
the recall election could be considered to have served a
full three-year term set by the Constitution.
Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30,
1995, during which respondent Roman served as
governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in
1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001
respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan
for only two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-
2001), his election on that day was actually only his third
term for the same position.
A recall term should not be considered as one full
term, because a contrary interpretation would in effect cut
short the elected official’s service to less than nine years
and shortchange his constituents. The desire to prevent
monopoly of political power should be balanced against
the need to uphold the voters’ obvious preference who, in
the present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of
the votes cast.

70
RIVERA III VS COMELEC
FACTS:
This is a resolution of two consolidated petitions
for certiorari assailing the Resolutions dated March 14,
2005 and November 8, 2005 of the COMELEC En Banc.
G.R. No. 167591
In the May 2004 Elections, respondent Marino "Boking"
Morales ran as candidate for mayor of Mabalacat,
Pampanga for the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June
30, 2007. Prior thereto or on January 5, 2004, he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy.
On January 10, 2004, Attys. Venancio Q. Rivera and
Normandick De Guzman, petitioners, filed with the
Second Division of COMELEC a petition to cancel
respondent Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy on the
ground that he was elected and had served three
previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat.
In his answer to the petition, respondent Morales
admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the
term commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 (first
term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third term), but
he served the second term from July 1, 1998 to June 30,
2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto
officer" because of the following reasons since his
proclamation as mayor was declared void by the RTC
and he was preventively suspended by the Ombudsman
71
in an anti-graft case from January 16, 1999 to July 15,
1999.
COMELEC Second Division rendered its
Resolution finding respondent Morales disqualified to run
for the position of municipal mayor.He then filed with the
COMELEC En Banc a motion for reconsideration.
The COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution granting
respondent Morales’ motion for reconsideration and
setting aside that of the Second Division.
G.R. No. 170577
After respondent Morales was proclaimed the duly
elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing
July 1, 2004, petitioner Anthony Dee, also a candidate for
mayor, filed with the RTC a petition for quo warranto
against the said respondent. Petitioner alleged that
respondent Morales, having served as mayor for three
consecutive terms, is ineligible to run for another term or
fourth term.
In his answer, respondent Morales raised the following
defenses:
a. He was not validly elected for the term 1998 to 2001
since the RTC declared in its Decision that his
proclamation as mayor of Mabalacat was void.
b. He was preventively suspended for six months by the
Ombudsman, during the same term in an anti-graft case,
an interruption in the continuity of his service as
municipal mayor of Mabalacat.
ISSUE: Whether or not Morales violated the three-term
limit rule.
RULING:
The Court held that such assumption of office
constitutes, for Francis, "service for the full term," and
should be counted as a full term served in contemplation
of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and
statutory provisions, supra, barring local elective officials
from being elected and serving for more than three
consecutive terms for the same position.
or the three-term limit for elective local
government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites
must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same
local government post, and (2) that he has fully served
three (3) consecutive terms.
same municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually
served the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a
proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of the
municipality of San Vicente.
Petitioner Francis’ contention that he was only a
presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his
proclamation was under protest did not make him less
than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the
duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election
coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous
exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the
term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in
contemplation of the three-term rule.
Having found respondent Morales ineligible, his
Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003
should be cancelled. The effect of the cancellation of a
Certificate of Candidacy is provided under Sections 6 and
7 of R.A. No. 6646.

With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying

requisites are present herein, thus effectively barring
petitioner Francis from running for mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. There
can be no dispute about petitioner Francis Ong having
been duly elected mayor of that municipality in the May
1995 and again in the May 2001 elections and serving
the July 1, 1995-June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-
June 30, 2004 terms in full. The herein controversy
revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral term, albeit there
can also be no quibbling that Francis ran for mayor of the

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COMELEC VS CRUZ G.R. No. 186616
PETITIONER: Comelec
RESPONDENTS: Conrado Cruz et. al
FACTS:
Respondents Cruz et. al challenged the constitutionality of Sec.2 of
R.A No. 9164 (entitled An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay
and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160) based
on the following arguments on the ground that the term limit
of Barangay officials should be applied prospectively and not
retroactively.
Sec. 2. Term of Office. The term of office of
all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after
the effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years.
No barangay elective official shall serve for more
than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position: Provided, however, That the term of office shall
be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the elective official was elected.
The RTC granted the petition and declared the challenged
proviso constitutionally infirm. The present petition, filed by the
COMELEC seeks a review of the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether Sec. 2 of R.A No. 9164 is unconstitutional on the
ground that it applies retroactively.
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HELD:
The respondents’ objection to the challenged provisos
constitutionality is its purported retroactive application of the
three-term limit when it set the 1994 barangay elections as a
reckoning point in the application of the three-term limit.
The respondents argued that the term limit, although
present in the previous laws, was not in RA No. 7160 when it
amended all previous barangay election laws. Hence, it was re-
introduced for the first time by RA No. 9164 (signed into law
on March 19, 2002) and was applied retroactively when it made the
term limitation effective from the 1994 barangay elections.
The Court’s own reading shows that no retroactive
application was made because the three-term limit has been there
all along as early as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after
the 1987 Constitution took effect; it was continued under the LGC
and can still be found in the current law.
The first law that provided a term limitation
for barangay officials was RA No. 6653 (1988); it imposed a two-
consecutive term limit. After only six months, Congress, under RA
No. 6679 (1988), changed the two-term limit by providing for a
three-consecutive term limit. This consistent imposition of the term
limit gives no hint of any equivocation in the congressional intent to
provide a term limitation. Thereafter, RA No. 7160 the LGC
followed, bringing with it the issue of whether it provided, as
originally worded, for a three-term limit for barangay officials. We
differ with the RTC analysis of this issue.
Section 43 is a provision under Title II of the LGC on Elective
Officials. These Title II provisions are intended to apply to all local
elective officials, unless the contrary is clearly provided. A contrary
application is provided with respect to the length of the term of
office under Section 43(a); while it applies to all local elective
officials, it does not apply to barangay officials whose length of
term is specifically provided by Section 43(c). In contrast to this
clear case of an exception to a general rule, the three-term limit
under Section 43(b) does not contain any exception; it applies to all
local elective officials who must perforce include barangay officials.
The respondents and the RTC argued that paragraphs (a)
and (b) of Section 43 are the general law for elective officials (other
than barangay officials); and paragraph (c) is the specific law
on barangay officials, such that the silence of paragraph (c) on term
limitation for barangay officials indicates the legislative intent to
exclude barangay officials from the application of the three-term
limit. This reading, however, is flawed for two reasons.
First, reading Section 43(a) and (b) together to the exclusion
of Section 43(c), is not justified by the plain texts of these
provisions. Section 43(a) plainly refers to local elective officials,
74
except elective barangay officials. In comparison, Section 43(b)
refers to all local elective officials without exclusions or
exceptions. Their respective coverages therefore vary so that one
cannot be said to be of the same kind as the other. Their separate
topics additionally strengthen their distinction; Section 43(a) refers
to the term of office while Section 43(b) refers to the three-term
limit. These differences alone indicate that Sections 43(a) and (b)
cannot be read together as one organic whole in the way the RTC
suggested. Significantly, these same distinctions apply between Sec.
43(b) and (c).
Second, the RTC interpretation is flawed because of its total
disregard of the historical background of Section 43(c).
From a historical perspective of the law, the inclusion of
Section 43(c) in the LGC is an absolute necessity to clarify the length
of term of barangay officials. Under RA No. 6679, the term of office
of barangay officials was five (5) years. The real concern was how
Section 43 would interface with RA No. 6679. Without a categorical
statement on the length of the term of office of barangay officials, a
general three-year term for all local elective officials under Section
43(a), standing alone, may not readily and completely erase doubts
on the intended abrogation of the 5-year term for barangay officials
under RA No. 6679. Thus, Congress added Section 43(c) which
provided a categorical three-year term for these officials. History
tells us that the unequivocal provision of Section 43(c)
notwithstanding, an issue on what is the exact term of office
of barangay officials was still brought to us via a petition filed by no
less than the President of the Liga ng Mga Barangay in 1997.

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