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2013-Constitutional Law-Reminders by Atty. Carlo L. Cruz
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JURISTS BAR REVIEW CENTER™
2013 REMINDERS ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP an SUFFRAGE
Ca!"# L$ C!%&
The POLICE POWER
The police power may use both the power of taxation and the power of eminent domain as implements
for the attainment of a legitimate police objective.
Subsequent law prohibiting gambling upheld as a valid exercise of the police power. [ Stone v.
Mississippi, 11 !S "1#$ %n the context of municipal law , a law ta&es precedence as against a treaty
obligation, for a treaty may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power. [ Ichong v. Hernandez ,
11 'hil. 1(($ note ) *s has been observed by !S constitutional scholars, a treaty has greater +dignity
than an executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind
it the authority of the 'resident, the Senate, and the people- a ratified treaty, unli&e an executive
agreement, ta&es precedence over any prior statutory enactment. [ Bayan Muna v. Romulo ) ./. 0o.
1(21", 3ebruary 1, 411$
Exercise of the Police Power 5 primarily exerc ised by the legis lature- may be delegated to the
'resident and administrative boards as well as the lawma&ing bodies on all municipal levels, including
the barang ays 5 vested in local government units under the genera l welfare clause of the 6ocal
overnment 7ode.
NOTE ) The integration of the 'hilippine 8ar under the 7onstitution does not ma&e a lawyer a member of
any group of which he is not already a member. “Such compulsion is justified s n exercise of the
police power of the Stte.! [In re Edillon, "# S7/* ((#$
THE LEGISLATURE MA' NOT BE COMPELLED [by mandamus$ to exercise the police power.
Tests for "lid Exercise of the Police Power ) [1 $ Lwful Su#ject ) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police power, and
[4$ Lwful $ens ) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon the individual.
$tters which h%e #een reco&ni'ed #( the Supre me Court s lwful su#j ects 5 8illboards
[Churchill & ait v. Ra!!erty , 94 'hil. ("$ 5 prices of prime commodities [ "a#us v. $hite, 941 !S #1#$ 5
six)year)old cabs [ a%icab perators o! Metro Manila v. Board o! ransportation , 11 S7/* (:$ 5
barber shops and massages services [ 'elasco v. 'illegas, 14 S7/* (2"$ 5 heavy vehicles and public
streets [ Bautista v. (uinio , 14: S7/* 94$ 5 video piracy [ io v. 'ideogram Regulatory Board , 1(1
S7/* 4"$ 5 bouncing chec&s [ )ozano v. Martinez, 1#2 S7/* 949$ 5 private roads inside subdivisions
[Sangalang v. I*C , 1:2 S7/* :1$ ) 0ational ;edical *dmission Test 5 9)test limitation rule [ +ept. o!
Education v. San +iego , 1" S7/* (99$ 5 free air time for 7<;=6=7 [ elecommunications and
Broadcast *ttorneys o! the ,hilippines v. CME)EC , 4" S7/* 99:$ 5 enerics *ct [ +el Rosario v.
Bengzon, 1" S7/* (41$ 5 boo&s of account [ "u Cong Eng v. rinidad , 4:1 !S ($ 5 =< #4 requiring
government agencies and <77s to streamline their identification card systems 5 [ -M v. +irector
/eneral01E+*, *pril 1, 42$ 8!T 0<T= ple v. orres [49 S7/* 1#1$, where the Supreme 7ourt
rejected a 0ational %> System on the basis of the people?s right to privacy 5 the regulation of rates
imposed by a public utility such as S!/0=7< [ Surigao del 1orte Electric Cooperative2 Inc. v. Energy
Regulatory Commission, ./. 0o. 1"9242, <ctober #, 41$- ban against the importation of used motor
vehicles to protect the domestic industry [./. 0o. 12#1:4 @=xecutive Secretary v. Subic %ntegrated
;acro Aentures 7orp.B and ./. 0o. 12":#1 @ E%ecutive Secretary v. Motor 'ehicle Importers
*ssociation o! Subic Bay 3reeport2 Inc.B, cited in E%ecutive Secretary v. 3orerunner Multi Resources , %nc.
) ./. 0o. 19 4#, Canua ry :, 419$- a law remov ing the remedy or right of redemption in cases of
foreclosures of real estate mortgag es already in place upon the effectivity of said new law [ /olden4ay
Merchandising Corporation v. E5uitable ,CI Ban# 5./. 0o. 1((#, ;arch 19, 419$
Re&ultions which h%e #een c)nowled&ed #( the Supreme Court s lwful mens for ttinin&
police power o#jecti%es ) L()!#*a!+%* -#! "()(!* [)orenzo v. +irector o! Health , ( 'hil. (($ 5
!(a*#na."( /#!+n #%!* an minimum w&es 6Ramos v. ,oblete2 78 ,hil. 9:;< 0 !ull0time
pharmacist in drug stores 6Roschen v. $ard, 4:: !S 99:$ 5 ."## (** .(-#!( +**%an4( #- a a!!+a(
"+4(n*( [/ould v. /ould, 21 *tl. 2#$ 5 "+++n ( 4a)a4+5 #- 4##n 4a!!+(!*, #! (a(!* [,eople
v. Chan, 2( 'hil. 211$ 5 *(!+"+&a+#n #- +.(4+"(* [Buc# v. Bell, 4:# !S 1($
1
Instnces when the mens for the ttinment of n pprentl( le&itimte police o#jecti%e rejected
for #ein& unlwful 5 =< prohibiting the inter)provincial transport of carabaos to prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter [ "not v. I*C , 1#" S7/* 2( ) 0oteD S7 commented on the absur dity of the
method$ 5 prohibition against the use of a material &nown as shoddy for the ma&ing of mattresses
annulled, there being no basis for fear that it was inimical to the health of the user [ $eaver v. ,almer
Bros. Co ., 4: !S #4$ 5 prohibition against distribution of handbills in public places @annulled on the
ground of freedom of expressionB [ (amison v. e%as, 91" !S #19$ 5 prohibition against wash room rates
and renting out rooms more than twice a day, to minimiEe if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and ali&e. 5 you cannot legislate moralityF [ $hite )ight
Corporation v. City o! Manila ) ./. 0o. 144"#2, Canuary 4, 4$ 5 regulation of par&ing fees in malls
) The power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate [ S/ v. *yala )and2 Inc. ) ./. 0o.
1::(2, September 1", 4$ 5 ordinance regulating the construction of fences and walls [requiring
setbac&s and see through fences$ [ 3ernando v. St. Scholastica=s College ) ./. 0o. 1211:, ;arch 14,
419$
Stndrds for *udicil Re%iew +for the %lidit( of ordinnces, ) *!+4 *4!%+n5 for laws dealing with
freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the !a+#na" .a*+* *ana! of review for
economic legislation- (+(n( #! +(+a( *4!%+n5 , for evaluating classifications based on
gender and legitimacy.
The o%er#redth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed
rights. [$hite )ight Corporation v. City o! Manila ) ./. 0o. 144"#2, Canuary 4, 4$
The POWER O- E$IET /O$0I
The power of eminent domai n a5 .( (6(!4+*( by th e Le&islture, th e President, various locl
le&islti%e #odies, certain pu#lic corportions li&e the 6and *uthority and even 1usi2pu#lic
corportions, li&e the '6>T and the '0/. @Gater districts may be given the power to expropriate.
[Metropolitan Cebu $ater +istrict v. (. -ing and Sons Company2 Inc.2 ./. 0o. 1:("9, *pril 12, 4$
ecessit( of Exercise2 The power of eminent domain should be construed liberally in favor of the
property owner- courts can loo& into whether the expropriation by the delegate is necessary or wise,
unless there is a specific, as opposed to a general, grant of authority to expropriate. [ City o! Manila v.
Chinese Community, # 'hil. 9#- Republic o! the ,hilippines v. )a rden de ,,. Benedictinos de
3ilipinas, 1 S7/* 2#2$
Pri%te Propert( 5 anything that can come under the dominion of man 5 MUST BE WHOLESOME )
real, personal, tangible and intangible properties, franchises, churches and other religious
properties, cemeteries E7CEPT money and choses in action because just compensation is usually paid
also in money.
SERVICES are considered embraced in the concept of property subject to ta&ing. The subject of this
case was the interconnection between the overnment Telephone System and the '6>T, so that the
former can use the lines and facilities of the '6>T. [/' v. '6>T, 42 S7/* 24$ %n PL/T %. TC [1
S7/* :1:$, '6>T was required to interconnect with a private communications company
T)in& 5 imports a physical dispossession of the owner, deprivation of all beneficial use and enjoyment
of his property. Re1uisites of T)in& in Eminent /omin 2 [1$ expropriator must enter a private
property [4$ entry must be for more than a momentary period [9$ entry must be under warrant or color of
legal authority [#$ property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected [($ utiliEation of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive the owner of beneficial enjoyment of the property. [ Republic v. Castelvi, (" S7/*
992$
Instnces of T)in&3 s reco&ni'ed #( the Courts 5 'ermanent inundation of a farmland because of
the construction of a dam nearby [ S v. )ynch, 1" !S ##($ 5 government planes constantly flying over
private property at very low altitudes [ S v. Causby, 94" !S 4(2$ 5 easement over a three)meter strip of
private property [*yala de Ro%as v. City o! Manila, 'hil. 41($ 5 ordinance prohibiting the construction of
any building which would obstruct the view of a plaEa from a highway [ ,eople v. 3a>ardo, 1# 'hil. ##9$ 5
7<;=6=7 /esolution requiring newspapers to provide it with free space of not less than H page for the
common use of political parties and candidates [,hilippine ,ress Institute v. CME)EC , 4## S7/* 4:4$
) right)of)way [aerial$ easements, resulting in the restriction on property rights over land traversed by
transmission lines [1,C v. *guirre0,aderanga, #2# S7/* #"1- 1ational ,o4er Corporation v. ,ure!oods
2
Corporation2 ./. 0o. 12: 4(, Septe mber 14, 4"- 1ational ,o4er Corporation v. Co , ./. 0o.
122:9, 3ebruary 1, 4- 1ational ,o4er Corporation v . Ileto ) ./. 0o. 12(:, Culy 11, 414,
Second >ivision, 8rion$ ) exhaust fan in a tunnel directly blowing smo&e into a house [ Richards v.
$ashington erminal, 499 !S (#2$ 5 agrarian reform [ *ssociation o! Small )ando4ners v. Secretary o!
*grarian Re!orm, 1:( S7/* 9#9$ 5 construction of a tunnel under the land [ 1ational ,o4er Corporation
v. Heirs o! Sang#ay ) ./. 0o. 12("4", *ugust 4#, 411$ ) ordinance requiring priva te cemeteries to
reserve 2I of their total areas to paupers [ City /overnment o! ?uezon City v. Ericta , 144 S7/* :($ 5
effort to prohibit malls from collecting par&ing fees ) he po4er to regulate2 ho4ev er2 does not include
the po4er to prohibit . he po4er to regulate does not inclu de the po4er to con!iscat e . [S/ v. *yala
)and2 Inc.2 ./. 0o. 1::(2, Septem ber 1", 4$ 5 agrarian reform 5 stoc# distribution [Section 91 of
/*22(: @7*/6B$ or collective o4nership, provided control of the corporation or cooperative is vested in
farmers)beneficiaries [Hacienda )uisita Incorporated v. ,residential *grarian Re!orm Council ) ./. 0o.
1:111, *pril 4#, 414$ 5 ordinance requiring setbac& requirement for walls [to ma&e available more
par&ing space for free for the general public$ [3ernando v. St. Scholastica=s College ) ./. 0o. 1211:,
;arch 14, 419, En Banc, ;endoEa$
AN ORDINANCE requiring private cemeteries to reserve 2I of their total areas to paupers is not a valid
exercise of the police power but an exercise of the power of eminent domain, which requires the
payment of just compensation. [City /overnment o! ?uezon City v. Ericta , 144 S7/* :($ A COMELEC
RESOLUTION requiring newspapers to provide it with free space of not less than H page for the
common use of political parties and candidates constitutes t)in& of private property without payment of
just compensation. [,hilippine ,ress Institute v. CME)EC , 4## S7/* 4:4$
M(!( +n(n+#n # (6)!#)!+a( does not bind the owner, who may still sell the property before actual
expropriation. [,eople v. 3a>ardo, 1# 'hil. ##9$
Pu#lic 4se 5 any use directly available to the general public as a matter of right and not merely
forbearance or accommodation. Exmples 5 )a!* which a re res communes- a!a!+an !(-#!
[*ssociation o! Small )ando4ners v. Secretary o! *grarian Re!orm, 1:( S7/* 9#9$- )!#)(!5 (8#(
# )%."+4 *(!
companies 8+4(* a
@demandable +n+*
as a (! ( .5
matter )!+8a
of right by("5 9#/n(
anyone )%."+4 to%+
prepared "++(*
pay for, said
li&e telephone
servicesB or light
[ +enieter
)and Co. v. 3lorida ,ublic Service Co ., 14" S. #4$ ) )+"# (8("#)(n 4(n(! [,rovince o!
Camarines Sur v. C* , 444 S7/* 1:9$- (6)!#)!+a+#n -#! *"% 4"(a!an4( an %!.an (8("#)(n +*
-#! a )%."+4 )%!)#*( (8(n +- ( (8("#)( a!(a +* "a(! *#" # )!+8a( #(#/n(!*, 4#(!4+a"
-+!*, (n(!a+n(n an *(!8+4( 4#)an+(* an #(! )!+8a( 4#n4(!n* [/eyes v. 0J*, 9( S7/*
##:; %!.an "an !(-#! an #%*+n, #! *#4+a"+&( #%*+n )!#!a +n8#"8+n #n"5 a #n(9a"-
(4a!( a!(a [ Manapat v. Court o! *ppeals, ./. 0o. 11#:", <ctober 1(, 4:$- *#4+a"+&( #%*+n,
whereby housing units are distributed andKor sold to qualified beneficiaries on much easier terms, has
already been included in the expanded definition of +public use or purpose in the context of the State?s
exercise of the power of eminent domain. [ Sumulong v. /uerrero2 0o. 6)#"2"(, Septem ber 9, 1":,
1(# S7/* #21, citi ng the earlier case of Heirs o! (uancho *rdona v. Reyes2 0os. 6)2(#, 2((9)
2(((, <ctober 42, 1"9, 14( S7/* 44, cited in [ City o! Manila v. e 5 ./. 0o. 12429, September
41, 411, Third >ivision, 'eralta$ ) Propert( already devoted to public use can still be expropriated.
[City o! Manila v. Chinese Community , # 'hil. 9#$
T(!( +* 4#""(4+8( #/n(!*+) as long as there is a concerted grou p wor& by the farmers on the land,
regardless of whether the landowner is a cooperative, association or corporation composed of farmers.
Jowever, this definition of collective ownership should be read in light of the clear policy of the law on
agrarian reform, which is to emancipate the tiller from the bondage of the soil and empower the common
people. Gorth noting too is its noble goal of rectifying +the acute imbalance in the distribution of this
precious resource among our people. [ *ssociation o! Small )ando4ners in the ,hilippines2 Inc. v.
Secretary o! *grarian Re!orm, ./. 0o. :":#4, Culy 1#, 1", 1:( S7/* 9#9, 9(4$ *ccordingly, J6%?s
insistent view that control need not be in the hands of the farmers translates to allowing it to run
roughshod against the very reason for the enactment of agrarian reform laws and leave the farmers in
their shac&les with sheer lip service to loo& forward to. [ Hacienda )uisita Incorporated v. ,residential
*grarian Re!orm Council ) ./. 0o. 1:111, *pril 4#, 414$
%n expropriation proceedings, the %lue of the lnd nd its ch rcter t the time it ws t)en #( the
&o%ernment re the criteri for determinin& just compenstion. [,hilipine 1ational il Company v.
Maglasang2 ./. 0o. 1((#:, 0ovember 11, 4"$ Propert( t)en should be assessed as of the time
of the ta&ing, which usually coincides with the commencement of expropriation proceedings. [ Republic v.
Castelvi, (" S7/* 992$
3
*ust Compenstion 5 full and fair equivalent of he property ta&en- must be fair to both parties. THE
DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION is a judicial function [ )and Ban# o! the ,hilippines v.
Escandor, ./. 0o. 1:12"(, <ctober 11, 41$ 'ayment of just compensation in #onds is allowed.
[*ssociation o! Small )ando4ners v. Secretary o! *grarian Re!orm, 1:( S7/* 9#9$ THE PRESENCE
OF TRANSMISSION LINES undoubtedly restricts respondent?s use of his property. 'etitioner is thus
liable to pay respondent the full mr)et %lue. [1ational ,o4er Corporation v. Co, ./. 0o. 122:9,
3ebruary 1, 4$
P(ment of just compenstion shall be made to the owner, which refers to all those who have lawful
interest in the property, including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee. [ -necht v. C*, 4: S7/* :(#$
BUT see Lnd 6n) of the Philippines %. 0$S -rmin& Corportion [./. 0o. 1:#:1, <ctober 1(,
4"$ ) Since *;S was not a landowner, but a mere lessee of the agricultural land owned by T<T7<, it
had no right under the 7*/6 to demand from 68' just compe nsation for its standing crops and
improvements. *s a lessee, the rights of *;S over its standing crops and improvements on the leased
property are defined, conferred, as well as limited by the provisions of the ;<* it executed with T<T7<.
*ust compenstion was determined in 1:9 as of the time of the ta&ing of the property in 14#.
Jowever, the Supreme 7ourt did not apply *rticle 14( of the 7ivil 7ode calling for the adjustment of the
peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or deflation because, in eminent domain cases. +The
obligation to pay arises from law , independent of contract. [ Commissioner o! ,ublic High4ays v.
Burgos, 2 S7/* "91$
*dministrative agencies have no jurisdiction over just compensation cases. Thus, as a rule, the >*/*8?s
decision setting the amount of just compensation is merely preliminary and not executory if challenged
before the S*7. xxx. The determination of the amount of just compensation is a judicial function that
cannot be usurped by administrative agencies. [)and Ban# v. Heirs o! )istana 3 ./. 0o. 1"4:(", ;ay
9, 411$
The owner is enti tled to p(ment of interest from the time of ta&ing until actual payment of just
compensation-
Interest of 14Iinterest must
per annum onbe
theclaimed or is deemed
just compensation waived.
is due [ rtula v.
the landowner in Republic , 44 S7/*
case of delay #::$
in payment,
which will, in effect, ma&e the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance. [)and Ban# o!
the ,hilippines v. Chico , ./. 0o. 12"#(9, ;arch 19, 4$
Ta6(* paid by the owner from the time of the ta&ing until actual transfer of title are reimbursable by the
expropriator. [City o! Manila v. Ro%as , 2 'hil. 41($ T+"( to the property shall not be transferred until
after actual payment of just compensation. ['isayan Re!ining Co. v. Camus, # 'hil. (($
The failure for a long time of the owner to question the lac& of expropriation proceedings covering a
property that the governmen t had ta&en constitu tes a waiver of his right to gain bac& possessi on. The
;endoEas? remedy is an action for the payment of just compensation, not ejectment. [ Republic v.
Mendoza2./. 0o. 1"(1, *ugust ", 41, 4nd >ivision, 0#d$
6!s may expropriate but ordinances, and not mere resolutions, would be needed for them to do so.
["usay v. Court o! *ppeals, ./. 0o. 1(22"#, *pril 2, 411$
T( a4+#n # !(4#8(! <%* 4#)(n*a+#n from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the
action for damages. The former, also &nown as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the
value of property ta&en in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the
power of eminent domai n has been attem pted by the ta&ing agency. [ *ccording to 9@* C(S2 Eminent
+omain2 A8; D In%erse condemntion is cuse of ction &inst &o%ernmentl defendnt to
reco%er the %lue of propert( which hs #een t)en in fct #( the &o%ernmentl defendnt3 e%en
thou&h no forml exercis e of the power of eminent dom in hs #een ttempted #( the t)in&
&enc(. $hile the typical ta#ing occurs 4hen the government acts to condemn property in the e%ercise
o! its po4er o! eminent domain2 the entir e doctrine o! inverse condemnation is predicated on the
proposition that a ta#ing may occur 4ithout such !ormal proceedings. he phrase Dinverse
condemnation2 as a common understanding o! that phrase 4ould suggest2 simply describes an action
that is the Dinverse or Dreverse o! a condemnation proceeding. $ [1ational ,o4er Corporation v. Heirs o!
Sang#ay ) ./. 0o. 12("4", *ugust 4#, 411, 3irst >ivision, 8ersamin$
The POWER O- T070TIO
D+*+n%+* from licenses [for regul atory purposes- exercise of the police power$. Taxes are for
purposes of risin& re%enues. ) In4"%(* all properties, whether tangible or intangible, found in the
4
territory of the taxing jurisdiction ) even shares of stoc& issued by a foreign corporation, but +in action in
the local state may be tax ed by it 6$ells 3argo v. CIR, # < 1($- also insurance proceeds from a
policy issued abroad [Manila Electric Co. v. "atco, 2 'hil. "$
Ta6 #n n#/"(( not allowed ) a tax based on circulation was annulled for being violative of due
process and freedom of expression. [/ros>ean v. *merican ,ress Co ., 4: !S 499$
D#%."( a6a+#n 5 when additional taxes are laid on the same subject by the same taxing jurisdiction
during the same taxi ng period and for the same purp ose. There is no specific proh ibition in the
7onstitution against doubl e taxation. 0o Supreme 7ourt decision also. +>ouble taxation is no more
prohibited than doubled taxation. +The power to tax twice is as ample as to tax once. *n additional
'4( tax on professionals who were already paying the '( occupation tax under the /evised %nternal
/evenue 7ode would be valid ) different taxing jurisdictions 5 local and national. [ ,unzalan v. Municipal
Board o! Manila , ( 'hil. #2$ 'ossible remedy 5 if the se cond tax constitutes a violation of the e1ul
protection cluse. %n the Pun'ln case, the S7 said there was no violation of the equal protection
clause because there was a substantial distinction between practitioners in ;anila as opposed to
practitioners elsewhere, who earned less.
P%."+4 P%!)#*( 5 a tax must be for a public purpose 5 the mere fact that a tax will be directly enjoyed
only by a private individual will not ma&e it invalid so long as some lin& to the public welfare is
established. =xamples 5 cash incentives for athletes- pensions paid to veterans- unemployment relief-
support for the handicapped, etc.
* tax levy [6<% 0o. 12($ on sale of fertiliEers for purposes of benefiting a private corporation, 'hilippine
'lanters, %nc. is invalid. 0ot even a valid exercise of the police power. [ ,lanters ,roducts Inc. v. 3ertiphil
Corporation, ./. 0o. 1222, ;arch 1#, 4"$ The imposition of a %ehicle re&istrtion fee is not an
exercise by the State of its police power, but of its taxation power ) mainly to raise funds for the
construction and maintenance of highways and to a much lesser degree, pay for the operating expenses
of the administering agency. x x x 3ees may be properly regarded as taxes even though they also serve
as an instrument
S7/* 94$ of regulation. [ ,hilippine *irlines2 Inc. v. Edu2 ./. 0o. 6)#19"9, *ugust 1(, 1"", 12#
The term LtaxL frequently applies to all &inds of exactions of monies which become public funds. %t is
often loosely used to include levies for revenue as well as levies for regulatory purposes such that
license fees are frequently called taxes although license !ee is a legal concept distinguishable from ta%
the former is imposed in the exercise of police power primarily for purposes of regulation, while the latter
is imposed under the taxing power primarily for purposes of raising revenues. [ Compania /eneral de
abacos de 3ilipinas v. City o! Manila , 11" 'hil. 9"9- " S7/* 9: @129B- ,aci!ic Commercial Co. v.
Romualdez, # 'hil, 1: @14:B$ Thus, if the generating of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation
is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax- but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that
incidentally revenue is also obtained does not ma&e the imposition a tax. [ Manila Electric Company v. El
*uditor /eneral y )a Comision de Servicios ,ublicos, :9 'hil. 199 @1#1B- Republic v. ,hilippine Rabbit
Bus )ines , 94 S7/* 41( @1: B$ xxx. *s a general rule, there must be a statutory gran t for a local
government unit to impose lawfully a gross receipts tax, that unit not having the inherent power of
taxation. The rule, however, finds no application in the instant case where what is involved is an exercise
of, principally, the regulatory power of the respondent 7ity and where that regulatory power is expressly
accompanied by the taxing power. [,rogressive +evelopment Corporat ion v. ?uezon City2 ./. 0o.
92"1, *pril 4#, 1", 1:4 S7/* 24, 292, citing SaldaFa v. City o! Iloilo2 1# 'hil. 4", 99 @1("B$ [S==
*ngeles niversity 3oundation v. City o! *ngeles, ./. 0o. 1", Cune 4:, 414, 3irst >ivision,
Aillarama 5 4here the issue pertained to the validity o! building permit !ees.$
T( 4#4#n% "(85 was imposed in the exercise of the State?s inherent power of taxation. [See Republic
v. CC3E+2 ./. 0o. 1#:24)2#, >ecember 1#, 41, 9:4 S7/* #24, #"4)"#$
Ta6 E6()+#n* 5 may be constitutional [*rticle A%, Section 4"[9$ 5 churches, etc. 5 [)ladoc v. CIR, 1#
S7/* 44$ or statutory [*rticle A%, Section 4"[#$ ) concurrence of a majority of all the members of
congress required for laws granting tax exemptions$. ) Ghere the tax exemption is granted &rtuitousl(,
it may be validly revo&ed at will, with or without cause BUT if the exemption is granted for a valuable
consideration, it parta&es of the nature of a contract and the obligation is protected against impair ment
[Casanova v. Hord, " 'hil. 14($
T( BILL OF RIGHTS
/ue Process nd E1ul Protection
5
Person 5 ll persons, nturl as well as rtificil, are covered- including liens ['illegas v. Hiu Chong
sai ,ao Ho , "2 S7/* 4:$ 5 *rtificial persons are cover ed but only insof ar as their prope rty is
concerned. [Smith Bell & Co. v. 1atividad , # 'hil. 192$
/epri%tion 5 to ta&e away forcibly- to prevent from possessing, enjoying or using something.
D()!+8a+#n per se is not necessarily unconstitutional- what is prohibited is deprivation of life, liberty or
property without due process of lw.
Life connotes in the first place the integrity of the physical person. %t can be validly claimed by law, as in
the imposition of the death penalty [for a heinous offense, not for a petty offense$ or when a person is
required to render personal military service.
The compulsory steriliEation of incurable hereditary imbeciles was considered all right since the operation
only involved +a minimum of pain, or none at all. [ Buc# v. Bell, 4:# !S 4$ ) The S7 considered as
confisctor( a municipal ordinance prohibiting the construct ion on residential land of any building that
might obstruct the view of the public plaEa from the highway. [,eople v. 3a>ardo, 1# S7/* ##9$
Su#stnti%e /ue Process 5 requires the intrinsi c validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the
person with respect to his life, liberty and property. R(=%+!((n* 5 [1$ the law must have a valid
governmental objective, i.e., the inter ests of the publi c generally as distinguished from those of a
particular class require the intervention of the State- and [4$ the objective must be pursued in a lawful
manner- the means employed must be reasonably related to the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive.
* law prohibiting the sale of mil& for less than the specified minimum or floor price, to prevent the
lowering of the quality of mil& sold in the mar&et, upheld as valid. [ 1ebbia v. State o! 1e4 "or# , 41 !S
(4$ * law was annulle d as violative of substantive due process where it was show n that the rates
prescribed by it for railroad companies, while allowing them some profit, did not permit them a
reasonable
11"$ return of
* municipal their investments.
ordinance [ Chicago2
required all laundry Mil4au#ee & St. to
est ablishments ,aul Rail4ay
issue their v. Minnesotta
receipts , 19# !S
in =nglish or
Spanish. "lid, as the measure see&s to protect the public from deceptions and misunderstandings.
[-4ong Sing v. City o! Manila , #1 'hil. 19$ * law prohibited merchants from maintaining its boo&s of
accounts in any language other than =nglish, Spanish or any other local dialect. In%lid because it
prevented merchants from using other languages, including their own. [ "u Cong Eng v. rinidad , 4:1
!S ($ ) * criminal investigation underta&en by an agency which, under the law, is li&ewise responsible
for the conduct of a preliminary investigation leading to a criminal prosecu tion would not be violative of
due process. [Concio v. +(, ./. 0o. 1:((:, Canuary 4, 4"$ ) 0o violation of due process when
an investigating prosecutor files an information or dismisses a complaint cogniEable by the ;T77
without first requiring the submission of counter)affidavits. [Borlongan v. ,ena , ./. 0o. 1#9(1,
0ovember 49, 4:$ ) * reevaluation does not necessita te the introduction of new materials for review
nor does it requir e a full hearing for new argumen ts. %n this light, the respondent has been given the
opportunity to be heard by the ><6 = Secretary. [ 1*SEC /uards *ssociation v. 1ational Service
Corporation, ./. 0o. 12(##4, *ugust 4(, 41$
* law which imposes a 9)month cap on the claim of <3Gs with an unexpired portion of one year or more
in their contracts, but none on the claims of other <3Gs or local wor&ers with fixed)term employment, is
violative of subs tantive due pr ocess. @ *lso violative o! the e5ual protection clause G suspect
classi!ication.B [Serrano v. /allant Maritime Services2 Inc ., ./. 0o. 12:21#, ;arch 4#, 4$
The conce pt of +vested right is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process that
expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary
state action- it inclu des not only legal or equitable title to the enfor cement of a demand but also
exemptions from new oblig ations created after the right has become veste d. /ights are considered
vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and
irrefutable. [Heirs o! *rcadio Castro Sr. v. )ozada ) ./. 0o. 12942, *ugust 4, 414, 3irst >ivision,
Aillarama$ Ghile one may not be deprived of his +vested right, he may lose the same if there is due
process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence. [ ?uiao v. ?uiao ) ./. 0o 1:2((2,
Culy #, 414, Second >ivision, /eyes$
Procedurl /ue Proc ess ) The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential
elements of due process and neither of these elements can be eliminated without running afoul of the
constitutional guaranty. ) *udicil /ue Process 5 [1$ impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the case- [4$ jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person and the
6
property subject of the proce eding proper service of summons- [9$ defend ant must be given an
opportunity to be heard- [#$ judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
TJ= *G*/> <3 (I ;<0TJ6M %0T=/=ST /*T= is not supported both by the allegations in the
pleadings and the evidence on record. xxx %t violated the due process requirement because respondents
were not informed of the possibility that the /T7 may award (I monthly interest. They were deprived of
reasonable opportunity to refute and present controverting evidence as they were made to believe that
the complainant petitioner was see&ing for what she merely stated in her 7omplaint. [ +iona v. Balangue )
./. 0o. 1:9((, Canuary :, 419, Second >ivision, del 7astillo$
R+ # a))(a" lost through neglect- no denial of due process. [ )obete v. Sundiam , 149 S7/* ($
R+ # A))(a" is not essential to a right to a hearing- may be deprived except for *rt. A%%%,[($,[4$, on the
minimum appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme 7ourt. ) The ri&ht to cross2exmine is no t an
indispensable aspect of due process. 7learly, the right to cross)examine a witness, although a
fundamental right of a party, may be waived. [ E5uitable ,CIBan#ing Corporat ion v. RCBC Capital
Corporation, ./. 0o. 1"44#", >ecember 1", 4"$
C#%n*(" as&ed for reinvestigation and as&ed to defer proceedings until reinvestigation was concluded-
judge said trial should proceed- counsel did not participate- on appeal, trial was set aside- +serious
irregularity 5 violative of due process [ ,eople v. Beriales, : S7/* 921$
Instances 4hen notice o! hearing may be validly omitted 4ithout violating due process 5 cancellation of a
passport of a fugitive from justice- prevent ive suspension of a civil servant- distraint of property for tax
delinquency- padloc&ing of unsanitary restaurant or movie theaters showing obscene movies- nuisances
per se. ) N%+*an4( per se 5 objectionable under any circumstance because it presents an immediate
danger to the welfare of the community 5 mad dog 5 may be abated without necessity of judicial
authoriEation. ) N%+*an4( per ccidens 5 objectionable only under som e but not all circums tances. *
nuisance per accidens may be summarily abat ed if autho riEed by law, provi ded the nuisance per
accidens is of trifling value only. [ )a4ton v. Steele , 1( 4 !S 19 9$ On"5 nuisances per se may be
summarily abated. [Civil Code2 *rticle 7:$ *n industrial waste processing plant is not a nuisance per se.
*ccordingly,#(
(ovellanos2 its S7/* "($ may be ordered stopped only after judicial proceedings. [ ,arayno v.
operations
* mar&et stall not affected by a recent fire is not a public nuisance and may not be abated without judicial
proceedings [*silo v. ,eople, / 0o. 1(1:)1", ;arch 411$
7learly, when Custice ancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or the city
engineer did not consider the building, or its demolish ed portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons
and property. This fact alone should have warned the ;;>* against summarily demolishing the
structure. N(+(! #(* ( MMDA a8( ( )#/(! # (4"a!( a +n a n%+*an4($ On"5 4#%!* #- "a/
a8( ( )#/(! # ((!+n( /((! a +n +* a n%+*an4( . [*C Enterprises v. 3rabelle ,roperties
Corp., [./. 0o. 122:##, 4 0ovember 42, (2 S7/* 24(, 22)221$ [ /ancayco v. City /overnment o!
?uezon City ) ./. 0o. 1::":, <ctober 11, 411, En Banc, Sereno$
/espondents? fence is not a nuisance per se . 8y its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of
the community. %t was built primar ily to secure the propert y of respondents and preve nt intruders from
entering it. *nd as correctly pointed out by respondents , the sidewal& still exists. %f petitioner believes
that respondents? fence indeed encroaches on the sidewal&, it may be so proven in a hearing conducted
for that purpose. 0ot being a nuis ance per se, but at most a nuisance per accidens, its summary
abatement without judicial intervention is unwarranted. [ )ucena /rand Central erminal2 Inc. v. (*C
)iner2 Inc ., ./. 0o. 1#"9 9, 3ebr uary 49, 4(, #(4 S7/* 1:#, 11, cit ed in ,erez v. Spouses
Madrona and ,ante 9 ./. 0o. 1"##:", ;arch 41, 414, 3irst >ivision, Aillarama$
Aiolation of due process is a personal de!ense that can only be asserted by the persons whose rights
have been allegedly violated. [ 1apere v. Barbarona, ./. 0o. 12#42, Canuary 91, 4"- Carandang v.
Heirs o! ?uirino *. +e /uzman, ./. 0o. 129#:, 0ovember 4, 42, (" S7/* #2, #"$
E1ul Protection 5 * flight attendant is dismissed for being fat. 'rivate actions cannot violate the equal
protection guarantee. The equal protection clause does not apply to private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful. ["rasuegui v. ,hilippine *ir )ines, ./. 0o. 12""1, <ctober 1:, 4"$
Re1uirements for "lid Clssifiction ) [1$ substantial distinctions [4$ germane to the purpose of the
law [9$ must not be limited to existing conditions only [#$ must apply equally to all members of the class.
7
>1: S%.*an+a" D+*+n4+#n* ) cannot be based on color of attire or of vehicles, emotions, shape or
color of eyesKcan be based on height, weight, health [lepers$, age, allegiance or citiEenship. ) ?@ 5(a!
#"* not allowed to run for same office from which they have retired. Aalid. [ +umlao v. CME)EC, (
S7/* 94$ ) The classification of cities as +"5 %!.an+&( 4++(* if they had an annual revenue of '#
;illion and all others as component cities is valid. use. [ Ceniza v. CME)EC, 2 S7/* :29$ RA ?0,
which authoriEes the <mbudsman to impose a six)month preventive suspension, instead of the civil
service provisions of the *dministrative 7ode, which limits the disciplining authority?s prerogative to only
imposing a prevention suspension for a period not exceeding days, does not violate the equal
protection guarantee. Substantial distinctions exist. [/obenciong v. Court o! *ppeals , ./. 0o. 1(""9,
;arch 91, 4"$ There is a substantial distinction between appointive and elective officials. [?uinto v.
CME)EC, ./. 0o. 1"2", >ecember 1, 4, [;/$ 3ebruary 44, 41, 'uno$ E6(4%+8( O!(! N#$
1 should be struc& down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned
truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth +concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration only. [Biraogo v. he ,hilippine ruth Commission o! 9; ,
./. 0o. 149(, >ecember 1, 41$ * substantial distinction exists between municipalities with
pending 7ityhood bills prior to the subsequent passage of a law increasing the revenue requirem ent of
cities [to '1T$ and those which see& 7ityhood on the basis of the new law. [ )eague o! Cities o! the
,hilippines v. CME)EC, ./. 0o. 1:2(1, *pril 14, 411$
The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same
protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place in li&e circumstances.
Thus, the guarantee of the equal protection of laws is not violated if there is a reasonable classification.
3or a classification to be reasonable, it must be shown that @1B it rests on substantial distinctions- @4B it is
germane to the purpose of the law- @9B it is not limited to existing conditions only- and @#B it applies
equally to all members of the same class. [ ,hilippine Rural Electric Cooperatives *ssociation2 Inc. v.
+I)/, #(1 'hil. 2"9 @49B$ !nfortunately, 7;< 4:)49 does not meet these requirements. Ge do not
see how the quality of wheat is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it
came from. Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from 7;< 4:)49 have imported food
grade wheat, the product would still be declared as feed grade wheat, a classification subjecting them to
:I tariff.
wheat, <n would
they the other hand,
only even ifto
be made thepay
importers listed
9I tariff, under
thus 7;< 4:)49
depriving have
the state of imported
the taxesfeed
due.grade
The
regulation, therefore, does not become disadvant ageous to respondent only, but even to the state.
[Commissioner o! Customs v. Hypermi% 3eeds Corporation ) ./. 0o. 1:(:, 3ebruary 1, 414,
Second >ivision, Sereno$
The subject clause contains a suspect classi!ication in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits
of fixed)term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 9)month cap on the claim of <3Gs
with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other <3Gs or
local wor&ers with fixed)term employment. The subject clause single s out one classification of <3Gs
and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage. [ Serrano v. /allant Maritime Services2 Inc ., ./. 0o.
12:21#, ;arch 4#, 4$
/epublic *ct 0o. 424 has been upheld by the Supreme 7ourt as against a challenge as to its
constitutionality on the ground of its purported violation of the equal protection clause, as it applies only
to women, and not to men. The 7ourt cited +the unequal power relati onship between women and men
and +the fact that women are more li&ely than men to be victims of violence, not to mention +the
widespread gender bias and prejudice against women as basic distinctions between women and men
which justify the +classification under the law. [/arcia v. +rilon, ./. 0o. 1:42:, Cune 4(, 419$
>2: G(!an( # ( P%!)#*( #- ( La/ 9 E6a)"(* 5 there are substantial distinctions between men
%. women with respect to the performance of hard labor as against passing grades in examinations, or
between forei&n %. locl crs with respect to taxes, but not in the context of traffic violations.
>3: M%* n# .( "++( # (6+*+n 4#n ++#n* #n"5 9 The classification must be enforced not only for
the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected exists. ) * law prohibited members of non)
7hristian tribes form drin&ing liquor, on the ground that their low degree of culture and their unfamiliarity
with this &ind of drin& rendered them more susceptible to its effects as compared to more civiliEed
countrymen who were not affec ted by it. 6aw S!ST*%0=>. [ ,eople v. Cayat, 2" 'hil. 14$ ) * tax was
limited only to <rmoc Sugar 7ompany [specifically named in the ordinance$, which was then the only
sugar company in the area. 7lassification not limited to existing conditions, as the tax measure would not
be applicable to similar companies which may be established in the same taxing jurisdiction in the future.
[rmoc Sugar Co.2 Inc. v. reasurer o! rmoc City, 44 S7/* 29$
8
>: M%* a))"5 (=%a""5 # a"" (.(!* #- ( 4"a**$ 9 The classification will be regarded as invalid if all
the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
The law can treat #rn&( officils differently from other local elective officials because the
7onstitution itself provides a significant distinction between these elective officials with respect to length
of term and term limitation. [CME)EC v. Cruz, ./. 0o. 1"2212, 0ovember 4, 4$
SE0RC8ES nd SEI94RES
* search warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action or the commencement of a
prosecution. The proceeding is not one against any person, but is solely for the discovery and to get
possession of personal property. %t is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made
necessary because of public necessit y. %t resembles in some respect with what is commonly &nown as
Cohn >oe proceedings. Ghile an application for a search warrant is entitled li&e a criminal action, it does
not ma&e it such an action. * search warrant is a legal process which has been li&ened to a writ of
discovery employed by the State to procure relevant evidence of crime. %t is in the nature of a criminal
process, restricted to cases of public prosecutions. * search warrant is a police weapon, issued under
the police power. * search warrant must issue in the name of the State, namely, the 'eople of the
'hilippines. * search warrant has no relation to a civil process. %t is not a process for adjudicating civil
rights or maintaining mere private rights. %t concerns the public at large as distinguished from the ordinary
civil action involving the rights of private persons . %t may only be applied for in the furtherance of public
prosecution. [nited )aboratories2 Inc. v. Isip @( 'hil. 9#4 @4(BB, at 9(:)9("$
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a
search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. %t would thus
categoriEe what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as
equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in speci!ic courts of indicated
competence. %t ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search
warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action. 3or, indeed, a warrant,
such
in ouras a warrantas
jurisdiction of an
arrest or in
order a writing
search issu
warrant,
ed inmerely constitutes
the name process.
of the 'eople * search
of the warrant
'hilippines is defined
signed by a
judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it
before the court. * search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process a&in to a writ of discovery. %t is a
special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.
[Malaloan v. Court o! *ppeals ) ./. 0o. 1#":, ;ay 2, 1#, 494 S7/* 4#, cited in ,)+ v. H,S
So!t4are and Communication Corporation ) ./. 0o. 1:2# , >ecember 1, 414, 3irst >ivision,
6eonardo)de 7astro$
Since a search warrant proceeding is not a criminal action, it necessarily follows that the requirement set
forth in Section (, /ule 11 of the /ules on 7riminal 'rocedure which states that Lall criminal actions
either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of
a public prosecutorL does not apply. [ ,)+ v. H,S So!t4are and Communication Corporation ) ./. 0o.
1:2#, >ecember 1, 414, 3irst >ivision, 6eonardo)de 7astro$
* private individual or a private corporation complaining to the 08% or to a government agency charged
with the enforcement of special penal laws, such as the 83*>, may appear2 participate and !ile
pleadings in the search warrant proceedings to mintin2 inter alia2 the validity o! the search 4arrant
issued by the court and the dmissi#ilit( o! the properties seized in anticipation of a criminal case to be
filed- such private party may do so in collaboration with the 08% or such government agency. The party
may !ile an opposition to a motion to 5uash the search warran t issued by the court, or a motion !or the
reconsideration of the court order granting such motion to quash. [ nited )aboratories2 Inc. v. Isip ./.
0o. 121(2, 3ebruary 1(, 4:, (12 S7/* 24, at 2")2 , cite d in ,)+ v. H,S So!t4are and
Communication Corporation ) ./. 0o. 1:2#, >ecember 1, 414, 3irst >ivision, 6eonardo)de 7astro$
AVAILABE to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of crime or not [ Moncado v. ,eople=s Court,
" 'hil. 1$, and even corporations [ Stonehill v. +io#no , 4 S7/* 9"9$, although they may be required to
open their boo&s of accounts for examination by the State in the exercise of the police power or the
power of taxation. The guaranty may be invo&ed by a person inside a phone booth @eaves dropping on
an accused in a public phone booth 5 unless with a warrant 5 is illegalB [ -atz v. S , 9" !S 9#:$, or
even by &nown criminals or fugitives 5 one cannot just force his way into any man?s house on the illegal
orders of a superior, however lofty his ran&. [ *lih v. Castro, 1(1 S7/* 4:$
9
RE:4ISITES for %lid Serch Wrrnt or Wrrnt of 0rrest 5 [1$ %t must be based on probable
cause. [4$ 'robable cause must be determined personally by the judge. [9$ The determination must be
made after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
[#$ The warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seiEed.
The production order under the A)a!# R%"( should not be confused with a search warrant for law
enforcement under *rticle %%%, Section 4 of the 1": 7onstitution. [ Secretary o! 1ational +e!ense v.
Manalo2 ./. 0o. 1"2, <ctober :, 4"$ * #n) in1uir( order, under Section 11 of the AMLA, is
not a search warrant or warrant of arrest as it contemplates a direct object but not the seiEure of persons
or property. [Republic o! the ,hilippines v. Eugenio, ./. 0o. 1:#24, 3ebruary 1#, 4"$
[1$ Pro##le cuse ) There is a distinction between the preliminr( in1uir(, which determines probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arre st, and the preliminr( in%esti&tion proper, which
ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination of probable
cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation
proper 5 whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged 5 is the function of the investigating prosecutor. [,eople v. /abo2 ./. 0o. 121"9, *ugust 9,
41$
R%"(* #- C#%!, R%"( 12?, S(4+#n 3 5 each warrant should refer only to one specific offense.
Exmples of in%lid wrrnts 2 * warrant which alleges violations of 78 circulars, Tariff and 7ustoms
laws, the %nternal /evenue 7ode and the /evised 'enal 7ode [ Stonehill v. +io#no, 4 S7/* 9"9$, or for
four separate and distinct offenses [ *sian Surety & Insurance v. Herrera, (# S7/* 914$, or for +illegal
traffic in narcotics and contraband [ Castro v. ,abalan, : S7/* #::$, or a sctter2shot wrrnt, for
robbery, theft, qualified theft or =stafa [ ,eople v. C*, 412 S7/* 11$ ) +hordin& of used bottles is not
a crime or offense. [ Coca0Cola Bottlers ,hils.2 Inc. v. /omez , ./. 0o. 1(##1, 0ovember 1#, 4"$ ) %t
is quit e obvious then that their cause of action arose out of the intrusion into their est#lished
&oodwill
Search involving
warrant the two
%0A*6%>. motorcycle
[Hon 1e Chan models and
v. Honda not Co.2
Motor patent
)tdinfr.,ingement. 0o offense
./. 0o. 1:4::(, specified.
>ecember 1,
4:$
[4$ Pro##le cuse must #e determined personll( #( the jud&e . ) Garrants of arrest may be issued
by dministrti%e uthorities only for the purpose of carrying out a finl findin& of %ioltion of lw ,
li&e an order of deportation or an order of contempt, and not for the sole purpose of investigation or
prosecution. [Board o! Commissioners v. de la Rosa , 1: S7/* "(9$
[9$ T( ((!+na+#n %* .( a( a-(! (6a+na+#n %n(! #a #! a--+!a+#n #- (
4#)"a+nan an ( /+n(**(* ( a5 )!#%4($ 9 @/egional Trial 7ourt$ judges need not personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses for purposes of determining probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest [ Soliven v. Ma#asiar , 12: S7/* 99$ =valuation of the documents relevant to
probable cause must be done personally by the [/T7$ judge. [Enrile v. Salazar, 1"2 S7/* 41:$
*ffidavit based on +reliable information 5 +correct to the best of his &nowledge and belief 5 cannot be
used as basis for a search warrant [ *lvarez v. C3I, 2# 'hil. 99$ ) ;ere affidavits not enough to issue a
serch wrrnt- judge must ta&e depositions in writing and attach them to the record as these are
necessary to determine the existence of probable cause. [Mata v. Bayona, 14" S7/* 9""$
[#$ The /a!!an %* )a!+4%"a!"5 (*4!+.( ( )"a4( # .( *(a!4( an ( )(!*#n* #! +n* #
.( *(+&($ 9 *ohn /oe warrants are generally not valid [ Common4ealth v. Crotty, 1 *llen @;ass.B #9$
but a warrant against a (ohn +oe described in the same as the +person occupying and in control of a
building at a specified address was considered valid. [ ,eople v. 'eloso , #" 'hil. 12$ ) * description of a
place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended. [ ,eople v. 'eloso , #" 'hil. 12$ ) * search warrant need not identify with
particularity the person against whom it is directed- it suffices that the place to be searched and things to
be seiEed are described. [,eople v. )agman, ./. 0o. 12"2(, >ecember ", 4"$
T( CA (" a ( )!#4((+n* before the ;a&ati /T7 and the ;untinlupa /T7 are separate and
distinct. The object of the motion to quash search warrant, here filed by respondents 'astrana and *bad
with the ;a&ati /T7, the issuing court, was to test the validity of its issuance, given that the warrant was
made to cover several offenses rather than just one as the rules provide. <n the other hand, the object
of the ;untinlupa injunction case is to prevent the three agencies from using the seiEed articles in any
criminal proceeding against ;endoEa, et al . considering the S=7 and the 08%?s failure to immediately
10
turn over the seiEed articles to the court that issued the warrant as the rules require. 8ut Section 1# of
/ule 142 is clear. :uestions concernin& #oth ;< the issunce of the serch wrrn t nd =< the
suppression of e%idence sei'ed under it re mtters tht cn #e rised onl( with the issuin&
court if3 s in the present cse3 no criminl ction hs in the mentime #een filed in court .
[Securities and E%change Commission v. Mendoza ) ./. 0o. 1:#4(, *pril 49, 414, Third >ivis ion,
*bad$
>enerl wrrnts not allowed 5 +records pertaining to all business transactions. [ Stonehill v. +io#no, 4
S7/* 9"9$ ) +equipment used as means for comm itting offen ses ) n# a"" #/( 5 general warrant.
[Burgos v. Chie! o! Sta!! , 199 S7/* "$ ) +boo&s, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers
used by him in connection with his activities as money)lender, charging a usurious interest, in violation of
law 5 8a"+ description. [*lvarez v. C3I2 2# 'hil.99$ ) +documents, papers and other records of the
7''K0'*K0>3, such as minutes of the party meetings, plans of these groups, programs, list of possible
supporters, subversive boo&s and instructions, manuals not otherwise available to the public and support
money from foreign or local sources. 5 NOT VALID 5 vaguely described and not par ticulariEed. >oes
not specify, among others, what subversi ve boo&s and instructions, etc. [1olasco v. ,ano , 19 S7/*
1(4$
An(n ( *(4#n a!%(n, petitioner asserts that the nipa hut located about 4 meters away from his
house is no longer within the +permissible area that may be searched by the police officers due to the
distance and that the search warrant did not include the same nipa hut as one of the places to be
searched. The <S, on the other hand, argues that the cons titutional guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seiEure is applicable only against government authorities and not to private individuals
such as the barangay tanod who found the folded paper conta ining pac&s of shabu inside the nipa hut.
xxx. Javing been established that the assis tance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police
authorities who effected the searched warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of
persons in authority. 8y virtue of the abov e provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay
tanods were acting as agents of a person in authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search
conducted was unreasonable and the confi scated items are inadmi ssible in evidence. [ +el Castillo v.
,eople ) ./. 0o. 1"(14", Canuary 9, 414, Third >ivision, 'eralta$
Section ", /ule 142 of the /ules of 7ourt allows the absence of the lawful occupant provided that two
witnesses are present.
Section ". Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses.
N 0o search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of
the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.
The presence of the two barangay officials was not disputed by petitioner. xxx. /esulta ntly, the seiEed
items cannot, therefore, be considered as Lfruits of the poisonous tree.L [ 'alleno v. ,eople ) ./. 0o.
14(, Canuary , 419$
Wrrntless 0rrests3 Serches nd Sei'ures 2 /ules of 7ourt, /ule 119, Section ( 5 a peace officer
or even a private person may, /+#% a /a!!an, a!!(* a person [1$ when such person has in fact just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presen ce- [4$ when an
offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal &nowledge of facts indicating that the
person tofrom
escaped be arrested
a penal has com mittedorit-place
establishment or [9$where
whenhethe
is person
serving to bejudgment
final arrested or
is atemporarily
prisoner who has
confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. [@1B
rrest in fl&rnte delicto, @4B rrest effected in hot pursuit, and @9B rrest of escped prisoners$
An #--(n*( is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule
authoriEing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, lthou&h t distnce +in
this cse3 two meters or ?@ meters,, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once
to the scene thereof. @.S. v. 3ortaleza , 14 'hil. #:4 [1$- and .S. v. Samonte, 12 'hil. (12 [11$B
%n essence, Section (, par. @aB, /ule 119, requires that the accused be caught in !lagrante delicto or
caught in the act of committing a crime. [,eople v. Sucro, ./. 0o. 949, ;arch 1", 11$
S(4+#n @, R%"( 113 #- ( 1@ R%"(* #n C!++na" P!#4(%!( #(* n# !(=%+!( ( a!!(*+n
#--+4(!* # )(!*#na""5 /+n(** ( 4#+**+#n #- ( #--(n*( /+ (+! #/n (5(* . [*belita III v.
+oria2 ./. 0o. 1:2:4, 1# *ugust 4, (2 S7/* 44, 442)44:$ %t is sufficient for the arresting team
that they were monit oring the pay)off for a number of hours long enough for them to be informed that it
11
was indeed appellant, who was the &idnapper. This is equivalent to personal &nowledge based on
probable cause. [,eople v. yboco, ./. 0o. 1:"9, Canuary 1, 411$
Tipped informtion is sufficient pro##le cuse to effect a warrantless search only in cases involving
either a buy)bust operation or drugs in transit. [ ,eople v. Martinez , ./. 0o. 11922, >ecember 19,
41$
%n a #u(2#ust operation, the violator in fl&rnte delict o and the police officers conducting the
operation are not only authoriEed but duty)bound to apprehend the violator and to search him for
anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime. [ ,eople v. Macatingag ,
Canuary 1, 4, Canuary 1, 4$ The absence of evidence of a prior surveillance does not affect the
regularity of a buy)bust opera tion, especially when the buy)bust team members 4ere accompanied to
the scene by their in!ormant . [,eople v. de la Rosa, ./. 0o. 1"(122, Canuary 42, 411$
* buy)bust operation is not invalidated by mere non)coordination with the '>=*. [,eople v. *bedin )
./. 0o. 1:92, *pril 11, 414- ,eople v. 3undales ) ./. 0o. 1"#22, September (, 414$
* '<6%7= <33%7=/? S *7T <3 S<6%7%T%0 >/!S from appellant during the buy)bust operati on, or
what is &nown as the Ldeco( solicittion,L is not prohibited by law and does not invalidate the buy)bust
operation. [,eople v. Espiritu ) ./. 0o. 1"1, Canuary , 419$
The military arrested, without warrants, among others, [1$ a suspected rebel, bedridden because of a
bullet wound for subversion, which was considered by the military as a continuing offense [4$ a sleeping
man, who was hog)tied and bodily dumped into a police jeep for allegedly subversive remar&s made by
him the day before [another continuing offense$ [9$ a suspected murderer for a murder supposedly
committed y him 1# days earlier. 5 *rrests held valid by the S7. [mil v. Ramos, 1" S7/* 911$
T(!( %* -+!* .( a "a/-%" a!!(* .(-#!( a /a!!an"(** *(a!4 4an .( a( ) +the process cannot
be reversed. [ ,eople v2 Chua Ho San , 9" S7/* #94$ 0evertheless, a search substantially
contemporaneous
arrest at the outsetwith ansearch.
of the arrest can precede
[,eople the arrest
v. Racho if 0o.
, ./. the police
1"2(4,have probable
*ugust cause to ma&e the
9, 41$
S(4+#n 0 #- ( F#!(*!5 C#( authoriEes the forestry officer to arrest, even without a warrant, any
person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined by the 3orestry
7ode and to seiEe and confisc ate the tools and equipment used in committin g the offense or the forest
products gathered or ta&en by the offender. [Revaldo v. ,eople ) ./. 0o. 1:(", *pril 12, 4$
There was constructi%e possession of prohibited drugs even when the accused was not home when
the prohibited drugs were found in the master?s bedroo m of his house. [ ,eople v. orres , ./. 0o.
1:"9:, September 14, 42$ The wife cannot feign ignorance of the drugs? existence as she had full
access to the room, including the space under the bed. [,eople v. ira, ./. 0o. 1921(, ;ay 4", 4#,
#9 S7/* 19#$
The accused was in constructive possession of prohibited drugs which had been found in the drawer
located in her bedroom. [*buan v. ,eople, ./. 0o. 12"::9, <ctober 4:, 42$
There are xxx instances when a /a!!an"(** *(a!4 an *(+&%!( is val id, to wit D @1B consented
serches- @4B s n incident to lwful rrest - @9B serches of %essels nd ircrft for %ioltion of
immi&rtion3 customs3 nd dru& lws - @ #B serches of mo%in& %ehicles- @(B serches of
utomo#iles t #orders or constructi%e #orders- @2B where the prohi#ited rticles re in “plin
%iewA! @:B serches of #uildin&s nd premises to enforce fire3 snitr(3 nd #uildin& re&ultions-
and @"B + stop nd fris)! opertions @T(!!5 *(a!4B. [,eople v. )opez, ./. 0o. 1"1:#:, September
42, 4"- see also Epie2 (r. v. lat0Marredo , ./. 0o. 1#"11:, ;arch 44, 4:, (1" S7/* 2#1, 2#2.$
*6S< customs serches and exi&ent nd emer&enc( circumstnces . [,eople v. /onzales , #1:
'hil. 9#4, 9(: @41B$ [ ,eople v. +e5uina , ./. 0o. 1::(:, Canu ary 1, 411- see also ,eople v.
Racho, ./. 0o. 1"2(4, *ugust 9, 41 and Malacat v. C*, 4"9 S7/* 1($ Wa!!an"(** *(a!4(*
an *(+&%!(* a +"+a!5 4(4)#+n* valid 5 justified on the basis of the right of the State to protect
itself. >issentD the bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of national security
ignores the fact that the 8ill of /ights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if
asserted on the ground of national security. [ 'almonte v. de 'illa, 1: S7/* 4(2$ T+))( +n-#!a+#n
+n .%59.%* #)(!a+#n* #! 4a*(* +n8#"8+n !%* +n !an*+ . [,eople v. Martinez , ./. 0o. 11922,
>ecember 19, 41$
M#8+n V(+4"(* 9 such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe prior to the search that they would
12
find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. @0 tip from n
informnt constitutes pro##le cuse.B [,eople v. uazon , ./. 0o. 1:(:"9, September 9, 4:$ ) Tip
was given one wee& before the warrantless search of a vehicle. The Supreme 7ourt said the
warrantless search was valid. eehan#ee dissented saying there 4as enough time to obtain a 4arrant .
[,eople v. C3I o! Rizal 5 (esse Hope , 11 S7/* "2$ ) BIC'CLE ) Curisprudence defines +transport as
+to carry or convey from one place to another. %n the instant case, appellant was riding his bicycle when
he was caught by the police. Je admitted that he was about to convey the pac&a ge, which contained
marijuana, to a certain Cimmy onEales. Garrantless arrest justified. [,eople v. ,ena!lorida, ./. 0o.
1:(2#, *pril 1, 4"$ ) The search in this case is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or
prohibited drugs was about to leave. '<4 'allayoc had to ma&e a quic& decision and act fast. %t would be
unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting the search under the circumstances.
Time was of the essence in this case. The searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. %ndeed, he
only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination. [ ,eople v. Mariacos ,
./. 0o. 1""211, Cune 2, 41$
In "a/-%" a!!(** , it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a
wrrntless serch not onl( on the person of the suspect3 #ut lso in the permissi#le re within
the ltterBs rech . <therwise stat ed, a valid arres t allows the seiEure of evidence or dangerous
weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase
Lwithin the area of his immediate controlL means the area from within which he might gain possession of
a weapon or destructible evidence. ['aleroso v. Court o! *ppeals, ./. 0o. 12#"1(, 9 September 4,
(" S7/* #1, (()(2 citing ,eople v. Cueno , 9( 'hil. 1(1, 129 @1"B- ,eople v. Cubcubin2 (r ., id. at
4:1- ,eople v. Estella, ##9 'hil. 22, 2"9 @49B$Therefore, it is only but expected and legally so for the
police to search his car as he was driving it when he was arrested. [ ,eople v. yboco, ./. 0o. 1:"9,
Canuary 1, 411$
-irst, (!( /a* n# 8a"+ a!!(* #- )(++#n(!$ Ghen he was flagged down for committing a traffic
violation, he was not, ipso !acto and solely for this reason, arrested. xxx Second, (!( .(+n n# 8a"+
a!!(*, ( /a!!an"(** *(a!4 a !(*%"( -!# + /a* "+(/+*( +""(a"$ 666 %t must be noted that
the evidence
actually seiEed,
concealed although
inside alleged
a metal to be inside
container inadvertently discovered,
petitioner?s poc&et. was not the
7learly, in +plain view.was
evidence %t was
not
immediately apparent. [See ,eople v. Macalaba, ##9 'hil. (2( @49B$ 0either was there a consented
warrantless search. 7onsent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing
evidence. [Caballes v. Court o! *ppeals , #4# 'hil. 429 @44B$ xxx 0either does the search qualify under
the +stop and fris& rule. Ghile the rule normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or
unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and fris& is
merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons. [ ,eople v. Sy Chua , ### 'hil. :(:
@49B$ xxx The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. Ghile he may have failed to object
to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not,
however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seiEed during the illegal warrantless arrest.
[,eople v. )apita>e , ##( 'hil. :4 @49B$ The subject items seiEed during the illegal arrest are
inadmissible. [,eople v. Martinez, ./. 0o. 11922, 19 >ecember 41$ The drugs are the very corpus
delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes
conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused. [ Id.$ [)uz v. ,eople ) . /. 0o. 1::"", 3ebruary 4,
414, Second >ivision, Sereno$
8elocura was caugh t in !lagrante delicto violating Section 91 of /epublic *ct 0o. #19 @The 6and
Transportation and Traffic 7ode 5 spurious government plateB. %n !lagrante delicto means in the very act
of committing the crime. To be caught in !lagrante delicto necessarily implies the positive identification of
the culprit by an eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such identification is a direct evidence of culpability,
because it Lproves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption.L [/o v. )eyte II
Electric Cooperative2 Inc., ./. 0o. 1:2, 3ebruary 1", 4", (#2 S7/* 1":, 1($ Chie! Insp. +ivi na
signaled !or Belocura to stop !or veri!ication but the latter ignored the signal and sped o!! to4ards Balut2
ondo. he team pursued Beloc ura=s >eep until they bloc#ed its path 4ith their amara4 3 vehicle2
!orcing Belocura to stop. *t this point2 Chie! Insp . +ivina and the rest o! the team approac hed the >eep
and introduced themselves to Belocura as policemen. Chie! Insp. +ivina 5ueried Belocura on the
government plate. S,; Ro>as con!iscated Belocura=s Berreta @ mm. pistol JSerial 1umber M;8KL
that 4as tuc#ed in his 4aist and its !ully loaded magaz ine 4hen he could not produc e the appropriate
documents !or the pistol and the government plate. hey arrested him. =ven by his own admission , he
was actually committing a crime in the presence or within the view of the arresting policemen. Such
manner by which 8elocura was apprehended fell under the first category in Section (, /ule 119 of the
/ules of 7ourt. The arrest was valid, therefore, and the arresting policemen thereby became cloa&ed
with the authority to validly search his person and effects for weapons or any other article he might use in
the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or might be used as evidence in the trial of the
13
case, and to seiEe from him and the area within his reach or under his control, li&e the jeep, such weapon
or other article. The evident purpose of the incidental search was to protect the arresting policemen from
being harmed by him with the use of a concealed weapon. *ccordingly, the warrantless character of the
arrest could not by itself be the basis of his acquittal. [ 'aldez v. ,eople, ./. 0o. 1:1", 0ovember 49,
4:, (9" S7/* 211$ [NOTE 5 accused was *7O!%TT=> because of inadequate testimonial evidence
5 the arresting officer who seiEed the marijuana bric&s was not presented to testify.$[ ,eople v. Belocura )
./. 0o. 1:9#:#, *ugust 4, 414, 3irst >ivision, 8ersamin$
V(**("* an A+!4!a- 9 Searches and seiEures without warrant of vessels and aircraft for violation of
customs laws are valid. [ Roldan v. *rca, 2( S7/* 992$
The essential element of the charge is the movement of the dangerous drug from one place to another.
%n this case, appellant was apprehended inside the airport, as he was intending to board his flight bound
for >avao 7ity with a substantial amount or 12.29 grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu
in his possession, concealed in separate plastic bags inside his oversiEed Spice rubber shoes. Ghile it
may be argued that appellant was yet to board the aircraft or travel some distance with the illegal drugs
in his possession, it cannot be denied that his presence at the airport at that particular instance was for
the purpose of transporting or moving the dangerous drugs from one place to another. [ ,eople v. )aba 5
./. 0o. 19", Canuary 4", 419$
P"a+n V+( / 9 The )"a+n 8+(/ #4!+n( applies when the following requisites concurD @aB the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position
from which he can view a particular area- @bB the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent-
@cB it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seiEure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully ma&e an initial
intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. %n the course of such
lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object
must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. [ Revaldo v. ,eople ) ./. 0o. 1:(", *pril
12, 4$ ) Jowever, if the pac&age proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transparency,
be or if its
seiEed. %n other contents
words, if theare obvious
pac&age is to an that
such observer, then the contents
an experienced observerare in plain
could inferview
fromand
its may
appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. %t must be
immediately apparent to the polic e that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seiEure. [ ,eople v. +oria2 /. 1(4, Canuary 44, 1$ The drum
alleged to have contained the methamphetamine was placed in the open bac& of the van, hence, open
to the e(e nd hnd of the 08% agents. The liquid)filled drum was thus within the plain view of the 08%
agents, hence, a product of a legal search. [,eople v. )agman, ./. 0o. 12"2(, >ecember ", 4"$
T(!!5 S(a!4In4+(n # a La/-%" A!!(* 9 Wa!!an"(** *(a!4 (8(n .(-#!( a!!(* is valid when an
officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close
range is presently dangerous to the officer or to others. [ erry v. hio , 9 4 !S 1$ In a "(++a(
/a!!an"(** a!!(*, the arresting police officers are authoriEed to search and seiEe from the offender @1B
any dangerous weapons and @4B the things which may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense. @'eople v. *yangao, ./. 0o. 1#49(2, *pril 1#, 4#, #4: S7/* #4", #99.B [ ,eople v. Bohol ,
./. 0o. 1:1:4, Culy 4", 4"$
S(a!4 [for concealed weapons and all unlawful articles$ in the course of a valid arrest is valid. [ *dams
v. $illiams, #: !S 1#9- see also ,eople v. 3igueroa, 4#" S7/* 2: and ,eople v. Salazar , 422 S7/*
2:$
%n this case, the prosecution has satisfactorily established that airport security officers found in the
person of petitioner the marijuana fruiting tops contained in rolled paper stic&s during the final security
chec& at the airport?s pre)departure area. 'etitioner at first refused to show the contents of his short
pants poc&et to Soriano who became suspicious when his hand felt the Lslightly bulgingL item while
fris&ing petitioner.
%n [,eople v. (ohnson #1 'hil. :9# @4B$, which also involved seiEure of a dangerous drug from a
passenger during a routine fris& at the airpo rt, this 7ourt ruled that such evidence obtained in a
warrantless search was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures xxx Ge find no
irregularity in the search conducted on petitioner who was as&ed to empty the contents of his poc&ets
upon the fris&er?s reasonable belief that what he felt in his hand while fris&ing petitioner?s short pants was
a prohibited or illegal substance. Such search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure,
14
which is allowed under Section of /.*. 0o. 249(. [ Sales v. ,eople ) ./. 0o. 1149, 3ebruary 2,
419$
A44#!+n # ( Rules of Court , personal property may be seiEed in connection with a criminal
offense either by authority of a search warrant or as the product of a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
%f the search is by virtue of a search warrant, the personal property that may be seiEed may be that which
is the subject of the offense- or that which has been stolen or embeEEled and other proceeds, or fruits of
the offense- or that which has been used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
[Section 9, /ule 142, Rules o! Court$ %f the search is an incident of a lawful arrest, seiEure may be made
of dangerous weapons or anything that may have been used or may constitute proof in the commission
of an offense. [Section 19, /ule 142, Rules o! Court$ [,hillipine +rug En!orcement *gency v. Brodett )
./. 0o. 129, September 4", 411, 3irst >ivision, 8ersamin$
The search of the contents of petitioner?s short pants poc&ets being a valid search pursuant to routine
airport security procedure, the illegal substance @marijuanaB seiEed from him was therefore admissible in
evidence. 'etitioner?s reluctance to show the contents of his short pants poc&et after the fris&er?s hand
felt the rolled papers containing marijuana, and his nervous demeanor aroused the suspicion of the
arresting officers that he was indeed carrying an item or material subject to confiscation by the said
authorities. [Sales v. ,eople ) ./. 0o. 1149, 3ebruary 2, 419, 3irst >ivision, Aillarama$
Wi%er ) An a!!(* may be made without a warrant where the right thereto is wi%ed by the person
arrested, provided he &new of such right and &nowingly decided not to invo&e it. [ ,eople v. abar, 444
S7/* 1##$ ) *n accused cannot question her arrest for the first time on appeal. [,eople v. Marcelino 2
./. 0o. 1"4:", Culy 42, 41$
The accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to raise such issue before
arraignment. Jowever, this waiver is limited only to the arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. * 4aiver o! an illegal 4arrantless arrest does not
carry 4ith it a 4aiver o! the inadmissibility o! evidence seized during the illegal 4arrantless arrest .
[,eople v. Martinez, ./. 0o. 11922, >ecember 19, 41$
Rules o! Court2 Rule ;;:2 Section 9K 5 postin& of #il will not result in wi%er of ri&ht to 1uestion
lwfulness of the rrest.
Wa 4#n*+%(* a !(a*#na."( #! %n!(a*#na."( /a!!an"(** *(a!4 or seiEure is purely a judicial
question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the
search or seiEure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seiEure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured. [ ,eople v.
1uevas, ./. 0o. 1:499, 3ebruary 44, 4:, (12 S7/* #29, #:2, cited in Sy. '. ,eople ) ./. 0o.
1"41:", *ugust 1(, 411, Third >ivision, 'eralta$
3urthermore, this 7ourt has consistently ruled that even if the arresting offic ers faile d to ta&e a
photograph of the seiEed drugs as required under Section 41 of /.*. 0o. 12(, such procedural lapse is
not fatal and will not render the items seiEed inadmissible in evidence. [ ,eople v. ctavio ) ./. 0o.
141, *pril 9, 419, Second >ivision, 'ereE$
The Ri&ht to Pri%c(
9ones of Pri%c( ) C#n*+%+#n 5 8ill of /ights 5 Section 1 )due process, equal protection, Section 4
)searches and seiEures, Section 2 ) liberty of abode- Section " ) freedom of association and Section 1: )
right against self)incr imination ) C+8+" C#( 5 0rt. = 5 every person shall respect the dignity, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of
meddling and prying into the privacy of another. ) 0rt. D= 5 holds a public officer or employee or any
private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person ) 0rt.
=D 5 recogniEes the privacy of letters and other private communications. ) R(8+*( P(na" C#( 5 A!$
22 5 ma&es a crime the violation of secrets by an officer ) *rt. 4" 5 trespass to dwelling ) A!$ 20922
5 the revelation of trade and industrial secrets ) S)(4+a" La/* 5 /* #4 *nti)Giretapping 6aw ) /*
1#( 5 Secrecy of 8an& >eposits *ct ) /* "49 5 %ntellectual 'roperty 7ode ) R%"(* #- C#%! 5 /ule
19, Sec. 4# 5 privileged communication
This statutory right to privacy will not prevent the courts from authoriEing an inquiry upon the fulfillment of
the requirements set forth under Section 11 of the AMLA [in instances where there is probable cause
that the deposits or investments are related to &idnapping for ransom, certain violations of the
7omprehensive >angerous >rugs *ct of 44, hijac&ing and other violations under /.*. 0o. 249(,
15
destructive arson and murder$ [ Republic o! the ,hilippines v. Eugenio , ./. 0o. 1:#24, 3ebruary 1#,
4"$
The provisions of /* 12( requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are
constitutional. %ndeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for
admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. Emplo(ees have a
reduced expectation of privacy. Gith respect to persons chr&ed before the public prosecutor?s office
with criminal offenses punishable with six @2B years and one @1B day imprisonment, a mandatory drug
testing can never be random or suspicionless. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a
blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of /* 12(. >rug testing in this case would violat e a persons? right to privac y guaranteed
under Sec. 4, *rt. %%% of the 7onst itution. Gorse still, the accused persons are veritably force d to
incriminte themsel%es. [Social (ustice Society v. +angerous +rugs Board 5 ./. 0o. 1(:":,
0ovember 9, 4"$ Section 92 of /.*. 0o. 12( provides that drug tes ts shall be perform ed only by
authoriEed drug testing centers. [1acague v. Sulpicio )ines , ./. 0o. 1:4(", *ugust ", 41$
'etitioner?s claim of violation of his const itutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. Jis other
argument invo&ing the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 9@1B, *rticle %%% of
the 1": 7onstitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate
intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government wor&place under the aforecited authorities.
xxx. *s already mentioned, the search of petitioner?s computer was justified there being reasonable
ground for suspecting that the files stored therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the
investigation being conducted by 7S7 as government employer of such misconduct subject of the
anonymous complaint. This situation clearly falls under the exception to the warrantless requirement in
administrative searches defined in <?7onnor. [ ,ollo v. Chairperson -arina Constantino0+avid ) ./.
0o. 1"1""1, <ctober 1", 411, =n 8anc, Aillarama$
7ompelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed ordinance is, thus, a
clear encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily includes their right to decide how best to
protect their property. %t also appears that requiring the exposure of their property via a see)thru fence is
violative of their right to privacy, considering that the residence of the 8enedictine nuns is also located
within the property. The right to privacy has long been considered a fundamental right guaranteed by the
7onstitution that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. The right to privacy is essentially the
right to be let alone [ /amboa v. Chan , ./. 0o. 19292, Culy 4#, 414, 2:: S7/* 9"(, 92, citing
Mor!e v. Mutuc , 19 'hil. #1( @12"B$ , as governmental powers should stop sho rt of certain int rusions
into the personal life of its citiEens. [ $hite )ight Corporation v. City o! Manila , ./. 0o. 144"#2, Canuary
4, 4, (:2 S7/* #12, at ##1, citing City o! Manila v. )aguio , #( 'hil. 4" @4(B$ %t is inherent in
the concept of liberty, enshrined in the 8ill of /ights @*rticle %%%B in Sections 1, 4, 9@1B, 2, ", and 1:, *rticle
%%% of the 1": 7onstitution. [ /amboa v. Chan, ./. 0o. 19292, Culy 4#, 414, 2:: S7/* 9"(, at 9:)
9", citing ple v. orres , 9(# 'hil. #" @1"B$ [ 3ernando v. St. Scholastica=s College ) ./. 0o.
1211:, ;arch 14, 419, En Banc, ;endoEa$
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the courts are
required to weigh both notions. %n these cases, alth ough considered a fundamental right, the right to
privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and
compelling. [/amboa v. Chan 0 ./. 0o. 19292, Culy 4#, 414$
Gith respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated [ 4ith the collect ion
and !or4arding o! in!ormation by the ,1, vis0N0vis the interest o! the state to dismantle private armies $,
suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. Ghile it is true that Section 41, *rticle A% of the
7onstitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not
every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. %n
Sabio v. /ordon , we have held that the right of the people to access information on matters of public
concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. %n that case, we
declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest.
=mploying the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Mor!e v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of
the individual?s right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this
case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating ban&ing transactions adequately
protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason
compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation. [ /amboa v. Chan 0 ./. 0o.
19292, Culy 4#, 414$
16
7ompelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed ordinance is, thus, a
clear encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily includes their right to decide how best to
protect their property. %t also appears that requiring the exposure of their property via a see)thru fence is
violative of their right to privacy, considering that the residence of the 8enedictine nuns is also located
within the property. The right to privacy has long been considered a fundamental right guaranteed by the
7onstitution that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. The right to privacy is essentially the
right to be let alone [ /amboa v. Chan , ./. 0o. 19292, Culy 4#, 414, 2:: S7/* 9"(, 92, citing
Mor!e v. Mutuc , 19 'hil. #1( @12"B$ , as governmental powers should stop sho rt of certain int rusions
into the personal life of its citiEens. [ $hite )ight Corporation v. City o! Manila , ./. 0o. 144"#2, Canuary
4, 4, (:2 S7/* #12, at ##1, citing City o! Manila v. )aguio , #( 'hil. 4" @4(B$ %t is inherent in
the concept of liberty, enshrined in the 8ill of /ights @*rticle %%%B in Sections 1, 4, 9@1B, 2, ", and 1:, *rticle
%%% of the 1": 7onstitution. [ /amboa v. Chan, ./. 0o. 19292, Culy 4#, 414, 2:: S7/* 9"(, at 9:)
9", citing ple v. orres , 9(# 'hil. #" @1"B$ [ 3ernando v. St. Scholastica=s College ) ./. 0o.
1211:, ;arch 14, 419, En Banc, ;endoEa$
0rticle III3 Section D F=< ) An5 (8+(n4( #.a+n( +n 8+#"a+#n #- +* #! ( )!(4(+n *(4+#n *a""
.( +na+**+."( -#! an5 )%!)#*( +n an5 )!#4((+n$ 9 The so)called =xclusionary /ule teaches that
evidence illegally obtained shall be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.
-reedom of Expression
-reedom from Censorship ) * radio station was denied a permit to operate pursuant to a new
ordinance converting its location into a commercial area. %t was, however, shown that said ordin ance
was passed to suppress said station?s criticisms against the local government. Curisprudence
distinguishes between a content2neutrl re&ultion, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the
speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards- and
a content2#sed restrint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the
utterance or speech. 7ontent)based laws are generally treated as more suspect than content)neutral
laws because of judicial concern with discrimination in the regulation of expression. 7ontent)neutral
regulations
scrutiny. of speech
<rdinance or of
held asconduct that mayrestraint.
content)based amount to%0A*6%>.
speech, are subject
[ 1e4 to lesser
Sounds but still heightened
Broadcasting 1et4or#2
Inc. v. +y , ./. 0os. 1:4: P 1:#11, *pril 4, 4$
;innesota shut down a paper for being a +public nuisance. !S S7D =ven +miscreant purveyors of
scandal, such as Cay ;. 0ear?s blatantly anti)Semitic Saturday 'ress, are protected from prior restraint.
Thus, a law which provides for the suppression of any periodical found, after hearing, on the basis of its
past issues, to be obscene, is %0A*6%>. [ 1ear v. Minnesota, 4"9 !S 2: @191B$ !S S7 upheld a law
which authoriEed the suppression of any issue of any periodical if and as such issue was found to be
objectionable fter judicil herin&, but without affecting the right of the periodical to continue
publication. The statu te was aimed again st issues alread y published, not again st future issue s.
[-ingsley Boo#s v. Bro4n , 9(# !S #92$ ) 0o political campaigns allowed except during the election
period. [/onzales v. CME)EC, 4: S7/* "9($
-reedom from Punishment ) 3reedom of expression does not cover ideas offensive to public order or
decency or the reputatio n of persons, whic h are all entitled to protection by the State. Thus, the lewd
word, the obscene word, the seditious word, the slanderous word, cannot be considered a +step to the
truth and therefore will not enjoy immunity from prohibition and punishment. [ hornhill v. *labama, 91
!S ""$
T( C"(a! an P!(*(n Dan(! R%"( 9 Custice 3ernando 5 the term cler seems to point to a causal
connection with the danger of the substantive evil arising from the utterance questioned. Present refers
to the time element. %t used to be identified with imminent and immediate danger. The danger must not
only be probable but very li&ely inevitable. [ /onzales v. CME)EC , 4: S7/* "9 ($ The cler nd
present dn&er rule is founded on the sme principles s Content2#sed Restrint. [Chavez v.
/onzales, ./. 0o. 12"99", 3ebruary 1(, 4"$
* 19)year old girl showed up in class with a blac& arm band to protest !S policy in Aietnam and was
suspended. Suspension set aside by the !S S7 ) +%t can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights Qat the schoolhouse gate. [in#er v. +es Moines Independent
School +istrict @12B, adopted in Malabanan v. Ramento , 14 S7/* 9( ) Students barred from re)
enrollment because they had participated in demonstrations. $l#nn affirmed, although some
students were not accepted for re)enrollment, not for participating in a rally but because of academic
deficiencies. ['illar v. echnological Institute o! the ,hilippines , 19( S7/* :2- see also 1on v. +ames ,
1"( S7/* (49$$
17
A )!+8a( +n+8+%a" may be the subject of public comment even if he is not a public official or at least a
public figure, as long as he is involved in a public issue. 5 the public?s primary interest is in the event.
[Rosenbloom v. Metromedia , #9 !S 4$
N(/*)a)(! )%."+4a+#n* tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily
punishable by the courts. This rule is otherwise after the case is ended. [,eople v. *larcon, 2 'hil. 42($
*ccused delivered inside an auditorium before less than a thousand persons a speech attac&ing various
political and racial groups while an angry crowd of about one thousand gathered outside to protest the
meeting and a number of disturbances occurred, created by the people outside not by the defendant.
7onvicted under an ordinance punishing +any improper noise, riot, disturbance, breach of the peace, or
diversion tending to the breach of the peace. 7onviction annulled. 5 a function of free speech is to
provide dispute. [erminiello v. City o! Chicago , 99: !S 1$ BUT in -einer %. ew Gor), [9# !S 91($,
the !S Supreme 7ourt upheld a statute forbidding spea&ing on public streets +with intent to provo&e a
breach of peace. %t found the accused to be guilty of a +genuine attempt to arouse the 0egro people
against the whites. 7hief Custice 7harles =vans writes for a unanimous 7ourt to overturn the conviction
of a 7ommunist, who had been arrested at a meeting to protest the police shooting of stri&ing
longshoremen. +'eaceable assembly for lawful disc ussion cannot be made a crime. [ S v. +ir# +e
(onge @19:B$ [0ote ) * (4"(!* 8(# occurs when an acting partyRs right to freedom of speech is
curtailed or restricted by the government in order to prevent a reacting partyOs behavior. The common
example is that of demonstrators @reacting partyB causing a speech @given by the acting partyB to be
terminated in order to preserve the peace. The best &nown case involving the hec&lerRs veto is probably
3einer v. 1e4 "or# [9# !.S. 91($, handed down by the Supreme 7ourt in 1(1. 7hief Custice 3red ;.
Ainson, writing for the majority, held that police officers acted within their power in arresting a spea&er if
the arrest was Lmotivated solely by a proper concern for the preservation of order and protection of the
general welfare.L %n /regory v. Chicago [9# !S 111$, Cus tice Jugo 8lac&, in a concurring opinion,
argued that arresting demonstrators as a consequence of unruly behavior of by)standers would amount
to a LJec&lerRs
the hec&lerRs veto. %t was
Aeto,L rejected
finding in Hill v. Colorado
Lgovernmental grants of[(9 !S to
power :9$ 2 where
private the Supreme
actorsL 7ourt rejected
to be Lconstitutionally
problematicL in cases where Lthe regulations allowed a single, private actor to unilaterally silence a
spea&erL$
Tests of o#scenit( 5 [1$ whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find the wor&, ta&en as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest- [4$ whether the wor& depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable law- [9$
whether the wor&, ta&en as a whole, lac&s serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. [ Miller v.
Cali!ornia, 9: 6. ed. #1$ ) O#scene magaEines cannot be summarily confiscated- a warrant must be
issued. [,ita v. C* , 1:" S7/* 924$ ) Ghere a language is categoriEed as indecent, as in petitioner?s
utterances on a general)patronage rated TA program, it may be readily proscribed as unprotected
speech. [Soriano v. )aguardia, ./. 0o. 12#:"(, *pril 4, 4$
!nprotected speech or low2%lue expression, refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography,
false or misleading advertisement, insulting or +fighting words, i.e., those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national
security. The 7ourt finds that petitioner?s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to
the average child. =ven if we concede that petitioner?s remar&s are not obscene but merely indecent
speech, still the 7ourt rules that petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free
speech. Said statements were made in a medium easily accessible to children. Gith respect to the young
minds, said utterances are to be treated as unprotected speech. [ Soriano v. )aguardia, ./. 0o. 12#:"(,
*pril 4, 4$
-reedom of 0ssem#l( 2 The use of public places for public meetings or rallies can only be reson#l(
re&ulted, and not #solutel( prohi#ited . C"(a! an )!(*(n an(! !%"( a))"+( . [,rimicias v.
3ugoso, " 'hil. :1P Reyes v. Bagatsing, 14( S7/* ((9$
BP B"$ 0 9 T( P%."+4 A**(."5 A4 #- 1@ ) * written permit shall be required for a public
assembly in a public place. Jowever, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done in
a freedom pr) dul( est#lished #( lw or ordinnce [centrally located within the poblacion 5 Section
1($ or in pri%te propert(, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required, or in the cmpus of &o%ernment2owned nd operted eductionl
institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulati ons of said educational institution. P#"++4a"
((+n* #! !a""+(* (" %!+n an5 ("(4+#n 4a)a+n )(!+# a* )!#8+( -#! .5 "a/ a!( n#
18
4#8(!( .5 +* A4 . [Section #$ The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application
/++n /# 2 /#!+n a5* -!# ( a( ( a))"+4a+#n /a* -+"(, -a+"+n /+4, ( )(!+ *a""
.( ((( !an(.
8.'. 0o. "" is a + content2neutrl regulation of the time, place , and manner of holding public
assemblies. 0either is the law overbroad. %t regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and
petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils 7ongress
has the right to prev ent. There is, li&ewise, no prior restrai nt, since the content of the spee ch is not
relevant to the regulation. The so)called cli#rted preempti%e response policy has no place in our
legal firmament and must be struc& dow n as a dar&ness that shro uds freedom. The delegation to the
mayors of the power to issue rally +permits is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally)sound
+clear and present danger standard. [Bayan v. Ermita, #"" S7/* 442$
TESTS 9 Purpose Test ) The test of a lawful assembly should be the purposes for which it is held,
regardless of the auspic es under which it is organiEed . +'eaceable assembly for lawful disc ussion
cannot be made a crime. %n this case, the conviction of a 7ommuni st, who had been arres ted at a
meeting to protest the police shooting of stri&ing longshoremen, was reversed by the !S Supreme 7ourt.
[+e (onge v. regon , 44 !S 9(9 @19:B$ 0uspices Test applied 5 a rally of the 7ommunist 'arty of
the 'hilippines was prohibited, because a fiscal had determined the 7'' to be an illegal association.
[Evangelista v. Earnsha4, (: 'hil. 4(($ 5 not yet formally abrogated in this jurisdiction.
/espondent was holding the position of Social %nsurance Specialist of the 7laims >epartment of
overnment Service %nsurance System @S%SB when she was administratively charged with rave
;isconduct andKor 7onduct 'rejudicial to the 8est %nterest of the Service for the following actsD 1.
Gearing red shirt and marching to or appearing at the office of the %nvestigation !nit in protest and to
support *tty. ;ario ;olina @*tty. ;olinaB and *tty. *lbert Aelasco @*tty. AelascoB- 4. 7onspiring with
other employees and temporarily leaving her wor&place, and abandoning her post and duties- 9.
8admouthing the security guards and the S%S management and defiantly raising clenched fists- and #.
7ausing alarm, frightening some employees, and disrupting the wor& at the %nvestigation !nit during
office hours.
%n this case, 7S7 found that the acts of respondents in going to the S%S)%! office wearing red shirts to
witness a public hearing do not amount to a concerted activity or mass action proscribed above. 7S7
even added that their actuations can be deemed an exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of
expression. The 7* found no cogent reason to deviate therefrom.
overnment wor&ers, whatever their ran&s, have as much right as any person in the land to voice out
their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. 7ivil Service does
not deprive them of their freedom of expression. %t would be unfair to hold that by joining the government
service, the members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be
reasonably regulated only but can never be ta&en away.
%n the rec ent case of /SIS v. -apisanan ng mga Manggaga4a sa /SIS [S%S, ./. 0o. 1:194,
>ecember 2, 42, (1 S7/* 244$, the 7ourt upheld the posit ion of petitioner S%S because its
employees, numbering between 9 and " each day, staged a wal&out and participated in a mass
protest or demonstration outside the S%S for four straight days. Ge cannot say the same for the 4 or
so employees in this case. To equate their wearing of red shirts and going to the S%S)%! office for just
over an hour with that four)day mass action in -apisanan ng mga Manggaga4a sa /SIS case and to
punish them in the same manner would most certainly be unfair and unjust.
/ecent analogous decisions in the !nited States, while recogniEing the governmentRs right as an
employer to lay down certain standards of conduct, tend to lean towards a broad definition of Lpublic
concern speechL which is protected by their 3irst *mendment. <ne such case is that of Scott v. Meters .
[11 3.9d "4 @4d 7ir. 1B$ %n said case, the 0ew Mor& Transit *uthority @0MT*B, responsible for
operation of 0ew Mor& 7ityRs mass transit service, issued a rule prohibiting employees from wearing
badges or buttons on their uniforms. * number of union members wore union buttons promoting their
opposition to a collective bargaining agreement. 7onsequently, the 0MT* tried to enforce its rule and
threatened to subject these union members to discipline. The court, though recogniEing the governmentRs
right to impose reasonable restrictions, held that the 0MT*Rs rule was Lunconstitutionally overboard.L
Thus, respondentsR freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and 7S7Rs /esolution 0o. 4)
1912 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action has only tempered or regulated these
rights. ;easured against that definition, respondentsR actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted
19
activity or mass action. The 7S7 and the 7* were both correct in arriving at said conclusion. [S%S v.
AillaviEa ) ./. 0o. 1"41, Culy 4:, 41$
%n said 0ovember 1(, 41 >ecision, this 7ourt ruled that complainants? concerted mass action was
actually a stri&e and not a legitimate exercise of their right to freedom of expression- that compla inants
violated the Canuary 1", 4 <rder of Secretary 6aguesma- that the union officers? dismissal was valid-
and that petitioners therein failed to present proof that the union members participated in the commission
of an illegal act during the said stri&e- hence, their dismissal was unjustified. [ Solid Ban# nion v.
Metropolitan Ban# and rust Company ) ./. 0o. 1(9:, September 1:, 414, Sec ond >ivision, del
7astillo$
-reedom of Reli&ion
R("a( P!#8+*+#n * +n ( C#n*+% +#n 9 'reambleK*rticle %%, Sec. 2Kestablishment clause [*rticle %%%,
Section ($ 5 *rticle A%, Section 4@4B ) state cannot set up a church [ Everson v. Board o! Education , 99
!S 1$- no part of the business of government to compose official prayers [ Engel v. 'itale, 9: !S #41$-
state may not require reading of bible verses [ +istrict o! *bington o4nship v. Schempp , 9:# !S 49$-
may not provide for the distribution of bibles through public teachers using government time [ udor v.
Board o! Education, 1# 0C 91$- BUT may allow religious instruction on released)time arrangement @with
obligation to ma&e up for lost timeB [ Lorach v. Clauson, 9#9 !S 92$ 5 *rticle %A, Section 9 @9B, on
optional religious instruction- or lend textboo&s to both public and parochial schools @ownership of the
boo&s remains with the stateB [Board o! Education v. *llen , 94 !S 492$- and even provide transportation
to students of both public and parochial schools [ Everson v. Board o! Education , 99 !S 1- +/eclrtion
of Pled&in& -ithfulness ) #ene%olent neutrlit( pproch ) gives room for accommodation of
religious exerc ises as requir ed by the 3ree =xerc ise 7laus e ) benevolent neutrality could allo4 !or
accommodation o! morality based on religion2 provided it does not o!!end compelling state interests ) the
state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the !ree e%ercise is not in!ringed any more than
necessary to achieve the legitimat e goal o! the state2 i.e.2 it has chosen a 4ay to achieve its legitim ate
state end that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties. Escritor=s con>ugal arrangement cannot
be penalized as she has made out a case !or e%emption !rom the la4 based on her !undamental right to
!reedom o! religion. [Estrada v. Escritor , *.;. 0o. ')4 )12(1, Cune 44, 42- see also Estrada v.
Escritor, *.;. 0o. ')4 )12(1, *ugust #, 49$. SEE ALSO *rticle A, Section 9[1$ 5 The State shall
defend the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood. ) D3or a Christian nation li#e ours2 such bestial act should never be
tolerated. 6,eople v. Bosi 0 /.R. 1o. ;@8KKQ2 (une 9Q2 9;92 Second +ivision2 Reyes<
The est#lishment cluse does not inhibit the use of public property for religious purposes when the
religious character of such use is merely incidental to a temporary use which is available indiscriminately
to the public in general, as in religious processions along public streets. [ ,eople v. 3ernandez, 7* . /.
0o. 6)114" @1#(B$ 0othing objectionable with respect to the use of private contributions for the purchase
of a religious image. [/arces v. Estenzo, 1# S7/* (1$
R("++#%* P!#-(**+#n an W#!*+) 9 /eligious profession and worship has a twofold aspect 5
freedom to #elie%e and freedom to ct on oneHs #eliefs. T( -+!* +* a.*#"%( a* "#n a* ( .("+(-
+* 4#n-+n( /++n ( !(a" #- # %$ T( *(4#n +* *%.<(4 # !("+ +#n /(!( ( .(" +(- +*
!an*"a( +n# (6(!na" a4* a a--(4 ( )%."+4 /("-a!( . [Cant4ell v. Connecticut, 91 !S 42$ 0o
license needed to sell 8ibles because to subject said activity to a license fee would be to impair the free
exercise of religious profession and worship, which includes the right to disseminate religious beliefs
[*merican Bible Society v. City o! Manila, 11 'hil. 9"2$ BUT a '1, A*T registration fee would not
constitute an impairment of religious freedom, because said registration fee is a mere administrative fee,
not one imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. [ olentino v. Secretary o!
3inance, 49( S7/* 29$
Ebralinag v. +ivision Superintendent o! Schools o! Cebu [41 S7/* 4(2 @19B$ upheld the religious
freedom of Cehovah?s Gitnesses and ruled that they could, if they so wished, refuse to salute the
'hilippine flag because of their religious belief that it is an +image.
R("++#%* T(** 9 * conscientious o#jector who refused, on religious grounds, to ta&e an oath which
contained a provision requiring service in the militia in times of war was considered morally unfit to
practice law. [In re Summers, 94( !S (21$ * conscientious o#jector may not refuse, by reason of his
religious beliefs, to render personal military or civil service, as required under *rticle %%, Section # of the
7onstitution. [,eople v. Losa, 9" < 12:2$
Li#ert( of 0#ode
20
* housemaid may transfer residence even if she had not yet paid the amount advanced by an
employment agency. [ Caunca v. Salazar , "4 'hil."(1$ To require non)7hristian tribes to reside in a
reservation, for their better education, advancement and protection, would be a valid exercise of the
police power. [Rubi v. ,rovincial Board o! Mindoro , ( 'hil. (($ * mayor deports women of ill0repute to
>avao. There is no showing that he was authoriEed to do so under any law. +<urs is a government of
laws, and not of men. [ 'illavicencio v. )u#ban, 9S7/* ::"$ The Supreme 7ourt has sustained an
administrative regulation, enacted pursuant to legislative authority, temporarily suspending the
deployment of 3ilipina domestics abroad on the ground of public safety. [ ,hil. *ssociation o! Service
E%porters v. +rilon, 129 S7/* 9"2$ 0ational security invo&ed for limiting a person?s right to return to the
country. [Marcos v. Manglapus, 1:: S7/* 22$
W+"( ( !+ # !a8(" is a constitutional right that may be impaired only +in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law, there are recogniEed exceptions
other than those created by law. 3oremost is the restricti on on the right to travel of persons charged of
crimes before the courts. *nother is the restriction on persons subpoenaed or ordered arrested by the
Senate or Jouse of /epresentatives pursuant to their power of legislative inquiry. There are also
restrictions on the right to travel imposed on government officials and employees. 3or example, <ffice of
the 7ourt *dministrator 7ircular 0o. #)49@8B requires judges and court personnel +to secure a travel
authority from the <ffice of the 7ourt *dministrator before they can travel abroad even during their
approved leave of absence or free time. This restriction to travel abroad is imposed even in the absence
of a law. %n the present case, petitioners are already undergoing preliminary investigation in several
criminal cases, and charges may be filed before the courts while petitioners are abroad. %n fairness to the
overnment which is tas&ed with the prosecution of crimes, this 7ourt must hear first the overnment in
oral argument before deciding on the temporary restraining order which if issued could frustrate the
overnment?s right to prosecute. The ove rnment must be heard on how the charge s against
petitioners could proceed while petitioners are abroad. [*rroyo v. +e )ima ) ./. 0o. 19#, 0ovember
1(, 411, En Banc, 7arpio, D+**(n+n O)+n+#n$
I a* .((n a!%( a OCA C+!4%"a! N#$ 92003 B on vacation leave to be spent abroad unduly
restricts a citiEen?s right to travel guaranteed by Section 2, *rticle %%% of the 1": 7onstitution. 6et there
be no doubt that the 7ourt recog niEes a citiEen?s constitutional right to trave l. %t is, however, not the
issue in this case . The only issue in this case is the non)c ompliance with the 7ourt ?s rules and
regulations. %t should be noted that resp ondent, in her 7omment, did not raise any constitutional
concerns. %n fact, she was apologetic and openly admitte d that she went abroad wit hout the require d
travel authority. Jence, this is not the proper vehicle to thresh out issues on one?s constitutional right to
travel. 0onetheless, granting that it is an issue, the exercise of one?s right to travel or the freedom to
move from one place to another, [ Mirasol v. +epartment o! ,ublic $or#s and High 4ays2 ./. 0o.
1(":9, Cune ", 42, # S7/* 91", 9(9$ as assured by the 7onstitution, is n# a.*#"%(. There are
constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations regulating the right to travel. Section 2 itself provides
that +neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or
public health, as may be provided by law. Some of these statutory limitations are the followingD
1$ he Human Security *ct o! 9; or Republic *ct JR.*. 1o. @879 . The law restricts the
right to travel of an individual charged with the crime of terrorism even though such person
is out on bail.
4$ he ,hilippine ,assport *ct o! ;@@K or R.*. 1o. 98@. 'ursuant to said law, the
Secretary of 3oreign *ffairs or his authoriEed consular officer may refuse the issuance of,
restrict the use of, or withdraw, a passport of a 3ilipino citiEen.
9$ he D*nti0 ra!!ic#ing in ,ersons *ct o! 98 or R.*. 1o. @9 . 'ursuant to the
provisions thereof, the 8ureau of %mmig ration, in order to manage migra tion and curb
traffic&ing in persons, issued ;emorandum <rder /adjr 0o. 411)11, allowing its Travel
7ontrol and =nforcement !nit to +offload passengers with fraudulent travel documents,
doubtful purpose of travel, including possible victims of human traffic&ing from our ports.
#$ he Migrant $or# ers and verse as 3ilipinos *ct o! ;@@Q or R. *. 1o. :92 as
amended by R.*. 1o. ;99 . %n enforcement of said law, the 'hilip pine <verseas
=mployment *dministration J,E* may refuse to issue deployment permit to a specific
country that effectively prevents our migrant wor&ers to enter such country.
($ he *ct on ' iolence against $omen and Children or R.*. 1o. @9K9. The law restricts
movement of an individual against whom the protection order is intended.
2$ Inter0Country *doption *ct o! ;@@Q or R.*. 1o. :8. 'ursuant thereto, the %nter)
7ountry *doption 8oard may issue rules restrictive of an adoptee?s right to travel +to
protect the 3ilipino child from abuse, exploitation, traffic&ing andKor sale or any other
21
practice in connection with adoption which is harmful, detrimental, or prejudicial to the
child.
%nherent limitations on the right to travel are those that natura lly emanate from the source . These are
very basic and are built)in with the power. *n example of such inherent limitation is the power of the trial
courts to prohibit persons charged with a crime to leave the country. [ Silverio v. Court o! *ppeals , ./.
0o. #4"#, *pril ", 11, 1( S7/* :2, :2($ %n such a case, permission of the court is necessary.
*nother is the inherent power of the legislative department to conduct a congressional inquiry in aid of
legislation. %n the exercise of legislative inquiry, 7ongress has the power to issue a subpoena and
subpoena duces tecum to a witness in any part of the country, signed by the chairperson or acting
chairperson and the Spea&er or acting Spea&er of the Jouse- [Jouse /ules and 'rocedure overning
%nquiries in *id of 6egislation, adopted on *ugust 4", 41, Section :$ or in the case of the Senate,
signed by its 7hairman or in his absence by the *cting 7hairman, and approved by the Senate
'resident. [Senate /ules of 'rocedure overning %nquiries in *id of 6egislation, adopted on *ugust 41,
1(, Section 1:$ xxx. *s earlier stated, with respect to members and employees of the Cudiciary, the
7ourt issued <7* 7ircular 0o. #)49 to regulate their forei gn travel in an unofficial capacity. Such
regulation is necessary for the orderly administration of justice. %f judges and court personnel can go on
leave and travel abroad at will and without restr ictions or regulations, there could be a disruption in the
administration of justice. * situation where the employees go on mass leave and travel together, despite
the fact that their inval uable services are urgently needed , could possibly arise. 3or said reason ,
members and employees of the Cudiciary cann ot just invo&e and deman d their right to travel. [ )eave
+ivision v. Heusdens ) *.;. 0o. ')11)44:, >ecember 19, 411, En Banc, ;endoEa$
The Ri&ht to Informtion
T(!( a!( 4"(a! +*+n4+#n* between the right of 7ongress to information which underlies the power of
inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. 3or one, the demand of a
citiEen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same
obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by 7ongress. 0either does the right to information
grant a citiEen the power to exact testim ony from governm ent officials. These powers belong only to
7ongress and not to an individual citiEen. [ Senate v. Ermita, ./. 0o. 12:::, *pril 4, 42$ The right
of 7ongress or any of its 7ommittees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with
the people?s right to public informat ion. The former cannot claim that every legis lative inquiry is an
exercise of the people?s right to information. [ 1eri v. Senate Committee on *ccountability o! ,ublic
!!icers, ./. 0o. 1"2#9, ;arch 4(, 4"$ The 7<;=6=7 may be compelled to disclose or publish the
names of the nominees of the various party )list groups named in the petitions. [ Bantay Republic *ct v.
CME)EC, ./. 0o. 1::4:1, ;ay #, 4:$
Splendid S(mmetr() The right of access to public documents, has been recogniEed as a self)executory
constitutional right. The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above)quoted Section 4"
complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern found in the 8ill of /ights.
The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 4"
recogniEes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. [he ,rovince o! 1orth
Cotabato v. he /overnment o! the Republic o! the ,hilippines ,eace ,anel on *ncestral +omain , /
0o. 1"9(1, <ctober 1#, 4"$
Ghile national board examinations, such as the 7'* 8oard =xams are matters of public concern, there
may be valid reasons to limit access to the =xamination 'apers in order to properly administer the exam.
[*ntolin v. +omondon2 / 0o. 12(92, Culy (, 41$
J%!+*)!%(n4( [Chavez v. ,C//, 92 'hil. 199, 12)124 @1"B$ has provided the following limitations
to that rightD @1B national security matters and intellig ence information- @4B trade secr ets and ban&ing
transactions- @9B criminal matters- and @#B other confidential information such as confidential or classified
information officially &nown to public officers and employees by reason of their office and not made
available to the public as well as diplomatic correspondence, closed door 7abinet meetings and
executive sessions of either house of 7ongress, and the internal deliberations of the Supreme 7ourt.
This could only mean that while no prohibition could stand against access to official records, such as the
S*60, the same is undoubtedly subject to regulation. [ RE RE?ES 3R C," 3 9
S*EME1 3 *SSES2 )I*BI)IIES *1+ 1E$RH 6S*)1< *1+ ,ERS1*) +** SHEE R
CRRIC)M 'I*E 3 HE (SICES 3 HE S,REME CR *1+ 33ICERS *1+
EM,)"EES 3 HE (+ICI*R" ) *.;. 0o. )")2)S7, Cune 19, 414, En Banc, ;endoEa$
Jere, petitioners? second letter dated ;ay 1#, 41 specifically requested for [ sic$ detailed information
regarding the winning bidder, such as company profile, contact person or responsible officer, office
address and 'hilippine registration. 8ut before 'S*6; could respond to the said letter, petitioners filed
22
the present suit on ;ay 1, 41. 'S*6;?s letter)reply dated ;ay 41, 41 advised petitioners that their
letter)re quest was referred to the counsel of )Gater. Ge find such action insufficient compliance with
the constitutional requirement and inconsistent with the policy under ='%/* to implement the
privatiEation of 0'7 assets in an Lopen and transparentL manner. 'S*6;?s evasive response to the
request for information was unjustified because all bidders were required to deliver documents such as
company profile, names of authoriEed officersKrepresentatives, financial and technical experience.
7onsequently, this relief must be granted to petitioners by directing 'S*6; to allow petitioners access to
the papers and documents relating to the company profile and legal capacity of the winning bidder.
[Initiatives !or +ialogue and Empo4erment through *lternative )egal Services2 Inc. v. ,o4er Sector
*ssets and )iabilities Management Corporation ) ./. 0o. 14"", <ctober , 414, En Banc, Aillarama$
The Ri&ht of 0ssocition
RELATE T< 0RT. 7III3 Sec. ;? ) The State shall respect the role of independent peopleRs organiEations
to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framewor&, their legitimate and
collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means. 'eopleRs organiEations are bona
fide associations of citiEens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest and with
identifiable leadership, membership, and structure.
;embers of the civil service may not declare a stri&e to enforce their economic demands. [ *lliance o!
/overnment $or#ers v. Ministry o! )abor and Employment , 14# S7/* 1$ The *nti)Subversion *ct,
which outlawed the 7ommunist 'arty of the 'hilippines, was held not violative of the right of association
on the ground that the government has a right to protect itself against subversion. [ ,eople v. 3errer, #"
S7/* 9"4$ * law providing that closed)shop agreem ents in 78*s shoul d not include membe rs of
religious sects which prohibit them from joining labor unions is valid. /ight to associate includes the right
not to associate on the basis of religious beliefs. ['ictoriano v. Elizalde Rope $or#ers= nion , ( S7/*
(#$
0rticle III3 Section ;@$ N# "a/ +)a+!+n ( #."+a+#n #- 4#n!a4* *a"" .( )a**($
C#n!a4 5 civil law concept 5 any lawful agreement on property or property rights, whether real or
personal, tangible or intangible. %ncludes -!an4+*(* or 4a!(!* granted to persons or entities, li&e an
a%#!+&a+#n # .%+" a )%."+4 %+"+5 [+artmouth College v. $ood4ard, # Gheat. (1"$- does not cover
"+4(n*(* [,edro v. ,rovincial Board o! Rizal , (9 'hil. 149- an v. +irector o! 3orestry, 14( S7/* 94 5 a
license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful and is not a contract with
the government$ NOTE 0rticle 7II3 Section ;; 5 franchises to operate public utilities shall be subject to
amendment, alteration or repeal by the 7ongress when the common good so requires ) does not cover
a!!+a( 4#n!a4, marriage being a social institution subject at all times to regulation by the legislature
and to change of the srcinal conditions [ Maryland v. Hill, 14( !S 14$ 5 does not cover )%."+4 #--+4( or
*a"a!+(*, except those already earned. [Mississippi v. Miller, 4:2 !S 1:#$
LICENSE AGREEMENTS are not contracts within the purview of the due process and the non)
impairment of contracts clauses enshrined in the 7onstitution. [ Republic o! the ,hilippines v. ,agadian
City imber Co.2 Inc., ./. 0o. 1(9", September 12, 4"$
La/* 5 statutes, executive orders and administrative regulations, municipal ordinances [ )im v. Register
o! +eeds, #2 < 922($ BUT does not include judic ial decisions [but see /anzon v. Inserto, 149 S7/*
:19 5 4here it 4as held that the clause 4ould be violated by the substitution o! a mortgage 4ith a surety
bond as security !or the payment o! a loan as this 4ould change the terms and conditions o! the srcinal
mortgage contract over the mortgagee=s ob>ection. G his change 4as e!!ected by a decision o! a court2
not by a la4.$
T# +)a+!, the law must retroact so as to affect existing contracts concluded before its enactment- no
impairment if the law is to be applied prospectively. I)a+!(n is anything that diminishes the efficacy
of the contract as when the principal of the loan is reduced or the period for payment is either lengthened
or shortened
R((+(* 5 there will be impairme nt only if all remedies are withdrawn, even if the only remedy left is
the most difficult [Manila rading Co. v. Reyes , 24 'hil. #21$
The impirment cluse m( #e limited #( the StteHs fundmentl powers.
23
G#" C"a%*( Ca*(* 5 contracts stipulated payme nt should be made in gold despite a change in
currency. Subsequent law converting currency to silver was considered valid. [ 1orman v. Baltimore, 4#
!S 4#$
AN E7ECUTIVE ORDER and a law declared a moratorium on the paymen t of pre)war debts until after
eight years from the settlement of the war damage claims of the debtors. The law was considered invalid
5 no more emergency by reason of the war 5 period was oppressively long. [ Rutter v. Esteban , 9 'hil.
2"$ * law converted all pre)existing share tenancy contracts to leasehold tenancy arrangements. Aalid 5
police power. [Illusorio v. Court o! *grarian Re!orm , 1: S7/* 4($ 6ots sold for residential purposes used
for construction of commercial buildings based on new Eoning ordinance. Aalid 5 police power. [rtigas
& Co. v. 3eati Ban# , # S7/* (99$ BP 22 5 valid exercise of the police power. [ )ozano v. Martinez, 1#2
S7/* 949$ * government directive which discontinued assignment of salaries of teachers to creditors is
not offensive to the impairment clause because the latter could still collect loans after salaries had been
withdrawn by the employees themselves. [ iro v. Hontanosas, 14( S7/* 2:$ Substitution of mortgage
with security bond as security for payment of loans violative of impairment clause @0oteD it 4as a court
4hich made this change .B [ /anzon v. Inserto, 149 S7/* :19$ * private company had a contract with a
town to suppl y water. Ghen the town became a city, the latte r expropriated the properties and
franchises of the water company. Aalid. [6ong %sland Gater Supply 7o., %nc. v. 8roo&lyn, 122 !S 2"($
Section #: [of /.*. 0o. ":1$ did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed
properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the one)year period
srcinally provided in *ct 0o. 919(. The new redemption period commences from the date of foreclosure
sale, and expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever
is earlier. There is li&ewise no retroactive application of the new redemption period because Section #:
exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall
retain their redemption rights under *ct 0o. 919(. [ /olden4ay Merchandising Corporation v. E5uitable
,CI Ban# 5./. 0o. 1((#, ;arch 19, 419, 3irst >ivision, Aillarama$
Custodil In%esti&tion K any questioning by law enforcement officers after a person has been ta&en
into custody
9"# !S #92$ or
Theotherwise deprivedattaches
right to counsel of his freedom of start
upon the actionofinthe
any significant way.
investigation, Miranda
i.e., [when v. *rizona ,
the investigating
officer starts to as& questions to elicit information andKor confessions or admissions from the accused.
[/amboa v. Cruz , ./. 0o. 6)(241, 4: Cune 1"", 124 S7/* 2#4, 2(9$ RA 3 also provides that
+custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an Uinvitation? to a person who is investigated
in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the
Uinviting? officer for any violati on of law. ) The accused was, upon his arrest in OueEon where he had
fled, subjected by the police to informal inculpatory investigation that continued during their trip to ;anila,
where his formal investigation was conducted at the police station. Je was not assisted by counsel, who
arrived the following day. Jis confession during the trip from OueEon was held inadmissible. [ ,eople v.
Compil, 4## S7/* 19($ I /a* %!+n ( )!("++na!5 +n8(*+a+#n that 8o&ingco mentioned his and
7ol?s plan to &ill 'asion. 8o&ingco?s confession was admittedly ta&en without the assistance of counsel in
violation of Section 14, *rticle %%% of the 1": 7onstitution. %n ,eople v. Sunga, [##: 'hil. ::2 @49B$we
held that +the right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be deemed Ucritical stages?
in the criminal process. The preliminary investigation can be no different from the in)custody
interrogations by the police, for a suspect who ta&es part in a preliminary investigation will be subjected
to no less than the StateRs processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who might
be liable for criminal prosecution. [,eople v. Bo#ingo 5 ./. 0o. 1":(92, *ugust 1, 411$
The guarantees of Sec. 14 @1B, *rt. %%% of the 1": 7onstitution, or the so)called ;iranda rights, may be
invo&ed only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. 7ustodial investigation starts when
the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect ta&en into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions
to the person to elicit incriminating statements. [ ,eople v. )ara 0./. 0o. 1"::, *ugust 19, 414$
L+n(9%)* 5 *fter the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an uncounseled accused
made in a police line)up is inadmissible. ['eople v. ;acam, 49" S7/* 92$ BUT, citing >m#o %.
Cru' [124 S7/* 2#4 @1""B$, the Supreme 7ourt, in People %. Lmsin& [4#" S7/* #:1$ and 'eople v.
Salvatierra [4:2 S7/* (($, declared that the right to counsel is NOT available during a police line)up as
this is not considered part of the custodial investigation. [ +e la orre v. Court o! *ppeals , 4# S7/* 12-
recently affirmed in ,eople v. )ara 0 ./. 0o. 1"::, *ugust 19, 414$ RE9ENACTMENT of the crime
in the absence of counsel is inadmissible evidence against the accused. [ ,eople v. Suarez, 42: S7/*
11$
24
T( !+ # 4#%n*(" +* n# (**(n+a" in administrative proceedings. [*mpong v CSC, ./. 0o. 12:12,
*ugust 42, 4"$
o torture3 force3 %iolence3 thret3 intimidtion3 or n( other mens which %itite the free will shll
#e used &inst him. Secret detention plces3 solitr(3 incommunicdo3 or other similr forms of
detention re prohi#ited. 2 SWEARING OFFICERS should have confessants physically examined by
independent doctors before administering the path. [,eople v. Barros, 144 S7/* 9#$
0n( confession or dmission o#tined in %ioltion of this or Section ; hereof shll #e
indmissi#le in e%idence &inst him. 2 !ncounselled confession made during custodial investigation
[made before the accused was advised of his custodial rights$, as well as evidence obtained from house
of the accused, inadmissible. !ncounselled confession made to a m(or, whom the accused treated as
a con!idante, and who did not even question the accused, dmissi#le. Statements spontaneously made
by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deeme d %oluntr( and are dmissi#le in
evidence. [,eople v. *ndan , ./. 0o. 112#9:, ;arch 9, 1:, 42 S7/* (, 1)11.$ !ncounselled
extrajudicial statement given to #rn&( tnods, including the 6rn&( Chirmn, inside a barangay
hall %0*>;%SS%86=. 8ut uncounselled admission [of crime of arson$ made to a neighbor *>;%SS%86=.
[,eople v. Mayo, ./. 0o. 1:#:, September 42, 42$ !ncounselled but voluntary written admissions
made to &agawads ADMISSIBLE. 0ot under custodial investigation at the time. [ ,eople v. /il, ./. 0o.
1:4#2", <ctober 1(, 4"$
In People %. Won& Chuen $in& [942 'hil. 14 @12B$, the trial court, in convicting the accused, relied
heavily on the signatures which they affixed on the boxes of *lpen Cereals and on the plastic bags. The
7ourt construed the accused?s act of affixing their signatures thereo n as a tacit admission of the crime
charged. *nd, since the accused were not informed of their ;iranda rights when they affixed their
signatures, the admission was declared inadmis sible evidence for having been obtained in violation of
their constitutional rights. [Ho $ai ,ang v. ,eople ) ./. 0o. 1:244, <ctober 1, 411, 3irst >ivision,
>el 7astillo$
The Ri&ht
charged in to 6il
court 2 one
+may who
apply forisbail
notwith
detained may in
any court notthe
post bail. ) *ny
province, city person in custody
or municipality whohe
where is not yet
is held.
>espite the absence of any written application, respondent judge verbally granted bail to ;elgaEo. This
is a clear deviation from the proc edure laid down in Sec. 1: of /ule 11#. *s regards the insistence of
Cudge 7anoy that such may be considered as +constructive bail, there is no such species of bail under
the /ules. [,antilo v. Canoy , *.;. 0o. /TC)11)4424, 3ebruary , 411$ ) J%!+*)!%(n4( is replete with
decisions on the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant
of bail, especially in cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or lif e
imprisonment, where bail is a matter of discretion. [ +ericto v. Bautista2 *.;. 0o. ;TC))14(,
0ovember 4, 4, 9#2 S7/* 449, 44:$ ) 8ail may be granted even if evidence of guilt is strong where
the accused is ill and requires hospitaliEation. [+e la Rama v. ,eople=s Court , :: 'hil. #21$
R("+an4( #n a )!(8+#%* #!(! granting bail does not justify the absence of a hearing in a subsequent
petition for bail. [ Basco v. Rapatalo2 supra note 42- citing Baylon v. Sison2 919 'hil. @1(B- ucay v.
+omangas2 914 'hil. 19( @1(B$ =ven if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an
application for bail of an accused, the court may still require the prosecution to answer questions in order
to ascertain, not only the strength of the StateRs evidence, but also the adequacy of the amount of bail.
['illanueva v. Buaya , *.;. 0o. /TC)")4191, 0ovember 44, 41$ =ven where there is no petition for
bail in a case li&e 7riminal 7ase 0o. 119")9, a hearing should still be held. his hearing is separate and
distinct !rom the initial hearing to determine the e%istence o! probable cause , in which the trial judge
ascertains whether or not there is sufficien t ground to engender a well)founded belief that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the crime. The 'rosecuti on must be given a
chance to show the strength of its evidence- otherwise, a violation of due process occurs. [ +irecto v.
Bautista, *.;. 0o. ;TC))14(, 0ovember 4, 4, 9#2 S7/* 449$ The fact that the public
prosecutor recommended bail for *nchet a did not warrant dispensing with the hearing. xxx [ Marzan0
/elacio v. 3lores, *.;. 0o. /TC))1#"", Cune 4, 4, 99# S7/* 1, $ in whom alone the discretion
to determine whether to grant bail or not was vested. Ghatever the public prosecutor recommended,
including the amount of bail, was non)binding. 0or did such recommendation constitute a showing that
the evidence of guilt was not strong. %f it was otherwise, the trial judge could become unavoidably
controlled by the 'rosecution. [/acal v. In!ante ) *.;. 0o. /TC) #)1"#(, <ctober (, 411, 3irst >ivision,
8ersamin$ SEPARATE HEARING for bail not indispensable 5 hearing on petition for bail may be
summary in nature or held in the course of the trial. [/erardo v. C3 %, "2 'hil. (#$
The earlier ruling of this 7ourt that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of the right to question the validity
of the arrest has already been superseded by Section 42, /ule 11# of the /evised /ules of 7riminal
25
'rocedure. 3urthermore, the principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of his
arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without
previously invo&ing his objections thereto. [ Borlongan v. ,ena, ./. 0o. 1#9(1, 0ovember 49, 4:$
Criminl /ue Process ) >enial of right to preliminary investigation is a denial of due process, even if the
right to a preliminary investigation is just a statutory right. [ ,atanao v. Enage, 141 S7/* 44"$ ) !pon the
filing of the complaint and affidavit with respect to cases cogniEable by the ;T77, the prosecutor shall
ta#e the appropria te action based on the a!!idavits and other supporting documents submitted by the
complainant. %t means that the prosecutor may either dismiss the complaint if he does not see sufficient
reason to proceed with the case, or file the information if he finds probable cause. The prosecutor is
not mndted to re1uire the su#mission of counter2ffid%its. Petitioners could not %lidl( clim
the ri&ht to preliminr( in%esti&tion. They were not denied due process. [ Borlongan v. ,ena3 ./.
0o. 1#9(1, 0ovember 49, 4:$ ) * judge, who is also the mayor, should not have a share in the fines
he imposes against the accus ed who appear before him. [ umey v. hio , 4:9 !S (1$ ) 'olice
authorities forced an emetic solution through a tube into the stomach of a suspect to eject two narcotic
pills he had swallowed to prevent their use as evidence against him. Aiolative of due process 5 [ Rochin
v. Cali!ornia, 9#4 !S 12($ Small amount of blood extra cted from an uncon scious person suspected of
being drun& was not considered violative of due process. [ Breithanpat v. *bram, 9(4 !S #94$ ) the
determination of probable cause, for purposes of preliminary investigation, is an executive function. [ )im
,o v. +epartment o! (ustice ) ./. 0o. 1(1", 3ebruary 11, 419, 3irst >ivision, /eyes$
'enal provisions of an =< which became effective on Cune 4, 1"4 were sought to be enforced against
the accused for acts they committed on *pril 4, 1"4. Aiolative of due process. [ ,esigan v. *ngeles ,
14 S7/* 1:#$ Said =< was declared unconstitutional in "not v. I*C [1#" S7/* 2($. >ate of
publication of penal laws is the date of the release for circulation of the <. [ ,eople v. 'eridiano , 194
S7/* (4#$
!nder the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the /T7 of an
offense not punis hable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as here. [See /ule 11#,
Section
the (, /ules
presence of 7ourt$ The conditions
o! bail0negating Indeed2 pursuant
7ourt heldDmandates to or
the denial therevocation
tough on o!
bail pending
bail appeal
pending appealpolicy2
such
that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court !or an o!!ense
punishable by death2 reclusion perpetua or li!e imprisonment 4here bail is prohibited . [)eviste v. Court o!
*ppeals, ./. 0o. 1"144 , ;arch 1:, 41, 21( S7/* 21, 2#", cited in ?ui v. ,eople ) ./. 0o.
12121, September 42, 414, Third >ivision, Aelasco$
The Ri&hts of the 0ccused
ACCUSATION is not synonymous with guilt. [ ,eople v. +ramayo , #4 S7/* ($ T( 4#n*+%+#na"
)!(*%)+#n #- +nn#4(n4( may be overcome by contrary presumptions based on the experience of
human conduct, such as +the wic&ed flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion.
[,eople v. )abara, *pril 4, 1(#$ E*4a)( from detention during the pendency of the case before the trial
court is in itself an indication of his guilt. [ ,eople v. Isang , ./. 0o. 1"9":, >ecember #, 4"$
P#**(**+#n of stolen property may give rise to the reasonable presumption that it was he himself who
had stolen it. [S v. Espia, 12 'hil. (2$
+*ny person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the StateQprovided that the filing of the charges
for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary invest igation
shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.L 5 UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of the
constitutional presumption of innocence. [+umlao v. CME)EC, ( S7/* 94$
N# +n-(!(n4( #- %+" may be drawn against an accused for his failure to ma&e a statement of any sort.
[,eople v. *rciaga , S7/* 1$ Ghile the accused has a right to be sil ent, they run the ris& of an
inference from the non)production of evidence. [ ,eople v. Solis, 14" S7/* 41:$ 3ailure or refusal of the
accused to testify may prejudice him if the prosecution has already established a prima facie case
against him. [,eople v. Resano, 194 S7/* :1$
The constitutional mandate of presumption of innocence prevails until a promulgation of final conviction
is made. [rillanes v. ,imentel , ./. 0o. 1:"1:, Cune 4:, 4"$
26
>enial of right to preliminary investigation is a denial of due process, even if the right to a preliminary
investigation is just a statutory right. [ ,atanao v. Enage , 141 S7/* 44"$ >enial of th is right, in the
absence of a waiver, will violate due process. [ Bunye v. Sandiganbayan, 4( S7/* 4$ 'reliminary
investigation is a component part of due process in criminal justice. [ Sales v. Sandiganbayan, 92 S7/*
49$
T( O.%*an need not conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a complaint. %ndeed, we
have said in -necht v . +esierto [9(9 'hil . ## @1"B$ and later in Mamburao2 Inc. v. !!ice o! the
mbudsman [9" 'hil. :24 @4B$ and -araan v. !!ice o! the mbudsman [#:2 'hil. (92 @4#B$ that
should investigating officers find a complaint utterly devoid of merit, they may recommend its outright
dismissal. ;oreover, + +* a"*# /++n (+! +*4!(+#n # ((!+n( /((! #! n#
)!("++na!5 +n8(*+a+#n *#%" .( 4#n%4($ The 7ourt has undoubtedly ac&nowledged the
powers of the <mbudsman to +*+** a 4#)"a+n #%!+ /+#% a )!("++na!5 +n8(*+a +#n in
he ,residential *d Hoc 3act03inding Committee on Behest )oans v. +esierto . [#9: 'hil. :4 @44B$
Ge reiterate that the <mbudsman has full discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be
filed, inclu ding whether a preliminary investigation is warranted. The 7ourt there fore gives due
deference to the <mbudsman?s decision to no longer conduct a preliminary investigation in this case on
the criminal charges levelled against respondent Aelasco. [ (udge *ngeles v. /utierrez 9 ./. 0os.
1"121 P 1"1:9, ;arch 41, 414$
The ri&ht to #e ssisted #( counsel is indispens#le only in judicil criminl proceedin&s. 2 The
right to counsel begins from the time a person is ta&en into custody and placed under investigation for
the commission of a crime. [ ,eople v. )ino, 12 S7/* "$ The right to counsel does not cease after
trial- 4#n+n%(* #n a))(a". [,eople v. Rio, 41 S7/* :4$
>eaf)mute could not defend himsel f at the trial because of lac& of sign langua ge expert. 7onviction
reversed. [,eople v. ,arazo, 91 S7/* 1#2$
The description
designation [e.g.,and not the
Section designati
9b of on of the
the *nti)raft offense
6aw$, is contro
an accused maylling. =ven
still be if there of
convicted is bribery
an erroneou
if the s
information properly +describes the offense. [ Soriano v. Sandiganbayan , 191 S7/* 1"#$ * person
charged with rape, of which he was absolved, cannot be convicted of qualified seduction, which was not
included in the information. [ ,eople v. Ramirez , 2 S7/* 1##$ 7onviction of the accused of rape by
intimidation under an information charging him with raping his daughter while she was asleep and
unconscious would violate his const itutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. [,eople v. *bino, 9:4 S7/* ($ * person charged with homicide by drowning
cannot be convicted of homicide by stabbing. [,eople v. rtega, 4:2 S7/* 122$
The use of the words +aggravatingKqualifying circumstances will not add any essential element to the
crime. 0either will the use of such words further apprise the accused of the nature of the charge. The
specific allegation of the attendant circumstance in the %nformation, coupled with the designation of the
offense and a statement of the acts constituting the offense as required in Sections " and of /ule 11,
is sufficient to warn the accus ed. ['eop le v. de la 7ruE, ./. 0o. 1:#9: 1, >ecember 11, 4"$
'etitioners cannot be validly convicted on the basis of the srcinal information as the prosecution failed to
allege in the informations that the crimes were comm itted +in relation to their offic e. 'etitioners were
thus not placed in danger of being convicted when they entered their plea of not guilty to the insufficient
information. [Herrera v. Sandiganbayan , ./. 0os. 1122)21, 3ebruary 19, 4, 4- /uy v.
,eople, ./. 0os. 122:#)2, ;arch 4, 4$
T( a(n(n entails the deletion of the phrase +gross neglect of duty from the %nformation. *lthough
this may be considered a substantial amendment, the same is allowable even after arraignment and plea
being beneficial to the accused. *s a replacement, +gross inexcusable negligence would be included in
the %nformation as a modality in the commission of the offense. This 7ourt belie ves that the same
constitutes an amendment only in form. [ *lbert v. Sandiganbayan, ./. 0o. 12#1(, 3ebruary 42, 4$
P(++#n(! 4"a+* that the information filed against him charged him with violation of *rt. 1:1 of the /'7
in his capacity as 8oard ;ember of the Sangguniang ,anlala4igan, but the Sandiganbayan convicted
him of violation of *rt. 1:4 as a private individual. Thus, he avers, he had not been given a chance to
defend himself from a criminal charge of which he had been convicted, claiming a violation of his right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and his right to due process of
law. The last paragraph of *rt. 1:4 does not specify that the offending person is a public or private
individual as does its par. 1. The crime in *rt. 1:1 is absorbed by the last paragraph of *rt. 1:4. The
headings in italics of the two articles are not cont rolling. Ghat is contr olling is not the title of the
27
complaint, or the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly
violated, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. [ ,actolin v.
Sandiganbayan, ./. 0o. 121#((, ;ay 4, 4", Aelasco$
*dmittedly, the prosecution could have alleged in the information the mode of committing a violation of
Section 9@eB of /* 0o. 91 with technical precision by using the disjunctive term LorL instead of the
conjunctive term Land.L 0onetheless, in the early case of /allego2 et al. v. Sandiganbayan [41 'hil. 9:
@1"4B$, the 7ourt already clarifi ed that the phrases Lmanifest partiality,L Levident bad faithL and Lgross
inexcusable negligenceL are merely descriptive of the different modes by which the offense penaliEed in
Section 9@eB of /* 0o. 91 may be committed, and that the use of all these phrases in the same
information does not mean that the indictment charges three distinct offenses. [ (aca v. ,eople , ./. 0o.
1222:, Canuary 4", 419$
The 7* further ratiocinated that the variance in the two crimes is not fatal to 'ielago?s conviction. %ndeed,
in order to obtain a conviction for rape by sexual assault, it is essential for the prosecution to establish
the elements that constitute such crime. *rticle 422)*@4B of the /evised 'enal 7ode explicitly provides
that the gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual assault which is the insertion of the penis into another
person?s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another person?s genital or anal orifice. %n
the instant case, this element is clearly present when *** straightforwardly testified in court that 'ielago
inserted his forefinger in her vagina and anus. Curisprudence has it that testimonies of child)victims are
given full weight and credit, since when a woman or a girl)child says that she has been raped, she says
in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed comm itted. Thus, ***?s unre lenting
narration of what transpired, accompanied by her categorical identification of 'ielago as the malefactor,
established the case for the prosecution. [ ,ielago v. ,eople ) ./. 0o. 444, ;arch 19, 419$
The 7* correctly declared that the illegal possession of marijuana was +a crime that is necessarily
included in the crime of drug pushing or dealing, for which the accused have been charged with. The
right of ;anansal a to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him enunciat ed in
Section 1#@4B, *rticle %%% of the 1": 7onstitution was not violated simply because the information had
precisely charged him with selling, delivering, giving away and distributing more or less :( grams of
dried marijuana leaves. Thereby, he was being sufficiently given notice that he was also to be held to
account for possessing more or less :( grams of dried marijuana leaves. *s )acerna and similar rulings
have explained, the Vcrime of illegal sale of marijuana defined and punished under Section # of /epublic
*ct 0o. 2#4(, as amended, implied the prior possession of the marijuana. *s such, the crime of illegal
sale included or absorbed the crime of illegal possession. The rule is that when there is a variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the
evidence, and the offense as charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved include d in that which is charged. [Section #, /ule 14, /ules of 7ourt
@1""B$
*ccording to Section (, /ule 14, /ules of 7ourt @1"(B, the rule then applicable, an offense charged
necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. [ ,eople v. Manansala )
./. 0o. 1:(9, *pril 9, 419, 3irst >ivision, 8ersamin$
E64()+#n to the right to meet witnesses face to face 5 dying declarations.
The ri&ht to cross2exmine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. 7learly, the right to cross)
examine a witness, although a fundamental right of a party, may be waived. [ E5uitable ,CIBan#ing
Corporation v. RCBC Capital Corporation, ./. 0o. 1"44#", >ecember 1", 4"$ %f a witness dies before
his cross)examination, his direct testimony can be stric&en off the record- may be retained if the material
points of his direct testimony had been covered on cross. [ ,eople v. Seneres , S7/* 4- ,eople v.
/orospe, 14 S7/* 499$
3ailure to invo&e right to compulsory process constitutes a waiver that cannot be rectified or undone on
appeal. [S v. /arcia, 1 'hil. 9"#$ %t is the court?s duty to compel the attendance of persons subject of
subpoenas. [,eople v. Barda>e , S7/* 9""$ ) The rights of an accused in a criminal prosecution to
cross examine the witness against him and to have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance
of witnesses and the production of other evidence in his behalf does not lie. 7T* 7ase 0o. :12 is not a
criminal prosecution, and even granting that it is related to %.S. 0o. 4()49, the respondents in the
latter proceeding are the officers and accountant of petitioner )corporation, not petitioner. [ 3itness
+esign2 Inc. v. Commissioner o! Internal Revenue, ./. 0o. 1::"4, <ctober 1:, 4"$
There can be no valid conviction before a valid arraignment. [ Bor>a v. Mendoza , :: S7/* #44$ The right
to be present at trial is a personal right that may be waived, BUT his presence may be required if it is
28
necessary for purposes of identification [ ,eople v. ,residing (udge , 14( S7/* 42 and ,eople v.
Macaraeg, 1#1 S7/* 9:$ and also for arraignment. [ *5uino v. Military Commission 1o. 92 29 S7/*
(#2$ * trial in absentia does not abrogate the provisions of the /ules of 7ourt regarding forfeiture of the
bail bond if the accused fails to appear. [/ule 11#, Section 41$ [,eople v. ,rieto, "# S7/* 1"$
The Writ of 8#es Corpus ) The liberty of a person may be restored by habeas corpus where he is
subjected to physical restraint, such as arbitrary detent ion, or even by moral restraint, as when a
housemaid is prevented from leaving her employ because of the influence of the person detaining her.
[Caunca v. Salazar , "4 'hil. "(1$ * prisoner convicted by a court without juri sdiction or where his
sentence has become invalid, as in the case of a person convicted of a crime of a political complexion
during the Capanese <ccupation after restoration of the legitimate government, may avail himself of the
writ. [*lcantara v. +irector o! ,risons, :( 'hil. :#$ 8#es corpus is also available to a person
sentence to a longer penalty than that subsequently meted out to another person convicted of the same
offense [/umabon v. +irector o! ,rision s, 9: S7/* #4$ or in cases of unlawful denial of bail [ La!ra v.
City $arden, : S7/* ::1$
* restricti%e custod( and monitorin& of mo%ements or whereabouts of police officers under
investigation by their supe riors is not a form of illegal deten tion or restraint of liber ty. [ Manalo v.
Calderon, ./. 0o. 1:"4, <ctober 1(, 4:$
A 95(a!9#" /+#/ had been living with her nephew, who acted as her guardian. Jer other relatives
too& her, and said nephew filed a petition for habeas corpus. The writ of habeas corpus is issued when
one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from exercising legal custody over
another person. Thus, it contemplates two instancesD @1B deprivation of a person?s liberty either through
illegal confinement or through detention and @4B withholding of the custody of any person from someone
entitled to such custody. %f the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in
whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. 'etition dismissed because of finding
that the widow was not being detained and restrained of her liberty. [ In the Matter o! the petition o!
Habeas Corpus o! Eu!emia E. Rodriguez2 !iled by Edgardo E. 'eluz , ./. 0o. 12#"4, Canuary 4,
4"$
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cove r extralegal &illings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof . [Section 1$ ;ere substant ial evidence is required. [Section 1:$ 5 a
writ of amparo should not be issued when the petition merely states that he is +under threat of
deprivation of liberty with the police stating that he is not arrested but merely Uin custody .? [ Salcedo v.
Bollozos3 *.;. 0<. /TC)1 )4492, Culy (, 41$- or to protect concerns that are purely prope rty or
commercial, as in this forcible entry case, where enforcement of the judgment had resulted in violence.
[apuz v. del Rosario , ./. 0o. 1"4#"#, Cune 1:, 4"$- excludes the protection of property rights.
[Ro%as v. Macapagal0*rroyo, ./. 0o. 1"1((, September :, 41$, such as the threatened demolition
of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court. [Canlas v. 1apico Homeo4ners= *ssociation, ./.
0o. 1"4:(, Cune (, 4"$
A )(++#n -#! a Writ of 0mpro may be filed by any concerned citiEen, organiEation, association or
institution only if there is no &nown member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.
[Section 4 of the /ule on the $rit o! *mparo ) *.;. 0o. :))14)S7, <ctober 4#, 4:$ BUT a petition
for a $rit o! Habeas Corpus may be filed by any person on behal f of the aggrieve d party. [ Boac v.
Cadapan, / 0o. 1"##21, ;ay 91, 411$
The Grit of Jabeas >ata requires concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to
privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. [Section 2 [a$ and should not issue for purposes of
+fishing expeditions. [apuz v. del Rosario , ./. 0o. 1"4#"#, Cune 1:, 4"$ The Grit of Jabeas >ata
may not be granted on the basis of labor)related issue s. [ Manila Electric Company v. )im , ./. 0o.
1"#:2, <ctober (, 41$
The Ri&ht &inst Self2Incrimintion ) AVAILABLE not only in criminal prosecutions but also in all
other government proceedings, including civil actions and administrative or legislative investigations.
;ay be claimed not only by an accused, but also by any witness to whom an incriminating question is
addressed.
W(n a8a+"a."( 5 an accused may altogether refuse to testify 5 as to an ordinary witness, including
witnesses in legislative inquiries, the right may be invo&ed only as and when the incriminating question
is as&ed. [ Senate v. Ermita , ./. 0o. 12:::, *pril 4, 42- Sabio v. /ordon , ./. 0o. 1:#9#,
29
<ctober 1:, 42- Standard Chartered Ban# v. Senate Committee on Ban#s2 3inancial Institutions and
Currencies , ./. 0o. 12:1:9, >ecember 4:, 4:$
* person charged with rape may be examined for gonorrhea, which would be the same as fingerprinting
or examining other parts or features of the body for identification purposes. [ S v. an eng , 49 'hil.
1#($ * woman accused of adultery may be examined to determine if she is pregnant. [ 'illa!lor v.
Summers, #1 'hil. 24$ The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against
himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not
an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. [ Holt v. S, 41" !S 4#(- *lih v. Castro ,
1(1 S7/* 4:$ BUT NOTE Socil *ustice Societ( %. /n&erous /ru&s 6ord 5[./. 0o. 1(:":,
0ovember 9, 4"$, where the Supreme 7ourt invalidated mandatory drug testing for persons accused
of crimes for being a violation of their right to privacy. The prohibition applies to compulsion for the
production of documents, papers and chattels that may be used as evidence against the witness, except
where the state has a right to inspect the same, such as the boo&s of accounts of corporations, under the
police powe r. [# $igmore, Sec. 42#$ The privilege also protects the accused against any attempt to
compel him to furnish a specimen of his handwriting in connection with his prosecution for falsification.
[Beltran v. Samson, (9 'hil. (:$
0rticle III3 Section ;$ 1 N# )(!*#n *a"" .( (a+n( *#"("5 .5 !(a*#n #- +* )#"++4a" .("+(-* an
a*)+!a+#n*$ 2 N# +n8#"%na!5 *(!8+%( +n an5 -#! *a"" (6+* (64() a* a )%n+*(n -#! a
4!+( /(!(#- ( )a!5 *a"" a8( .((n %"5 4#n8+4($
COVERS slavery and peonage. [/evised 'enal 7ode 5 penalties are imposed upon any person who, in
order to require or enforce the payment of a debt, shall compel the debtor to wor& for him, against his
will, as household servant or farm)laborer. @*rticle 4#:B$
E7CEPTIONS 5 [1$ )%n+*(n -#! a 4!+( [4$ +"+a!5 *(!8+4( [*rt. %%, Sec. #- ,eople v. Losa, 9" <
12:2$ [9$ na8a" (n"+*(n [/obertson v. 8aldwin, 12( !S 4#($[#$ posse comittus [S v. ,ompeya ,
91 'hil. 4#($ [($ !(%!n # /#! #!(!* [ -aisahan ng Manggaga4a sa -ahoy v. /otamco Sa4mills , #(
< Supp.
7ode, 0o.
*rticle , p. 1#:$ [2$ ptri potests 5 unemancipated minors must obey their parents [7ivil
911$
* housemaid who was being detained and required to render services was released on habeas corpus.
[Caunca v. Salazar, "4 'hil. "(1$ The !S Supreme 7o urt declared as unconstitutional a penal statut e
declaring persons who receive advance payment for wor& but subsequently refuse to wor& as having
induced said advance payment with intent to defraud. [,olloc# v. $illiams , 944 !S #$
Punishment
PENALT' must ordinarily be proportionate to the offense 8!T, where the offense has become so
rampant as to require the adoption of a more effective deterrent, a more severe penalty may be justified,
li&e the theft of coconuts or jeeps, punis hed as qualified theft under the /evis ed 'enal 7ode. )
MECHANICAL failure in electric chair considered an unforeseeable event 5 not cruel and unusual
punishment. [)ouisiana v. Res4eber, 94 !S #($
0rticle III3 Section ;J F=< T( ()"#5(n #- )5*+4a", )*54#"#+4a", #! (!a+n )%n+*(n
aa+n* an5 )!+*#n(! #! (a+n(( #! ( %*( #- *%.*ana! #! +na(=%a( )(na" -a4+"++(* %n(!
*%.%an 4#n++#n* *a"" .( (a" /+ .5 "a/$
0rticle III3 Section =@$ N# )(!*#n *a"" .( + )!+*#n( -#! (. #! n#n9)a5(n #- a )#"" a6$
DEBT 5 refers to any civil obligation arising from contract, expressed or implied 5 a purely private matter
which gives rise only to civil actions. includes even debts obtained through fraud [ /ana4ay v. ?uillen,
#4 'hil. "($ BUT see Lo'no %. $rtine' [1#2 S7/* 949$, where it was ruled that a person can be
validly punished in a criminal action if he contracted his debt through fraud. Je is to be punished for his
deceit, not his debt.
* law required employers to pay salaries at least once every two wee&s, and punished them for not
doing so. VALID 5 punishment is for refusal to ma&e payment even if capable of ma&ing payment.
[,eople v. Merillo , ./. 0o. 6)9#1, Cune 4", 1(1$
* defendant in a civil action was ordered arrested for contempt because of his failure, owing to his
insolvency, to pay the plaintiff past and future sup port. %0A*6%>. [ Sura v. Martin , 42 S7/* 4"2$ 8!T
NOTE new law which ma&es failure to give support a criminal offense, which may be justified as a valid
exercise of the police power.
30
*n accused [ esta!a$ as&ed to return the money he embeEEled may be subjected to subsidiary
imprisonment for his failure to ma&e restitution 8!T the law has been amended and subsidiary
imprisonment can be imposed only for non)payment of fines. [ S v. Cara, #1 'hil. "42$
* civil servant who fails to pay a debt may be validly suspended. [3lores v. atad, 2 S7/* 2:2$
/ou#le *eoprd( 2 The principle of double jeopardy applies only to criminal proceedings. [Res >udicata
in prison grey.$
CONVICTED in ;T7 for grave oral defamation- /T7 dismisses appeal on the ground of prescription
after finding that the offense committed was only slight oral defamation 5 double jeopardy has set in.
[Castro v. ,eople, ./. 0o. 1""94, Culy 49, 4"$
The principle of double jeopardy finds no application in administrative cases. [Cayao0)asam v. Ramolet,
./. 0o. 1(194, >ecember 1", 4"$
REUISITES 5
[1$ "lid complint or informtion 2 %f, without the express consent of the accused, the information is
dismissed on the ground that it is defective when it is not so in fact, another prosecution based on the
same allegation will constitute double jeopardy. [S v. "am ung $ay , 41 'Jhil. 2:$
PETITIONERS and the other accused pleaded not guilty to the srcinal informations. Thereafter, at the
instance of the petitioners, through a joint petition for bail, they raised the issue of lac& of jurisdiction on
the ground that the prosecution failed to allege in the informations that the crimes were committed +in
relation to their office. <n the same day, respondent court ordered the amendment of the informations
accordingly. Thus, the first requirement for double jeopardy to attach, that is, that the informations
against the petitioners were valid, has not been complied with. [Herrera v. Sandiganbayan, ./. 0os.
1122)21, 3ebruary 19, 4, 4$
The change of the offense charged from 8omicide to $urder is merely a forml mendment nd not
su#stntil mendment or a substitution. Jomicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder-
thus, the responden t judge merely ordered the amendment of the %nformation and not the dismissal of
the srcinal %nformation. To repeat, it was the same srcina l information that was amended by merely
crossing out the word +Jomicide and writing the word +;urder, instead, whic h showed that there was
no dismissal of the homicide case. [,acoy v. Ca>igal, ./. 0<. 1(:#:4, September 4", 4:$
'etitioners cannot be validly convicted on the basis of the srcinal information as the prosecution failed to
allege in the informations that the crimes were comm itted +in relation to their offic e. 'etitioners were
thus not placed in danger of being convicted when they entered their plea of not guilty to the insufficient
information. [Herrera v. Sandiganbayan , ./. 0os. 1122)21, 3ebruary 19, 4, 4- /uy v.
,eople, ./. 0os. 122:#)2, ;arch 4, 4$
[4$ -iled #efore competent court
* person charged before an incompetent court is not placed in first jeopardy because, obviously, a court
without jurisdiction cannot render a valid judgment. [ +e /uzman v. Escalona , " S7/* 21$ Ghere an
information is motu proprio dismissed for lac& of jurisdiction by a court which is actually competent to
hear, said dismissal will benefit the accused who shall be entitled to plead double jeopardy. [ S v.
Regala, 4" 'hil. (:$
The Supreme 7ourt ruled that military tribunals had no jurisdiction to try cases of civilians. Cudgments
invalidated. [laguer v. Military Commission , 1( S7/* 1##$ So, in Cru' %. Enrile [12 S7/* :4, it
said cases may be re)tried, as there were no valid previous proceedings. BUT in Tn %. 6rrios [1
S7/* 2"2$, the Supreme 7ourt said that its ruling in Ol&uer should be applied prospecti vely only to
future cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Jence, in the interest of
justice and consistency, there should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of
conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of the
Ol&uer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State. <nly in particular cases
where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of the 7onstitutional rights
of the accused should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the
violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, and not on the laguer doctrine. %f a retrial is no
31
longer possible, the accused should be released since the judgment against him is null on account of the
violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.
%f a court)martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment will be accorded the
finality and conclusiveness as to the issues involved which attend the judgments of a civil court in a case
of which it may legally ta&e cogniEance- x x x and restricting our decision to the above question of double
jeopardy, we judge that, consistently with the above act of 14, and for the reasons stated, the plaintiff
in error, a soldier in the *rmy, having been acquitted of the crime of homicide, alleged to have been
committed by him in the 'hilippines, by a military court of competent jurisdiction, proceeding under the
authority of the !nited States, could not be subsequently tried for the same offense in a civil court
exercising authority in that territory. @Marcos v. Chie! o! Sta!!2 *3,, " 'hil, 4#2 @1(1B, at 4#")4(1, cited
in /arcia v. E%ecutive Secretary ) ./. 0o. 1"((#, Culy 9, 414, Third >ivision, 'eralta$
AN INFORMATION FOR PARRICIDE dismissed by a regional trial court based on a mere manifestation
of the public prosecutor, and without the judge ma&ing an independent assessment of the merits of the
case and the evidence on record, which dismissal resulted in the recall of the warrant of arrest$, is
%0=33=7T!*6, and the judge is to be considered as having gravely abused his discretion, such that the
subsequent filing of a case for rec&less imprudence resulting in parricide filed with the ;eT7 would not
vest in it jurisdiction over the new case, the /T7 having retai ned jurisdiction over the offense to the
exclusion of all other courts . The requisite that the judgmen t be rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is therefore absent. [Honrales v. Honrales, ./. 0o. 1"42(1, *ugust 4(, 41$
[9$ To which the defendnt hd pleded
0o double jeopardy if the complaint is dismissed before arraignment of the accused. [ S v. Solis, 2 'hil.
2:2$ The accused, after pleading guilty, testified to prove mitigating circumstances. 'lea of guilty
deemed vacated because of the testi mony. 0o double jeopardy as there was no valid plea upon
promulgation of judgment of acquittal. [ ,eople v. Balisacan, 1: S7/* 111$
[#$ Of which he hd #een pre%iousl( c1uitted or con%icted or which ws dismissed or otherwise
terminted without his express consent
>ismissal with the express consent of the accused will not bar another prosecution but consent, to be
effective, must be express. ;ere silence or failure of the accused to object to the dismi ssal cannot be
considered as consent. [,eople v. "lagan , (" 'hil. "(1$ The prosecution moved for the dismissal of the
case in the morning. >efense counsel offered no objection. %n the afternoon of the same day, defense
counsel and the accused submitted a formal manifestation objecting to the dismissal. SC ) =xpress
consent. 0o double jeopardy. [,eople v. ,ilpa, :2 S7/* "1$
>ismissal, even if with the express consent of the accused, will give rise to double jeopardy if the same is
based on the insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution 5 acquittal. %n this case, the prosecution
filed a petition for certi orari questioning the erron eous dismissal by the judge . S7 said however
erroneous the order of dismissal is, and although a miscarriage of justice resulted from said order,
double jeopardy sets in. [,eople v. City Court o! Silay , :# S7/* 4#"$
Rule ;;3 Section J 5 the grant of a motion to quash, filed by the defendant before he ma&es his plea,
can be appealed as the defendant has not been placed in jeopardy !06=SS ( .a*+* -#! (
+*+**a" +* ( (6+n4+#n #- 4!++na" "+a.+"+5 an #%."( <(#)a!5$ [)os Banos v. ,edro, ./. 0o.
1:9("", *pril 44, 4$
* judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable. [ ,eople v. errado, ./. 0o. 1#"442, Culy
1#, 4", ((" S7/* "#, 9$ *s we have previously held in ,eople v. Court o! *ppeals [./. 0o.
1(421, 3ebruary 41, 4:, (12 S7/* 9"9$, La verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a
reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in
jeopardy for the same offense.L [Id., at 9:$ True, the finality of acquittal rule is not one without exception
as when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac& or excess of jurisdiction. %n
such a case, the judgment of acquittal may be questioned throug h the extraordinary writ of certiorari
under /ule 2( of the /ules of 7ourt. %n the instant case, however, we cannot treat the appeal as a /ule
2( petition as it raises no jurisdictional error that can invalidate the judgment of acquittal. Suffice it to
state that the trial court is in the best position to determine the sufficiency of evidence against both
appellant and inumtad. %t is a well)settled rule that this 7ourt accords great respect and full weight to
the trial court?s findings, unless the trial court overloo&ed substantial facts which could have affected the
outcome of the case. [,eople v. Montinola, ./. 0o. 1:"21, Canuary 91, 4", (#9 S7/* #14, #4:$ %t
32
is not at all irregular for a court to convict one of the accused and acquit the other. The acquittal of
inumtad in this case is final and it shall not be disturbed. [ ,eople v. Banig ) ./. 0o. 1::19:, *ugus t
49, 414, 3irst >ivision, del 7astillo$
%n the present case, the withdrawal of the criminal cases did not include a categorical dismissal thereof
by the /T7. >ouble jeopardy had not set in because Soriano was not acquitted nor was there a valid and
legal dismissal or termination of the fifty one @(1B cases against her. %t stands to reason therefore that the
fifth requisite which requires conviction or acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal of the case without
the approval of the accused, was not met. xxx. Since we have held that the ;arch 1:, 4# <rder
granting the motion to dismiss was committed with grave abuse of discretion, then respondents were not
acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the case. =rgo, the fifth requisite
which requires the conviction and acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal of the case without the
approval of the accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in. [See Cerezo v. ,eople, ./.
0o. 1"(49, 1 Cune 411, 2( S7/* 444, 44, cited in ,hilippine 1ational Ban# v. Soriano ) ./. 0o.
12#(1, <ctober 9, 414, Second >ivision, 'ereE$
A))(a" #- ( P!#*(4%+#n 9 *n a4=%+a" [7astro v. 'eople, Culy 49, 4"$ or a +*+**a" %( #
+n*%--+4+(n45 #- (8+(n4( ['eople v. 7ity 7ourt of Silay, :# S7/* 4#"$, except one made with grave
abuse of discretion [alman v. Sandiganbayan, 11# S7/* #9$, or a dismissal based on a (n+a" #- !+
# a *)((5 trial ['eople v. *nano, : 'hil. 4"$, gives rise to double jeopardy. The grant of a (%!!(!
# (8+(n4( operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, unless the court acted with
grave abuse of discretion, as when the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case [when
the court pre)emptively dismissed the case or aborted its right to complete its presentation of evidence$
or where the trial was a sham. ['eople v. Tan, ./. 0o. 12:(42 , Culy 42, 41$, eve n if done at the
instance of the accused, give rise to double jeopardy, unless it can be shown that the court?s actions are
tainted by grave abuse of discretion. ['eople v. 'ablo, " S7/* 4"$
G+8(n that Custice 0ario?s %er#l order dismissing 7riminal 7ase 0os. 4(44)4(9 [on the ground of
the accused?s right to a speedy trial$ is null and void, and does not exist at all in contemplation of law, it
follows that petitioners cannot invo& e the constitutional right agains t double jeopardy . %n the instant
'etition, legal jeopardy has not yet attached since there is so far no valid dismissal or termination of the
criminal cases against petitioners. [(acob v. Sandiganbayan, ./. 0o. 12442, 0ovember 1:, 41$
Crimes Co%ered 2 The srcinal offense charged OR for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof </ for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged
in the srcinal complaint of information. [ E%amples 5 murder and homicide$
/octrine of Super%enin& E%ent 2 *n accused may be prosecuted for another offense if a subsequent
development changes the character of the first indictment under which he may have already been
charged </ 7<0A%7T=>. [ Melo v. ,eople , "( 'hil. :22$ * person convicted of physical injuries may
still be prosecuted for homicide if the victim dies later. [ +iaz v. S, 449 !S ##4$ *fter pleading not guilty
to a complaint for slight physical injuries, the charge was changed to serious physical injuries after it was
determined that the injur ies became permanent scars. 0o double jeopardy. [ ,eople v *dil , :2 S7/*
#24$
Insepr#le Offenses 2 Ghere one offense is inseparable from another and proceeds from the same
act, they cannot be the subject of separate prosecutions, such as smo&ing and possession of opium.
[S v. ,oh Chi , 4 'hil. 1#$ <ne who steals several things from the same person on the same occasion
can be held accountable only for one crime of theft. [ ,eople v. umlos , 2: 'hil. 94$ <ne already
convicted of less serious physical injuries cannot be later prosecuted for assault on a person in authority
committed on the same occasion and against the same victim. [acas v. Cariaso, :4 S7/* (4"$
PETITIONER was charged before the ;eT7 with two separate offensesD @1B /ec&less %mprudence
/esulting in Slight 'hysical %njuries @7riminal 7ase 0o. "492:B- and @4B /ec&less %mprudence /esulting
in Jomicide and >amage to 'roperty @7riminal 7ase 0o. "4922B. 'etitioner pleaded guilty to the charge
in 7riminal 7ase 0o. "492: and was meted out the penalty of public censure. %nvo&ing this convic tion,
petitioner moved to quash the %nformation in 7riminal 7ase 0o. "4922 for placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same offense of rec&less imprudence. /ec&less imprudence under *rticl e
92( is a single quasi)offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that
conviction or acquittal of such quasi)offense bars subsequent prosecuti on for the same quasi)offense,
regardless of its various resulting acts [ ,eople v. +iaz. [# 'hil. :1( @1(#B$ 'rosecutions under *rticle
92( should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. %n
imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penal ties under *rticle 92( for each
consequence alleged and proven. %n short, there shall be no splitting of charges under *rticle 92(, and
33
only one information shall be filed in the same firs t level court. [ Ivler v. Modesto0San ,edro, ./. 0o.
1:4:12, 0ovember 1:, 41$
It is possi#le for one ct to &i%e rise to se%erl crimes 5 violation of motor vehicles law and damage
to property. [,eople v. /uanco, #: < #1:$ O(! (6a)"(* ) falsification and violation of conditional
pardon [ Culanag v. +irector o! ,risons , 4 S7/* 1149$- illegal possession of firearms and carrying
unlicensed firearms during the election period [ apales v. C* , 14 S7/* #:1$- %llegal recruitment and
=stafa [,eople v. Saley , 41 S7/* :1($- ;urder and illegal possession of firearms [ ,eople v. ac0an,
1"4 S7/* 21$ * person acquitt ed of consented abduc tion was subsequ ently charged with qualified
seduction arising from the same act on which an earlier prose cution was based. 0o double jeopardy.
[,erez v. C*, 12" S7/* 492$ Ghether there can be a separate offense of illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition if there is another crime committed was already addressed in *gote v. )orenzo. *gote,
li&e petitioner herein, was convicted of separate charges of @1B illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition and @4B violation of the election gun ban by the /T7 and the 7*. Jowever, applying Section
1 of /* "4#, we set aside *gote?s conviction for illegal possession of firearm since another crime was
committed at the same ti me @violation of the elect ion gun banB. [ Madrigal v. ,eople, ./. 0o. 1"42#,
*ugust 19, 4"$ * person who stole sev eral items from a single victim on a single occ asion may be
prosecuted can be charged with only one crime of theft. [,eople v. umlos , 2: 'hil. 94$
Lws nd Ordinnces 2 * person convicted of >ueteng under an ordinance may not again be charged
with the same act under the provisions of the /evised 'enal 7ode. %f the two charges are based on one
and the same act, conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution
under the other. ["ap v. )euterio, 6)1422, *pril 9, 1($ The accused was charged for having installed a
jumper under an ordinance. 7omplaint dismissed on the ground of prescription. 6ater, he was charged
with theft of electricity under the /'7. 7ourt dismissed the second case, upon motion of the accused.
The Supreme 7ourt sustained the dismissal on the ground of double jeopa rdy. [ ,eople v. Relova, 1#"
S7/* 44$
0rticle III3 Section ==. N# ex post fcto "a/ #! .+"" #- aa+n(! *a"" .( (na4($
E7 POST FACTO LAWS 5 [1$ refer to criminal matters [4$ are retroactive in their application [9$ wor& to
the prejudice of the accused ) EVEN if the law is criminal in nature and is made to operate retroactively, it
will not be e% post !acto if it favors the accused.
NOT E7 POST -0CTO ) Gar profits tax law retroactively imposing taxes in income acquired during the
Capanese occupation. [Republic v. 3ernandez, 'hil. 9#$ 'reventi ve suspension provided for in /*
91, not punitive, merely preventive. [ Bayot v. Sandiganbayan , 14" S7/* 9"9$ Suspensions of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are not laws. [Montenegro v. Castaneda, 1 'hil. ""4$
The enactment of /.*. 0o.12, on the other hand, is a significant development only because it clearly
manifests that prior to its enactment, numbered accounts or anonymous accounts were permitted
ban&ing transactions, whether they be allowed by law or by a mere ban&ing regulation. To be sure, an
indictment against =strada using this relatively recent law cannot be maintained without violating the
constitutional prohibition on the enactment and use of e% post !acto laws. [,eople v. Estrada, ./. 0os.
12#92")2, *pril 4, 4$
0ot being penal laws, *dministrative <rder 0o. 19 and ;emorandum <rder 0o. 21 cannot be
characteriEed as e%0post !acto laws. [ he ,residential *d0Hoc 3act03inding Committee on Behest )oans
J33CB) v. +esierto, ./. 0o. 1#(1"#, ;arch 1#, 4"$
/* 19: providing for forfeiture as a penalty cannot be applied to acquisitions made prior to its passage
without running afoul of the 7onstitution condemning e% post !acto laws. [-atigba# v. Solicitor /eneral,
1" S7/* (#$
* new law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect. Jowever, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who
is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effec t. These are the rule, the exception and
exception to the exception on effectivity of laws. *lthough an additional fine of '1(,. is imposed by
/.*. 0o. "4#, the same is still advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment is
lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua under '.>. 0o. 1"22. ['aleroso v. ,eople , ./. 0o. 12#"1(, 3ebruary 44, 4"$
*n *dministrative <rder limiting the authority of the <ffice of the 'resident to review determinations of
the Secretary of Custice to capital offenses is not ex post facto, for being a mere procedural rule. [See
34
*ngeles v. /aite , ./. 0o. 12(4:2, 0ovember 4(, 4$ /emedial laws may be given retroactive effect.
['ictorias Milling Co.2 Inc. v. ,adilla , ./. 0o. 1(224, <ctober 2, 4"$
<n 4 ;ay 42, /epubl ic *ct 0o. 9##, otherw ise &nown as the LCuvenile Custice and Gelfare *ct of
42,L too& effect. Section 2" thereof specifically provides for its retrocti%e ppliction [,eople v.
Sarcia, ./. 0o. 122#1, 1 September 4, ( S7/* 4$ xxx. 7learly, /epublic *ct 0o. 9## is
applicable in this case even though the crime was committ ed four @#B years prior to its enactment and
effectivity. 'arenthetically, with more reason should /epublic *ct 0o. 9## apply to this case as the
4( conviction by the lower courts was still under review when the law too& effect in 42. [ ,eople v.
Sarcia, ./. 0o. 122#1, 1 September 4, ( S7/* 4, at #")#$ Section 9" of /epublic *ct 0o.
9## warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law notwithstanding that heKshe
has reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction is pronounced. [ ,eople v. (acinto,
./. 0o. 1"449, 12 ;arch 411, 2#( S7/* (, 241$ [ ,eople v. Monticalvo ) ./. 0o. 19(:,
Canuary 9, 419, Second >ivision, 'ereE$
BILL OF ATTAINDER 5 a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial, its essence being the
substitution of legislative fiat for a judicial determination of guilt.
%t is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a
group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial that it becomes a bill of
attainder. *nti)Subversion *ct is a bill of attainder becau se it pronounced the guilt of the 7'' without
any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial. [ ,eople v. 3errer, #" S7/* 9"4$
The !S Supreme 7ourt conside red as a bill of attainder a law prohibiting payment from publi c funds of
compensation to individually named respondents, except for jury or military service, unless they were
reappointed by the 'resident with the advice and consent of the Senate. 5 punishment without judicial
trial. [S v. )ovett, 949 !S 99$
An #!+nan4( required employees to execute affidavits stating whether or not they were ever members
of the
the 7ommunist
government 5 'arty
VALIDand prohibiting
5 not #ill ofthe employment
ttinder 5 no of persons who
punishment had advocated
is imposed the overthrow
by a general of
regulation
which merely provides standards of qualification and eligibility for employment. [ /arner v. Board o!
,ublic $or#s o! )os *ngeles , 9#1 !S :1:$
R$A$ N#$ 33@ is not a bill of attainder. * bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on
individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. =ssential to a bill of attainder are a
specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or
otherwise, and the lac& of judicial trial. [ Misolas v. ,anga, ./. 0o. "99#1, Canuary 9, 1, 1"1 S7/*
2#", 2($ xxx. /.*. 0o. 99( does not posses s the elements of a bill of attain der. %t does not see& to
inflict punishment without a judicial trial. /.*. 0o. 99( merely lays down the grounds for the termination
of a 8%/ or 8<7 official or employee and provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic
processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee are amply protected.
[Bureau o! Customs Employees *ssociation v. eves ) ./. 0o. 1"1:#, >ecember 2, 411, En Banc,
Aillarama$
CITIZENSHIP
CITIZENSHIP is membership in a political community with all its concomitant rights and responsibilities.
* child born of a 3ilipino mother on Canuary 1:, 1:9 is a natural)born 3ilipino citiEen. * child born on
Canuary 1:, 1:9 of a natural)born 3ilipino mother who, at the time of his birth, had embraced the
citiEenship of her husband is a citiEen of the country of his father. 7hildren born of 3ilipino mothers
before Canuary 1:, 1:9 could have elected 'hilippine citiEenship until the year 1#. * child born of a
3ilipino mother before Canuary 1:, 1:9 who elects 'hilippine citiEenship upon reaching the age of
majority is a natural)born 3ilipino citiEen.
NATURALIZATION is a process by which a foreigner acquires, voluntarily or by operation of law, the
citiEenship of another state. DIRECT naturaliEation is effected by [1$ +n+8+%a" )!#4((+n*, usually
judicial, under general naturaliEation laws [4$ by *)(4+a" a4 #- ( "(+*"a%!( , often in favor of
distinguished foreigners who have rendered some notable service to the local state [9$ by 4#""(4+8(
4an( #- na+#na"+5 [naturaliEation en masse$ as a result of cession or subjugation and [($ in some
cases, by a#)+#n of orpha n minors as natio nals of the State whe re they are born . DERIVATIVE
naturaliEation is conferred on [1$ the /+-( of the naturaliEed husband [4$ on the +n#! 4+"!(n of the
naturaliEed parent and [9$ on the a"+(n /#an upon marriage to a national. 0<T= 5 does not always
35
follow as a matter of course, for it is usually made subject to stringent restrictions and conditions. <ur
own laws provide that an alien woman married to a 3ilipino shall acquire his citi Eenship only i! she
hersel! might be la4!ully naturalized .
;inor children born and residing in the 'hilippines shall, upon the naturaliEation of their fathers, be
considered naturaliEed 3ilipinos. ;inor children born outside the 'hilippines but residing in the
'hilippines upon the naturaliEation of their fathers, shall be considered naturaliEed 3ilipinos. 7hildren of
naturaliEed 3ilipinos born outside the 'hilippines shall be considered naturaliEed citiEens but only upon
their election of 'hilippine citiEenship upon the attainment of the age of majority and their ta&ing of an
oath of allegian ce. * naturaliEed 3ilipino may be +denatura liEed if he becomes a nominal direc tor of a
corporation, pursuant to a shareholders? agreement, to accommodate his compadre, a foreigner, who
wants to gain control of the corporation?s board of directors. The +denaturaliEation of a naturaliEed
3ilipino shall have the effect of denaturaliEing his wife and children only if the ground for revo&ing his
naturaliEation were based on the intrinsic validity of his naturaliEation. The State may revo&e the
naturaliEation of a 3ilipino on petition of the Solicitor enera l. %t is the State , through the Soli citor
eneral, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturaliEation in the appropriate
denaturaliEation proceedings. %t is not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case
involving the naturaliEed citiEen?s descendant. [ )im#aichong v. CME)EC , ./. 0os. 1:""91)94, *pril
1, 4$
RA 22@ ) Sec. #. +erivative Citizenship. ) The unmarried child, wheth er legitimate, illegitimate or
adopted, below eighteen @1"B years of age, of those who re)acquire 'hilippine citiEenship upon effectivity
of this *ct shall be deemed citiEens of the 'hilippines.
CA ?3 5 'hilippine citiEenship may be "#* by 5 [1$ na%!a"+&a+#n in a foreign country [4$ (6)!(**
!(n%n4+a+#n of citiEenship [9$ *%.*4!+.+n # an #a #- a""(+an4( to support the 7onstitution or laws
of a -#!(+n 4#%n!5 upon attaining eighteen years of age or more, provided, however, that a 3ilipino
may not divest himself of 'hilippine citiEenship in any manner while the /epublic of the 'hilippines is at
war with any country [#$ !(n(!+n *(!8+4( to or accepting comm ission in the a!( -#!4(* #- a
-#!(+n
said 4#%n!5
foreign , unless
country, with
if said the consent
foreign countryofmaintains
the /epublic of the
armed 'hilippines,
forces if it has a with
in the 'hilippines defensive pact with
its consent,
etc. [($ 4an4(""a+#n of the certificate of naturaliEation [2$ having been declared a (*(!(! in times of
war, unless a plenary ardon or amnesty has been granted [:$ in case of a woman, %)#n (! a!!+a( #
a -#!(+n(! if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husband?s country, sh acquires his nationality.
'J%6%''%0= 7%T%W=0SJ%' may be RE9ACUIRED by [1$ na%!a"+&a+#n, provided that the applicant
possesses none of the disqualifications prescribed for naturaliEa tion. [ NOTE 5 Bengzon v. House o!
Representatives$ [4$ !()a!+a+#n of deserters, provided a woman who lost her citiEenship by reason of
her marriage to an alien may be repatriated in accordance with te provisions of section 4 of 7* 29 after
the termination of the marital status [9$ +!(4 a4 #- C#n!(**
* soldier who renounced his 3ilipino citiEe nship and joined the !S *rmy during the Second Gorld Gar
shall not be considered as having lost his or her 'hilippine citiEenship despite his or her express or
implied renunciation of the same.
RA 22@ ) %t is hereby declared the policy of the State that all 'hilippine citiEens of another country shall
be ((( n# # a8( "#* their 'hilippine citiEenship under the conditions of this *ct. *ny provision of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural)born citiEenship by reason of their naturaliEation as citiEens
of a foreign country are hereby ((( # a8( !(9a4=%+!( 'hilippine citiEenship upon ta&ing the an
oath of allegiance to the /epublic. Na%!a"9.#!n 4++&(n* of the 'hilippines who, after the effecti vity of
this *ct, becom e citiEens of a foreign country shall !(a+n their 'hilippine citiEenship upon ta&ing the
aforesaid oath. The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen @1"B
years of age, of those who re)acquire 'hilippine citiEenship upon effectivity of this *ct shall be deemed
citiEens of the 'hilippines. Those who !(a+n or !(9a4=%+!( 'hilippine citiEenship under this *ct shall
enjoy -%"" 4+8+" an )#"++4a" !+* and be subject to all attendant liabil ities and responsibil ities under
existing laws of the 'hilippines and the following conditionsD @1B Those intending to exercise their !+
#- *%--!a( must meet the requirements under Section 1, *rticle A of the 7onstitution, /epublic *ct 0o.
1", otherwise &nown as LThe <verseas *bsentee Aoting *ct of 49L and other existing laws- @4B
Those see&i ng ("(4+8( )%."+4 #--+4( in the 'hilippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the 7onstitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, a( a )(!*#na" an */#!n !(n%n4+a+#n #- an5 an a"" -#!(+n 4++&(n*+)
before any public offi cer authoriEed to administer an oath- @9B Those a))#+n( # an5 )%."+4 #--+4(
shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the /epublic of the 'hilippines and its duly
constituted authorities prior to their assumption of officeD ,rovided, That they !(n#%n4( (+! #a #-
a""(+an4( to the country where they too& that oath- @#B Those intending to )!a4+4( (+! )!#-(**+#n in
36
the 'hilippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice-
and @(B That !+ # 8#( or be ("(4( or a))#+n( to an5 )%."+4 #--+4( in the 'hilippines 4ann#
be exercised by, or extended to, those whoD @aB are 4an+a(* for or are #44%)5+n an5 )%."+4 #--+4(
in the country of which they are naturaliEed citiEens- andKor @bB are in a4+8( *(!8+4( as commissioned or
non)commissioned officers in the a!( -#!4(* of the country which they are naturaliEed citiEens.
Repu#lic 0ct o. J==?3 otherwise )nown s the Citi'enship Retention nd Re20c1uisition 0ct3
pplies #n"5 # na%!a"9.#!n F+"+)+n# 4++&(n*$ /ul citi'ens under R0 J==? re na%!a"9.#!n
4++&(n*$
* dual citiEen who reacquires his citiEenship under /* 44( must comply with the twin requirements of
oath of allegiance to the /epublic of the 'hilippines and renunciation of his foreign citiEenship to qualify
to run for elective office. [ )opez v. CME)EC , ./. 0o . 1"4:1, Culy 49, 4 "$ To qualify as a
candidate in 'hilippine elections, 3ilipinos must only have one citiEenship, namely, 'hilippine citiEenship.
[(acot v. +al, ./. 0o. 1:"#" , 0ovember 4:, 4"$ /eacquisition of 'hilippine citiEenship under
/epublic *ct 0o. 44( has no automatic impact or effect on his residenceKdomicile, for purposes of
registering as a voter or running for public office$ [(apzon v. CME)EC, ./. 0o. 1""", Canuary 1,
4$ The so)called twin requirements do not apply to *mericans under the >us soli rule and 3ilipinos
under the >us sanguinis principle. They are qualified to run for public office independently of the
provisions of /* 44(. [Cordora v. CME)EC, ./. 0o. 1:2#:, 3ebruary 1, 4$
7onsidering the citiEenship clause @*rt. %AB of our 7onstitution, + +* )#**+."( -#! ( -#""#/+n 4"a**(*
#- 4++&(n* #- ( P+"+))+n(* # )#**(** %a" 4++&(n*+) D @1B Those born of 3ilipino fathers andKor
mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of >us soli - @4B Those born in the 'hilippines of
3ilipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers? country such children are citiEens of that
country- @9BThose who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter?s country the former are considered
citiEens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced 'hilippine citiEenship.
NOTE RA 22@
!nder
his 'hilippine
country, laws,
retains hera3ilipino
3ilipinacitiEenship
who marries a foreigner,
unless whose
by her act laws ma&e
or omission her
she automatically
can be deemed atocitiEen
have of
renounced the same. !nder 'hilippine laws , an alien woman who marri es a natural)born 3ilipino
automatically becomes a 3ilipino citiEen, provided she is not disqualified to be a citiEen of the 'hilippines.
!nder 'hilippine laws, an alien woman who marries a naturaliEed 3ilipino automatically becomes a
3ilipino citiEen, provided she is not disqualified to be a citiEen of the 'hilippines. 8oth male and female
3ilipino citiEens shall remain 3ilipinos despite their alien spouses except only when they may be deemed
by their act or omission to have renounced their 'hilippine citiEenship. ) !nder Section 1( of 7* #:9, an
alien woman marrying a 3ilipino, native)born or naturaliEed, becomes ipso !acto a 3ilipina provided she is
not disqualified to be a citiEen of the 'hili ppines under Sec tion # of the same law. 6i&ewise, an alien
woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturaliEed here follows the 'hilippine citiEenship of her
husband the moment he ta&es his oath as 3ilipino citiEen, provided she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section #. [Moya )im "ao v. CIR2 #1 S7/* 44$
/ul citi'enship #(* n# a"/a5* !(*%" +n %a" a""(+an4($ D%a" 4++&(n*+) is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two
or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. 3or instance, such a
situation may arise when a person whose parents are citiEens of a state which adheres to the principle of
>us sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of >us soli. Such a person, ipso !acto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citiEen of both states. D%a"
a""(+an4(, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states. Ghile dual citiEe nship is involunt ary, dual allegian ce is the
result of an individual?s volition. ) 'etitioner was a dual citiEen who consiste ntly voted in successive
elections. Je was considered to have effectively elected 'hilippine citiEenship. [Mercado v. Manzano ,
9: S7/* 29$
8eing a legitimate child, respondent?s citiEenship followed that of her father who is 7hinese, unless upon
reaching the age of majority, she elects 'hilippi ne citiEenship. %t is a settled rule that only legitima te
children follow the citiEenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority
of the mother and follow her nationality. [ /o2 Sr. v. Ramos , ./. 0os. 12:(2): and 1:1#2,
September #, 4, (" S7/* 422, 4#)4($ *n illegitimate child of 3ilipina need not perform any act to
confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citiEens of the 'hilippines- he automatically
becomes a citiEen himself. [ Id. at 4($ 8ut in the case of respondent, for her to be considered a 3ilipino
citiEen, she must have validly elected 'hilippine citiEenship upon reaching the age of majority. [ Republic
o! the ,hilippines v. Sagun ) ./. 0o. 1":(2:, 3ebruary 1(, 414, 3irst >ivision, Aillarama$
37
8ased on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing 'hilippine citiEenship areD @1B a statement of
election under oath- @4B an oath of allegiance to the 7onstitution and overnment of the 'hilippines- and
@9B regis tration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil regis try. [ Ma v.
3ernandez2 (r.2 ./. 0o. 1"9199, Culy 42, 41, 24( S7/* (22, (::$ 3urthermore, no election of
'hilippine citiEenship shall be accepted for registration under 7.*. 0o. 24( unless the party exercising
the right of election has complied with the requirements of the *lien /egistration *ct of 1(. %n other
words, he should first be required to register as an alien. [/onaldo '. 6edesma, *0 <!T6%0= <3
'J%6%''%0= %;;%/*T%<0 *0> 7%T%W=0SJ%' 6*GS, Aol. %, 42 ed. , pp. (42$ 'ertinently, the
person electing 'hilippine citiEenship is required to file a petition with the 7ommission of %mmigration and
>eportation @now 8ureau of %mmigrationB for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration based
on his aforesaid election of 'hilippine citiEenship and said <ffice will initially decide, based on the
evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said election. [ Id. at (4:, citing ;emorandum <rder dated
*ugust 1", 1(2 of the 7%>$ *fterwards, the same is elevated to the ;inistry @now >epartmentB of Custice
for final determination and review. [ Id., citing ><C <pinion 0o. 1"4 dated *ugust 1, 1"4$ %t should be
stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authoriEes the direct filing of a petition
for declaration of election of 'hilippine citi Eenship before the courts. The special proce eding provided
under Section 4, /ule 1" of the /ules of 7ourt on Cancellation or Correction o! Entries in the Civil
Registry2 merely allows any interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction of entry in the
civil registry, i.e.2 election, loss and recovery of citiEenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the
respondent. [Republic o! the ,hilippines v. Sagun ) ./. 0o. 1":(2:, 3ebruary 1(, 414, 3irst >ivision,
Aillarama$
8ased on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural
requirements for a valid and effective election of 'hilippine citiEenship. /espondent cannot assert that
the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of
'hilippine citiEenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citiEenship
by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the 'hilippines, and
other similar acts showing exercise of 'hilippine citiEenship cannot ta&e the place of election of
'hilippine citiEenship. Jence, respondent cannot now be allowed to see& the intervention of the court to
confer
*s uponinher
we held 'hilippine
Ching2 [ Id. at citiEenship when clearly
14$ the prescribed she has
procedure failed to'hilippine
in electing validly elect 'hilippine
citiEenship citiEenship.
is certainly not
a tedious and painsta&ing process. *ll that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election
of 'hilippine citiEenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Javing failed to
comply with the foregoing requirements, respondent?s petition before the trial court must be denied.
[Republic o! the ,hilippines v. Sagun ) ./. 0o. 1":(2:, 3ebruar y 1(, 414, 3irst >ivision, Aillarama$
FAILURE TO RENOUNCE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP in accordance with the exact tenor of Section (@4B
of /epublic *ct @/.*.B 0o. 44( renders a dual citiEen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective
public office. xxx. The foreign citiEenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn
before an officer authoriEed to administer oath. Ge have stressed in *dvocates and *dherents o! Social
(ustice !or School eachers and *llied $or#ers J**S(S Member v. +atumanong [./. 0o. 12"2,
;ay 11, 4:, (49 S7/* 1"$ that the framers of /.*. 0o. 44( did not intend the law to concern itself
with the actual status of the other citiEenship. [ Sobe>ana0Condon v. Commission on Elections ) ./. 0o.
1":#4, *ugust 1, 414, En Banc, /eyes$
The use of a foreign passport after renouncing one?s foreign citiEenship is a positive and voluntary act of
one?s representation as to one?s nationality- it does not divest 3ilipino citiEenship regained by repatriation
but it recants the oath of renunciation required to qualify one to run for elective office [under /* 44($.
[Ma5uiling v. CME)EC , ./. 0o. 1(2# , *pril 12, 419- see also Reyes v. CME)EC , ./. 0o.
4:42#, Cune 4(, 419$
SUFFRAGE
S(4+#n 1$ S%--!a( a5 .( (6(!4+*( .5 a"" 4++&(n* #- ( P+"+))+n(*, n# #(!/+*( +*=%a"+-+(
.5 "a/, /# a!( a "(a* (+((n 5(a!* #- a(, an /# *a"" a8( !(*+( +n ( P+"+))+n(* -#!
a "(a* #n( 5(a! an +n ( )"a4( /(!(+n (5 )!#)#*( # 8#(, -#! a "(a* *+6 #n*
+(+a("5 )!(4(+n ( ("(4+#n$ N# "+(!a45, )!#)(!5, #! #(! *%.*an+8( !(=%+!((n *a""
.( +)#*( #n ( (6(!4+*( #- *%--!a($
The following shall be disqualified from votingD [a$ *ny person who has been sentenced by final judgment
to suffer imprisonment for not less than one year, such disability not having been removed by plenary
pardon or granted amnestyD 'rovided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under this
paragraph shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five years after service of
sentence. [b$ *ny person who has been adjud ged by final judgment by comp etent court or tribunal of
having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as rebellion,
38
sedition, violation of the anti)subversion and firearms laws, or any crime against national security, unless
restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with lawD 'rovided, That he shall regain his right
to vote automatically upon expiration of five years after service of sentence. [c$ %nsane or incompetent
persons as declared by competent authority. [<mnibus =lection 7ode 5Section 11"$
>ual citiEens, under /* 44(, may exercise the right of suffrage under the provisions of /* 1", the
<verseas *bsentee Aoting *ct of 49. [ 1icolas0)e4is v. CME)EC, ./. 0o. 124:(, *ugust #, 42$
=ven their children, who acquire derivative citiEenship when they were minors, may vote, under the same
conditions. 8y law, however, the right of dual citiEens 4ho vote as absentee voters pertains only to the
election of national officials, specificallyD the president, the vice)president, the senators, and party)list
representatives. ['elasco v. CME)EC , ./. 0o. 1"(1, >ecember 4#, 4"$
S(4+#n 2$ T( C#n!(** *a"" )!#8+( a *5*( -#! *(4%!+n ( *(4!(45 an *an4+5 #- (
.a""# a* /("" a* a *5*( -#! a.*(n(( 8#+n .5 =%a"+-+( F+"+)+n#* a.!#a$
T( C#n!(** *a"" a"*# (*+n a )!#4(%!( -#! ( +*a."( an ( +""+(!a(* # 8#( /+#% (
a**+*an4( #- #(! )(!*#n*$ Un+" (n, (5 *a"" .( a""#/( # 8#( %n(! (6+*+n "a/* an
*%4 !%"(* a* ( C#+**+#n #n E"(4+#n* a5 )!#%"a( # )!#(4 ( *(4!(45 #- ( .a""#$
Section 4 is to be considered as an exception to the +six months residence requirement in Section 1.
xxx.
[4$ Section (@dB of /.*. 0o. 1" specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is
+recogniEed as such in the host country because immigration or permanent residence in another country
implies renunciation of oneRs residence in his country of srcin. Jowever, same Section allow s an
immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as heKshe executes an affidavit
to show that heKshe has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed
in Sections 1 and 4 of *rticle A that +all citiEens of the 'hilippines not otherwise disqualified by law must
be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that 7ongress must establish a system for absentee
voting- for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the 'hilippines is required, there is no sense for the
framers of the
underta&ing 7onstitution
to return to mandate
after 9 years$ 7ongres
[Macalintal v. sCME)EC
to establish a system
, ./. 1(:19,for absente
Culy e voting.
1, 49$ [0oteD
39
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