CITY OF MANILA v.

TEOTICO

FACTS.
In January 1958, at about 8pm, Genaro Teotico was about to board a jeepney in P. Burgos, Manila when he fell into an
uncovered manhole. This caused injuries upon him. Thereafter he sued for damages under Article 2189 of the Civil
Code the City of Manila, the mayor, the city engineer, the city health officer, the city treasurer, and the chief of police.
CFI Manila ruled against Teotico. The CA, on appeal, ruled that the City of Manila should pay damages to Teotico.
The City of Manila assailed the decision of the CA on the ground that the charter of Manila states that it shall not be
liable for damages caused by the negligence of the city officers in enforcing the charter; that the charter is a special law
and shall prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law; and that the accident happened in national highway.

ISSUE. WON the City of Manila is liable in the case at bar.

HELD.
Yes. It is true that in case of conflict, a special law prevails over a general law; that the charter of Manila is a special law
and that the Civil Code is a general law. However, looking at the particular provisions of each law concerned, the
provision of the Manila Charter exempting it from liability caused by the negligence of its officers is a general law in the
sense that it exempts the city from negligence of its officers in general. There is no particular exemption but merely a
general exemption. On the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code provides a particular prescription to the effect
that it makes provinces, cities, and municipalities liable for the damages caused to a certain person by reason of
the “…defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision.”

The allegation that the incident happened in a national highway was only raised for the first time in the City’s motion
for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals, hence it cannot be given due weight. At any rate, even though it is a
national highway, the law contemplates that regardless of whether or not the road is national, provincial, city, or
municipal, so long as it is under the City’s control and supervision, it shall be responsible for damages by reason of the
defective conditions thereof. In the case at bar, the City admitted they have control and supervision over the road
where Teotico fell when the City alleged that it has been doing constant and regular inspection of the city’s roads, P.
Burgos included.
 BERNARDINO JIMENEZ VS. CITY OF MANILA AND IAC.

FACTS.
On August 15, 1974 petitioner together with his neighbors, went to Sta. Ana public market to buy "bagoong" at the
time when the public market was flooded with ankle deep rainwater. After purchasing the "bagoong" he turned around to
return home but he stepped on an uncovered opening which could not be seen because of the dirty rainwater, causing a dirty
and rusty four-inch nail, stuck inside the uncovered opening, to pierce the left leg of plaintiff-petitioner penetrating to a depth
of about one and a half inches. He was hospitalized for 20 days in the Veterans Memorial Hospital1 for 20 days and had to
with crutches for 15 days. Due to his condition he was not able to attend to his school bus business and had to engage the
services of one Bienvenido Valdez to supervise his business for an aggregate compensation of nine hundred pesos (P900.00).
Petitioner sued for damages the City of Manila and the Asiatic Integrated Corporation under whose administration the
Sta. Ana Public Market had been placed by virtue of a Management and Operating Contract. The lower court ruled in favor of
respondents. However on appeal, the IAC reversed the decision and held that Asiatic Integrated Corporation should be held
liable for damages.
Petitioner now prays that the City of Manila should be held solidarily liable with AIC. On its defense the City of
Manila claims that by virtue of Article I, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4092 as amended (Revised Charter of Manila) it cannot
be held liable.
ISSUE. WON the City of Manila should be held liable for damages
DECISION.
Yes, this issue has been laid to rest in the case of City of Manila v. Teotico where the Supreme Court squarely ruled that
Republic Act No. 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for "damages or injury to persons
or property arising from the failure of city officers" to enforce the provisions of said Act, "or any other law or ordinance or
from negligence" of the City "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions.” Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides that: "Provinces, cities
and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by any person by reason of defective
conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works under their control or supervision."
Such provision constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities x x x liable for
damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" -- specifically --"of the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision." In other words, Art. 1, sec. 4,
R.A. No. 409 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object, thereof, while Article 2189 of the
Civil Code governs liability due to "defective streets, public buildings and other public works” in particular and is therefore
decisive on this specific case.
Further, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach, that the
defective public works belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article
requires is that the province, city or municipality has either "control or supervision" over the public building in question. In
the case at bar, there is no question that the Sta. Ana Public Market, despite the Management and Operating Contract between
respondent City and Asiatic Integrated Corporation remained under the control of the former.
The City of Manila is likewise liable for damages under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, respondent City having
retained control and supervision over the Sta. Ana Public Market and as tort-feasor under Article 2176 of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts. Petitioner had the right to assume that there were no openings in the middle of the passageways and if any, that
they were adequately covered. Had the opening been covered, petitioner could not have fallen into it. Thus the negligence of
the City of Manila is the proximate cause of the injury suffered; the City is therefore liable for the injury suffered by the
petitioner.
Respondent City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corporation being joint tort-feasors, are solidarily liable under
Article 2194 of the Civil Code. Petition Granted.

1
In trying to minimize their liability, respondents claimed that the damages sought should be reduced since as a war veteran, the
petitioner’s hospital expenses were free of charge.
2
"The City shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal
Board, or any other City Officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said
Mayor, Municipal Board, or any other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions."
 PLDT v. CA
FACTS.
This case had its inception in an action for damages by private respondent spouses against petitioner Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) for the injuries they sustained when their jeep ran over a mound of earth
and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground
conduit system. The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left
uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. As a result of the accident,
respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her
cheek, while the respondent husband suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of the jeep was shattered.

PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by respondent spouses were
the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and
Company (Barte, for short), an independent contractor which undertook the construction of the manhole and the
conduit system. Accordingly, PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte alleging that, under the terms of their
agreement, PLDT should in no manner be answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the negligence or
carelessness of Barte or any of its employees. In answer thereto, Barte claimed that it was not aware nor was it notified
of the accident involving respondent spouses and that it had complied with the terms of its contract with PLDT by
installing the necessary and appropriate standard signs in the vicinity of the work site, with barricades at both ends of
the excavation and with red lights at night along the excavated area to warn the traveling public of the presence of
excavations.

ISSUE. Whether PLDT is liable to respondent Esteban spouses?

HELD.
No. The perils of the road were known to, hence appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By
exercising reasonable care and prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious consequences
of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of petitioner.

The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of said
signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private respondents already
knew of the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep
of respondents to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards
the accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs
on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have
prevented the injury. It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure
to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm and necessity that one should
exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last
clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a
resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of
the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for
the consequences of his imprudence.

A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or
negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent
evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the
existence of the same if contested, otherwise his action must fail.

CA decision was SET ASIDE.

 LAUDENCIO TORIO et al. v. ROSALINA FONTANILLA et al.
G.R. L- 29993, October 23, 1978, FIRST DIVISION, (MUÑOZ PALMA, J.)

Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed resolution No. 159 for the Malasiqui town fiesta celebration.
Resolution No. 182 was also passed creating the "1959 Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee" which in turn
organized a subcommittee on entertainment and stage, with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. There was a construction of 2
stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another for the "cancionan". Jose Macaraeg supervised the construction of the stage.
The program started at about 10:15 o'clock that evening with some speeches, and many persons went up the stage. The
"zarzuela" then began but before the dramatic part of the play was reached, the stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla
who was at the rear of the stage was pinned underneath. Fontanilla was taken to the San Carlos General Hospital where
he died in the afternoon of the following day.

The heirs of Vicente Fontanilla filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 11, 1959 to
recover damages. Named party-defendants were the Municipality of Malasiqui, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui and
all the individual members of the Municipal Council in 1959. Answering the complaint defendant municipality
invoked inter alia the principal defense that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign
functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can
arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents. The trial court dismissed the case. On appeal in the CA, it
reversed the trial court's decision and ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally.

ISSUE: Is the celebration of a town fiesta an undertaking in the exercise of a municipality's governmental or public
function or is it of a private or proprietary character?

HELD: YES. We hold that the holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the Municipality of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, was an
exercise of a private or proprietary function of the municipality.

Section 2282 of the Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
"Section 2282. Celebration of fiestas. - A fiesta may be held in each municipality not oftener than once a year upon a date
fixed by the municipal council. A fiesta shall not be held upon any other date than that lawfully fixed therefor, except
when, for weighty reasons, such as typhoons, inundations, earthquakes, epidemics, or other public calamities, the fiesta
cannot be held in the date fixed, in which case it may be held at a later date in the same year, by resolution of the
council."

This provision simply gives authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty
to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in
essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance
of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed, was not to secure profit or gain but merely to
provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a
source of income for the town, nonetheless it is a private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public
schools, jails, and the like which are for public service.

As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an undertaking or
function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and will be decisive.
The basic element, however beneficial to the public the undertaking may be, is that it is governmental in essence, otherwise,
the function becomes private or proprietary in character. Easily, no governmental or public policy of the state is
involved in the celebration of a town fiesta.

It follows that under the doctrine of respondeat superior, petitioner municipality is to be held liable for damages for the
death of Vicente Fontanilla if that was attributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or agents.

Lastly, petitioner or appellant Municipality cannot evade responsibility and/or liability under the claim that it was Jose
Macaraeg who constructed the stage. The Municipality acting through its municipal council appointed Macaraeg as
chairman of the sub-committee on entertainment and in charge of the construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg
acted merely as an agent of the Municipality. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is
responsible or liable for the negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks.

The ordinary doctrine is that a director, merely by reason of his office, is not personally liable for the torts of his
corporation; he must be shown to have personally voted for or otherwise participated in them."

On these principles We absolve the municipal councilors from any liability for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. The
records do not show that said petitioners directly participated in the defective construction of the "zarzuela" stage or
that they personally permitted spectators to go up the platform.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, We AFFIRM in toto the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as the Municipality of
Malasiqui is concerned (L-30183), and We absolve the municipal councilors from liability and SET ASIDE the
judgment against them (L-29993).
 MUN. OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION v. HON. JUDGE ROMEO FIRME, et al.
G.R. No. 156686, July 27, 2011, FIRST DIVISION (Medialdea, J.)

A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of
Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump
truck of the Mun. of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of
the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and 4 others suffered varying
degrees of physical injuries. Private respondents instituted a complaint for damages against the Estate of Nieveras and
Balagot. However, the defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the Mun. of San Fernando and the driver of the
dump truck. The Mun. of San Fernando filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action,
non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger
jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision. The RTC held the Mun. of San Fernando and Bislig liable.

ISSUE: Is the Mun. of San Fernando liable for torts committed by its employee?

HELD:
NO. The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the
municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions. As emphasized in the case of Torio v. Fontanilla, the
distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its
agents which result in an injury to third persons.

It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge
of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary
capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant
was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions
recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.

In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the
Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando’s municipal streets."

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed
pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, the Court rules that the driver of the dump
truck was performing duties or tasks
pertaining to his office.

The Court already stressed in the case of Palafox, et.al. v. Province of Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer, and the
Provincial Treasurer that "the construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time
of the accident are admittedly governmental activities."

After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, the Court arrives at the conclusion that the
municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the
discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger — tragic and deplorable though it may be —
imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.

Ruling reiterated in JAYME v. APOSTOL

Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an
employee of the Municipality of Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but
it was then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan. Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring Miguel
to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to catch his Manila flight. The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin Jayme, a
minor, who was then crossing the National Highway. The intensity of the collision sent Marvin 50m away from the
point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very high speed at the time of the accident.
 The parents of Marvin, filed a complaint for damages with and prayed that all respondents be held solidarily
liable for their loss. They pointed out that that proximate cause of Marvin's death was Lozano's negligent and reckless
operation of the vehicle. Apostol and Simbulan averred that Lozano took the pick-up truck without their consent.
Likewise, Miguel and Lozano pointed out that Marvin's sudden sprint across the highway made it impossible to avoid
the accident. Yet, Miguel denied being on board the vehicle when it hit Marvin. The Municipality of Koronadal adopted
the answer of Lozano and Miguel. As for First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Company, Inc., the vehicle insurer, it
insisted that its liability is contributory and is only conditioned on the right of the insured. Since the insured did not file
a claim within the prescribed period, any cause of action against it had prescribed.

HELD:
As correctly held by the RTC, the true and lawful employer of Lozano is the Municipality of Koronadal. Unfortunately
for Spouses Jayme, the municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in governmental
functions and, hence, immune from suit. This immunity is illustrated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme,
where this Court held:

“It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the
discharge of governmental functions and can only be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were
acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right
to show that the defendant was not acting in governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the
case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.”

Verily, liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct employer. The accidental death of
Marvin Jayme is a tragic loss for his parents. However, justice demands that only those liable under our laws be held
accountable for Marvin's demise. Justice cannot sway in favor of petitioners simply to assuage their pain and loss. The
law on the matter is clear: only the negligent driver, the driver's employer, and the registered owner of the vehicle are
liable for the death of a third person resulting from the negligent operation of the vehicle. Mayor Miguel could not thus
be held liable for the damages caused by the former. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger in the Isuzu pick-up at the
time of the accident.
 HON. GABRIEL LUIS QUISUMBING, HON. ESTRELLA P. YAPHA ET AL. (MEMBERS OF THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF CEBU), PETITIONERS, VS. HON. GWENDOLYN F. GARCIA
(IN HER CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF THE PROVINCE OF CEBU), HON. DELFIN P. AGUILAR
ET AL.
G.R. No. 175527, December 08, 2008, EN BANC, TINGA, J.
FACTS.
The Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a financial audit on the Province of Cebu for the period ending
December 2004. It discovered that several contracts amounting to P102,092,841.47 were not supported with a
Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to enter into a contract, as required under
Section 22 of RA 71603. The audit team then recommended that the Governor secure such sanggunian resolution to
which the latter filed a motion for reconsideration. However, without waiting for the resolution of the reconsideration
sought, she instituted an action for Declaratory Relief before the RTC of Cebu City where it was impleaded as
respondents several officials of COA and the Sanggunian Panlalawigan. Alleging that the infrastructure contracts
subject of the audit report complied with the bidding procedures provided under RA 9184 (Government Procurement
Reform Act) and were entered into pursuant to the general and/or supplemental appropriation ordinances passed by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Gov. Garcia alleged that a separate authority to enter into such contracts was no longer
necessary.
RTC ruled pursuant to Sections 22(c) in relation to Sections 306 and 346 of the LGC and Section 37 of the
Government Procurement Reform Act, the Governor need not secure prior authorization by way of a resolution from
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cebu before she enters into a contract involving monetary obligations
on the part of the Province of Cebu when there is a prior appropriation ordinance enacted. The trial court also declared
that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan does not have juridical personality nor is it vested by R.A. No. 7160 with authority
to sue and be sued. On the question of the remedy of declaratory relief being improper because a breach had already
been committed, the trial court held that the case would ripen into and be treated as an ordinary civil action.
ISSUE. WON the governor needed a prior authorization of the sanggunian to enter into such contracts
DECISION.
To determine WON such prior authorization is required; the case should be remanded to the lower court to
determine the facts of the case. Section 22 of the LGC requires prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned before
the local chief executive may enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit. Sec. 306 of R.A. No. 7160
merely contains a definition of terms. Read in conjunction with Sec. 346, Sec. 306 authorizes the local chief executive to
make disbursements of funds in accordance with the ordinance authorizing the annual or supplemental appropriations.
The "ordinance" referred to in Sec. 346 pertains to that which enacts the local government unit’s budget, for which
reason no further authorization from the local council is required, the ordinance functioning, as it does, as the legislative
authorization of the budget. To construe Sections 306 and 346 of R.A. No. 7160 as exceptions to Sec. 22(c) would
render the requirement of prior Sanggunian authorization superfluous, useless and irrelevant. The requirement was
deliberately added as a measure of check and balance, to temper the authority of the local chief executive, and in
recognition of the fact that the corporate powers of the local government unit are wielded as much by its chief
executive as by its council.
However, the sanggunian authorization may be in the form of an appropriation ordinance passed for the year
which specifically covers the project, cost or contract to be entered into by the local government unit as provided by
Sec 3234. It should be observed that, as indicated by the word "only" in Sec. 323, the items for which disbursements
may be made under a reenacted budget are exclusive. Clearly, contractual obligations which were not included in the
previous year’s annual and supplemental budgets cannot be disbursed by the local government unit. It follows, too, that
new contracts entered into by the local chief executive require the prior approval of the sanggunian.

3
Sec. 22. Corporate Powers – Every local government unit, as a corporation, shall have the following powers: x x x (c) Unless
otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of the local government unit
without prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned. A legible copy of such contract shall be posted at a conspicuous place in
the provincial capitol or the city, municipal or barangay hall
4
In case of a reenacted budget, "only the annual appropriations for salaries and wages of existing positions, statutory and
contractual obligations, and essential operating expenses authorized in the annual and supplemental budgets for the preceding year
shall be deemed reenacted and disbursement of funds shall be in accordance therewith."
 The words "disbursement" and "contract" separately referred to in Sec. 346 and 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160 should
be understood in their common signification. Disbursement is defined as "To pay out, commonly from a fund. To
make payment in settlement of a debt or account payable." “Contract,” on the other hand, is defined by our Civil Code
as "a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or
to render some service." And so, to give life to the obvious intendment of the law and to avoid a construction which
would render Sec. 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160 meaningless, disbursement, as used in Sec. 346, should be understood to
pertain to payments for statutory and contractual obligations which the sanggunian has already authorized thru
ordinances enacting the annual budget and are therefore already subsisting obligations of the local government unit.
Contracts, as used in Sec. 22(c) on the other hand, are those which bind the local government unit to new obligations,
with their corresponding terms and conditions, for which the local chief executive needs prior authority from the
sanggunian.
R.A. No. 9184 establishes the law and procedure for public procurement. Sec. 375 thereof explicitly makes the
approval of the appropriate authority which, in the case of local government units, is the sanggunian, the point of
reference for the notice to proceed to be issued to the winning bidder. This provision, rather than being in conflict with
or providing an exception to Sec. 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160, blends seamlessly with the latter and even acknowledges that
in the exercise of the local government unit’s corporate powers, the chief executive acts merely as an instrumentality of
the local council. Read together, the cited provisions mandate the local chief executive to secure the sanggunian’s
approval before entering into procurement contracts and to transmit the notice to proceed to the winning bidder not
later than seven (7) calendar days therefrom.
Parenthetically, Gov. Garcia’s petition for declaratory relief should have been dismissed because it was
instituted after the COA had already found her in violation of Sec. 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160. One of the important
requirements for a petition for declaratory relief under Sec. 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court is that it be filed before
breach or violation of a deed, will, contract, other written instrument, statute, executive order, regulation, ordinance or
any other governmental regulation. Thus, the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the action despite the fact
that the subject thereof had already been breached by Gov. Garcia prior to the filing of the action. Nonetheless, the
conversion of the petition into an ordinary civil action is warranted under Sec. 6, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.
Erroneously, however, the trial court did not treat the COA report as a breach of the law and proceeded to resolve the
issues as it would have in a declaratory relief action. Thus, it ruled that prior authorization is not required if there exist
ordinances which authorize the local chief executive to enter into contracts.
The problem with this ruling is that it fails to take heed of the incongruent facts presented by the parties. What
the trial court should have done, instead of deciding the case based merely on the memoranda submitted by the parties,
was to conduct a full-blown trial to thresh out the facts and make an informed and complete decision. The question
which should have been answered by the trial court, and which it failed to do was whether, during the period in
question, there did exist ordinances (authorizing Gov. Garcia to enter into the questioned contracts) which rendered the
obtention of another authorization from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan superfluous. It should also have determined the
character of the questioned contracts, i.e., whether they were, as Gov. Garcia claims, mere disbursements pursuant to
the ordinances supposedly passed by the sanggunian or, as COA officials claim, new contracts which obligate the
province without the provincial board’s authority. It cannot be overemphasized that the paramount consideration in the
present controversy is the fact that the Province of Cebu was operating under a re-enacted budget in 2004, resulting in
an altogether different set of rules as directed by Sec. 323 of R.A. 7160. This Decision, however, should not be so
construed as to proscribe any and all contracts entered into by the local chief executive without formal sanggunian
authorization. In cases, for instance, where the local government unit operates under an annual as opposed to a re-
enacted budget, it should be acknowledged that the appropriation passed by the sanggunian may validly serve as the
authorization required under Sec. 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160. After all, an appropriation is an authorization made by
ordinance, directing the payment of goods and services from local government funds under specified conditions or for
specific purposes.
Note
 The Province of Cebu was operating under a reenacted budget in 2004.
 Gov. Garcia entered into contracts on behalf of the province while this reenacted budget was in force.
 CITY OF MANILA VS. IAC
FACTS.
Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died and was buried in North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto.
Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021. The wife paid the full amount of the lease. Apart, however
from the receipt, no other document embodied such lease over the lot. Believing that the lease was only for five years,
the city certified the lot as ready for exhumation. On the basis of the certification, Joseph Helmuth authorized the
exhumation and removal of the remains of Vicencio. His bones were placed in a bag and kept in the bodega of the
cemetery. The lot was also leased to another lessee. During the next all souls day, the private respondents were shocked
to find out that Vicencio’s remains were removed. The cemetery told Irene to look for the bones of the husband in the
bodega. Aggrieved, the widow and the children brought an action for damages against the City of Manila and others
including Joseph Helmuth, the officer-in-charge of the said burial grounds owned and operated by the City
Government of Manila. The court ordered defendants to give plaintiffs the right to make use of another lot. The CA
affirmed and included the award of damages in favor of the private respondents. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners alleged in their petition that the North Cemetery is exclusively devoted for public use or purpose as stated in
Sec. 316 of the Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of Manila. They conclude that since the City is a political
subdivision in the performance of its governmental function, it is immune from tort liability which may be caused by its
public officers and subordinate employees. Private respondents maintain that the City of Manila entered into a contract
of lease which involves the exercise of proprietary functions with Irene Sto. Domingo. The city and its officers
therefore can be sued for any-violation of the contract of lease.
ISSUE. WON the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a governmental, or a corporate or proprietary
function of the City of Manila.

RULING.
The City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of municipal
corporations to be exercised by and through its city government in conformity with law, and in its proper corporate
name. It may sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character-public,
governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the other. Governmental powers
are those exercised in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they include the
legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for the special benefit and
advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial, private and corporate. In connection with the
powers of a municipal corporation, it may acquire property in its public or governmental capacity, and private or
proprietary capacity. The New Civil Code divides such properties into property for public use and patrimonial
properties (Article 423), and further enumerates the properties for public use as provincial roads, city streets, municipal
streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said
provisions, cities or municipalities, all other property is patrimonial without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, the Court declared that with respect to proprietary functions the settled rule is that a
municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu. The Court further stressed that Municipal
corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort.... The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or
employer must answer civilly for the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or line of his
employment, by which another who is free from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations under the
conditions herein stated, fall within tile operation of this rule of law, and are liable accordingly, to civil actions
for damages when the requisite elements of liability co-exist. ...
Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial
property of the City of Manila. The administration and government of the cemetery are under the City Health Officer,
the order and police of the cemetery, the opening of graves, niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the
purification of the same are under the charge and responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. With the acts of
dominion, there is no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in
its proprietary or private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the
private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting
parties. Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between them. Therefore, a
breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for such breach is
prescribed in the contract.
 CEFERINO INCIONG v. CHAIRMAN EUFEMIO DOMINGO
G.R. No. 96628, 3 July 1992, EN BANC, (Paras, J.)

When Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM) failed to pay real estate taxes due on its sugar refinery situated at
Barangay Caloocan, Balayan, Batangas, the Provincial Treasurer of Batangas scheduled the sale of said refinery at public
auction. To restrain the sale, PHILSUCOM filed a petition for prohibition in the CA against the Provincial Treasurer
and Provincial Assessor of. The CA issued a status quo ante order.

Meanwhile, Barangay Caloocan thru Atty. Ceferino Inciong filed a Motion for Intervention alleging that Barangay
Caloocan is an indispensable party in the case as it has a 10% share of the property tax sought to be collected from
PHILSUCOM. Barangay Caloocan filed an Answer to PHILSUCOM's Petition and a motion for reconsideration of the
restraining.

On December 24, 1986, PHILSUCOM and the Municipal Treasurer of Balayan, Batangas entered into an Amnesty
Compromise Agreement. PHILSUCOM paid the amount of P7,199,887.51 to the Municipal Treasurer where Barangay
Caloocan was allocated a share of 10% or a total of P719,988.75.

Consequently, Atty. Ceferino Inciong filed a case for payment of attorney's fees against the Province of Batangas,
Municipality of Balayan and Barangay Caloocan, before the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of Inciong. When the case
became final and when it was referred to the COA, Chairman Eufemio Domingo stated that the hiring of Inciong by
the Punong Barangay did not carry with it the approval of the Sangguniang Barangay nor was there any appropriation
therefor; the hiring was not approved by the Solicitor General and concurred in by COA, thus, Inciong not entitled to
attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:
Is Atty. Ceferino Inciong entitled to attoryney’s fees?

RULING:
YES.
1. The employment by Barangay Caloocan of petitioner as its counsel, even if allegedly unauthorized by the
Sangguniang Barangay, is binding on Barangay Caloocan as it took no prompt measure to repudiate petitioner's
employment.
2. The Decision directing Barangay Caloocan to pay attorney's fees to petitioner, has become final and executory
and is binding upon Barangay Caloocan.
3. COA Circular No. 86-255 cannot diminish the substantive right of Inciong to recover attorney's fees under the
final and executory Decision dated August 9, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court.

The 10% allocation is erroneous because pursuant to Republic Act No. 5447, Barangay Caloocan should only share
from the basic tax which is 50% of what PHILSUCOM paid because the other half should go to the Special Education
Fund. Under the said Republic Act No. 5447, the rightful share of Barangay Caloocan should be P359,994.38 only.
Thus, respondent prays that in the event the Court orders the payment of attorney's fees to Inciong this amount of
P359,994.38 should be made as the basis therefor.
 PROVINCE OF CEBU, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
ATTY. PABLO P. GARCIA, respondents.
FACTS.
On 1964, while then incumbent Governor Espina was on official business in Manila, the Vice-Gov, Almendras and 3
members of the Provincial Board enacted A Resolution donating to the City of Cebu anarea of over 380 hectares. The
deed of donation was immediately executed in behalf of the Province of Cebu by Vice-Governor Almendras and
accepted in behalf of the City of Cebu by Mayor Sergio Osmeña,Jr. The document of donation was prepared and
notarized by a private lawyer.

After the city announced the sale of the lots, Governor Espina, engaged the services of respondent Garcia, for the
annulment of the deed of donation.

The Provincial Board passed a resolution authorizing the Provincial Attorney, Baguia, to enter his appearance for the
Province of Cebu and for the incumbent Governor, Vice-Governor and members of the Provincial Board in this case.

A compromise agreement was reached between the province of Cebu and the city of Cebu.

For services rendered atty, Garcia filed a Notice of Attorney's Lien, praying that his statement of claim of attorney's lien
in said case be entered upon the records. To said notice, petitioner Province of Cebu opposed: the payment of
attorney's fees are not allowed by law.

ISSUE. Can a province be held liable for attorney’s fees?

HELD.
Yes. Anent the question of liability for respondent counsel's services, the general rule that an attorney cannot recover
his fees from one who did not employ him or authorize his employment, is subject to its own exception.
We apply a rule in the law of municipal corporations: "that a municipality may become obligated upon an implied
contract to pay the reasonable value of the benefits accepted or appropriated by it as to which it has the general power
to contract. The doctrine of implied municipal liability has been said to apply to all cases where money or other
property of a party is received under such circumstances that the general law, independent of express contract implies
an obligation upon the municipality to do justice with respect to the same." (38 Am Jur. Sec. 515, p. 193):
The obligation of a municipal corporation upon the doctrine of an implied contract does not connote an enforceable
obligation. Some specific principle or situation of which equity takes cognizance must be the foundation of the claim.
The principle of liability rests upon the theory that the obligation implied by law to pay does not originate in the
unlawful contract, but arises from considerations outside it. The measure of recovery is the benefit received by the
municipal corporation. The amount of the loan, the value of the property or services, or the compensation specified in
the contract, is not the measure. If the price named in the invalid contract is shown to be entirely fair and reasonable
not only in view of the labor done, but also in reference to the benefits conferred, it may be taken as the true measure
of recovery.
The petitioner cannot set up the plea that the contract was ultra vires and still retain benefits thereunder. Having
regarded the contract as valid for purposes of reaping some benefits, the petitioner is estopped to question its validity
for the purposes of denying answerability.
 THE HON. EXPEDITO B. PILAR, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor and concurrently presiding officer
protempore of the Sanguniang Bayan of Dasol, Pangasinan, Petitioner, v. THE SANGUNIANG BAYAN OF
DASOL, PANGASINAN

Petitioner was elected vice mayor of Dasol, Pangasinan in 1980 local elections. March 4, 1980, the Sanguniang Bayan
adopted Resolution No. 1 which increased the salaries of the mayor and municipal treasurer to P18,636.00 and
P16,044.00 per annum respectively. The said resolution did not provide for an increase in salary of the vice mayor
despite the fact that such position is entitled to an annual salary of P16,044.00. Petitioner questioned the failure of the
Sanguniang Bayan to appropriate an amount for the payment of his salary.

On December 12, 1980, the Sanguniang Bayan enacted a resolution appropriating the amount of P500.00 per month as
the salary of the petitioner. This amount was increased to P774.00 per month in December, 1981. On October 26,
1982, the Sanguniang Bayan enacted a resolution appropriating the amount of P15,144.00 as payment of the unpaid
salaries of the petitioner from January 1, 1981 to December 31, 1982. The resolution was vetoed by the respondent
mayor resulting into the filing by the petitioner of this petition for a writ of mandamus.

ISSUE. Can petitioner avail of damages due to the failure of the respondents to pay him his lawful salary?

HELD.
Yes. That respondent Hon. Mayor Lodovico Espinosa alone should be held liable and responsible for the
miserable plight of the petitioner is clear. Respondent Mayor vetoed without just cause on October 26, 1982 the
Resolution of the Sanguniang Bayan appropriating the salary of the petitioner. While "to veto or not to veto involves
the exercise of discretion" as contended by respondents, respondent Mayor, however, exceeded his authority in an
arbitrary manner when he vetoed the resolution since there exists sufficient municipal funds from which the salary of
the petitioner could be paid. Respondent Mayor’s refusal, neglect or omission in complying with the directives of the
Provincial Budget Officer and the Director of the Bureau of Local Government that the salary of the petitioner be
provided for and paid the prescribed salary rate, is reckless and oppressive, hence, by way of example or correction for
the public good, respondent Mayor is liable personally to the petitioner for exemplary or corrective damages.

Respondent Mayor was ordered to pay petitioner from his private and personal funds actual damages and costs of
litigation the amount of P5,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00; exemplary or corrective damages in the
amount of P5,000.00; and attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00.
 SOLANO LAGANAPAN, petitioner, vs.Mayor ELPIDIO ASEDILLO, MUNICIPALITY OF KALAYAAN,
LAGUNA, and EPIFANIO RAGOTERO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-28353, September 30, 1987

FACTS: In 1960, Solano Laganapan was appointed chief of by the respondent Mayor Asedillo. Later that, his salary
was increased and he was extended an appointment which was approved as provisional. In 1962, the petitioner was
given another increase in salary and a corresponding appointment was made to continue until replaced by an eligible but
not beyond thirty (30) days from receipt of certification of eligibles. Then, in 1963, 1964, and 1965, he was again given
salary increases, and new appointments were extended to him.

However, on 1967, the petitioner was summarily dismissed from his position by respondent Mayor Elpidio
Asedillo, on the ground that his appointment was provisional and that he has no civil service eligibility. Respondent
Epifanio Ragotero was appointed acting chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna on the same day, in place of the petitioner.
Days, following his dismissal, the Municipal Council abolished the appropriation for the salary of the chief of police.

Hence, Laganapan filed a petition before the Court of First Instance, seeking his reinstatement to the position
of chief of police with back salaries and damages. In answer, respondents Mayor Elpidio Asedillo and Epifanio
Ragotero claimed that the appointment of the petitioner, being merely temporary in character, and the petitioner having
no civil service eligibility, his services could be terminated with or without cause, at the pleasure of the appoint power;
and that the petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.

The respondent Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna, for its part, alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action
against it; and that, if the acts of the respondent mayor are patently irregular, the said mayor should be held solely liable
therefor.

ISSUE: WON Mayor Elpidio Asedillo alone should be liable for the back salaries of the petitioner.

RULING: NO. We find no merit in the contention of the respondent Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna that Mayor
Elpidio Asedillo alone should be held liable for the back salaries of the petitioner, because the records show that the
action was instituted against Mayor Asedillo, not personally, but in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Kalayaan,
Laguna, and he appeared and defended the action in such capacity.

Furthermore, it is of record that, after the summary dismissal of the petitioner by respondent Mayor Asedillo
on 16 February 1967, the Municipal Council of Kalayaan instead of opposing or at least protesting the petitioner's
summary dismissal from his position, even abolished the appropriation for the salary of the Chief of Police of Kalayaan,
Laguna, We consider this act of the Municipal Council of Kalayaan as an approval or confirmation of the act of
respondent Mayor in summarily dismissing the petitioner, as to make said municipality equally liable, as held by the trial
court, as respondent Mayor for the reinstatement of petitioner and for the payment of his back salaries.

Therefore, respondent Mayor Asedillo who was sued in his official capacity as municipal mayor, having passed
away, the liability to pay petitioner his back salaries must now devolve upon the respondent municipality alone.
 MELCHOR G. MADERAZO SENIFORO PERIDO, AND VICTOR MADERAZO, JR., V. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 165065, September 26, 2006, FIRST DIVISION, (CALLEJO, SR., J.)

Verutiao averred that Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984, provides that, to facilitate the development
of the public market, in the absence of adequate government finance, construction by private parties of buildings and
other structures for commercial purposes may be allowed and the expenses thereof shall be reimbursed to the builder
by applying 50% to the monthly rentals when occupied for business. She spent P24,267.00 for the construction of the
market stall, as stated in the itemized statement of expenses she submitted to then Municipal Treasurer Jose Lee on
February 14, 1992. She was not, however, reimbursed by the Municipality of her expenses. After the construction, she
then opened the stall for business. She paid the rent for the whole year of 1992 but did not pay the rentals in 1993.

Verutiao and the Municipality entered into a one-year lease contract, renewable every year with a monthly rental
of P400.00. It is also provided that, any violation of the conditions therein agreed shall be sufficient cause for its
cancellation, notwithstanding the fact that the contract has not yet expired. The Municipality partially paid her
P10,000.00 of her total expenses in the construction of the market stall. She and her husband received a letter-order
from Mayor Melchor Maderazo, directing her to vacate the stall within twenty-four (24) hours because of her failure to
pay the rentals for the stall. As of January 1997, Verutiao had an unpaid rental of P2,532.00, after deducting her
expenses for the construction of the stall. The Mayor declared in his letter that the lease contract had been cancelled.
The spouses Verutiao, through counsel, sent a letter to the Mayor, stating, among others, that under Section 38 of
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984, she did not have to pay rental until her expenses were reimbursed, as the rentals due
would be debited from 50% of the amount she advanced for the construction of the market stall, and that she will
vacate the stall only after the municipality shall have reimbursed her expenses in the construction. However, Mayor
Maderazo padlocked the leased premises. Thus, petitioners filed a case of unjust vexation before the Sandiganbayan.
The latter convicted Melchor G. Maderazo, Seniforo Perido, and Victor Maderazo, Jr. of the crime of unjust vexation,
but acquitted the other accused.

ISSUE: Are Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Victor Maderazo, Jr. liable?

HELD:
YES. Petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Sangguniang Bayan member Victor Maderazo, Jr., had no right,
without judicial intervention, to oust Verutiao from the stall, and had her merchandise transported to the police station,
thereby preventing her from doing business therein and selling her merchandize. Petitioner Mayor Maderazo had no
right to take the law into his own hands and deprive Verutiao of her possession of the stall and her means of livelihood.

Undeniably, petitioner Mayor is tasked to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the
Municipality and to implement all approved programs, projects, services and activities of the Municipality[40] and to
ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the Municipality are collected.[41] He is obliged to institute or cause to be
instituted administrative or judicial proceedings for the recovery of funds and property.[42] However, in the performance
of his duties, petitioner Mayor should act within the confines of the law and not resort to the commission of a felony. A
public officer is proscribed from resorting to criminal acts in the enforcement of laws and ordinances. He must exercise
his power and perform his duties in accordance with law, with strict observance of the rights of the people, and never
whimsically, arbitrarily and despotically.

Even as we find petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Victor Maderazo, Jr. guilty of unjust vexation, we
find petitioner Seniforo Perido deserving of an acquittal. The Prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with the
other petitioners. He was at the situs of the stall merely to witness the inventory and ensure peace and order. He agreed
to have the contents of the stall of Verutiao stored in the police station presumably to protect the property from the
elements and asportation by thieves until after Verutiao shall have claimed the same or the disposition thereof
determined by the authorities concerned.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of
the Sandiganbayan isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that petitioner Seniforo Perido is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged.
 ROBLE ARRASTRE, INC. v. HON. ALTAGRACIA VILLAFLOR and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS

FACTS.
Petitioner Roble Arrastre, Inc. is a cargo handling service operator, authorized by the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
to provide and render arrastre and stevedoring services at the Municipal Port of Hilongos, Leyte, and on all vessels
berthed thereat. For the years 1992 and 1993, petitioner was granted Business Permits No. 349 and No. 276,
respectively, by respondent Municipal Mayor Altagracia Villaflor. On December 14, 1993, pending final consideration
of petitioner’s application for renewal with the PPA Office, the PPA through its Port Manager Salvador L. Reyna issued
a 90-day hold-over authority to petitioner. Stated therein was the proviso that notwithstanding the 90-day period
aforementioned, the authority shall be deemed ipso facto revoked if an earlier permit/contract for cargo handling
services is granted or sooner withdrawn or cancelled for cause pursuant to PPA Administrative Order No. 10-81. On
January 27, 1994, while the 90-day hold-over authority was in effect, petitioner filed with respondent mayor an
application for the renewal of its Business Permit No. 276. However, the same was denied. In denying petitioner’s
application, respondent mayor invoked Municipal Resolution No. 93-27, passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Hilongos,
Leyte, which prohibits any party which likewise operates shipping lines plying the route of Cebu to Hilongos and vice
versa, from engaging in arrastre and stevedoring services at the port of Hilongos.

Aggrieved by the denial, petitioner filed with the RTC, a Petition for Mandamus with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
against respondent Mayor. According to petitioner, the source of the power of the municipal mayor to issue licenses is
Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC, which is merely for the purpose of revenue generation and not regulation, hence, the
municipal mayor has no discretion to refuse the issuance of a business license following the applicant’s payment or
satisfaction of the proper license fees. Petitioner further alleged that it is the PPA which is vested with the discretion to
determine whether a party can render arrastre service in a particular port area.

The RTC opined that the PPA has the sole authority to grant permits in the operation of cargo handling services in all
Philippine ports, whether public or private. Proceeding therefrom, it ruled that the refusal of respondent mayor to
approve petitioner’s application for renewal of the business permit was not based on law nor upon her discretion. CA
reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC and ruled that the pursuit of the duty of the mayor under Section 444
necessarily entails exercise of discretion.

ISSUE. WON CA validly rendered its decision when it refused to apply the precedent in Symaco v. Aquino wherein this
Honorable Supreme Court held that even in the absence of any ordinance granting the respondent Mayor such
discretion, she cannot refuse issuance of the permit if there is prior compliance by the petitioner with all documentary
requirement and full payment of the required permit fees.

HELD.
Section 444(b)(3)(iv) provides that the power of the municipal mayor to issue licenses is pursuant to Section 16 of the
LGC known as the General Welfare Clause, which declares:
SEC. 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of
their inhabitants.
While we agree with petitioner that there is no ordinance conferring upon the respondent mayor the power to refuse
the issuance of the permit for the operation of an arrastre service, we are, as yet, unprepared to declare that the power
of the municipal mayor as enunciated under Section 444(b)(3)(iv) is ministerial. What can be deduced from the
aforesaid section is that the limits in the exercise of the power of a municipal mayor to issue licenses, and permits and
suspend or revoke the same can be contained in a law or an ordinance. Otherwise stated, a law or an ordinance can
provide the conditions upon which the power of the municipal mayor under Section 444(b)(3)(iv) can be
exercised. Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC takes its cue from Section 16 thereof, which is largely an exercise of
delegated police power.

Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, whereby the power of the respondent mayor to issue
license and permits is circumscribed, is a manifestation of the delegated police power of a municipal
corporation. Necessarily, the exercise thereof cannot be deemed ministerial. As to the question of whether the power
is validly exercised, the matter is within the province of a writ of certiorari, but certainly, not of mandamus.

It may be true, as argued by petitioner, that Resolution No. 93-27, which was enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Hilongos, is not an ordinance but merely a resolution. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a
specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
Additionally, the two are enacted differently - a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution,
unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

However, the fact that Resolution No. 93-27 is a “mere” resolution can do nil to support petitioner’s cause. As stated
earlier, the proper action is certiorari to determine whether grave abuse of discretion had been committed on the part of
respondent mayor in the refusal to grant petitioner’s application. Petitioner’s petition for mandamus is incompetent
against respondent mayor’s discretionary power.
 MANUEL E. ZAMORA VS. GOVERNOR JOSE R. CABALLERO, ANESIO M. RANARIO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 147767, January 14, 2004, THIRD DIVISION, CARPIO MORALES, J.
FACTS.
Petitioner Manuel Zamora, a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela Valley (the Sanggunian),
seeks to invalidate all acts executed and resolutions issued by the Sanggunian during its sessions held on February 8 and
26, 2001 for lack of quorum. On February 8, 2001, the Sanggunian held a special session to, allow the Governor to
deliver his State of the Province Address. As only seven members of the fourteen-member Sanggunian were present, no
resolution was considered. On February 26, 2001, the Sanggunian held its 4th regular session during which it issued
Resolution No. 05 declaring the entire province of Compostela Valley under a state of calamity and Resolution No.
07 authorizing the Governor to enter into a construction contract with Allado Construction Company, Inc. for the
completion of Phase II of the construction of the capitol building. During the same session, the Sanggunian accepted
the letter of irrevocable resignation submitted by Board Member Gemma Theresa M. Sotto.
While only eight members of the Sanggunian were present at the commencement of the session on February
26, 2001, the Journal of the Proceedings and Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 showed that a total of thirteen members
attended it. Petitioner additionally alleged that when the vote respecting Resolution No. 05 was taken, only the
remaining six members voted for the adoption thereof, the then presiding officer Board Member Rolando Osorio not
having cast his vote; that when Resolution No. 07 was taken up, however, then presiding officer Osorio, relinquished
his seat to Board Member Graciano Arafol after the six members present unanimously voted on the said resolution in
the affirmative, following which Osorio cast his vote as a member also in the affirmative, thereby authorizing the
Governor to enter into the Contract with Allado Company; and that Board Member Arafol thereafter relinquished his
seat as presiding officer to Board Member Osorio who once again assumed the duties of a presiding officer.
The petition was dismissed by the RTC on the ground that Gemma Theresa M. Sotto should not be counted as
member for the purpose of determining the number to constitute a quorum because she is in the United States of
America as raised as a defense of the respondents

ISSUE. WON the acts of the sanggunian pertaining to the questioned resolutions are valid.

DECISION.
Resolutions no. 5 and 7 are invalid for lack of quorum. A majority of all members of the sanggunian who have
been elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum to transact official business. Should a question of quorum be raised
during a session, the presiding officer shall immediately proceed to call the roll of the members and thereafter announce
the results. “Quorum” is defined as that number of members of a body which, when legally assembled in their proper
places, will enable the body to transact its proper business or that number which makes a lawful body and gives it
power to pass upon a law or ordinance or do any valid act. “Majority,” when required to constitute a quorum, means
the number greater than half or more than half of any total. In fine, the entire membership must be taken into account
in computing the quorum of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, for while the constitution merely states that “majority of
each House shall constitute a quorum,” Section 53 of the LGC is more exacting as it requires that the “majority of all
members of the sanggunian . . . elected and qualified” shall constitute a quorum.
Thus the trial court should have based its determination of the existence of a quorum on the total number of
members of the Sanggunian without regard to the filing of a leave of absence by Board Member Sotto5. The fear that a
majority may, for reasons of political affiliation, file leaves of absence in order to cripple the functioning of the
sanggunian is already addressed by the grant of coercive power to a mere majority of sanggunian members present
when there is no quorum. A sanggunian is a collegial body. Legislation, which is the principal function and duty of the
sanggunian, requires the participation of all its members so that they may not only represent the interests of their
respective constituents but also help in the making of decisions by voting upon every question put upon the body. The
acts of only a part of the Sanggunian done outside the parameters of the legal provisions aforementioned are legally
infirm, highly questionable and are, more importantly, null and void.

5 There is nothing on record, save for respondents’ allegation, to show that Board Member Sotto was out of the country and to thereby conclude
that she was outside the coercive power of the Sanggunian when the February 8 and 26, 2001 sessions were held. In fact it is undisputed that the
leave form filed by said Board Member before the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) did not mention that she was going out
of the country.
Note
Assuming arguendo that there was quorum the questioned resolutions are still null and void.
 Resolution No. 05 declaring the entire province of Compostela Valley under state of calamity is still null and
void because the motion for its approval was approved by only six members. When there are thirteen members
present at a session, the vote of only six members cannot, at any instance, be deemed to be in compliance with
Section 107(g) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC which requires the concurrence of the
approval by the majority of the members present and the existence of a quorum in order to validly enact a
resolution.
 The grant of authority to the governor to enter into the construction contract is also deemed not approved in
accordance with the law even if it received seven affirmative votes, which is already the majority of thirteen,
due to the defect in the seventh vote. For as priorly stated, as the Journal confirms, after all six members voted
in the affirmative, Board Member Osorio, as acting presiding officer, relinquished his seat to Board Member
Arafol and thereafter cast his vote as a member in favor of granting authority to the Governor. A presiding
officer shall only vote to break a tie. Such act by Osorio is clearly intended to circumvent an express
prohibition under the law.
 HABAGAT GRILL Through LOUIE BIRAOGO, Proprietor/Manager, PETITIONER, VS. DMC-URBAN
PROPERTY DEVELOPER, INC., RESPONDENT.

FACTS.
Consunji Inc. acquired and became the owner of a residential lot situated in Matina Davao City. On June 13,
1981, David Consunji Inc transferred said lot to its sister company, the DMC Urban Property Developers, Inc (DMC)
in whose favor TCT No. T-279042 was issued. Alleging that Louie Biraogo forcibly entered said lot and built the
Habagat Grill in December 1993, DMC filed on March 28, 1994 a Complaint for Forcible Entry against Habagat Grill
and/or Louie Biraogo. The Complaint alleged that as owner DMC possessed the lot in question from June 11, 1981
until December 1, 1993, that on that day, December 1, 1993, Louie Biraogo, by means of strategy and stealth,
unlawfully entered into the lot in question and constructed the Habagat Grill thereon, thus illegally depriving DMC of
the possession of said lot since then up to the present, that the reasonable rental value of said lot is P10,000 a month.
Louie Biraogo in his Answer denied illegally entering the lot in question.

After necessary proceedings, the MTCC rendered a decision dismissing the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and lack of cause of action. Thereafter, the RTC affirmed the decision. On appeal, the CA reversed the
decision, ruling that the petitioner faulted for not presenting any other documentary evidence to establish the date of
Habagat Grill’s construction. The appellate court explained that the lower court could take cognizance of Presidential
Proclamation No. 20, but not of the situational relation between the property covered by the Proclamation and the land
in question.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner avers that no cause of action was alleged by respondent, as shown by the
following circumstances: (1) the latter’s property was not encroached upon by Habagat Grill, which had allegedly been
constructed on a portion of land owned by the City Government of Davao; and (2) respondent failed to prove that its
predecessor-in-interest had prior possession of the property. On the other hand, respondent argues that the trial court
indiscriminately ignored the Report of the survey team that had been constituted to determine the exact location of
Habagat Grill. Respondent further contends that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the metes and bounds
of the property covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 20.

ISSUE. WON respondent alleged a sufficient cause of action in its complaint

RULING.
YES. “Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without
proof because they already know them.” Its object is to save time, labor and expense in securing and introducing
evidence on matters that are not ordinarily capable of dispute or actually bona fide disputed, and the tenor of which can
safely be assumed from the tribunal’s general knowledge or from a slight search on its part.

Indeed, municipal courts may take judicial notice of the municipal ordinances in force in the municipality in
which they sit. Such notice, however, is limited to what the law is and what it states. As can be gleaned from its
discussions, the trial court took judicial notice of the existence of Presidential Proclamation No. 20, which declared
Times Beach a recreation center. The MTC also took judicial notice of the location of the beach, which was from the
shoreline to the “road towards the shoreline.” On the basis of these premises, the trial court resolved that the lot on
which petitioner’s restaurant was located should necessarily be inside Times Beach, which was owned by the City of
Davao. Hence, it was the City -- not respondent -- that had a cause of action against petitioner. To arrive at this
conclusion, the MTC made its own estimate of the location of the metes and bounds of the property mentioned by the
law.
The location of Habagat Grill cannot be resolved by merely taking judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation No. 20;
such location is precisely at the core of the dispute in this case. Moreover, considering respondent’s allegation that the
supposed lot covered by the Ordinance has been lost due to inundation by the sea, we cannot fathom how the trial
court could have known of the actual location of the metes and bounds of the subject lot. Neither may the MTC take
discretionary judicial notice under Section 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, because the exact boundaries of the lot
covered by that law are not a matter of public knowledge capable of unquestionable demonstration. Neither may these
be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

Hence, the CA was correct in disregarding the findings of the trial courts, because they had erred in taking judicial
notice of the exact metes and bounds of the property. The appellate court aptly relied on the Report submitted by the
survey team that had been constituted by the trial court, precisely for the purpose of determining the location of
Habagat Grill in relation to respondent’s lot.
Petition denied.

* Petitioner also argued that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, because mere allegation of
ownership did not, by itself, show that respondent had prior possession of the property. The Court
disagree. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. As long as these
allegations demonstrate a cause of action either for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter. This principle holds, even if the facts proved during the trial do not support the
cause of action thus alleged, in which instance the court -- after acquiring jurisdiction -- may resolve to dismiss the
action for insufficiency of evidence.
* Finally, petitioner avers that respondent failed to prove that the latter’s predecessor-in-interest had prior possession of
the property. Conversely, respondent alleges that its predecessor was in prior physical possession of the property as the
registered owner thereof since June 11, 1981. Again, the Court rule for respondent. The only issue in ejectment
proceedings is possession de facto, not possession de jure. In the present case, prior possession of the lot by respondent’s
predecessor was sufficiently proven by evidence of the execution and registration of public instruments and by the fact
that the lot was subject to its will from then until December 1, 1993, when petitioner unlawfully entered the premises
and deprived the former of possession thereof.
 BATANGAS CATV, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CITY
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD and BATANGAS CITY MAYOR, respondents.

FACTS.
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to
construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is
authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, “provided, however, that any increase of
ratesshall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. In November 1993, petitioner increased its
subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening
to cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No.
210. Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging that respondent
Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under
Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the
CATV operation in the Philippines.

ISSUE. May a local government unit regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its territorial
jurisdiction?

HELD.
No. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC exercises
regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies.

Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause. This is primarily
because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses public properties in order to
reach subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV system – the use of public streets, rights of ways, the
founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions – allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV
operators.

But, while we recognize the LGUs’ power under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No. 210. We
are convinced that respondents strayed from the well recognized limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210
are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the State’s deregulation policy over the CATV industry.

LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive regulatory power of
the NTC.