G.R. No.
94951 April 22, 1991 Under Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms
APEX MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and SINCLITICA CANDIDO, respondents.
Bernabe B. Alabastro for petitioner.
Angel Fernandez for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Is the househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company a domestic helper or a
regular employee of the said firm? This is the novel issue raised in this petition.
Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex Mining
Company, Inc. on May 18, 1973 to perform laundry services at its staff house located at
Masara, Maco, Davao del Norte. In the beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis.
However, on January 17, 1982, she was paid on a monthly basis at P250.00 a month
which was ultimately increased to P575.00 a month.
On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she was
hanging her laundry, she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. She reported
the accident to her immediate supervisor Mila de la Rosa and to the personnel officer,
Florendo D. Asirit. As a result of the accident she was not able to continue with her work.
She was permitted to go on leave for medication. De la Rosa offered her the amount of
P 2,000.00 which was eventually increased to P5,000.00 to persuade her to quit her job,
but she refused the offer and preferred to return to work. Petitioner did not allow her to
return to work and dismissed her on February 4, 1988.
On March 11, 1988, private respondent filed a request for assistance with the
Department of Labor and Employment. After the parties submitted their position papers
as required by the labor arbiter assigned to the case on August 24, 1988 the latter
rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, Conformably With The Foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the respondent, Apex Mining Company, Inc., Masara, Davao del
Norte, to pay the complainant, to wit:
1 Salary Differential –– P16,289.20
2. Emergency Living Allowance –– 12,430.00
3. 13th Month Pay Differential –– 1,322.32
4. Separation Pay (One-month for every year of service [1973-19881) ––
25,119.30 or in the total of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY ONE
PESOS AND 42/100 (P55,161.42).
SO ORDERED.1
Not satisfied therewith, petitioner appealed to the public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), wherein in due course a decision was rendered by the
Fifth Division thereof on July 20, 1989 dismissing the appeal for lack of merit and affirming
the appealed decision. A motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in a resolution
of the NLRC dated June 29, 1990.
Hence, the herein petition for review by certiorari, which appopriately should be a
special civil action for certiorari, and which in the interest of justice, is hereby treated as
such.2 The main thrust of the petition is that private respondent should be treated as a
mere househelper or domestic servant and not as a regular employee of petitioner.
The petition is devoid of merit.
"househelper" or "domestic servant" are defined as follows:
The term "househelper" as used herein is synonymous to the term "domestic
servant" and shall refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders
services in and about the employer's home and which services are usually
necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and
ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's
family.3
The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant
who is employed in the employer's home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort
and enjoyment of the employer's family. Such definition covers family drivers, domestic
servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and other similar househelps.
The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or laundrywomen working in
staffhouses of a company, like petitioner who attends to the needs of the company's
guest and other persons availing of said facilities. By the same token, it cannot be
considered to extend to then driver, houseboy, or gardener exclusively working in the
company, the staffhouses and its premises. They may not be considered as within the
meaning of a "househelper" or "domestic servant" as above-defined by law.
The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the
home of said employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a
househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company staffhouse
may be similar in nature, the difference in their circumstances is that in the former
instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter case, whether it is a
corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other
agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the
premises of the business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of the
company or employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular
employee.
Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic servant is assigned
to certain aspects of the business of the employer that such househelper or domestic
servant may be considered as such as employee. The Court finds no merit in making
any such distinction. The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working
within the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection
with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and employees,
warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be
considered as a regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family
househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the
Labor Code, as amended.
Petitioner denies having illegally dismissed private respondent and maintains that
respondent abandoned her work.1âwphi1 This argument notwithstanding, there is
enough evidence to show that because of an accident which took place while private
respondent was performing her laundry services, she was not able to work and was
ultimately separated from the service. She is, therefore, entitled to appropriate relief as
a regular employee of petitioner. Inasmuch as private respondent appears not to be
interested in returning to her work for valid reasons, the payment of separation pay to
her is in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision and resolution of
public respondent NLRC are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 169295-96 November 20, 2006
REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA CASTANEDA, Respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Before this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 filed by Remington Industrial
Sales Corporation to reverse and set aside the Decision2 of the Fourth Division of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 64577 and 68477, dated January 31, 2005, which
dismissed petitioner’s consolidated petitions for certiorari, and its subsequent Resolution,3
dated August 11, 2005, which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
The present controversy began when private respondent, Erlinda Castaneda ("Erlinda")
instituted on March 2, 1998 a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages,
non-payment of overtime services, non-payment of service incentive leave pay and
non-payment of 13th month pay against Remington before the NLRC, National Capital
Region, Quezon City. The complaint impleaded Mr. Antonio Tan in his capacity as the
Managing Director of Remington.
Erlinda alleged that she started working in August 1983 as company cook with a salary
of Php 4,000.00 for Remington, a corporation engaged in the trading business; that she
worked for six (6) days a week, starting as early as 6:00 a.m. because she had to do the
marketing and would end at around 5:30 p.m., or even later, after most of the
employees, if not all, had left the company premises; that she continuously worked with
Remington until she was unceremoniously prevented from reporting for work when
Remington transferred to a new site in Edsa, Caloocan City. She averred that she
reported for work at the new site in Caloocan City on January 15, 1998, only to be
informed that Remington no longer needed her services. Erlinda believed that her
dismissal was illegal because she was not given the notices required by law; hence, she
filed her complaint for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, salary differentials,
service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and 10% attorney’s fees.
Remington denied that it dismissed Erlinda illegally. It posited that Erlinda was a
domestic helper, not a regular employee; Erlinda worked as a cook and this job had
nothing to do with Remington’s business of trading in construction or hardware
materials, steel plates and wire rope products. It also contended that contrary to
Erlinda’s allegations that the (sic) she worked for eight (8) hours a day, Erlinda’s duty was
merely to cook lunch and "merienda", after which her time was hers to spend as she
pleased. Remington also maintained that it did not exercise any degree of control
and/or supervision over Erlinda’s work as her only concern was to ensure that the
employees’ lunch and "merienda" were available and served at the designated time.
Remington likewise belied Erlinda’s assertion that her work extended beyond 5:00 p.m.
as she could only leave after all the employees had gone. The truth, according to
Remington, is that Erlinda did not have to punch any time card in the way that other
employees of Remington did; she was free to roam around the company premises,
read magazines, and to even nap when not doing her assigned chores. Remington
averred that the illegal dismissal complaint lacked factual and legal bases. Allegedly, it
was Erlinda who refused to report for work when Remington moved to a new location in
Caloocan City.
In a Decision4 dated January 19, 1999, the labor arbiter dismissed the complaint and
ruled that the respondent was a domestic helper under the personal service of Antonio
Tan, finding that her work as a cook was not usually necessary and desirable in the
ordinary course of trade and business of the petitioner corporation, which operated as
a trading company, and that the latter did not exercise control over her functions. On
the issue of illegal dismissal, the labor arbiter found that it was the respondent who
refused to go with the family of Antonio Tan when the corporation transferred office and
that, therefore, respondent could not have been illegally dismissed.
Upon appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) rendered a Decision,5
dated November 23, 2000, reversing the labor arbiter, ruling, viz:
We are not inclined to uphold the declaration below that complainant is a domestic
helper of the family of Antonio Tan. There was no allegation by respondent that
complainant had ever worked in the residence of Mr. Tan. What is clear from the facts
narrated by the parties is that complainant continuously did her job as a cook in the
office of respondent serving the needed food for lunch and merienda of the
employees. Thus, her work as cook inured not for the benefit of the family members of
Mr. Tan but solely for the individual employees of respondent.
Complainant as an employee of respondent company is even bolstered by no less than
the certification dated May 23, 1997 issued by the corporate secretary of the company
certifying that complainant is their bonafide employee. This is a solid evidence which
the Labor Arbiter simply brushed aside. But, such error would not be committed here as
it would be at the height of injustice if we are to declare that complainant is a domestic
helper.
Complainant’s work schedule and being paid a monthly salary of ₱4,000.00 are clear
indication that she is a company employee who had been employed to cater to the
food needed by the employees which were being provided by respondent to form part
of the benefit granted them.
With regard to the issue of illegal dismissal, we believe that there is more reason to
believe that complainant was not dismissed because allegedly she was the one who
refused to work in the new office of respondent. However, complainant’s refusal to join
the workforce due to poor eyesight could not be considered abandonment of work or
voluntary resignation from employment.
Under the Labor Code as amended, an employee who reaches the age of sixty years
old (60 years) has the option to retire or to separate from the service with payment of
separation pay/retirement benefit.
In this case, we notice that complainant was already 60 years old at the time she filed
the complaint praying for separation pay or retirement benefit and some money claims.
Based on Article 287 of the Labor Code as amended, complainant is entitled to be paid
her separation pay/retirement benefit equivalent to one-half (1/2) month for every year
of service. The amount of separation pay would be based on the prescribed minimum
wage at the time of dismissal since she was then underpaid. In as much as complainant
is underpaid of her wages, it behooves that she should be paid her salary differential for
the last three years prior to separation/retirement.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby, SET ASIDE, and a new
one is hereby entered ordering respondents to pay complainant the following:
1. Salary differential - ₱12,021.12 2. Service Incentive Leave Pay - 2,650.00 3. 13th Month
Pay differential - 1,001.76 4. Separation Pay/retirement benefit - 36,075.00
Total - ₱51,747.88
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved to reconsider this decision but the NLRC denied the motion. This denial
of its motion prompted petitioner to file a Petition for Certiorari 6 with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64577, on May 4, 2001, imputing grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC in (1)
reversing in toto the decision of the labor arbiter, and (2) awarding in favor of
respondent salary differential, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay differential
and separation benefits in the total sum of ₱51,747.88.
While the petition was pending with the Court of Appeals, the NLRC rendered another
Decision7 in the same case on August 29, 2001. How and why another decision was
rendered is explained in that decision as follows:
On May 17, 2001, complainant filed a Manifestation praying for a resolution of her
Motion for Reconsideration and, in support thereof, alleges that, sometime December
18, 2000, she mailed her Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration registered as
Registered Certificate No. 188844; and that the said mail was received by the NLRC,
through a certain Roland Hernandez, on December 26, 2000. Certifications to this effect
was issued by the Postmaster of the Sta. Mesa Post Office bearing the date May 11,
2001 (Annexes A and B, Complainant’s Manifestation).
Evidence in support of complainant’s having actually filed a Motion for Reconsideration
within the reglementary period having been sufficiently established, a determination of
its merits is thus, in order.
On the merits, the NLRC found respondent’s motion for reconsideration meritorious
leading to the issuance of its second decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated November 23, 2000, is MODIFIED
by increasing the award of retirement pay due the complainant in the total amount of
SIXTY TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN and 50/100 (₱62,437.50). All other
monetary relief so adjudged therein are maintained and likewise made payable to the
complainant.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner challenged the second decision of the NLRC, including the resolution denying
its motion for reconsideration, through a second Petition for Certiorari 8 filed with the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68477 and dated January 8, 2002, this
time imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the NLRC in (1) issuing the second decision despite losing its jurisdiction due
to the pendency of the first petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and (2)
assuming it still had jurisdiction to issue the second decision notwithstanding the
pendency of the first petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, that its second
decision has no basis in law since respondent’s motion for reconsideration, which was
made the basis of the second decision, was not filed under oath in violation of Section
14, Rule VII9 of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC and that it contained no
certification as to why respondent’s motion for reconsideration was not decided on
time as also required by Section 10, Rule VI10 and Section 15, Rule VII11 of the
aforementioned rules.
Upon petitioner’s motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the consolidation of the two (2)
petitions, on January 24, 2002, pursuant to Section 7, par. b(3), Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of the Court of Appeals. It summarized the principal issues raised in the
consolidated petitions as follows:
1. Whether respondent is petitioner’s regular employee or a domestic helper;
2. Whether respondent was illegally dismissed; and
3. Whether the second NLRC decision promulgated during the pendency of
the first petition for certiorari has basis in law.
On January 31, 2005, the Court of Appeals dismissed the consolidated petitions for lack
of merit, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in issuing the
assailed decisions.
On the first issue, it upheld the ruling of the NLRC that respondent was a regular
employee of the petitioner since the former worked at the company premises and
catered not only to the personal comfort and enjoyment of Mr. Tan and his family, but
also to that of the employees of the latter. It agreed that petitioner enjoys the
prerogative to control respondent’s conduct in undertaking her assigned work,
particularly the nature and situs of her work in relation to the petitioner’s workforce,
thereby establishing the existence of an employer-employee relationship between
them.
On the issue of illegal dismissal, it ruled that respondent has attained the status of a
regular employee in her service with the company. It noted that the NLRC found that no
less than the company’s corporate secretary certified that respondent is a bonafide
company employee and that she had a fixed schedule and routine of work and was
paid a monthly salary of ₱4,000.00; that she served with petitioner for 15 years starting in
1983, buying and cooking food served to company employees at lunch and merienda;
and that this work was usually necessary and desirable in the regular business of the
petitioner. It held that as a regular employee, she enjoys the constitutionally guaranteed
right to security of tenure and that petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving
that her dismissal on January 15, 1998 was for a just or authorized cause and that the
manner of dismissal complied with the requirements under the law.
Finally, on petitioner’s other arguments relating to the alleged irregularity of the second
NLRC decision, i.e., the fact that respondent’s motion for reconsideration was not under
oath and had no certification explaining why it was not resolved within the prescribed
period, it held that such violations relate to procedural and non-jurisdictional matters
that cannot assume primacy over the substantive merits of the case and that they do
not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that
would nullify the second NLRC decision.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s contention that the NLRC lost its jurisdiction to
issue the second decision when it received the order indicating the Court of Appeals’
initial action on the first petition for certiorari that it filed. It ruled that the NLRC’s action
of issuing a decision in installments was not prohibited by its own rules and that the need
for a second decision was justified by the fact that respondent’s own motion for
reconsideration remained unresolved in the first decision. Furthermore, it held that under
Section 7, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court,12 the filing of a petition for certiorari
does not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order
or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from
further proceeding with the case.
From this decision, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on February 22, 2005,
which the Court of Appeals denied through a resolution dated August 11, 2005.
Hence, the present petition for review.
The petitioner raises the following errors of law: (1) the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the NLRC’s ruling that the respondent was petitioner’s regular employee and
not a domestic helper; (2) the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner was
guilty of illegal dismissal; and (3) the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the
issuance of the second NLRC decision is proper.
The petition must fail. We affirm that respondent was a regular employee of the
petitioner and that the latter was guilty of illegal dismissal.
Before going into the substantive merits of the present controversy, we shall first resolve
the propriety of the issuance of the second NLRC decision.
The petitioner contends that the respondent’s motion for reconsideration, upon which
the second NLRC decision was based, was not under oath and did not contain a
certification as to why it was not decided on time as required under the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC.13 Furthermore, the former also raises for the first time the
contention that respondent’s motion was filed beyond the ten (10)-calendar day period
required under the same Rules,14 since the latter received a copy of the first NLRC
decision on December 6, 2000, and respondent filed her motion only on December 18,
2000. Thus, according to petitioner, the respondent’s motion for reconsideration was a
mere scrap of paper and the second NLRC decision has no basis in law.
We do not agree.
It is well-settled that the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed to
serve the demands of substantial justice, particularly in labor cases.15 Labor cases must
be decided according to justice and equity and the substantial merits of the
controversy.16 Rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice.17 Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be avoided.18
This Court has consistently held that the requirement of verification is formal, and not
jurisdictional. Such requirement is merely a condition affecting the form of the pleading,
non-compliance with which does not necessarily render it fatally defective. Verification
is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true
and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and
that the pleading is filed in good faith.19 The court may order the correction of the
pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the
attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.20
Anent the argument that respondent’s motion for reconsideration, on which the NLRC’s
second decision was based, was filed out of time, such issue was only brought up for the
first time in the instant petition where no new issues may be raised by a party in his
pleadings without offending the right to due process of the opposing party.
Nonetheless, the petitioner asserts that the respondent received a copy of the NLRC’s
first decision on December 6, 2000, and the motion for reconsideration was filed only on
December 18, 2000, or two (2) days beyond the ten (10)-calendar day period
requirement under the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC and should not be
allowed.21
This contention must fail.
Under Article 22322 of the Labor Code, the decision of the NLRC shall be final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from the receipt thereof by the parties.
While it is an established rule that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within
the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to
perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory, it is
equally settled that the NLRC may disregard the procedural lapse where there is an
acceptable reason to excuse tardiness in the taking of the appeal.23 Among the
acceptable reasons recognized by this Court are (a) counsel's reliance on the footnote
of the notice of the decision of the Labor Arbiter that "the aggrieved party may appeal.
. . within ten (10) working days";24 (b) fundamental consideration of substantial justice;25
(c) prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment, as where the tardy
appeal is from a decision granting separation pay which was already granted in an
earlier final decision;26 and (d) special circumstances of the case combined with its
legal merits27 or the amount and the issue involved.28
We hold that the particular circumstances in the case at bar, in accordance with
substantial justice, call for a liberalization of the application of this rule. Notably,
respondent’s last day for filing her motion for reconsideration fell on December 16, 2000,
which was a Saturday. In a number of cases,29 we have ruled that if the tenth day for
perfecting an appeal fell on a Saturday, the appeal shall be made on the next working
day. The reason for this ruling is that on Saturdays, the office of the NLRC and certain
post offices are closed. With all the more reason should this doctrine apply to
respondent’s filing of the motion for reconsideration of her cause, which the NLRC itself
found to be impressed with merit. Indeed, technicality should not be permitted to stand
in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the
parties for the ends of justice are reached not only through the speedy disposal of cases
but, more importantly, through a meticulous and comprehensive evaluation of the
merits of a case.
Finally, as to petitioner’s argument that the NLRC had already lost its jurisdiction to
decide the case when it filed its petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals upon
the denial of its motion for reconsideration, suffice it to state that under Section 7 of Rule
6530 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition shall not interrupt the course of the
principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has
been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding with the case. Thus,
the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, in connection with a pending
case in a lower court, does not interrupt the course of the latter if there is no writ of
injunction.31 Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in
issuing its second decision which modified the first, especially since it failed to consider
the respondent’s motion for reconsideration when it issued its first decision.
Having resolved the procedural matters, we shall now delve into the merits of the
petition to determine whether respondent is a domestic helper or a regular employee of
the petitioner, and whether the latter is guilty of illegal dismissal.
Petitioner relies heavily on the affidavit of a certain Mr. Antonio Tan and contends that
respondent is the latter’s domestic helper and not a regular employee of the company
since Mr. Tan has a separate and distinct personality from the petitioner. It maintains
that it did not exercise control and supervision over her functions; and that it operates as
a trading company and does not engage in the restaurant business, and therefore
respondent’s work as a cook, which was not usually necessary or desirable to its usual
line of business or trade, could not make her its regular employee.
This contention fails to impress.
In Apex Mining Company, Inc. v. NLRC,32 this Court held that a househelper in the staff
houses of an industrial company was a regular employee of the said firm. We
ratiocinated that:
Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms
"househelper" or "domestic servant" are defined as follows:
"The term ‘househelper’ as used herein is synonymous to the term ‘domestic servant’
and shall refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders services in and
about the employer’s home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for
the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal
comfort and enjoyment of the employer’s family."
The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant
who is employed in the employer’s home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort
and enjoyment of the employer’s family. Such definition covers family drivers, domestic Petitioner contends that there was abandonment on respondent’s part when she
servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and similar househelps. refused to report for work when the corporation transferred to a new location in
Caloocan City, claiming that her poor eyesight would make long distance travel a
xxx xxx xxx
problem. Thus, it cannot be held guilty of illegal dismissal.
The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the
On the other hand, the respondent claims that when the petitioner relocated, she was
home of said employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a
no longer called for duty and that when she tried to report for work, she was told that
househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company staffhouse
her services were no longer needed. She contends that the petitioner dismissed her
may be similar in nature, the difference in their circumstances is that in the former
without a just or authorized cause and that she was not given prior notice, hence
instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter case, whether it is a
rendering the dismissal illegal.
corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other
agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the We rule for the respondent.
premises of the business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of the
As a regular employee, respondent enjoys the right to security of tenure under Article
company or employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular
27938 of the Labor Code and may only be dismissed for a just39 or authorized40 cause,
employee.
otherwise the dismissal becomes illegal and the employee becomes entitled to
Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic servant is assigned reinstatement and full backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld
to certain aspects of the business of the employer that such househelper or domestic up to the time of actual reinstatement.
servant may be considered as such an employee. The Court finds no merit in making
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his
any such distinction. The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working
employment.41 It is a form of neglect of duty; hence, a just cause for termination of
within the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection
employment by the employer under Article 282 of the Labor Code, which enumerates
with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and employees,
the just causes for termination by the employer.42 For a valid finding of abandonment,
warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be
these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without
considered as a regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family
valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee
househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of
relationship, with the second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by
the Labor Code, as amended.
overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employee has no more intention to
In the case at bar, the petitioner itself admits in its position paper33 that respondent work.43 The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it
worked at the company premises and her duty was to cook and prepare its employees’ was deliberate and unjustified.44 This, the petitioner failed to do in the case at bar.
lunch and merienda. Clearly, the situs, as well as the nature of respondent’s work as a
Alongside the petitioner’s contention that it was the respondent who quit her
cook, who caters not only to the needs of Mr. Tan and his family but also to that of the
employment and refused to return to work, greater stock may be taken of the
petitioner’s employees, makes her fall squarely within the definition of a regular
respondent’s immediate filing of her complaint with the NLRC. Indeed, an employee
employee under the doctrine enunciated in the Apex Mining case. That she works
who loses no time in protesting her layoff cannot by any reasoning be said to have
within company premises, and that she does not cater exclusively to the personal
abandoned her work, for it is well-settled that the filing of an employee of a complaint
comfort of Mr. Tan and his family, is reflective of the existence of the petitioner’s right of
for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement is proof enough of her desire to return
control over her functions, which is the primary indicator of the existence of an
to work, thus, negating the employer’s charge of abandonment.45
employer-employee relationship.
In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the
Moreover, it is wrong to say that if the work is not directly related to the employer's
dismissal is for a just and valid cause; failure to do so would necessarily mean that the
business, then the person performing such work could not be considered an employee
dismissal was illegal.46 The employer’s case succeeds or fails on the strength of its
of the latter. The determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship is
evidence and not on the weakness of the employee’s defense.47 If doubt exists
defined by law according to the facts of each case, regardless of the nature of the
between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of
activities involved.34 Indeed, it would be the height of injustice if we were to hold that
justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.48
despite the fact that respondent was made to cook lunch and merienda for the
petitioner’s employees, which work ultimately redounded to the benefit of the petitioner IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated
corporation, she was merely a domestic worker of the family of Mr. Tan. January 31, 2005, and the Resolution dated August 11, 2005, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 64577 and 68477 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
We note the findings of the NLRC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that no less than
the company’s corporate secretary has certified that respondent is a bonafide SO ORDERED.
company employee;35 she had a fixed schedule and routine of work and was paid a
monthly salary of ₱4,000.00;36 she served with the company for 15 years starting in 1983,
buying and cooking food served to company employees at lunch and merienda, and
that this service was a regular feature of employment with the company.37
Indubitably, the Court of Appeals, as well as the NLRC, correctly held that based on the
given circumstances, the respondent is a regular employee of the petitioner.1âwphi1
Having determined that the respondent is petitioner’s regular employee, we now
proceed to ascertain the legality of her dismissal from employment.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10361
AN ACT INSTITUTING POLICIES FOR THE PROTECTION AND WELFARE OF DOMESTIC
WORKERS
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
ARTICLE I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the "Domestic Workers Act" or "Batas
Kasambahay".
Section 2. Declaration of Policies. – It is hereby declared that:
(a) The State strongly affirms labor as a primary social force and is
committed to respect, promote, protect and realize the fundamental
principles and rights at work including, but not limited to, abolition of
child labor, elimination of all forms of forced labor, discrimination in
employment and occupation, and trafficking in persons, especially
women and children;
(b) The State adheres to internationally accepted working conditions
for workers in general, and establishes labor standards for domestic
workers in particular, towards decent employment and income,
enhanced coverage of social protection, respect for human rights
and strengthened social dialogue;
(c) The State recognizes the need to protect the rights of domestic
workers against abuse, harassment, violence, economic exploitation
and performance of work that is hazardous to their physical and
mental health; and
(d) The State, in protecting domestic workers and recognizing their
special needs to ensure safe and healthful working conditions,
promotes gender-sensitive measures in the formulation and
implementation of policies and programs affecting the local
domestic work.
Section 3. Coverage. – This Act applies to all domestic workers employed and working
within the country.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the term:
(a) Debt bondage refers to the rendering of service by the domestic
worker as security or payment for a debt where the length and
nature of service is not clearly defined or when the value of the
service is not reasonably applied in the payment of the debt.
(b) Deployment expenses refers to expenses that are directly used for
the transfer of the domestic worker from place of origin to the place
of work covering the cost of transportation. Advances or loans by the
domestic worker are not included in the definition of deployment
expenses.
(c) Domestic work refers to work performed in or for a household or
households.
(d) Domestic worker or "Kasambahay" refers to any person engaged
in domestic work within an employment relationship such as, but not
limited to, the following: general househelp, nursemaid or "yaya",
cook, gardener, or laundry person, but shall exclude any person who
performs domestic work only occasionally or sporadically and not on
an occupational basis.
The term shall not include children who are under foster family
arrangement, and are provided access to education and given an
allowance incidental to education, i.e. "baon", transportation, school
projects and school activities.
(e) Employer refers to any person who engages and controls the
services of a domestic worker and is party to the employment
contract.
(f) Household refers to the immediate members of the family or the
occupants of the house that are directly provided services by the
domestic worker.
(g) Private Employment Agency (PEA) refers to any individual,
legitimate partnership, corporation or entity licensed to engage in
the recruitment and placement of domestic workers for local
employment.
(h) Working children, as used under this Act, refers to domestic
workers who are fifteen (15) years old and above but below eighteen
(18) years old.
ARTICLE II
RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES
Section 5. Standard of Treatment. – The employer or any member of the household shall
not subject a domestic worker or "kasambahay" to any kind of abuse nor inflict any form
of physical violence or harassment or any act tending to degrade the dignity of a
domestic worker.
Section 6. Board, Lodging and Medical Attendance. – The employer shall provide for
the basic necessities of the domestic worker to include at least three (3) adequate
meals a day and humane sleeping arrangements that ensure safety.
The employer shall provide appropriate rest and assistance to the domestic worker in
case of illnesses and injuries sustained during service without loss of benefits.
At no instance shall the employer withdraw or hold in abeyance the provision of these
basic necessities as punishment or disciplinary action to the domestic worker.
Section 7. Guarantee of Privacy. – Respect for the privacy of the domestic worker shall
be guaranteed at all times and shall extend to all forms of communication and personal
effects. This guarantee equally recognizes that the domestic worker is obliged to render
satisfactory service at all times.
Section 8. Access to Outside Communication. – The employer shall grant the domestic
worker access to outside communication during free time: Provided, That in case of
emergency, access to communication shall be granted even during work time. Should
the domestic worker make use of the employer’s telephone or other communication
facilities, the costs shall be borne by the domestic worker, unless such charges are
waived by the employer.
Section 9. Right to Education and Training. – The employer shall afford the domestic
worker the opportunity to finish basic education and may allow access to alternative
learning systems and, as far as practicable, higher education or technical and
vocational training. The employer shall adjust the work schedule of the domestic worker
to allow such access to education or training without hampering the services required
by the employer.
Section 10. Prohibition Against Privileged Information. – All communication and
information pertaining to the employer or members of the household shall be treated as
privileged and confidential, and shall not be publicly disclosed by the domestic worker
during and after employment. Such privileged information shall be inadmissible in
evidence except when the suit involves the employer or any member of the household
in a crime against persons, property, personal liberty and security, and chastity.
ARTICLE III
PRE-EMPLOYMENT
Section 11. Employment Contract. – An employment contract shall be executed by and
between the domestic worker and the employer before the commencement of the
service in a language or dialect understood by both the domestic worker and the
employer. The domestic worker shall be provided a copy of the duly signed
employment contract which must include the following:
(a) Duties and responsibilities of the domestic worker;
(b) Period of employment;
(c) Compensation;
(d) Authorized deductions;
(e) Hours of work and proportionate additional payment;
(f) Rest days and allowable leaves;
(g) Board, lodging and medical attention;
(h) Agreements on deployment expenses, if any;
(i) Loan agreement;
(j) Termination of employment; and
(k) Any other lawful condition agreed upon by both parties.
The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) shall develop a model employment
contract for domestic workers which shall, at all times, be made available free of
charge to domestic workers, employers, representative organizations and the general
public. The DOLE shall widely disseminate information to domestic workers and
employers on the use of such model employment contract.
In cases where the employment of the domestic worker is facilitated through a private
employment agency, the PEA shall keep a copy of all employment contracts of
domestic workers and shall be made available for verification and inspection by the
DOLE.
Section 12. Pre-Employment Requirement. – Prior to the execution of the employment
contract, the employer may require the following from the domestic worker:
(a) Medical certificate or a health certificate issued by a local
government health officer;
(b) Barangay and police clearance;
(c) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) clearance; and
(d) Duly authenticated birth certificate or if not available, any other
document showing the age of the domestic worker such as voter’s
identification card, baptismal record or passport.
However, Section 12(a), (b), (c) and (d) shall be standard requirements when the
employment of the domestic worker is facilitated through the PEA.
The cost of the foregoing shall be borne by the prospective employer or agency, as the
case may be.
Section 13. Recruitment and Finder’s Fees. – Regardless of whether the domestic worker
was hired through a private employment agency or a third party, no share in the
recruitment or finder’s fees shall be charged against the domestic worker by the said
private employment agency or third party.
Section 14. Deposits for Loss or Damage. – It shall be unlawful for the employer or any
other person to require a domestic worker to make deposits from which deductions shall
be made for the reimbursement of loss or damage to tools, materials, furniture and
equipment in the household.
Section 15. Prohibition on Debt Bondage. – It shall be unlawful for the employer or any
person acting on behalf of the employer to place the domestic worker under debt
bondage.
Section 16. Employment Age of Domestic Workers. – It shall be unlawful to employ any
person below fifteen (15) years of age as a domestic worker. Employment of working
children, as defined under this Act, shall be subject to the provisionsof Section 10(A),
paragraph 2 of Section 12-A, paragraph 4 of Section 12-D, and Section 13 of Republic
Act No. 7610, as amended, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act".
Working children shall be entitled to minimum wage, and all benefits provided under this
Act.
Any employer who has been sentenced by a court of law of any offense against a
working child under this Act shall be meted out with a penalty one degree higher and
shall be prohibited from hiring a working child.
Section 17. Employer’s Reportorial Duties. – The employers shall register all domestic
workers under their employment in the Registry of Domestic Workers in the barangay
where the employer’s residence is located. The Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) shall, in coordination with the DOLE, formulate a registration system
for this purpose.
Section 18. Skills Training, Assessment and Certification. – To ensure productivity and
assure quality services, the DOLE, through the Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA), shall facilitate access of domestic workers to efficient
training, assessment and certification based on a duly promulgated training regulation.
ARTICLE IV
EMPLOYMENT – TERMS AND CONDITIONS
Section 19. Health and Safety. – The employer shall safeguard the health and safety of
the domestic worker in accordance with laws, rules and regulations, with due
consideration of the peculiar nature of domestic work.
Section 20. Daily Rest Period. – The domestic worker shall be entitled to an aggregate
daily rest period of eight (8) hours per day.
Section 21. Weekly Rest Period. – The domestic worker shall be entitled to at least
twenty-four (24) consecutive hours of rest in a week. The employer and the domestic
worker shall agree in writing on the schedule of the weekly rest day of the domestic
worker: Provided, That the employer shall respect the preference of the domestic
worker as to the weekly rest day when such preference is based on religious grounds.
Nothing in this provision shall deprive the domestic worker and the employer from
agreeing to the following:
(a) Offsetting a day of absence with a particular rest day;
 (b) Waiving a particular rest day in return for an equivalent daily rate
of pay;
(c) Accumulating rest days not exceeding five (5) days; or
(d) Other similar arrangements.
Section 22. Assignment to Nonhousehold Work. – No domestic worker shall be assigned
to work in a commercial, industrial or agricultural enterprise at a wage rate lower than
that provided for agricultural or nonagricultural workers. In such cases, the domestic
worker shall be paid the applicable minimum wage.
Section 23. Extent of Duty. – The domestic worker and the employer may mutually agree
for the former to temporarily perform a task that is outside the latter’s household for the
benefit of another household. However, any liability that will be incurred by the
domestic worker on account of such arrangement shall be borne by the original
employer. In addition, such work performed outside the household shall entitle the
domestic worker to an additional payment of not less than the existing minimum wage
rate of a domestic worker. It shall be unlawful for the original employer to charge any
amount from the said household where the service of the domestic worker was
temporarily performed.
Section 24. Minimum Wage. – The minimum wage of domestic workers shall not be less
than the following:
(a) Two thousand five hundred pesos (P2,500.00) a month for those
employed in the National Capital Region (NCR);
(b) Two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a month for those employed in
chartered cities and first class municipalities; and
(c) One thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500.00) a month for those
employed mother municipalities.
After one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, and periodically thereafter, the
Regional Tripartite and Productivity Wage Boards (RTPWBs) shall review, and if proper,
determine and adjust the minimum wage rates of domestic workers.
Section 25. Payment of Wages. – Payment of wages shall be made on time directly to
the domestic worker to whom they are due in cash at least once a month. The
employer, unless allowed by the domestic worker through a written consent, shall make
no deductions from the wages other than that which is mandated by law. No employer
shall pay the wages of a domestic worker by means of promissory notes, vouchers,
coupons, tokens, tickets, chits, or any object other than the cash wage as provided for
under this Act.
The domestic worker is entitled to a thirteenth month pay as provided for by law.
Section 26. Pay Slip. – The employer shall at all times provide the domestic worker with a
copy of the pay slip containing the amount paid in cash every pay day, and indicating
all deductions made, if any. The copies of the pay slip shall be kept by the employer for
a period of three (3) years.
Section 27. Prohibition on Interference in the Disposal of Wages. – It shall be unlawful for
the employer to interfere with the freedom of any domestic worker to dispose of the
latter’s wages. The employer shall not force, compel or oblige the domestic worker to
purchase merchandise, commodities or other properties from the employer or from any
other person, or otherwise make use of any store or services of such employer or any
other person.
Section 28. Prohibition Against Withholding of Wages. – It shall be unlawful for an
employer, directly or indirectly, to withhold the wages of the domestic worker. If the
domestic worker leaves without any justifiable reason, any unpaid salary for a period not
exceeding fifteen (15) days shall be forfeited. Likewise, the employer shall not induce
the domestic worker to give up any part of the wages by force, stealth, intimidation,
threat or by any other means whatsoever.
Section 29. Leave Benefits. – A domestic worker who has rendered at least one (1) year
of service shall be entitled to an annual service incentive leave of five (5) days with pay:
Provided, That any unused portion of said annual leave shall not be cumulative or
carried over to the succeeding years. Unused leaves shall not be convertible to cash.
Section 30. Social and Other Benefits. – A domestic worker who has rendered at least
one (1) month of service shall be covered by the Social Security System (SSS), the
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth), and the Home Development
Mutual Fund or Pag-IBIG, and shall be entitled to all the benefits in accordance with the
pertinent provisions provided by law.
Premium payments or contributions shall be shouldered by the employer. However, if
the domestic worker is receiving a wage of Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) and above
per month, the domestic worker shall pay the proportionate share in the premium
payments or contributions, as provided by law.
The domestic worker shall be entitled to all other benefits under existing laws.
Section 31. Rescue and Rehabilitation of Abused Domestic Workers. – Any abused or
exploited domestic worker shall be immediately rescued by a municipal or city social
welfare officer or a social welfare officer from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) in coordination with the concerned barangay officials. The DSWD
and the DILG shall develop a standard operating procedure for the rescue and
rehabilitation of abused domestic workers, and in coordination with the DOLE, for
possible subsequent job placement.
ARTICLE V
POST EMPLOYMENT
Section 32. Termination of Service. – Neither the domestic worker nor the employer may
terminate the contract before the expiration of the term except for grounds provided
for in Sections 33 and 34 of this Act. If the domestic worker is unjustly dismissed, the
domestic worker shall be paid the compensation already earned plus the equivalent of
fifteen (15) days work by way of indemnity. If the domestic worker leaves without
justifiable reason, any unpaid salary due not exceeding the equivalent fifteen (15) days
work shall be forfeited. In addition, the employer may recover from the domestic worker
costs incurred related to the deployment expenses, if any: Provided, That the service
has been terminated within six (6) months from the domestic worker’s employment.
If the duration of the domestic service is not determined either in stipulation or by the
nature of the service, the employer or the domestic worker may give notice to end the
working relationship five (5) days before the intended termination of the service.
The domestic worker and the employer may mutually agree upon written notice to pre-
terminate the contract of employment to end the employment relationship.
Section 33. Termination Initiated by the Domestic Worker. – The domestic worker may
terminate the employment relationship at any time before the expiration of the
contract for any of the following causes:
(a) Verbal or emotional abuse of the domestic worker by the
employer or any member of the household;
(b) Inhuman treatment including physical abuse of the domestic
worker by the employer or any member of the household;
 (c) Commission of a crime or offense against the domestic worker by
the employer or any member of the household;
(d) Violation by the employer of the terms and conditions of the
employment contract and other standards set forth under this law;
(e) Any disease prejudicial to the health of the domestic worker, the
employer, or member/s of the household; and
(f) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Section 34. Termination Initiated by the Employer. – An employer may terminate the
services of the domestic worker at any time before the expiration of the contract, for
any of the following causes:
(a) Misconduct or willful disobedience by the domestic worker of the
lawful order of the employer in connection with the former’s work;
(b) Gross or habitual neglect or inefficiency by the domestic worker in
the performance of duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed by the employer on the
domestic worker;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the domestic worker against
the person of the employer or any immediate member of the
employer’s family;
(e) Violation by the domestic worker of the terms and conditions of
the employment contract and other standards set forth under this
law;
(f) Any disease prejudicial to the health of the domestic worker, the
employer, or member/s of the household; and
(g) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Section 35. Employment Certification. – Upon the severance of the employment
relationship, the employer shall issue the domestic worker within five (5) days from
request a certificate of employment indicating the nature, duration of the service and
work performance.
ARTICLE VI
PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES
Section 36. Regulation of Private Employment Agencies (PEAs). – The DOLE shall, through
a system of licensing and regulation, ensure the protection of domestic workers hired
through the PEAs.
The PEA shall be jointly and severally liable with the employer for all the wages, wage-
related benefits, and other benefits due a domestic worker.
The provision of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the
"Labor Code of the Philippines", on qualifications of the PEAs with regard to nationality,
networth, owners and officers, office space and other requirements, as well as
nontransferability of license and commission of prohibited practices, shall apply.
In addition, PEAs shall have the following responsibilities:
(a) Ensure that domestic workers are not charged or levied any
recruitment or placement fees;
(b) Ensure that the employment agreement between the domestic
worker and the employer stipulates the terms and conditions of
employment and all the benefits prescribed by this Act;
(c) Provide a pre-employment orientation briefing to the domestic
worker and the employer about their rights and responsibilities in
accordance with this Act;
(d) Keep copies of employment contracts and agreements
pertaining to recruited domestic workers which shall be made
available during inspections or whenever required by the DOLE or
local government officials;
(e) Assist domestic workers with respect to complaints or grievances
against their employers; and
(f) Cooperate with government agencies in rescue operations
involving abused or exploited domestic workers.
ARTICLE VII
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Section 37. Mechanism for Settlement of Disputes. – All labor-related disputes shall be
elevated to the DOLE Regional Office having jurisdiction over the workplace without
prejudice to the filing of a civil or criminal action in appropriate cases. The DOLE
Regional Office shall exhaust all conciliation and mediation efforts before a decision
shall be rendered.
Ordinary crimes or offenses committed under the Revised Penal Code and other special
penal laws by either party shall be filed with the regular courts.
ARTICLE VIII
SPECIAL PROVISIONS
Section 38. Information Program. – The DOLE shall, in coordination with the DILG, the SSS,
the PhilHealth and Pag-IBIG develop and implement a continuous information
dissemination program on the provisions of this Act, both at the national and local level,
immediately after the enactment of this law.
Section 39. "Araw Ng Mga Kasambahay". – The date upon which the President shall
approve this "Domestic Workers Act" shall be designated as the "Araw ng mga
Kasambahay".
ARTICLE IX
PENAL AND MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Section 40. Penalty. – Any violation of the provisions of this Act declared unlawful shall
be punishable with a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) but not more
than Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil
or criminal action by the aggrieved party.
Section 41. Transitory Provision; Non-Diminution of Benefits. – All existing arrangements
between a domestic worker and the employer shall be adjusted to conform to the
minimum standards set by this Act within a period of sixty (60) days after the effectivity
of this Act: Provided, That adjustments pertaining to wages shall take effect immediately
after the determination and issuance of the appropriate wage order by the RTWPBs:
Provided, further, That nothing in this Act shall be construed to cause the diminution or
substitution of any benefits and privileges currently enjoyed by the domestic worker
hired directly or through an agency.
Section 42. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – Within ninety (90) days from the
effectivity of this Act, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Secretary of Social
Welfare and Development, the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, and the
Director General of the Philippine National Police, in coordination with other concerned
government agencies and accredited nongovernment organizations (NGOs) assisting
domestic workers, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the effective
implementation of this Act.
ARTICLE X
FINAL PROVISIONS
Section 43. Separability Clause. – If any provision or part of this Act is declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the remaining parts or provisions not affected shall remain in full force
and effect.
Section 44. Repealing Clause. – All articles or provisions of Chapter III (Employment of
Househelpers) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended and renumbered by
Republic Act No. 10151 are hereby expressly repealed. All laws, decrees, executive
orders, issuances, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 45. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
complete publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national newspapers
of general circulation.
Approved,

(Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE (Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.

President of the Senate Speaker of the House of
Representatives

This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 78 and House Bill No. 6144 was finally
passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on November 27, 2012 and
November 26, 2012, respectively.

(Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES (Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP

Secretary of Senate Secretary General
House of Representatives

Approved: JAN 18 2013

(Sgd.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III
President of the Philippines