ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents .

March 25, 1919

Facts
Justo Lukban, who was then the Mayor of the City of Manila, ordered the deportation of 170 prostitutes
to Davao. His reason for doing so was to preserve the morals of the people of Manila. He claimed that the
prostitutes were sent to Davao, purportedly, to work for a haciendero Feliciano Ynigo. The prostitutes
were confined in houses from October 16 to 18 of that year before being boarded, at the dead of night,
in two boats bound for Davao. The women were under the assumption that they were being transported
to another police station while Ynigo, the haciendero from Davao, had no idea that the women being sent
to work for him were actually prostitutes.

The families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges against Lukban, Anton Hohmann, the Chief of
Police, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of Davao. They prayed for a writ of habeas corpus to be issued
against the respondents to compel them to bring back the 170 women who were deported to Mindanao
against their will.

During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women were deported without their consent. In effect,
Lukban forcibly assigned them a new domicile. Most of all, there was no law or order authorizing Lukban's
deportation of the 170prostitutes.

Issue
Whether we are a government of laws or a government of men.

Held
We are clearly a government of laws. Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the
prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the
contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who
compels any person to change his residence.

Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as
stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Their choice of profession should not be a cause for
discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to
compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the human race. These women have been
deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to collect their
belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban et al
must be severely punished.

ISSUE:
The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce
around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus
the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his
capacity as Mayor.

RULING:
The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus
100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief
executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen
and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend
his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint
and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the
court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has
inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has
illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why
the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law,
could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily
have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of
process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change
her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her
birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily
evaded.