Thinking Skills and Creativity 7 (2012) 271–279

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Thinking Skills and Creativity

journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/tsc

Research Note

Critical thinking, executive functions and their potential relationship

María Luisa Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga ∗ , María Teresa Sanz de Acedo Baquedano,
Oscar Ardaiz Villanueva
Public University of Navarra, Spain

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The central issue of this paper is to review the possible relationships between the constructs
Received 24 May 2011 of critical thinking and executive functions. To do this, we first analyse the essential com-
Received in revised form 5 April 2012 ponents of critical thinking from a psychological and neurological point of view. Second, we
Accepted 11 April 2012
examine the scope of the cognitive and neurological nature of executive functions. Third,
Available online 26 April 2012
we propose a model for comparing or mapping between the most important processes of
both constructs. Fourth, we offer some conclusions on the relational path between the two
Keywords:
Critical thinking
concepts based on the studies reviewed and suggest possible lines of investigation that will
Executive functions undoubtedly facilitate the understanding of shared features and key differences between
Creativity critical thinking and executive functions.
Brain structures © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Critical thinking

Critical thinking, which some authors call reflective thinking, is characterised as directed, reasoned and purposeful. The
adjective “critical” denotes its evaluative possibility; it does not have a pejorative meaning because, since it refers to a
meaningful and constructive interpretation of the information. Critical thinkers are well-researched, rely on their reason
and their open-mindedness, are fair when evaluating, honest when confronting personal biases y persistent in the pursuit
of truth, exhibit a sceptical, questioning attitude, and are rational when considering and selecting the criteria best suited to
help in the interpretation of social and personal reality (Paul & Elder, 2001). People differ notably in the degree to which
they have the cognitive skills mentioned, even sometimes it happens that being strong critical thinkers for conditioning of
context they do not act as such. Critical thinking, in contrast to other forms of thought, involves a state of doubt, hesitation,
perplexity and complexity and also a desire for inquiry, retrieval, creation and integration that leads to resolution of the
problem at hand.
To develop a universal definition of critical thinking is beyond the scope of this paper given the range of viewpoints
that exist. Despite this, there are still common aspects that overlap some of the models that inform the development of
a general construct (Facione, 2006). Next, we describe the essential components of critical thinking and most relevant
neuropsychological bases.

1.1. Components

The activity to think critically is a multidimensional capacity and basically encompasses cognitive, metacognitive and
dispositional components (Ku, 2009; Nieto & Saiz, 2011; Phan, 2010). The number of its cognitive components may vary

∗ Corresponding author at: Departamento de Psicología y Pedagogía, Campus de Arrosadía, Universidad Pública de Navarra, 31006 Pamplona, España,
Spain. Tel.: +34 948 169479; fax: +34 948 169169.
E-mail address: mlsa@unavarra.es (M.L. Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga).

1871-1871/$ – see front matter © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tsc.2012.04.008
272 M.L. Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 7 (2012) 271–279

according to the authors, but the following are generally accepted:to discover assumptions, to make inductive and deduc-
tive inferences, to evaluate information, to interpret causes, to predict effects, to formulate and test hypotheses, to make
decisions and to define and solve problems (Ennis, 1987; Facione, 1990; Friedman et al., 2007, 2008; Griggs, Jackson, Marek,
& Christopher, 1998; Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005) together with the sub-skills of each of these major components. Critical
thinking also includes creative skills to generate many varied and original ideas because both the important decisions and
the resolution of open issues require high doses of creation (Moseley et al., 2005). According to Renaud and Murray (2008),
“while this touches only briefly on the concept of critical thinking, it seems that many of these elements could be likened
to higher order levels of thinking, which attempt to explain “how” or “why”, as compared to lower knowledge levels, which
focus simply on “what” (p. 86)”.
Metacognitive components such as consciousness, knowledge and regulation, are basic elements of the practice of crit-
ical thinking. To think critically, one must be aware of the cognitive process that must be activated at a precise moment
(consciousness), to know what process is and what steps should be followed (knowledge) and finally to review the essential
moments of the action (self-regulation) (Kuhn, 1999; Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga, 2010). A person is not a critical thinker about
everything and at all times, but a person is a critical thinker about some things in some contexts. It is difficult to be critical
of everything because this requires having a broad knowledge of all subjects; hence, most people are demanding only on
certain matters (VanderStoep & Pintrich, 2003). Self-regulation of the mind, of the demands of the task and of behaviour is
a very active and practical process; it is internal but has an external projection that manifests itself in judgments, reactions
and adaptations. It is performed step-by-step at the time that cognitive operations, affects and goal-oriented behaviours
arise and are maintained. This involves making decisions to allocate and distribute effort, attention, and time, so on during
the performance of one or more tasks. The constantly performed monitoring of the three characteristic phases planning
(before activity), execution (during the activity) and evaluation (after activity) constitutes the core of self-regulation, where
each moment has its own aim and relevance and, in turn, prepares the way for the next moment (Leung & Kember, 2003;
Phan, 2006, 2009, 2010; Zimmerman, 2008).
The dispositional components (motivations, orientation to goals, and attitudes) help people who are able to think critically
and monitor their own functions and behaviours or who really want or are inclined to act in front of any person, event or
circumstance in a thoughtful and intentional way (Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo, 2000; Halpern, 2003). As Stanovich (1999)
pointed out, when you isolate the effects of cognitive ability in judgments and reasoning tasks, the residual variance can
be explained in terms of thinking dispositions. Similarly, Leung and Kember (2003) argued that critical thinking is related
to motivational variables, such as learning styles, self-efficacy beliefs and effort. Other dispositional variables reported in
the literature include the delay in making judgments, fairness when evaluating the behaviour of others, open-mindedness,
acceptance of justified positions, consistent performance, trust in one’s own capabilities and self-questioning. All these
characteristics reflect oneı̌s inclination to apply critical thinking skills.
In summary, it is sufficient to note that critical thinking has two essential aspects or, as some authors claim (Facione,
1990, 2011; Stapleton, 2011), that it is of a dual nature:skills (cognitive and metacognitive) and dispositions. However, for a
long time, only the cognitive abilities were taken into account, particularly in educational interventions. Currently, almost all
authors believe that the mere acquisition and expertise of cognitive skills does not guarantee the process of critical thinking.
A person can know and master skills but be unable to implement them. It is necessary to realise what one knows, monitor
the process of thinking and be willing and motivated to exercise those skills when the circumstances require. Both aspects
are already included implicitly or explicitly in the interpretations of most theorists in the field of critical thinking (Bailin,
1999; Ennis, 1987; Halpern, 1998, 2003; McPeck, 1981; Phan, 2009). Therefore, it is accepted that, to think reflectively about
something, the joint participation of cognitive, regulatory and motivational processes are required, although, in some studies,
their relationship has been challenged by low positive correlations, as in Facione and Facione’s research (1997) where r = .20.
Critical thinking also appears to be sensitive to context social and how individuals make it meaning has a profound effect
on one’s ability to think critically. Components of critical thinking that have been exposed equip to people for coping with
social situations. They help to reason about other people and social situations. Critical thinker will be able to demonstrate
an in-depth knowledge of topics related to social cognition.

1.2. The thinking brain

It could be argued that the neurological bases of critical thinking are integrated mostly by the neural substrates of the
prefrontal cortex. The most functionally and structurally differentiated and most well-studied regions are the dorsolateral
and ventromedial cortices, the latter is joined to the orbitomedial cortex according to some classifications (Dietrich, 2004;
Fuster, 2002; Houdé, 2007). The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, reflective and coordinating brain per excellence, follows
from the hippocampus and recovers knowledge from it (declarative memory) as well as the experiences it stores (episodic
memory). Its role does not consist of transforming direct sensory stimuli, but it participates in the creation and control of the
higher processes of induction, deduction, decision-making, problem-solving and creativity (Kirsch et al., 2006; Lang et al.,
2006; Luna, Padmanabhan, & O’Hearn, 2010; Stuss & Alexander, 2000). The ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the social and
emotional brain, is connected with the limbic system (LeDoux, 1996) and is linked in a special way with reasoning, conflict
resolution and decision-making (Fig. 1). The relations of these two structures with the psychological processes mentioned
it is necessary to interpret with relative caution, as seems to be a universally accepted by neuroscientists that all critical
 M.L. Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 7 (2012) 271–279 273

Fig. 1. Major regions of the prefrontal cortex.

thinking skills involve many regions of the brain. An area may be activated during a task but no play a critical role in
performing the task.
The prefrontal cortex seems to be related to inductive and deductive reasoning. Diamond (2002) and Richland, Morrison,
and Holyoak (2006) all found activity in the left prefrontal cortex during analogue task performance. Rips (1994) argued from
the mental logic theory that the neuroanatomical mechanisms of deductive reasoning and language processing are related
only to this cortex. On the other hand, Johnson-Laird (1995) postulated that deductive reasoning requires the involvement
of both the left and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, perhaps because his mental model theory proposes a spatial hypoth-
esis that is processed in the right hemisphere. Goel and Dolan (2000, 2001, 2003) found: (a) dissociation of the mechanisms
involved in reasoning with neutral contents and familiar contents; (b) reasons to accept the mental logic and mental model
theories; (c) activity in the syntactic and semantic components of language and long-term memory, which contradicts the
proposal of mental logic theory that only recognises such activity in the syntactic component; and (d) links between familiar
tasks and the left fronto-temporal system and also between unfamiliar tasks and bilateral parietal system (visuo/spatial).
Thus, activity in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and sometimes the right dorsolateral cortex is necessary for reason-
ing to occur (Braver & Ruge, 2006). The ventromedial prefrontal cortex is also involved in the reasoning processes when
evaluating the social and emotional meaning of events and correcting the errors that may occur (LeDoux, 1996). It is known
that the right side of this cortex is activated when a subject immersed in strong feelings attempts to trade an incoherent
reasoning style for a coherent one (Houdé, 2007).
Likewise, the left ventromedial prefrontal cortex is more related to the decisions that have a particular logic, defined
conditions and a familiar decision space; these decisions are called “true” because the result is almost always the same,
independent of the subject executing them. In contrast, the right prefrontal cortex is more related to subjective and adapted
rather than logical decisions relative to the time and living space of a particular subject (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000).
According to Bechara (2004), decision-making is guided not only by cognitive information, but also by emotional cues that
help to anticipate the consequences of the various possible scenarios arising from the available options. Failure to allocate
adequate emotional value to the various response options can generate changes in decision-making. Also, other evidence
supporting the importance of the emotion in decision-making are the findings relative to the activation during this process
of limbic system, which is projected on different areas of the ventromedial zone and it seems that aim to anticipate the
negative and positive consequences of the different alternatives of choice (Arana et al., 2003; Stuss, Gallup, & Alexander,
2001; Stuss & Levine, 2000; Tanabe et al., 2007).
The problem solving process involves the participation of different brain structures and connective networks within
theses structures widely distributed. Among these structures, as with the production of reasoning, plays an important role
in the prefrontal cortex. The major or minor implication of certain brain areas seems to be linked to the characteristics
and conditions of the specific problems to solve. Thus, it has been found that with increasing complexity of the problem is
increased activation that occurs in the prefrontal cortex, both left and right, indicating more intensive production procedures
relating to the presence of executive processes and maintenance of the working memory (Goel & Dolan, 2000, 2001, 2003).
The question now is whether creativity is beyond neurological understanding. The answer seems to be “no”. The pro-
duction of something new, after incubation phase characterised by spontaneity and decentralised attention, requires that
some other information appear in the working memory, which can be recombined. According to Martindale (1999), the fact
that memory is of a distributed nature is important for creativity because, without this aspect, there would never be new
274 M.L. Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 7 (2012) 271–279

connections between items, and it would be difficult to integrate disparate elements in the creative process. The integration
of different information is probably executed in the lower right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. However, the assessment
of whether the creative product is appropriate also depends upon distributed working memory and sustained and flexible
attention, and this evaluation task is executed by the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Conceptual links generate need;
therefore, an evaluation process is necessary to determine which of them are truly creative. Although current studies defend
the notion that the right prefrontal cortex contributes more to creativity than does the left, the contributions of the left
prefrontal cortex should not be marginalised (Mihov, Denzler, & Förster, 2010). Both hemispheres are needed to integrate
unconscious and conscious experiences connected with creation. They synthesise information that could be recognised as
creative and are later appropriately applied to works of art or science (Brandoni & Anderson, 2009; Runco, 2004; Snyder,
Bossomaier, & Mitchell, 2004).
It is thought that scattered ideas, implicitly stored in the memory, are attracted by associative thinking when it recruits
new neural networks. Its significance and value depends upon the nature of the problem, to the point that you can go
beyond what is known without resorting to trial and error. This suggests that the networks that support an open mind have
a useful role in the creative process. Sometimes, hidden thoughts appear forcefully and can make an innovative contribution
(Gabora, 2010). These associations are not literal connections, but new groups of items that have never before been activated
together. Thus, memory becomes a prerequisite for creation (Butler, Scherer, & Reiter-Palmon, 2003). Therefore, Miller and
Cohen (2001) stated that the prefrontal cortex plays four roles in creativity:it produces new links of networks or ideas,
it evaluates the appropriateness of a new idea, it participates in all its cognitive processes for resolution or development
of that idea and it implements the expression of that creative idea. Thus, constant interaction between the two cerebral
hemispheres is necessary for creativity every time. Therefore, to produce a creative act, a person must be able to pass
spontaneously from divergent or associated thinking to convergent or analytical thinking. Indeed, according to Mihov et al.
(2010), one of the immediate challenges of neuroscience is to identify what areas of the two cerebral hemispheres are in
constant communication during the development of the creative process. This knowledge would answer the questions of
“how the brain generates new ideas” and “what happens in the brain when it is engaged in a creative process” (Dietrich,
2004; Fuster, 2002).
Finally, metacognitive components would be represented by the most anterior dorsolateral cortex, which facilitates
self-evaluation and adjustment of activity based on continuous performance (Maril, Simons, Mitchell, & Schwartz, 2003).
Dispositions of thinking would be associated mainly with the ventromedial cortex, which inhibits behaviour, detects and
resolves conflicts, holds attention on the task and creates and maintains goal-directed behaviour (Burgess, 2000; Shallice,
2001).

2. Executive functions

Executive functions are being studied from an interdisciplinary perspective because they are analysed by both cogni-
tive and clinical psychology, neuropsychology and neurology. They constitute a set of managerial processes involved in
programming, implementation, supervision, regulation, generation and adjustment of thoughts, memories, emotions and
behaviour to achieve complex goals in dynamic environments, most notably when it comes to situations that require an
unfamiliar, novel or ambiguous approach (Geurts, Broeders, & Nieuwland, 2010; Gilbert & Burgess, 2008; Ridderinkhof, van
den Wildenberg, Segalowitz, & Carter, 2004; Verdejo-García and Bechara, 2010). These cognitive mechanisms coordinate and
integrate information from input, processing and output systems and are activated when tasks require a conscious effort and
a novel adaptation, for example, when you need to retrieve stored information, plan ahead, evaluate achievements, select
a course of action, predict consequences, resolve a conflict and project beliefs and emotions from the past into the future
(Fuster, 2004; Godefroy, 2003).

2.1. Specific functions

The scientific literature has identified the following executive functions: (1) inhibition, suppression of habitual or auto-
matic responses that may jeopardise the success of a new plan; (2) decision, the establishment of optimal rules of conflict
resolution; (3) cognitive flexibility, contextual changes, strategies, choices, mental models, etc.; (4) updating, support, review
and renewal of the representations of working memory; (5) planning, control and monitoring (action-oriented), proposal
of the most appropriate alternatives for action and choice according to the characteristics of the problem at hand; (6) ener-
gization, initiation and maintenance of any response; and (7) task fixing, executive direction based on task demands (Ardilla
& Ostrosky-Solís, 2008; Del Misser, Mäntylä, & Bruine de Bruin, 2010; Friedman et al., 2008; Godefroy, 2003; Miyake et al.,
2000; Shallice, Stuss, Picton, Alexander, & Gillingham, 2008; Stuss & Alexander, 2007; Verdejo-García & Pérez-García, 2007).
These functions appear to be linked, but their correlations are not very high (r < .40) (Gilbert & Burgess, 2008). According
to Mäntylä, Rönnlund, & Kliegel (2010), they differ in terms of cognitive complexity; for example, inhibition should be
considered a less complex function than updating and flexibility.
What theoretical explanations have been given to the functions mentioned above? Because of its diversity, multiple mod-
els have been proposed, whose discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, the reader is advised to read a study
that develops this topic deeply, the work of Tirapu-Ustárroz, García-Molina, Luna-Lario, Roig-Rovira and Pelegrín-Valero
(2008a, 2008b). The models put forward by these authors are working hypotheses formulated from different perspectives,
 M.L. Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 7 (2012) 271–279 275

such as top-down hierarchical modulation models, action-oriented temporal integration models related to working memory,
hierarchical representation models and models that address specific aspects of executive functioning. The authors conclude
that executive functions are combinations of cognitive processes that come together to operate in different situations and
it is best to analyse them divided into sub-processes to ensure proper understanding, assessment and intervention. Each
of the sub-processes, as will be discussed shortly, may be related to specific regions of the prefrontal cortex, although it is
possible that, at different times, several of them are situated in the same region.
The range of executive functions proposed has been studied mainly with statistical methods, neuroimaging and normal
subjects, compared with subjects with damage to different frontal regions. Thus, research using factorial structural models
considers executive functions to be latent variables in responses given to cognitive tests (manifest variables) (Carelli, Forman,
& Mäntyalä, 2008; Miyake et al., 2000), and studies using neuroimaging techniques rely on a stratified structure of executive
functions with moderate correlation and apparent shared genetic bases (Friedman et al., 2008).

2.2. The executive brain

The described executive functions have also been identified in the prefrontal cortex, called the executive centre of the
brain (Goldberg, 2001; Stuss & Levine, 2002). This cortex maintains interconnections; it exchanges information with the rest
of the cortical and subcortical sensory systems, motor and perceptual, to execute control and organisation tasks.
Determining the relative contributions of each subregion to the different prefrontal executive functions is a highly
complex theoretical and methodological topic. The dorsolateral region is closely connected to the cognitive operations
of planning, working memory, mental flexibility, fluency, metacognition, working strategies, sequencing, self-assessment,
activity monitoring and integration of cognitive and emotional experiences, operations that are also main elements of
executive functions (Goldberg, 2001; Maril et al., 2003; Stuss & Alexander, 2000; Stuss & Levine, 2000).
The ventrolateral part is associated with executive functions involved in simple tasks, such as the maintenance of short-
term memory, detection and resolution of simple conflicts and attention. Different parts of the ventrolateral region have
been associated with the storage of different types of information, although this still remains a somewhat controversial
finding.
Another area of the brain with strong projections is the cingulated, which is part of the limbic system. It seems that this
area senses when it is necessary to exercise some control, for example, if two or more behaviours come into conflict and a
top-down input intervenes to resolve it. Then the mission of the cingulated cortex is warning if at some point you have to
resort to modulation.
Therefore, executive functions require the joint participation of integrated dynamic systems in the prefrontal cortex,
posterior cortical regions and limbic (hippocampus, amygdala or insula) and basal (basal ganglia and brainstem) structures
(Bechara et al., 2000; Clark et al., 2008; Robbins & Arnsten, 2009). The frontal cortex is the most voluminous region of the
brain, occupying one third of its total area, and its functional diversity is very broad (Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007; Stuss &
Alexander, 2007). Within the context of this functional diversity of the frontal cortex, we find one of the key current debates
about the unitary or independent nature of executive functions (Jurado & Rosselli, 2007). We are still far from having a full
understanding of the functional architecture of the brain. We know that a brain area supports a particular function, but
we do not know how this happens. So far, it is accepted that the prefrontal cortex can be divided into functionally discrete
regions, which is an assessment that did not exist a few years ago (Gilbert & Burgess, 2008).
Another problematic issue is the degree of overlap that may occur between executive functions and other cognitive
processes, such as critical thinking, which will be the subject of the following analysis.

3. Interaction and overlap of constructs

Based on the concepts presented, we propose below some connections that may exist between critical thinking and
executive functions. We have seen that both constructs are umbrella terms, meaning that they unite and organise other
cognitive processes, thereby allowing for comparison both in a general way and when considering their specific components
and neural structures.
The cognitive components of critical thinking and executive functions mostly belong to higher cognition, and their acti-
vation requires the participation of both routine and controlled processing. Using Evans’s proposal (2008), both constructs
would require the intervention of thought type 1 (automatic, unconscious, etc.) and thought type 2 (reflective, aware, etc.)
of the central resources of working memory and control and integration processes. The environmental and specific task
characteristics would demand the application of both or either type of thinking to produce an appropriate response.
It has been previously observed that executive functions and critical thinking skills are associated with the structures and
functions of the two essential parts of the prefrontal cortex:dorsolateral and ventromedial (Goldberg, 2001). The dorsolateral
region is closely related to planning processes, working memory, fluency, problem solving and mental flexibility, and the
ventrolateral region is related to storage of information, inhibition, detection and resolution of conflict and motivation. Both
are part of critical thinking and executive functions. From different research perspectives, cognitive neuroscience has made
significant progress in characterising the nature of these two constructs and their underlying brain mechanisms (Arnett
et al., 1997). Critical thinking and executive functions could have very similar neuroanatomical substrates, which would
support their functional diversity and adaptability.
276 M.L. Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 7 (2012) 271–279

CRITICAL THINKING EXECUTIVE

FUNCTIONS
Induction
and Inhibition
deduction
Attitude Decision
making Decision

CC Problem Flexibility
Orientation solving
DC
Updating

Creativity
Motivation Planning
MC
Regulation Energization
Knowledge
Awareness Task
fixing

Fig. 2. Cognitive components (CC), metacognitive components (MC) and dispositional components (DC) of critical thinking and executive functions.

According to Verdejo-García and Bechara (2010), in order for the resolution of a task to demand the involvement of
executive functions, it must be characterised as: (1) new, a surprising and unexpected situation; (2) complex, having a goal
that cannot be resolved through routine learned mechanisms; and (3) unstructured, presenting instructions only to the
objective of the task, not to the way to achieve it and promote the generation of diverse and creative strategies. These same
criteria and some others are needed to work with critical thinking, for example, to generate many varied and original ideas
when it comes to solving an open problem.
Fig. 2 shows the components of critical thinking (inside the circle) and executive functions (outside the circle). Thus,
we can visualise the cognitive components (CC) of inductive and deductive reasoning, decision-making, problem solving
and creativity. Similarly, we can visualise the metacognitive components (MC) of control, self-awareness of processes and
knowledge and dispositional components (DC) of motivation, goal-orientation and attitude. Regarding executive functions,
we refer to the ones proposed by the scientific literature and previously defined:inhibition, decision, flexibility, updating,
planning, energization and task fixing.
To establish some connections, you could say that: (1) induction and deduction mainly claim automatic behaviour inhibi-
tion, planning and control of the process of reasoning, decision-making and mental flexibility; (2) choice, or the determination
function, is an essential characteristics of decision-making; (3) problem solving involves the intervention of the determina-
tion function, planning, updating and cognitive flexibility functions to organise, sequence and verify solutions; (4) creativity
relates to the executive functions of energization, updating, flexibility and integration of disparate elements; (5) regulation
is an active process that seeks to ensure the achievement of goals, including in a special way the functions of planning and
monitoring; (6) awareness of the processes themselves would be achieved through inhibition of automatic responses; (7)
knowledge of what you know would mean updating the representations of working memory; (8) motivation, the dynamic
process per excellence that creates and maintains behaviour, is present in the executive function called energization (Stuss
& Alexander, 2007); (9) goal orientation because critical thinking has a specific purpose could be associated with task fixing;
and (10) the attitude or learned predisposition to respond to a task in a consistent manner would be represented by the
nature of cognitive functions themselves, which is none other than control.
Therefore, critical thinking shares common components with the executive functions and with its main objective, which
is to facilitate the individual’s adaptation to new and complex situations going beyond the common and fast behaviours.
This objective is shared by each of the cognitive, metacognitive and dispositional components of critical thinking.

4. Conclusions, limitations and future research

The main goal of this review was to give the reader a basic understanding of critical thinking and executive functions
and to establish a way of exploring the possible relationships that might exist between these two constructs. The results are
shown in some conclusions, limitations and suggestions for future research.
In conclusion, critical thinking and executive functions can be considered multifaceted phenomena, and as such, the
scientific community does not manage to attribute new components to each. Aggregating many processes and sub-processes
 M.L. Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga et al. / Thinking Skills and Creativity 7 (2012) 271–279 277

under a single name appears to give unity to the construct, but it also brings difficulties when analysing the overlap that occurs
with other concepts and other studies, causing some confusion. Therefore, better clarification and specification focusing on
the differentiation of its components are necessary. It has been stated that: (a) the cognitive components of critical thinking
are so complex that, for its successful development, other cognitive processes must be involved and supported by large
doses of motivational and emotional energy; (b) critical thinking and executive functions have a great similarity with the
nature of meta-cognitive and dispositional components and with the neurological substrates in the prefrontal cortex where
they act; and (c) the most relevant differences seem to be in their objectives:critical thinking seeks to solve complex issues
with typically original solutions, whereas executive functions seek to control, coordinate and integrate the tasks of thinking
to optimise their performance in terms of the subject’s environment and goals. These issues are manifested, for example,
when people with high levels of critical thinking fail in their projects as a result of being unable to properly administer their
talents. Hence, executive functions in higher cognition are important. The comparison and analysis of these mechanisms
enable us to learn a little more about their achievements and conclude that, despite their differences, they need each other.
This review has at least two limitations, which may become challenges for new studies. First, it fails to consider the
training programmes that enhance thinking and executive functions, because both variables can be the object of intentional
and planned improvement. It is known that learning and experience, even the daily one, give form to brain, and they
product continuous changes in physical and functional structures. (Greenspan & Shanker, 2004). This exercise is interesting
to develop when working with vulnerable populations, such as patients with neurological deficits and the elderly and with
students. Research suggests we should start early by treating young children as individuals with thoughts, goals, feelings,
and intentions. Critical thinking needs to move from being a “program” to being part of the educative culture. Formalizing
training for teachers and creating specific classroom expectations will help to develop this culture where critical thinking
becomes embedded within the fabric of the teaching community. Second, the different ways that both constructs have
been evaluated and the characteristics of measuring instruments that have been used for that purpose have not been
compared and contrasted in this paper. The complexity of these phenomena makes its measurement a difficult problem
for neuropsychology and contemporary cognitive psychology.
Future research can address various aspects related to critical thinking and executive functions, such as: (a) whether
individual differences in executive functions can predict the success of critical thinking (Del Misser et al., 2010); (b) delin-
eation of the nature of the cognitive components of critical thinking and executive functions, because there is still debate
about the extent of both constructs, if they are unitary or multi-processing systems with independent but related compo-
nents; (c) what methods and research subjects may be the most appropriate for analysis (specific versus multiple methods
and psychometric versus neuroimaging with clinical versus normal subjects); (d) whether critical thinking is composed of
cognitive, metacognitive and dispositional components or just cognitive components and executive functions; (e) whether
is possible create new methodology using multiple instrumental strategies thereby supporting the student in improving in
critical thinking and executive functions, providing learners with opportunities to critically think about to use their skills in
different situations, and (f) if prefrontal cortex lesions produce similar clinical profiles for both constructs.
Psychology might be using too many concepts to explain the same variable, which causes confusion in the scientific com-
munity, loss of time and hinderer progress in the fundamental aspects addressed in this paper. Some relevant developments
will undoubtedly take place in the coming years, basically for three reasons. First, due to the interest among researchers
in integrating the cognitive and socio-emotional operations in the prefrontal cortex. Second, due to increasingly accurate
knowledge regarding the effect those mental disorders have on executive functions. Third, due to the significant results
those are being provided by brain imaging studies. For example, they have found that the brains of people trained in music
and art show different of activation that the brains of untrained persons. These studies provide support for a difficult hypoth-
esis, aforementioned: Neuronal activation patterns may change in response to experience and learning (Reiterer, Pereda, &
Bhattacharya, 2009).
Considering all of these points, this review is a first step on the way to exploring the relationships that exist between
critical thinking and executive functions, with the ultimate goal being to learn what happens in the mind and in the brain
when the two processes are activated. We hope that the present study stimulates further research in the field.

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