Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 477 – 493

Assessing law enforcement preparedness

to address Internet fraud
Ronald G. Burns*, Keith H. Whitworth, Carol Y. Thompson
Department of Sociology, Criminal Justice and Anthropology, Texas Christian University, TCU Box 298710,
Fort Worth, TX 76129, USA

Abstract

Recent societal concern regarding computer crime was well documented in the research literature. To date,
however, modest research addressed how large, local police and sheriff’s departments confront Internet fraud.
Using data collected from surveys distributed to the seven hundred largest police- and sheriff’s departments, the
present article addresses law enforcement: (1) preparedness to enforce Internet fraud crimes; (2) perceptions of
Internet fraud; (3) cooperative policing efforts; and (4) Internet fraud information dissemination practices. Among
other things, results suggested that individuals within these departments believed Internet fraud was problematic,
although they lacked the resources to properly address the problem. These results are discussed as they relate to
the organizational design of law enforcement agencies and their potential to adapt to innovative crimes.
Suggestions are offered for a more effective approach to confronting Internet fraud.
D 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction Recognized as ‘‘contrepreneurial crime’’ under the

New technologies such as the Internet have not
only radically changed the means by which one
communicates, conducts business, and engages in
recreation, but have also brought new avenues for
criminal pursuits and new forms of victimization.
Consequently these changes produced serious con-
sequences for law enforcement agencies, which were
charged with preventing and responding to such acts
and which were currently already burdened with
addressing traditional forms of crime, and most
recently, terrorist activities. Media and government
reports suggested a notable increase in computer
crimes, with significant losses attributed to Internet
fraud. Evidence suggested that neglect of these
crimes would only exacerbate the problem and lead
to further stresses on law enforcement.
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-817-257-6155; fax:
+1-817-257-7737.
E-mail address: r.burns@tcu.edu (R.G. Burns).
umbrella term ‘‘white-collar crime,’’ fraud existed
since the origin of recorded history (Friedrichs,
1996), with legislation regarding fraud dating back
to fourth century B.C. in ancient Greece (Drapkin,
1989). Accordingly, increasing research attention was
directed toward fraud, and more generally white-
collar crime. Despite the increasing frequency with
which it occurred (e.g., Baker, 1999; Sherman, 2001)
and the notable harms it caused (e.g., Farnsworth &
Kelleher, 2002a; Farnsworth & Knap, 2002; Sher-
man, 2001), Internet fraud remained largely absent
from the research literature.
Many argued that law enforcement was in the
unenviable position of having to keep pace with
‘‘technocriminals’’ (e.g., Carter & Katz, 1996; Conser
& Russell, 2000; Dantzker, 2000; Gaines, Kappeler,
& Vaughn, 1997; Swanson, Territo, & Taylor, 1998)
who exploited the Internet to commit new and inno-
vative crimes (e.g., Albanese, 2000; Friedrichs, 1996;
Gaines et al., 1997; Meyer & Short, 1998; Swanson
et al., 1998). Goodman (2001, p. 10) summarized the

0047-2352/$ – see front matter D 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2004.06.008
478 R.G. Burns et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 477–493
situation in noting that ‘‘Unfortunately, the absence of
a standard definition for computer crime, a lack of
reliable criminal statistics on the problem, and sig-
nificant underreporting of the threat pose vexing
challenges for police agencies.’’ These and related
issues dictate that additional research be conducted
on specific types of computer crime and attention be
given to the consequences these new forms of crime
have on law enforcement agencies. This article is a
response to this dictate and offers insight regarding
the extent to which law enforcement agencies are
prepared to address Internet fraud. The article also
examines the possible impact of organizational de-
sign on Internet fraud enforcement.
Internet fraud
As a relatively new form of crime, Internet fraud
affects a substantial number of people on a daily basis.
The effects of Internet fraud are often discussed in
terms of financial losses, thus, indirect effects of
Internet fraud go unnoticed. For instance, the fear
and/or apprehension of many who refrain from en-
gaging in online commerce as a result of fraudulent
activities is undoubtedly an overlooked consequence
of Internet fraud. The following addresses the nature
and extent of Internet fraud, the regulation of Internet
fraud, the available resources regarding Internet fraud,
and the impact of organizational design on efforts to
confront Internet fraud, with the goal of establishing a
foundation of scholarly work on such crimes.
Nature and extent of Internet fraud
The National Institute of Justice (1989, p. xiv)
broadly defined computer-related crime as ‘‘Any
illegal act for which knowledge of computer technol-
ogy is involved for its investigation, perpetration, or
prosecution.’’ The National Institute of Justice (1989)
classified computer crimes according to the role
played by computers in particular crimes: (1) a
computer as the object of a crime, with the computer
being the target (e.g., the theft of computer processor
time); (2) a computer as the subject of a crime, with
the computer as the physical location of the crime, or
as a source of or cause for particular types of asset
loss (e.g., viruses); and, the area of focus for the
present work; (3) a computer as the instrument of
crimes, used to commit more complex variations of
traditional crimes (e.g., Internet fraud). The Federal
Bureau of Investigation (2003) provided a solid
working definition of Internet fraud:
‘‘. . .any fraudulent scheme in which one or more
components of the Internet, such as web sites, chat
rooms, and e-mail, play a significant role in
offering non-existent goods or services to con-
sumers, communicating false or fraudulent repre-
sentations about the schemes to consumers, or
transmitting victims’ funds, access devices, or
other items of value to the control of the scheme’s
perpetrators.’’
Existing research indicated a rise in Internet fraud
with a disorganized set of responses available for its
control and prevention. This rise was suggested, for
instance, by the number of incidents reported by the
Internet Fraud Complaint Center’s (IFCC) Six-Month
Data Trends Report (Federal Bureau of Investigation,
2001a). The IFCC is an online web site, provided by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the
National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C), that
receives Internet fraud complaints. Research by Join-
son and Dietz-Uhler (2002) also reported an increase
in identity deception on the Internet, and Walker and
Levine (2001) discussed the increase of Internet
securities fraud. While harms caused by Internet
fraud were difficult to estimate, researchers suggested
losses could be billions of dollars; certainly in excess
of $13 million per year (Farnsworth & Kelleher,
2002a).
Regulating Internet fraud
Baker (2002, p. 3) noted that ‘‘There has been
little regulation of the Internet for any reason, let
alone for the purpose of reducing the incidence of
criminal and fraudulent acts.’’ This situation led
Drinkhall (1997) to suggest the use of the Internet
as a medium for fraud was beyond the control of
regulators. Along these lines, a recent National Insti-
tute of Justice (NIJ) report identified ‘‘. . . a near-term
window of opportunity for law enforcement to gain a
foothold in containing electronic crimes, which pres-
ently outpace most agency investigative resources’’
(Stambaugh et al., 2000, p. 1). The need to provide
law enforcement personnel with technology-based
training in order to prevent and control Internet fraud,
and more generally computer crime, was also noted
by researchers and special organizations designed to
combat technology crime, and strategies and opinions
varied widely about how to prevent and control
Internet fraud. For example, the High Technology
Crime Investigators Association recommended
attacking Internet fraud with a three-prong approach
that included building consumer awareness, helping
business protect against the crimes, and equipping
law enforcement officers with the tools to fight these
crimes (Kopelev, 2000). Others suggested that estab-
lishing regional investigative units might be the most
cost-effective alternative to implementing in-house
 R.G. Burns et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 477–493
high-tech crimes divisions (e.g., Partners Against
Crime, 1999; Rosenblatt, 1990). Responding to the
alleged seriousness of Internet fraud, Congress re-
cently passed the Financial Services Antifraud Net-
work Act of 2001 which aimed to enhance the
coordination of anti-fraud efforts and promoted the
sharing of information among state and federal finan-
cial regulators.
Some suggested that law enforcement’s overall
lack of preparedness to address Internet fraud was
attributed to a lack of funding (e.g., Beauprez,
2002; Farnsworth & Knap, 2002; Groover, 1996;
Rosenblatt, 1990), the lack of qualified individuals
maintaining the expertise to address such crimes
(e.g., Beauprez, 2002; Groover, 1996; Piler, 1997;
Stambaugh et al., 2000), a lack of training (e.g.,
Beauprez, 2002; Federal Bureau of Investigation,
2001b; Groover, 1996; Meyer & Short, 1998;
Stambaugh et al., 2000), the difficulty in keeping
current with new technological advancements (e.g.,
Groover, 1996; Meyer & Short, 1998; Piler, 1997;
Rosenblatt, 1990), the lack of necessary equipment
(e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2001b;
Groover, 1996; Meyer & Short, 1998; Stambaugh
et al., 2000), the rotation of officers into and out of
computer investigations (Rosenblatt, 1990), jurisdic-
tional issues (e.g., Beauprez, 2002; Farnsworth &
Kelleher, 2002b; Farnsworth & Knap, 2002; Koss-
ler, 2002), inadequate laws (e.g., Farnsworth &
Knap, 2002; Meyer & Short, 1998), and depart-
ments discouraging individuals from becoming in-
volved with computer crime cases (Rosenblatt,
1990). The limited police response to computer
crimes might unfortunately bring to fruition
Tafoya’s (1986) prediction that local law enforce-
ment agencies might soon be overwhelmed by this
sophisticated form of crime.
Internet fraud resources and information
Agencies and organizations such as the NW3C,
the National Consumers League, the National Cyber-
crime Training Partnership, and the National Coali-
tion for the Prevention of Economic Crime are
examples of resources available for law enforcement
agencies and the public to recognize the nature and
extent of Internet fraud. For instance, complaints filed
with the IFCC suggested that the total loss from all
referred cases of Internet fraud for the calendar year
2001 was $17.8 million, with a median loss of $435
per complainant. Internet auction fraud was by far the
most common complaint, with males reportedly most
likely to commit Internet fraud. It was found that
most complainants were males between the ages of
thirty and fifty (National White Collar Crime Center,
2002). Findings from the National Consumers
479
League (NCL) supported the IFCC findings. The
NCL noted that fraud involving online auctions
occurred far more frequently than other forms of
Internet fraud, and an average loss per complainant
of $518 in 2001 (Internet Fraud Watch, 2002).
Organizational design and Internet fraud
Enforcement of Internet fraud is relatively new in
comparison to enforcement of traditional types of
crime such as personal and property crimes. Many
law enforcement agencies employ personnel with
decades of street experience, but must rely on either
inexperienced current staff or young ‘‘techies’’ to
combat Internet fraud. This scenario creates an orga-
nizational challenge regarding how departments re-
spond to Internet fraud. Law enforcement agencies
are characteristically bureaucratic in nature (e.g.,
Roberg, Kuykendall, & Novak, 2002; Swanson et
al., 1998), which theoretically dictates the means of
response to this relatively new type of crime. Weber’s
(1947) bureaucratic model suggested the existence of
a division of labor within organizations characterized
by specified areas of competence, official duties
bound by a system of rational rules, and employees
appointed on the basis of qualifications, which re-
quired specialized training. To adequately address the
new technological challenges associated with Internet
fraud, law enforcement agencies are developing new
competencies and rules while training current and
new staff. To achieve these developmental goals in a
timely manner, a tremendous amount of change must
occur within the bureaucratic systems of law enforce-
ment departments.
The changes required of law enforcement agen-
cies in response to Internet fraud will undoubtedly
pose vexing problems to organizations historically
known for their rigidity. In critiquing the bureaucratic
organizational model, Bennis (1966) posited that
bureaucracies were not designed to assimilate the
influx of new technology entering the organization,
and the bureaucratic design didn’t take into account
emerging and unanticipated problems, adding that
communication and innovative ideas were often
thwarted or distorted due to hierarchical divisions.
Sparrow (1988) added that tall organizational struc-
tures (which were typically found in larger agencies,
King, 2003) might impede organizational perfor-
mance, for instance, slowing organizational reactions
to external stimuli. Bureaucracies were also cited as
having ‘‘low adaptiveness’’ (Hage, 1965), indicating
that barriers would likely materialize as law enforce-
ment agencies responded to Internet fraud. The in-
ability to adapt to change could result in Internet
fraud enforcement becoming (remaining?) a low
priority for law enforcement. For instance, Roberg
480 R.G. Burns et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 477–493
et al. (2002, p. 413) stated, ‘‘For without a high
capacity to adapt, efforts to change will either fail,
have limited success and ultimately be abandoned, or
be claimed as successful when in reality they are
not.’’
The present article adds to the literature on Inter-
net fraud by providing information from law enforce-
ment agencies on their general level of preparedness
to address such crimes. Of particular concern are
issues pertaining to training and resources, collabo-
ration and cooperation efforts, information dissemi-
nation practices, and the nature and extent of Internet
fraud in general. In using a unique data set and
addressing an issue that was largely absent from the
research literature, the present study provided a step
in the direction toward comprehensively assessing
and better preparing law enforcement to address
Internet fraud. Among other things, the present article
provides a foundation upon which further research in
this area can build.
Method of study
It was determined that a nationwide survey of the
largest law enforcement agencies (those most likely
to have computer crime investigative personnel)
would provide evidence of law enforcement’s pre-
paredness to address Internet fraud. Data were
collected through surveys distributed to the seven
hundred U.S. police departments and sheriff’s agen-
cies maintaining at least one hundred officers. The
surveys included questions regarding the prepared-
ness of the agency and level of involvement in
preventing and investigating Internet fraud. The
target population included all departments, as of
1999, that employed more than one hundred officers
(Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2000). Large agencies
were selected for this study primarily on the as-
sumption that their size would render them more
likely than smaller agencies to employ one or more
persons with training and/or experience in handling
Internet fraud cases. Moreover, previous studies
used this selection strategy in surveys of law en-
forcement responses to computer crime. For in-
stance, Meyer and Short (1998) addressed only
those agencies employing one hundred or more
officers as they believed these groups were most
heavily involved with such offenses. Further, earlier
research suggested that smaller police departments
(those serving populations less than 2,500 citizens,
which constituted 46.5 percent of all local police
agencies) were notably less likely than all other
departments to have Internet access or a web page.
Similarly, only 33 percent of smaller departments
had Internet access, with only 4 percent maintaining
an Internet home page. In contrast, 94 percent of
departments serving populations of one million or
more had Internet access and 18 percent maintained
an Internet home page (Bureau of Justice Statistics,
2001).
Each agency was sent a survey directed to the
‘‘Chief of Police or Director of the Agency.’’ Survey
instructions included information pertaining to the
nature and the importance of the research, instruc-
tions for completing the survey, and a working
definition of Internet fraud (each survey included
the aforementioned FBI definition of Internet fraud
for guidance). The chief or director was asked to
personally complete the survey, or to forward it to the
most qualified person. In cases where agencies had
special electronic/computer crime or Internet crime
divisions, it was anticipated that the survey would be
routed to the appropriate person in these divisions.
Also, it was expected that some agencies would not
have a special unit designed to address computer
crime, thus, it was decided that the chief or primary
director of the agency would be best suited to
complete the survey. Return postage was provided
in an attempt to increase the response rate (Babbie,
1990; Dillman, 1978). Each survey contained ques-
tions addressing issues pertaining to the perceptions,
awareness, control, and prevention of Internet fraud,
including a series of agency classification questions.
Subjects were assured anonymity and informed that
any information they provided would be presented
and discussed in aggregate form only. No individual
department or division would be identified in any
report, publication, or discussion.
Surveys were printed and distributed toward the
latter part of calendar year 2001. To increase the
response rate, a brief follow-up postcard/reminder
was mailed to each department shortly following
the initial mailing. Follow-up phone calls were then
made to further enhance the response rate (Dillman,
1978; Heberlein & Baumgartner, 1978; Mangione,
1995). Of the 700 surveys distributed to all large
police and sheriff’s departments, 217 were returned
resulting in a modest but acceptable response rate of
31 percent. The resulting dataset provided a wealth of
information for analysis and a starting place for
research in this area. A higher response rate was
desired but the modest level of response could be
partially explained by the difficulty in collecting data
from organizations rather than individuals. It was also
important to note that because the surveys were sent
to the population of all county and municipal law
enforcement agencies maintaining one hundred or
more officers, and not a select sample of the popu-
lation, it was difficult to compare the response rate
obtained in this study to those of studies employing
sampling strategies.
 R.G. Burns et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 477–493 481

The data sought were not accessible via any percentage of departments (46.7 percent) did not
systematic agency reporting and thus could not be have an electronic/computer crime division. Of those
collected via agency records. Thus, while the desired that had a division, most had one for one to three
unit of analysis was the agency, an individual within years (41.2 percent of all departments with an
the agency had to provide the desired information. electronic/computer crime division). The staffs of
Correspondingly, an individual within the agency was those maintaining a division typically included one
responsible for filling out the survey as a representa- to five personnel (93.3 percent). Most departments
tive for the agency. Thus, it was possible that the employed 100 – 249 officers (48.4 percent), and most
response rate was negatively affected by having served populations between 100,000 and 249,999
surveys routed through an agency director or a police (37.4 percent). Individuals who completed the survey
chief and requesting that individuals take the time to
complete and return the instrument for the department
(Heberlein & Baumgartner, 1978). Additionally, the Table 1
Classification of local/county agencies/departments
response rate was likely influenced by the salience of
the survey to the respondent (Goyder, 1982; Heber- ‘‘How long has your agency/department had an electronic/
lein & Baumgartner, 1978, 1981) and by the per- computer crime division?’’
ceived importance of the research sponsor (Heberlein % n
& Baumgartner, 1978). Heberlein and Baumgartner Less than one year 9.8 21
(1978) in their classic work on the factors affecting 1 – 3 years 22.0 47
response rates found that response rates were in- 3 – 5 years 14.5 31
creased when the content of the survey was of interest 5 or more years 7.0 15
to the respondent. They also found that importance of No electronic/computer crime division 46.7 100
the auspices of the questionnaire influenced response
rates with government-sponsored surveys obtaining ‘‘How many staff comprise the electronic/computer crime
division?’’
higher response rates than surveys sponsored by other
types of organizations, such as universities or market % n
firms (Heberlein & Baumgartner, 1978). While there 1–5 93.3 112
were many reasons why the response rate was not 6 – 12 5.8 7
higher, most of these could not have been prevented 13 – 25 0.8 1
in this study. Thus, despite the limitations of mail
survey methodology, this approach was deemed the ‘‘How many sworn personnel does your agency/department
best available for obtaining the necessary information have?’’
from key individuals within law enforcement agen- % n
cies. In general, the methodological difficulties with 100 – 249 48.4 105
obtaining the desired data underscored the need for 250 – 499 25.8 56
law enforcement to create a centralized database of 500 – 999 12.4 27
information on electronic/computer crime and law 1,000 or more 13.4 29
enforcement personnel specializing in computer
crimes. ‘‘What size population does your agency/department
serve?’’
% n
Findings 10,000 – 24,999 0.5 1
25,000 – 49,999 2.8 6
The findings were divided into six sections based 50,000 – 99,000 22.9 49
on the nature of the survey questions: (1) classifica- 100,000 – 249,999 37.4 80
tion, (2) perceptions/attitudes, (3) training/resources, 250,000 – 499,000 14.5 31
500,000 – 999,999 11.2 24
(4) collaboration/cooperation, (5) information dis-
1,000,000 or more 10.7 23
semination, and (6) extent of and response to Internet
fraud. ‘‘How long have you been employed with your agency/
department?’’
Classification
% n
Questions within the ‘‘classification’’ section 3 – 6 years 1.9 4
dealt with the size and structure of the agency and 6 – 10 years 11.6 25
division, and background of the individual com- 10 – 20 years 48.6 105
pleting the survey. As Table 1 indicates, a notable More than 20 years 38.0 82
482 R.G. Burns et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 477–493

appeared to be the more experienced officers. In Table 3

general, most served with their department for over Attitudinal responses to Internet fraud legislation
ten years (86.6 percent). % = respondents who ‘‘agree’’ or ‘‘agree strongly’’
Range = 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly)
Perceptions/attitudes N % Mode n

The following findings represented the respond- ‘‘Additional legislation 216 69.4 5 150
(more laws) is needed
ents’ perceptions/attitudes regarding various aspects
to deter Internet fraud.’’
of Internet fraud. Table 2 depicts results from a series ‘‘Additional legislation 217 74.7 5 162
of questions. Subjects were asked regarding whether (more laws) is needed to
they believed Internet fraud was a societal problem effectively punish Internet
and whether others, particularly those involved in fraud offenders.’’
criminal justice, recognized it as such (Table 2). ‘‘Additional legislation 217 77.0 5 167
Using a scale of 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree (more laws) is needed to
strongly) in responding to a series of statements, the facilitate interstate law
majority of subjects noted that they believed Internet enforcement of Internet
fraud was a societal problem (76.5 percent agreed or fraud.’’
‘‘Additional legislation 214 72.9 5 156
strongly agreed), although they believed their
(more laws) is needed to
departments (40.7 percent) and law enforcement in facilitate international law
general (41.0 percent) did not recognize it as such a enforcement of Internet fraud.’’
serious problem. Respondents also indicated that ‘‘Additional legislation 217 64.5 5 140
prosecutors (20.6 percent) and judges (11.7 percent) (more laws) is needed to
did not necessarily recognize Internet fraud as a more clearly define what
societal problem, and were less likely than the constitutes Internet fraud.’’
general public (27.8 percent) to recognize it as ‘‘Additional legislation 216 70.0 5 151
problematic. Information on respondents’ attitudes (more laws) is needed to
toward the need for additional legislation is avail- more clearly define law
enforcement’s boundaries
able in Table 3.
regarding the investigation
Roughly 70 percent of respondents agreed or of Internet fraud.’’
strongly agreed that additional legislation was needed

Table 2 to deter Internet fraud. About three-quarters of the

Attitudinal responses to Internet fraud as a societal problem respondents reported the need for additional laws for
% = respondents who ‘‘agree’’ or ‘‘agree strongly’’ effectively punishing Internet fraud. Concerning
Range = 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly) issues of law enforcement, most felt increased legis-
N % Mode n lation was needed to facilitate interstate enforcement
(77 percent) and roughly 73 percent believed addi-
‘‘I believe Internet fraud 217 76.5 5 166
is a significant problem.’’
tional legislation was needed to facilitate international
‘‘My agency/department 216 40.7 3 88 enforcement. Respondents also supported the idea of
recognizes Internet fraud additional legislation to more clearly define law
as a significant societal enforcement boundaries (70 percent agreed or strong-
problem.’’ ly agreed), deter Internet fraud offenses (69.5 per-
‘‘Law enforcement 217 41.0 3 89 cent), and more clearly define Internet fraud (64.5
organizations recognize percent).
Internet fraud as a Again using the scale of 1 (disagree strongly) to 5
significant societal (agree strongly), respondents offered their views on
problem.’’
who they believed should be enforcing Internet fraud
‘‘Prosecutors recognize 214 20.6 3 44
Internet fraud as a
laws. A substantial portion of respondents believed
significant societal that Internet fraud should be enforced at the federal
problem.’’ level (93 percent agreed or strongly agreed), followed
‘‘Judges recognize Internet 214 11.7 2 25 by state law enforcement agencies (69.7 percent),
fraud as a significant local law enforcement agencies (52.1 percent), and
societal problem.’’ county law enforcement agencies (48.3 percent).
‘‘Society recognizes Internet 216 27.8 3 60 There appeared notable opposition to the suggestion
fraud as a significant that Internet fraud laws should be enforced by private
societal problem.’’ investigators (6.8 percent).
 R.G. Burns et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 477–493 483

Subjects were asked not only who should be Table 5

enforcing Internet fraud laws, but who was enforc- Responses regarding the training practices and resources
ing such laws. Respondents generally believed that available to address Internet fraud
Internet fraud laws were being enforced by law % = respondents who ‘‘agree’’ or ‘‘agree strongly’’
enforcement agencies at the federal (38.3 percent Range = 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly)
agreed or strongly agreed), state (33.7 percent), N % Mode n
county (42.8 percent), and local (47.4 percent) ‘‘My agency/department has 216 15.3 2 33
levels. Respondents in general, however, did not the necessary resources to
believe that Internet fraud laws were being enforced adequately investigate
as strongly by law enforcement agencies outside of Internet fraud.’’
the United States (12.7 percent). Also, it was ‘‘My agency/department has 216 16.2 2 35
strongly believed that Internet fraud laws were not adequate equipment/tools to
being enforced by private investigators (2.6 percent). investigate Internet fraud.’’
Table 4 depicts findings regarding respondent beliefs ‘‘My agency/department is 216 6.5 2 14
adequately staffed to
of who is, and who should be enforcing Internet
investigate Internet fraud.’’
fraud laws. ‘‘Those responsible for 216 17.6 2 38
investigating Internet fraud
Table 4 are adequately trained.’’
Attitudinal responses to Internet fraud enforcement
% = respondents who ‘‘agree’’ or ‘‘agree strongly’’ Responses regarding Internet fraud training
Range = 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly) % = respondent’s use of resources in training (N = 217)

N % Mode n % n

‘‘Internet fraud laws should be 213 52.1 5 111 Workshops/seminars 65.9 143
enforced by local law Other law enforcement agencies 47.0 102
enforcement.’’ National Cybercrime 42.4 92
‘‘Internet fraud laws should be 211 48.3 5 102 Training Partnership
enforced by county law Training within the 23.5 51
enforcement.’’ agency/department
‘‘Internet fraud laws should be 211 69.7 5 147 Private investigators 3.2 7
enforced by state law (consultants)
enforcement.’’
‘‘Internet fraud laws should be 213 93.0 5 198 Responses regarding awareness of Internet fraud resources
enforced by federal law % = respondents reporting ‘‘aware’’ or ‘‘very aware’’
enforcement.’’ Range = 1 (not at all aware) to 5 (very aware)
‘‘Internet fraud laws should be 208 58.2 5 121 ‘‘Describe your agency/department awareness of the
enforced by law enforcement following:’’
agencies outside of the U.S.’’ N % Mode n
‘‘Internet fraud laws should be 206 6.8 1 14
Technical guidance on 214 33.2 3 71
enforced by private
investigative methods
investigators.’’
Labs equipped to support 214 29.0 2 62
‘‘Internet fraud laws are being 209 47.4 5 99
Internet fraud
enforced by local law
enforcement efforts
enforcement.’’
Relevant research 214 25.7 3 55
‘‘Internet fraud laws are being 208 42.8 3 89
regarding Internet fraud
enforced by county law
Expert Internet fraud 214 22.4 2 48
enforcement.’’
investigators
‘‘Internet fraud laws are being 208 33.7 3 70
Expert witnesses in the 213 16.9 1 36
enforced by state law
field of Internet fraud
enforcement.’’
Experienced prosecutors 214 15.4 1 33
‘‘Internet fraud laws are being 206 38.3 3 79
who specialize in
enforced by federal law
Internet fraud
enforcement.’’
‘‘Internet fraud laws are being 197 12.7 1 25
enforced by law enforcement Training/resources
agencies outside the U.S.’’
‘‘Internet fraud laws are being 194 2.6 1 5 As noted in Table 5, respondents answered ques-
enforced by private tions regarding the training practices and resources
investigators.’’ available to address Internet fraud. Specifically, the
484 R.G. Burns et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 477–493

survey included questions concerning department used the assistance of other groups with their inves-
resources, equipment/tools, and staff designated to tigations of Internet fraud. It appeared that depart-
investigate Internet fraud, as well as the training- ments most often used trained police investigators at
related preparedness of Internet fraud investigators. the local level (47.3 percent reported using often or
Respondents were also asked to identify the specific always using these resources) and interdepartmental
agencies used to assist with Internet fraud training, police investigators (39 percent) to aid in investiga-
and their department’s awareness of resources avail- tions of Internet fraud to a greater extent than they
able to assist with Internet fraud investigation and used investigators at the county (31.6 percent), state
enforcement. Finally, subjects were asked to identify (18.2 percent), and federal (24.4 percent) levels.
how often their department used various personnel in Respondents appeared to use trained civilian systems
efforts to assist with their investigations of Internet technicians (8.6 percent) on a notably limited basis.
fraud. Table 6 depicts these results.
Results shown in Table 5 indicated that respond-
ents generally believed that their departments did not Collaboration/cooperation
possess the resources, tools, and equipment necessary
to adequately investigate Internet fraud. They also did The following results pertained to survey ques-
not believe their departments were adequately staffed tions concerning the frequency with which depart-
to address such crimes. Using a scale of 1 (disagree ments collaborated and/or cooperated in Internet
strongly) to 5 (agree strongly) respondents showed fraud enforcement efforts. Respondents suggested
little support for the suggestion that their department that law enforcement agencies most often collaborat-
maintained the necessary equipment/tools (16.2 per- ed with other law enforcement groups within the
cent agreed or strongly agreed) or necessary resour- United States. When asked how often in the past
ces (15.3 percent) to adequately investigate Internet year their agency had at least weekly contact with a
fraud. Respondents also demonstrated little support to selection of Internet fraud-related resources, 19.1
suggestions that their departments were adequately percent reported having contact with local law en-
staffed to investigate Internet fraud (6.5 percent), and forcement agencies, 17.0 percent reported contact
that those responsible for investigating Internet fraud with county agencies, 6.6 percent reported contact
were adequately trained (17.6 percent). with state law enforcement agencies, and 6.6 percent
Subjects were asked about the resources their reported contact with federal law enforcement agen-
department used for Internet fraud training. Most cies. With the exception of the Internet Fraud Com-
respondents reported using workshops/seminars plaint Center (FBI/NWCCC), with whom 12.3
(65.9 percent) and other law enforcement agencies percent of respondents reportedly contact weekly,
(47.0 percent) as part of their training to fight Internet law enforcement agencies had limited contact with
fraud. They did not, however, appear to use training other support and enforcement groups. These find-
provided by private investigators/consultants (3.2 ings are depicted in Table 7.
percent). These findings are depicted in Table 5.
The survey also included a set of questions
concerning awareness of available training and Table 6
resources to address Internet fraud. Using a scale of Responses regarding use of Internet fraud investigative
1 (not at all aware) to 5 (very aware), respondents resources
reported their familiarity with various resources. % = respondents reporting ‘‘often’’ or ‘‘always’’ using
Respondents seemed moderately unaware of tools specified resource
that could be used against Internet fraud, for instance, Range = 1 (never) to 4 (always)
as roughly one-third reported being aware or very N % Mode n
aware of technical guidance on investigative meth-
ods. They seemed less aware of relevant research Interdepartmental police 210 39.0 2 82
investigators
regarding Internet fraud (25.7 percent), labs equipped
Trained police investigators 207 47.3 2 98
to support Internet fraud enforcement efforts (29 at the local level
percent), expert Internet fraud investigators (22.4 Trained police investigators 206 31.6 1 65
percent), and notably less aware of expert witnesses at the county level
in the field of Internet fraud, and experienced pros- Trained police investigators 209 18.2 2 38
ecutors who specialized in Internet fraud (16.9 and at the state level
15.4 percent, respectively). These findings are also Trained police investigators 209 24.4 2 51
depicted in Table 5. at the federal level
The final set of questions regarding Internet fraud Trained civilian system 209 8.6 1 18
training/resources addressed how often departments technicians
 R.G. Burns et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 477–493 485

Table 7 enforcement agencies. Respondents reported the least

Responses regarding collaboration with agencies for inves- effectiveness in working with the SEC’s Office of
tigating Internet fraud Internet Enforcement (24.4 percent), the NCL’s In-
% = respondents reporting at least weekly contact ternet Fraud Watch (26.8 percent), law enforcement
Range = 1 (never) to 5 (at least weekly) agencies outside of the United States (29.1 percent),
‘‘Within the past year, how often has your agency/ and civilian (private) investigators (30.9 percent).
department been in contact with the following regarding
Table 7 depicts these results.
Internet fraud?’’
N % Mode n Information dissemination
Local law enforcement agencies 215 19.1 4 41
County law enforcement agencies 212 17.0 4 36 Subjects were asked a series of questions con-
State law enforcement agencies 213 6.6 3 14 cerning the Internet fraud information dissemination
Federal law enforcement agencies 214 8.9 3 19 practices of their departments. Survey questions in-
Law enforcement agencies outside 215 0.9 1 2 volved the avenues through which their departments
of the U.S. disseminated information, the groups to whom they
Internet Fraud Complaint Center 212 12.3 1 26 distributed information, and the frequency with
(FBI/NWCCC) which they disseminated information to various
Civilian (private) investigators 214 0.5 1 1
groups in society.
Office of Internet Enforcement 211 0.0 1 0
(SEC)
It seemed that information on Internet fraud, as
Internet Fraud Watch (National 211 0.0 1 0 disseminated by law enforcement agencies, was tar-
Consumers League) geted toward specific groups. For instance, as noted
National Coalition for Prevention 213 0.0 1 0 in Table 8, most respondents reported that their
of Economic Crime agency sent Internet fraud awareness information to
other law enforcement entities (36.2 percent reported
% = Respondents reporting ‘‘effectively’’ or ‘‘very sending such information at least quarterly per year),
effectively’’ the general public (34.6 percent), and private sector
Range = 1 (not at all effectively) to 4 (very effectively) businesses (25.7 percent). In contrast, judges (3.3
‘‘How effectively does your agency/department cooperate
percent) and elected and appointed officials (7 per-
with the following agencies for investigating Internet
fraud?’’
cent) were least likely to receive such information.
Subjects were also asked to identify the methods
N % Mode n through which their department disseminated infor-
Local law enforcement agencies 201 64.2 3 129
County law enforcement agencies 187 62.0 2 116
Table 8
State law enforcement agencies 191 54.5 2 104
Responses regarding frequency agency/department provides
Federal law enforcement agencies 196 55.1 3 108
Internet fraud awareness information
Law enforcement agencies outside 86 29.1 2 25
of the U.S. % = respondents providing information at least quarterly
Internet Fraud Complaint Center 134 45.5 2 61 Range = 1 (never) to 5 (at least weekly)
(FBI/NWCCC) N % Mode n
Civilian (private) investigators 55 30.9 2 17
Other law enforcement entities 213 36.2 1 77
Internet Fraud Watch 41 26.8 1 11
General public 211 34.6 2 73
(National Consumers League)
Private sector businesses 214 25.7 1 55
Office of Internet Enforcement 41 24.4 1 10
Prosecutors 215 20.5 1 44
(SEC)
Elected and appointed officials 214 7.0 1 15
Judges 214 3.3 1 7
Subjects were also asked about the effectiveness
of their cooperation with other groups involved in Methods agency/department use to disseminate information
addressing Internet fraud. Using a scale of 1 (not at to public regarding Internet fraud
all effectively) to 4 (very effectively), subjects reported % = respondent use of resource (N = 217)
the level of cooperation between their departments % n
and others. In general, respondents who had contact Local newspaper 47.9 104
with particular resources reported that their depart- Your agency/department web site 32.3 70
ments worked most effectively with local law en- Public awareness programs 30.9 67
forcement agencies (64.2 percent reported effective or Local radio news 24.4 53
very effective cooperation). They also appeared to Bulletin/newsletter 15.2 33
find it effective to work with county (62.0 percent), Public service announcements 14.3 31
state (54.5 percent), and federal (55.1 percent) law School programs 8.8 19
486 R.G. Burns et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 477–493

Table 9 the extent they did. Respondents generally believed

Responses regarding specific complaints regarding Internet that Internet fraud was being enforced somewhat
fraud equally at the local, county, and state levels. While
% = complaints received by respondents at least monthly respondents suggested that Internet fraud should be
Range = 1 (never) to 5 (at least weekly) addressed by federal law enforcement agencies, they
N % Mode n also felt strongly that it should not be addressed by
Identity theft 209 81.8 5 171 private investigators. Respondents generally did not
Credit/debit card fraud 214 79.0 5 169 perceive that Internet fraud was being addressed by a
General merchandise sales 211 65.9 4 139 particular agency. Finally, it was generally felt that
Online auctions 210 39.5 4 83 greater legislation was needed in several areas re-
Computer equipment/software 212 34.4 3 73 garding Internet fraud. This finding was not surpris-
Investment/finance offers 206 25.7 2 53 ing given a recent report which called for updated
Advance fee loans 206 11.7 1 24 laws that could ‘‘. . .keep pace with electronic
Travel/vacation offers 208 8.7 1 18 crime. . .’’ (Stambaugh et al., 2000, p. 4).
Work at home offers 207 7.7 1 16
Sharing information
mation to the public regarding Internet fraud.
Respondents reported most often disseminating In- Analyzing the perceptions of the respondents in
ternet fraud-related information through the local the present study took on significance when consid-
newspaper (47.9 percent), the department website ering that those responding were prominent among
(32.3 percent), and public awareness programs the primary combatants against Internet fraud. Their
(30.9 percent). Table 8 displays these findings. perceptions were likely to influence Internet fraud
investigative practices. For example, respondents
Perceptions of the extent of and response to Internet believed that Internet fraud occurred on a regular
fraud basis within their jurisdictions. Yet, they did not
believe that others, for instance judges and elected
While the present study was certainly not de- officials, perceived Internet fraud as being as prob-
signed to measure the extent of Internet fraud, it did lematic. Interestingly, respondents reported being
offer results regarding the perceived frequency and least likely to distribute Internet fraud information
nature of Internet fraud-related calls to law enforce- to judges and elected and appointed officials. These
ment. Respondents generally believed that a great findings suggested that respondents’ perceptions
deal of Internet fraud occurred in their jurisdictions, might influence information distribution practices of
as noted by the 54.1 percent who noted that it Internet fraud investigators. It is possible that in this
occurred at least weekly, and the 27.6 percent who case, Internet fraud investigators’ perceptions and
noted that it occurred at least monthly. There existed, actions worked as a type of self-fulfilling prophecy.
however, a notable difference in the types of Internet Respondents’ beliefs that judges and elected officials
fraud offenses that respondents suggested were most didn’t consider Internet fraud to be a significant a
often reported to their departments and those most social problem discouraged them from disseminating
frequently reported to the IFCC and the NCL. Auc- pertinent information regarding Internet fraud to
tion fraud complaints were most commonly reported judges and elected officials. Thus, this belief might
to the latter although respondents’ departments most in fact perpetuate the perceived lack of concern for
often received complaints regarding identity theft Internet fraud by judges and elected officials because
(81.8 percent reported receiving these complaints at Internet fraud investigators had fewer interactions
least monthly), credit/debit card fraud (79 percent), with these agents of the court, thus influencing their
and general merchandise sales (65.9 percent). Table 9 perception that there was a lack of concern. Accord-
depicts these results. ingly, some influential elected individuals might be
less likely to offer and/or support legislation address-
ing such crimes, or they might be less likely to
Discussion prosecute or be familiar with Internet fraud.
Perhaps greater dissemination of information to
Several notable findings emerged in relation to judges and other elected officials would result in
respondents’ perceptions of Internet fraud. Most greater awareness of the nature, extent, seriousness,
respondents recognized Internet fraud as a societal and potential harm of Internet fraud and render
problem. They did not believe, however, their depart- support for legislation addressing Internet fraud and
ments, law enforcement in general, judges, and pros- related crimes. This suggestion was supported by
ecutors recognized Internet fraud to be problematic to research conducted by Meyer and Short (1998,
 R.G. Burns et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 477–493
p. 30) who found that computer crime investigators
often cited ‘‘inadequate laws’’ and the occasional
need ‘‘to educate court officials about the specialized
investigations they were conducting’’ as obstacles in
the fight against computer crime. Also, Stambaugh et
al. (2000, p. 1) suggested that ‘‘Greater awareness of
electronic crime should be promoted for all stake-
holders, including prosecutors, judges, academia,
industry, and the general public,’’ adding that ‘‘pros-
ecutors and judges need awareness training to stay
abreast of electronic crime’s impact and technology’’
(p. 4). Moreover, Schlegel (as cited in Farnsworth &
Knap, 2002) blamed a substantial lack of communi-
cation among all levels of law enforcement for the
limited response to Internet fraud. These calls for
education and communication, coupled with the pres-
ent findings, suggested the need for greater and more
effective Internet fraud information dissemination
practices.
The lack of communication regarding Internet
fraud might have wide reaching consequences for
computer crime fighting efforts in general. Groover
(1996) emphasized the importance of communica-
tion in arguing that it was easy to explain to city
leaders that additional funds were necessary to fight
violent crime, simply due to the fear caused by such
acts. Explaining to the same individuals the need for
additional funding to fight computer crimes becomes
much more difficult simply because budget pro-
viders, who deal with a finite set of resources,
respond to the priorities set by the general public.
Additional funding becomes difficult to obtain with-
out information pertaining to the harms caused by
electronic crimes. Groover (1996, p. 9) further
argued, ‘‘Departments immediately must begin to
articulate how behind they really are (in fighting
computer crime) and express the need for funds.’’
Rosenblatt (1990) echoed this comment, arguing
that local police departments did not recognize
computer crime as a high priority, and thus, were
hesitant to devote resources toward it.
Fighting Internet fraud
Respondents in this study perceived that all levels
of law enforcement were fighting Internet fraud to a
somewhat equal degree, however, there was a strong
belief that Internet fraud should be fought at the
federal level. A report on Internet fraud provided by
the National Consumers League (2000) supported
this suggestion. While subjects in the present research
were not asked why they supported federal enforce-
ment of Internet fraud, their support could be
explained by the differences between state and federal
laws, the multi-state jurisdiction of federal law en-
forcement agencies, and the greater degree of resour-
487
ces available at the federal level. Given the limited
number of federal law enforcement agents, however,
and the current and increasing frequency of Internet
fraud complaints, one could argue that federal agen-
cies need to hire a significant number of new agents if
they are to be the primary group fighting Internet
fraud. Hiring additional agents at the federal level
would permit these agents to investigate the smaller-
scale offenses that they currently dismiss due to their
relative insignificance. Other suggestions to fight
Internet fraud included regional Internet fraud en-
forcement groups (e.g., Rosenblatt, 1990), and better
preparing state, county, and/or local departments to
address such crimes.
Resources
Many respondents reported a lack of staff and
overall resources in their attempts to address Internet
fraud. This finding was expected given the results of
earlier research which suggested that responses from
computer crime investigators ‘‘paint a bleak picture
of inadequate training and resources slightly tem-
pered with a few success stories’’ (Meyer & Short,
1998, p. 28) and law enforcement’s historical limited
response to non-traditional crimes (e.g., Friedrichs,
1996).
Respondents seemed somewhat unaware of help-
ful resources to fight Internet fraud. Less than half of
all respondents reported being aware of technical
guidance on Internet fraud investigative methods,
relevant research regarding Internet fraud, labs
equipped to support Internet fraud enforcement
efforts, expert Internet fraud investigators, expert
witnesses for Internet fraud cases, and experienced
prosecutors who specialized in Internet fraud. These
findings demonstrated the need for a central deposi-
tory (a clearinghouse) of information available to all
law enforcement agencies. An ‘‘information com-
mons’’ in which those involved with Internet fraud
enforcement efforts could share, for example, techni-
cal information, the names of expert witnesses, ad-
vice from experienced prosecutors, or the location of
available labs would greatly assist law enforcement
efforts. Although progress is being made in this area
(e.g., efforts by the NW3C), much work remains.
Regardless of who organizes and operates the clear-
inghouse, any agency/organization choosing to house
the central depository of Internet fraud information
should give due consideration to the input of those
directly fighting Internet fraud. A vital resource such
as a central database of information on Internet fraud
would certainly be a time-intensive task that requires
continuous updating, or it runs the risk of losing law
enforcement and societal trust, and its potential
effectiveness.
488 R.G. Burns et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 477–493
Cooperation
Many researchers and agencies recognized the
need to address computer crime through cooperative
efforts among various law enforcement groups (e.g.,
Groover, 1996; National Consumers League, 2000;
Partners Against Crime, 1999; Rosenblatt, 1990).
One of the less obvious, yet significant benefits to
increased cooperation among law enforcement agents
with regard to Internet fraud was the ability to address
jurisdictional issues. To facilitate cooperation, Groov-
er (1996) proposed that computer crime could be
addressed through having various groups specialize
in particular areas with the intent to prevent officers
from becoming overwhelmed through having to mas-
ter such a wide array of crimes. Others promoted
specialization (National Consumers League, 2000)
and task forces (Federal Bureau of Investigation,
2001c; Rosenblatt, 1990) to address Internet fraud.
Former Attorney General Janet Reno called for more
effective law enforcement organization and a pooling
of resources on a national and regional basis to
address cyber crime (Partners Against Crime, 1999).
Results from the present study suggested the exis-
tence of cooperation and collaboration among law
enforcement agencies, although the extent, nature,
and frequency of those efforts remained unclear.
Evidence of law enforcement cooperation was sup-
ported by accounts of recent collaborative efforts
among various levels of law enforcement to address
Internet fraud (e.g., Aksamit & Alexander, 2001;
Lewis, 2002; Lichtblau & Perry, 2001). Further
research, however, should be directed toward quali-
tatively examining cooperative and collaborative In-
ternet fraud law enforcement efforts.
Internet fraud reporting
Interestingly, respondents noted that identity
theft, credit/debit card fraud, and general merchan-
dise sales were the most frequently reported forms
of Internet fraud. This finding differed from IFCC
and NCL findings that complaints regarding auction
fraud far outnumbered complaints regarding all
other forms of fraud. Such discrepancy might occur
as a result of victim awareness (perhaps those
participating in auctions were most likely aware of
the IFCC and NCL), or it was possible that victims
perceived law enforcement as incapable of address-
ing auction fraud. Such reporting differences could
also be explained by perceived seriousness of the
offenses (e.g., victims sought the most punitive/
serious enforcement actions for what they perceived
as more serious offenses). Self-blame among victims
of Internet fraud, and law enforcement authorities
blaming victims for their greed and naiveté were
additional victim-related issues impacting reporting
and investigative practices (Farnsworth & Knap,
2002). In addition to the obvious need to obtain
information pertaining to the frequency of Internet
fraud (e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2001a;
Stambaugh et al., 2000), greater research is needed
to examine various areas of Internet fraud victim
reporting practices and consequences.
Organizations, innovation, and adaptation
Overall resistance to change exists within most
organizations. Law enforcement agencies face many
obstacles in responding to the rapid changes associ-
ated with addressing Internet fraud. These obstacles
have recognizable implications for law enforcement
personnel. Kerr and Kerr (1972) stated that adapting
to a new environment or learning a new method or
technique often resulted in feelings of stress or the
fear of the unknown, which could have notable
implications for law enforcement. For example, the
confusion over new roles and the fear of the unknown
were experienced by some New York City police
officers during the transition toward a community
policing philosophy over a decade ago (Pisani, 1992;
see also Lewis, Rosenberg, & Sigler, 1999). Police
reluctance to change was evidenced in research
suggesting that some large police agencies failed to
restructure their organizational design, and others
changed in the opposite direction of the restructuring
suggestions offered by community policing reformers
(Maguire, Shin, Zhao, & Hassell, 2003). Law en-
forcement agencies might be reluctant to restructure
their organization to confront electronic crimes, and
might also encounter experienced personnel who
would plausibly resist being reassigned to the Internet
fraud division due to the new roles and extensive
training necessary to perform the duty.
Organizational change among police agencies
could lead to the ‘‘fear of the unknown,’’ especially
among personnel unfamiliar with the Internet and
associated technologies. Roberg et al. (2002) stated,
‘‘There is little doubt that most officers would rather
do what they believe they were hired for and what
they perceive to be the ‘real’ police role: crime
fighting.’’ A similar scenario was evident in commu-
nity policing with personnel expressing reluctance to
assignments as ‘‘social workers.’’ One might surmise
that fighting Internet fraud was not perceived by
many law enforcement personnel as ‘‘real crime
fighting.’’
Based on the current findings, and organizational
theory and its critique, it could be argued that law
enforcement perceptions, attitudes, and responses to
Internet fraud were impacted by organizational struc-
tures. For instance, personnel training and the avail-
 R.G. Burns et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 477–493
ability of adequate resources might be impacted by
the noted inflexibility of bureaucratic organizations.
The lack of training might be a result of resistance to
change from historical crime fighting approaches,
whereby departments were uninterested in Internet
fraud training opportunities. Further, the lack of
resources could stem from police departments failing
to adapt to change; choosing instead to do what was
customary. Innovation, or the adoption of an idea or
behavior that is new to the organization (Hage, 1999),
is essential in policing, particularly considering mod-
ern day reliance on technology. Unfortunately, hier-
archically structured organizations such as police
departments are strongly associated with inertia and
rigidly following customary protocols (Roberg et al.,
2002, p. 380).
In light of King’s (2003, pp. 214 – 215) suggestion
that ‘‘There is no evidence. . . that taller police
agencies are less innovative’’ than smaller agencies,
further research should address organizational inno-
vation within law enforcement agencies, with a
particular focus on the rates of innovation resulting
from shifts in policy and procedures, and the intro-
duction of new forms of crime (see, e.g., Hage, 1999,
for a discussion of organizational innovation and
organizational change). Addressing Internet fraud
requires departments to adopt additional roles, new
ideas, rules, competencies, procedures, and strategies
while integrating current and new personnel. Under-
standably, rates of innovation will depend on a host
of variables, with organizational characteristics being
central among them.
Directions for the future
Based on the present results and the existing
computer crime/Internet fraud literature, the follow-
ing general suggestions are offered to further ad-
dress Internet fraud law enforcement. First, further
research should attempt to determine why it is
perceived that federal law enforcement agencies
should lead the fight against Internet fraud. Deter-
mining why respondents believe federal law en-
forcement agencies should take the lead with
regard to Internet fraud should help determine
whether greater investigative powers are needed
by non-federal law enforcement groups, or if addi-
tional staffing and resources should be allocated to
federal law enforcement groups. Given the limited
staff sizes at the federal level, it is presumed that
federal agents benefit from having wider jurisdic-
tion than law enforcement officials at other levels.
If jurisdictional issues are what make federal agents
seem best positioned to fight Internet crime, con-
sideration should be given to widening the jurisdic-
489
tion of all involved in enforcing computer crime
laws. Caution is urged, however, in assuming that
public law enforcement at any level is best suited to
address Internet fraud. Specifically, results from the
present study were based on input from law en-
forcement agents; it was quite possible that the
results would differ if the same survey was admin-
istered to personnel in private sector corporations,
or civilians who were directly harmed by Internet
fraud.
Second, efforts should be made to determine
which law enforcement approach is best suited to
fight Internet fraud. Consideration should be given to
the creation of regional branches or specialized task
forces to help address the current, apparently frag-
mented approach to fighting Internet fraud. Meyer
and Short (1998) were among those who noted that
some agencies were developing specialized task
forces that successfully dealt with computer crime.
Publicly funded regional task forces staffed by expe-
rienced personnel from all levels of law enforcement
are a viable option that should be considered.
In general, it appeared that greater law enforce-
ment organization was required to address Internet
fraud. Although the present study was not necessarily
designed to suggest which organizational approach
would most effectively address Internet fraud, it
could be argued that changes in law enforcement’s
overall organizational approach should be considered.
Instead of requiring each department to hire, support,
and update experts in computer crime, many sug-
gested a pooling of resources, including personnel.
Perhaps a separate branch of law enforcement could
be designated to focus primarily on computer crimes.
Fighting street crime and computer crime requires
different skills and resources. To require the same
group of individuals to fight both types of crime has
resulted in, among other problems, neglect of com-
puter crime.
Third, efforts should be made to develop an
accessible database of Internet fraud law enforcement
officials/experts. Given the inherent difficulties in
obtaining a large response rate when conducting a
mail survey, the response rate in the current study was
also impacted by some surveys being routed through
at least one intermediary. Increased cooperation
among law enforcement officials and the facilitation
of research studies are among the presumed benefits
of providing a database of Internet fraud law enforce-
ment officials/experts.
Fourth, law enforcement officials should give
strong consideration to disseminating Internet fraud
information to policymakers/judges, and others
maintaining influences on criminal justice practices.
They should also continue to distribute such mate-
rial to the general public. Parsons (1960) suggested
490 R.G. Burns et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 477–493
that organizations differed from other groupings or
units in that they were more likely structured and
restructured to meet particular goals. In common-
weal organizations such as policing, these goals are
often determined by external (e.g., the public) and
internal (e.g., employees) pressures, thus highlight-
ing the need for targeted distribution of the extent
and nature of Internet fraud.
The call for increased dissemination of informa-
tion was not the first of its type, as many others noted
the importance of education. For instance, the NCL
recommended to the U.S. Department of Justice that
the federal government establish a permanent grant
fund to support public education about Internet fraud,
and further suggested that the federal government
work with all relevant groups by forming partnerships
and providing in-kind services, expertise and other
outlets for joint public education efforts (National
Consumers League, 2000). Additionally, a panel of
police experts for the National Institute of Justice
recently noted that distributing information to people
and groups was an attribute of a healthy police
department (Travis & Brann, 1997). In light of these
arguments, it was suggested that increased education
would help everyone recognize the significance of
Internet fraud, which in turn might generate addition-
al resources.
Fifth, law enforcement departments, through sup-
port from local, state, and federal governments,
should provide additional resources, including staff,
to those involved with Internet fraud enforcement
efforts. The lack of resources, including staff, train-
ing, and funding, provided to those fighting Internet
fraud, and more generally computer crimes, was well
documented in the literature. Society’s preoccupation
with traditional, street crime dictates that non-tradi-
tional crimes such as Internet fraud are neglected. At
some point in time society will be unable to continue
discrediting harms committed via computers. It is
strongly recommended that law enforcement at all
levels be provided the necessary resources to keep
pace with technocriminals. This concern was earlier
voiced by the NCL (National Consumers League,
2000) in its recommendation that the federal govern-
ment establish permanent funding to train all levels
of investigators and prosecutors and to assist in
computer crime-related law enforcement actions,
especially on a global basis. It is suggested that
efforts by the federal government to fund Internet
fraud enforcement should be mirrored by all levels of
government.
Sixth, law enforcement agencies need to attract
for employment those most capable of fighting
Internet fraud. Groover (1996) and Beauprez
(2002) were among those who noted the difficulty
law enforcement administrators face in hiring
employees who maintain both technical expertise
and investigative training. Groover suggested inte-
grating computers into basic, and in-service training
for all officers and expecting police departments to
pay for all computer training. In addition to support-
ing Groover’s suggestion, it was suggested that law
enforcement agencies target individuals maintaining
strong computer skills. Beauprez (2002) suggested
that due to the financial attraction of applying
advanced computer skills in the private sector, many
police departments must breed their own computer
crime detectives, adding that ‘‘Some street officers
turn into cybercops simply because they have a
home computer. Most departments still drag their
feet to create such positions’’ (2002, p. A14). The
present results suggested that many of those fighting
Internet fraud had been with their departments for
over ten years, and while their investigative experi-
ence undoubtedly added to enforcement efforts, it
was suggested that departments also seek computer
experts who could share expertise with experienced
investigators. Ideally departments would prefer per-
sonnel with advanced skills in both investigation
and computers, however, such individuals are diffi-
cult to locate. Departments should seek computer
experts who desire to learn investigative skills, and
investigators who are motivated to learn computer
skills, and further research should examine the
effectiveness of each approach.
Seventh, serious consideration should be devoted
toward the development of an information com-
mons, with an underlying goal to build and foster
stronger relationships with law enforcement groups.
A National Consumers League (2000) recommen-
dation to the U.S. Department of Justice suggested
that the federal government make a substantial
commitment of financial support to nonprofit organ-
izations involved in the collection and disse-
mination of Internet fraud information to law
enforcement. The clearinghouse of Internet fraud
information, for example, could be a place where
law enforcement officials share crime fighting tips,
problems they currently face regarding Internet
fraud, and overall technical guidance. The general
public could use it to locate prevention tips or
reporting procedures. Prosecutors and judges could
use it to locate recent legislative developments. This
was by no means the first call for such a resource,
as Stambaugh et al. (2000, p. 5), for instance,
suggested, ‘‘many investigators and prosecutors
are calling for a clearinghouse of online information
and technical guidance on methods, investigative
technologies, and research.’’
Eighth, it is suggested that further research focus
on Internet fraud victim reporting practices. One of
the more compelling findings of the present study
 R.G. Burns et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 32 (2004) 477–493
concerned respondent reports that auction fraud,
despite being the most common form of Internet
fraud reported to the IFCC and the NCL, was
reported to law enforcement groups on a notably
less frequent basis than identity theft, credit/debit
card fraud, and fraud involving general merchandise
sales.
Ninth, greater attention should focus on how
organizational design relates to law enforcement
responses to innovative crimes. The traditional bu-
reaucratic design of police agencies can hamper
efforts to confront emerging types of crime, al-
though despite its limitations, the bureaucratic model
remains prominent in today’s law enforcement agen-
cies. Swanson et al. (1998, p. 144) suggested that
the limitations of a bureaucratic organizational de-
sign did not indicate that ‘‘police administrators
should ignore or fail to try to reduce dysfunctional
aspects of bureaucracy, but rather that reform efforts
will generally take the form of improvements in
how the bureaucratic model operates and is experi-
enced’’ by employees and clients. Future research
should include organizational structure as a variable
to be considered in any assessment of enforcement
analyses, particularly those that involve innovation
and require adaptation.
Finally, researchers should focus greater efforts
toward documenting the nature and extent of Internet
fraud. In response to FBI Deputy Assistant Director
Kubic’s suggestion that ‘‘No one knows the full
extent of the fraud being committed on the Internet’’
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2001a, p. 3), and
Farnsworth and Kelleher’s (2002a) suggestion that no
single agency tracks all Internet fraud and available
numbers vary widely among those that track partic-
ular forms of Internet fraud, researchers should de-
vote due consideration to further identifying the
extent of Internet fraud. Such research should be
supported by both the private and public sectors.
Continued funding of work in this area is vital toward
further understanding of the nature and extent of
Internet fraud.
In sum, much work remains and many chal-
lenges must be met in order to better understand,
investigate, and prevent Internet fraud. Swanson et
al. (1998, p. 637) noted that future behavior is
generally ‘‘predicted by past behavior; that is, cir-
cumstances being equal, people will go on doing
what they have always done.’’ The emergence of
electronic crimes, however, dictates that law en-
forcement agencies can no longer ‘‘continue doing
what they have always done.’’ The present article
provides a step in the direction of assessing the
nature of Internet fraud through exploring the per-
ceptions of Internet fraud investigators and the
extent to which law enforcement is trained and
491
prepared to address these crimes. It is hoped that
additional research and development in this area will
prevent future victimizations and enhance law enfor-
cement’s capability to address these crimes.
Acknowledgements
This research was supported by the National
White Collar Crime Center and a grant from the U.S.
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,
Bureau of Justice Assistance (Grant #99-WC-CX-
0002). Opinions are those of the authors and do not
necessarily represent the position of AARP or PPI.
The authors wish to thank Wes Longhofer for his
assistance.
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