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Pakistan Affairs
Sunday, November 29, 2015 1

Day 6
Sequence
 The War in Afghanistan since 1979: Implications and
Challenges to Pakistan in the Post 2014 Era
Sunday, November 29, 2015 Pakistan Affairs 3

Revised Syllabus
1. Ideology of Pakistan ----- definition and elucidation,
historical aspects: Muslim rule in the Sub-continent, its
downfall and efforts for Renaissance. Movements for reforms
-- Shaikh Ahmad Sarhindi, Shah Waliullah, Sayyid Ahmad
Shaheed, Aligarh, Deoband, Nadwah, and other educational
institutions- Sindh Madrassah and Islamia College Peshawar.
Ideology of Pakistan in the light of Speeches and statements
of Allama Iqbal and Quaid i Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah.
2. Land and people of Pakistan-Geography, Society,
Natural resources, Agriculture, Industry and education with
reference to characteristics, trends and problems.
3. Pakistan and Changing Regional Apparatus
4. Nuclear Program of Pakistan, its Safety and Security;
International Concerns
5. Regional Economic Cooperation (SAARC,ECO,SCO) and the
Role of Pakistan
6. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan
Revised Syllabus
7. Pakistan’s Role in the Region
8. Palestine Issue
9. Changing Security Dynamics for Pakistan: Challenges to National
Security of Pakistan
10. Political Evolution Since 1971
11. Pakistan and US War on Terror
12. Foreign Policy of Pakistan Post 9/11
13. Evolution of Democratic System in Pakistan
14. Ethnic Issues and National Integration
15. Hydro Politics ; Water Issues in Domestic and Regional Context
16. Pakistan’s National Interest
17. Challenges to Sovereignty
18. Pakistan’s Energy Problems and their Effects
19. Pakistan’s Relations with Neighbors excluding India
20. Pakistan and India Relations Since 1947
21. Kashmir Issue
Revised Syllabus
22. Economic Challenges in Pakistan
23. Non-Traditional Security Threats in Pakistan: Role of Non-State
Actors
24. The war in Afghanistan since 1979 and its impact on, and
challenges to Pakistan, in the Post 2014 era.
25. Proxy Wars: Role of External Elements
26. Economic Conditions of Pakistan, the Most Recent Economic
Survey, the Previous and Current Budgets, and the Problems
and Performance of Major Sectors of Economy.
27. The Recent Constitutional and Legal Debates, the Latest
Constitutional Amendments and Important Legislations, Legal
Cases and the Role of Higher Courts.
28. The Prevailing Social Problems of Pakistan and the Strategies to
Deal with Them, Poverty, Education, Health and Sanitation
Draw This
Map
Introduction
 Afghanistan is one of Pakistan’s most strategically important
neighbors. From a geo-political standpoint, Afghanistan’s
location at the crossroads of south and central Asia has
always been critical.
 In the early 20th century, Muhammad Iqbal, described
Afghanistan as “the heart of Asia,” while India’s viceroy, Lord
Curzon, called it the “cockpit of Asia”.
 Throughout its history under Britain, it was a buffer against
Czarist Russia’s expansion that stopped in Central Asia at
River Oxus.
 The post independence significance of Afghanistan
continued, which brought super power rivalry and
complicated Pakistan- Afghanistan relations.
Introduction
 Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship has been a victim of
conflicting interests.
 The two have never been at ease with each other and deep
suspicions are observed in the bilateral policies pursued by
their governments.
 Pakistan always wished for a friendly government in
Afghanistan so that the western border could be considered
secure — a wish that never materialised.
 Pakistan and Afghanistan have long historical ties that go
back far beyond the partition of the subcontinent.
 Yet, despite their cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious
proximities, the relationship between the two cannot be
termed friendly.
History of Bilateral Relations
 At times bilateral relations reached deteriorating levels because
of certain contentious issues.
 After independence, Pakistan found itself confronted with a
neighbor that was the only country that voted against Pakistan’s
admission to the United Nations because of its claims over the
Durand Line, Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan on the western
side.
 The Durand Line has been a major concern throughout
Pakistan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan since 1947. The
Durand Line, marking the Eastern most boundary of
Afghanistan, was established as a result of the treaty signed by
the government of British India and Afghanistan’s Amir at the
end of the 19th century. In 1947, when Pakistan was first created,
Afghanistan refused to accept the Durand Line as an
international
Sunday, November 29, 2015
border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Pakistan Affairs 13
Perennial issues in Bilateral Relations
 Perennial issues adversely affecting Pak-Afghan Relations:
i. Durand Line issue
ii. The Pashtunistan issue

I. Durand Line issue:
 The Durand line resulted from a “Great Game,” i.e., a game
played by Russia and British India in manifesting their desires
to expand their empires.
 Russia’s expansion was motivated by their desire to weaken
British power, both in India and its extension into Europe.
 On the other hand, the British followed a “forward policy” in
order to contain the Russians within central Asia. Although
neither power held Afghanistan during this time,
Afghanistan’s role as a buffer between them grew throughout
the 1800s, leading to repeated clashes on its fringes.

Durand Line

 Abdul Rehman, the ruler of Afghanistan, made a request to the
British Viceroy, to appoint Sir Mortimer Durand, the Foreign
Secretary of British India, to head the Mission for negotiations over
the border between Afghanistan and the British India.
 The boundary, as decided upon by the parties, was made the subject
of an agreement by the Amir on November 12, 1893. The border line
split 17 million Afghan, non-Afghan, Baloch and Brahui tribes on
both sides.
 Although, geographically speaking, a much better frontier than the
Durand Line would have been the line of the Hindu Kush
mountains, in the interests of British policy it was desirable to keep
a strip of Afghan territory as a buffer zone between British India and
Russia.
 The Line gave control of all strategic entry points (Khyber, Tochi,
Kurram and Bolan) and other strategic heights along the border to
the British, who developed an extensive strategic railroad
communication to ensure quicker shifting of forces, should the
buffer state of Afghanistan fail to check the onslaught of Russia.
 Later on, the Afghan rulers reaffirmed the treaty three times.
Habibullah, son of Abdul Rahman, reaffirmed to British
government in 1905 that he would abide by the ‘agreements
and compacts’ entered into by his father.
 However, in 1919, Ammanullah (son of Habibullah) launched
an attack on the frontier in the hope of recovering “Peshawar
and up to the river Indus.” The invasion was contained, and
the Afghans were obliged to sue for peace.
 Two treaties followed the interim Treaty of Rawalpindi (1919)
and permanent Anglo-Afghan treaty (1921). These reaffirmed
the Durand agreement.
 When Nadir Shah ascended to the throne of Afghanistan in
1930, the validity of the 1921 treaty was reaffirmed by an
exchange of letters between the British Secretary of State for
Foreign AffairsPakistan
andAffairs
the Afghan minister in London 18
 Although the Durand line was confirmed by successive Afghan
governments, it was not accepted by the government of King
Zahir Shah after the withdrawal of British from India.
 Afghanistan’s Point of View
 At this point in history, the Afghan government had two objections
to the treaty.
 First, they contend that the Durand Line was established under
duress.
 Second, as the British Government in India has ceased to exist, they
also contend that the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921 is null and void.
Thus, they have laid claim to all areas between the Durand Line and
the River Indus.

 Pakistan’s Point of View
 Pakistan contends that, because the Durand Agreement was
negotiated at the request of Amir Abdul Rahman, himself, with a
British official of Amir’s own choice, and Amir and his advisor
publicly accepted the Agreement, thereby declaring that they were
satisfied with it, it likely was not signed under duress.
 Moreover, for half a century after the signing, every Afghan ruler had
reaffirmed the validity of the Durand Line as the agreed upon
frontier between Afghanistan and India.
 This contention is further strengthened by the fact that the
government of India Act of 1935 formally defined India to include the
tribal territory.

 With regard to the second argument, it is a well-settled
proposition of international law that according to the
principle of ‘res transit cum suo onere’, treaties of extinct
states concerning boundary lines … remain valid, and all
rights and duties arising from such treaties of the extinct state
devolve on the absorbing State.
 The United Kingdom government had also expressed its
public agreement regarding the validity of Durand Line, in
favor of Pakistan

 Due to Afghan propaganda against Durand Line’s validity, the
border remains insecure and more threatened today with
greater challenges for Pakistan.
 It leads to numerous uncontrollable problems: illegal border
crossings on daily basis, illicit drug trafficking, criminal
networks’ strongholds, terrorist sanctuaries and
fragmentation of society in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

II. The Pashtunistan issue:
i. The Pashtunistan issue was raised by the followers of the
Indian National Congress — Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and
his brother Dr Khan Saheb — in opposition to the creation
of Pakistan.
ii. The demand for Pashtunistan also serves as an effective tool
Kabul regimes employ for diverting the attention of their
people from domestic chaos and from the backwardness at
home.
iii. Afghanistan being a landlocked country, dependent on
Pakistan for its economic development and transit trade to
access international markets, decided on territorial
expansion as a way out to the sea. It took up the issue of
Pashtunistan, always supported by India, to claim more
territory stretching as far as the Arabian Sea.
i. The issue of Pushtunistan is closely linked with the Durand
Line as a troublesome tribal boundary.
ii. Afghanistan, following the argument that the Durand Line
was accepted under pressure, contends that Pushtuns living
on either side should have the right of self-determination, as
they were forcibly separated from their motherland.
iii. Secondly, the Afghan government argues that the
inhabitants of Pushtunistan are one nation and that the
Durand Line arbitrarily splits the nation into two.

i. Pakistan’s Point of View
 Because Pakistan contends that Pushtuns voted for Pakistan
in the 1947 referendum in Peshawar, it, therefore, refutes
validity of the Afghanistan’s position.
 Secondly, Afghanistan’s concern for the unity of Pushtuns is
not genuine because Afghanistan does not include the
Pushtuns on its side of the line in the proposed state of
“Pushtunistan”.

Pakistan’s Afghan Policy
 Phase I: Russian Presence in Afghanistan, 1979 – 1989
i. Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979
ii. 1980: Soviet troops installed a puppet regime in Kabul. The U.S.,
Pakistan, China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia offered support
to Mujahideen "freedom fighters" as they began a guerrilla war
against the Soviets.
iii. The Red Army presence in Afghanistan posed a direct threat to
regional stability.
iv. Pakistani planners saw this event as a prelude to further communist
expansion in the region and possible Afghan/Soviet claims into the
disputed border region.
v. Communist victory had the potential of creating permanent border
threat, since the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan was
perceived to be indefinite.
vi. Mass exodus of Afghans to Pakistan.
vii. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had direct, wide-ranging and far-
reaching impacts upon Pakistan’s internal and external security.
viii. Another positive aspect of the Soviet invasion was renewed U.S.
interests in Pakistan.
Refugees
Pakistan has received the most

Refugees
Pakistan has received the most

ix. Pakistan had three immediate options to deal with the
Afghan issue:
i. First, it could acquiesce, accepting the Soviet invasion as a fait
accompli.
ii. Second, it could provide all-out military support for Afghan
Mujahidin, thus helping them to achieve their objectives of
eliminating an adversary by force.
iii. Third, with the assistance of United States, Europe and Islamic
countries, it could bring political pressure to bear on the Soviet
Union, along with covertly assisting the Mujahidin.
x. Regarding all these issues, Pakistan had certain limitation. It
could not sustain supporting the Mujahidin in long term by
itself, considering possible Soviet retaliation. Therefore, to
form a covert support for Mujahidin with the active support
and involvement of the U.S. and Islamic countries became
prime strategy of combating Soviets in Afghanistan.
xi. Apart from supporting Afghan Mujahidin, Pakistan used this
opportunity, not only to strengthen Pakistan’s armed forces, but
also to forward Pakistan’s nuclear program and prolong its own
domination of Afghan political arena in the years after the war.
xii. Although Pakistan’s short-term policy objectives were to ensure the
withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, Pakistani policy
makers could also see that their long-term objective of establishing
a friendly government in Afghanistan might be hastened by their
effort.
xiii. The role of the ISI, or Pakistan’s intelligence agency dramatically
increased between 1983 and 1986.
xiv. Pakistan skillfully organized and manipulated the Afghan
resistance movement against communist forces, simultaneously
putting diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw from
Afghanistan. Pakistan Affairs
xv. Pakistan achieved its short-term objective when the Soviet
Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, in accordance
with the Geneva Accord.
xvi. Pakistan failed to achieve its long-term goal of establishing a
Pakistani friendly government in Afghanistan by putting pro-
Pakistani Mujahidin elements in Kabul.
xvii. This situation besides the fading U.S. interest in the region
after Soviet withdrawal, added the fragile situation of war-
torn Afghanistan that subsequently led to the emergence of
the hardliner Taliban and other terrorist groups such as Al
Qaida.
xviii.After the Soviet withdrawal, it was Pakistan’s long-term
objective that made Pakistan’s Afghan policy-makers strive to
Sunday, continue
November 29, 2015 their involvement
Pakistan Affairs in Afghanistan. 34
 Phase II: From the Soviet Withdrawal to the Fall of the Taliban,
1989 - 2001
i. 1992: Mujahideen forces, led by Ahmed Shah Massoud, removed
the Soviet-backed government of Mohammad Najibullah.
ii. 1993: The factions agreed on the formation of a government with
Burhanuddin Rabani as president, but infighting continues.
Lawlessness was rampant. Islamabad Agreement. Makkah
Agreement.
iii. 1994 September: The Taliban quickly emerge as one of the
strongest factions.
iv. 1996 September: The Taliban, under the leadership of Mullah
Muhammad Omer, seized control of Kabul and implemented a
strict interpretation of Islamic law. They executed Najibullah. The
Taliban offered Osama bin Laden refuge in Afghanistan.
v. Pakistan accorded the Taliban diplomatic recognition on May 25,
1997, after Mazar-e-Sharif had fallen to the Taliban for the first
time. Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates followed the suit two
days later. Official recognition by Pakistan further widened the gulf
with Iran.
Key Players in Afghanistan

 Phase II: From the Soviet Withdrawal to the Fall of the
Taliban, 1989 - 2001
vi. 2001: The UN imposes an arms embargo against the Taliban.
i. March 12: Ignoring an international outcry, the Taliban blew up two
2,000-year-old Buddhist statues in the cliffs above Bamian.
ii. May: Religious minorities were ordered to wear tags identifying
them as non-Muslims; Hindu women were required to veil
themselves like other Afghan women.
iii. July: Taliban baned the use of the Internet, playing cards, computer
discs, movies, satellite TV, musical instruments, and chessboards,
after declaring them against Islamic law.
iv. August: Eight Christian foreign-aid workers were arrested for
proselytizing. Two are American citizens.
v. Sept. 9: Northern Alliance Commander Ahmed Shah Massoud was
wounded in a suicide bombing, allegedly by al-Qaeda operatives.
Massoud died
from his wounds several days later.
Pakistan Affairs 37
 Phase II: From the Soviet Withdrawal to the Fall of the Taliban,
1989 - 2001
vii. Pakistan was more concerned about stability in Afghanistan due to
another new factor – the emergence of independent states in
Central Asia with their immense energy potential.
viii. Pakistan was now seeking a corridor for trade with Central Asian
countries. This posed Pakistan with a stark choice whether or not
to support and recognize this new Taliban power.
ix. Three key factors affected Pakistan decision.
i. First, the friendly regime will help provide access to Central Asian States.
ii. Second, the regime will bring stability and not raise the Pashtunistan issue
and decide the issue of the border.
iii. Third, it will not allow sanctuaries to India or any other hostile powers.
x. Cumulatively this would serve Pakistan’s objectives of having a
neutral western border allowing Pakistan to focus on internal
security and on India, especially Kashmir which had been in the
throes of a freedom struggle since 1989.
 Phase III: War on Terror, 2001 - 2014
i. 2001: Mid-Sept.
i. Fearing U.S. reprisals, Afghans began fleeing Kabul. Within a week more
than 4oo,000 people crossed into Pakistan.
ii. U.S. demanded that the Taliban hand over bin Laden and al-Qaeda
members.
iii. The Taliban offered to turn over bin Laden if presented with evidence of
his guilt.
iv. Saudi Arabia and the UAE cut off diplomatic ties. Pakistan pulled
diplomats from Afghanistan but maintains ties.
v. U.N. and Red Cross aid efforts are halted.
vi. Sept. 16: Pakistan's president, General Musharraf, pledges support for U.S.
efforts to arrest bin Laden and appeals to his nation for support. Taliban
supporters mount demonstrations.
vii. Sept. 24: The Taliban called for a jihad against America if U.S. forces enter
Afghanistan.
viii. Oct. 7: The U.S. begings bombing strategic Taliban sites in Afghanistan.
ix. December. 5: Hamid Karzai, an Afghan tribal leader, was chosen to head
an interim government by the delegates in Bonn.
ii. 2002 January: Pakistani intelligence officials detained Mullah
Abdul Salam Zaeef, the Taliban's former ambassador to
Pakistan. Zaeef is put into U.S. custody.
iii. 2003: Taliban forces took control of two remote districts near
the Pakistani border and held them for nearly a week. The
U.S. military launches Operation Avalanche, its largest
offensive in Afghanistan in two years.
iv. 2004: Afghanistan's Loya Jirga adopted a new constitution.
The constitution granted equality for men and women and
defineed the country as an "Islamic Republic.“ President
Karzai announceed that Afghanistan's first post-Taliban
elections will be postponed until September. The Taliban
vowed to disrupt the electoral process.
v. 2005: The Taliban began to regroup in larger numbers and
continued to attack U.S. troops, making it the deadliest year
for U.S. troops since the war ended in 2001.
vi. 2006: Throughout the spring of 2006, Taliban militants, now
a force of several thousand--infiltrate southern Afghanistan,
terrorizing local villagers and attacking Afghan and U.S.
troops.

vii. 2007: Taliban denied to negotiate with the U.S.-backed
Karzai government, and that violence would continue until
foreign troops withdraw from Afghanistan.
viii. 2008: About 80 people are killed and nearly 100 injured
when a suicide bomber attacks at a crowded dogfight near
Kandahar. A local Taliban group claims responsibility for a
suicide attack that killed 11 people and injured 22 more
outside a military base in Marden, Pakistan.

ix. 2009: The Taliban, retaliating against the Pakistan army in
late October, launched a series of terrorist attacks that killed
at least 300 people in Peshawar, Islamabad, and Lahore.
x. 2010: Three American soldiers, along with four Pakistanis,
were killed in a suicide bombing attack in Pakistan. Members
of the Taliban claim responsibility for the blast.
xi. 2011: About 500 members of the Taliban break out of the
Sarposa Prison in Kandahar. Osama bin Laden killed in May
2011.

xii. 2014: The Taliban opened an office in Doha, Qatar, and its
representatives held a press conference with an international
media contingent. The U.S. said it would begin long-delayed
peace talks with the group. Afghanistan was expected to do
the same, but instead said it would not engage in any
dialogue with the Taliban, saying such discussions lent the
militants credibility.
xiii. Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) 2014

In the line of Fire
“The ultimate question that confronted me was whether
it was in our national interest to destroy ourselves for the
Taliban. Were they worth committing suicide over? The
answer was a resounding no. It is true that we had
assisted in the rise of the Taliban after the Soviet union
withdrew from Afghanistan, which was then callously
abandoned by the United States.”
General(R) Pervez Musharaf

Taliban Turning Against Pakistan
i. Five days after September 11, 2001, Pakistan's president
Musharraf pledged support for the U.S.
ii. Pakistan as an ally of US on War on Terror
iii. Pakistan utilizing its land against Taliban by giving
Shamsi Base, etc.
iv. Laws and Justice system of Pakistan not according to
Islamic sprit.

Objectives of Pakistan’s Afghan Policy
 Objectives of Pakistan’s Afghan Policy:
i. To establish a Pakistan friendly/dependent government in
Afghanistan. It was perceived that a Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan would give Pakistan “Strategic Depth” against
India.
ii. To secure access to Central Asian markets.
iii. To put an end in all border disputes with Afghanistan

Indian Factor in Bilateral Relations
 India’s involvement in the internal affairs of Pakistan since
its inception to create instability in the country through
Afghanistan also remained a core problematic issue in
Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.
 The Kautiliyan concept of neighbor's neighbor being a
friend and the neighbor being an enemy, applies here in the
case of Pakistan’s neighbors.
 Both India and Afghanistan partnered together to become a
major source of apprehension for Pakistan at both eastern
and western borders.
 Except for the Taliban regime, India supported whatever
regime came into power in Kabul that opposed Pakistan.
 In fact, Afghanistan has always been an important part of
both Pakistan and India’s foreign policy for countering each
other.
US in Bilateral Relations
 During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the US
knowing about the loose nature of tribal areas in Pakistan-
Afghanistan borderlands used the region for defeating
communism.
 Pakistan played an influential role alongside the US and
Saudi Arabia by becoming a frontline state and providing
bases for Afghan resistance forces after the Saur revolution.
 Pakistan in order to have a friendly government in
Afghanistan took this opportunity and tried on many
entities beginning with supporting Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
 When it became obvious that Hekmatyar would not be able
to control Kabul, Pakistan’s support shifted to the Islamist
Taliban.
Mutual Suspicion in Bilateral Relations
 Pakistan-Afghanistan relations tend to be leaning more
towards mutual suspicion.
 Once the Taliban regime, recognized by Pakistan, was
ousted by the US, Pakistan became America’s non-NATO
ally in fighting them in a war against terrorism.
 Owing to all the domestic stagnation and inability in
controlling the spread of insurgency, Afghanistan started
accusing Pakistan of interfering in Afghanistan’s internal
affairs resulting in counter-accusations from Pakistan.
 Kabul accused Islamabad of harboring Afghan insurgents to
destabilize government authority while Islamabad
responded with pointing to Kabul’s alleged support in
collaboration with India to the Baloch guerrilla movement
and attempts at creating instability in the tribal areas.
Mutual Suspicion in Bilateral Relations
 An incessant blame game also continued between Kabul
and Washington and Islamabad and Washington.
Afghanistan was called by the US as having an inefficient
leadership and an unreliable partner while Islamabad was
criticized for “not doing enough” in fighting terrorism.
 Afghanistan attempted to divert people’s anger by blaming

his domestic disorder on Pakistan.

Pakistan-US Strategic Dialogue
 Owing to geographical contiguity the US needs Pakistan’s
full cooperation in the military operations against the
Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan.
 Keeping in mind the seriousness of the situation in
Afghanistan, US warmly welcomed Pakistan’s idea for
holding the Pak-US strategic dialogue so that new grounds
for cordial bilateral relationship could be prepared by
breaking away from the troubled past.
 The first ever strategic dialogue at the ministerial level held
on 24-25 March 2010 in Washington is of utmost
importance for the interests of both countries.
 This was the first round in the series of strategic dialogues
where the two countries were represented by both
democratic government leaders and top military officials.
Flaws in Pakistan’s Afghan Policy
 Flaws in Pakistan’s Afghan Policy:
i. Continuation of support for Islamic extremists within
Afghanistan, strongly contributed to destabilization of Pakistan
itself.
ii. The entire policy is based on wrong assumption, that with the
withdrawal of Soviet Union the pro-Pakistani Mujahidin factions
will be able to establish Islamabad friendly government in Kabul.
With the emergence of Taliban, Pakistan assumed that they will
be able to capture all Afghanistan, thus Pakistan will be able to
reach Central Asian Republics. On the other hand Pakistan
hoped, that a Taliban dominated government in Kabul would be
permanently friendly to Pakistan and they will recognize Durand
Line and curb Pashtun nationalism. Though certain elements
within the Taliban proved these assumption by attacking cultural
and historical symbols of Pashtuns identity (destruction of
Rahman Baba shrine in Peshawar), it is very unlikely that this
happens.
 Flaws in Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (cont):
iii. Increasing ISI role in Pakistan decision making processes on
Afghan affairs undermined civilian leadership.
iv. Pakistan’s internal, political instability also contributed to its
failure to form any long-term Afghan policy. Between the

time of President Zia’s death in 1988 to 2008, a total of six
changes took place in Pakistan.

 Flaws in Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (cont):
v. Afghan history and Afghans national characteristics prove that too
much involvement in Afghan internal affairs tends to raise the
reaction of all ethnic and religious groups. Rely on one political or
ethnic group to achieve long-term objectives is a wrong policy in
Afghanistan. It proves to be counterproductive in all levels. A
more broad based policy which includes different layers of Afghan
society may be more helpful in establishing peace in the region.
vi. Any successful approach to solve Afghan problem can only be
achieved whenever there is a regional consensus. Unilateral
approach by Pakistan only contributed to further violence and
destabilization of the region.
vii. Pakistan neither had the resources nor institutional capability to
sustain a client regime in Kabul. The burden will be so heavy that
will certainly destabilize Pakistan and cause its subsequent
collapse as a country.

Afghan Refugees in Pakistan
 There had been no proper documentation of Afghan refugees
living in the country since their arrival in 1979.
 Pakistan, a developing country with a population of 190
millions, anticipates the return of over 3 million Afghan
refugees because they pose an enormous economic burden.
 Pakistan maintained a policy of temporary protection with
voluntary return as the preferred option; however, the goal of
comprehensive repatriation remained elusive, hostage as it
was to Pakistan’s official Afghan Policy and protracted
fighting in Afghanistan.
 Even the end of the Cold War and withdrawal of the Soviet
troops from Afghanistan in 1989 did not result in a successful
return of all Afghan refugees, although the 1990s were hailed
as the “decade of repatriation” throughout the world.
Afghan Refugees in Pakistan
 Repatriation occurs when a situation improves in the
home country; unless the refugees themselves perceive
an improvement in ground realities, they do not opt for
return.
 In the case of Afghans, the political and economic
situation has still not improved to the extent where all
refugees would want to return.
 Therefore, alternative strategies need to be worked out
to manage the remaining refugee population.

Pakistani Taliban Moves to Afghanistan
 In October 2001, thousands of Pakistani Pakthun
tribesmen were mobilized for armed action and crossed
the Durand Line into Afghanistan to resist both the
American and NATO forces.
 For example, Sufi Mohammed, a Pakhtun cleric and leader
of the Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law
infiltrated Afghanistan with about 10,000 boys and young
men.

Taliban Moves to Tribal
 The arrival in tribal areas of the Afghan’s Taliban and Al-Qaeda’s
senior leadership along with hundreds of Afghan, Arab,
Chechen, Uzbek, East Asian, and Sudanese fighters in Pakistan
distributed millions of dollars among the tribal elders for shelter
 Thus, the Taliban leaders, who survived the U.S. bombing of
Afghanistan and the combat against the NATO troops in 2001,
went back to Pakistan, precisely to the tribal areas where their
Pashtun brothers reside, and namely to the North- West borders
of Pakistan .
 Al-Qaeda as been leasing compounds from the tribesmen to
establish training camps and command and control centers.

Internal Implications
 Pakistani Taliban members have been involved:-
i. Insurgent activity and terrorist attacks in Pakistan.
ii. There are about 40 militant groups with a combined membership
between 30,000 and 35,000.
iii. They are decentralized and do not always agree.
iv. They use social networks to recruit, raise funds, and to harass
people.
v. Participated in numerous suicide bombings and urban guerrilla
attacks inside Pakistan including the siege at the Pakistan Naval
Base Mehran in Karachi
vi. Taliban has provided shelter to Al-Qaeda leaders, foreigners who
are enemy/against Pakistan’s ideology.
vii. The war spills over into Pakistan
viii. US operations in Pakistan, involvement of CIA, Black water etc.
ix. CIA’s drone bombings
Terrorist Attacks since 9/11, 2001

2014

Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan
2003-2014
Security Force Terrorists/Insurgents Total
Civilians Personnel
2003 140 24 25 189
2004 435 184 244 863
2005 430 81 137 648
2006 608 325 538 1471
2007 1522 597 1479 3598
2008 2155 654 3906 6715
2009 2324 991 8389 11704
2010 1796 469 5170 7435
2011 2738 765 2800 6303
2012 3007 732 2472 6211
2013 3001 676 1702 5379
2014 298 92 147 537
Total* 18454
Pakistan Affairs 27009 5105368
Introduction
 BSA is officially known as Security and Defense
Cooperation Agreement
 Legal framework for the US presence in Afghanistan after
2014
 Determines the scope of activity for American troops after
2014.
 Sets the conditions for the US forces as a part of train,
advise and assist mission

Introduction
 It is a Agreement at this stage, having 26 articles
 Executive Agreement, not a mutual defense Treaty
 Approved by Loya Jarga on 24 Nov,2014.
 It is ratified by Afghan Parliament, and signed by Ashraf Ghani on

September 30, 2014
 The BSA goes into force on January 1, 2015 and remains in force "until
the end of 2024 and beyond" unless it is terminated by either side with
two years' notice.
 US forces’ number would decrease rapidly by being halved at the end of
2015 and reduced to only a vestigial force by end of 2016.

Bilateral Security Arrangement

Events Leading to BSA
 London Conference, Jan 28, 2010
 During the “London Conference on Afghanistan,” Afghanistan
announced on 28 January 2010 its intention of taking charge
of the "majority of operations in the insecure areas of
Afghanistan within three years and taking responsibility for
physical security within five years".
 This combined with the increase of Afghan military strength
to 171,600 and police numbers to 134,000 by October 2011
would enable the United States could begin to transition U.S.
troops out of Afghanistan in July 2011 according to US
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

 Drawdown Speech by Obama on 22nd June,2011
 On 22 June 2011, Obama addressed the nation from the White House
and announced that 10,000 troops would be withdrawn by the end of
2011 and an additional 23,000 troops will leave the country by the
summer of 2012. He said the drawdown would continue "at a steady
pace" until the United States handed over security to the Afghan
authorities in 2014. "We are starting this drawdown from a position of
strength," Obama said. "Al Qaeda is under more pressure than at any
time since 9/11."
 Asserting that the country that served as a base for the 11 September
2001 attacks no longer represented a terrorist threat to the United
States, Obama declared that the "tide of war is receding."
 The announced drawdown will leave approximately 68,000 U.S.
troops in Afghanistan by the autumn of 2012, but Gen. John R. Allen,
commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),
said that 23,000 of the 88,000 U.S. troops currently in Afghanistan
will be home by 30 September 2012 and thus 65,000 U.S. troops will
remain in Afghanistan after the so-called Phase 2 drawdown.

 The Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement, May 2012
 The U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement, officially
titled the "Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America",
provides the long-term framework for the relationship between
Afghanistan and the United States of America after the drawdown of
U.S. forces in the Afghanistan war. The agreement went into effect on
4 July 2012.
 After the signing of the strategic partnership agreement Obama laid
out his plans to end the war in Afghanistan responsibly. The plans call
for:
i. the removal of 23,000 US troops at the summer end of 2012, i.e. at the end
of September 2012;
ii. Afghan security forces to take the lead in combat operations by the end of
2013 while ISAF forces train, advise and assist the Afghans and fight
alongside them when needed; and
iii. the complete removal of all U.S. troops by the end of 2014, except for
trainers who will assist Afghan forces and a small contingent of troops with
a specific mission to combat al-Qaeda through counterterrorism
operations
 NATO Chicago Summit: Troops withdrawal and long
term presence
 On 21 May 2012 the leaders of the NATO-member countries
endorsed an exit strategy during the 2012 NATO Summit in
Chicago.
 The NATO-led ISAF Forces will hand over command of all
combat missions to Afghan forces by the middle of 2013, while
shifting at the same time from combat to a support role of
advising, training and assisting the Afghan security forces and
then withdraw most of the 130,000 foreign troops by the end of
December 2014.
 A new and different NATO mission will then advise, train and
assist the Afghan security forces including the Afghan Special
Operations Forces.
 Tokyo Conference on 8 July,2012, confirming the
withdrawal by end of 2014
 On Oct 3, 2012 meeting of US-Afghan Bilateral

Commission held
 Negotiations started in Nov, 2012, and agreement drafted

in Nov, 2013
Pakistan Affairs
Salient Features
i. The Parties recognize that ANDSF are responsible for securing
the people and territory of Afghanistan.
ii. United States’ obligation to seek funds on a yearly basis for

training, equipping, advising and sustaining of ANDSF.
iii. Exact number of the US troops after 2014 is not given,

however, this number may be between 8000 to 12000.
iv. Leeway for the US forces to conduct raids on Afghan homes.
v. Deployment of the US troops at 9 military and 7 air bases.

Salient Features
vi. No combat operations , unless mutually agreed.
vii. Exclusive jurisdiction of the US over its forces and its civil
component in offences on Afghan soil.
viii. Amnesty to Americans from appearing before any tribunal.
ix. Visa and tax exemptions to the US Military and Defense deptt.
Personnel.
x. No promise by the US to extend military support to

Afghanistan in the event of any attack or security threat.

Salient Features
xi. “Grave concern "by the US regarding external aggression
or threat to Afghanistan.
xii. No permanent US facilities in Afghanistan , or presence
that threatens Afghanistan’s neighbors
Pakistan Affairs
Afghanistan’s Stance
 Reservations on immunity to foreign troops in
Afghanistan.
 Secret US contacts with the Taliban thereby

bypassing the Afghan government.
 The US and Pakistan to hold talks with Taliban for

peace in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan’s Stance
 No “Nights raids” by US troops and targeting Afghan civilians in
their homes
 Time limit of 10 years for the stay of US troops was less.
 Demand for stronger US pledge to defend Afghanistan from any

incursion from Pakistan.
 Addition of one more military base at Bamian.
 Demand for jurisdiction over US soldiers involved in crimes on

Afghan soil.

Implications For Pakistan
Security implications
i. The BSA may act as a stabilizing force and post soviet-

withdrawal situation may not arise, hence lesser
security implications in the short run.
ii. The preamble-the US presence is not a threat to the

countries in the region.
iii. Afghanistan’s apprehensions regarding attack from

Pakistan is not well founded.
iv. So, apparently there is no threat to Pakistan from the

prolong US presence in Afghanistan
v. With BSA, the current strategic environment will persist.
vi. The BSA will keep the Taliban insurgency alive in

Afghanistan.
vii. Withdrawal of foreign troops may not reduce Taliban's
activities in Pakistan.
viii. The acts of terrorism will increase.
ix. The BSA will enable the US to pursue its hidden agenda in
Baluchistan.

x. Indians can also add fuel to the separatist tendencies in
Baluchistan.
xi. The Afghan National Force may fall apart on ethno sectarian
lines, causing a civil war, with severest security implications
for Pakistan
Geostrategic Importance of Pakistan

i. BSA has re-emphasized Pakistan’s geostrategic importance
Pakistan Affairs
Economic implications
i. Pakistan has received over US$ 20 billion in

aid since December 2001.
ii. Pakistan will no longer be enjoying the status

of a “Front line State,” hence no more such
assistance.
iii. The NATO cargo contractors and work force

Pakistan Affairs earning three times more than normal.
iv. This cargo accounts for over 25% of the total transit
trade from Pakistan into Afghanistan.
v. The ending of NATO Cargo Transit Trade will result

in:
i. Loss of revenue
ii. Joblessness from Khyber to Karachi
iii. The jobless people from FATA may be drawn into
smuggling
Pakistan Affairs
vi. Flight of foreign capital from Kabul could:
 weaken Afghanistan’s economy
 reduce the purchasing power, which can affect imports from

Pakistan
 lay-off a large Pakistani workforce
vii. Influx of 2 million economic refugees in case of BSA without
intra-afghan reconciliation
Pakistan Affairs
Socio-political implications
i. Civil war in Afghanistan will bring about mass exodus of Afghans,
which will cause social problems
ii. Increase in criminal activities (smuggling ,drug trafficking and

joining TTP) , especially in FATA region
iii. Flaring-up of sectarian violence in the country
iv. Deepening of political divide in Pakistan

Conclusion
 The BSA may secure Afghanistan for the time being and Post –
Soviet withdrawal like situation may not arise
 In the long run, the presence of US-troops under BSA will keep
the Taliban insurgency alive, thereby causing instability in
Afghanistan, which will:
 Create security, economic, social and political problems for
Pakistan

Recommendations
i. Pakistan should not play favorites in Afghanistan. No to “Good
Taliban and Bad Taliban” policy.
ii. Pakistan should play its due role in helping Afghanistan and the US
to make peace with Afghan Taliban
iii. A negotiated settlement with TTP be sought immediately through
Jirga system
iv. Special skill development programs be arranged through FATA DA
for the jobless
v. Installing biometric system at the entry points in Pakistan to keep
track of the Afghan refugees
vi. Confining the Afghan refugees to Refugee camps once the influx
starts
Recommendations
vii. Establishing special Industrial zone in FATA to absorb the
jobless people.
viii. Micro credit scheme be introduced for providing loans to the

jobless work-force associated with NATO Transit-trade.
ix. Strict vigilance by the customs authorities and FC to stop

smuggling and trafficking of drugs across the border.
x. Strengthening the intelligence along the border to have an

eye on the US and Indian covert activities in Baluchistan.
xi. Reactivation of ECO, SAARC, OIC and the SCO.

Class Discussion
US military presence in Afghanistan

will always cause the involvement of
other regional powers to interfere in
the internal affairs of Afghanistan.
Disagree Agree
Thank
You
Please contact for Queries
Asmatullah Junejo (PSP)
Senior Superintendent of Police, Rawalpindi
0300-7064608
asmatullahjunejo@hotmail.com

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Pakistan Affairs

Sunday, November 29, 2015 1

Sunday, November 29, 2015 Pakistan Affairs 3

i. Durand Line issue

ii. The Pashtunistan issue

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General(R) Pervez Musharaf

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ii. To secure access to Central Asian markets.

iii. To put an end in all border disputes with Afghanistan

Sunday, November 29, 2015 Pakistan Affairs 49

 Afghanistan attempted to divert people’s anger by blaming

Sunday, November 29, 2015 Pakistan Affairs 53

Afghan affairs undermined civilian leadership.

iv. Pakistan’s internal, political instability also contributed to its

failure to form any long-term Afghan policy. Between the

Sunday, November 29, 2015 Pakistan Affairs 57

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 Executive Agreement, not a mutual defense Treaty

 Approved by Loya Jarga on 24 Nov,2014.

 It is ratified by Afghan Parliament, and signed by Ashraf Ghani on

Sunday, November 29, 2015 Pakistan Affairs 71

Sunday, November 29, 2015 Pakistan Affairs 72

Sunday, November 29, 2015 Pakistan Affairs 73

Sunday, November 29, 2015 Pakistan Affairs 74

 On Oct 3, 2012 meeting of US-Afghan Bilateral

 Negotiations started in Nov, 2012, and agreement drafted

ii. United States’ obligation to seek funds on a yearly basis for

iii. Exact number of the US troops after 2014 is not given,

iv. Leeway for the US forces to conduct raids on Afghan homes.

v. Deployment of the US troops at 9 military and 7 air bases.

Sunday, November 29, 2015 Pakistan Affairs 78

viii. Amnesty to Americans from appearing before any tribunal.

x. No promise by the US to extend military support to

Sunday, November 29, 2015 Pakistan Affairs 79

xii. No permanent US facilities in Afghanistan , or presence

that threatens Afghanistan’s neighbors

 Secret US contacts with the Taliban thereby

 The US and Pakistan to hold talks with Taliban for

Sunday, November 29, 2015 Pakistan Affairs 81

 Demand for stronger US pledge to defend Afghanistan from any