DIMAANO, JUVY LYN A.

2009-47176

MW

I.

A. The marriage between Solenn and Sonny is voidable. Based on FC 45 (1), marriage
celebrated between parties aging between 18 and 21 years without parental consent is voidable.
Upon the celebration of their marriage, Solenn is 19 years old while Sonny is 20 years old. Thus,
their marriage is voidable.

B. Yes, based on FC 45 (1), such a marriage may be ratified after attaining the age of twenty-one
when the party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife.

II.

A. Shalimar is legitimate based on FC 164 which states that children conceived or born during
the marriage of the parents are legitimate in relation to FC 54 which states that children
conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under
Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Since Shalimar was
conceived before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become
final and executory, therefore she must be considered legitimate based on FC 54.

B. The system of property relationship that will be liquidated is the property regime of unions
without marriage wherein parties are capacitated to marry each other as stated in FC147. Under
this article, the rules on co-ownership applies. This article shall govern when a man and a woman
who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. Since their marriage is void, then the
property regime that will govern them is FC 147.

C. Since the land was acquired through a contract of sale, therefore ownership of the land vested
upon Sancho before the marriage. As such, it does not form part of the co-ownership. Hence,
only Sancho should get the land.

As to the jewelry, assuming that Sandy contributed in the care and maintenance of the family and
household, then it shall form part of the co-ownership and must be divided equally between
Sandy and Sancho. Based on FC 147, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household. Therefore, the value of the jewelry, as part of the co-ownership, must be
divided equally between Sancho and Sandy.

D. Shalimar is not entitled to presumptive legitime because it must be delivered only when the
property regime is either ACP/CPG based on FC 102 and 129. Also, nowhere does it state in
FC147 that presumptive legitime must be delivered.

III.

A. No, there is no legal basis for the court to approve Silverio’s petition for correction of entries.
As to the change of name, the case of Silverio vs Republic ruled that RA 9048 does not sanction
a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion,
changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in
the civil registry and the public interest.

As to the change of gender, there is also no legal basis to approve the petition. Based on the same
case stated above, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include
persons who have undergone sex reassignment. While petitioner may have succeeded in altering
his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the
change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason.

B. The answer will be different in Sharon’s case. In the case of Republic vs Cagandahan, SC
ruled that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his
gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with
good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sharon thinks of himself as a male and considering that his
body is already resembling that of a male’s, there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. Therefore, Sharon’s petition should be granted.

C. Assuming that Silverio’s petition was indeed denied and Sharon’s petition was indeed
granted, then their marriage cannot be legally recognized as valid in the Philippines. Based on
NCC 15, laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Thus, Philippine
law should apply. Based on FC 1 and 2, marriage must be between man and woman. In this case,
Sharon and Silverio are both male. Therefore, there marriage cannot be valid.

IV.

A. No, because according to NCC 1078, where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of
the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs. Under the rules on co-
ownership in NCC 493, each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
As such, the effect the sale of the 3 older siblings shall be valid only with respect to the portion
that may be allotted to them.
Therefore, as regards the subsequent repurchase, it cannot be valid because the twins were not
divested of their ownership.

B. The second sale is valid as to the shares of the 3 older siblings and Saturnina, the surviving
spouse. Based on FC 225, the father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over
the property of the unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment.
As such, Saturnina has legal guardianship over twin’s share in the land. However, based on the
same article, where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds
P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court
may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual
income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians. A
verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the
child resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where
the property or any part thereof is situated.

Since no verified petition for approval of the bond was filed in the proper court, the second sale
is unenforceable with respect to the share of the twins based on NCC 1403 (1) which states that a
contract entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or
legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers is unenforceable.

The twins need not redeem the property upon reaching the age of majority since they were never
divested of their ownership of their allotted share in the land.

V.

Santino can inherit from Sol via legal succession based on NCC 960 which states that legal
succession takes place when the will does not dispose of all the property belonging to the
testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place only with respect to the property of which
the testator has not disposed. Santino is not incapable of succeeding under NCC 1032 (2)
because such provision requires a conviction and Santino was not convicted.

Sara can also inherit from Sol via legal succession based on NCC 960. She is not incapable of
succeeding based on NCC 1027 (4) even though she was an attesting witness to the will since the
prohibition in this provision applies only to testamentary provisions.

Based on NCC 888, the legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of
the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. Therefore, the legitime of Santino and Sara
is 4M (1/2 of 8M). Each would therefore get 2M each as legitime.

The testamentary provision as to priest is valid since he does not fall under the prohibition in
NCC 1027 since he was not the priest who heard the confession of Sol during her last illness.
Therefore, he may inherit the 1M stated in the will from the free portion.

As to the remaining free portion valued at 3M, this will likely be divided equally between
Santino and Sara. Therefore, both Santino and Sara will inherit a total of 3.5M each (2M legitime
+ 1.5M free portion).
VI.

In this case, both the landowner and the builder are in bad faith based on NCC 453. The builder
is in bad faith because he knew that a portion of the apartment he was building encroached on the
property of another but he still continued constructing. The landowner is also in bad faith
because according to NCC 453, it is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the
landowner whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.
Since Santi, as the landowner, did not oppose the construction, he is also deemed in bad faith. In
such a case, NCC 453 dictates that the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though
both had acted in good faith. If both are in good faith, demolition is not a remedy based on NCC
448. Therefore, Santi cannot file a legal action for demolition.

VII.

A. Based on Molo vs Molo, the doctrine of dependent relative revocation is usually applied
where the testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will
with a present intention to make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and
the new disposition is not made or, if made, fails of effect for some reason.

This doctrine applies in this case because the act of destruction of the 1st will by Sydney is
connected with the making of the 2nd will so as fairly to raise the inference that the Sydney meant
the revocation of the 1st one to depend upon the efficacy of a 2nd will. In the absence of proof to
the contrary, it is presumed that Sydney destroyed the 1st will so that the 2nd will will be
considered as the substitute of the first. The presumption is against intestacy and therefore it can
be presumed that Sydney wanted the revocation of the 1st will to be conditioned on the effectivity
of her subsequent will. This doctrine is an exception to NCC 832.

B. The answer will be different because in this case, the general rule as stated in NCC 832 shall
apply. According to this provision, the revocation made in a subsequent will shall take effect,
even if the new will should become inoperative by reason of the incapacity of the heirs, devisees
or legatees designated therein, or by their renunciation. If Saffinia and Sophia renounced their
inheritance, it will fall under NCC 832 and not the doctrine of dependent relative revocation.

VIII.

The usufruct will continue even if the house burned down based on NCC 607, if the usufruct is
constituted on immovable property of which a building forms part, and the latter should be
destroyed in any manner whatsoever, the usufructuary shall have a right to make use of the land
and the materials. Therefore, the usufruct can continue through the use of the land and the
materials.

However, it will not continue after Sinfroso’s death because according to NCC 606, a usufruct
granted for the time that may elapse before a third person attains a certain age, shall subsist for
the number of years specified, even if the third person should die before the period expires,
unless such usufruct has been expressly granted only in consideration of the existence of such
person. In this case, the usufruct was constituted for the purpose of providing support to
Sinfroso. Therefore, the exception in NCC 606 shall apply which will extinguish the usufruct
upon Sinfroso’s death.

IX.

A. The doctrine of proximate cause does not apply because according to the case of Sps Guanio
vs Shangri-la, the doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delicts, not
in actions involving breach of contract.

B. According to Norton Resources vs All Asia Bank, a contract of adhesion is defined as one in
which one of the parties imposes a ready-made form of contract, which the other party may
accept or reject, but which the latter cannot modify. One party prepares the stipulation in the
contract, while the other party merely affixes his signature or his "adhesion" thereto, giving no
room for negotiation and depriving the latter of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.

The case at bar is not a contract of adhesion because the newlyweds did not just accept the
contract by merely affixing their signature. There was a room for negotiation and the spouses
was able to modify the contract by providing the number of guests and choosing the menu.

X.

A. In this case, Sabina is an illegitimate child based on FC 165 which states that children
conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this
Code. FC 177 regarding legitimation does not apply because for this provision to apply, the
parents should not have been disqualified by any impediment to marry each other upon
conception of the child. In this case, Sinclair was married to another when Sabina was born.
Therefore, FC 165 applies which makes her illegitimate.

B. Based on FC 195, illegitimate children are entitled to support. In relation to this, FC 194 states
that the education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph
shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the
age of majority. Assuming that Sinclair has the financial capacity to support Sabina’s schooling,
FC 194 dictates that Sinclair support Sabina’s education even beyond the age of majority.

XI.

A. There will be legal subrogation based on NCC 1302(3) which states that when, even without
the knowledge of the debtor, a person interested in the fulfillment of the obligation pays, without
prejudice to the effects of confusion as to the latter's share, there is legal subrogation. Sergio is
considered a person interested in the fulfillment of obligation because the operation of his
business is dependent upon the payment of the utility bills.

B. Yes, mora accipiendi or delay of the creditor has the following requisites: offer of
performance by the debtor, offer must be to comply with prestation as it should be performed,
and the creditor refuses performance without just cause. In this case, there was a delay on the
part of the creditor to comply with her obligation of paying the unpaid utility bills.
XII.
A. Based on NCC 1980, fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar
institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan.
B. In the case of Metrobank vs Rosales, a holdout agreement applies only if there is a valid and
existing obligation arising from any of the sources of obligation. In the present case, at the time
the bank took over the bank deposit, it was still not proven that Saachi was really the impostor.
Therefore, there is still no valid and existing obligation between Saachi and the bank. The
criminal case is also not yet decided.
XIII.
A. SEP can legally recover the deficiency based on the case of Tajanlangit vs Southern Motors
which ruled that when the creditor elected to sue on the note exclusively, such did not bar it from
pursuing further remedies on the deficiencies.
B. Yes, since the instant case does not fall under Recto Law. Therefore, there is no prohibition in
commencing an extrajudicial foreclosure on the mortgage on Stan’s house and lot.
XIV.
A. There is easement of subjacent and lateral support based on NCC 684 which states that no
proprietor shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or building
of sufficient lateral or subjacent support.
B. It is not proper since Sec. 70 of PD 1529 requires that the one filing must claim a part or
interest adverse to that of the registered owner. In this case, there is no adverse claim.
XV.
A. Yes, the three-year lease fall under NCC 1403 which requires that an agreement for the
leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property or of an interest therein
must be in writing and subscribed by the party charged or his agent in order to be enforceable.
NCC 1357 can apply and the contracting parties may compel each other to observe that form,
once the contract has been perfected. Therefore, Simon can compel Shannon to put the
agreement in writing.

B. No, because NCC 1650 states that when in the contract of lease of things there is no express
prohibition, the lessee may sublet the thing leased, in whole or in part, without prejudice to his
responsibility for the performance of the contract toward the lessor. Therefore, it cannot be
considered as a ground for terminating the lease.

XVI.
The parents are not correct. Sam is married to Selena, who is the parent of Suri. Therefore,
themcase falls under RA 8552 Sec. 7 (a) which states that the requirement of sixteen (16) year
difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the
biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee's parent.

XVII.
A. FC 147 is applicable since it pertains to a man and woman who are capacitated to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife. Therefore, the property should be
partitioned in equal shares since based on the same article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household. Sofia gets half of the 2M house and lot in Cavite, and 500,000 in the cash in
the bank because it can be presumed from the fact that Sofia was a stay-at-home mother that her
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

B. Since Sofia and Semuel were unmarried, the 3 children are illegitimate based on FC 165
which states that children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate. FC 195
(4) requires that parents support their illegitimate children. Therefore, Semuel is required to
support the minor children provided that he has recognized them as his children. If not
recognized, FC 175 in relation to FC 172 will apply and filiation may be proved in order that
they may be entitled to support.

XVIII.
A. SAL can be liable as the principal in a contract of carriage while SMA can be liable either in a
cross-claim or directly to Shasha as the one who committed the tort. This is grounded on the case
of China Airlines vs. Daniel Chiok which cited the Warsaw Convention and IATA-
Recommended Practice which states that transportation to be performed by several successive air
carriers shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Convention, to be one undivided transportation.
The obligation of the airline that issued the ticket remained and did not cease, regardless of the
fact that another airline had undertaken to carry the passengers to one of their destinations.

B. It is an agency coupled with an interest based on NCC 1927. There is a bilateral contract
between SAL and SMA since they both allow the endorsing of certain flights. It is also through
SMA which SAL fulfilled the obligation with Shasha.

XIX.
No, in the case of Security Bank vs. Globe Assurance, SC ruled that the indemnity agreement
was not executed for the benefit of the creditors. Instead, it is for the benefit of the surety, and if
the latter thought it necessary in its own interest to impose this stipulation, and the indemnitors
voluntarily agreed to the same, the courts should respect the agreement of the parties - and
require them to abide by their contract. Therefore, SSC can legally compel Sebastain to pay since
it was stated in the contract and the bond was already issued by SSC.

XX.
A. It depends on the basis. If it is based on a contract of carriage, he may be liable for actual
damages and will not be liable for moral damages since NCC 2220 requires fraud or badfaith.
However, if it is based on quasi-delict, it may be liable for actual damages if not actually diligent
in selecting or supervising employees under NCC 2180). He may also be liable for moral
damages under NCC 2219 (2).

B. If it is based on a contract, NCC 2210 mandates that interest, in the discretion of the court,
allowed upon damges for breach of contract. If based on quasi-delict, NCC 2211 applied which
states in crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages may, in a proper case, be
adjudicated in the discretion of the court. Rate is legal rate of 6% per annum based on Nacar v
Gallery Frames.