Lightningsolar

Prevention Today Vol. 5, no.
1/2, 51-65
LIGHTNING RISK TO PHOTOVOLTAIC POWER GENERATING SYSTEMS

Giovanni Luca Amicucci, Fabio Fiamingo
Italian National Institute for Occupational Safety and Prevention, Department of Safety Technologies Electric and Electronic Engineering
Laboratory, Monte Porzio Catone, (Rome), Italy
(Key words: photovoltaic systems, lightning risk, risk assessment, lightning protection system, surge protection,
overvoltage protection)
ABSTRACT
BACKGROUND - Financial incentives, such as preferential feed-in tariffs for producers of solar-generated
electricity, have supported solar photovoltaic installations in many countries all over the world.
The costs of such installations, however, can be high. These include the cost for the photovoltaic array field,
which converts sunlight into electric power; for the power inverter, which converts the voltage from direct
current to alternating current; and for the low-to-high voltage transformer that connects the system to the
distribution grid.
If one of these components fails, the repair or replacement costs must be added, in which case, the payback
period of the installation owner’s investment increases.
OBJECTIVES - Since failures may occur due to overvoltages and/or overcurrents caused by atmospheric
phenomena, i.e., due to the effects of lightning strikes, this paper proposes a way to select lightning protection
measures to safeguard photovoltaic systems (PV array fields) from direct or nearby lightning flashes.
METHODS - The method proposed is based on lightning risk assessment in accordance with the requirements
of standard IEC 62305-2.
RESULTS - On the basis of the extent of the risk posed by lightning, it is suggested to adopt suitable
protection measures, which may be drawn from the standards of the IEC 62305 series and from the guide
IEC 61173.
BOW PO/base indexing:
CIS: Lightning protection [CIS: Snl]; Overvoltage protection [CIS: Saepu]; Hazard evaluation [CIS: Qra]; Accident agencies
[CIS: Yad]; Photovoltaics industry [CIS: Xets]; Electrical industry [CIS: Xet]; Electric power generation [CIS: Xoc]
EUOSHA OSH: Power stations [OSH: 58761C]; Electrical hazards [OSH: 40321C]; Physical hazards [OSH: 40281B]; Risk
assessment [OSH: 19641D]
ATECO: Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply [ATECO: 40]
51
Prevention Today January - June 2009
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, many governments throughout the world have tried to increase the production of electric
power using photovoltaic systems through various incentives.
In Italy, the implementation of photovoltaic systems has received a boost (in accordance with the provisions
of Ministerial Decree of 19 February 2007 [1]) through the adoption of a feed-in tariff system, the so-called
“conto energia”, i.e., the Gestore dei Servizi Elettrici (GSE)1 pays the owner of the system a premium (feed-in
premium) for all the energy that the system produces over 20 years. Today this incentive is worth roughly
0.40€/kWh and may vary by ±20%, depending on the size of the system and its level of architectural integration
into the building housing it. Smaller systems that are architecturally well integrated are favoured.
The premium may be increased by 5% under particular conditions (e.g., replacement of roofing containing
asbestos), or up to 30% if the photovoltaic system is combined with cost-effective electric energy
management.
In addition to the incentive premium, a further benefit can be obtained by using the energy produced by the
system. Such energy may be used locally and/or fed into the electric grid in three possible ways:
• Net metering: the energy not used is fed to the electric grid thus creating a positive balance to offset any
negative balance due to consumption exceeding production over a billing period. The electric bill will be
calculated on the difference between these two values, which may lead to savings that are proportional to
the energy produced by the system.
• Indirect sale: the energy not used is sold to the GSE that pays a fixed price or a market price (depending
on the production volumes) for the energy produced by the system.
• Direct sale: the energy not used is sold to the electricity market, which is not recommended for photovoltaic
energy.
A photovoltaic power generating system (PVPGS) can be hit by direct lightning strikes and affected by nearby
flashes. Direct lightning may cause physical damage and failure of some of the system’s apparatus. Lightning
electromagnetic pulse (LEMP) from nearby flashes can also cause severe damages.
In such a context it is obvious that an insufficient protection from lightning damages can increase the return-
on-investment (ROI) time and the energy pay-back [2] of the photovoltaic (PV) system. Indeed, lightning
damage to any component of a PVPGS would dash its owner’s expectations on the return on the considerable
investment made.
Standard IEC 61173 [3] provides guidelines on protection measures against hazards due to overvoltages, such
as grounding, shielding, stroke interception and installation of surge protective devices (SPD). But in order for
the adoption of such measures to be effective, it has to be based on a careful assessment of the possible
risks, which must be conducted with engineering criteria.
The aim of this paper is to describe the application of the lightning risk assessment procedure as per standard
IEC 62305-2 [4], to validate the protection measures suggested by the IEC 61173 guide and propose other
measures that could be adopted.
A complete risk management procedure is developed here, according to the IEC 62305-2 standard, assessing
the risk of loss of human life (R1) and the risk of loss of economic value (R4).
1
Gestore dei Servizi Elettrici (GSE), is a public limited company - wholly owned by the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance – that
promotes the development of renewable energy sources in Italy. GSE manages incentives such as the “conto energia” feed-in scheme
to support photovoltaic systems.
52
Lightning risk to photovoltaic power generating systems
1. METHODS
1.1 Photovoltaic systems under consideration
A PVPGS consists of a photovoltaic direct current (DC) generator or PV array field, to convert sunlight into
electricity; one or more power inverters, to convert the direct current into alternate current (AC); and a low
voltage/high voltage (LV/HV) transformer, to connect the PVPGS to the electric grid.
The PV array field consists of PV modules connected in series and in parallel (Figure 1) in order to reach the
nominal value of voltage (usually less than 600 V DC). The DC feeder of the photovoltaic field is connected to
the power inverter, which converts DC to AC voltage (400/230 V AC), and is also connected to the electric
utility grid (20 kV AC) through the LV/HV transformer.
FIGURE 1 - A photovoltaic power generating system and its main components
PV array field
Power inverter Electric
grid
AC
DC
PE
LV/HV
EBB Transformer
PE
PE
The power distribution system adopted, according to standard IEC 60364 [5], is IT on the DC system side
and TN on the AC system side2. In this paper two cases are considered (Figure 2):
• a rooftop PV system, with a photovoltaic array field (structure to be protected) measuring 45 m wide, 60 m
long (about 250 kWp) and 15 m high from ground level (including 1.5 m of metal frame for each module)
• a ground-mounted PV system, with a photovoltaic array field measuring 45 m wide, 60 m long (about
250 kWp) and 1.5 m high (height of the metal frame of each module).
2
International standard IEC 60364 distinguishes three families of earthing arrangements, using the two-letter codes TN, TT, and IT.
The first letter indicates the connection between earth and the power-supply equipment (generator or transformer):
T: direct connection of a point with earth (Latin: terra);
I: no point is connected with earth (isolation), except perhaps via a high impedance.
The second letter indicates the connection between earth and the electrical device being supplied:
T: direct connection of a point with earth;
N: direct connection to neutral at the origin of installation, which is connected to the earth.
53
FIGURE 2 - Example of a rooftop PV system (left) and of a ground-mounted PV system (right )
PV module PV string
Roof top
Ground
Building Techhical cabinet for the power

inverter and the LV/HV transformer
The PV array field feeds a power inverter consisting of four DC/AC elements of 80 kW each, which are
connected in parallel with the electric grid through the LV/HV transformer.
The structures are assumed to be isolated, lacking a lightning protection system (LPS) and with no-one nearby
for extended periods of time.
The collection areas of the structures to be protected, as defined by standard IEC 62305-2, are, for the rooftop
system, equivalent to the collection areas of the building that is housing the PV array field, whereas for the
ground-mounted system, they are equivalent to the collection areas of the PV array field itself.
In the case of the rooftop system, the DC/AC power inverter and the transformer are located inside the building
that is housing the photovoltaic system; in the case of the ground-mounted system, they are located inside a
cabinet (the cabinet is inside the PV array field, below the metal frames of some modules, in such a way that
no contribution to the collection areas is added).
The system is connected to the electric grid with an HV shielded (Rs≤1Ω/km) and buried (ρ = 500 Ωm) power
cable (1000 m long), in a rural environment (as defined in standard IEC 62305 [4]).
It is assumed that there are no coordinated SPD systems.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the data and characteristics of the structures and of their internal systems.
TABLE 1 - Characteristics of the structures
Parameter Comment Symbol(*) Value

PV array field dimensions (m) rooftop system Lb×Wb×Hb 60×45×15
PV array field dimensions (m) ground-mounted system Lb×Wb×Hb 60×45×1.5
Location factor isolated Cd 1
Shield at external structure boundary none KS1 1
Shield at internal structure boundary none KS2 1
inside the structure
People present in the structure nt n
(only for the rooftop system)
People present in the structure outside the structure nt (not relevant)
* for more information about adopted symbols refer to standard IEC62305-2 (2006) [4]
54
The number of people that are present outside the structure is not relevant, since it is assumed that the
structure, of an industrial kind, is located in a rural area and fenced, so that people stay nearby for a very short
time and at a certain distance. Concerning the rooftop system, the number of people present inside the
structure (of an industrial kind) are quantified with a generic n, since the values of Lt and Lf that are used here
were obtained directly from the tables in Annex C of the standard IEC 62305-2 [4].
TABLE 2 - Internal power systems (DC and AC) and relevant incoming power line characteristics

Soil resistivity Ωm ρ 500
Length (m) m Lc 1,000
HV/LV transformer at entrance of building Ct 0.2
Line location factor isolated Cd 1
Line environmental factor rural Ce 1
shielded line (bonded to the
equipotential bonding bar
PLD 0.02
Line shield with the equipment connected
PLI 0.002
to the same bonding bar)
Rs≤1Ω/km e Uw = 6 kV
unshielded cable, no routing
Internal wiring precaution
precautions to avoid large KS3 1
(DC and AC side of system)
loops
Equipment withstand voltage
(starting from the DC side to the main Uw = 1.5 kV KS4 1
circuit of the LV/HV transformer)
Coordinated SPD protection set none PSPD 1
Dimensions of the structure no structure is adjacent to
- -
at the end “a” of the line(*) the structure to be protected
1.2 Lightning risk assessment for a rooftop PVPGS

The lightning risk assessment for a rooftop PVPGS is performed by calculating the risk of loss of human life
(R1) and the risk of economic loss (R4).
1.2.1 Risk of loss of human life (R1)

According to the IEC 62305-2 standard, two zones can be defined. Indeed, the external surface of the
building that is housing the PV array field must be considered differently, in terms of risk assessment, with
respect to the internal surface. There is a single fire-proof compartment and there is no spatial shield
between the two zones:
Z1 = outside of the building that is housing the PV array field;
Z2 = inside of the building that is housing the PV array field (where the internal systems are located).
55
TABLE 3 - Z1 zone - Rooftop PVPGS - Risk R1

Type of surface around the building grass ra 10-2
Shock protection fence PA ≈0
Loss by touch and step voltages
yes Lt 10-2
near the structures
Type of surface on the roof top reinforced concrete ra 10-2
none
Loss by touch and step voltages
(avoiding maintenance Lt ≈0
on the roof top
during thunderstorms)

Floor surface concrete ru 10-2
depending on the building that is
housing the PV system, in the case of
Risk of fire interest, it is assumed low risk of fire rf 10-3
(structure containing combustible
materials only occasionally)
Special hazard no special hazard hz 1
one of the following provisions:
fire extinguishers; fixed and manually
operated extinguishing installations;
Fire protection rp 0.5
manual alarm installations; hydrants;
fire-proof compartments; protected
escape routes
Internal power systems yes
(including the electric system of the building) (connected to the main panel)
Loss by touch and step voltages yes Lt 10-2
Loss by physical damage yes Lf 5×10-2
Probability of damage, risk component RB No LPS PB 1
No SPD installed, shielded line
(bonded to the equipotential bonding
Probability of damage, risk component RU bar with the equipment connected PU = PLD 0.02
to the same bonding bar)
Rs≤1Ω/km; Uw = 6 kV
No SPD installed, shielded line (bonded
to the equipotential bonding bar with
Probability of damage, risk component RV PV = PLD 0.02
the equipment connected to the same
bonding bar) Rs≤1Ω/km; Uw = 6 kV
56
According to the standard IEC 62305-2 [4] the risk components of the risk R1 are expressed by:
R1=RA+RB+RU+RV (1)
where:
RA = ND×PA×ra×Lt (2)
RB = ND×PB×rp×hZ×rf×Lf (3)
RU = NL×PU×ru×Lt (4)
RV = NL×PV×rp×hZ×rf×Lf (5)
The calculations concerning risk R1 have to be repeated for each zone in which the structure was divided, by
considering, however, only the risk components that concern each zone. The overall risk is obtained by the
sum of the risks of each zone.
As in the standard IEC 62305-2 [4], the probability PA is negligible because of the fence, the probability PB is
equal to 1 because the structure is not protected with a LPS, the probabilities PU and PV are equal to PLD
because no SPD set is installed.
Considering a lightning ground flash density of
Ng = 4 flashes/(year×km2) (maximum value in Italy) (6)
it is possible to obtain a number of dangerous events due to flashes to the structure (photovoltaic array
field) of:
ND = Ng×Cd×Ad×10-6 (7)
Using the values in Table 1, formulas (6) and (7) give the following value:
ND = 7,4×10-2 (8)
Whereas NL, the number of dangerous events due to flashes to the service (HV power line), is:
NL = Ng×Cd×Ct×Al×10-6 (9)
Using the value in Table 1, formulas (6) and (9) give the following value:
NL = 1.7×10-2 (10)
It can be observed that the number of dangerous events due to direct flashes to the structure is about four
times greater than the value obtained for the number of dangerous events due to flashes to the service.
Therefore, using the values of Table 1, 2, 3, 4 it is possible to obtain the following value for risk R1 for zone Z2
(such risk does not include RA that constitutes risk R1 for zone Z1):
R1 = 1.89×10-6 (11)
It can be observed that the risk R1 for zone Z1 is practically negligible because of the fence around the building
and because all maintenance activity on the rooftop during thunderstorms is forbidden. Hence, the overall
risk R1 is reduced to the value for zone Z2 that is given by formula (11).
By considering a value for the tolerable risk of RT = 1×10-5, as suggested by the standard IEC 62305-2 [4],
because R1≤RT, it follows that a lightning protection system for such a risk is not necessary.
It is important to observe that, taking into account the same conditions, if the building that is housing the
system had an ordinary risk of fire (specific fire load between 800 MJ/m2 and 400 MJ/m2) instead of a low one
(specific fire load below 400 MJ/m2 or structure containing combustible materials only occasionally), then the
risk R1 (equal to 1.86×10-5) would have been greater than the tolerable risk; in such case, to reduce the risk R1
below the tolerable value, it would have been sufficient to adopt additional fire protection measures, such as
fixed, automatically operated extinguishing installations (obtaining R1 = 7.47×10-6).
57
It must also be noted that losses for touch and step voltages on the rooftop were negligible (Table 3), because
it was assumed that maintenance activities during thunderstorms would be avoided.
Finally, if there is a LPS before installing the photovoltaic array field (of course, for the rooftop type), the array
field must be integrated in the LPS, and it is important to take into account the increased risk of physical
damage that this entails.
1.2.2 Risk of economic loss (R4)

Once it has been established that no protection measures are needed to reduce the risk of loss of human life,
it is important to assess the risk of economic loss R4.
To assess risk R4 the following risk components must be considered: RB, RC, RM, RV, RW e RZ (whose meanings
are in line with those of the analogous risk components that are described in the standard IEC 62305-2 [4]).
Table 5 shows the amount of loss according to Annex C of standard IEC 62305-2 [4], whereas Table 6 shows
the values of the probabilities of damage according to Annex B of standard IEC 62305-2 [4].

depending on the building that is
housing the PV system, in the case of
Risk of fire interest, it is assumed low risk of fire rf 10-3
(structure containing combustible
materials only occasionally)
Special hazard no special hazard hz 1
one of the following provisions: fire
extinguishers; fixed, manually operated
Fire protection extinguishing installations; manual rp 0.5
alarm installations; hydrants; fire proof
compartments; protected escape routes
Internal power systems yes
(including the electric system of the building) (connected to the main panel)
Loss by overvoltages yes Lo 0.2
Loss by physical damage yes Lf 0.5
The value of Lo is not obtained through Annex C of standard IEC 62305-2 [4], but it is based on the fact that
Lo represents the maximum value, with respect to the cost of the system, that it is possible to sustain (equal
to the cost of the power inverter, estimated by guide IEC 61173 [3] at around 20% of the cost of the whole
system).
The probability PMS is calculated using the product of KMS = KS1×KS2×KS3×KS4; if a SPD set that satisfies the
requirements of the standard IEC 62305-4 [6] is installed, then PM is the lesser value between PSPD and PMS.
If there is a SPD set for equipotenzialisation, according to standard IEC 62305-3 [7], the probabilities PV and
PW are equal to the lesser value between PSPD and PLD, whereas the probability PZ is equal to the lesser value
between PSPD and PLI.
58

Probability of damage, risk component RB No LPS PB 1
Probability of damage, risk component RC No coordinated SPD set PC = PSPD 1
Probability of damage, risk component RM KS1 = KS2 = KS3 = KS4 = 1 PM = PMS 1
No SPD set installed, shielded line
Probability of damage, risk component RV PV = PLD 0.02
bar with the equipment connected to the
same bonding bar) Rs≤1Ω/km; Uw = 6 kV
Probability of damage, risk component RW PW = PLD 0.02
Probability of damage, risk component RZ PZ = PLI 0.002
According to the standard IEC 62305-2 [4] the risk components for R4 are expressed by (all relating to Z2 zone):
R4 = RB+RC+RM+RV+RW+RZ (12)
where:
RB = ND×PB×rp×hZ×rf×Lf (13)
RC = ND×PC×Lo (14)
RM = NM×PM×Lo (15)
RV = NL×PV×rp×hZ×rf×Lf (16)
RW = NL×PW×Lo (17)
RZ = NI×PZ×Lo (18)
Always considering the lightning ground flash density expressed in (6), it is possible to obtain a number of
damaging events due to flashes to the structure (photovoltaic array field) and to the service (HV power line)
equal to the values in (8) and in (10); moreover NM (19) and NI (20) take into account flashes near the structure
and the incoming service,
NM = Ng×(Am - Ad×Cd)×10-6 (19)

NI = Ng×Ct×Ce×Ai×10-6 (20)
where:
Am = 2.5×105 (21)
Ai = 5.6×105 (22)
corresponding to
NM = 9.32×10-1 (23)
and
NI = 4.47×10-1 (24)
The values for the risk components (Table 7) are obtained by using the above formulas and the parameters in
Tables 1, 2, 5 and 6.
59
TABLE 7 - Risk component values and their percentages over total economic risk R4
Risk component Rx Value (Rx/R4)%

RB 1.85×10-5 0.009%
-2
RC 1.48×10 7.350%
RM 1.86×10 -1
92.519%
-8
RV 8.54×10 0.000%
-5
RW 6.83×10 0.034%
-4
RZ 1.79×10 0.089%
-1
R4 2.02×10 100.000%
Considering that risk R4 is related to the annual cost ct of the system to be protected through the formula:
R4 = CL/ct (25)
where:
CL is the loss,
then the total loss (CL) for the PVPGS can be obtained as:
CL = R4 × ct (26)
Therefore, without protection measures one has an increase of the total loss of about 20% of the annual cost
of the PVPGS and consequently the time for the return on investment [2] and for the energy pay-back increases
significantly.
To drastically reduce these losses, more measures must be adopted, starting from the analysis of Table 7 and
taking into account what is suggested by the IEC 61173 guide [3].
1.3 Lightning risk assessment for a ground-mounted PVPGS

As in the previous case, the lightning risk assessment for a ground-mounted PVPGS is performed by
calculating the risk of loss of human life (R1) and the risk of economic loss (R4).
1.3.1 Risk of loss of human life (R1)

The same considerations as the ones for the rooftop PVPGS, can be applied to a ground-mounted PVPGS.
Indeed, because of the small collection area Ad (3,708.62 m2 instead of 18,511.73 m2 of the rooftop PVPGS) of
a photovoltaic array field with a negligible height (that brings the number of dangerous events to ND = 1.5×10-2
and NL = 1.8×10-2) and due to the lack of a building with the risk of fire, R1 is negligible (R1 = 1.89×10-6).
Therefore, it is not necessary to adopt protection measures (for normal risk of fire one has R1 = 3.83×10-6 and with
the installation of fixed, automatically operated extinguishing installations, the risk reduces to R1 = 1.55×10-6).
Naturally, especially if the geometric dimension of the photovoltaic array field is very large, it is also strongly
advisable to avoid any maintenance activity during thunderstorms.
1.3.2 Risk of economic loss (R4)

The same considerations as the ones for the rooftop PVPGS also apply here. The value of each risk component
is slightly different and is shown in Table 8.
60
TABLE 8 - Risk component values and their percentages over total economic risk R4
Risk component Rx Value (Rx/R4)%

RB 3.71×10-6 0.002%
-3
RC 2.97×10 1.472%
RM 1.98×10 -1
98.402%
-8
RV 8.90×10 0.000%
-5
RW 7.12×10 0.035%
-4
RZ 1.79×10 0.089%
-1
R4 2.01×10 100.000%
2. RESULTS
2.1 Adoption of protection measures
Since the risk of economic loss is almost identical in both cases, the rooftop system and the ground-mounted
system, the following considerations are based on the numerical values of the rooftop system.
As shown in Table 7, the most important risk component is RM (92.5% of the total risk R4). Such a component
provides an estimate of the probability of failure of internal systems due to overvoltages originated by inductive
phenomena (LEMP) by nearby flashes.
The very first protection measure, as suggested jointly by the IEC61173 guide[3] and the IEC 62305-4 standard
[6], is to reduce the induction phenomena on both circuits (AC and DC) of the PVPGS. To achieve this, cable
lengths must be as short as possible, e.g., in the DC side of the PVPGS it is possible to reduce the cable
length of the positive and negative poles that should also be twisted together to reduce the cable loop surface;
whereas in the AC side, it is possible to reduce the cable length of the PE, phase and neutral conductors, that
should, in turn, be twisted together so that to avoid unnecessary large cable loops in the system.
Such a protection measure, according to the IEC 62305-2 standard [4], is defined as routing precaution (KS3
reduces to 0.2, consequently PMS becomes equal to 0.95), and is able to reduce the risk component RM up to
95% of the value that it would have without a protection measure (i.e., to RM = 1.77×10-1 and R4 = 1.92×10-1).
In order to have an effective routing precaution, however, the loop area, due to the interconnection cables (DC
side) and to the power line (AC side), must not exceed 0.5 m2, in accordance to standard IEC 62305-2 [4];
unfortunately, it is not easy to achieve this value mainly because of the junction box (J-Box) of each
photovoltaic module, which has interconnection cables (positive and negative poles) that are spaced 10 cm
from each other and whose length is about 1 m (Figure 3).
FIGURE 3 - Large cable loop due to the interconnection cables leaving the J-Boxes and connecting to the
power inverter
Large loop area

Power inverter
AC
DC
PE EBB
61
The J-Box is set at the rear of each typical PV module as illustrated in Figure 4.
FIGURE 4 - Typical J-Box at the rear of a PV module
PV module rear view
J-Box
Frame
PV cell
Interconnection cables
Therefore, routing precautions can only be used on small PV systems (with power less than 10 kWp), which
can actually achieve a total loop area smaller than 0.5 m2 as required by standard IEC 62305-2 [4]. The residual
area is due to the many mini-loops with an area ranging from 0.02 m2 to 0.05 m2 of each module of the
photovoltaic array strings (Figure 5).
However, the adoption of routing precautions in the AC side, between the power inverter and the transformer,
is easier to obtain.
FIGURE 5 - Reduction of the cable loop due to the interconnection cables connecting to the power inverter by
routing precautions
Small loop area

Power inverter
AC
DC
PE EBB
62
The routing precautions reduce the cable loop area below 0.5 m2, which reduces KS3 to 0.02, consequently,
PMS reaches the value of 0.01 and therefore, RM = 1.86×10-3 and R4 = 1.69×10-2 and the most important component
of R4 becomes RC, i.e., 87% of the new value of R4, whereas, RM reduces to 11% of the new value of R4.
The fact that the cable loop area can be hardly reduced below a certain value put the power inverter, in the
DC side of PVPGS, at risk of failure due to overvoltages.
By using the formulas to evaluate the induced voltage (Ui ), as suggested in annex A of standard IEC 62305-4
[6], it is possible to calculate the number of modules that are connected in series/parallel that form a loop
area that is sufficient for having a Ui greater than 1.5 kV due to a nearby flash (distance 250 m; IMAX = 30 kA;
T1 = 0.25 µs). The result shows that a photovoltaic array field with less than 200 modules - with a total power
of the photovoltaic array field less than 40 kWp, obtained by assuming 200 Wp per module - should not have
any problems.
As regards photovoltaic array field with more than 200 modules, it is possible to use shielded cables (a shield
of resistance RS less than 20 Ω/km is sufficient) bonded at both ends to the same equipotential bonding bar.
Such a solution is easy (Figure 6), albeit expensive, and drastically reduces the risk component RM by 99.99%
(KS3 reduces to 0.001, consequently PMS reaches the value of 0.0001 and one has RM = 1.86×10-5 and
R4 = 1.50×10-2, with RC equal to 98% of the new value of R4 and RM equal to 0.12% of the new value of R4),
with a total amount of loss per annum reduced to 1.5% of the total cost of the PVPGS.
FIGURE 6 - Interconnection cables connecting to the power inverter by using shielded cables bonded at both
ends to the same equipotential bonding bar
Shielded cable
Power inverter
AC
DC
PE EBB
It must also be remembered that the frame of each module have a screen effect as reported by Haeberlin [8],
which reduces the probability of failure of the power inverter, caused by inductive phenomena of 10% or
greater values.
The SPDs can be a more economic and effective protection measure. If the adopted SPD set is designed for
a lightning protection level (LPL) type III-IV, then one has PSPD = 0.03<PMS, so that PM = PSPD = 0.03, from which
one obtains RM = 5.59×10-3 and R4 = 6.30×10-3, with RC equal to 7% of the new value of R4 and RM equal to
89% of the new value of R4, thus reducing the risk component RM, but also the component RC, bringing R4 to
3% of its original value. It must be noted that the PSPD value that is valid for a LPL type III-IV was adopted,
thus reducing the risk amount by two orders of magnitude. If a SPD set with better characteristics were used,
one which is usually used to protect systems located in relevant structures that require a LPL higher than LPL I,
the value of PSPD would have been lesser, reducing the risk by further orders of magnitude.
Figure 7 shows that the SPDs should be installed close to the power inverter. If the SPDs are installed only in
the vicinity of the power inverter, and no routing precautions are adopted, then induced overvoltages could
occur, which may not be high enough to trigger the SPDs, but could be high enough to short circuit the bypass
diode of the PV module (which is used to avoid that the module absorb the voltage when the lighting is
insufficient) [8].
63
FIGURE 7 - Reduction of the cable loop due to the interconnection cables connected to the power inverter by
the adoption of SPDs
Power inverter
AC
DC
SPD
PE EBB
To avoid this drawback, diodes should be bypassed with a reverse voltage as high as possible (1 kV or higher)
and, in large photovoltaic array fields, additional routing precautions must be adopted.
Once the risk component RM is reduced by means of the above suggested solutions, RC becomes the most
important component. Unlike RM, the component RC is related to the failure of internal systems due to the
LEMP caused by the direct flashes to the structure. According to standard IEC 62305-2 [4] the only possibility
to reduce such component is to install a protection system based on a coordinated SPD set that can function,
according to standard IEC 62305-2, only with a LPS. Although installing a LPS in order to reduce RC may
seem to be unnecessarily expensive, it is the only solution to avoid physical damages due to direct flashes on
the photovoltaic array field.
A solution to avoid the shadow of a LPS on the photovoltaic array field during daylight is the adoption, as
LPS, of the metal frames of the photovoltaic modules, welded to each other. Of course the mechanical
characteristics of the frame must comply with standard IEC 62305-3 [7] for a LPS. Another possible solution
is to use an “external” LPS, constituted by wires connected into a mesh over the photovoltaic array field [9],
by taking into account both, the separation distance [7] between the LPS and the PV modules, and the shadow
that this solution may generate over the array field.
3. DISCUSSION
A complete risk assessment - in compliance with the standard IEC 62305-2 [4] - was performed on a grid-
connected PVPGS. Examples were given of a rooftop and a ground-mounted PVPGS of medium size (about
250 kWp). The risk of loss of human life and the risk of economic loss were assessed.
In the two cases of interest, the risk of loss of human life was below the tolerable value, hence the respective
PVPGSs do not need any protection measures. The risk of economic loss, however, was estimated to be
considerable.
When observing the value and the weight of each risk component, it emerges that the higher risks come from
nearby flashes, due to electromagnetic induction, and that the risk of failure is greater in the DC side of the system.
Taking into account the high value (about 20% of the cost of the system) of the expected annual economic
loss, some protection measures must be adopted, otherwise the time needed for the return on the investment
and the energy payback increases too much.
Therefore, in compliance with standard IEC 61173, some protection measures have been proposed and
evaluated in order to assess the effective change of the value of the reduction of the risk component through
these measures.
64
The analysis indicated that, as expected, the best solution for large PVPGSs is to adopt shielded cables (in
the cables outgoing from the J-Boxes, at the rear of each PV module, and in the power line) bonded at both
ends and connected to the same equipotential bonding bar.
Smaller PVPGSs can be protected by adopting surge SPDs in the cables close to the power inverter.
REFERENCES
1. Italy. Decreto legislativo 19 febbraio 2007, Ministero dello sviluppo economico, Criteri e modalità per
incentivare la produzione di energia elettrica mediante conversione fotovoltaica della fonte solare, in
attuazione dell'articolo 7 del decreto legislativo 29 dicembre 2003, n. 387. Gazzetta Ufficiale - Serie
Generale n. 45, 23 febbraio 2007
2. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. What is the energy payback for
PV?. [online]. 2004 [cited July 2009];[2 screens]. Available from: http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy04osti/
35489.pdf
3. International Electrotechnical Commission. Overvoltage protection for photovoltaic (PV) power generating
systems - Guide. 1st ed. Geneva (Switzerland): IEC; 1992. IEC 61173
4. International Electrotechnical Commission. Protection against lightning - Part 2: Risk management for
structures and services. 1st ed. Geneva (Switzerland): IEC; 2006. IEC 62305-2
5. International Electrotechnical Commission. Low-voltage electrical installations - Part 1: Fundamental
principles - Assessment of general characteristics - Definitions. 5th ed. Geneva (Switzerland): IEC; 2005.
IEC 60364
6. International Electrotechnical Commission. Protection against lightning - Part 4: Electrical and electronic
systems within structures. 1st ed. Geneva (Switzerland): IEC; 2006. IEC 62305-4
7. International Electrotechnical Commission. Protection against lightning - Part 3: Physical damage to
structures and life hazard. 1st ed. Geneva (Switzerland): IEC; 2006. IEC 62305-3
8. H. Haeberlin. Interference voltages induced by magnetic field of simulated lightning currents in
photovoltaic modules and array, 17th European Photovoltaic Solar Energy Conference. Munich (Germany).
[online]. 2001 [cited July 2009];[4 screens]. Available from: http://labs.hti.bfh.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/
lab1/pv/emv01.pdf
9. International Electrotechnical Commission. Protection against lightning - Part 1:General principles. 1st
ed. Geneva (Switzerland): IEC; 2006. IEC 62305-1
65

Lightningsolar

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Titolo originale

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Lightningsolar

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Prevention Today Vol. 5, no.

LIGHTNING RISK TO PHOTOVOLTAIC POWER GENERATING SYSTEMS

BOW PO/base indexing:

FIGURE 1 - A photovoltaic power generating system and its main components

FIGURE 2 - Example of a rooftop PV system (left) and of a ground-mounted PV system (right )

Building Techhical cabinet for the power

TABLE 1 - Characteristics of the structures

Parameter Comment Symbol(*) Value

Parameter Comment Symbol(*) Value

1.2 Lightning risk assessment for a rooftop PVPGS

1.2.1 Risk of loss of human life (R1)

TABLE 3 - Z1 zone - Rooftop PVPGS - Risk R1

Parameter Comment Symbol(*) Value

TABLE 4 - Z2 zone - Rooftop PVPGS - Risk R1

Parameter Comment Symbol(*) Value

Ng = 4 flashes/(year×km2) (maximum value in Italy) (6)

1.2.2 Risk of economic loss (R4)

TABLE 5 - Z2 zone - Rooftop PVPGS - Risk R4

Parameter Comment Symbol(*) Value

TABLE 6 - Z2 zone - Rooftop PVPGS - Risk R4

Parameter Comment Symbol(*) Value

NM = Ng×(Am - Ad×Cd)×10-6 (19)

Risk component Rx Value (Rx/R4)%

1.3 Lightning risk assessment for a ground-mounted PVPGS

1.3.1 Risk of loss of human life (R1)

1.3.2 Risk of economic loss (R4)

Risk component Rx Value (Rx/R4)%

Large loop area

FIGURE 4 - Typical J-Box at the rear of a PV module

PV module rear view

Small loop area

Potrebbero piacerti anche