EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
TORREGOSA
1. Sison v. People
Memory Aid: Sticks and stones may break my bones, but
words will never hurt me.
Keywords: Mauling, Eyewitness testimony,
photographic evidence
Principles:
1. The fact that several sworn statements does not make the
testimony incredible, if they were made to identify more
suspects apprehended during the investigation.
2. A mistake in identifying the accused does not make one
entirely untrustworthy, nor does it make the whole testimony
a falsity, since an honest mistake is not inconsistent with a
truthful testimony.
3. As a general rule, when photographs are presented in
evidence, they must be identified by the photographer as to
its production and testified as to the circumstances under
which they were produced.
4. By way of exception to the above mentioned rule, it is not
only the photographer, but the witness who can identify
these pictures, and can be proved prima facie either by the
testimony of the person who made it or by other competent
witnesses.
Facts:
During the period of August to October 1986, several
informations were filed in court against 11 persons identified
as Marcos loyalists charging them with the murder of
Salcedo. These cases were consolidated, and all accused
pleaded not guilty to the charge, thus, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented 12 witnesses, including 2
eyewitnesses (Ranulfo Sumilang & Renato Banculo).
They likewise presented documentary evidence
consisting of newspaper accounts of the incident and
various photographs taken during the mauling. They
were able to establish that on July 27, 1986, a rally was
scheduled to be held at Luneta by Marcos Loyalists. While
they applied for a permit, such was denied. However, they
pushed through the rally. It was then that Col. Edgar Dula
Torres arrived and asked for the permit, which was not
produced. They were given 10 minutes to disperse, and upon
failure to comply, tear gas and truncheons were used to
disperse them. Some of them fought back and threw stones
at the police. They then fled towards Maria Orosa St.
Later, a small group of loyalists approached Annie Ferrer,
who was jogging in the area at the time. She then began
chanting in support of Marcos, and was subsequently
arrested by the police. It was then that in the ensuing
commotion, Renato Banculo saw the loyalists
attacking persons in yellow. He then saw a man in
yellow (Salcedo) being chased by a group of Marcos
loyalists, who mauled him. He saw Ranulfo Sumilang
rush to Salcedo’s aid, but was unsuccessful. While
Sumilang was able to pacify them for a while, ultimately, he
was unsuccessful. After further being beaten, Salcedo was
able to escape, but eventually was caught by Joel Tan and
Nilo Pacadar, with the mauling continuing until he lost
consciousness. Upon being brought to the hospital, he died
upon arrival. COD was hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic,
ATTY.
sustaining various contusions, abrasions, lacerated wounds
and skull fractures.
There were several witnesses to the mauling,
including several press people both local and foreign,
who took pictures and video footage of the event, and
became front page news the following day.
The principal accused denied their participation and offered
alibis. Joselito Tamayo testified that he was not in any of the
photographs because he was at his house in QC that day.
Gerry Neri claimed he was at the Luneta theater. Romeo
Sison was allegedly at his office waiting for some pictures to
be developed, claiming to be afflicted with a hernia. Richard
de los Santos admits he was present but did not hit Salcedo,
and that he was merely watching. Nilo Pacadar admitted that
he was a loyalist and that he attended the rally, but that he
likewise did not hit Salcedo. Joel Tan testified that he tried
to pacify the maulers but that he was ignored. Atty Lozano
and Nuega and Annie Ferrer did not testify.
On December 16, 1988, the trial court found Romeo Sison,
Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos, and Joselito
Tamayo guilty as principals to the crime. Annie Ferrer was
convicted as an accomplice. It acquitted the others. On
appeal, the CA acquitted Annie Ferrer, but increased the
penalty of the rest of the accused, except Tamayo, to
reclusion perpetua.
Contention of the parties
Appellants claim that the CA erred in sustaining the
testimonies of the two eyewitnesses because they were
“unreliable, doubtful, and do not deserve any credence”,
since they surfaced only after a reward was announced. This
argument was anchored on Banculo submitting three
sworn statements providing a new or improved
version of the incident, and while on the witness
stand, mistakenly identified a detention prisioner in
another case. Sumilang was likewise evasive and
unresponsive.
They also contend that the court erroneously gave
evidentiary weight to several exhibits, namely, the
joint affidavits of the police intelligence operatives
who witnessed the rally and subsequent dispersal
operation, the photographs taken of the victim while
he was being mauled and those published in
newspapers and magazines (which were questioned
because of lack of proper identification by the
person/s who took them)
Issue:
1. WoN the testimony of the two eyewitnesses,
Banculo and Sumilang, were admissible
2. WoN the photographs should be admissible
considering that the author did not testify
3. WoN there is conspiracy among the accused
Held:
First Issue
The court found that there was no proof that the two
eyewitnesses testified because of the reward, and evidence
shows that he submitted his sworn statement two
U S C L A W | Page 1 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
hours after the mauling. The fact that he executed 3
sworn statements does not make them and his
testimony incredible, as they were made to identify
more suspects apprehended during the investigation.
The records show that Sumilang was reprimanded several
times by the trial court, but this was not enough to reject
his testimony since he did not exhibit the undesirable
conduct all throughout his testimony. It was correctly
given credence by the trial court. Unless there are
compelling reasons, the SC cannot disturb the
findings of the lower court with regards to the
witness while they are on the witness stand.
Banculo’s mistake in identifying the accused does not
make him entirely untrustworthy, nor does it make
his whole testimony a falsity, since an honest mistake
is not inconsistent with a truthful testimony.
As a whole, the SC sustained the trial courts findings that the
witnesses’ testimonies corroborated each other on all
important and relevant details, and that they were supported
by the medical and documentary evidence on record.
Second Issue
With respect to the photographs in question, as a rule, when
photographs are presented in evidence, they must be
identified by the photographer as to its production
and testified as to the circumstances under which
they were produced. It must be a correct
representation or reproduction of the original, and its
admissibility is determined by its accuracy in
portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The
photographer is not the only witness who can identify
these pictures, and can be proved prima facie either
by the testimony of the person who made it or by
other competent witnesses after which it can be admitted
subject to impeachment as to its accuracy.
In the offering of the photographs as evidence
appellants objected to their admissibility for lack of
proper identification. However, the same exhibits
were used by Tamayo and Neri to prove that they
were not in any of the pictures and could not have
participated in the mauling, and were made a part of
the defense exhibits. Subsequently, the prosecution
used these to cross-examine all the accused. No
objection was made until the third hearing, which objection
was made anchored on the fact that the person who took
them was not presented to identify them. The SC held
that the use of the photographs by the accused to show their
alleged non-participation is an admission of the exactness
and accuracy thereof.
By analyzing the photographs, only three of the
appellants were in the photos, namely, de los Santos,
Pacadar, and Tan. Sison appears only once, and is
shown running after the victim. Tamayo was not
identified in any pictures. The absence however, does
not exculpate, since the photographs did not capture
the entire sequence of events but merely segments
thereof. While the pictures did not capture Sison and
Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were nevertheless
ATTY. TORREGOSA
identified by the two eyewitnesses, and thus, their alibi
must fail.
Third Issue
The court held that there was conspiracy among the
appellants because at the time they committed the crime,
their actions showed unity of purpose, a concerted effort to
bring about the death of Salcedo. Where conspiracy exists
and is proved, all conspirators are liable for every act
regardless of the intent and character of their participation.
In the present case, the death was murder qualified by abuse
of superior strength. While the appellants argued that it
should be covered under death in a tumultuous affray, the
facts and evidence show that it was between a group and
one individual, negating their argument. The assailants were
numerous, and were armed with stones. Clearly, there was
abuse of superior strength and numbers, which qualified the
killing to murder. However, treachery could not be
appreciated absent of any proof that the attack was
deliberately and consciously chosen to ensure the assailant’s
safety from any defense for the reason that he had the
opportunity to run, but was overtaken. Likewise, evident
premeditation cannot be alleged because the attack was
sudden and spontaneous.
2. State vs. Tatum
Memory Aid: “Regiscope film; Authentication of a
photograph”
Principle: The quantum of authentication required for
admissibility of a photograph in evidence is simply that some
witness (not necessarily the photographer) be able to give
some indication as to when, where, and under what
circumstances the photograph was taken, and that the
photograph accurately portray the subject or subjects
illustrated.
Facts
William Tousin received monthly welfare checks from the
state of Washington. In February, 1960, Tousin did not
receive his check (checks were generally mailed to a rooming
house where Tousin resided.) The mail was normally left on
a window ledge in the hallway of the rooming house. Tousin’s
February check was endorsed and cashed at Sherman’s Food
Store in Pasco by someone other than the payee, Tousin.
An employee of the store, Caroline Pentecost, testified that
although she could not specifically recall the above-
mentioned transaction, the initials appearing on the face of
the check were hers. She also testified that whenever a check
was presented to her for payment at the store, the store
manager had instructed her to initial it and then insert it into
a “Regiscope” machine
**Regiscope machine is simultaneously photographs,
through two separate lenses, both the check and the person
facing the machine.
When it was discovered that the endorsement of the payee
was a forgery, the Regiscope film was sent to the Regiscope
distributor to be developed. The processed film shows both
U S C L A W | Page 2 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
the check and the person of appellant (from his waist up)
with the food store in the background.
The photographs were presented and authenticated by the
saleslady who dealt with the accused at the time of
encashment. Phillip Dale (Regiscope distributor) also testified
at length concerning the Regiscope process.
Upon the trial, both the negative and the print therefrom
were admitted in evidence. This was objected to on the
ground that there was no competent witness who
authenticated the photographs.
Issue
(1) WON the Regiscope films sufficiently authenticated to
warrant their admission as evidence
(2) WON Phillip Dale qualify as an expert witness with respect
to the filming process despite the fact that he was not a
photographer by profession
Held
(3) The testimony of witnesses taken together
amounted to a sufficient authentication to warrant
the admission of the photograph as evidence.
The saleslady was a competent witness. Although the
photographer is an ideal witness, anyone who is familiar with
the person, thing or event depicted in the photograph can be
a competent witness like the saleslady being the one who
personally dealt with the suspect when the encashment
transpired.
(2) Yes.
The fact that Dale was not a professional photographer and
may have not understood all of the technical details of the
process, did not, from an evidentiary standpoint, disqualify
him from expressing an opinion in his testimony as to the
possibility of altering a given Regiscope print.
This court has many times held that the question of whether
or not a witness is qualified to express an expert opinion lies
within the sound discretion of the trial court. As such, the
Court finds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
this regard.
3. Tijing v. CA
Memory Aid: I’m your labadera but that is my baby not
yours. Your kabit is baog and you are ligated. Your birth
certificate was registered 4 months after birth. You did not
present the midwife or logbook.
Facts:
In August 1989, Angelita (employer) went to Bienvenida
(laundrywoman) house to fetch her for an urgent laundry
job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing,
she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left
her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of
Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child
while Bienvenida was doing laundry.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and
Edgardo, Jr., were gone.
ATTY. TORREGOSA
Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a
tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the
common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were
lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan.
Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where
she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after
four years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to
her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez,
was already named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that
Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her demand
to do so.
Bienvenida and Edgardo (her husband) filed their petition for
habeas corpus with the trial court in order to recover their
son. To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two
witnesses, namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez.
The first witness, Vasquez, testified that she assisted in the
delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her
clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She supported her testimony with
her clinical records. The second witness, Benjamin Lopez,
declared that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez (brother of
the common law husband of Angelita), could not have
possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter was
sterile. He recalled that Tomas met an accident and bumped
his private part against the edge of a banca causing him
excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing
capacity. Benjamin further declared that Tomas admitted to
him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son and
that he and Angelita were not blessed with children.
For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother
of the child. She asserts that at age, she gave birth to John
Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife
Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She added, though,
that she has two other children with her real husband, Angel
Sanchez. She said the birth of John Thomas was registered
by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local
civil registrar of Manila on August 4, 1989.
Trial Court ruled in favor of Bienvenida but CA reversed.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy?
(Yes)
(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas
Lopez are one and the same person and is the son of
petitioners? (Yes)
Ruling:
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of
his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus, it is the
proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody
of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third
person of his own free will. It may even be said that in
custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and
involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale
for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is
prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of
custody over a child. It must be stressed too that in habeas
corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and
U S C L A W | Page 3 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
material, subject to the usual presumptions including those
as to identity of the person.
A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the
evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish
that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo
Tijing, Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear
children. From her very lips, she admitted that after the birth
of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez
Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without
the benefit of marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that
ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered no
evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988 or
for a period of ten years. The midwife who allegedly
delivered the child was not presented in court. No clinical
records, log book or discharge order from the clinic were ever
submitted.
Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that
Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son. Benjamin
Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile
because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that
John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Moreover,
Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had
no children after almost fifteen years together. Though
Tomas Lopez had lived with private respondent for fourteen
years, they also bore no offspring.
Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of
John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the
midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged
birth of the child. Under the law, the attending physician or
midwife in attendance at birth should cause the registration
of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can
the parent register the birth of his child. The certificate must
be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty days after
the birth. Significantly, the birth certificate of the child stated
Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married on
October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false
because even private respondent had admitted she is a
"common-law wife". This false entry puts to doubt the other
data in said birth certificate.
Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the
child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong
similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is
competent and material evidence to establish parentage.
Needless to stress, the trial court's conclusion should be
given high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe
the physical appearances of the minor and petitioner
concerned.
Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in
Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic.
Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records
consisting of a log book, discharge order and the signatures
of petitioners. -- this is the “conventional way” of proving the
birth of a child.
ATTY. TORREGOSA
All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject
minor is indeed the son of petitioners. The writ of habeas
corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using
conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and
scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the
facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural
Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing
using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is
based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2)
copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and
child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a
novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is
still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case
comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility
of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply
the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress. Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to
DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in
the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.
4. People v. Vallejo
Keywords: Pink Shorts; DNA; EJ Confession with
Mayor
Memory Aid: I raped and killed my sister’s tutee. I dropped
her body in the river. I’m saying that my confession is
coerced by the Mayor and the Police and that DNA samples
were contaminated. The people who saw me? They did not
see me rape and kill with their two eyes.
Facts:
The Rape and Killing
The victim's mother, Ma. Nida Diolola, testified that at around
1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, she sent her
9-year old daughter Daisy Diolola to their neighbor's house
so that Aimee Vallejo, the sister of accused-appellant, who
was Daisy’s tutor. Aimee's house, where accused-appellant
was also staying, is about four to five meters away from
Daisy's house. Ma. Nida saw her daughter go to the house of
her tutor. She was wearing pink short pants and a
white sleeveless shirt. An hour later, Daisy came back
with accused-appellant. They were looking for a book which
accused-appellant could copy to make a drawing or a poster
that Daisy would submit to her teacher. After finding the
book, Daisy and accused-appellant went back to the latter's
house. When Ma. Nida woke up at about 5:30 o'clock after
an afternoon nap, she noticed that Daisy was not yet home.
She started looking for her daughter and proceeded to the
house of Aimee. Aimee's mother told Ma. Nida that Daisy was
not there and that Aimee was not able to help Daisy with her
lessons because Aimee was not feeling well as she had her
menstrual period. Ma. Nida looked for Daisy in her brother's
and sister's houses, but she was not there either. At about
7:00 o'clock that evening, Ma. Nida went back to her
neighbor's house, and there they saw accused-appellant,
who told her that Daisy had gone to her classmate's house
U S C L A W | Page 4 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
to borrow a book. But, when Ma. Nida went there, she was
told that Daisy had not been there. Ma. Nida went to the dike
because she was told that they saw Daisy playing at about
3:30 o'clock in the afternoon. Jessiemin Mataverde also told
Ma. Nida that Daisy was playing in front of her house that
afternoon and even watched television in her house, but that
Daisy later left with accused-appellant.
Ma. Nida and her brother and sister searched for Daisy the
whole evening until the early morning of the following day,
but their search proved fruitless. Then, at about 10:00
o'clock in the morning of June 11, 1999, she was informed
that the dead body of her daughter was found tied to the
root of an aroma tree by the river after the
"compuerta" by a certain Freddie Quinto. The body was
already in the barangay hall when Ma. Nida saw her
daughter. Daisy was wearing her pink short pants with
her sleeveless shirt tied around her neck. Barangay
Councilmen Raul Ricasa and Calring Purihin reported the
incident to the Rosario police. The other barangay officers
fetched accused-appellant from his house and took him to
the barangay hall. At the barangay hall, Ma. Nida
pointed to accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo as the
probable suspect since he was with the victim when
she was last seen alive.
The People who saw.
Another witness, Jessiemin Mataverde, testified that at
around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day, she saw
Daisy playing with other children outside her house. Later,
Daisy watched television instead from the door of Jessiemin's
house. About five minutes later, accused-appellant came
to the house and told Daisy something, as a result of
which she went with him and the two proceeded
towards the "compuerta."
Jessiemin testified that at around 5:00 o'clock that afternoon,
while she and her daughter were in front of a store across
the street from her house, accused-appellant arrived to buy
a stick of Marlboro cigarette. Accused-appellant had only his
basketball shorts on and was just holding his shirt. They
noticed both his shorts and his shirt were wet. After
lighting his cigarette, accused-appellant left.
Charito Yepes, another neighbor of Ma. Nida, also testified
that at about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999,
she and her husband decided to get some fishing implements
to go fishing at the compuerta. She said they met accused-
appellant Gerrico Vallejo near the seashore and noticed
that he was uneasy and looked troubled. Charito said
that accused-appellant did not even greet them, which was
unusual. She also testified that accused-appellant's
shorts and shirt (sando) were wet, but his face and
hair were not.
The Police and the Blood Samples
SPO1 Arnel Cuevas testified that upon receipt of the report,
the Chief responded to the call together with his men. When
they arrived, Daisy's body was already in the barangay hall.
SPO1 Cuevas took photographs of the body. At that time,
Daisy was wearing pink short pants and a dirty white panty
with a dirty white sleeveless shirt wrapped around her neck.
The inquiries conducted by the police showed that one
Freddie Quinto was fishing near the compuerta when
ATTY. TORREGOSA
he accidentally hit the body of Daisy, which was in the
mud and tied to the root of an aroma tree.
Accused-appellant was invited by the policemen for
questioning. Based on the statements of Jessiemin
Mataverde and Charito Paras-Yepes, the policemen went to
the house of accused-appellant at about 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of July 11, 1999 and recovered the white
basketball shirt, with the name Samartino and No. 13 printed
at the back, and the violet basketball shorts, with the number
9 printed on it, worn by accused-appellant the day before.
The shirt and shorts, which were bloodstained, were
turned over to the NBI for laboratory examination.
Pet Byron Buan, Forensic Biologist of the NBI, testified that
he took blood samples from accused-appellant in his office
for laboratory examination to determine his blood type.
Likewise, the basketball shorts and shirt worn by accused-
appellant on the day the victim was missing and the victim's
clothing were turned over for the purpose of determining the
presence of human blood and its groups.
The results of the examinations conducted by Pet Byron T.
Buan showed accused-appellant to belong to Group
"O". The following specimens: (1) one (1) white no. 13
athletic basketball shirt, with patches "Grizzlies" in front and
"SAMARTINO" at the back; (2) one (1) violet no. 9 athletic
basketball short pants; (3) one (1) white small "Hello Kitty"
T-shirt with reddish brown stains; (4) one (1) "cut" pink short
pants with reddish brown stains; (5) one (1) "cut" dirty white
small panty with reddish brown stains, were all positive
for the presence of human blood showing the
reactions of Group "A".
The Mayor
Renato Abutan, Municipal Mayor of Rosario, Cavite, testified
that he was informed of the rape and murder at past 10:00
o'clock in the evening of June 11, 1999. The mayor said he
immediately proceeded to the municipal jail, where accused-
appellant was detained, and talked to the latter. Accused-
appellant at first denied having anything to do with the
killing and rape of the child. The mayor said he told accused-
appellant that he could not help him if he did not tell the
truth. At that point, accused-appellant started crying
and told the mayor that he killed the victim by
strangling her. Accused-appellant claimed that he
was under the influence of drugs. The mayor asked
accused-appellant if he wanted to have the services of Atty.
Lupo Leyva, a resident of Rosario, as his lawyer. When
accused-appellant said he did, Mayor Abutan fetched Atty.
Leyva from his house and took him to the police station about
11:00 o'clock that evening.
Trial Court convicted him and hence this appeal.
Issues:
1. WON the trial court gravely erred in convicting the
accused-appellant of rape with homicide despite the
insufficiency and weakness of the circumstantial
evidence of the prosecution.
2. WON the trial court gravely erred in giving evidentiary
weight to the alleged oral confessions of the accused-
appellant despite its being hearsay in nature.
U S C L A W | Page 5 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
3. WON the trial court committed reversible error in giving
probative value to the written extra-judicial
confession of the accused-appellant despite the fact that
the same was obtained through force and
intimidation and that the lawyer who assisted him during
his custodial investigation did not and could not possibly give
him effective legal assistance.
Rulings:
Under Rule 133, section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a
conviction if:
(a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and
(c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, the following circumstantial evidence
establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-
appellant:
1. The victim went to Aimee Vallejo's house, where accused-
appellant was residing, at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
July 10, 1999, for tutoring.
2. At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant
and Daisy went together to the latter's house to get a book
from which the former could copy Daisy's school project.
After getting the book, they proceeded to accused-
appellant's residence.
3. From accused-appellant's house, Daisy then went to the
house of Jessiemin Mataverde where she watched television.
Accused-appellant thereafter arrived and whispered
something to Daisy, and the latter went with him towards the
"compuerta."
4. At about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the spouses
Iluminado and Charito Yepes saw accused-appellant coming
out of the "compuerta," with his clothes, basketball shorts,
and t-shirt wet, although his face and hair were not.
According to these witnesses, he looked pale, uneasy, and
troubled (balisa). He kept looking around and did not even
greet them as was his custom to do so.
5. The fishing boat which accused-appellant used as a
bomber (a boat for catching fish with dynamite) was docked
by the seashore.
6. A little before 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Jessiemin
Mataverde also saw accused-appellant buying a Marlboro
cigarette from a store. Jessiemen also noticed that accused-
appellant's clothes were wet but not his face nor his hair.
7. By 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, as Ma. Nida Diolola
looked for her daughter, she was told by accused-appellant
that Daisy had gone to her classmate Rosario's house. The
information proved to be false.
8. Daisy's body was found tied to an aroma tree at the part
of the river near the "compuerta."
9. During the initial investigation, accused-appellant
had scratches on his feet similar to those caused by
the thorns of an aroma tree.
10. The clothes which accused-appellant wore the day
before were bloodstained. The bloodstains on
accused-appellant's clothes and on Daisy's clothes
were found positive of human blood type "A."
11. Accused-appellant has blood type "O."
ATTY. TORREGOSA
12. The vaginal swabs from Daisy's body contained her DNA
profile as well as that of accused-appellant.
Discussion on DNA evidence
The DNA analysis conducted by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida
Viloria-Magsipoc is questioned by accused-appellant. He
argues that the prosecution failed to show that all the
samples submitted for DNA testing were not contaminated,
considering that these specimens were already soaked in
smirchy waters before they were submitted to the laboratory.
DNA is an organic substance found in a person's cells which
contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical twins,
each person's DNA profile is distinct and unique.
When a crime is committed, material is collected from the
scene of the crime or from the victim's body for the suspect's
DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is
then matched with the reference sample taken from the
suspect and the victim.
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an
association exists between the evidence sample and the
reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to
various chemical processes to establish their profile. The test
may yield three possible results:
1) The samples are different and therefore must have
originated from different sources (exclusion). This
conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or
discussion;
2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of
the test, whether the samples have similar DNA types
(inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons
including degradation, contamination, or failure of some
aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the analysis might
then be repeated with the same or a different sample, to
obtain a more conclusive result; or
3) The samples are similar, and could have originated
from the same source (inclusion). In such a case, the
samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds
to determine the statistical significance of the
similarity.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore,
courts should consider, among others things, the following
data: how the samples were collected, how they were
handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, the bloodstains taken from the clothing
of the victim and of accused-appellant, the smears taken
from the victim as well as the strands of hair and nails taken
from her tested negative for the presence of human DNA.
But the vaginal swabs taken from the victim yielded
positive for the presence of human DNA. Upon analysis by
the experts, they showed the DNA profile of accused-
appellant.
U S C L A W | Page 6 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
Discussion on Confessions
Accused-appellant challenges the validity of the oral and
written confessions presented as evidence against him. He
alleges that the oral confessions were inadmissible in
evidence for being hearsay, while the extrajudicial
confessions were obtained through force and intimidation.
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced
confessions treated in this constitutional provision:
(1) coerced confessions, the product of third degree
methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, and
intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of
Section 12, and (2) uncounselled statements, given
without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are
the subject of paragraph 1 of the same section.
Indeed, accused-appellant admitted that he was first asked
whether he wanted the services of Atty. Leyva before the
latter acted as his defense counsel. And counsel who is
provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the
accused where the latter never raised any objection against
the former's appointment during the course of the
investigation but, on the contrary, thereafter subscribed to
the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.
Accused-appellant contends that the rulings in
People vs. Andan and People vs. Mantung do not
apply to this case. We disagree. The facts of these
cases and that of the case at bar are similar. In all
these cases, the accused made extrajudicial
confessions to the municipal mayor freely and
voluntarily. In all of them, the extrajudicial
confessions were held admissible in evidence, being
the spontaneous, free, and voluntary admissions of
the guilt of the accused. We note further that the
testimony of Mayor Abutan was never objected to by
the defense.
The admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions of accused-
appellant is also attacked on the ground that these were
extracted from him by means of torture, beatings, and
threats to his life. The bare assertions of maltreatment
by the police authorities in extracting confessions from
the accused are not sufficient.
5. Lucas v. Lucas
Keywords: DNA testing; Who is the father of this
musical prodigy?
Principle/Doctrine:
Before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood
testing, the moving party must show that there is a
reasonable possibility of paternity
Facts
Petitioner, Jesse Lucas (JESSE), filed a Petition to Establish
Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA
Testing before the RTC. Jesse alleged that he is the son
of Elsie who got acquainted with respondent Jesus S.
Lucas (JESUS) in Manila.
His mother, at that time, moved from Davao to Manila and
stayed with a certain “Ate Belen” who worked in a prominent
ATTY. TORREGOSA
nightspot in Manila. She often times accompanied “Ate
Belen” to work.
Jesse submitted the following documents to support his
Petition:
a. Certificate of Live Birth
b. Baptismal Certificate
c. College Diploma showing that he graduated from Saint
Louis University Baguio with a degree in Psychology
d. Certificate of Graduation from the same school
e. Certificate of Recognition from UP, College of Music
f. Clippings of several articles from different newspapers
about Jesse as a musical prodigy
JESUS learned of this and he filed a Special appearance and
Comment manifesting the petition was adversarial in nature
and therefore, summons should be served on him.
Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear
the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and
hence, set the case for hearing. JESUS filed a Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that the DNA testing cannot be had
on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s
father.
RTC: Dismissed the case and held that JESSE failed to
establish compliance with the 4 procedural aspects for a
paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba,
namely:
1. A prima facie case
2. Affirmative defenses
3. Presumption of Legitimacy
4. Physical Resemblance between the putative father
and the child
CA: Ruled in favor of Jesus. It noted that Jesse failed to show
that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity
action had been met and held that DNA testing should not
be allowed when the JESSE has failed to establish a prima
facie case.
At the risk of being repetitious, the CA stressed that it sees
the danger of allowing an absolute DNA testing to a
compulsory recognition test even if the plaintiff failed to
establish prima facie proof.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the CA erred when it essentially ruled that DNA
testing can only be ordered after JESSE has
established prima facie proof of filiation
2. W/N the CA erred with its misplaced reliance on the
case of Herrera v Alba, especially as regards the
Four Significant Procedural Aspects of a Paternity
Action
RULING:
Yes, a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can
issue a DNA testing order. However, it is not yet time to
discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-a-vis the motion for
DNA testing since no evidence has been presented yet.
Herrera v. Alba, misapplied.
U S C L A W | Page 7 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
The 4 Significant Procedural Aspects in a traditional paternity
case which parties have to face has been widely
misunderstood and misapplied in this case.
A party is confronted by these during trial, when the parties
have presented their respective evidence. They are matters
of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of
the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation
has been filed. The CA’s observation that JESSE failed to
establish a prima facie case is therefore, misplaced. A prima
facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere
allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for
conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and
integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate
court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application
of any person, who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after
due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the
following:
a. A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
b. A biological sample: (i) was not previously subject to the
type of DNA testing requested; or (ii) was previously
subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons
c. DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique
d. DNA testing has the scientific potential new information
that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case
e. Existence of other factors, if any, which the court may
consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity
of the DNA Testing.
This rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a
prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law
enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is
commenced. This does not mean, however, that a DNA
testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the
hearing the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing
order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the
applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or
good cause for the holding of the test. In these states, a
court order for blood testing is considered a search, which
under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by
a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility,
was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of
a probable cause.
The Court agrees and found that, as a preliminary matter,
before the court may issue an order for compulsory
blood testing, the moving party must show that there
is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained
hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party
to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a
show cause hearing must be held in which the court
can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance
of a court order for blood testing. The same condition
precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the
putative father from mere harrassment suits.
ATTY. TORREGOSA
Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA Testing,
JESSE must present prima facie evidence or establish a
reasonable possibility of paternity.
6. People v. Cabigquez
Keywords: Robbery and Rape in a Sari-Sari Store
Facts:
One evening, AAA and her 3 minor children BBB, CCC, and
DDD slept inside her small sari-sari store which was
annexed through the exterior balcony of her house. She
left the 50-watt incandescent bulb on as they slept through
the night.
At around 3:30am, AAA was awakened when clothes fell on
her face and when she looked up, she saw a man whose face
was covered with a handkerchief and wearing a camouflage
jacket and cycling shorts. He poked a gun at her and
screamed which awoke the children.
Despite the cover, BBB was able to identify him as Romulo
Grondiano, one of their neighbors based on the hanging
mole located below his left eye.
Armed with a stainless handgun, Grondiano ordered AAA and
her children to lie face down. He then ransacked the store,
taking with him P3k cash and P7k worth of grocery items.
His company then entered without anything to cover his
face, whom BBB identified as Juanito Cabigquez. Cabigquez
proceeded to ravish AAA in full view of her children.
Before leaving, the malefactors threatened to kill them if they
would tell anyone about the incident. However, shortly after
they left, AAA and her children went to the house of AAA’s
older son, EEE, and asked for help.
AAA failed to disclose the identities of the 2 assailants while
BBB, fearing retaliation decided not to divulge their identities.
That same morning, AAA reported the incident to the Police
Station. No criminal complaint, however was filed since AAA
was still uncertain of the identities. AAA was physically
examined and it revealed that the smear recovered from her
vagina was positive for spermatozoa. Further, a a two-
centimeter contusion on AAA’s left hand dorsum.
Two months after, Cabigquez and Grondiano were arrested
for Possession of illegal drugs. With them incarcerated and
now certain of their safety, BBB finally revealed their
identities and 2 informations were filed against them for
Robbery and Rape.
RTC, on motion by the defense, ordered the NBI to conduct
a DNA analysis on the sperm taken. However, the sample
collected from AAA did not match the DNA profile because
the specimen was merely a vaginal discharge.
Appellant’s contention
U S C L A W | Page 8 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
 It is significant that AAA did not recognize him and
his co-accused despite her familiarity.
 He questioned the accuracy and credibility of BBB’s
testimony given her failure to immediately divulge
the identity of the perpetrators after the incident.
BBB saw the accused several times after the alleged
crimes transpired and yet, she did not manifest any
alarm.
 Prosecution failed to establish conspiracy since BBB
did not actually see that Cabigquez was on the
balcony while the robbery was being committed.
RTC AND CA: Convicted them of the crimes charged and
adjudged them civilly liable for actual damages of P10k for
the stolen items and cash.
ISSUES
1. w/n the prosecution failed to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt since the dna test result
was negative
2. w/n the court erred in giving weight and credence
to the incredible and inconsistent testimony of the
witnesses
3. w/n there was conspiracy
4. w/n the court erred in awarding actual damages
since there was no basis for the actual cost of the
items taken from the store
RULING
1. No. Even if the specimen obtained from the vaginal
swabs and submitted to the NBI failed to match, the
commission of rape was clearly shown by
testimonial and documentary evidence. For
purposes of criminal investigation, DNA
identification is indeed a fertile source of both
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. In this case,
however, the result of the DNA test is rendered
inconclusive to exculpate or inculpate the appellant
since the sample tested merely contained vaginal
discharges. This, notwithstanding, the totality of
evidence satisfactorily established that it was indeed
appellant who raped AAA.
BBB’s testimony taken together with the medical
examination and AAA’s own declarations in court,
provides sufficient basis for the conviction.
A positive DNA match is unnecessary when the
totality of the evidence presented before the court
points to no other possible conclusion. It may
strengthen the evidence but an inconclusive DNA
test result may not be sufficient to exculpate the
accused.
2. No. Failure to immediately reveal the identity of a
perpetrator of a felony does not affect, must less,
impair, the credibility of witnesses , more so if such
delay is adequately explained.
3. Yes. Conspiracy was sufficiently proven by
circumstantial evidence on record as it was shown through
circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner
in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred upon the
acts of the accused themselves.
ATTY. TORREGOSA
No. The trial court has the power to take judicial notice of
the value of stolen goods because these are matters of public
knowledge or capable of unquestionable demonstration.
Judicial cognizance, which is based on considerations of
expediency and convenience, displace evidence since, being
equivalent to proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is
intended to achieve.
7. Air France v. Carrascoso
Keywords: White man must be given priority in the first-
class seat. Pinoy, only in Tourist class.
Facts:
In 1958, Rafael Carrascoso, a civil engineer and several other
Filipinos were tourists en-route to Rome from Manila.
Carrascoso was a member of a group of 48 Filipino Pilgrims
that left Manila for Lourdes. Carrascoso was issued a first-
class round-trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop--‐ over
in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of Air France
to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a
“better right” than him. Carrascoso protested but when
things got heated and upon advice of other Filipinos on
board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to
the plane’s tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the
Philippines, he sued Air France for damages for the
embarrassment he suffered during his trip.In court,
Carrascoso testified, among others, that when he was forced
to take the tourist class, he went to the plane’s pantry where
he was approached by a plane purser who told him that he
noted in the plane’s journal the following:
“First-‐ class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class
against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene.”
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The
trial court eventually awarded damages in favor of
Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the
CA. It avers that the ticket did not represent the true and
complete intent and agreement of the parties as Carrascoso
knew that said he did not have confirmed reservations for
first class, though he had tourist class protection, because
the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he
would have a first class ride as such was subject to
availability of first class seats.
Air France also contended that Carrascoso’s testimony
regarding the note made by the purser is inadmissible as
evidence as the testimony of the entry comes within the
proscription of the best evidence rule (BER).
Issues:
1. WON Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.
2. WON Air France’s contentions are with merit; more
particularly, does the entry in the notebook fall within the
prohibition of the BER?
Ruling:
U S C L A W | Page 9 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
1. YES. It appears that AF’s liability is based on Culpa-
Contractual.
Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between AF and
Carrascoso. There was a contract to furnish Carrascoso a
first-class passage. Second, the said contract was breached
when AF Failed to furnish first class transportation at
Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when AF’s
employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation berth “after he was already seated” and to
take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered
inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby
causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.
The SC did not give credence to AF’s claim that the issuance
of a first-class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that
he will be given a first-class seat. Such claim is simply
incredible.
Culpa Aquillana
Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of
carriage between AF and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous
act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract
merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by
the carrier’s employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and
due consideration. They are entitled to be projected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and
abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or
discourteous conduct on the part of the employees towards
a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against
the carrier. AF’s contract with Carrascoso is one attended
with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s action is placed
upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty
by the AF – a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
2. NO. No. Air France’s contentions are without merit as:
(1) adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable and an oral
evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket are
unreliable; and
(2) the testimony of the entry does not fall within the
prohibition of BER.
Nonetheless, such statements then, as provided by the
circumstances and environment of the case, are admissible
as part of the res gestae.
The court refused to believe the first contention of Air France
as to do so would give no security to the passenger and the
stability of the relations existent between a passenger and
carrier would be placed in the hollow hands of an airline.
Consequently, the spoken words or alleged oral evidence
tending to show the non--‐ guarantee of a first class ticket
must be refused.
Likewise, it is settled that when the subject of an
inquiry are the contents of a document, its original
must be presented as provided for under BER.
However, such prohibition does not apply in the
instant case because the subject of inquiry was not
the entry of the notebook made by the pursuer but
the ouster incident. Hence, the testimony of the entry is
admissible.
ATTY. TORREGOSA
Nonetheless, when the dialogue happened between
Carrascoso and the pursuer, the impact of the startling
occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The
excitement had not yet died down. Statements then, in this
environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. For,
they grow “out of the nervous excitement and mental and
physical condition of the declarant.” The utterance of the
pursuer regarding his entry in the notebook was
spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster
incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus
escapes the operation of the hearsay rule and forms part of
the res gestae.
In the instant case, it is without doubt that Carrascoso was
able to prove the contract and its subsequent breach by Air
France. Therefore, Carrascoso is entitled to the award for
damages.
8. People v. Tan
Keywords: Public officials made it appear that they
distributed relief goods when in truth and in fact, they didnt.
Instead, they falsified documents.
Doctrine: If the documents or papers to be introduced in
evidence were produced by the use of carbon sheets, and
which thereby produced a facsimile of the originals including
the figures and the signatures on the originals, they are
regarded as duplicate originals and may be introduced as
such, even without accounting for the non--‐ production of
the other originals.
Facts:
Respondents Pacita Madrigal--‐ Gonzales and others are
charged with the crime of falsification of public documents,
in their capacities as public officials and employees, by
having made it appear that certain relief supplies and/or
merchandise purchased for distribution to calamity indigents
or sufferers, when in fact and in truth, no such distributions
of such relief and supplies as valued and supposedly
purchased by said respondents in the public and official
documents had ever been made.
In order to prove the charge of falsification, the prosecution
presented to a witness a booklet of receipts, which contained
the triplicate copies, and according to said witness the
original invoices were sent to the Manila office of the
company, the duplicates to the customers, so that the
triplicate copies remained in the booklet.
However, Hon. Bienvenido M. Tan, then presiding in the
court below, interrupted the proceeding holding that the
triplicates are not admissible unless it is first proven that the
originals were lost and cannot be produced.
Issue: Whether or not the triplicates formed by the used of
carbon papers are admissible as evidence?
Ruling:
YES. The admissibility of duplicates or triplicates has long
been a settled question. This matter has received
consideration from the foremost commentator on the Rules
of Court thus:
U S C L A W | Page 10 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
"When carbon sheets are inserted between two or
more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of
a contract upon the outside sheet, including the
signature of the party to be charged thereby,
produces facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such
signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke
of the pen which made the surface or exposed
impression, all of the sheets so written on are
regarded as duplicate originals and either of them
may be introduced in evidence as such without
accounting for the nonproduction of the others.’
(Moran, 1952 ed., p. 444.)
Further, as the best evidence rule is that rule which requires
the highest grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed
fact. A "duplicate sales slip’ when made at the same time and
on the same machine as the original, are duplicate originals,
and these have been held to be as much primary evidence
as the originals.
9. People vs. Tandoy
Keywords: PHOTOCOPY OF THE MONEY WAS PRESENTED
AS EVIDENCE
Facts:
On May 27, 1986, at about 3:30 p.m. Lt. Salido, Jr. of the
Makati Police Station dispatched Pfc. Herino de la Cruz, and
Detectives Pablo R. Singayan, Nicanor Candolesas, Luisito de
la Cruz, Estanislao Dalumpines, Antonio Manalastas and
Virgilio Padua to conduct a buy-bust operation at Solchuaga
St., Barangay Singkamas, Makati.
The target area was a store along the said street, and
Singayan was to pose as the buyer. He stood alone near the
store waiting for any pusher to approach. The other
members of the team strategically positioned themselves.
Soon, three men approached Singayan. One of them was the
accused-appellant, who said without preamble: "Pare, gusto
mo bang umiskor?" Singayan said yes. The exchange was
made then and there — two rolls/pieces of marijuana for one
P10.00 and two P5.00 bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-
Narcotics Unit).
The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy. Manalastas
and Candolesas made a body search of the accused-
appellant and took from him the marked money, as well as
eight more rolls/foils of marijuana and crushed leaves.
The arresting officers brought Tandoy to the Office of the
Anti-Narcotics Unit, Makati Police Station, for investigation by
Detective Marvin Pajilan.
The accused-appellant chose to remain silent after having
been informed of his constitutional rights.
These events were narrated under oath by De la Cruz,
Singayan and Pajilan. Microscopic, chemical and
chromotographic examination was performed on the
confiscated marijuana by Raquel P. Angeles, forensic chemist
of the National Bureau of Investigation, who later testified
that the findings were positive. The marijuana was offered
as an exhibit.
ATTY. TORREGOSA
During the trial, presented as evidence is a photocopy of the
marked money used in the operation which was objected to
by the accused as it is not the original money and so is a
violation of the best evidence rule.
Issue: Whether or not the photocopy of the money
presented as evidence is a violation of the best evidence
rule?
Ruling:
No, Apparently, appellant erroneously thinks that said
marked money is an ordinary document falling under Sec. 2,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court which excludes the
introduction of secondary evidence except in the five (5)
instances mentioned therein.
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the
document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only
as to whether or not such document was actually executed,
or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding
its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible.
Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the
prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its
existence and not its contents, other substitutionary
evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore admissible
without the need of accounting for the original.
10. Compania Maritima v. Allied
KEYWORDS: AUDITOR’S REPORT; EVIDENCE
DOCTRINES: In this case, accountants' reports are
inadmissible in evidence. The rule that "when the original
consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and
the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole", the original writings need not
be produced (Sec. 2[e], Rule 130, Rules of Court)
cannot be applied in this case because the
voluminous character of the records, on which the
accountants' reports were based, was not duly
established
FACTS:
Since the onset in 1954 of litigation between the parties
herein, this is the fifth case between them that has been
elevated to this Court. The incidents preceding the instant
appeal are as follows:
On August 11, 1952 the Compañia Maritima and the Allied
Free Workers Union entered into a written contract whereby
the union agreed to perform arrastre and stevedoring work
for the company's vessels at Iligan City. The contract was to
be effective for one month counted from August 12, 1952.
It was stipulated that the company could revoke the contract
before the expiration of the term if the union failed to render
proper service. The contract could be renewed by agreement
of the parties.
At the time the contract was entered into, the union had just
been organized. Its primordial desire was to find work for its
members. The union agreed to the stipulation that the
U S C L A W | Page 11 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
company would not be liable for the payment of the services
of the union "for the loading, unloading and deliveries of
cargoes" and that the compensation for such services would
be paid "by the owners and consignees of the cargoes" as
"has been the practice in the port of Iligan City".
Despite that certification case, the company on August 24,
1954 served a written notice on the union that, in accordance
with paragraph 4 of the 1952 contract, the same would be
terminated on August 31, 1954. Because of that notice, the
union on August 26, 1954 filed in the CIR charges of unfair
labor practice against the company.
On August 31, 1954 the company entered into a new
stevedoring and arrastre contract with the Iligan Stevedoring
Association. On the following day, September 1, the union
members picketed the wharf and prevented the Iligan
Stevedoring Association from performing arrastre and
stevedoring work. The picket lasted for nine days. Because
of such, the plaintiff filed a case for damages and in support
presented reports of the accountants as evidence. The
defendant objected because such was in violation of the best
evidence rule.
ISSUE: Whether or not the presented reports was in
violation of the best evidence rule?
RULING:
Yes, The company argues that the accountants' reports are
admissible in evidence because of the rule that "when the
original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time
and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole", the original writings need not
be produced (Sec. 2[e], Rule 130, Rules of Court).
That rule cannot be applied in this case because the
voluminous character of the records, on which the
accountants' reports were based, was not duly established.
It is also a requisite for the application of the rule that the
records and accounts should be made accessible to the
adverse party so that the correctness of the summary may
be tested on cross-examination.
What applies to this case is the general rule "that an audit
made by, or the testimony of, a private auditor, is
inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records,
books of accounts, reports or the like".
11. The Consolidated Bank v. Del Monte Motor Works
DOCTRINE: The BEST EVIDENCE RULE under Rule 130,
Section 3, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is not
absolute and is not applicable to this case. BEST EVIDENCE
RULE applies only where the content of the document is the
subject of the inquiry
KEY PHRASES: You PROMISED me One Million+;
Inapplicability of Best Evidence Rule; Failure to specifically
deny the genuineness and due execution
FACTS:
Petitioner Consolidated Bank And Trust Corporation (CBTC)
filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money against
respondents for a loan amounting to One Million Pesos (P1,
ATTY. TORREGOSA
000,000) that was extended to the latter, as evidenced by a
promissory note, where the respondents defaulted in the
payment thereof.
Under the promissory note, respondents Del Monte Motor
Works, Inc. (Del Monte) and Morales bound themselves
jointly and severally to pay petitioner the full amount of the
loan through twenty-five monthly installments of P40,000.00
a month with interest pegged at 23% per annum. As the
respondents defaulted on their monthly installments, the full
amount of the loan became due and demandable pursuant
to the terms of the promissory note.
CBTC attached the following to their complaint:
1. A photocopy of the promissory note supposedly
executed by respondents;
2. A copy of the demand letter that it sent to the
respondents dated 20 January 1983, and statement of
account; and
3. A statement of account pertaining to respondents' loan.
During the trial, CBTC presented as its sole witness, Liberato
A. Lavarino (Lavarino), then the manager of its Collection
Department. Lavarino stated that respondents obtained the
loan, subject of this case, from petitioner and due to
respondents' failure to pay a single monthly installment on
this loan, petitioner was constrained to send a demand letter
to respondents; that as a result of this demand letter,
Jeannette Tolentino (Tolentino), Del Monte's controller,
wrote a letter to petitioner requesting for some consideration
because of the unfavorable business atmosphere then
buffeting their business operation; that Tolentino enclosed to
said letter a check with a face value of P220,020.00 to be
discounted by petitioner with the proceeds being applied as
partial payment to their company's obligation to petitioner;
that after receipt of this partial payment, respondents'
obligation again became stagnant prompting petitioner to
serve respondents with another demand letter which,
unfortunately, was unheeded by respondents.
CBTC made its formal offer of evidence. However, as the
original copy of the promissory note could no longer be
found, CBTC instead sought the admission of the duplicate
original of the promissory note which was identified and
marked as Exhibit E, which the trial court initially admitted
into evidence Exhibit E.
Del Monte filed a manifestation and motion for
reconsideration of the trial court’s order admitting into
evidence Exhibit E, claiming among others that it could not
possibly be considered an original copy of the original copy
of the promissory note.
Respondents separately filed their motions to dismiss on the
similar ground that with the exclusion of Exhibits A and E,
petitioner no longer possessed any proof of respondents
alleged indebtedness.
RULING OF THE LOWER COURTS:
The case before the trial court was dismissed, and was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
U S C L A W | Page 12 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
ISSUE: Whether or not the application of the BEST
EVIDENCE RULE, which led to the exclusion of Exhibit E was
proper.
RULING:
NO. The BEST EVIDENCE RULE under Rule 130, Section 3,
of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is not absolute and is
not applicable to this case. It applies only when what is in
dispute or the subject of the inquiry is the contents of a
document.
Bearing in mind that the risk of mistransmission of the
contents of a writing is the justification for the "best evidence
rule," we declare that this rule finds no application to this
case. It should be noted that respondents never disputed the
terms and conditions of the promissory note thus leaving us
to conclude that as far as the parties herein are concerned,
the wording or content of said note is clear enough and
leaves no room for disagreement. In their responsive
pleadings, respondents' principal defense rests on the
alleged lack of consideration of the promissory note. In
addition, respondent Morales also claims that he did not sign
the note in his personal capacity. These contentions clearly
do not question the "precise wording" of the promissory note
which should have paved the way for the application of the
"best evidence rule."
Besides, the "best evidence rule" is not absolute. As quoted
earlier, the rule accepts of exceptions. One of which is when
the original of the subject document is in the possession of
the adverse party. As pointed out by petitioner in its motion
to inhibit, had it been given the opportunity by the court a
quo, it would have sufficiently established that the original of
Exhibit "A" was in the possession of respondents which would
have called into application one of the exceptions to the "best
evidence rule."
Moreover, Section 8 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 8. How to contest such documents. — When an action
or defense is founded upon a written instrument, xxx the
genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath,
specifically denies them and sets forth what he claims to be
the facts; xxx
Significantly, respondents failed to deny specifically the
execution of the promissory note. This being the case, there
was no need for petitioner to present the original of the
promissory note in question. Their judicial admission with
respect to the genuineness and execution of the promissory
note sufficiently established their liability to petitioner
regardless of the fact that petitioner failed to present the
original of said note. Indeed, when the defendant fails to
deny specifically and under oath the due execution and
genuineness of a document copied in a complaint, the
plaintiff need not prove that fact as it is considered admitted
by the defendant.
ATTY. TORREGOSA
12. Arceo vs. PEOPLE
KEY PHRASES: 2 Loans, 1 Worthless Check; Lost Check and
Return Slip; No need to present check to sustain a conviction
under B.P. 22; Inapplicability of best evidence rule
DOCTRINE: Rule 130, Section 3, of the Rules of Court,
otherwise known as the BEST EVIDENCE RULE applies only
where the content of the document is the subject of the
inquiry. Where the issue is the execution or existence of the
document or the circumstances surrounding its execution,
the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial
evidence is admissible.
FACTS:
On March 14, 1991, petitioner Arceo, obtained a loan from
private complainant Josefino Cenizal in the amount of
P100,000.00. Several weeks thereafter, Arceo obtained an
additional loan of P50,000.00 from Cenizal. Petitioner then
issued in favor of Cenizal, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)
Check No. 163255, post dated August 4, 1991, for
P150,000.00, at Cenizal’s house. When August 4, 1991 came,
Cenizal did not deposit the check immediately because Arceo
promised that he would replace the check with cash. Such
promise was made verbally seven (7) times. When his
patience ran out, Cenizal brought the check to the bank for
encashment. The head office of the Bank of the Philippine
Islands through a letter dated December 5, 1991, informed
Cenizal that the check bounced because of insufficient funds.
Thereafter, Cenizal went to the house of petitioner to inform
him of the dishonor of the check but Cenizal found out that
Arceo had left the place. So, Cenizal referred the matter to a
lawyer who wrote a letter giving Arceo three days from
receipt thereof to pay the amount of the check. Arceo still
failed to make good the amount of the check.
As a consequence, Cenizal executed before the office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City his affidavit and submitted
documents in support of his complaint for estafa and
violation of BP 22 against Arceo. After due investigation, this
case for violation of BP 22 was filed against Arceo. The check
in question and the return slip were however lost by Cenizal
as a result of a fire that occurred near his residence. Cenizal
executed an Affidavit of Loss regarding the loss of the check
in question and the return slip.
RULING OF THE LOWER COURTS:
After trial, petitioner was found guilty as charged. Aggrieved,
he appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate
court affirmed the trial court’s decision in toto. Petitioner
sought reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, this petition.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
Petitioner claims that the trial and appellate courts erred in
convicting him despite the failure of the prosecution to
present the dishonored check during the trial. He also
contends that he should not be held liable for the dishonor
of the check because it was presented beyond the 90-day
period provided under the law. Petitioner further questions
his conviction since the notice requirement was not complied
with and he was given only three days to pay, not five
banking days as required by law. Finally, petitioner asserts
that he had already paid his obligation to Cenizal.
U S C L A W | Page 13 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
ISSUE:
Whether ARCEO should be convicted of the violation of BP
22 notwithstanding the fact that the prosecution failed to
present the dishonored check during trial
RULING:
YES. ARCEO’s insistence on the presentation of the check in
evidence as a condition sine qua non for conviction under BP
22 is wrong. He anchors his argument on Rule 130, Section
3, of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the BEST
EVIDENCE RULE.
However, the rule applies only where the content of the
document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is
the execution or existence of the document or the
circumstances surrounding its execution, the best evidence
rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing
a worthless check. Hence, the subject of the inquiry is the
fact of issuance or execution of the check, not its content.
Here, the due execution and existence of the check were
sufficiently established:
●CENIZAL testified that he presented the originals of the
check, the return slip and other pertinent documents before
the Office of the City Prosecutor when he executed his
complaint-affidavit during the preliminary investigation.
 PACIFICO MARQUEZ, FILOMENO and GREGORIO, both
●The City Prosecutor found prima facie case against ARCEO
for violation of BP 22 and filed the corresponding information
based on the documents.
Although the check and the return slip were among the
documents lost by Cenizal in a fire that occurred near his
residence, he was nevertheless able to adequately establish
the due execution, existence and loss of the check and the
return slip in an affidavit of loss as well as in his testimony
during the trial of the case.
The trial court found that, contrary to petitioner’s claim,
Cenizal’s counsel had informed petitioner in writing of the
check’s dishonor and demanded payment of the value of the
check. Despite receipt of the notice of dishonor and demand
for payment, petitioner still failed to pay the amount of the
check.
Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the period of
five banking days from receipt of notice of dishonor within
which to pay the amount of the check. While petitioner may
have been given only three days to pay the value of the
check, the trial court found that the amount due thereon
remained unpaid even after five banking days from his
receipt of the notice of dishonor. This negated his claim that
he had already paid Cenizal and should therefore be relieved
of any liability.
Cenizal’s presentment of the check to the drawee bank 120
days (four months) after its issue was still within the
allowable period. Petitioner was freed neither from the
obligation to keep sufficient funds in his account nor from
liability resulting from the dishonor of the check.
Moreover, petitioner’s claim of payment was nothing more
than a mere allegation. He presented no proof to support it.
If indeed there was payment, petitioner should have
ATTY. TORREGOSA
redeemed or taken the check back in the ordinary course of
business. Instead, the check remained in the possession of
the payee who demanded the satisfaction of petitioner’s
obligation when the check became due as well as when the
check was dishonored by the drawee bank.
These findings (due notice to petitioner and non-payment of
the obligation) were confirmed by the appellate court. This
Court has no reason to rule otherwise. Well-settled is the rule
that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by
the appellate court, are not to be disturbed.
13. Heirs of Teodoro Dela Cruz v. CA
KEYWORDS: Photocopy of Carbon Copy; Deed of Sale;
Prescription
DOCTRINE: Before secondary evidence can be presented,
all duplicates and/or counterparts must be accounted for,
and no excuse for the non-production of the original
document itself can be regarded as established until all its
parts are unavailable.
FACTS:
In 1986, HEIRS OF TEODORO DELA CRUZ represented by
EDRONEL DELA CRUZ, the petitioners, filed an action for
reconveyance with damages against private respondents
surnamed MADRID, involving a parcel of land situated in
Poblacion, San Mateo, Isabela.
In their complaint, petitioners assert that the subject land
was bought by their predecessor-in-interest from the private
respondents, Madrid brothers, that a deed of sale was
executed on May 18, 1959, and that since then, they have
been in actual, physical, continuous and open possession of
the property. However, sometime in October 1986, much to
their dismay and surprise, private respondents managed to
obtain a Torrens Title over the said land.
On the other hand, the Madrids denied having executed the
said deed of sale and assuming that said document exists,
the same is fictitious and falsified. Meanwhile, Pacifico
Marquez contends that he is an innocent purchaser for value
of the property having bought the same from the Madrid
brothers in 1976.
During the trial, petitioners were unable to present the
original deed of sale since it was lost. Consequently, they
were constrained to offer a photocopy of the purported
original carbon copy of the deed of sale as “Exhibit A”, in an
effort to prove the transaction.
RTC: Exhibit A was inadmissible as evidence. Case was
dismissed.
Since at the time of the execution of Teodoro dela Cruz'
affidavit, a duplicate original carbon copy of the alleged sale
was still in his possession, the plaintiffs must have to account
for it. No proof was adduced that this remaining copy was
lost or destroyed. Furthermore, no attempt was done to
produce the copies retained by the notary public although
there is a possibility that the same still exist. Neither was
there any proof that the copy sent to the court as required
by the notarial law is unavailable. Under these facts, the
U S C L A W | Page 14 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
Court believes that the 'xerox copy of a certified true copy of
the original issued by the notary public cannot be admitted
in evidence to prove the conveyance of the land in question.
CA: Exhibit A was admissible as evidence for failure of the
private respondents to object when it was offered during the
trial.
Had the defendants interposed an objection to Exh. "A" on
the ground of its incompetency for not complying with the
best evidence rule, it would have been properly excluded by
the trial court. Defendants' omission to object on the proper
ground operated as a waiver, as this was a matter resting on
their discretion
However, while CA ruled that Exhibit A was admissible, it
concluded that the same had no probative value to support
the allegation of the petitioners that the disputed land was
sold to them in 1959. Thus:
The lone fact that Atty. Tabangay asserted that he
recognized his signature on the copy shown by Teodoro
when the loss of the originals was just made known to him,
does not render Exh. A trustworthy as to the actual execution
of the alleged deed of sale. Exh. A does not even contain a
reproduction of the alleged signatures of the Madrid brothers
for comparison purposes. The surviving witness to the
alleged execution, Constantino Balmoja was not presented to
corroborate Atty. Tabangays testimony, hinged as the latter
was on secondary evidence.
Hence, the case was still dismissed by CA.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Exhibit A does prove that the sale of the land
indeed occurred. (evidence related issue)
2. Who among the parties are the lawful owners of the
disputed land.
RULING:
1. Exhibit A failed to prove the fact of sale.
To begin with, Atty. Sevillano Tabangay, the notary public
who notarized the deed of sale, testified that the document
has about five (5) copies. Hence, it is imperative that all the
originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence
can be presented. These, the petitioners failed to do.
Moreover, records show that none of these five copies was
even presented during the trial. Petitioners explanation that
these copies were lost or could not be found in the National
Archives was not even supported by any certification from
the said office.
It is a well-settled principle that before secondary
evidence can be presented, all duplicates and/or
counterparts must be accounted for, and no excuse
for the non-production of the original document itself
can be regarded as established until all its parts are
unavailable.
Notwithstanding this procedural lapse, when Exhibit A was
presented, private respondents failed, not only to object, but
even to cross-examine the notary public, Atty. Tabangay,
regarding its execution. Because of this failure to object, the
ATTY. TORREGOSA
same becomes primary evidence. To be sure, even if Exhibit
A is admitted in evidence, the SC agreed with the Court of
Appeals that its probative value must still meet the various
tests by which its reliability is to be determined. Its tendency
to convince and persuade must be considered for
admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its
probative value.
As earlier stated, Exhibit A was merely a photocopy lifted
from the carbon copy of the alleged deed of sale. A cursory
glance will immediately reveal that it was unsigned by any of
the parties and undated as to when it was executed. Worse,
when Atty. Tabangay typed Exhibit A, the contents were
based on an alleged carbon original which petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest presented to him, without bothering
to check his own files to verify the correctness of the contents
of the document he was copying. In other words, Atty.
Tabangays failure to determine the accuracy of the carbon
copy requested by the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest
renders Exhibit A unreliable. However, all is not lost for the
petitioner.
2. Petitioners are the lawful owners of the land.
The records show that the disputed property has been in the
possession of the petitioners since 1959. They have since
been introducing several improvements on the land which
certainly could not have escaped the attention of the
Madrids. Furthermore, during all this time, the land was
enclosed, there was construction of various infrastructure on
the land was undoubtedly a clear exercise of ownership
which the Madrids could not ignore. Oddly, not one of them
protested.
The SC did not accept the Madrids explanation that they did
not demand the petitioners to vacate the land due to the
unexplained killings within the area. Not a single shred of
evidence was presented to show that these killings were
perpetrated by the petitioners. Hence, it was pure
speculation. To make matters worse, the record is bereft of
any documentary evidence that the Madrids sent a written
demand to the petitioners ordering them to vacate the land.
Next, the fact that the Madrids were able to secure titles, did
not operate to vest upon them ownership of the property.
The Torrens system does not create or vest title. It has never
been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership,
especially considering the fact that both the Madrids and
Marquezes obtained their respective TCTs only in October
1986, twenty-seven long (27) years after petitioners first
took possession of the land. If the Madrids and Marquezes
wished to assert their ownership, they should have filed a
judicial action for recovery of possession and not merely to
have the land registered under their respective names.
Even if we were to rule that the Certificates of Title to the
private respondents would ripen into ownership of the land,
and therefore, the defense of prescription would be
unavailing, still, the petitioners would have acquired title to
it by virtue of the equitable principle of laches. The Madrids
long inaction or passivity in asserting their rights over
disputed property will preclude them from recovering the
same.
Lastly, Marquez claim that he is a purchaser in good faith and
for value does not inspire any merit. Curiously, in his Answer,
U S C L A W | Page 15 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
he stated that he has been aware that the former were in
possession of the land since 1959. Being aware of the
petitioner’s possession, he cannot claim to be a buyer in good
faith.
DECISION: Exhibit A presented by the petitioners was
inadmissible but the by virtue of prescription, the petitioners
are held to be the owner of the land.
14. Meyers vs. United States
KEYWORDS: TTs (Testimony and Transcript);
Perjury; Best Evidence Rule
DOCTRINES:
 The best evidence rule does not apply in the case
because there was no dispute over the contents of
the transcript. The best evidence rule is limited to
cases where the contents of writing are to be
proved.
 Statements alleged to be perjurious may be proved
by any person who heard them, as well as by a
reporter who recorded them in shorthand.
FACTS:
Bleriot H. Lamarre and the appellant, Bennett E. Meyers,
were jointly indicted for violating the District of
Columbia statute which denounces perjury and
subornation. Meyers was an officer in the United States
Army. In 1939, while stationed at Wright Field, near Dayton,
Ohio, he organized under the laws of Ohio a corporation
called Aviation Electric Corporation. Meyers had become
acquainted with Lamarre and his wife as early as 1936 or
1937. Late in 1939, he went to see Lamarre in California and
suggested that the latter come to Dayton to become
associated with Aviation Electric (a corporation organized by
Meyers). The invitation was accepted and in January, 1940,
Lamarre was made secretary-treasurer of the corporation,
and a certificate for 224 shares was transferred to him
without valuable consideration. A few months thereafter he
became President of the company.
From its modest beginning in 1939 the operations of Aviation
Electric Corporation expanded substantially and rapidly. It
obtained contracts to furnish parts to large corporations
engaged in producing aircraft for the United States Army.
Meyers advanced considerable sums for working capital and
took therefor the company's promissory notes which were
secured by the pledge and delivery to him of certificates,
endorsed in blank, evidencing all its capital stock. Large
profits were earned as long as the war continued, until it was
dissolved.
The United States Senate created the investigating
committee to ascertain whether there had been instances of
waste, fraud, corruption, mismanagement, excessive profits
or inefficiency in the nation's war effort. In the course of an
inquiry into government contracts with a large airplane
supplier, the appellant (Meyers) testified before that
committee. It developed during the hearing that Aviation
Electric Corporation had been a sub-contractor on
government work and that Lamarre had been its
President from 1940 until its dissolution in 1946.
ATTY. TORREGOSA
The subcommittee subpoenaed Lamarre, who testified.
Appellant's insistence that Lamarre committed the perjury is
based on the fact that Lamarre was asked this question, "So
you understood all of the time that for all practical
purposes, he [Meyers] owned the business?"; and that
Lamarre answered by saying, "That is right," and then
continued with other statements to that effect. Yet, in the
course of the subcommittee counsel's examination, Lamarre
made the opposite statements, upon which the appellant
now relies as a defense to the first count.
The setting in which the statement appears shows that in
making it, Lamarre was referring to the occasion in 1940
when a large part of the stock had just been transferred to
him and endorsed back to Meyers to serve as collateral.
When Lamarre was asked, "It [the stock] belonged to
Meyers all the time?", he answered, "No, sir, it did not."
He was then asked, "Well, then, when did it become
yours, actually yours?" and he replied, "When the notes
were paid off." He added, "It had always been mine as
a matter of fact." Thus, Lamarre testified under oath
that Mr. Meyers had no financial interest or has no
connection to Aviation Electric Corporation. At other
point of his testimony, he also made a contradictory claim
that indeed Mr. Meyer had financial interest in the
corporation or otherwise has substantial interest in the
corporation.
Because of the allegedly perjurious testimony of Mr.
Lamarre, he was charged with three counts of perjury for
falsely denying that Mr. Meyers had interest in the company
when in truth and in fact, Mr. Meyers has financial interest in
the corporation.
During the arraignment, Lamarre pleaded guilty to the
charge of perjury made against him. Moreover, he also
testified fully and freely at Meyers' trial that he had knowingly
and willfully falsified in that respect before the
subcommittee, and that in fact Meyers was at all times the
real owner of the company.
Meyers' subordination of this perjury was proved by
the evidence of Lamarre that on the day before his first
appearance before the subcommittee, Meyers instructed
him (Lamarre) to swear that "Meyers had no financial
interest or any other interest other than the money that he
had loaned to the corporation and which had been repaid to
him by the middle of 1942." The evidence showed that
Lamarre actually made the statements and representations
to the subcommittee; that his testimony was false and was
given knowingly and willfully; and that Meyers suborned the
perjury.
In relation to the best evidence rule (BER), a certain
Justice of the present case argued that the testimony of the
special counsel on the perjurious statement of Mr. Lamarre
should not have been admitted under the BER. The
testimony given by the special counsel came about during
trial of Mr. Meyers—in order to prove that the crime of
subordination of perjury was committed. To prove this fact,
the prosecution presented the special counsel
namely, William P. Rogers (Rogers), the chief counsel
to the senatorial committee, who had examined
Lamarre before the subcommittee and consequently
U S C L A W | Page 16 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
had heard all the testimony given by him before that
body. He was permitted to testify as to what Lamarre
had sworn to the subcommittee. Later in the trial, the
government introduced in evidence a stenographic
transcript of Lamarre's testimony at the senatorial
hearing. No party objected to the testimony of the
special counsel and this was not raised as a defense
by the accused. In his brief here the appellant characterizes
this as a "bizarre procedure" but does not assign as error the
reception of Rogers' testimony.
The dissenting opinion, however, asserts it was
reversible error to allow Rogers to testify at all as to
what Lamarre had said to the subcommittee, on the theory
that the transcript itself was the best evidence of
Lamarre's testimony before the subcommittee.
ISSUE: WON the testimony of the special counsel is
inadmissible under the best evidence rule?
RULING: The testimony of the special counsel was
admissible.
The majority of the Justices disagreed with the dissenting
justice. The best evidence rule does not apply in the
case because there was no dispute over the contents
of the transcript. As applied generally in federal courts,
the best evidence rule is limited to cases where the
contents of writing are to be proved.
Here, there was no attempt to prove the contents of a
writing; the issue was what Lamarre had said, not
what the transcript contained. The transcript made from
shorthand notes of his testimony was, to be sure, evidence
of what he had said, but it was not the only admissible
evidence concerning it.
Rogers' testimony was equally competent, and was
admissible whether given before or after the
transcript was received in evidence. Statements alleged
to be perjurious may be proved by any person who heard
them, as well as by a reporter who recorded them in
shorthand.
A somewhat similar situation was presented in Herzig v. Swift
& Co., 146 F.2d 444, decided by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1945. In that case the trial
court had excluded oral testimony concerning the earnings
of a partnership on the ground that the books of account
were the best evidence. After pointing out the real nature
and scope of the best evidence rule, the court said:
“Here there was no attempt to prove the contents
of a writing; the issue was the earnings of a
partnership, which for convenience were recorded
in books of account after the relevant facts
occurred. The federal courts have generally
adopted the rationale limiting the best
evidence rule to cases where the contents of
the writing are to be proved. We hold,
therefore, that the district judge erred in
excluding the oral testimony as to the
earnings of the partnership."
ATTY. TORREGOSA
With the best evidence rule shown to be inapplicable,
it is clearly seen that it was neither "preposterously
unfair", as the appellant asserts, nor unfair at all, to
permit the transcript of Lamarre's evidence to be
introduced after Rogers had testified. Since both
methods of proving the perjury were permissible, the
prosecution could present its proof in any order it chose.
There is also no substance in the criticism, voiced by the
appellant and in the dissent, of the fact that Rogers testified
early in the unduly protracted trial and the transcript was
introduced near its close. Appellant's counsel had a copy of
the transcript from the second day of the trial, and had full
opportunity to study it and to cross-examine Rogers in the
light of that study. The mistaken notion that, had the
transcript been first put in evidence, Rogers'
testimony would have been incompetent is, of
course, based on the erroneous idea that the best
evidence rule had application. Since the Court perceives
no prejudicial error in appellant's trial, the judgment entered
pursuant to the jury's verdict will not be disturbed.
15. Seiler vs. Lucas Film LTD
Keywords: Copycat; striders; best evidence rule; original
document
Doctrine: The best evidence rule embodied in Rules 1001-
1008 represented a codification of longstanding common law
doctrine. Dating back to 1700, the rule requires not, as its
common name implies, the best evidence in every case but
rather the production of an original document instead of a
copy.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Seiler, a graphic artist and a science fiction
character creator, claims that he created and published in
1976 and 1977 science fiction creatures called Garthian
Striders. In 1980, George Lucas released The Empire Strikes
Back, a motion picture that contains a battle sequence
depicting giant machines called Imperial Walkers. In 1981
Seiler obtained a copyright on his Striders, depositing with
the Copyright Office "reconstructions" of the originals as they
had appeared in 1976 and 1977.
Seiler claims that George Lucas copied his “Striders” which
he published in 1976 and 1977, while Lucas claims that Seiler
only obtained copyright protection one year after the release
of “The Empire Strikes Back”; Lucas further contends that
Seiler cannot produce documents that antedate “The Empire
Strikes Back”.
During trial in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, Seiler proposed to exhibit his
Striders in a blow-up comparison to Lucas' Walkers at
opening statement, the district judge held an evidentiary
hearing on the admissibility of the "reconstructions" of
Seiler's Striders. Applying the "best evidence rule," Federal
Rules of Evidence 1001-1008, the district court found at the
end of a seven-day hearing that Seiler lost or destroyed the
originals in bad faith under Rule 1004(1) and that
consequently no secondary evidence, such as the post-
Empire Strikes Back reconstructions, was admissible. In its
opinion the court found specifically that Seiler testified
U S C L A W | Page 17 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
falsely, purposefully destroyed or withheld in bad faith the
originals, and fabricated and misrepresented the nature of
his reconstructions.
The district court granted summary judgment to Lucas after
the evidentiary hearing.
Seiler now contends 1) that the best evidence rule does not
apply to his works, 2) that if the best evidence rule does
apply, Rule 1008 requires a jury determination of the
existence and authenticity of his originals, and 3) that 17
U.S.C. 410(c) of the copyright laws overrides the Federal
Rules of Evidence and mandates admission of his secondary
evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the best evidence rule applies in this
case?
HELD:
1. Application of the best evidence rule.
The best evidence rule embodied in Rules 1001-1008
represented a codification of longstanding common law
doctrine. Dating back to 1700, the rule requires not, as its
common name implies, the best evidence in every case but
rather the production of an original document instead of a
copy. Many commentators refer to the rule not as the best
evidence rule but as the original document rule.
Rule 1002 states: "To prove the content of a writing,
recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or
photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in
these rules or by Act of Congress." Writings and recordings
are defined in Rule 1001 as "letters, words, or numbers, or
their equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting,
printing, photostating, photographing, magnetic impulse,
mechanical or electronic recording, or other form of data
compilation."
The Advisory Committee Note supplies the following gloss:
Traditionally the rule requiring the original document is
centered upon accumulations of data and expressions
affecting legal relations set forth in words and figures. This
meant that the rule was one essentially related to writings.
Present day techniques have expanded methods of storing
data, yet the essential form which the information ultimately
assumes for usable purposes is words and figures. Hence the
considerations underlying the rule dictate its expansion to
include computers, photographic systems, and other modern
developments.
Some treatises, whose approach seems more historical than
rigorously analytic, opine without support from any cases
that the rule is limited to words and figures.
We hold that Seiler's drawings were "writings" within the
meaning of Rule 1001(1); they consist not of "letters, words,
or numbers" but of "their equivalent." To hold otherwise
would frustrate the policies underlying the rule and introduce
undesirable inconsistencies into the application of the rule.
In the days before liberal rules of discovery and modern
techniques of electronic copying, the rule guarded against
incomplete or fraudulent proof. By requiring the possessor of
the original to produce it, the rule prevented the introduction
ATTY. TORREGOSA
of altered copies and the withholding of originals. The
modern justification for the rule has expanded from
prevention of fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a
central position in the law. When the contents of a writing
are at issue, oral testimony as to the terms of the writing is
subject to a greater risk of error than oral testimony as to
events or other situations. The human memory is not often
capable of reciting the precise terms of a writing, and when
the terms are in dispute only the writing itself, or a true copy,
provides reliable evidence. Viewing the dispute in the context
of the concerns underlying the best evidence rule, we
conclude that the rule applies.
McCormick summarizes the rule as follows:
[I]n proving the terms of a writing, where the terms are
material, the original writing must be produced unless it is
shown to be unavailable for some reason other than the
serious fault of the proponent.
The contents of Seiler's work are at issue. There can be no
proof of "substantial similarity" and thus of copyright
infringement unless Seiler's works are juxtaposed with Lucas'
and their contents compared. Since the contents are material
and must be proved, Seiler must either produce the original
or show that it is unavailable through no fault of his own.
Rule 1004(1). This he could not do.
The facts of this case implicate the very concerns that justify
the best evidence rule. Seiler alleges infringement by The
Empire Strikes Back, but he can produce no documentary
evidence of any originals existing before the release of the
movie. His secondary evidence does not consist of true
copies or exact duplicates but of "reconstructions" made
after The Empire Strikes Back. In short, Seiler claims that the
movie infringed his originals, yet he has no proof of those
originals. Seiler argues that the best evidence rule does not
apply to his work, in that it is artwork rather than "writings,
recordings, or photographs." He contends that the rule both
historically and currently embraces only words or numbers.
Neither party has referred us to cases which discuss the
applicability of the rule to drawings.
To recognize Seiler's works as writings does not, as Seiler
argues, run counter to the rule's preoccupation with the
centrality of the written word in the world of legal relations.
Just as a contract objectively manifests the subjective intent
of the makers, so Seiler's drawings are objective
manifestations of the creative mind. The copyright laws give
legal protection to the objective manifestations of an artist's
ideas, just as the law of contract protects through its
multifarious principles the meeting of minds evidenced in the
contract. Comparing Seiler's drawings with Lucas' drawings
is no different in principle than evaluating a contract and the
intent behind it. Seiler's "reconstructions" are "writings" that
affect legal relations; their copyrightability attests to that.
A creative literary work, which is artwork, and a photograph
whose contents are sought to be proved, as in copyright,
defamation, or invasion of privacy, are both covered by the
best evidence rule. We would be inconsistent to apply the
rule to artwork which is literary or photographic but not to
artwork of other forms. Furthermore, blueprints, engineering
drawings, architectural designs may all lack words or
numbers yet still be capable of copyright and susceptible to
U S C L A W | Page 18 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
fraudulent alteration. In short, Seiler's argument would have
us restrict the definitions of Rule 1001(1) to "words" and
"numbers" but ignore "or their equivalent." We will not do so
in the circumstances of this case.
Our holding is also supported by the policy served by the best
evidence rule in protecting against faulty memory. Seiler's
reconstructions were made four to seven years after the
alleged originals; his memory as to specifications and
dimensions may have dimmed significantly. Furthermore,
reconstructions made after the release of the Empire Strikes
Back may be tainted, even if unintentionally, by exposure to
the movie. Our holding guards against these problems.
2. Rule 1008.
As we hold that the district court correctly concluded that the
best evidence rule applies to Seiler's drawings, Seiler was
required to produce his original drawings unless excused by
the exceptions set forth in Rule 1004. The pertinent
subsection is 1004(1), which provides:
The original is not required, and other evidence of the
contents of a writing, recording, or photograph is admissible
if--
(1) Originals lost or destroyed. All originals are
lost or have been destroyed, unless the proponent
lost or destroyed them in bad faith ...
In the instant case, prior to opening statement, Seiler
indicated that he planned to show to the jury reconstructions
of his "Garthian Striders" during the opening statement. The
trial judge would not allow items to be shown to the jury until
they were admitted in evidence. Seiler's counsel reiterated
that he needed to show the reconstructions to the jury during
his opening statement. Hence, the court excused the jury
and held a seven-day hearing on their admissibility. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge found that the
reconstructions were inadmissible under the best evidence
rule as the originals were lost or destroyed in bad faith. This
finding is amply supported by the record.
16. Heirs of Margarita Prodon v. Heirs of Maximo
Alvarez
Keywords: Quieting of title; best evidence rule
Doctrine: The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the
terms of a written document are the subject of the inquiry.
In an action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of
a deed of sale with right to repurchase that purportedly cast
a cloud on the title of a property, therefore, the Best
Evidence Rule does not apply, and the defendant is not
precluded from presenting evidence other than the original
document.
FACTS:
The Heirs of Alvarez and Valentina Clave claimed that they
could not locate the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797
pertaining to the land they inherited from their parents, that
the entry of the deed of sale with right to repurchase on the
original TCT did not exist, and that the entry ad been
maliciously done by Prodon. Prodon claimed otherwise that
the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had executed the deed of sale
with right to repurchase, registered and duly annotated in
ATTY. TORREGOSA
the TCT. Also, she had become the absolute owner thereof
due to its non-repurchase.
The custodian of the records of the property attested that
the copy of the deed of sale with the right of repurchase
could not be found in the files of the Register of Deeds of
Manila.
The RTC ruled in favor of Prodon, finding that although the
deed itself could not be presented as evidence in court, its
contents could nevertheless be proved by secondary
evidence in accordance with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, upon proof of its execution or existence and of the
cause of its unavailability being without bad faith when
Prodon swore that she purchased the land and her testimony
has been confirmed by the Notarial Register and the Primary
Entry Book of the RoD of Manila.
The CA reversed the decision; “…a party must first present
to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for
non-production of the original instrument. The correct order
of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, contents,
although the court in its discretion may change this order if
necessary.”
ISSUE: Whether the pre-requisites for the admission of
secondary evidence had been complied with.
HELD:
Yes. This action does not involve the terms or contents of the
deed of sale with right of repurchase. The principal issue was
whether or not it had really existed.
The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms
of a written document the original of the document must be
produced in court. The rule excludes any evidence other than
the original writing to prove the contents thereof, unless the
offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the
original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the
reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the absence
of bad faith on the part of the offer or to which the
unavailability of the original can be attributed.
The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure
that the exact contents of a writing are brought before the
court, considering that (a) the precision in presenting to the
court the exact words of the writing is of more than average
importance, particularly as respects operative or dispositive
instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, because a
slight variation in words may mean a great difference in
rights; (b) there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the
human process of making a copy by handwriting or
typewriting; and (c) as respects oral testimony purporting to
give from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special
risk of error, greater than in the case of attempts at
describing other situations generally. The rule further acts as
an insurance against fraud. Verily, if a party is in the
possession of the best evidence and withholds it, and seeks
to substitute inferior evidence in its place, the presumption
naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld for
fraudulent purposes that its production would expose and
defeat. Lastly, the rule protects against misleading inferences
resulting from the intentional or unintentional introduction of
selected portions of a larger set of writings.
U S C L A W | Page 19 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a
writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be
introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence,
execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its
terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In such a
case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without
accounting for the original. This case involves an action for
quieting of title which may be based on the fact that a deed
is invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. The terms
of the writing may or may not be material to an action for
quieting of title, depending on the ground alleged by the
plaintiff.
17. De Vera v. Aguilar
Keywords: “Siblings fight over a piece of land”
Doctrine: Secondary evidence is admissible when the
original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior
to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the
proponent must first establish the existence, execution, loss,
and contents of the original document.
Facts:
Petitioners and respondent Leona are the children and heirs
of the late Marcosa Bernabe. In her lifetime, Marcosa
Bernabe owned the disputed parcel of land situated in
Bulacan.
The disputed property was mortgaged by petitioners Basilio
and Felipe to a certain Atty. Bordador. When the mortgage
had matured, the respondents redeemed the property from
Atty. Bordador and in turn Marcosa sold the same to them as
evidenced by a deed of absolute sale. The respondents then
registered the deed resulting in the cancellation of the tax
declaration in the name of Marcosa and the issuance of
another in the name of the Aguilars. Since then and up to
the present, the Aguilars have been paying taxes on the land.
Later on, respondent Mariano was issued a free patent to the
land on the basis of which an OCT was issued in his name.
Petitioners wrote to the respondents claiming that as children
of Marcosa, they were co-owners of the property and
demanded partition thereof on threats that the respondents
would be charged with perjury and/or falsification. The
petitioners also claimed that the respondents had resold the
property to Marcosa. Respondents replied that they were the
sole owners of the disputed parcel of land and denied that
the land was resold to Marcosa.
True to petitioners' threat, they filed a falsification case
against the respondents but the fiscal recommended
dismissal of the charge of falsification of public document
against the respondents for lack of a prima facie case.
Petitioners then filed a suit for reconveyance of the disputed
lot.
RTC: In favor of petitioners. RTC admitted as evidence a
photocopy of the alleged deed of sale by the respondents
selling the disputed lot to Marcosa.
CA: Reversed the RTC’s decision. It found that the loss or
destruction of the original deed of sale has not been duly
ATTY. TORREGOSA
proven by the petitioners. Hence, secondary evidence, i.e.,
presentation of the xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of sale
is inadmissible.
Issue:
W/N the petitioners have satisfactorily proven the loss of the
original deed of sale so as to allow the presentation of the
xeroxed copy of the same.
Ruling:
No. Section 4 of Rule 130 (now Section 5, Rule 130) of the
Rules of Court on Secondary Evidence states:
Sec. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or
destroyed. — When the original writing has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction,
or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the recollection of
witnesses.
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original
documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the
introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must
first establish the existence, execution, loss, and contents of
the original document.
ITCAB, the existence of an alleged sale of a parcel of land
was proved by the presentation of a xeroxed copy of the
alleged deed of absolute sale.
In establishing the execution of a document the same may
be established by the person or persons who executed it, by
the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or
by any person who was present and saw it executed or who,
after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures; or
by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had
previously confessed the execution thereof.
The trial court’s findings show that there was preponderance
of evidence that clearly disclosed the facts that Atty. Ismael
Estela prepared the alleged deed of sale. Atty. Emiliano
Ibasco, Jr., the notary public who ratified the document, also
positively identified the signatures appearing therein to be
that of the spouses and witnesses Luis de Vera and Ismael
Estela.
The destruction of the instrument may be proved by any
person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any
person who knew the fact of its loss, or by any one who had
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination
in the place or places where the document or papers of
similar character are usually kept by the person in whose
custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find
it; or who has made any other investigation which is
sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed
lost.
However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted
for before using copies since no excuse for non-production
of the writing itself can be regarded as established until it
appears that all of its parts are unavailable.
ITCAB, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr. testified that the alleged
deed of sale has about four or five original copies. Hence, all
U S C L A W | Page 20 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence
can be given of any one. This petitioners failed to do. Records
show that petitioners merely accounted for three out of four
or five original copies. Also, when asked on the witness stand
as to the whereabouts of the original document, Luis
answered that it was with the Provincial Assessor of Malolos;
that his sister, Maria, borrowed it from him and brought it to
the Registry of Deeds to have it registered.
Indeed, upon the appellees' own evidence, the original of the
deed of sale in question has not been lost or destroyed. It
was submitted to the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Malolos for registration. The appellees, therefore, should
have asked the office to produce it in court and if it could not
be produced for one reason or another should have called
the Register of Deeds or his representative to explain why.
That they failed to do. The loss or destruction of the original
of the document in question has not, therefore, been
established. Hence, secondary evidence of it is inadmissible.
18. Country Bankers Insurance v. Lagman
“1990 Bond; Best Evidence Rule”
Principle: Under the best evidence rule, the original
document must be produced whenever its contents are the
subject of inquiry. A photocopy, being a mere secondary
evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that the original
is unavailable
Facts:
Nelson Santos applied for a license with the National Food
Authority (NFA) in engaging the business of storing palay.
Under Act No. 3893 or the General Bonded Warehouse Act
the approval for said license was conditioned upon posting
of a cash bond, a bond secured by real estate, or a bond
signed by a duly authorized bonding company.
Accordingly, Country Bankers issued Warehouse Bond No.
03304 and Warehouse Bond No. 02355 through its agent,
Antonio Lagman. Santos was the bond principal,
Lagman was the surety and the Republic of the
Philippines, through the NFA was the obligee.
Agreements were executed by Santos, as bond principal,
together with Ban Lee Lim Santos, Rhosemelita Reguine and
Lagman, as co-signors. The latter bound themselves jointly
and severally liable to Country Bankers for any damages
which it may sustain as a consequence of the said bond.
Santos then secured a loan using his warehouse receipts as
collateral. When the loan matured, Santos defaulted in his
payment. The sacks of palay covered by the warehouse
receipts were no longer found in the bonded warehouse. By
virtue of the surety bonds, Country Bankers was compelled
to pay.
Consequently, Country Bankers filed a complaint for a sum
of money before the RTC of Manila.
Petitioner’s contention
(1) That by the express terms of the 1989 Bonds,
they shall remain in full force until cancelled by the
Administrator of the NFA
ATTY. TORREGOSA
(2) That Section 177 of the Insurance Code
applies, in that the bond may only be cancelled by
the obligee, by the Insurance Commissioner or by a
competent court
Respondent’s contention
(1) That the 1989 Bonds have expired
(2) That the 1990 Bond supersedes, cancels, and
renders no force and effect the 1989 Bond, which
did not include Lagman as party
Therefore, Lagman argues, Country Bankers has no
cause of action against him
RTC ruling:
Declared Reguine and Lagman jointly and severally liable to
pay Country Bankers.
Also, since the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
persons of defendants Nelson Santos and Ban Lee Lim
Santos, let the case against them be DISMISSED.
In holding Lagman and Reguine solidarily liable to Country
Bankers, the trial court relied on the express terms of the
Indemnity Agreement that they jointly and severally bound
themselves to indemnify and make good to Country Bankers
any liability which the latter may incur on account of or
arising from the execution of the bonds.
CA ruling:
Reversed the decision of the RTC and ordered the dismissal
of the complaint filed against Lagman
The appellate court held that the 1990 Bond superseded the
1989 Bonds. Lagman was also exonerated by the appellate
court from liability because he was not a signatory to the
alleged Indemnity Agreement covering the 1990 Bond.
Issue: WON the 1990 Bond may be admitted as evidence
Held:
1990 Bond was not admitted as evidence. The 1990
Bond was a mere photocopy hence, may not be
admissible pursuant to the best evidence rule.
Lagman’s insistence on novation depends on the validity,
nay, existence of the allegedly novating 1990 Bond. Country
Bankers understandably impugns both. We see the point.
Lagman presented a mere photocopy of the 1990 Bond. We
rule as inadmissible such copy.
Under the best evidence rule, the original document must be
produced whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry.
Sec. 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a
photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not
admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable.
Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that before
a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the
contents of the original, the offeror must prove the following:
(1) Existence or due execution of the original;
(2) Loss and destruction of the original or the
reason for its non-production in court; and
U S C L A W | Page 21 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
(3) On the part of the offeror, the absence of bad
faith to which the unavailability of the original can
be attributed.
The correct order of proof is as follows: existence,
execution, loss, and contents.
In the case at bar, Lagman mentioned during the direct
examination that there are actually 4 duplicate originals of
the 1990 Bond – kept by NFA, Loan Officer of the NFA
Country Bankers and the fourth was in his possession.
A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other
satisfactory explanation for the non-production of the original
instrument. When more than one original copy exists,
it must appear that all of them have been lost,
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before
secondary evidence can be given of any one. A
photocopy may not be used without accounting for
the other originals.
Despite knowledge of the existence and whereabouts of
these duplicate originals, Lagman merely presented a
photocopy. He admitted that he kept a copy of the 1990 Bond
but he could no longer produce it because he had already
severed his ties with Country Bankers. However, he did not
explain why severance of ties is by itself reason enough for
the non-availability of his copy of the bond considering that,
as it appears from the 1989 Bonds, Lagman himself is a
bondsman. Neither did Lagman explain why he failed to
secure the original from any of the three other custodians he
mentioned in his testimony.
No novation to speak of
Having discounted the existence and/or validity of the 1990
Bond, there can be no novation to speak of.
For novation to take place, the following requisites must
concur:
(1) There must be a previous valid obligation;
(2) The parties concerned must agree to a new
contract;
(3) The old contract must be extinguished;
(4) There must be a valid new contract.
In this case, only the first element of novation exists. Indeed,
there is a previous valid obligation, i.e., the 1989 Bonds.
There is however neither a valid new contract nor a clear
agreement between the parties to a new contract since the
very existence of the 1990 Bond has been rendered dubious.
Without the new contract, the old contract is not
extinguished.
As such, Lagman, as co-signor, together with Santos, Ban
Lee Lim and Reguine, bound themselves jointly and severally
to Country Bankers to indemnify it for any damage or loss
sustained on the account of the execution of the bond.
In relation to the argument that the 1989 Bond have
already expired
While CA held that the 1989 bonds were effective only for 1
year, as evidenced by the receipts on the payment of
premiums, the SC did not agree.
ATTY. TORREGOSA
The official receipts in question serve as proof of payment of
the premium for one year on each surety bond. It does not,
however, automatically mean that the surety bond is
effective for only 1 year. In fact, the effectivity of the
bond is not wholly dependent on the payment of premium.
19. EDSA Shangri-la Hotel v. BF Corporation
Keyword: Unpaid Construction Contract ;
Admissibility of Photocopies of Progress Billing Nos.
14 to 19, PMIs and WVOs
Principle: Exceptions to the Best Evidence Rule: Rule 130
Section 3 (b); Secondary Evidence Rule 130 Section 6
Facts:
Edsa Shangri-la Hotel (ESHRI) and BF executed a
construction contract for the construction of the EDSA
Shangri-la Hotel starting May 1, 1991. In said contract, a
stipulation was agreed that BF would submit monthly
progress billings, and such would be the measure of the
payment of ESHRI’s monthly payments. In a memorandum-
letter dated August 16, 1991 to BF, ESHRI laid out the
collection procedure BF was to follow, to wit: (1) submission
of the progress billing to ESHRIs Engineering Department;
(2) following-up of the preparation of the Progress Payment
Certificate with the Head of the Quantity Surveying
Department; and (3) following-up of the release of the
payment with one Evelyn San Pascual.
BF followed this procedure in all its 19 progress billings from
May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992. Based on Progress Billing Nos.
1 to 13, ESHRI paid BF Php 86,501,834.05. According to BF,
however, ESHRI, for Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, did not
re-measure the work done, did not prepare the Progress
Payment Certificates, and remit payment for the inclusive
periods covered. After several attempts to collect, BF finally
filed a collection case for sum of money and damages against
ESHRI on July 26, 1993.
In its defense, ESHRI claimed having overpaid BF for
Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13 and, by way of counterclaim
with damages, asked that BF be ordered to refund the excess
payments. ESHRI also charged BF with incurring delay and
turning up with inferior work accomplishment.
RTC ruled in favor of BF. ESHRI filed an appeal with the CA,
where the CA affirmed the RTC’s judgement for two reasons:
(1) the issues raised were factual and evidentiary; (2) BF had
sufficiently established its case by preponderance of
evidence as ESHRI remised in its obligation to re-measure
BFs later work accomplishments and pay.
Issues: Whether or not the admittance of evidence of
photocopies of Progress Billings Nos. 14 to 19, PMIs and
WVOs be admitted?
Ruling: Documents were admissible for complying
with the best evidence rule.
According to ESHRI, before being allowed to adduce in
evidence the photocopies adverted to, BF should have laid
the basis for the presentation of the photocopies as
secondary evidence, conformably to the best evidence rule.
U S C L A W | Page 22 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
On the other hand, BF contents that they have complied with
the laying-the-basis requirement. BF explained that it could
not present the original of the documents since they were in
the possession of ESHRI which refused to hand them over to
BF despite repeated requests.
The term best evidence denotes the rule requiring that the
original of a writing must, as a general proposition, be
produced and secondary evidence of its contents is not
admissible except where the original cannot be had. Rule
130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court enunciates the best
evidence rule:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced;
exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed,
or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith
on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or
under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule 130,
which reads:
SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse
party’s custody or control. If the document is in the
custody or under control of the adverse party, he
must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after
such notice and after satisfactory proof of its
existence, he fails to produce the document,
secondary evidence may be presented as in the
case of loss.
Secondary evidence of the contents of a written document
refers to evidence other than the original document itself.
However, certain explanations must be given before a party
can resort to secondary evidence. The presentation of the
photocopied documents in question as secondary evidence
was valid. Based from the stenographic notes, factual
premises were adduced, to wit: (1) the existence of the
original documents which ESHRI had possession of; (2) a
request was made on ESHRI to produce the documents; (3)
ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to produce them; and (4)
ESHRI was not inclined to produce them.
20. Citibank vs. Teodoro
“Sale Invoices”
DOCTRINE: Before secondary evidence may be admitted to
prove the contents of original documents, the offeror must
prove the due execution and the subsequent loss or
unavailability of the original.
Facts:
Citibank operates a credit card system through which it
extends credit accommodations to its cardholders for the
purchase of goods and services from its member
establishments. The purchases are later on paid for by
ATTY. TORREGOSA
cardholders upon receipt of the billings or statements of
account from the company.
Respondent Efren S. Teodoro was one such cardholder.
Respondent made various purchases through his credit card.
Accordingly, he was billed by petitioner for those purchases,
for which he tendered various payments.
Citibank claims that as of January 20, 1995, respondent had
an obligation of P191,693.25 inclusive of interest and service
charges. It made several demands for payment but
respondent refused to pay, claiming that the amount
demanded did not correspond to his actual obligations.
Because of this refusal, Citibank filed a complaint for
collection against Teodoro.
 It was filed in the RTC but was later dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction (jurisdictional amount). It was
eventually transferred to the MTC.
Petitioner presented several sales invoices or charge slips,
which added up to only P24,388.36. Although mere
photocopies of the originals, the invoices were marked in
evidence.
Because all these copies appeared to bear the
signatures of respondent, the trial court deemed
them sufficient proof of his purchases with the use of
the credit card.
MTC: Citibank won. Court ordered Teodoro to pay
BUT only the amount of P24,388.36 + interest and
penalty fee.
The Statement of Account alone will not prove that
[respondent] has an outstanding obligation to [petitioner] in
the amount of P191,693.95. This must be substantiated by
the Sales Invoices which unearthed the purchases made by
[respondent] when he availed himself of the credit card of
[petitioner].
While it is true that [petitioner] has offered the Sales Invoices
(Exhibits F, F-1, F-4) to show the purchases made by
[respondent], it is equally true also that adding all the
amount in said invoices, the sum of P191,693.95 which
according to [petitioner] is the outstanding obligation of
[respondent], is hardly met. [Petitioner] even admitted that
it could not produce all the invoices. Without the other Sales
Invoices, there is a cloud of doubt hovering over the claim of
[petitioner] to [respondent].
Respondent appealed to:
RTC: Affirmed the MTC
CA: Reversed the RTC.
 The photocopies of the sales invoices or charge slips
was insufficient to prove any liability on
respondent’s part.
Citibank appeals to the SC.
Issue: Are the photocopies of the Sales Invoices admissible
in evidence?
U S C L A W | Page 23 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
Ruling:
NO. The invoices were in triplicates (all considered
original). Petitioner failed to show that all 3 copies
were lost/unavailable. Thus, the photocopies were
inadmissible in evidence.
The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence
to prove the alleged obligation. Photocopies thereof are mere
secondary evidence. As such, they are inadmissible because
petitioner, as the offeror, failed to prove any of the
exceptions provided under Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, as well as the conditions of their admissibility.
Because of the inadmissibility of the photocopies in the
absence of the originals, respondent’s obligation was not
established.
SEC. 5. When original document is
unavailable. When the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his
part, may prove its contents by a copy,
or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.
Applying the above Rule to the present case, before a party
is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the
contents of the original sales invoices, the offeror must prove
the following:
(1) the existence or due execution of the original;
(2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for
its nonproduction in court; and
(3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to
which the unavailability of the original can be attributed.
The correct order of proof is as follows: existence,
execution, loss, and contents. At the sound discretion of
the court, this order may be changed if necessary.
Existence was established by the photocopies and
testimony of Hernandez.
Loss was not established:
When more than one original copy exists, it must
appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court before secondary
evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may not
be used without accounting for the other originals.
In the present case, triplicates were produced, although the
cardholder signed the sales invoice only once. During the
trial, Hernandez explained that an original copy had gone to
respondent, another to the merchant, and still another to
petitioner.
 Each of these three copies is regarded as an original
in accordance with Section 4 (b) of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
The loss of the originals and reasonable diligence in the
search for them were conditions that were not met, because
ATTY. TORREGOSA
the sales invoices might have been found by Equitable.
Hernandez, testifying that he had requested the originals
from Equitable, failed to show that he had subsequently
followed up the request.
Petitioner failed to show that all three original copies were
unavailable, and that due diligence had been exercised in the
search for them.
21. Gabatan vs. Court of Appeals
“Sole Heir to estate, Birth Certificate”
Principle: Under the best evidence rule, when the subject
of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall
be admissible other than the original document itself.
Although the best evidence rule admits of exceptions and
there are instances where the presentation of secondary
evidence would be allowed, such as when the original is lost
or the original is a public record, the basis for the
presentation of secondary evidence must still be established.
FACTS:
Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel
of land, identified as Lot 3095 C-5 declared for taxation in
the name of Juan Gabatan. In an action for Recovery of
Property and Ownership and Possession, respondent alleged
that she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited
the same from her deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan
Evero (Hermogena). Respondent further claimed that her
mother, Hermogena, is the only child of Juan Gabatan and
his wife, Laureana Clarito. Respondent alleged that upon the
death of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was entrusted to his
brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilo's wife, Rita
Gabatan, for administration.
In their answer, petitioners denied that respondent's mother
Hermogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with
Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the
rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that
Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue and
that Juan was survived by one brother and two sisters,
namely: Teofilo (petitioners' predecessor-in-interest),
Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited
the subject land from Juan Gabatan.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent.
The CA rendered the herein challenged Decision affirming
that of the RTC. The CA gave weight to the Deed of Absolute
Sale executed by Macaria Gabatan de Abrogar, Teofilo,
Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan, wherein Hermogena
was identified as an heir of Juan Gabatan.
ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in conferring upon respondent
the status of sole heir of Juan Gabatan.
RULING:
Here, two conflicting birth certificates of respondent were
presented at the RTC. Respondent, during her direct
testimony, presented and identified a purported certified true
copy of her typewritten birth certificate which indicated that
her mother's maiden name was "Hermogena Clarito
Gabatan" labeled as “Exhibit A”. Petitioners, on the other
hand, presented a certified true copy of respondent's
U S C L A W | Page 24 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
handwritten birth certificate which differed from the copy
presented by respondent. Among the differences was
respondent's mother's full maiden name which was indicated
as "Hermogena Clarito" in the handwritten birth certificate
labeled as “Exhibit 1”.
We cannot subscribe to the trial court's view that since the
entries in Exhibit 1 were handwritten, Exhibit 1 was the one
of dubious credibility. Verily, the certified true copies of the
handwritten birth certificate of respondent (petitioners'
Exhibits 1 and 8) were duly authenticated by two competent
witnesses; namely, Rosita Vidal, Assistant Registration
Officer of the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Cagayan de
Oro City and Maribeth E. Cacho, Archivist of the National
Statistics Office (NSO), Sta. Mesa, Manila. Both witnesses
testified that: (a) as part of their official duties they have
custody of birth records in their respective offices, 23 and (b)
the certified true copy of respondent's handwritten birth
certificate is a faithful reproduction of the original birth
certificate registered in their respective offices. Thus,
between respondent's Exhibit A and petitioners' Exhibits 1
and 8, the latter documents deserve to be given greater
probative weight.
Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the birth
certificate presented by respondent (Exhibit A) is a reliable
document, the same on its face is insufficient to prove
respondent's filiation to her alleged grandfather, Juan
Gabatan.
To prove the relationship of respondent's mother to Juan
Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best evidence of such
familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil
Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment. In
the absence of these, respondent should have presented
proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child.
However, respondent's mother's birth certificate, which
would have been the best evidence of Hermogena's
relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence
at the RTC. Neither did respondent present any authentic
document or final judgment categorically evidencing
Hermogena's relationship to Juan Gabatan.
Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses, who
testified that they personally knew Hermogena and/or Juan
Gabatan, that they knew Juan Gabatan was married to
Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena was the child of Juan
and Laureana. However, none of these witnesses had
personal knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan to
Laureana or the fact of birth of Hermogena to Juan and
Laureana. These witnesses based their testimony on what
they had been told by, or heard from, others as young
children. Their testimonies were, in a word, hearsay.
Aside from the testimonies of respondent's witnesses, both
the RTC and the CA relied heavily on a photocopy of a Deed
of Absolute Sale. In this document involving the sale of a lot
different from Lot 3095 C-5, "Hermogena Gabatan as heir of
the deceased Juan Gabatan" was indicated as one of the
vendors. However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute
Sale, including its contents and the signatures therein, as
competent evidence was vigorously and repeatedly objected
ATTY. TORREGOSA
to by petitioners' counsel for being a mere photocopy and
not being properly authenticated.
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself. Although the best
evidence rule admits of exceptions and there are instances
where the presentation of secondary evidence would be
allowed, such as when the original is lost or the original is a
public record, the basis for the presentation of secondary
evidence must still be established.
22. NPC v. Codilla
KEYWORDS: Photocopy materials, Bumping vessels
DOCTRINE: The rules use the word "information" to define
an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This
would suggest that an electronic document is relevant only
in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any
other document, which is presented in evidence as proof of
its contents. However, what differentiates an electronic
document from a paper-based document is the manner by
which the information is processed; clearly, the information
contained in an electronic document is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically.
Facts:
M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and
operated by private respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co.,
allegedly bumped and damaged petitioner’s Power Barge
209. Petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for damages
against Bangpai Shipping Co., for the alleged damages
caused on petitioner’s power barges. In the course of the
proceedings, plaintiff was given the opportunity by the trial
court to present originals of the Xerox or of the photocopies
of the documents it offered but it never produced the
originals. The plaintiff attempted to justify the admission of
the photocopies by contending that "the photocopies offered
are equivalent to the original of the document" on the basis
of the Electronic Evidence.
Issue: Whether or not photocopied materials can be
admissible as evidence.
Ruling: No.
"(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the
representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other
models of written expression, described or however
represented, by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed,
which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally
signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or
other means which accurately reflects the electronic data
message or electronic document. For the purpose of these
Rules, the term "electronic document" may be used
interchangeably with "electronic data message".
The information in those Xerox or photocopies was not
received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically.
Moreover, such electronic evidence must be authenticated
U S C L A W | Page 25 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
(Sections 1 and 2, Rule 5, Rules on Electronic Evidence),
which the plaintiff failed to do. Finally, the required Affidavit
to prove the admissibility and evidentiary weight of the
alleged electronic evidence (Sec. 1, Rule 9, Ibid) was not
executed, much less presented in evidence.
The Xerox or photocopies offered should, therefore, be
stricken off the record. Aside from their being not properly
identified by any competent witness, the loss of the principals
thereof was not established by any competent proof.
XXX
On the other hand, an "electronic document" refers to
information or the representation of information, data,
figures, symbols or other models of written expression,
described or however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact
may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any
printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately
reflects the electronic data message or electronic document.
The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic
document received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would
suggest that an electronic document is relevant only in terms
of the information contained therein, similar to any other
document, which is presented in evidence as proof of its
contents. However, what differentiates an electronic
document from a paper-based document is the manner by
which the information is processed; clearly, the information
contained in an electronic document is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies
submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents
therein, such as the signatures of the persons who
purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or
produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can
a person’s signature affixed manually be considered as
information electronically received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the
argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were
produced through an electronic process, then these
photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules
on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not
preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared
that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic
documents, it is consequential that the same may not be
considered as the functional equivalent of their original as
decreed in the law.
23. MCC Industrial Sales v. Ssanyong Corporation
KEYWORDS: Electronic, stainless steel, telephone,
inadmissibile
Doctrine: The terms “electronic data message” and
“electronic document,” as defined under the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile
transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot
be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional
ATTY. TORREGOSA
equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is
not admissible as electronic evidence.
FACTS
Petitioner is engaged in the business of importing and
wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is
the responded, an international trading company with head
office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in
Makati City, Philippines. The two corporations conducted
business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy
transmissions. Respondent would send the pro forma
invoices containing the details of the steel product order to
petitioner; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative
affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to
the respondent, again by fax.
Respondent filed a civil action for damages due to breach of
contract against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City. In its complaint, respondent alleged that
defendants breached their contract when they refused to
open the letter of credit in the amount of US$170,000.00 for
the remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos.
ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.
After respondent rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer
to Evidence alleging that respondent failed to present the
original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil
action was based. Petitioner contends that the photocopies
of the pro forma invoices presented by respondent
Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their supposed contract
of sale are inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the
ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as
the best evidence the original fax transmittal. On the other
hand, respondent posits that, from a reading of the law and
the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the original facsimile
transmittal of the pro forma invoice is admissible in evidence
since it is an electronic document and, therefore, the best
evidence under the law and the Rules. Respondent further
claims that the photocopies of these fax transmittals
(specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are
admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the
respondent sufficiently explained the non-production of the
original fax transmittals.
Issue: Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of
facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and
admissible as such?
Held:
Electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of
an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, as long
as it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means,
showing to reflect the data accurately. Thus, to be admissible
in evidence as an electronic data message or to be
considered as the functional equivalent of an original
document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must
foremost be an “electronic data message” or an “electronic
document.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
8792 defines the “Electronic Data Message” refers to
information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic,
optical or similar means, but not limited to, electronic data
U S C L A W | Page 26 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or
telecopy.
The phrase “but not limited to, electronic data interchange
(EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy” in the
IRR’s definition of “electronic data message” is copied from
the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), from which majority of the provisions of R.A.
No. 8792 were taken. While Congress deleted this phrase in
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the IRR
reinstated it. The deletion by Congress of the said phrase is
significant and pivotal.
Moreover, when Congress formulated the term “electronic
data message,” it intended the same meaning as the term
“electronic record” in the Canada law. This construction of
the term “electronic data message,” which excludes telexes
or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony
with the Electronic Commerce Law’s focus on “paperless”
communications and the “functional equivalent approach”
that it espouses. Facsimile transmissions are not, in this
sense, “paperless,” but verily are paper-based.
In an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original
paper-based information or data that is scanned, sent
through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. In
a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no
original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual
reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as
originals. Ineluctably, the law’s definition of “electronic data
message,” which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with
“electronic document,” could not have included facsimile
transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as
sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These
two copies are distinct from each other, and have different
legal effects. While Congress anticipated future
developments in communications and computer technology
when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of
technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy (except
computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as
compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine
transmission), when it defined the term “electronic data
message.”
The terms “electronic data message” and “electronic
document,” as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly,
a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic
evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original
under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as
electronic evidence.
24. Maliksi v. COMELEC
KEYWORDS: Election for Mayor, 2nd placer’s recount using
ballot images vs paper images against the Best Evidence
Rule.
DOCTRINE: The picture images of the ballots are electronic
documents that are regarded as the equivalents of the
original official ballots That the two documents—the official
ballot and its picture image—are considered "original
documents" simply means that both of them are given equal
ATTY. TORREGOSA
probative weight. In short, when either is presented as
evidence, one is not considered as weightier than the other.
Facts:
During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Saquilayan the winner for the position of Mayor
of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the
second highest number of votes, brought an election protest
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite alleging that
there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209
clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of
the votes, and, based on the results of the revision, declared
Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding
Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions
of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the
meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for execution
pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor.
In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division,
without giving notice to the parties, decided to
recount the ballots through the use of the printouts
of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued
an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to
deposit the amount necessary to defray the expenses for the
decryption and printing of the ballot images. Later, it issued
another order dated April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan to
augment his cash deposit.
On August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a resolution
nullifying the RTC’s decision and declaring Saquilayan as the
duly elected Mayor. The En banc affirmed the decision and
hence this petition.
Issues:
Is there a violation of due process? Yes
Are ballot images original documents? Yes
Can ballot images be resorted to without accounting for the
paper ballots? No
Rulings:
Discussion on Due Process
It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should
not have conducted the assailed recount proceedings
because it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to
which no existing rule of procedure allowed it to conduct a
recount in the first instance. The recount proceedings
authorized under Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8804, as amended, are to be conducted by the COMELEC
Divisions only in the exercise of their exclusive original
jurisdiction over all election protests involving elective
regional (the autonomous regions), provincial and city
officials.
Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay
Concerns (ABC) v. Commission on Elections, the power of the
COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy
resolution of its cases should still be exercised only after
giving to all the parties the opportunity to be heard on their
opposing claims. The parties’ right to be heard upon
adversarial issues and matters is never to be waived or
sacrificed, or to be treated so lightly because of the possibility
of the substantial prejudice to be thereby caused to the
parties, or to any of them. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc
should not have upheld the First Division’s deviation from the
U S C L A W | Page 27 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
regular procedure in the guise of speedily resolving the
election protest, in view of its failure to provide the
parties with notice of its proceedings and an
opportunity to be heard, the most basic requirements
of due process.
Moreover, due process of law does not only require notice of
the decryption, printing, and recount proceedings to the
parties, but also demands an opportunity to be present at
such proceedings or to be represented therein. Maliksi
correctly contends that the orders of the First Division simply
required Saquilayan to post and augment his cash deposit.
The orders did not state the time, date, and venue of the
decryption and recount proceedings. Clearly, the First
Division had no intention of giving the parties the opportunity
to witness its proceedings.
Mendoza v. Commission on Elections instructs that notice to
the parties and their participation are required during the
adversarial aspects of the proceedings. In that case, after the
revision of the ballots and after the election protest case was
submitted for decision, the ballots and ballot boxes were
transferred to the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) in
connection with a protest case pending in the SET. Mendoza
later learned that the COMELEC, with the permission of the
SET, had meanwhile conducted proceedings within the SET’s
premises. Mendoza then claimed that his right to due process
was violated because he had not been given notice by the
COMELEC that it would be conducting further proceedings
within the SET premises
Discussion on the Best Evidence Rule and Original
Documents for COMELEC
The picture images of the ballots are electronic
documents that are regarded as the equivalents of
the original official ballots themselves. In Vinzons-Chato
v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, the Court
held that "the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and
recorded by the PCOS, are likewise ‘official ballots’ that
faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by the
voter, as defined by Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such,
the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the
paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used
for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest."
That the two documents—the official ballot and its
picture image—are considered "original documents"
simply means that both of them are given equal
probative weight. In short, when either is presented as
evidence, one is not considered as weightier than the other.
But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts,
the COMELEC, and the Electoral Tribunals to quickly
and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture
images of the ballots in the proceedings had before
them without notice to the parties. Despite the equal
probative weight accorded to the official ballots and
the printouts of their picture images, the rules for the
revision of ballots adopted for their respective
proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the
primary or best evidence of the voters’ will. In that
regard, the picture images of the ballots are to be
ATTY. TORREGOSA
used only when it is first shown that the official
ballots are lost or their integrity has been
compromised.
25. People v. Enojas
Key Phrases: Taxi Driver; Totality of Circumstantial
Evidence
Relevant Doctrines:
 Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and 3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
 Text messages are to be proved by the testimony
of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi,
posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text
messages with the other accused in order to identify
and entrap them. As the recipient of those
messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his
possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of
such messages and was competent to testify on
them.
FACTS:
The City Prosecutor of Las Piñas charged appellants Enojas,
Gomez, Santos, and Jalandoni with murder before the Las
Piñas Regional Trial Court (RTC).
PO2 Gregorio and PO2 Pangilinan were patrolling the vicinity
of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall when they spotted a
taxi that was suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto
Glass shop. They approached the taxi and asked the driver,
Enojas, for his documents. He complied but, being doubtful
of his documents, they asked him to come with them to the
police station for further questioning.
Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and left his
taxi behind. On reaching a convenience store, they stopped
and PO2 Pangilinan went down to relieve himself. As he
approached the store's door, however, he came upon two
suspected robbers. He shot one suspect dead and hit the
other who nevertheless still managed to escape. But
someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death.
Upon hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and fired
at an armed man whom he saw running towards Pilar Village
and another running towards Alabang-Zapote Road while
firing his gun at PO2 Gregorio. He returned the shots but the
men were able to take a taxi and escape. PO2 Gregorio
radioed for help and for an ambulance. When he returned to
his mobile car, he realized that accused Enojas who he had
with them had fled.
P/Insp. Torred, the Chief of Investigation Division, testified
that he and PO2 Rosarito immediately responded to PO2
Gregorio's urgent call. Suspecting that accused Enojas was
involved in the attempted robbery, they searched the
abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone that Enojas
U S C L A W | Page 28 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
apparently left behind. P/Ins. Torred instructed PO3 Cambi
to monitor its incoming messages.
The police later ascertained that the suspect whom PO2
Pangilinan had killed was someone named Reynaldo
Mendoza who was armed. They found spent 9 mm and M-16
rifle shells at the crime scene. Follow-up operations at
nearby provinces resulted in finding the dead body of one of
the suspects, Alex Angeles, at the Metro South Medical
Center in Cavite.
PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored
the messages in accused Enojas' mobile phone and, posing
as Enojas, communicated with the other accused. The police
then conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in the
arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, the
police were also able to capture accused Enojas and Gomez.
The prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile
phone text messages between Enojas and some of his co-
accused.
Manifesting in open court that they did not want to adduce
any evidence or testify in the case, the accused opted to
instead file a trial memorandum for their defense. They
pointed out that they were entitled to an acquittal since they
were all illegally arrested and since the evidence of the text
messages were inadmissible, not having been properly
identified.
RTC rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty of
murder qualified by evident premeditation and use of armed
men with the special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearms. It thus sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, without the possibility of
parole.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal and affirmed
in toto the conviction of the accused. The CA, however, found
the absence of evident premeditation since the prosecution
failed to prove that the several accused planned the crime
before committing it. The accused appealed from the CA to
this Court.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the prosecution failed to prove that the accused-
appellants took part in the shooting of PO2 Pangilinan for not
being able to present direct evidence. - NO
2. W/N text messages were admissible - YES
RULING:
1. It may be true that the prosecution have not presented
direct evidence but they could prove the accused appellants’
liability by circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held
that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
1) there is more than one circumstance;
2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
ATTY. TORREGOSA
Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the
prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for the
conviction of all the accused. Thus:
1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas as the
driver of the taxicab suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila
Auto Glass shop. Subsequent inspection of the taxicab
yielded Enojas' mobile phone that contained messages which
led to the entrapment and capture of the other accused who
were also taxicab drivers.
2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain in
the cab to go to the police station where he was about to be
taken for questioning. He did not go to the police afterwards
to clear up the matter and claim his taxi.
3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez as one
of the men he saw running away from the scene of the
shooting.
4. The text messages identified "Kua Justin" as one of those
who engaged PO2 Pangilinan in the shootout; the messages
also referred to "Kua Justin" as the one who was hit in such
shootout and later died in a hospital in Cavite. These
messages linked the other accused.
5. During the follow-up operations, the police investigators
succeeded in entrapping accused Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas,
and Gomez, who were all named in the text messages.
6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the
taxi driven by Enojas clearly made references to the 7-11
shootout and to the wounding of "Kua Justin," one of the
gunmen, and his subsequent death.
7. The context of the messages showed that the accused
were members of an organized group of taxicab drivers
engaged in illegal activities.
8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in
possession of mobile phones with call numbers that
corresponded to the senders of the messages received on
the mobile phone that accused Enojas left in his taxicab.
2. As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC
admitted them in conformity with the Court's earlier
Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to
criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the
accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other
accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient
of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his
possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such
messages and was competent to testify on them.
The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid
warrant of arrest. But, assuming that this was so, it cannot
be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charge but for
rejecting any evidence that may have been taken from them
after an unauthorized search as an incident of an unlawful
arrest, a point that is not in issue here. At any rate, a crime
had been committed — the killing of PO2 Pangilinan — and
the investigating police officers had personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest had
committed it. The text messages to and from the mobile
phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong
leads on the participation and identities of the accused.
Indeed, the police caught them in an entrapment using this
knowledge.
U S C L A W | Page 29 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
26. People v. Navarro
Key Phrase/s: Wiretapping at police station; Authentication
of Tape Recording
Relevant Doctrine:
 The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or
recording of private communications. Since the
exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan
was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
 A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony
of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the
conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was
the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the
tape are those of the persons such are claimed to
belong.
Facts:
On February 4, 1990 in Lucena, Quezon, Felipe Navarro
who was a member of the Lucena Integrated National
Police, allegedly assaulted Ike Lingan in the police
headquarters with the intent to kill by hitting Lingan
with the butt of a gun. After victim fell and hit his head on
the concrete pavement, Lingan had a concussion, causing his
death.
In the evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and
Enrique "Ike" Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station
DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan, went
to the Entertainment City following reports that it was
showing nude dancers. After the three had seated
themselves at a table and ordered beer, a scantily clad
dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act.
As she removed her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his
camera and took a picture. At that point, the floor manager,
Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached
Jalbuena and demanded to know why he took a picture.
Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang pakialam, because this is my
job." Sioco pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he warned
the latter that he would kill him. When Jalbuena saw that
Sioco was about to pull out his gun, he ran out of the joint
followed by his companions.
Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to
report the matter. Three of the policemen on duty, including
petitioner Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police
station, and they asked Jalbuena and his companions to join
them. Jalbuena declined and went to the desk officer, Sgt.
Anonuevo, to report the incident. In a while, Liquin and Sioco
arrived on a motorcycle and were met by Navarro who talked
with them for around fifteen minutes. Afterwards, petitioner
Navarro turned to Jalbuena, pushed him to the wall and
threatened him with a gun cocked and pressed on his face,
accordingly because Jalbuena made Liquin his enemy. Lingan
intervened and said he was there to mediate, but failed. He
then turned to Sgt. Anonuevo and told him to make of record
the behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan.
This angered Lingan and the two had a heated exchange
with Lingan proposing they have a fistfight. As Lingan was
about to turn away, Navarro hit him with the handle of his
pistol above the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood
flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner
Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which floored
ATTY. TORREGOSA
him. Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said that the latter
witnessed that Lingan was the one who challenged him. He
then poked his gun at the right temple of Jalbuena and made
him sign his name on the blotter. Jalbuena could not affix his
signature. His right hand was trembling and he simply wrote
his name in print.
Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner
Navarro to his office, while a policeman took Lingan to the
Quezon Memorial Hospital. The station manager of DWTI,
Boy Casanada, arrived and, learning that Lingan had been
taken to the hospital, proceeded there. Lingan died from his
injuries.
Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record
on tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased.
Petitioner Felipe Navarro claims that it was the deceased who
tried to hit him twice, but he (petitioner) was able to duck
both times, and that Lingan was so drunk he fell on the floor
twice, each time hitting his head on the concrete.
Trial Court: Gave credence to the evidence for the
prosecution – finds that the evidence for the prosecution is
the more credible, concrete and sufficient to create that
moral certainty in the mind of the court that accused herein
is criminally responsible. The defense's evidence which
consists of outright denial could not, under the circumstances
overturn the strength of the prosecution's evidence. This
court finds that the prosecution witnesses, more particularly
Stanley Jalbuena, lacked any motive to make false
accusation, distort the truth, testify falsehood or cause
accusation of one who had neither brought him harm or
injury.
Going over the evidence on record, the postmortem report
issued by Dra. Eva Yamamoto confirms the detailed account
given by Stanley Jalbuena on how Lingan sustained head
injuries.
Said post-mortem report, together with the testimony of
Jalbuena, sufficiently belies the claim of the defense that the
head injuries of deceased Lingan were caused by the latter's
falling down on the concrete pavement head first.
Court of Appeals: affirmed RTC – Just because Jalbuena
was a victim of the aggression himself does not impair the
probative worth of his positive and logical account. In fact,
Navarro’s assault on Jalbuena which was admitted by the
defense shows motivation and violent nature. Navarro’s
account is too illogical to be accepted since the wounds
inflicted could not be caused by falling.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Jalbuena is credible
and Whether or not the voice recording is admissible
Ruling: The appeal is without merit.
First. Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the
testimony of Jalbuena on the ground that he was a biased
witness, having a grudge against him. The testimony of a
witness who has an interest in the conviction of the accused
is not, for this reason alone, unreliable. Trial courts, which
have the opportunity to observe the facial expressions,
gestures, and tones of voice of a witness while testifying, are
U S C L A W | Page 30 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
competent to determine whether his or her testimony should
be given credence. In the instant case, petitioner Navarro
has not shown that the trial court erred in according weight
to the testimony of Jalbuena.
Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice
recording he had made. It may be asked whether the tape is
admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits
wiretapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law
prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of
private communications. Since the exchange between
petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape
recording is not prohibited. Nor is there any question that it
was duly authenticated.
A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a
witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2)
that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and
(3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such
are claimed to belong. In the instant case, Jalbuena testified
that he personally made the voice recording; that the tape
played in court was the one he recorded; and that the
speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A
sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of
the tape presented by the prosecution.
Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established:
(1) that there was a heated exchange between petitioner
Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an
entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of
violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan,
with the latter getting the worst of it.
The testimony made by Dr. Eva Yamamoto, who performed
the autopsy on the body of Lingan and issued the medical
certificate further supports the facts presented before the
court in consonance with the recording.
Third. The mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation
or threat on the part of the offended party immediately
preceding the act is considered in favor of Navarro.
(Provocation - any unjust or improper conduct or act of the
offended party, capable of exciting, inciting or irritating
anyone; must be sufficient and should immediately precede
the act; must immediately precede the act so much so that
there is no interval between the provocation by the offended
party and the commission of the crime by the accused.) The
remarks of Lingan constituted sufficient provocation.
The mitigating circumstance that the offender had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed
should also be appreciated in favor of petitioner. The frantic
exclamations of petitioner Navarro after the scuffle that it
was Lingan who provoked him shows that he had no intent
to kill the latter. The allowance of this mitigating
circumstance is consistent with the rule that criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a
crime in a place where the public authorities are engaged in
the discharge of their duties should be appreciated against
petitioner Navarro. The offense in this case was committed
ATTY. TORREGOSA
right in the police station where policemen were discharging
their public functions.
SPECTRA NOTES: This case was decided before the
effectivity of the rules in electronic evidence. SC here
mentioned that only the recorder may authenticate the said
evidence but the rules now provide that ANYONE may testify
as to the accuracy of the recording.
27. CHATO v. HRET
KEYWORDS:
Scanned images of ballots by PCOS, OK as evidence
DOCTRINE
Picture images of the ballots as scanned by the PCOS are
equivalent to official ballots and allowed as evidence under
the rules on electronic evidence. It faithfully captures in
electronic form the votes cast by the voter.
FACTS:
Liwayway Vinzons-Chato (Chato) sought re-election in 2010
as representative of the Second Legislative District of
Camarines Norte. However, she lost to Elmer E. Panotes
(Panotes) who got 3,885 votes higher than her.
Unfazed, Chato filed an electoral protest before the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) assailing the
results in all the 160 clustered precincts in four (4)
municipalities. The initial revision of ballots showed a
substantial discrepancy between the votes of the parties per
physical count vis-à-vis their votes per election returns in the
precincts of the Municipalities of Basud and Daet
Panotes moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the
case and prayed that a preliminary hearing be set in order to
determine first the integrity of the ballots and the ballot
boxes used in the elections. He further urged that, should it
be shown during such hearing that the ballots and ballot
boxes were not preserved, the HRET should direct the
printing of the picture images of the ballots of the questioned
precincts stored in the data storage device for said precincts.
Thus, in its Resolution No. 11-208, the HRET directed
the copying of the picture image files of ballots
relative to the protest despite Chato’s objection.
Chato questioned the authenticity of the images and further
alleged that they were taken from polluted Compact Flash
(CF) cards. The HRET denied Chato’s motion on the ground
that she failed to show proof that the CF cards used in the
twenty (20) precincts in the Municipalities of Basud and Daet
with substantial variances were not preserved or were
violated.
Significantly, the HRET declared that, although the
actual ballots used in the 2010 elections are the best
evidence of the will of the voters, the picture images
of the ballots are regarded as the equivalent of the
original, citing Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, as long as no genuine question is raised as to the
authenticity of the original or it would not be unjust or
inequitable to admit the copy in lieu of the original.
U S C L A W | Page 31 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
Chato maintains that picture images of the ballots
cannot be considered as the "official ballots" or the
equivalent of the original paper ballots which the
voters filled out since the automated election system
(AES) used during the 2010 elections was paper-
based. According to her, the "official ballot" is only the paper
ballot that was printed by the National Printing Office and/or
the BSP.
ISSUE: Whether or not the picture images of the ballots may
be considered as the "official ballots" or the equivalent of the
original paper ballots which the voters filled out.
RULING
Yes, it is. R.A. No. 8436 (Automated Election Law), as
amended by R.A. No. 9369, defines "official ballot"
where Automated Election System (AES) is utilized as
the "paper ballot, whether printed or generated by
the technology applied, that faithfully captures or
represents the votes cast by a voter recorded or to be
recorded in electronic form."
There are two types of AES identified under the law: (1)
paper-based election system; and (2) direct recording
electronic election system. A paper-based election system,
such as the one adopted during the 2010 elections, is the
type of AES that "use paper ballots, records and counts
votes, tabulates, consolidates/canvasses and transmits
electronically the results of the vote count."
The paper-based AES allowed voters to fill out an official
paper ballot by shading the oval opposite the names of their
chosen candidates. Each voter was then required to
personally feed his ballot into the Precinct Count Optical Scan
(PCOS) machine which scanned both sides of the ballots
simultaneously, meaning, in just one pass. As established
during the required demo tests, the system captured
the images of the ballots in encrypted format which,
when decrypted for verification, were found to be
digitized representations of the ballots cast.
28. Yu Tek & Co v. Gonzales
Keywords: 600 piculs of sugar; Parol Evidence
Principles: While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of
ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot
serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract
additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud
or mistake.
Parties are presumed to have reduced to writing all the
essential conditions of their contract.
Facts:
The basis of the action is a written contract, Exhibit A,
containing the following information:
Basilio Gonzalez acknowledged the receipt of Php3,000 from
Messrs. Yu Tek & Co., and in consideration of said sum, he
obligates to deliver to Yu Tek 600 piculs of sugar of the first
and second grade, according to the result of the polarization,
within the period of three months at any place within the said
ATTY. TORREGOSA
municipality of Santa Rosa which Yu Tek or its representative
may designate.
In case Gonzales does not deliver within the period, the
contract will be rescinded and he will be obligated to return
to Yu Tek the amount received and also the sum of Php1,200
by way of indemnity for loss and damages.
Yu Tek proved that no sugar had been delivered to it under
the contract nor had it been able to recover the Php3,000. It
prayed for judgment for the Php3,000 and Php1,200.
Judgment was rendered for Php3,000 only. Both parties
appealed.
Gonzales contention: The court erred in refusing to permit
parol evidence showing that the parties intended that the
sugar was to be secured from the crop which he raised on
his plantation, and that he was unable to fulfill the contract
by reason of the almost total failure of his crop.
Issue: Whether or not parol evidence may be introduced to
add or vary the terms of a written contract
Held: No The rule which excludes parol evidence to add to
or vary the terms of a written contract is applicable in this
case. There is not the slightest intimation in the contract that
the sugar was to be raised by the Gonzales. Parties are
presumed to have reduced to writing all the essential
conditions of their contract.
While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of
ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it
cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the
contract additional contemporaneous conditions
which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless
there has been fraud or mistake.
In the case at bar, Gonzales wanted to show that the sugar
was to be obtained exclusively from the crop raised by him.
There is no clause in the written contract which even
remotely suggests such a condition. Gonzales undertook to
deliver a specified quantity of sugar within a specified time.
The contract placed no restriction upon him in the matter of
obtaining the sugar. He was equally at liberty to purchase it
on the market or raise it himself. It may be true that he
owned a plantation and expected to raise the sugar himself,
but he did not limit his obligation to his own crop of sugar.
The condition which Gonzales seeks to add to the contract
by parol evidence cannot be considered. The rights of the
parties must be determined by the writing itself.
The second contention of Gonzales arises from the first. He
assumes that the contract was limited to the sugar he might
raise upon his own plantation; that the contract represented
a perfected sale; and that by failure of his crop he was
relieved from complying with his undertaking by loss of the
thing due. (Arts. 1452, 1096, and 1182, Civil Code.) The
argument is faulty in assuming that there was a perfected
sale.
Article 1450 defines a perfected sale as follows: The sale
shall be perfected between vendor and vendee and shall be
binding on both of them, if they have agreed upon the thing
U S C L A W | Page 32 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
which is the object of the contract and upon the price, even
when neither has been delivered."
Article 1452 reads: "The injury to or the profit of the thing
sold shall, after the contract has been perfected be governed
by the provisions of articles 1096 and 1182.
Gonzales’ undertaking was to sell to Yu Tek 600 piculs of
sugar of the first and second classes. Sugar is one of the
staple commodities of this country. For the purpose of sale,
its bulk is weighed, the customary unit of weight being
denominated a ''picul.'' There was no delivery under the
contract. If called upon to designate the article sold, it is clear
that Gonzales could only say that it was "sugar." He could
only use this generic name for the thing sold. There was no
"appropriation" of any particular lot of sugar.
Neither party could point to any specific quantity of sugar
and say “This is the article which was the subject of our
contract."
McCullough case: tobacco factory which the parties dealt
with was specifically pointed out and distinguished from all
other tobacco factories.
Barretto case: particular shares of stock which the parties
desired to transfer were capable of designation.
Tan Leonco case: quantity of hemp was the subject of the
contract, it was shown that quantity had been deposited in a
specific warehouse, and thus set apart and distinguished
from all other hemp.
The contract, in this case, was merely an executory
agreement; a promise of sale and not a sale. As there was
no perfected sale, it is clear that articles 1452, 1096, and
1182 are not applicable. Gonzales having defaulted in his
engagement, Yu Tek is entitled to recover the Php3,000
which it advanced to the former.
Yu Tek has appealed from the judgment of the trial court on
the ground that it is entitled to recover the additional sum of
Php1,200 under paragraph 4 of the contract.
Under the contract, the defendant was not limited to his
growing crop in order to make the delivery. He agreed to
deliver the sugar and nothing is said in the contract about
where he was to get it. This is a clear case of liquidated
damages. The contract plainly states that if the defendant
fails to deliver the 600 piculs of sugar within the time agreed
on, the contract will be rescinded and he will be obliged to
return the P3,000 and pay the sum of P1,200 by way of
indemnity for loss and damages. There cannot be the
slightest doubt about the meaning of this language or the
intention of the parties.
There is no room for either interpretation or construction.
Under the provisions of article 1255 of the Civil Code
contracting parties are free to execute the contracts that they
may consider suitable, provided they are not in contravention
of law, morals, or public order. There is nothing in the
contract under consideration which is opposed to any of
these principles
ATTY. TORREGOSA
29. Baluyut vs. Poblete
Keywords: “One month v One year” ; Parol Evidence
Doctrines:
1) When the terms of an agreement are reduced to
writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon
and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than
the contents of the agreement itself.
2) Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal
agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or
defeat the operation of a valid contract. While parol evidence
is admissible to explain the meaning of written contracts, it
cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract
additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in writing, unless there has been fraud or
mistake.
FACTS:
Baluyut, loaned from the spouses Eulogio and Salud Poblete
the sum of P850,000.00. As evidence of her indebtedness,
Baluyut signed, on even date, a promissory note for the
amount borrowed. Under the promissory note, the loan shall
mature in one month. To secure the payment of her
obligation, she conveyed to the Poblete spouses, by way of
a real estate mortgage contract, a house and lot she owns.
Upon maturity of the loan, Baluyut failed to pay her
indebtedness. The Poblete spouses subsequently decided to
extrajudicially foreclose the real estate mortgage.
The mortgaged property was sold on auction where the
Poblete spouses were the highest bidders. Baluyut failed to
redeem the subject property within the period required by
law prompting Eulogio Poblete to execute an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Title. Baluyut remained in possession of the
subject property and refused to vacate the same. Hence,
Eulogio and the heirs of Salud filed a Petition for the issuance
of a writ of possession with the RTC of Pasig.
The trial court issued an order granting the writ of
possession. However, before Eulogio and the heirs of Salud
could take possession of the property, Baluyut filed an action
for annulment of mortgage, extrajudicial foreclosure and sale
of the subject property, as well as cancellation of the title
issued in the name of Eulogio and the heirs of Salud, plus
damages. In the meantime, Eulogio died and was substituted
by his heirs. After trial on the merits, the trial court issued a
Decision dismissing Baluyut's complaint. CA also denied.
Petitioner’s contentions:
a. private respondents' witness, a certain Atty. Edwina
Mendoza, is a competent witness and that her testimony,
that the maturity of the loan is one year, is acceptable proof
of the existence of collateral agreements which were entered
into by the parties who executed the Promissory Note and
the Real Estate Mortgage. In effect, there is conflict between
the date of maturity of the loan as stated in the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage and the Promissory Note, on one hand, and
the real date of maturity as agreed upon by the parties
b. the issue of the real date of the maturity of the loan
can be settled only by a formal letter of demand indicating
the sum due and the specific date of payment which is the
duty of the private respondents to give; that absent said
letter of demand, the loan may not be considered to have
U S C L A W | Page 33 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
matured; that, as a consequence, the property given as a
collateral may not be foreclosed and the subsequent
consolidation of title over the subject property should be
annulled.
c. that even if the issue on the term of the loan was
first brought up in petitioner's Addendum to the Motion for
Reconsideration filed with the CA, the appellate court may
still properly consider this issue in the interest of justice and
equity
d. presumption of regularity does not apply because
there are no records of the foreclosure proceedings involving
the subject property despite the need of the sheriff to submit
an Affidavit of Posting of Notices before he is allowed to
schedule an auction sale. The lower court should have acted
judiciously by annulling the foreclosure and ordering the
repeat of the proceedings.
e. That she did not receive any notice despite being
entitled under the law to an Assessment Notice or Notice of
Redemption coming from the highest bidder 30 days before
the expiration of the period to redeem apprising her of the
principal amount, the interest, taxes and other lawful fees
due in case she opts to exercise her right of redemption
ISSUE: Is the testimony of Atty Edwina Mendoza relevant
considering that the promissory note indicates that the
maturity date of the loan is one month after? (Main issue)
HELD: against petitioner Baluyut
On the issue regarding the date of the maturity of the loan
An issue not raised during trial could not be raised for the
first time on appeal as to do so would be offensive to the
basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process. It would be
unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity
to present evidence in contra to the new theory, which it
could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the
hearing before the trial court.
Even if petitioner had properly raised the issue regarding the
real date of maturity of the loan, it is a long-held cardinal rule
that when the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing,
it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no
evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the
contents of the agreement itself. In the present case, the
promissory note and the real estate mortgage are the law
between petitioner and private respondents. It is not
disputed that under the Promissory Note dated July 20, 1981,
the loan shall mature in one month from date of the said
Promissory Note.
Petitioner makes much of the testimony of Atty. Edwina
Mendoza that the maturity of the loan which petitioner
incurred is one year. However, evidence of a prior or
contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not
admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a
valid contract. While parol evidence is admissible to explain
the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose
of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all
in writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.
In the instant case, aside from the testimony of Atty.
Mendoza, no other evidence was presented to prove that the
real date of maturity of the loan is one year. In fact there
ATTY. TORREGOSA
was not even any allegation in the Complaint and in the
Memorandum filed by petitioner with the trial court to the
effect that there has been fraud or mistake as to the date of
the loan's maturity as contained in the Promissory Note of
July 20, 1981.
Moreover, during her cross-examination, petitioner herself
never claimed that the loan shall mature in one year despite
being questioned regarding its maturity. Petitioner failed to
present clear and convincing evidence to prove her allegation
that the real agreement of the parties is for the loan to
mature in one year.
As to the failure to comply the legal requirement by the
sheriff:
The fact that the documents could not be found in the office
of the sheriff does not mean that there was failure to comply
the requirements. In fact the spouses were able to present
the Affidavit of Publication which is more extensive than the
Affidavit of Posting of Notice. It has far more reaching effects
than the Posting of Notice.
As to the failure to execute of affidavit of posting of notice:
The requirement is not applicable in the case at bar because
Baluyut relied on a law and jurisprudence that is specifically
applicable to foreclosure of mortgages covering loans
granted by rural banks. In the present case, it is between
private individuals.
On the failure to give Assessment Notice to Baluyut:
This issue was raised first time on appeal so it is not proper
for the court to rule on it. Besides, there is nothing under the
law that requires the highest bidder to furnish an assessment
notice or notice of redemption prior to the expiration of the
redemption. It only stated that failure to procure a notice will
only give the redemptioner the right to not pay assessments,
taxes and liens upon the redemption.
30. Cruz v. Court of Appeals
Keywords: PAKYAW – BUY & SELL OF FISH – PAROL
EVIDENCE
Doctrine: The reason for Sec. 7, Rule 130 is the
presumption that when the parties have reduced their
agreement to writing they have made such writing the only
repository and memorial of the truth, and whatever is not
found in the writing must be understood to have been waived
or abandoned.
FACTS:
Respondent Salonga filed a complaint for collection and
damages against petitioner Cruz for alleged unpaid loans
brought by their agreements in the buy-and-sell of fish
indicated by the receipts. Cruz, however, denied the
allegations contending that the receipts were not loans but
actually indicated the payments of Salonga for the purchase
of fish from him based on their “pakyaw” agreement and
fishpond rental. Cruz even counterclaimed that it was in fact
Salonga who owed him money due to unpaid rental of the
sublease of the fishpond.
Both parties entered into stipulation of facts during a pre-trial
conference. One of these is that Cruz needed money so he
U S C L A W | Page 34 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
requested Salonga to advance the amount not only of P28k
but P35k (Exhibit D) to meet his obligations with the original
lessor of the fishpond. Exhibit D, reading as follows:
5/4/82
Received the amount of Thirty Five Thousand Cash from
Rodrigo Quiambao and Conrado Salonga on the day of May
4, 1982.
Sgd. Lucio Cruz
At the trial:
Salonga’s allegations:
He claimed that aside from the amounts of P35,000.00 (Exh.
D), P8,000.00 (Exh. E), P500.00 (Exh. F), P3,000.00 (Exh. G)
and P3,750.00 (Exh. H) mentioned in the partial stipulation
of facts, he also delivered to the petitioner P28,000.00, which
constituted the consideration for their "pakyaw" agreement.
This was evidenced by a receipt dated May 14, 1982 marked
as Exhibit I and reading as follows:
May 14, 1982
Tinatanggap ko ang halagang dalawampu't walong libong
piso (P28,000.00) bilang halaga sa
pakyaw nila sa akin sa sangla sa kahong bilang #8 maliit at
sa kaputol na sapa sa gawing may bomba. Ito ay tatagal
hanggang Agosto 1982.
SGD. LUCIO CRUZ
Cruz’s allegations:
That he entered into a "pakyaw" and sublease agreement
with Salonga for a consideration of P28,000 for each
transaction. Out of the P35,000 (as evidenced by Exh D) he
received from the private respondent on May 4, 1982,
P28,000 covered full payment of their "pakyaw" agreement
while the remaining P7,000 constituted the advance payment
for their sublease agreement.
He denied having received another amount of P28,000 from
Salonga on May 14, 1982. He contended that the instrument
dated May 14, 1982 (Exh. I) was executed to evidence their
"pakyaw" agreement and to fix its duration. He was
corroborated by Sonny Viray, who testified that it was he who
prepared the May 4, 1982, receipt of P35,000.00, P28,000 of
which was payment for the "pakyaw" and the excess of
P7,000.00 as advance for the sublease. (so nag refer ra daw
ang Exh I sa earlier money na nareceive ni Cruz from Salonga
as evidenced by Exh D. Di daw kaduha ni hatag og 28K si
Salonga niya)
RTC: Ruled in favor of the Cruz. The Judge found that the
transactions between the petitioner and the private
respondent were indeed "pakyaw" and sublease agreements.
CA: Reversed the decision of the trial court on the following
justification:
Exhibit "I" is very clear in its non-reference to the transaction
behind Exhibit "D." What only gives the semblance that
Exhibit "I" is an explanation of the transaction behind Exhibit
"D" are the oral testimonies given by the defendant and his
two witnesses. On the other hand, Exhibit "I" is very clear in
ATTY. TORREGOSA
its language. Thus, its tenor must not be clouded by any
parol evidence introduced by the defendant. And with the
tenor of Exhibit "I" remaining unembellished, the conclusion
that Exhibit "D" is a mere tentative receipt becomes
untenable.
The trial court erred when it relied on the self-serving
testimonies of the defendant and his witness as against the
receipts both parties presented and adopted as their own
exhibits. As said before, Exhibit "I" is very clear in its tenor.
And if it is really the intention of Exhibit "I" to explain the
contents of Exhibit "D", such manifestation or intention is not
found in the four corners of the former document.
The respondent court also found that the amounts of
P35,000.00, P8,000.00, P500.00, P3,000.00, P3,750.00 and
P4,000.00 were not payments for the "pakyaw" and sublease
agreement but for loans extended by Salonga to Cruz. It also
accepted Salonga's claim that the amount of P28,000.00 was
delivered to the petitioner on May 14, 1982, as payment on
the "pakyaw" agreement apart from the P35,000.00 (Exh. D)
that was paid on May 4, 1982. However, it agreed that the
amount of P6,000.00 received by the private respondent
from the petitioner should be credited in favor of the latter.
ISSUES:
1. The public respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in
(1) disregarding parol evidence to Exhibits "D" and "I"
despite the fact that these documents fall under the
exceptions provided for in Sec. 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court and thereby in (2) making a sweeping conclusion that
the transaction effected between the private respondent and
petitioner is one of contract of loan and not a contract of
lease. (MAIN)
2. Assuming for the sake of argument that exhibits "D" and
"I" evidence separate transactions, the latter document
should be disregarded, the same not having been pleaded as
a cause of action.
RULING:
1. Rule 130, Sec. 7, of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 7. Evidence of Written Agreements. — When the terms
of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be
considered as containing all such terms, and therefore, there
can be, between the parties and their successors in interest,
no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the
contents of the writing, except xxx.
The reason for the rule is the presumption that when the
parties have reduced their agreement to writing they have
made such writing the only repository and memorial of the
truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be
understood to have been waived or abandoned.
The rule, however, is NOT applicable in the case at bar,
Section 7, Rule 130 is predicated on the existence of a
document embodying the terms of an agreement, but Exhibit
D does not contain such an agreement. It is only a receipt
attesting to the fact that on May 4, 1982, the petitioner
received from the private respondent the amount of P35,000.
It is not and could not have been intended by the parties to
be the sole memorial of their agreement. As a matter of fact,
Exhibit D does not even mention the transaction that gave
U S C L A W | Page 35 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
rise to its issuance. At most, Exhibit D can only be considered
a casual memorandum of a transaction between the parties
and an acknowledgment of the receipt of money executed
by the petitioner for the private respondent's satisfaction. A
writing of this nature, as Wigmore observed is not covered
by the parol evidence rule.
A receipt — i.e. a written acknowledgment, handed by one
party to the other, of the manual custody of money or other
personality — will in general fall without the line of the rule;
i.e. it is not intended to be an exclusive memorial, and the
facts may be shown irrespective of the terms of the receipt.
This is because usually a receipt is merely a written
admission of a transaction independently existing, and, like
other admissions, is not conclusive.
The "pakyaw" was mentioned only in Exhibit I, which also
declared the petitioner's receipt of the amount of P28,000.00
as consideration for the agreement. The petitioner and his
witnesses testified to show when and under what
circumstances the amount of P28,000.00 was received. Their
testimonies do not in any way vary or contradict the terms
of Exhibit I. While Exhibit I is dated May 14, 1982, it does
not make any categorical declaration that the amount of
P28,000.00 stated therein was received by the petitioner on
that same date. That date may not therefore be considered
conclusive as to when the amount of P28,000.00 was actually
received.
A deed is not conclusive evidence of everything it may
contain. For instance, it is not the only evidence of the date
of its execution, nor its omission of a consideration conclusive
evidence that none passed, nor is its acknowledgment of a
particular consideration an objection to other proof of other
and consistent considerations; and, by analogy, the
acknowledgment in a deed is not conclusive of the fact.
A distinction should be made between a statement of fact
expressed in the instrument and the terms of the contractual
act. The former may be varied by parol evidence but not the
latter. Section 7 of Rule 130 clearly refers to the terms of an
agreement and provides that "there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the
terms of the agreement other than the contents of the
writing."
The statement in Exhibit I of the petitioner's receipt of the
P28,000.00 is just a statement of fact. It is a mere
acknowledgment of the distinct act of payment made by the
private respondent. Its reference to the amount of
P28,000.00 as consideration of the "pakyaw" contract does
not make it part of the terms of their agreement. Parol
evidence may therefore be introduced to explain Exhibit I,
particularly with respect to the petitioner's receipt of the
amount of P28,000.00 and of the date when the said amount
was received.
We find that it was error for the Court of Appeals to disregard
the parol evidence introduced by the petitioner and to
conclude that the amount of P35,000.00 received on May 4,
1982 by the petitioner was in the nature of a loan
accommodation. The Court of Appeals should have
considered the partial stipulation of facts and the testimonies
of the witnesses which sought to explain the circumstances
ATTY. TORREGOSA
surrounding the execution of Exhibits D and I and their
relation to one another.
Also, the record shows that no objection was made by the
private respondent when the petitioner introduced evidence
to explain the circumstances behind the execution and
issuance of the said instruments so he is deemed to have
waived the benefit of the parol evidence rule.
2. The CA however did not act in excess of its jurisdiction
when it appreciated Exhibit I despite the fact that it was not
pleaded as a cause of action and was objected to by the
petitioner in accordance with Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules
of Court on Amendment to conform to or authorize
presentation of evidence.
Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation
of evidence. — When issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the
pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at
any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does
not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is
objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the
issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the
presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved
thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that
the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in
maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court
may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to
meet such evidence.
31. Lechugas v. Court of Appeals
Keywords: which lot is it?.. Lot 5456?, lot 5522?
Doctrine:
parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be
invoked by either party to the litigation against the other,
where at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a
privy of a party to the written instrument in question and
does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right
originating in the instrument or the relation established
thereby.
Facts:
The petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry with
damages against the private respondents for unlawfully
entering lot no. 5456. The complaint was dismissed which
prompted Petitioner to file an action for recovery of
possession. Petitioner alleged that she bought the said land
from certain Leoncia Lesangue. Defendants, on the other
hand, maintain that the land which plaintiff bought from
Leoncia Lasangue in 1950 is different from the land now
subject of this action. To prove this point, defendants
presented their witness in the person of Leoncia Lasangue
herself. During trial, Leoncia testified that the lot she sold to
the petitioner was not lot 5456 but another lot, Lot 5522.
Lesangue did not know how to read and write, so the
document of sale was prepared by the petitioner, thereafter,
the former was made to sign it
U S C L A W | Page 36 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
RTC: ruled in favor of the defendants
CA: Affirmed RTC’s decision
Issue: Whether or not the Parol evidence rule may be
invoked against strangers to a contract.
Ruling:
No. As explained by a leading commentator on our Rules of
Court, the parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not
properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against
the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not
party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in
question and does not base a claim on the instrument or
assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation
established thereby. The petitioner's reliance on the parol
evidence rule is misplaced. The rule is not applicable where
the controversy is between one of the parties to the
document and third persons. So, even if Lechugas was a
party to the deed of sale, she was not allowed to invoke the
parol evidence rule against defendants because defendants
are not parties to the written agreement subject of the
litigation.
32. Heirs of Mario Pacres and Veneranda and v.
Heirs of Ygona and Ramirez
Keywords: Assertion of oral partition only when
expropriation proceedings for SRP expansion became
imminent; barred by PER; front portion gyud sa yuta ila gusto
TLDR; 2 siblings (Mario and Veneranda) tried to prevent the
buyers of their siblings’ share of the land from claiming
expropriation proceeds by claiming that there was an oral
partition favoring them. SC said their alleged oral partition is
barred by the PER and the petitioners weren’t even parties
to the sale in the first place.
Doctrine:
To preclude the application of the Parol Evidence Rule, it
must be shown that "at least one of the parties to the suit is
not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in
question and does not base a claim on the instrument or
assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation
established thereby." A beneficiary of a stipulation pour
autrui obviously bases his claim on the contract. He therefore
cannot claim to be a stranger to the contract and resist the
application of the Parol Evidence Rule.
Facts:
Lot No. 9 is a 1,007 square meter parcel of land located at
Kinasang-an, Pardo, Cebu City and fronting the Cebu
provincial highway. The lot originally belonged to Pastor
Pacres who left it intestate to his six (6) heirs Margarita,
Simplicia, Rodrigo, Francisco, Mario and Veñaranda
(petitioner). Petitioners admitted that at the time of
Pastor’s death in 1962, his heirs were already occupying
definite portions of Lot No. 9. The front portion along the
provincial highway was occupied by the co-owned Pacres
ancestral home, and beside it stood Rodrigo’s hut (also
fronting the provincial highway). Mario’s house stood at the
back of the ancestral house. This is how the property stood
in 1968, as confirmed by petitioner Valentina’s testimony.
ATTY. TORREGOSA
On the same year, the heirs leased "the ground floor of the
ancestral home together with a lot area of 300 square meters
including the area occupied by the house" to respondent
Ramirez, who immediately took possession thereof. In 1974,
four of the Pacres siblings (namely, Rodrigo, Francisco,
Simplicia and Margarita) sold their shares in the ancestral
home and the lot on which it stood to Ramirez. Because of
this, Ramirez’s initial possession as a lessee turned into
a co-ownership with two of the heirs (Mario and
Venaranda) who did not sell their shares in the house and
lot.
On various dates, Rodrigo, Francisco, Simplicita and
Margarita sold the rest of their remaining shares in Lot No.
to respondent Ygoña. The buyer Ygoña filed a petition to
survey and segregate the portions she bought from Lot No.
9 to which Mario objected on the ground that he wanted to
exercise his right as co-owner to redeem his siblings’
shares. Vendee Rodrigo also opposed on the ground that he
wanted to annul the sale for failure of consideration. The
complaint for legal redemption filed bd to annul the sale for
failure of consideration. The complaint for legal redemption
filed by Mario and Venaranda was dismissed on the ground
of improper exercise of the right.
In June 1993, the Republic of the Philippines (DPWH)
expropriated the front portion of Lot No. 9 for the
expansion of the Cebu south road. As occupant of the
expropriated portion, Ygoña moved to withdraw her
corresponding share in the expropriation payment.
Petitioners opposed the said motion.
A month later, July 1993, the Pacres siblings executed a
Confirmation of Oral Partition/Settlement of Estate
of Pastor Pacres (Digester’s note: This was executed years
after buyers Ygona and Ramirez took possession of the front
portions of Lot 9). The relevant statements in the affidavit
read: “That in that ORAL PARTITION, the shares or portion
to be allotted to Mario Pacres and Veñaranda Pacres Vda. de
Ababa shall be fronting the national highway, while the
shares of the rest shall be located at the rear”.
In 1994, Mario, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, filed an
ejectment suit against Ramirez’ successor-in interest
Vicentuan. Mario claimed sole ownership of the lot occupied
by Ramirez/Vicentuan by virtue of the oral partition. He
argued that Ramirez/Vicentuan should pay rentals to him for
occupying the front lot and should transfer to the rear of Lot
No. 9 where the lots of Ramirez’s vendors are located. The
court dismissed Mario’s assertion that his siblings sold the
rear lots to Ramirez. It held that the deeds of sale in favor of
Ramirez clearly described the object of the sale as the
ancestral house and lot. Thus, Ramirez has a right to
continue occupying the property he bought.
The Complaint for Specific Performance:
On 1996, Veñaranda and the heirs of Mario filed the instant
complaint for specific performance against Ygoña and
Ramirez. Mario’s heirs insist in the action for specific
performance that the heirs agreed on a partition prior to
the sale. They seek compliance with such agreement from
Ygoña and Ramirez (their siblings’ vendees), on the basis
that the two were privy to these agreements, hence bound
to comply therewith. In compliance with such partition,
U S C L A W | Page 37 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
Ygoña and Ramirez should desist from claiming any portion
of the expropriation payment for the front lots.
Their other cause of action is directed solely at Ygoña, whom
they insist agreed to unwritten additional obligations
other than the payment of the purchase price of the shares
in Lot No. 9. Veñaranda and Mario’s heirs insist that Ygoña
contracted with her vendors to assume all obligations
regarding the payment of past and present estate taxes,
survey Lot No. 9 in accordance with the oral partition, and
obtain separate titles for each portion.
Respondents denied privity with the supposed oral partition
and hence claimed they are the ones entitled to the
expropriation payment. To discredit petitioners’ assertion of
an oral partition, respondents presented Exhibit No. 1, which
is the sketch that undermined petitioners’ allegation that the
heirs partitioned the property and immediately took
possession of their allotted lots/shares. Ygoña also denied
ever agreeing to the additional obligations being imputed
against her.
RTC: In favor of Respondents (vendees). It held that the
petitioners (heirs) failed to prove partition of the lot in
accordance with petitioners’ version.
CA affirmed RTC: Since petitioners did not question the
validity of the deeds and did not assail its terms as failing to
express the true intent of the parties, the written document
stands superior over the allegations of an oral agreement.
Issue: Whether the heirs (petitioners) were able to prove
the existence of the alleged oral statements such as the:
1. Unwritten Partition; and
2. Unwritten Additional obligations of surveying and
titling.
Held:
No. The existence of an oral partition was not proven.
Petitioners’ only piece of evidence to prove the alleged oral
partition was the joint affidavit (entitled "Confirmation of Oral
Partition/Settlement of Estate") supposedly executed by
some of the Pacres siblings and their heirs in 1993 to the
effect that such an oral partition had previously been agreed
upon. Petitioners did not adequately explain why the affidavit
was executed only in 1993, several years after respondents
Ygoña and Ramirez took possession of the front portions of
Lot No. 9. If there had been an oral partition allotting the
front portions to petitioners since Pastor’s death in 1962,
they should have immediately objected to respondents’
occupation. Instead, they only asserted their ownership over
the front lots beginning in 1993 (with the execution of their
joint affidavit) when expropriation became imminent and was
later filed in court.
The heirs’ assertion of partition is further belied by their
predecessor-in-interest (Mario)’s assertion of co-ownership
over the same lot in the legal redemption case filed 10 years
ago. The allegations in that legal redemption case alleged
that Lot No.9 was owned by the Pacres siblings pro indiviso
and that Ygona bought the undivided shares of four of the
siblings.
ATTY. TORREGOSA
(Relevant Topic) With respect to the alleged additional
obligations (payment of taxes, etc) which petitioners seek to
be enforced against respondent Ygoña, the SC likewise found
that the trial and appellate courts did not err in rejecting
them as these assertions by petitioners have not been
sufficiently established.
In the first place, contracts take effect only between the
parties, their assigns and heirs. Consequently, petitioners,
not being parties to the contracts of sale between Ygoña and
the petitioners’ siblings, cannot sue for the enforcement of
the supposed obligations arising from said contracts.
Neither can they seek enforcement of a contract on the
ground of stipulations pour autrui, or stipulations for the
benefit of third parties since the written contracts of sale in
this case contain no such stipulation in favor of the
petitioners.
While petitioners claim that there was an oral stipulation, it
cannot be proven under the Parol Evidence Rule (PER).
Under this Rule, "when the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than
the contents of the written agreement." While the Rule
admits of exception, no such exception was pleaded, much
less proved, by petitioners.
The Parol Evidence Rule applies to "the parties and their
successors in interest." Conversely, it has no application to a
stranger to a contract. For purposes of the Parol Evidence
Rule, a person who claims to be the beneficiary of an alleged
stipulation pour autrui in a contract (such as petitioners) may
be considered a party to that contract. It has been held that
a third party who avails himself of a stipulation pour autrui
under a contract becomes a party to that contract.
Moreover, for Parol Evidence Rule to not apply (in relation to
stipulation pour autrui), it must be shown that "at least one
of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to
the written instrument in question and does not base a claim
on the instrument or assert a right originating in the
instrument or the relation established thereby." A beneficiary
of a stipulation pour autrui obviously bases his claim on the
contract. He therefore cannot claim to be a stranger to the
contract and resist the application of the Parol Evidence Rule.
Thus, even assuming that the alleged oral undertakings
invoked by petitioners may be deemed stipulations pour
autrui, still petitioners’ claim cannot prosper, because they
are barred from proving them by oral evidence under the
Parol Evidence Rule.
On the matter of expropriation payments, the SC ruled that
the proper venue for such issue is the expropriation court,
and not here where a different cause of action (specific
performance) is being litigated.
U S C L A W | Page 38 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
33. Silvano Gaje v. Patricia Vda de Dalisay
KEYWORDS/PHRASES: The presumption of truthfulness
engendered by notarized documents is rebuttable and yields
to clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
FACTS:
Desiderio Dalisay Sr (Dalisay Sr) bought two parcels of land
(subject properties) but the Deeds of Sale indicated Desiderio
Dalisay Jr (Dalisay Jr), his son, as the vendee. Dalisay Sr
maintained possession of the two parcels of land until his
death. Thereafter, his widow Patricia took possession of the
property, her being the special administratrix of Dalisay Sr’s
estate. She planted banana trees, corn and lemositos, as well
as donated 100 square meters to Brgy San Miguel Water
System Association.
In 1994, Dalisay Jr sold the subject properties to Gaje and
Mellonida. Patricia then filed a complaint for the annulment
of the sale made by Dalisay Jr. Patricia alleged that the
subject properties were owned by Dalisay Sr. The latter took
actual possession of the property and even leased the same
to a corporation (Davao Premier Fruits Corporation.)
Further, in a Memorandum of Agreement, the heirs of Dalisay
Sr, including Dalisay Jr, indicated their consensus to have the
estate of Dalisay Sr divided among them, which estate
includes the subject properties.
Petitioners, on the other hand, averred that it was Dalisay Jr
who bought the subject properties and only allowed his
father to make use of the same. They contend that the best
evidence to prove ownership being the two Deeds of Sale
naming Dalisay Jr as vendee.
RTC: Held that the subject properties are owned by Dalisay
Sr. Even after his death, his widow Patricia continued to
introduce improvements and even donated a parcel of land,
which was not objected by Dalisay Jr., despite his claim of
ownership. Dalisay Jr. failed to how that he exercised
attributes of ownership.
CA: Affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Dalisay, Jr. could not
have exercised the attributes of ownership because he is not
the owner of the lots. The claim of Dalisay Jr that his
ownership of the properties has been proven by his payment
of real estate taxes on the properties is also not valid
ISSUE: Whether the Deeds of Sale, which are notarized
documents and regarded as evidence of high character, may
be used as basis to prove ownership
(MINOR ISSUE: Petitioners questioned award of Atty’s fees
- this was granted as the CA did not provide basis for such
fees)
HELD:
NO. The evidence on record speaks otherwise.
Petitioners' reliance on the presumption of regularity of
notarized documents cannot overcome the evidence on
record which supports the ownership of Dalisay, Sr. over the
parcels of land.
ATTY. TORREGOSA
The presumption of truthfulness engendered by notarized
documents is rebuttable, yielding to clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary.
Even as the Deeds of Sale indicate the name of Dalisay, Jr.
as vendee of the parcels of land, it was established by strong
evidence that Dalisay, Sr. remained the owner thereof, and
had no intention of transferring the ownership of the parcels
of land exclusively to Dalisay, Jr. to the exclusion of all his
other heirs.
During the lifetime of Dalisay, Sr, he utilized the parcels of
land in the concept of an owner. He used the subject
properties as a banana plantation of his corporation. He later
leased the same to another corporation. No participation by
Dalisay, Jr. either in the utilization of the land or in the lease
thereof was shown. Petitioners even admitted that they saw
the improvements introduced by Dalisay Sr.
No objection was similarly heard from Dalisay, Jr. when
Patricia donated a portion of the subject properties to Brgy
San Miguel. He only questioned this after 21 years His silence
conflicts with human nature — an owner of the property
being expected to oppose the commission by other parties of
acts of ownership which would diminish or wrest away his
interest in the property.
Lastly, petitioners' contention that the Deeds of Sale
indicating the name of Dalisay, Jr. as vendee is the best
evidence to prove his ownership of the parcels of land does
not hold water.
In the case at bar, Patricia, is not party to the Deeds of Sale.
The rule excluding extrinsic evidence in the construction of
writings is inapplicable in a case where one of the parties to
the case is a stranger to the contract.
Patricia is a stranger to the said Deeds of Sale; thus, the trial
court properly admitted extrinsic evidence adduced by
respondent against its efficacy, and can be deemed
competent to defeat the deed.
34. Robles v. Lizarraga Hermanos
KEYWORD: HACIENDA NAHALINAN
FACTS:
Hacienda Nahalinan belonged originally to the spouses
Zacarias Sr. and Anastacia Robles, the parents of Zacarias Jr.
Upon the death, Anastacia was made administratrix. She
leased the hacienda to Zacarias Jr. for a period of 6 years.
As agreed, any permanent improvement necessary for the
cultivation and exploitation of the hacienda should be at the
expense of Zacarias Jr. As the hacienda was in a run-down
state, it was foreseen by Zacarias Jr. would put too much
expense. He thus introduced improvements into the
hacienda. The firm Lizarraga Hermanos was quite aware of
this as Zacarias Jr. was a customer of the firm. 3 years before
the lease would expire, Anastacia died. Zacarias et al, among
others, acquired the hacienda from their coheirs by way of
purchase. Lizarraga came forward as an interested buyer of
the hacienda. In the course of the negotiation, an obstacle
was encountered on the remaining lease of Zacarias Jr. It
U S C L A W | Page 39 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
was proposed that he would surrender the last 2 years and
permit Lizarraga to take possession.
It was alleged by Zacarias Jr. in the TC that the Lizarraga
agreed to pay in consideration of shortening his lease the
improvements he introduced. This was agreed to by Zacarias
Jr. and thus, the instrument of conveyance by which the
three owners, Zacarias, Jose and Evarista Robles, conveyed
the property to Lizarraga Hermanos was accordingly
executed. Furthermore, it will be noted that the three
grantors in the deed conveyed only their deceased mother;
and precisely the same words are used in defining what was
conveyed by Zacarias Robles as in defining what was
conveyed by the other two. ." What was conveyed by
Zacarias Jr. is not defined as being, in part, the hacienda
"Nahalinan," nor as including any of his rights in or to the
property conveyed other than those which he possessed in
the character of heir”. No reference was made as to the
surrender of the rights of Zacarias as lessee nor anything
concerning the improvements.
Zacarias Jr. alleged that what was conveyed by Zacarias Jr.
is not defined as being, in part, the hacienda "Nahalinan,"
nor as including any of his rights in or to the property
conveyed other than those which he possessed in the
character of heir. Upon this manifestation Zacarias Jr.
subsided; and, believing that the agreement with respect to
compensation would be carried out in good faith, he did not
further insist upon the incorporation of said agreement into
this document. Lizarraga however alleged that it is claimed
that the agreement with respect to compensating Zacarias
Jr. for improvements and other things was never in fact
made. This proposition was favorably received by the
Lizarraga; and it is admitted that an agreement was arrived
at with respect to the value of the carabao, which were taken
over for the agreed price, but it is claimed with respect to the
crop that the parties did not come into accord.
ISSUE: Whether or not the preponderance of evidence
supports Zacarias Jr.
RULING: Yes.
Zacarias Jr. introduced a letter written by Severiano Lizarraga
to Zacarias Jr. , in which reference is made to an appraisal
and liquidation and was relied upon by Zacarias as
constituting written evidence of the agreement; but it seems
to us so vague that, if it stood alone, and a written contract
were really necessary, it could not be taken as sufficient
proof of the agreement in question. But we believe that the
contract is otherwise proved by oral testimony. Carmelo
Lizarraga himself admitted — contrary to the statement of
Lizarraga's answer — that a few days before the conveyance
was executed Zacarias Jr. proposed that the Lizarraga should
buy all the things that Zacarias Jr. then had on the hacienda,
whereupon the Lizarragas informed him that they would buy
those things if an agreement should be arrived at as to the
price.
Direct testimony of Zacarias Jr. and his brother Jose to the
effect that the agreement was as claimed by Zacarias; and
this is supported by the natural probabilities of the case in
connection with a subsequent appraisal of the property,
which was rendered futile by the course pursued by Lizarraga
Hermanos.
ATTY. TORREGOSA
Lizarraga argues that the trial court erred in admitting oral
evidence of a contract different from that expressed in the
contract of sale the written contract must be taken as
expressing all agreements and stipulations entered into
between the parties.
There is no allegation in the complaint that the written
contract fails to express the agreement of the parties. The
purpose is to enforce an independent or collateral agreement
which constituted an inducement to the making of the sale,
or part of the consideration therefor. There is no rule of
evidence of wider application than that which declares
extrinsic evidence inadmissible either to contradict or vary
the terms of a written contract. The execution of a contract
in writing is deemed to supersede all oral negotiations or
stipulations.
The General Rule: The execution of a contract in writing is
deemed to supersede all oral negotiations or stipulations
concerning its terms and the subject- matter which preceded
the execution of the instrument, in the absence of accident,
fraud or mistake of fact.
Exception: Proof is admissible of any collateral, parol
agreement that is not inconsistent with the terms of the
written contract, though it may relate to the same subject-
matter.
As expressed in a standard legal encyclopedia, the doctrine
here referred to is as follows: "The rule excluding parol
evidence to vary or contradict a writing does not extend so
far as to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence to show
prior or contemporaneous collateral parol agreements
between the parties, but such evidence may be received,
regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains
any reference to such collateral agreement, and whether the
action is at law or in equity."
In the case before us the deed of conveyance purports to
transfer to the Lizarraga only such interests in certain
properties as had come to the conveyors by inheritance.
Nothing is said concerning the rights in the hacienda which
Zacarias Jr. had acquired by lease or concerning the things
that he had placed thereon by way of improvement or had
acquired by purchase. The verbal contract which Zacarias Jr.
has established in this case is therefore clearly independent
of the main contract of conveyance, and evidence of such
verbal contract is admissible under the doctrine above stated.
The rule that a preliminary or contemporaneous oral
agreement is not admissible to vary a written contract
appears to have more particular reference to the obligation
expressed in the written agreement, and the rule had never
been interpreted as being applicable to matters of
consideration or inducement. In the case before us the
written contract is complete in itself; the oral agreement is
also complete in itself, and it is a collateral to the written
contract, notwithstanding the fact that it deals with related
matters.
U S C L A W | Page 40 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
35. Spouses Amoncio v. Benedicto
Keywords: Parol evidence, exceptions, construction of 5
buildings by lessee on the rented land of the lessor
Facts:
In July 1997, Spouses Amoncio (lessors) entered into a
contract of lease with Garcia (lessee) over the 120 sq. m.
portion of their 600 sq. m. property. Garcia pre-terminated
the lease on July 1999 while respondent stayed until June
2000.
In August 1997, Spouses Amoncio also leased the 240 sq. m.
portion of the same property to respondent Benedicto for five
(5) years. The contract of lease provides:
6. That the leased parcel of land shall be
devoted exclusively for the construction
supply business of the [Lessee];
xxx xxx xxx
10. Design specification needs final
approval by the Lessor[,] while structural
improvements would have to conform to
local government specification, taxes on
structural improvement will be for the
account of the Lessee.
However, Benedicto stopped paying rentals in December
1999. Spouses Amoncio also discovered that Benedicto have
put up improvements on another 120 sq. m. portion of the
property which was not leased to him nor Garcia. Moreover,
respondent occupied the previously rented portion of Garcia.
Spouses Amoncio asked respondent to pay his arrears and
desist from continuing with his construction. Because of
respondent's failure to meet petitioners' demands, they
asked him to vacate the property and rescinded the contract
of lease.
Spouses Amoncio filed in the RTC of Quezon City a case for
recovery of possession of real property and prayed for
payment of rent for Benedicto’s and Garcia’s portions and for
the 120 sq. m. portion occupied by respondent as well as
rents in arrears.
In his answer with counterclaim, respondent denied the
accusations and alleged that it was the spouses who owed
him money. According to him, he and petitioner Wilfredo
Amoncio agreed to construct five commercial buildings on
petitioners' property. One of the buildings was to go to
Garcia, two to petitioners and the last two to him. They also
agreed that he was to finance the construction and
petitioners were to pay him for the two buildings assigned to
them. Respondent added he was to pay the rentals for five
years and surrender the buildings (on his leased portion) to
petitioners after the lapse of said period. However, in June
2000, he vacated the premises after he and petitioners could
no longer settle things amicably.
RTC Ruling: The RTC gave credence to respondent's
version and dismissed petitioners' case for lack of factual and
legal basis. It also granted respondent's counterclaim.
CA Ruling: The CA affirmed the RTC's decision and
dismissed petitioners' appeal.
ATTY. TORREGOSA
Issues:
1) WON petitioners consented to the construction of
the buildings
2) WON they waived their right to respondent's
assertion of facts that were not embodied in the lease
contract
3) WON the claims for rental should be granted
4) WON petitioners are liable to respondent
Ruling:
1. Yes. This necessitates a review of the facts which is not
a task of the Court. Moreover, petitioners' denial cannot
negate the overwhelming proof that it was petitioner
Wilfredo himself who secured the building permit for
the project. He also required that all design
specifications were to be approved by him.
2. Yes. Parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or
contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by
testimony purporting to show that, at or before the
signing of the document, other terms were orally
agreed on by the parties. Under this rule, the terms of
the written contract are conclusive upon the parties
and evidence aliunde is inadmissible to vary an
enforceable agreement embodied in the document.
Rule 130, Section 9 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 9. Evidence of written
agreements. — When the terms of the
agreement have been reduced in writing,
it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between
the parties and their successors, no
evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to
modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his
pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in
the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the
parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.
The first exception applies when the ambiguity or
uncertainty is readily apparent from reading the
contract. The wordings are so defective that what the
author of the document intended to say cannot be
deciphered. It also covers cases where the parties
commit a mutual mistake of fact, or where the document
is manifestly incomplete as the parties do not intend to
exhibit the whole agreement but only to define some of
its terms.
The second exception includes instances where the
contract is so obscure that the contractual intention of
the parties cannot be understood by mere inspection of
the instrument. Thus, extrinsic proof of its subject
matter, of the relation of the parties and of the
U S C L A W | Page 41 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
circumstances surrounding them when they entered into
the contract may be received as evidence.
Under the third exception, the parol evidence rule
does not apply where the purpose of introducing the
evidence is to show the invalidity of the contract. This
includes cases where a party alleges that no written
contract ever existed, or the parties fail to agree on the
terms of the contract, or there is no consideration for
such agreement.
The fourth exception involves a situation where the
due execution of the contract or document is in issue.
The present case does not appear to fall under any
of the given exceptions. However, a party to a
contract may prove the existence of any separate
oral agreement as to any matter which is not
inconsistent with its terms. This may be done if,
from the circumstances of the case, the court believes
that the document does not convey entirely the whole
of the parties' transaction.
In this case, there are tell-tale signs that petitioners and
respondent had other agreements We agree with the
trial court that respondent, undertook the construction
subject hereof, is not disputed by petitioners.
Respondent testified that two units thereof were
intended for petitioners, another two units for him and
one for Garcia. The building permit issued therefor by
the Building Official bore the signature of petitioner
Wilfredo. Petitioners have chosen to adopt inconsistent
positions which are barred.
Moreover, petitioners also failed to make a timely
objection against respondent's assertion of their prior
agreement on the construction of the buildings. Where
a party entitled to the benefit of the parol evidence rule
allows such evidence to be received without objection,
he cannot, after the trial has closed and the case has
been decided against him, invoke the rule in order to
secure a reversal of the judgment. Hence, by failing to
object to respondent's testimony in the trial court,
petitioners waived the protection of the parol evidence
rule.
3. No. Benedicto already paid the rent for December
1999 to June 2000 by way of advance rental and
deposit, each for 3 months. For the unexpired
portion of the lease, petitioners are also not
entitled. They already benefited from the
construction of the five buildings in their property.
Ruling in their favor would unjustly enrich them
considering that they did not spend for the
construction of the buildings. It was respondent
who financed the entire project which, however,
was taken over completely by petitioners.
As a rule, the contract is the law between the
parties that must be enforced in sensu
strictione. However, it cannot be done under
the circumstances of this case. To do so
would result in a patently unjust juridical
ATTY. TORREGOSA
situation. We, as a court not only of justice
but of equity as well, may exercise our
equitas jurisdictio to refine the rough edges
of the rule and avoid injustice.
4. Yes. Since the trial court allowed respondent's
testimony as evidence of the parties' prior
agreement (regarding the construction of the
buildings and the cost thereof), petitioners should
pay respondent. Petitioners never disputed the
construction of the two buildings given to them. If
one of the contracting parties derived some benefit
but did not give anything for it to the other, it is
only fair that he should return the amount by which
he was unjustly enriched.
36. Palanca v. Wilson
Keywords: breach of contract; intrinsic ambiguity of the
meaning of “capacity”; production vs treatment; alcohol is
life
Principle: Section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure
providing that a written agreement shall be presumed to
contain all the terms, nevertheless "does not exclude
other evidence of the circumstances under which the
agreement was made, or to which it relates, or to
explain an intrinsic ambiguity”
FACTS:
Song Fo & Co. of Manila, through its manager Carlos
Palanca, entered into a contract with Fred Wilson & Co.
for the purchase of a distilling apparatus. Wilson & Co
ordered the apparatus of Turner, Schon & Co., London.
About five months after the machine was installed, Palanca
wrote Wilson & Co. that the rectifying machine had been
examined by a number of competent persons who stated
that the machine was not capable of producing the
amount of alcohol stipulated in the contract. Getting
no satisfaction from the reply of Wilson & Co., action for
damages for breach of contract was begun in the CFI of
Manila, praying first that the defendant be ordered to comply
strictly with the terms of the contract and second that the
defendant be ordered to pay as damages the amount of
P16,713.80.
Appellant Palanca argues that there has been a breach of the
contract in that instead of the machine having a capacity of
6,000 liters for every 24 hours of work, it only had a
producing capacity of 480 liters for this period of time.
Appellant thus requires that all the terms of the contract be
given effect with special emphasis upon the phrase “de un
grado de 96-97 Gay Lussac” [translation: a machine
producing alcohol of a grade 96-97 Gay Lussac]. According
to him, this last phrase in connection with the phrase “de una
capacidad de 6,000 litros cada 24 horas de trabajo”
[translation: capacity of 6,000 litres for every 24 hours of
work], could not possibly mean that the machine was only to
take in 6,000 liters, for this would be improbably in view of
the word “capacity” as indicating receptivity and on the
preliminary negotiations as explaining the intentions of the
parties.
U S C L A W | Page 42 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
Thus, appellant Carlos Palanca, the manager of Song Fo &
Co., and now the successor of the company testified that he
told the agents of Wilson & Co. that he needs a machine
that would produce at least 6,000 liters of alcohol a
day.
On the other hand, the agent of Wilson & Co squarely
contradicted this on the stand and said Palanca asked him to
get a price on an apparatus to treat 6,000 liters. [Note:
IOW, according to Wilson & Co, the term “capacity” was for
the “treatment” of 6,000 liters (as raw material) and not the
“production” of 6,000 liters]
ISSUE: WON Fred Wilson is liable for breach of contract –
NO
HELD:
The agreement was for the treatment of 6,000 liters, not
production.
SC resolved the issue from 2 directions:
1. By taking up the meaning of the words themselves
2. By evidence of the circumstances under which the
agreement was made
As to the meaning of the word “capacity”
The terms of the contract disclose the following essential
constitutes:
(1) A machine Guillaume, type "C" (Agricola) as described on
page 30 of the Catalogue Egrot, edition of 1907;
(2) A machine of a capacity of 6,000 liters for every 24 hours
of work, and
(3) A machine producing alcohol of a grade 96-97 Gay
Lussac.
Type C (Agricola) as described on pages 30 and 31 of the
catalogue mentions the grade of alcohol guaranteed of 96-
97 Gay Lusaac, but contains no mention of a capacity of
6,000 liters a day. Passing the second element for the
moment, there is no dispute in the record, or more properly
speaking the plaintiff did not prove, that the machine
did not turn out alcohol of the grade 96-97 Gay
Lussac. Predicated therefore on the description to be found
in the catalogue, it is plain that the defendant sold to the
plaintiff the machine there mentioned. This leave for
interpretation the word “capacity”.
That in connection with the distilling of liquor, the word
"capacity" may have different meanings unless restricted in
terminology. The ordinary meaning of the word as defined in
English and Spanish dictionaries both denote that it means
“anything that can receive or contain”.
We think, however, that it can be laid down as a premise for
further discussion that there is intrinsic ambiguity in the
contract which needs explanation. Section 285 of the
Code of Civil Procedure providing that a written
agreement shall be presumed to contain all the terms,
nevertheless "does not exclude other evidence of the
circumstances under which the agreement was
made, or to which it relates, or to explain an intrinsic
ambiguity."
ATTY. TORREGOSA
As to the surrounding circumstances
Turning, therefore, to the surrounding circumstances, we
find the following: Wilson & Co. in their offer to Song Fo
& Co., while mentioning capacity, only did so in
express connection with the name and description of
the machine as illustrated in the catalogue. They
furnished Song Fo & Co. with plans and specifications of the
distilling apparatus; and these describe a capacity of
6,000 liters of jus (ferment).
Wilson & Co.'s order to manufacturer, while
mentioning a capacity of 6,000 liters per day, does so
again in connection with the description in the
maker's catalogue. And, finally, it was stated during the
trial, and it has not been denied, that a machine capable of
producing 6,000 liters of rectified alcohol every 24 hours from
nipa ferment would cost between P35,000 and P40,000.
The proper construction of clause 1 of the contract, in
question in connection with the conduct of the parties and
surrounding circumstances, is that Wilson & Co. were to
furnish Song Fo & Co. a distilling apparatus, type C
(Agricola), as described on page 30 of the maker's
catalogue, capable of receiving or treating 6,000
liters every 24 hours of work and of producing alcohol
of a grade 96-97 Gay Lussac.
37. Enriquez v. Ramos
KEYWORDS:
Parol evidence, exception.. Deed of sale did not reflect true
agreement to build feeder roads in the subdivision.
DOCTRINE:
 The Parol Evidence Rule (Rule 130, Sec. 9, par. 1)
provides that when the terms of an agreement had BEEN
REDUCED TO WRITING it is to be considered as
containing all that has been agreed upon and that no
evidence other than the terms there can be admitted
between the parties (meaning no evidence aliunde or
evidence outside the written agreement can be
admitted; otherwise stated, only the contents of the
written agreement can be admitted in evidence)
 However, this is not without exceptions. If
there is an allegation in the pleadings that
the agreement DOES NOT EXPRESS the intent
of the parties, parol evidence or evidence
aliunde may be offered in evidence. So, for the
exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule to be availed
of, they must be PUT IN ISSUE in the pleadings.
SUMMARY:
 WRITTEN INSTRUMENT IN QUESTION: Contract
of Sale with Mortgage (Exhibit A) between Enriquez
et al. and Ramos.
 ALLEGED ORAL AGREEMENT: That Enriquez et al
would undertake the construction of roads.
 PAROL EVIDENCE: An instrument entitled
“Explanation” (Exhibit 3) used by Ramos to prove
the existence of the alleged oral agreement.
FACTS:
Ramos purchased from Enriquez et al. 20 parcels of land
located in Quezon City and covered by transfer certificates of
U S C L A W | Page 43 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
title for the amount of P235,056.00 of which only the amount
of P35,056.00 was paid on the date of sale, the balance of
P200,000.00 being payable within two years from the date
of sale, with interest and an acceleration clause.
To secure the payment of the balance of P200,000.00
defendant executed a mortgage in favor of plaintiffs upon
the 20 parcels of land sold and on a half interest over a parcel
of land in Bulacan which was embodied in the same deed of
sale, and said deed of sale with mortgage was registered in
the Offices of the Registers of Deeds of Quezon City and
Pampanga.
Ramos broke certain stipulations contained in said deed of
sale with mortgage, thus, plaintiffs instituted foreclosure
proceedings. Ramos set up as an affirmative defense
that the contract mentioned in the complaint DOES
NOT EXPRESS THE TRUE AGREEMENT OF THE
PARTIES because certain important conditions
agreed upon were not included therein by the counsel
who prepared the contract; that the stipulation that was
omitted from the contract was the PROMISE ASSUMED BY
PLAINTIFFS THAT THEY WOULD CONSTRUCT ROADS in the
lands which were to be subdivided for sale on or before
January, 1959.
Ramos alleged that it was the plaintiffs’ counsel who
suggested NOT TO INCLUDE the same
promise/agreement BECAUSE there exists a Quezon
City Ordinance that required the construction of
feeder roads, thus it was WAS ALREADY DEEMED TO
BE PART of the contract. Ramos offered the
instrument titled “Explanation” marked as Exhibit 3
to prove that such plaintiffs’ promise/oral agreement
existed.
Ramos further claims that the true purchase price of the sale
was not P235,056.00 but only P185,000.00, the difference of
P50,000.00 being the voluntary contribution of defendant to
the cost of the construction of the roads which plaintiffs
assumed to do as abovementioned.
The RTC allowed the presentation of and admitted in
evidence Exhibit 3 (the “Explanation”) – a parol
evidence – to prove that a contemporaneous oral
agreement was also reached between parties relative
to the construction of the roads.
Plaintiff claims that the RTC violated the Parol Evidence
Rule (Rule 130, Sec. 9, par. 1) which provides that when the
terms of an agreement had BEEN REDUCED TO WRITING it
is to be considered as containing all that has been agreed
upon and that no evidence other than the terms there can
be admitted between the parties (meaning no evidence
allunde or evidence outside the written agreement can be
admitted; otherwise stated, only the contents of the written
agreement can be admitted in evidence)
ISSUE: Whether an agreement outside a document (the
agreement to build feeder roads) may be considered as an
exception to parole evidence rule?
ATTY. TORREGOSA
RULING:
YES, parole evidence rule admits of an exception. We
find no error in the conclusion reached by the court a quo for
indeed that is the condition to be expected by a person who
desires to purchase a big parcel of land for purposes of
subdivision.
In a subdivision the main improvement to be undertaken
before it could be sold to the public is feeder roads as
otherwise it would be inaccessible and valueless and would
offer no attraction to the buying public. That such
requirement was uppermost in the mind of defendant is
proven by the execution by the plaintiffs of the so-called
"Explanation" (Exhibit 3) on the very day the deed of sale
was executed wherein it was stated that the sum of
P50,000.00 was advanced by defendant as her contribution
to the construction of the roads which plaintiffs assumed to
undertake "in accordance with the provisions of the City
Ordinance of Quezon City."
The RTC did not err in allowing presentation of parole
evidence to prove that a contemporaneous oral agreement
was also reached between parties relative to the construction
of the roads. The parole evidence rule provides that when
the terms of an agreement had been reduced to writing it is
to be considered as containing all that has been agreed upon
and that no evidence other than the terms there can be
admitted between the parties (Section 22, Rule 123). This
rule, however, only holds true if there is allegation
that the agreement does not express the intent of the
parties. If there is and this claim is in issue in the
pleadings, the same may be the subject parole
evidence.
Here, Ramos HAS SPECIFICALLY PLEADED that the
contract of sale in question DOES NOT EXPRESS the
true intent of the parties with regard to the
construction of the roads. This is clear in the answer
wherein defendant has specifically pleaded that the contract
of sale in question does not express the true intent of the
parties with regard to the construction of the roads.
Thus, the RTC DID NOT ERR in admitting the
“Explanation” (Exhibit 3) in evidence. It appearing that
plaintiffs have failed to comply with the condition precedent
relative to the construction of the roads in the subdivision in
question, it follows that their action is premature as found by
the court a quo.
38. Land Settlement and Development Co. v. Garcia
Keywords: Tractor; Letter
Doctrine: When the operation of the contract is made to
depend upon the occurrence of any event, which, for that
reason is a condition precedent, such may be established by
parol evidence. This is not varying the terms of the written
contract by extrinsic agreement, for the simple reason that
there is no contract in existence; there is nothing to which to
apply the excluding rule.
Facts:
Settlement and Development Corp. (SADECO) filed a case for
specific performance against Garcia Plantation Co., Inc. and
U S C L A W | Page 44 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
Salud C. De Garcia and Vicente B. Garcia for the recovery of
a sum of money representing the unpaid balance of two
tractors that Garcia Plantation purchased from them. The
spouses were also impleaded because Salud executed two
promissory notes where she personally assumed the
obligation.
The defendants admitted the execution of the promissory
notes but alleged that the contract was novated by a
subsequent agreement contained in a letter sent by Filomino
Kintanar, Manager, Board of Liquidators of SADECO giving
Salud an extension up to May 31, 1957 to settle the account,
and since the complaint was filed on February 20, 1957, they
claimed that the action was premature and prayed for its
dismissal.
The plaintiffs admitted the due execution and genuineness
of the letter but argued that it did not express the true intent
and agreement of the parties.
At the trial, plaintiffs presented Atty. Guinto, Legal Officer of
the Board of Liquidators to testify on the true agreement and
intention of the parties at the time of the letter was drafted
and prepared. However, the court, upon the objection of
defendants, ruled out said testimony and prevented the
introduction of the evidence under the parol evidence rule.
Plaintiff also wanted to present Mr. Kintanar, the one who
drafted the letter, but in viewing of the ruling of the court, it
rested its case instead.
The lower court dismissed the case, stating that the action
was premature. The CA certified the case to the SC, pointing
that the questions presented were purely legal in nature.
Issue: WON the trial court was correct in excluding
parol evidence, tending to prove the true intention
and agreement of the parties and the existence of a
condition precedent, before the extension granted
the defendants, contained in the letter, could become
effective.
Ruling:
The parol evidence consisted of the testimony of Attys.
Guinto and Kintanar. The effectivity of the said novation
(extension of time to pay) was premised on a prior
agreement between the parties that the defendants “will
make a substantial downpayment immediately, with the
understanding that upon non-payment of the substantial
amount, the extension shall be deemed as not granted and
the LASADECO shall feel free to seek redress in court.” The
said condition was also manifested in the second paragraph
of the letter: 1st paragraph: please be advised that the Board
has granted you an extension up to May 31 1957, within
which to pay your account. 2nd paragraph: “this matter has
been the subject of agreement between your husband and
this office”
The subject of agreement alluded to in the second
paragraph, was the condition to be complied with for the
extension of time.
The lower court should have admitted the parol evidence to
prove the failure of the document in question to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties. It should not have
ATTY. TORREGOSA
improvidently and hastily excluded said parol evidence,
knowing that that the subject matter therein was one of the
exceptions to the parol evidence rule.
When the operation of the contract is made to depend upon
the occurrence of any event, which, for that reason is a
condition precedent, such may be established by parol
evidence. This is not varying the terms of the written contract
by extrinsic agreement, for the simple reason that there is
no contract in existence; there is nothing to which to apply
the excluding rule.
This rule does not prevent the introduction of extrinsic
evidence to show that a supposed contract never became
effective by reason of the failure of some collateral condition
or stipulation, pre-requisite to liability.
The rule excluding parole evidence to vary or contradict a
writing, does not extend so far as to preclude the admission
of extrinsic evidence, to show prior or contemporaneous
collateral parol agreements between the parties, but such
evidence may be received regardless of whether or not the
written agreement contains reference to such collateral
agreement.
The courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may admit
evidence of surrounding circumstances, in order to arrive at
the true intention of the parties.
Had the trial court permitted to prove the condition
precedent to the extension of the payment, the said plaintiff
would have been able to show that because the defendants
failed to pay a substantial downpayment, the agreement was
breached and the contract contained in the letter never
became effective and the extension should be considered as
not having been given at all.
39. Heirs of Ureta v. Heirs of Ureta
Keywords: Extra judicial sale of partition, Parol Evidence
Rule
Doctrine: The objection against the admission of any
evidence must be made at the proper time, as soon as the
grounds therefor become reasonably apparent, and if not so
made, it will be understood to have been waived. In the case
of testimonial evidence, the objection must be made when
the objectionable question is asked or after the answer is
given if the objectionable features become apparent only by
reason of such answer.
Facts:
Alfonso Ureta had 14 children and was financially well-off
during his lifetime. He owned several fishpens, a fishpond, a
sari-sari store, a passenger jeep, and was engaged in the
buying and selling of copra.
Alfonso executed four Deeds of Sale covering several parcels
of land in favor of 3 of his children Policronio, Liberato,
Prudencia, and his common-law wife, Valeriana Dela Cruz.
This was suggested by his son Francisco, who was then
municipal judge, to reduce the inheritance taxes. Alfonso
continued to own, possess, and enjoy the lands and their
produce.
U S C L A W | Page 45 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403
When Alfonso died, the parcels of the land transferred to
Policronio were tenanted by the Fernandez Family (except
for a portion of parcel 5). These tenants never turned over
the produce of the lands to Policronio or any of his heirs, but
to Alfonso and, later, to the administrators of his
estate. Policronio died on November 22, 1974. Except for
the said portion of parcel 5, neither Policronio nor his heirs
ever took possession of the subject lands.
Alfonso’s heirs executed a Deed of Extra -Judicial Partition
which included all the lands that were covered by the 4 deeds
of sale that were previously executed by Alfonso for taxation
purposes. Conrado, Policronio’s eldest son, representing the
Heirs of Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
in behalf of his co-heirs. It appears that the rest of
Policronio’s heirs are not aware of this agreement.
Believing that the six parcels of land belonged to their late
father, and as such, excluded from the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition, the Heirs of Policronio sought to amicably settle the
matter with the Heirs of Alfonso. However, no settlement was
made, hence, Heirs of Policronio filed a complaint for
Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of Possession,
Annulment of Documents, Partition, and Damages against
the Heirs of Alfonso before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
In 2001, RTC dismissed the complaint of Heirs of Policronio.
RTC found that heirs of Policronio failed to rebut the evidence
of the Heirs of Alfonso which proved that the Deed of Sale in
the possession of the former was one of the 4 Deeds of Sale
executed by Alfonso for taxation purposes, and that
Policronio or his heirs never took possession of the subject
lands except a portion of parcel 5. RTC also found that there
was no money involved in the sale. Even granting that there
was, as claimed by the Heirs of Policronio, ₱2,000.00 for six
parcels of land, the amount was grossly inadequate. The
RTC, however, found that the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
was valid as all the heirs of Alfonso were represented and
received equal shares and all the requirements of a valid
extra-judicial partition were met.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC ruling that the
Deed of Sale was void being absolutely simulated. Alfonso
continued to exercise all the rights of an owner. On the other
hand, Policronio never exercised any rights of ownership,
never demanded delivery of the produce, and never paid
realty taxes on the properties. Also, the testimony of Amparo
Castillo (one of the grandchildren), as to the circumstances
surrounding the actual arrangement and agreement between
the parties prior to the execution of the Deeds of Sale, was
not rebutted. The CA, however, annulled the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Partition due to the incapacity of Conrado to validly
bind his co-heirs as there is no Special Power of Attorney.
The heirs of Policronio filed a Motion for Reconsideration
(MR) arguing that the Best Evidence Rule was violated in
giving credence to the testimony of Amparo Castillo with
regard to the simulation of the Deed of Sale.
The CA held that the oral testimony was admissible under
Sec. 9(b) of Rule 130, which provides that evidence aliunde
may be allowed to explain the terms of the written
agreement if the same failed to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties or when the validity of the written
ATTY. TORREGOSA
agreement was put in issue. The heirs of Policronio waived
their right to object to evidence aliunde when they failed to
do so during trial. The heirs of Policronio argue that the rules
on parol evidence and hearsay were violated by the CA in
ruling that the Deed of Sale was void.They argued that based
on the parol evidence rule, the Heirs of Alfonso and,
specifically, Amparo Castillo, were not in a position to prove
the terms outside of the contract because they were not
parties nor successors-in-interest in the Deed of Sale in
question. They also argued that the parol evidence rule may
not be properly invoked by either party in the litigation
against the other, where at least one of the parties to the
suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written
instrument in question and does not base a claim on the
instrument or assert a right in the instrument or the relation
established thereby.
Issue: WON the testimony of Castillo can be admitted in
evidence without violating the Parol Evidence Rule
Ruling: YES. The heirs of Policronio are deemed to have
waived the benefit of the parol evidence rule for failing to
timely object to Castillo’s testimony.
The objection against the admission of any evidence must be
made at the proper time, as soon as the grounds therefor
become reasonably apparent, and if not so made, it will be
understood to have been waived. In the case of testimonial
evidence, the objection must be made when the
objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given
if the objectionable features become apparent only by reason
of such answer.
In this case, the Heirs of Policronio failed to timely object to
the testimony of Amparo Castillo and they are, thus, deemed
to have waived the benefit of the parol evidence rule.
Assuming arguendo that they timely objected, their
argument would still fail. Par. (b) and (c) of Sec. 9 of Rule
130 are applicable in this case. Sec. 9 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court provides that when the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing
all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or
add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in
his pleading: (a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or
imperfection in the written agreement; (b) The failure of the
written agreement to express the true intent and agreement
of the parties thereto; (c) The validity of the written
agreement; or (d) The existence of other terms agreed to by
the parties or their successors in interest after the execution
of the written agreement. The term “agreement” includes
wills.
The failure of the Deed of Sale to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties was clearly put in issue in the
complaint. It was alleged that the Deed of Sale was only
made to lessen the payment of estate and inheritance taxes
and not meant to transfer ownership. The exception in
paragraph (b) is allowed to enable the court to ascertain the
true intent of the parties, and once the intent is clear, it shall
prevail over what the document appears to be on its face. As
U S C L A W | Page 46 of 47
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 2 – EH 403 ATTY. TORREGOSA

the true intent of the parties was duly proven in the present Issue: whether or not the parol evidence on the extension
case, it now prevails over what appears on the Deed of Sale. of the redemption period be admitted?
The exception in paragraph (c) is also applicable. The validity
of the Deed of Sale was also put in issue. The operation of Ruling:
the parol evidence rule requires the existence of a valid Yes. The SC said that they found nothing in the record
written agreement. Thus, it is not applicable in a proceeding which would justify in disturbing the findings of the trial
where the validity of such agreement is the fact in dispute, judge who accepted her testimony as a substantially
such as when a contract may be void for lack of true account of all that occurred, and declined to
consideration. believe the conflicting testimony of the defendant
which he characterized as vague and incredible. The
Considering that the Deed of Sale has been shown to be void defendant having extended the time within which the
for being absolutely simulated and for lack of consideration, plaintiff could repurchase the land on condition that she
the Heirs of Alfonso are not precluded from presenting would find the money and make repurchase within the
evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written extended period, it is clear that he cannot be permitted to
agreement. Indeed, the applicability of the parol evidence repudiate his promise, it appearing that the plaintiff stood
rule requires that the case be between parties and their ready to make the payment within the extended period,
successors-in-interest. In this case, both the Heirs of Alfonso and was only prevented from doing so by the conduct of
and the Heirs of Policronio are successors-in-interest of the the defendant himself.
parties to the Deed of Sale as they claim rights under Alfonso
and Policronio, respectively. The parol evidence rule The court further ruled that the rule forbidding the
excluding evidence aliunde, however, still cannot apply admission of parol or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary, or
because the present case falls under two exceptions to the contradict a written instrument does not apply so as to
rule, as discussed above. prohibit the establishment by parol of an agreement
between the parties to a writing, entered into subsequent
40. Canuto v. Mariano to the time when the written instrument was executed,
notwithstanding such agreement may have the effect of
Keywords: Parol evidence; Christmas; Jose Mari adding to, changing, modifying, or even altogether
Chan; Extension of redemption period abrogating the contract of the parties as evidenced by the
writing; for the parol evidence does not in any way
Facts: deny that the original agreement of the parties was
Canuto (plaintiff) executed a deed of sale on Dec. 4, 1913 that which the writing purports to express, but
of the parcel of land described in the complaint to Mariano merely goes to show that the parties have exercised
(defendant), for the sum of P360, reserving the right to their right to change or abrogate the same, or to
repurchase the land for that amount within one year from make a new and independent contract.
the date of the deed of sale. The redemption period having
elapsed, and the plaintiff having failed to exercise her right It makes no difference how soon after the execution of the
to repurchase within that period, the defendant set up written contract the parol one was made. If it was in fact
a claim of absolute ownership to the land, subsequent and is otherwise unobjectionable it may be
notwithstanding the insistent demand of the plaintiff that proved and enforced.
she be permitted to exercise her reserved right of
repurchase in accordance with an alleged oral agreement
for the extension of the redemption period down to the end
of the month of December. Canuto, on the second day of
December, 1914, while she was washing clothes, two days
before the expiration of the original redemption period, she
asked the defendant, who passed by, for an extension of
time for the repurchase of the land and that upon her
promise to make the repurchase during the month of
December, 1914, the defendant agreed to extend the
redemption set out in the written contract, to the end of
that month; that after the expiration of the original
redemption period, she thought to make the repurchase in
accordance with the agreement as to the extension of the
time therefor; but the defendant failed to appear at the
time and place, which was the residence of Atty. Mercado,
she then went to his house, but was told that he was not
at home; and that since that time defendant has refused
to carry out his oral agreement, claiming that the
redemption period set out in the original deed of sale
expired on the fourth day of December, 1914, and that she
had no right to repurchase the land after that date.
Severino Pascual, who was present when the oral
agreement to extend the time for the repurchase of the
land was made, corroborated her testimony in this regard.

U S C L A W | Page 47 of 47