THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT

A. Definition and Role of Law, Arts. 267, 251 (b); Book V, Rule I, Sec. 1 (d)

 Belyca Corporation v. Calleja, 168 SCRA 184 (1988)SAUZA

FACTS:

Belyca Corporation, the petitioner herein, is a duly organized, registered and existing
corporation engaged in the business of poultry raising, piggery and planting of agricultural
crops such as corn, coffee and various vegetables which employs approximately 205 rank
and file employees/workers,

On June 3, 1986, private respondent Associated Labor Union (ALU)-TUCP, a legitimate

labor organization duly registered with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, filed with the
Regional Office of the Ministry of Labor and Employment at Cagayan de Oro City, a petition
for direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file
employees/workers of Belyca. The collective bargaining unit sought in the petition, or in
case of doubt of the union's majority representation, for the issuance of an order authorizing
the immediate holding of a certification election. Although the case was scheduled for
hearing at least three times, no amicable settlement was reached by the parties. During the
scheduled hearing of July 31, 1986 they, however, agreed to submit simultaneously their
respective position papers on or before August 11, 1986. But petitioner contends that the
bargaining unit must include all the workers in its integrated business concerns ranging from
piggery, poultry, to supermarts and cinemas so as not to split an otherwise single bargaining
unit into fragmented bargaining units.

The Labor Arbiter granted the certification election sought for by petitioner union in his
order dated August 18, 1986.

On February 4, 1987, respondent employer Belyca Corporation, appealed the order of the
Labor Arbiter to the Bureau of Labor Relations in Manila which denied the appeal and the
motion for reconsideration. Thus, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction seeking to annul or to set aside the resolution of the Bureau of Labor
Relations dated November 24, 1986 and denying the appeal, and the Bureau's resolution
dated January 13, 1987 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the proposed bargaining unit is an appropriate bargainingunit?

HELD:
No, the Labor Code does not specifically definewhat constitutes an appropriate
collective bargaining unit. Article 256 of the Codeprovides: Exclusive bargaining
representative.—The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the
employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be exclusive representative
of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. However, an
individual employee or group of employee shall have the right at any time to present
grievances to their employer.

Among the factors considered in Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co.
Inc. (103 Phil 1103 [1958]) are: "(1) will of employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and
unity of employee's interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties or similarity of
compensation and working conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and probationary employees". Under the
circumstances of that case, the Courtstressed the importance of the fourth factor and
sustained the trial court's conclusion that two separate bargaining units should be formed
in dealing with respondent company, one consisting of regular and permanent employees
and another consisting of casual laborers or stevedores.

Otherwise stated, temporary employees should be treated separately from permanent

employees. But more importantly, this Court laid down the test of proper grouping, which is
community and mutuality of interest.

Among others, the noted differences are: their working conditions, hours of work, rates of
pay, including the categories of their positions and employment status. As stated by
petitioner corporation in its position paper, due to the nature of the business in which its
livestock-agro division is engaged very few of its employees in the division are permanent,
the overwhelming majority of which are seasonal and casual and not regular employees.
Definitely, they have very little in commonwith the employees of the supermarts and
cinemas. To lump all the employees of petitioner in its integrated business concerns cannot
result in an efficacious bargaining unit comprised of constituents enjoying a community or
mutuality of interest. Undeniably, the rank and file employees of the livestock-agro division
fully constitute a bargaining unit that satisfies both requirements of classification according
to employment status and of the substantial similarity of work and duties which will
ultimately assure its members the exercise of their collective bargainingrights.

B. Determination of Appropriate Bargaining Unit

1. Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil

 Mariculum Mining Corporation v. Florentino, et al., G.R. Nos. 221813 &

222723, 23 July 2018PAGUICAN
FACTS:
The dispute traces its roots back to when the Philippine National Bank and the Development
Bank of the Philippines transferred its ownership of Maricalum Mining to the National
Government for disposition or privatization because it had become a non-performing asset.

The National Government thru the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) executed a Purchase and
Sale Agreement (PSA) with G Holdings, a domestic corporation primarily engaged in the
business of owning and holding shares of stock of different companies. G Holdings bought
90% of Maricalum Mining’s shares and financial claims in the form of company notes.
Concomitantly, G Holdings also assumed Maricalum Mining’s liabilities in the form of
company notes. Upon signing the PSA and paying the down payment, G Holdings
immediately took physical possession of Maricalum’sSipalay Mining Complex, as well as its
facilities, and took full control of the latter’s management and operations. The Sipalay General
Hospital, Inc. was then incorporated to provide medical services and facilities to the general
public.

Some of the Maricalum’s employees who retired formed several manpower cooperatives.
Each of the said cooperatives executed identical sets of Memorandum of Agreement with
Maricalum wherein they undertook, among others, to provide the latter with a steady supply of
workers, machinery and equipment for a monthly fee.

Some of Maricalum’s workers, including complainants, and some of Sipalay General

Hospital’s employees jointly filed Complaint with the Labor Arbiter against G Holdings, its
president, and officer-in-charge, and the cooperatives and its officers for illegal dismissal,
underpayment and nonpayment of salaries, underpayment of overtime pay, underpayment of
premium pay for holiday, nonpayment of separation pay, underpayment of holiday pay,
nonpayment of service incentive leave pay, nonpayment of vacation and sick leave,
nonpayment of 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

In its decision, the LA ruled in favor of complainants. It held that G Holdings is guilty of labor-
only contracting with the manpower cooperatives thereby making them all of them solidarily
and directly liable to complainants. The LA reasoned that G Holdings connived with
Maricalum in orchestrating the formation of manpower cooperatives to circumvent
complainants’ labor standard rights.

The NLRC modified the ruling of the LA. Some are not entitled to the monetary awards
because they were not able to establish the fact of their employment. Also, the NLRC
imposed the liability of paying the monetary awards imposed by LA against Maricalum,
instead of G Holdings, because it was Maricalum not G Holdings who entered into service
contracts by way of MOA with each of the manpower cooperatives. The court already ruled
that G Holdings and Maricalum have separate and distinct corporate personalities.
The CA denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the NLRC. It emphasized that the
NLRC’s factual findings are conclusive and binding on the appellate courts when they are
supported by substantial evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the NLRC’s ruling which allowed the piercing
of the corporate veil against Maricalum Mining and not Sipalay Hospital.

HELD:
The records show that Maricalum was guilty of entering into labor-only contracting agreement
with the manpower cooperatives, thus, all of them are solidarily liable to the complainants by
virtue of Article 106 of the Labor Code.

The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only in three basic areas, namely: (a)
defeat of public convenience as when the corporate fiction is used as a vehicle for the
evasion of an existing obligation; (b) fraud cases or when the corporate entity is used to justify
a wrong, protect fraud, or defend a crime; or (c) alter ego cases, where a corporation is
merely a farce since it is a mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or where the
corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to make it
merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation.

While the veil of corporate fiction maybe pierced under certain instances, mere ownership of
a subsidiary does not justify the imposition of liability on the parent company. It must further
appear that to recognize a parent and a subsidiary as separate entities would aid in the
consummation of a wrong. Thus, a holding corporation has a separate corporate existence
and is to be treated as a separate entity; unless the facts show that such separate corporate
existence is a mere sham, or has been used as an instrument for concealing the truth.

Piercing the corporate veil based on the alter ego theory requires the concurrence of three
elements: control of the corporation by the stockholder or parentcorporation, fraud or
fundamental unfairness imposed on the plaintiff, and harm or damage caused to the plaintiff
by the fraudulent or unfair act of the corporation. The absence of any of these elements
prevents piercing the corporate veil.

In this case, complainants have not successfully proven that G Holdings fraudulently
exercised its control over Maricalumto fraudulently evade any obligation. They also fell short
of proving that G Holdings had exercised operational control over employees of Sipalay
Hospital.

 Ang Lee v. SamanhangManggagawa ng Super Lamination (SMSLS-

NAFLU-KMU), 809 SCRA 313 (2016)ESTRELLADO

Facts:

Petitioner ErsonAng Lee, through Super Lamination, is a duly registered entity principally
engaged in the business of providing lamination services to the general public. Respondent
Samahan ng mgaManggagawa ng Super Lamination Services (Union A) is a legitimate labor
organization, which is also a local chapter affiliate of the National Federation of Labor Unions
- Kilusang Mayo Uno. It appears that Super Lamination is a sole proprietorship under
petitioner's name,[5] while Express Lamination and Express Coat are duly incorporated
entities separately registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Union A filed a Petition for Certification Election[7] to represent all the rank-and-file employees
of Super Lamination.[8]On the same date, Express Lamination Workers' Union (Union B) also
filed a Petition for Certification Election to represent all the rank-and-file employees of
Express Lamination.[9]Also on the same date, the Samahan ng mgaManggagawa ng Express
Coat Enterprises, Inc. (Union C) filed a Petition for Certification Election to represent the rank-
and-file employees of Express Coat.[10]

Super Lamination, Express Lamination, and Express Coat, all represented by one counsel,
separately claimed in their Comments and Motions to Dismiss that the petitions must be
dismissed on the same ground — lack of employer-employee relationship between these
establishments and the bargaining units that Unions A, B, and C seek to represent as well as
these unions' respective members. Super Lamination, in its Motion, posited that a majority of
the persons who were enumerated in the list of members and officers of Union A were not its
employees, but were employed by either Express Lamination or Express
Coat.[12] Interestingly, both Express Lamination and Express Coat, in turn, maintained the
same argument that a majority of those who had assented to the Petition for Certification
Election were not employees of either company, but of one of the two other companies
involved.[13]

All three Petitions for Certification Election of the Unions were denied. On 21 May 2008, an
Order was issued by DOLE denying the respective petitions of Unions B and C on the ground
that there was no existing employer-employee relationship between the members of the
unions and the companies concerned. On 23 May 2008, DOLE also denied the petition of
respondent Union A on the same ground.

The three unions filed their respective appeals before the Office of the DOLE Secretary,
which consolidated the appeal.DOLE found that Super Lamination, Express Lamination, and
Express Coat were sister companies that had a common human resource department
responsible for hiring and disciplining the employees of the three companies. The same
department was found to have also given them daily instructions on how to go about their
work and where to report for work. It also found that the three companies involved constantly
rotated their workers, and that the latter's identification cards had only one signatory.

To DOLE, these circumstances showed that the companies were engaged in a work-pooling
scheme, in light of which they might be considered as one and the same entity for the
purpose of determining the appropriate bargaining unit in a certification election.

Issue:How to determine an appropriate bargaining unit

Ruling:

Petitioner argues that there is no showing that the rank-and-file employees of the three
companies would constitute an appropriate bargaining unit on account of the latter's different
geographical locations.This contention lacks merit. The basic test for determining the
appropriate bargaining unit is the application of a standard whereby a unit is deemed
appropriate if it affects a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual interests in
wages, hours, working conditions, and other subjects of collective bargaining.55 We have
ruled that geographical location can be completely disregarded if the communal or mutual
interests of the employees are not sacrificed. As correctly observed by the CA and DOLE,
while there is no prohibition on the mere act of engaging in a work-pooling scheme as sister
companies, that act will not be tolerated, and the sister companies' separate juridical
personalities will be disregarded, if they use that scheme to defeat the workers' right to
collective bargaining. The employees' right to collectively bargain with their employers is
necessary to promote harmonious labor-management relations in the interest of sound and
stable industrial peace.

2. Factors in Unit Determination

 U.P. v. Ferrer-Calleja, 211 SCRA 451 (1992)POLINAR

Facts:

The case was initiated in the Bureau of Labor Relations by a petition filed by a registered
labor union, the "Organization of Non-Academic Personnel of UP" (ONAPUP). Claiming to
have a membership of 3,236 members comprising more than 33% of the 9,617 persons
constituting the non-academic personnel of UP-Diliman, Los Baños, Manila, and Visayas, it
sought the holding of a certification election among all said non-academic employees of UP.
At a conference thereafter held in the Bureau, UP stated that it had no objection to the
election. Another registered labor union, the "All UP Workers' Union," filed a comment, as
intervenor in the certification election proceeding. Alleging that its membership covers both
academic and non-academic personnel, and that it aims to unite all UP rank-and-file
employees in one union, it declared its assent to the holding of the election provided the
appropriate organizational unit was first clearly defined. It observed in this connection that the
Research, Extension and Professional Staff (REPS), who are academic non-teaching
personnel, should not be deemed part of the organizational unit.

Issue: Whether or not academic and non-academic personnel in the entire UP system should
compose two separate bargaining units.

Ruling: YES

UP employees may quite easily be categorized into two general classes: the group composed
of employees whose functions are non-academic and the group made of those performing
academic functions. Not much reflection is needed to perceive that the community or
mutuality of interests which justifies the formation of a single collective bargaining unit is
wanting between the academic and non-academic personnel of the university. The dichotomy
of interests, the dissimilarity in the nature of the work and duties as well as in the
compensation and working conditions of the academic and non-academic personnel dictate
the separation of these two categories of employees for purposes of collective bargaining.


San Miguel Corporation v. Laguesma, 236 SCRA 595 (1994)Julei

San Miguel Corporation, Inc. v. SMC Supervisors and Exempt Union, 655
SCRA 1 (2011)MABBORANG
SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INCORPORATED VS SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
SUPERVISORS and EXEMPT UNION

G.R. No. 146206

[San Miguel Foods has factory/branches in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis. The
employees from these three branches wanted to form a single bargaining unit. This was
opposed by the company as being against the “one company, one union” policy. SC ruled
that applying the mutuality of interest test, there should only be one bargaining unit.]

FACTS:

In the case of San Miguel Corporation Supervisors and Exempt Union v. Laguesma, the
Court held that even if they handle confidential data regarding technical and internal business
operations, supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of petitioner San
Miguel Foods, Inc. are not to be considered confidential employees, because the same do not
pertain to labor relations, particularly, negotiation and settlement of grievances.
Consequently, they were allowed to form an appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of
collective bargaining. The Court also declared that the employees belonging to the three
different plants of San Miguel Corporation Magnolia Poultry Products Plants in Cabuyao, San
Fernando, and Otis, having community or mutuality of interests, constitute a single bargaining
unit.

A certification election was conducted. On the date of the election, petitioner filed the
Omnibus Objections and Challenge to Voters, questioning the eligibility to vote by some of its
employees on the grounds that some employees do not belong to the bargaining unit which
respondent seeks to represent or that there is no existence of employer-employee
relationship with petitioner.

Based on the results of the election, the Med-Arbiter issued the Order stating that since the
Yes vote received 97% of the valid votes cast, respondent is certified to be the exclusive
bargaining agent of the supervisors and exempt employees of petitioner's Magnolia Poultry
Products Plants in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis.

On appeal, the then Acting DOLE Undersecretary, in the Resolution, affirmed the Order of the
Med-Arbiter.

CA affirmed the Resolution of DOLE Undersecretary with modification stating that those
holding the positions of Human Resource Assistant and Personnel Assistant are excluded
from the bargaining unit.

Hence, this petition by the San Miguel Foods

ISSUE: Whether or not CA departed from jurisprudence when it expanded the scope of the
bargaining unit.

HELD:

NO.

In San Miguel vs Laguesma, the Court explained that the employees of San Miguel
Corporation Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis constitute
a single bargaining unit, which is not contrary to the one-company, one-union policy. An
appropriate bargaining unit is defined as a group of employees of a given employer,
comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest
of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to
serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions
of the law.

It held that while the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be reckoned with in
determining the appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not decisive or conclusive. Other
factors must be considered. The test of grouping is community or mutuality of interest. This is
so because the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights. Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the employees.
Their functions mesh with one another. One group needs the other in the same way that the
company needs them both. There may be differences as to the nature of their individual
assignments, but the distinctions are not enough to warrant the formation of a separate
bargaining unit.

The Court affirms the finding of the CA that there should be only one bargaining unit for the
employees in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis of Magnolia Poultry Products Plant involved
in dressed chicken processing and Magnolia Poultry Farms engaged in live chicken
operations. Certain factors, such as specific line of work, working conditions, location of work,
mode of compensation, and other relevant conditions do not affect or impede their
commonality of interest. Although they seem separate and distinct from each other, the
specific tasks of each division are actually interrelated and there exists mutuality of interests
which warrants the formation of a single bargaining unit.

DISPOSITIVE: Respondent won

DOCTRINE: An appropriate bargaining unit is defined as a group of employees of a given

employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the
collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be
best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective
bargaining provisions of the law.
It held that while the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be reckoned with in
determining the appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not decisive or conclusive. Other
factors must be considered. The test of grouping is community or mutuality of interest. This is
so because the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights. Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the employees.
Their functions mesh with one another. One group needs the other in the same way that the
company needs them both. There may be differences as to the nature of their individual
assignments, but the distinctions are not enough to warrant the formation of a separate
bargaining unit.

3. Unit Severance and Globe Doctrine

 Kapisanan ng mgaManggagawasa Manila Railroad Co. v. Yard Crew

Union Railroad Engineering Department Union, Manila Railroad Co.,
109 PHIL. 1143 (1960)VIDAL
FACTS:
In 1955, petitioner Kapisanan filed a petition praying that it be certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent of the Manila railroad Company (Company). In 1957, the Court then found
three unions appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining and these are (1) the engine
crew unit, (2)the crew unit, and (3) all the other personnel except the supervisors, temporary
employees and members of the auditing department. The following were then certified as the
exclusive bargaining agents: (1) the Union de Maquinistas y Motormen, (2) the conductors,
and (3) petitioner Kapisanan.

The problem arose when respondent, Manila Railroad Yard Crew Union filed a case praying
that it be defined as a separate bargaining unit which was opposed by the petitioner
Kapisanan on the grounds that (1) it had been duly certified as the collective bargaining agent
in the unit of all the rest of the employees and that (2) such agreement bars certification of
another unit.

To resolve such issue, the lower court ordered a plebiscite in the three groups, namely (1) the
Engineering Department, (2) the Station Employees and the (3) Yard Crew Personnel – they
all shall vote in a secret ballot on the question of whether or not they desire to be separated
from the unit of the rest of the employees being represented by petitioner Kapisanan.

ISSUE: Whether there should be a plebiscite to identify the proper bargaining unit?

HELD:
Yes. One of the factors in determining the appropriate bargaining unit is the Globe Doctrine
wherein the desires or the will of the employees shall be the basis. The Court suggested a
plebiscite-carried by a secret ballot which will be conducted by the Court itself and not by the
Department of Labor and Employment.

RATIO:
To determine which of the several claimant groups forms a proper bargaining unit, it is
necessary to apply the Globe Doctrine or the express will or desire of the employees. Such
doctrine sanctions the holding of a series of elections, not for the purpose of allowing the
group receiving an overall majority of votes to represent all employees, but for the specific
purpose of permitting the employees in each of the categories to select the group which each
chooses as a bargaining unit.

 Mechanical Department Labor Union v. CIR, 24 SCRA 925

(1968)NABATAR
FACTS:
The case began on 13 February 1965 by a petition of the respondent "Samahan ng mga
Manggagawa, etc." calling attention to the fact that there were three unions in the Caloocan
shops of the Philippine National Railways: the "Samahan", the "Kapisanan ng Manggagawa
sa Manila Railroad Company", and the Mechanical Department Labor Union;

That no certification election had been held in the last 12 months in the Caloocan shops; that
both the "Samahan" and the Mechanical Department Labor Union had submitted different
labor demands upon the management for which reason a certification election was needed to
determine the proper collective bargaining agency for the Caloocan shop workers.

The petition was opposed by the management as well as by the Mechanical Department
Labor Union, the latter averring that it had been previously certified in two cases as sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the employees and laborers of the PNR'S mechanical
department, and had negotiated two bargaining agreements with management in 1961 and
1963; that before the expiration of the latter, a renewal thereof had been negotiated and the
contract remained to be signed; that the "Samahan" had been organized only in 21 January
1965; that the Caloocan shops unit was not established nor separated from the Mechanical
Department unit;

That the "Samahan" is composed mainly of supervisors who had filed a pending case to be
declared non-supervisors; and that the purpose of the petition was to disturb the present
smooth working labor management relations.

TRIAL COURT: reviewed the collective bargaining history of the Philippine National Railways
and allowed the establishment of new and separate bargaining unit in one company, even in
one department of the same company

the Mechanical Department Labor Union appealed to this Court questioning the applicability
under the circumstances of the "Globe doctrine" of considering the will of the employees in
determining what union should represent them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the employees at the Caloocan Shops can desire the respondent union,
"Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Caloocan Shops", to be separated from the Mechanical
Department Labor Union, with a view to the former being recognized as a separate
bargaining unit, applying the Globe Doctrine

RULING: Yes, the Globe Doctrine is applicable in this case.

Yes because even though Appellant Mechanical contends that the application of the "Globe
doctrine" is not warranted because the workers of the Caloocan shops do not require different
skills from the rest of the workers in the Mechanical Department of the Railway Company.
This question is primarily one of facts.

The Industrial Court has found that there is a basic difference, in that those in the Caloocan
shops not only have a community of interest and working conditions but perform major repairs
of railway rolling stock, using heavy equipment and machineries found in said shops, while
the others only perform minor repairs. It is easy to understand, therefore, that the workers in
the Caloocan shops require special skill in the use of heavy equipment and machinery
sufficient to set them apart from the rest of the workers.

In addition, the record shows that the collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the
appellant union have been in existence for more than two (2) years; hence, such agreements
cannot constitute a bar to the determination, by proper elections, of a new bargaining
representative (PLDT Employees' Union vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., 51 Off.
Gaz., 4519).

As to the charge that some of the members of the appellee, "Samahan Ng Manggagawa", are
actually supervisors, it appears that the question of the status of such members is still
pending final decision; hence, it would not constitute a legal obstacle to the holding of the
plebiscite. At any rate, the appellant may later question whether the votes of those ultimately
declared to be supervisors should be counted.

Whether or not the agreement negotiated by the appellant union with the employer, during the
pendency of the original petition in the Court of Industrial Relations, should be considered
valid and binding on the workers of the Caloocan shops is a question that should be first
passed upon by the Industrial Court.

 Filoil Refinery Corporation v. Filoil Supervisory & Confidential

Employees Association and CIR, 46 SCRA 512 (1972)BELEN
Facts:
Respondent FILOIL SUPERVISORY & CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION is a
labor organization which is composed exclusively of the supervisory and confidential
employees of petitioner FILOIL REFINERY CORPORATION. There exists another entirely
distinct labor association composed of Filoils rank and file employees with which petitioner
executed a collective bargaining agreement expressly excluding from its coverage Filoils
supervisory and confidential employees.
Respondent association filed with the industrial court its petition for certification as the sole
and exclusive collective bargaining agent of all of Filoils supervisory and confidential
employees.
Petitioner corporation filed a motion to dismiss the petition citing among its objections the
composition of the respondent association. Petitioner is saying that, as a general rule,
supervisors should form an association of their own and should exclude all other types of
personnel unless a special consideration exists like they are so few in numbers and that there
are other technical men or confidential employees equally few in number which, in the latter
case, the supervisors, technical men and confidential employees may be constituted into one
unit.
The CIR cast aside the objection saying that since the confidential employees are very few
and are, by practice and tradition, identified with management, the NLRB, because of such
‘identity of interest’ (Wilson & Co., 68 NLRB 84), has allowed their inclusion in the bargaining
unit of supervisors who are likewise identified with management.
Hence the appeal
Issue:
WON confidential employees may be included in the supervisors bargaining unit.
Held:
YES
Ratio: The other principal ground of petitioner’s appeal questioning the confidential
employees’ inclusion in the supervisors’ bargaining unit is equally untenable. Respondent
court correctly held that since the confidential employees are very few in number and are by
practice and tradition identified with the supervisors in their role as representatives of
management vis-a-vis the rank and file employees, such identity of interest has allowed their
inclusion in the bargaining unit of supervisors-managers for purposes of collective bargaining
in turn as employees in relation to the company as their employer.

4. Effect of Prior Agreement/CBA Coverage

 General Rubber and Footwear Corp. v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 155

SCRA 283 (1987)CABADING
FACTS
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing rubber sandals and
other rubber products. In 1985, the Samahang Manggagawa sa General Rubber Corporation
ANGLO was formed by the daily paid rank and file employees as their union for collective
bargaining.

July 17, 1985, the monthly-paid employees of the petitioner-corporation, after forming their
own collective bargaining unit the National Association of Trade Unions of Monthly Paid
Employees-NATU, filed a petition for direct certification with the Bureau of Labor Relations.
Petition was opposed by petitioner. September 2, 1985, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order for
the holding of a certification election after finding that a certification election is in order.
Petitioner argues that the order violates the thrust of the Labor Code insofar as formation of a
bargaining unit is concerned. A policy is in favor of a larger unit and not the creation of
smaller units in one establishment which might lead to fragmentation, thus impractical. On
appeal, the Bureau of Labor Relations denied both the appeal and motion for reconsideration
interposed by petitioner and affirmed the ruling of the Med-Arbiter.

ISSUE: WON Bureau of Labor Relations committed serious errors of law and grave abuse of
discretion:

 Issuing the assailed order which sanctioned the creation of two (2) bargaining units
within the petitioner-corporation.

 In holding that supervisors, employees performing managerial, confidential and

technical functions and office personnel (who are negotiated by petitioner to be
excluded from the existing bargaining unit because they are performing vital functions
to management) to form and join a labor organization and be members of the new
bargaining unit.

RULING: Petition denied.

 ARTICLE 1 : 'Section 1. Appropriate bargaining unit. This Agreement covers all regular
employees and workers employed by the company at its factory in Malabon, Metro
Manila. The words 'employee,' 'laborer' and 'workers' when used in this Agreement shall
be deemed to refer to those employees within the bargaining unit. Employees who
occupy managerial, confidential or technical positions, supervisors, contract employees,
monthly-paid employees, and security as well as office personnel are excluded from the
appropriate bargaining unit. The monthly-paid rank-and-file employees can form a
union of their own, separate and distinct from the existing rank-and-file union composed
of daily-paid workers.

 The members of private respondent are not managerial employees but merely
considered as rank-and-file employees who have every right to self-organization or to
be heard through a duly certified collective bargaining union. The Supervisory power of
the members of private respondent union consists merely in recommending as to what
managerial actions to take in disciplinary cases. As defined in the Labor Code, a
'managerial employee is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such managerial
actions.' . "Members of supervisory unions who do not fall within the definition of
managerial employees shall become eligible to join or assist the rank-and-file labor
 organization, and if none exists, to form or assist in the forming of such rank-and-file
organizations."

 For the petitioner to have to deal with two (2) collective bargaining unions, there is no
one to blame except petitioner itself for creating the situation it is in. From the beginning
of the existence in 1963 of a bargaining unit for the employees up to the present,
petitioner had sought to indiscriminately suppress the members of the private
respondent's right to self-organization provided for by law. It can never bind
subsequent federations and unions particularly private respondent-union
because it is a curtailment of the right to self-organization guaranteed by the
labor laws. However, to prevent any difficulty and to avoid confusion, the monthly-paid
rank-and-file employees should be allowed to join the union of the daily-paid-rank-and-
file employees of petitioner so that they can also avail of the CBA benefits or to form
their own rank-and-file union.

5. Effect of Including Employees Outside of the Bargaining Unit, Art. 256

 SamahangManggagawasa Charter Chemical – SUPER v.

Charter Chemical & Coating Corp., 645 SCRA 538 (2011)BARTOLATA
FACTS:
The Petitioner-Union filed a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file
employees of Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation with the Mediation Arbitration of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region in 1989.

The Petition was opposed by the respondent company citing as grounds: (1) the failure of
SMCC-SUPER to comply with the documentation requirements set by law and (2) the
inclusion of supervisory employees within the petitioner union.

Consequently, the Mediator-Arbiter dismissed SMCC-SUPER’s petition finding, among

others, that “the list of membership of petitioner union consisted of 12 batchman, mill operator
and leadman who performed supervisory functions. Under Article 245 of the Labor Code,
said supervisory employees are prohibited from joining petitioner union which seeks to
represent the rank-and-file employees of respondent company.” [reference: Toyota Motor
Philippines vs. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union, 335 Phil. 1045 (1997)]

The appeal of SMCC-SUPER was initially dismissed by the DOLE after the same was found
to have been filed out of time. On motion for reconsideration, however, the petition was
granted stating, among others, that “there was no independent evidence presented to
establish respondent-company’s claim that some members of the petitioner union were
holding supervisory positions x x x.”
After being elevated on appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the decision of the DOLE was
reversed and set aside, the findings of the Mediator-Arbiter that the petitioner union consisted
of a co-mingling of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees was given credence leading
to the pronouncement that SMCC-SUPER is not a legitimate labor organization and thus, has
no legal right to file a certification for certification election.

ISSUE: Whether or not the mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees in petitioner
union nullify its legal personality as a legitimate labor organization.

HELD:
NO.

The Supreme Court held that the CA’s ruling that SMCC-SUPER cannot be considered a
legitimate labor organization in view of its violation of Article 245 of the Labor Code is
misplaced as “while there is a prohibition against the mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file
employees in one labor organization, the Labor Code does not provide for the effects
thereof.”

As such, “after a labor organization has been registered, it may exercise all the rights and
privileges of a legitimate labor organization. Any mingling between supervisory and rank-
and-file employees in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy for that is not among
the grounds for cancellation of its registration, unless such mingling was brought
about by MISREPRESENTATION, FALSE STATEMENT or FRAUD under Article 239 OF
THE Labor Code.” (Emphasis provided)

Thus, SMCC-SUPER, through the questioned co-mingling, was not divested of its status as a
legitimate labor organization and as such, has the right to file the subject petition for
certification election.

C. Determining Agency, Arts. 232, 238

VI. UNION REPRESENTATION

A. Pre-condition: Employer-employee Relationship

 Allied Free Workers Union v. Cia Martima, 19 SCRA 258 (1967)POLIDO

FACTS

Compania Maritima (Maritima) and Allied Free Workers’ Union (AFWU) entered into a
contract for lease of services where the latter will perform all the work of stevedoring and
arrastre services of all vessels or boats of Maritima located in Iligan City. As agreed by both
parties, the contract is good and valid for one (1) month but subject for renewal with the
reservation that Maritima has the right to revoke the contract even before the expiration of the
term, should the AFWU fails to render good service.

However, during the latter part of 1953, Maritima complained to AFWU regarding the
unsatisfactory and inefficient service by the laborers, hence, Maritima hire extra laborers not
affiliated to any union.

AFWU presented to Maritima a written proposal for a collective bargaining agreement but no
reply was made by the latter. This prompted AFWU to institute proceedings in the Industrial
Court that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent in the bargaining unit
composed of all the laborers doing the arrastre and stevedoring. But Maritima alleged the
lack of employer-employee relationship between the parties. AFWU charged MARITIMA of
unfair labor practices before the CIR but again MARITIMA deny the employer-employee
relationship. MARITIMA on the other hand filed an action to rescind the contract between
AFWU from doing arrastre and stevedoring work and contracted with the Iligan Stevedoring
Union for the same work.

After almost 10 years, the CFI rendered its decision requesting the Honorable Secretary
of Labor or any of his authorized representative to conduct certification election among all the
workers and/or stevedores working in the wharf of Iligan City who are performing stevedoring
and arrastre service aboard Compania Maritima vessels. Both parties appealed, AFWU
claiming that it should be declared as the majority union while MARITIMA contends that
because there was a absence of employer-employee relationship, such order of certification
election is not correct.

ISSUE

Whether or not a employer-employee relationship exists between the laborers and the
Compania MARITIMA

HELD

NO.

Under the contract, AFWU was an independent contractor of MARITIMA based on the
following findings of fact which can no longer be disturbed:

First, the petitioner union operated as a labor contractor under the so called “cabo system and
such it has a complete set of officers and office personnel. Second, the payroll where laborers
listed and paid were prepared by the union itself without the intervention or control of the
respondent company and/or its agent at Iligan City. MARITMA never had any knowledge of
the individual names of laborers and/or workers listed in the union payroll or in their roster or
membership. Third, the union members who were hired by the union to perform arrastre and
stevedoring work on respondent’s vessel at Iligan port were being supervised and controlled
by the general foreman of the petitioner union or by any union assistant or responsible for the
execution of the labor contract. Fourth, all the laborers’ and/or workers hired for said work are
union members and are only responsible to their immediate chief who are officers and/or
employees of the union.

Fifth, there were no instances where officers and employees of the respondent and/or its
agent had interfered in the giving of instructions to the laborers performing the arrastre and/or
stevedoring work either aboard vessels or at the wharf of Iligan City.

Using the four-fold test of determining the existence of employer-employee relationship, the
power of dismissal and the power to control the employee’s conduct, which is the most
important element are not present exercised by the respondent MARITIMA towards the said
laborers of the union.

AFWU was the one who hired the laborers and has the power to exercise using the four-fold
test against the laborers contracted by MARITIMA, hence the existence of employer-
employee relationship is evident between AFWU and the laborers but not between laborers
and the MARITIMA.

 Hijo Resources Corporation v. Mejares, 780 SCA 617 (2016)PAMISARAN

FACTS:
Respondents Epifanio P. Mejares, Remegio C. Baluran, Jr., Dante Saycon, and
CecilioCucharo (respondents) were among the complainants, represented by their labor union
named "NagkahiusangMamumuong Bit, Djevon, at Raquilla Farms saHijo Resources
Corporation" (NAMABDJERA-HRC), who filed with the NLRC an illegal dismissal case
against petitioner Hijo Resources Corporation (HRC). Complainants (respondents) alleged
that petitioner HRC, formerly known as Hijo Plantation Incorporated (HPI), is the owner of
agricultural lands. In 2000, HPI was renamed as HRC. In December 2003, HRC's application
for the conversion of its agricultural lands into agri-industrial use was approved. In 2001,
complainants were absorbed by HRC, but they were working under the contractor-growers:
Buenaventura Tano (Bit Farm); DjeramePausa (Djevon Farm); and Ramon Q. Laurente
(Raquilla Farm).

On 1 July 2007, complainants formed their union NAMABDJERA-HRC, which was later
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). On 24 August 2007,
NAMABDJERA-HRC filed a petition for certification election before the DOLE. When HRC
learned that complainants formed a union, the three contractor-growers filed with the DOLE a
notice of cessation of business operations. In September 2007, complainants were terminated
from their employment on the ground of cessation of business operations by the contractor-
growers of HRC.
On 19 September 2007, complainants, represented by NAMABDJERA-HRC, filed a case for
unfair labor practices, illegal dismissal, and illegal deductions with prayer for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees before the NLRC. On 19 November 2007, DOLE
Med-Arbiter Lito A. Jasa issued an Order, dismissing NAMABDJERA-HRC's petition for
certification election on the ground that there was no employer-employee relationship
between complainants and HRC. Complainants did not appeal the Order of Med-Arbiter but
pursued the illegal dismissal case they filed.

On 4 January 2008, HRC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for illegal dismissal. The
motion to dismiss was anchored on the following arguments: (1) Lack of jurisdiction under the
principle of res judicata; and (2) The Order of the Med-Arbiter finding that complainants were
not employees of HRC, which complainants did not appeal, had become final and executory.

On 5 February 2008, Labor Arbiter Sagmit denied the motion to dismiss and held that res
judicata does not apply. ((The Labor Arbiter ruled that the decision of the Med-Arbiter in a
certification election case, by the nature of that proceedings does not foreclose further dispute
between the parties as to the existence or non-existence of employer-employee relationship
between them. Thus, the finding of Med-Arbiter that no employment relationship exists
between HRC and complainants does not bar the Labor Arbiter from making his own
independent finding on the same issue. The non-litigious nature of the proceedings before the
Med-Arbiter does not prevent the Labor Arbiter from hearing and deciding the case.)

HRC filed with the NLRC a petition for certiorari with a prayer for temporary restraining order,
seeking to nullify the Orders of Labor Arbiter. The NLRC granted the petition.

(The NLRC held that the Med-Arbiter Order dismissing the certification election case on the
ground of lack of employer-employee relationship between HRC and complainants (members
of NAMABDJERA-HRC) constitutes res judicata under the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment, and thus, warrants the dismissal of the case. The NLRC ruled that the Med-Arbiter
exercises quasi-judicial power and the Med-Arbiter's decisions and orders have, upon their
finality, the force and effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res
judicata.)

The CA reversed the NLRC’s Resolution. (Under Article 217 of the Labor Code, the Labor
Arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction over illegal dismissal cases. Although the
proceedings before the Labor Arbiter are also described as non-litigious, the Court of Appeals
noted that the Labor Arbiter is given wide latitude in ascertaining the existence of employment
relationship. Hence, the Court of Appeals concluded that the decision in a certification
election case does not foreclose further dispute as to the existence or non-existence of an
employer-employee relationship between HRC and the complainants.)

Issue:

Whether the Labor Arbiter, in the illegal dismissal case, is bound by the ruling of the Med-
Arbiter regarding the existence or non-existence of employer-employee relationship between
the parties in the certification election case.

Held:

No. As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts in this case are very similar to those in the
Sandoval case, which also involved the issue of whether the ruling in a certification election
case on the existence or non-existence of an employer-employee relationship operates as res
judicata in the illegal dismissal case filed before the NLRC. In Sandoval, the DOLE
Undersecretary reversed the finding of the Med-Arbiter in a certification election case and
ruled that there was no employer-employee relationship between the members of the
petitioner union and Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. (SSI), since the former were employees of the
subcontractors. Subsequently, several illegal dismissal cases were filed by some members of
the petitioner union against SSI. Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled that there was no
employer-employee relationship between the parties, citing the resolution of the DOLE
Undersecretary in the certification election case. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC
ruling and held that the members of the petitioner union were employees of SSI. On appeal,
this Court affirmed the appellate court's decision and ruled that the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC erred in relying on the pronouncement of the DOLE Undersecretary that there was no
employer-employee relationship between the parties. The Court cited the ruling in the Manila
Golf case that the decision in a certification election case, by the very nature of that
proceeding, does not foreclose all further disputes between the parties as to the existence or
non-existence of an employer-employee relationship between them. This case is different
from the Chris Garments case cited by the NLRC where the Court held that the matter of
employer-employee relationship has been resolved with finality by the DOLE Secretary,
whose factual findings were not appealed by the losing party. As mentioned earlier, the Med-
Arbiter's order in this case dismissing the petition for certification election on the basis of non-
existence of employer-employee relationship was issued after the members of the respondent
union were dismissed from their employment. The purpose of a petition for certification
election is to determine which organization will represent the employees in their collective
bargaining with the employer. The respondent union, without its member-employees, was
thus stripped of its personality to challenge the Med-Arbiter's decision in the certification
election case. Thus, the members of the respondent union were left with no option but to
pursue their illegal dismissal case filed before the Labor Arbiter. To dismiss the illegal
dismissal case filed before the Labor Arbiter on the basis of the pronouncement of the Med-
Arbiter in the certification election case that there was no employer-employee relationship
between the parties, which the respondent union could not even appeal to the DOLE
Secretary because of the dismissal of its members, would be tantamount to denying due
process to the complainants in the illegal dismissal case.

B. Methods of Establishing Majority Status

1. Policy/Purpose, Const., Art. XIII, Sec. 3; Arts. 218A (b), 267; 251 (b); Book V,
 Rule VI, Sec. 1

 Reyes v. Trajano, supra GAJUNERA

Facts: The certification election was authorized to be conducted by the Bureau of
Labor Relations on Oct 20, 1987. The “CHALLENGED” votes of 141 Iglesia ni Kristo
members
were segregated and excluded from the final count in virtue of an agreement between the
competing unions, reached at the pre-election conference, that the Iglesia Ni Kristo members
should not be allowed to vote "because they are not members of any union and refused
to participate in the previous certification elections. Iglesia ni Kristo members filed a petition
to cancel the election alleging that it "was not fair" and the result thereof did "not reflect the
true sentiments of the majority of the employees. Med-Arbiter saw no merit on the petition
because Iglesia Ni Kristo members do not possess any legal personality to institute this
present cause of action since they were not parties to the petition for certification
election. Iglesia Ni Kristo members appealed to Bureau of Labor Relations. Bureau of Labor
Relations sustained the decision of Med-Arbiter. Hence, this case

Issue: WON only members of the union have the right right to vote?

Ruling: (NO) The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment of the
wishes of the majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not to be
represented by a labor organization, and in the affirmative case, by which particular labor
organization. If the results of the election should disclose that the majority of the workers do
not wish to be represented by any union, then their wishes must be respected, and no union
may properly be certified as the exclusive representative of the workers in the bargaining unit
in dealing with the employer regarding wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment. The minority employees—who wish to have a union represent them in collective
bargaining—can do nothing but wait for another suitable occasion to petition for a certification
election and hope that the results will be different. They may not and should not be permitted,
however, to impose their will on the majority—who do not desire to have a union certified as
the exclusive workers' benefit in the bargaining unit—upon the plea that they, the minority
workers, are being denied the right of self-organization and collective bargaining. As
repeatedly stated, the right of self-organization embraces not only the right to form, join
orassist labor organizations, but the concomitant, converse right NOT to form, join or assist
any labor union.

That the INK employees, as employees in the same bargaining unit in the true sense of the
term, do have the right of self-organization, is also in truth beyond question, as well as the
fact that when they voted that the employees in their bargaining unit should be represented by
"NO UNION," they were simply exercising that right of self-organization, albeit in its negative
aspect. The respondents' argument that the petitioners are disqualified to vote because they
"are not constituted into a duly organized labor union"—"but members of the INK which
prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization"—
and "hence, not one of the unions which vied for certification as sole and exclusive bargaining
representative," is specious. Neither law, administrative rule nor jurisprudence requires that
only employees affiliated with any labor organization may take part in a certification election.
On the contrary, the plainly discernible intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote to
all bona fide employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are members of a labor
organization or not.

Neither does the contention that petitioners should be denied the right to vote because they
"did not participate in previous certification elections in the company for the reason that their
religious beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist labor organizations," persuade
acceptance. No law, administrative rule or precedent prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote
by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past certification elections. In denying the
petitioners' right to vote upon these egregiously fallacious grounds, the public respondents
exercised their discretion whimsically, capriciously and oppressively and gravely abused the
same.

 SamahangManggagawasa PREMEX v. Sec. of Labor, 286 SCRA 692

(1998)GULANES
FACTS: A certification election was conducted among employees (No Union & National
Federation of Labor) of respondent Permex Producer and Exporter Corporation with ‘No
Union’ winning. Later however, some employees of Permex Producer formed a labor
organization known as the SamahangManggagawasaPermex (SMP) which they registered
with the Department of Labor and Employment and then affiliated with the Philippine
Integrated Industries Labor Union (PIILU). (SMP-PIILU) wrote the respondent company
requesting recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of employees at
the Permex Producer and was granted. They then entered into a CBA. A year later, National
FedrationLabor filed again for a petition for certification election but was dismissed. Two
arguments are put forth in support of the petition. First, it is contended that petitioner has
been recognized by the majority of the employees at Permex Producer as their sole collective
bargaining agent. Petitioner argues that when a group of employees constituting themselves
into an organization and claiming to represent a majority of the work force requests the
employer to bargain collectively, the employer may do one of two things.

First, if the employer is satisfied with the employees’ claim, the employer may voluntarily
recognize the union by merely bargaining collectively with it. The formal written confirmation is
ordinarily stated in the collective bargaining agreement.

Second, if on the other hand, the employer refuses to recognize the union voluntarily, it may
petition the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct a certification election. If the employer does
not submit a petition for certification election, the union claiming to represent the employees
may submit the petition so that it may be directly certified as the employees’ representative or
a certification election may be held.

ISSUE: Whether or not SamahangManggagawasaPermex-Philippine Integrated Industries

Labor Union (SMP- PIILU) should be recognized as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees.

HELD: NO.

As held in the case of Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. Ferrer-Calleja

“. . . Ordinarily, in an unorganized establishment like the Calasiao Beer Region, it is the union
that files a petition for a certification election if there is no certified bargaining agent for the
workers in the establishment. If a union asks the employer to voluntarily recognize it as the
bargaining agent of the employees, as the petitioner did, it in effect asks the employer to
certify it as the bargaining representative of the employees — A CERTIFICATION WHICH
THE EMPLOYER HAS NO AUTHORITYTO GIVE, for it is the employees’ prerogative (not the
employer’s) to determine whether they want a union to represent them, and, if so, which one it
should be.”

In accordance with this ruling, Permex Producer should not have given its voluntary
recognition to SMP-PIILU-TUCP when the latter asked for recognition as exclusive collective
bargaining agent of the employees of the company. The company did not have the power to
declare the union the exclusive representative of the workers for the purpose of collective
bargaining. It is not enough that a union has the support of the majority of the employees. It is
equally important that everyone in the bargaining unit be given the opportunity to express
himself.

2. Request for SEBA Certification, Book V, Rule VII, Secs. 1-6

a) Requisites of SEBA certification in unorganized establishment with only

one legitimate labor organization- Rule VII , Sec. 4/Action of the Reg.
Div.-Rule VII, Sec.4.1

b) Requisites for SEBA certification in unorganized establishment with

more than one legitimate labor org. - Rule VII, Sec 5

c) Requisites for SEBA certification in organized establishment- Rule VII ,

Sec. 6

d) Effect of SEBA Certification, Book V , Rule VII, Sec. 4.2, as amended

by D.O. 40-1-15

3. Elections

e) Certification Election, Art. 268-269; Book V, Rule I, Sec. 1 (h), (II);Book

 V, Rules VIII, IX, X

f) Consent Election, Book V, Rule 1, Sec. 1 (h); Book V, Rule VIII,Secs.

10, 11, 23, 24

g) Run-Off Election, Art. 268, par. 1, penultimate sentence; Book V,Rule I,

Sec. 1 (ss); Book V, Rule X, Secs. 1, 2

4. Venue of Petition, Book V, Rule VIII, Sec. 2; Book V, Rule VIII, Sec. 1

 Cruzvale, Inc. v. Laguesma, 238 SCRA 389 (1994)CABAÑOG

Private respondent, Union of Filipino Workers (UFW), filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), Regional Office No. IV, a petition for certification election among the
regular rank-and-file workers of petitioner.

Petitioner filed its comment to the petition for certification election. It sought the denial of the
petition, among the grounds enumerated is that the Regional Office No. IV of the DOLE has
no jurisdiction over the petition since petitioner Company’s place of business is located at
Cubao, Quezon City, which is outside the jurisdiction of the said Regional
Office. Consequently, it is the National Capital Region or NCR of the DOLE which has
jurisdiction over said petition.Med-Arbiter found petitioner’s claim unmeritorious and rendered
a decision in favor of respondent union.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners correctly interpreted Section 1, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code which states: “Where to file. A petition for certification
election shall be filed with the Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the principal office of
the Employer. The petition shall be in writing and under oath.”

HELD:

NO. The word “jurisdiction” as used in said provision refers to the venue where the petition for
certification must be filed. Unlike jurisdiction, which implies the power of the court to decide a
case, venue merely refers to the place where the action shall be brought. Venue touches
more the convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case. Reasoning
Section 1, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code refers only to
cases where the place of work of the employees and the place of the principal office of the
employer are within the same territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Office where the petition
for certification election is filed. The said provision does not apply to the filing of petitions for
certification election where the place of work of the employees and the place of principal
office of the employer are located within the territorial jurisdictions of different regional offices.
We assume that in the drafting of the Omnibus Rules, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment took into consideration the fact that there are many companies
with factories located in places different from places where the corporate offices are located.
The worker, being the economically-disadvantaged party whether as complainant, petitioner
or respondent, as the case may be, the nearest governmental machinery to settle a labor
dispute must beplaced at hisimmediate disposal and the employer must in no case be
allowed a choice in favor of another competent agency sitting in another place to the
inconvenience of the worker. Petitioner has not shown how it will be prejudiced by the hearing
on the petition for certification election before the Regional Office No. IV, which has its offices
in Quezon City, the same city where the principal place of business of petitioner is located.
Petitioner is, therefore, being unreasonable in demanding that the petition for certification
election be filed with the National Capital Region Office, which holds offices in Manila. Unlike
in the Rules governing the procedure before Regional Offices, the New Rules of Procedure of
the National Labor Relations Commission prescribes that all cases in which labor arbiters
have jurisdiction should be filed in the branch office which has territorial jurisdiction over the
“workplace of the complainant/petitioner” (Rule IV, Sec. 1[a]). The NLRC Rules defines the
workplace as follows: “For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the place or
locality where the employee is regularly assigned when the cause of action arose. It shall
includethe place where the employee is supposed to report back after a temporary detail,
assignment or travel.

C. Certification Election: Process, Book V, Rules VIII (as amended by DO 40-F-03

and DO 40-I-15), IX, X

1. The Union as Initiating Party, Art. 251 (b); Book V, Rule VIII, Sec. 1

a) Organized Establishment, Arts. 238, 264, 268; Book V, Rule I, Sec.

1(II); Rule VII, Sec. 6

(1) Petition Before Freedom Election Period, Arts. 264, 268; Book
V, Rule VIII, Sec. 3 (d), Sec. 13 par. 1

 Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. Manila, Inc. v. Laguesma,

212 SCRA 281 (1992)APURADA
FACTS:

Atlantic has adopted the practice of hiring project employees when existing fabrication
capacity cannot absorb increases in job orders for steel structures and other heavy
construction works. Said project employees are covered by the Project Worker/Reliever
Employment Agreements which indicate the specific projects to which they are assigned and
the duration of their employment. Upon the expiration of their contracts/agreements, the
employment of these employees is automatically terminated unless the projects to which they
are assigned have not yet been completed, in which case, they are rehired for the remainder
of the project. Atlantic executed a CBA with URFA, which is the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all the regular rank-and-file employees.

Thereafter, another labor org LAKAS-NFLfiled a Petition for Certification Election with the
Med-Arbitration Unit to be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the regular
non-project employees of Atlantic. Med-Arbiter granted the petition. Atlantic appealed alleging
that the project employees sought to be represented by LAKAS-NFL were formally issued
regular employment appointments by Atlantic which were accepted by said project
employees. And that Atlantic agreed to formally regularize all the remaining alleged project
employees with at least one year of service pending the final outcome of the certification
election case. DOLE UsecLaguesma denied the appeal.

Argument of Atlantic: The bargaining unit of the alleged regular project workers has ceased
to exist by virtue of the regularization of all the alleged project workers with at least one year
of service.

ISSUE: WON LAKAS-NFL can file a pet for cert elections even though there is an existing
CBA between Atlantic and URFA, which is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of
all the regular rank-and-file employees of the petitioner including the regular project
employees with more than one year of service?

RULING: NO. The regularization of all the regular project employees with at least one year of
service and the subsequent membership of said employees with the URFA mean that the
alleged regular project employees whom respondent LAKAS-NFL seeks to represent are, in
fact, regular employees by contemplation of law and included in the appropriate bargaining
unit of said Collective Bargaining Agreement consequently, the bargaining unit which
respondent LAKAS-NFL seeks to represent has already ceased to exist.

Art. 232 Prohibition on Certification Election. — The Bureau shall not entertain any petition for
certification election or any other action which may disturb the administration of duly
registered existing collective bargaining agreements affecting the parties except under
Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of this Code.

Paragraph 2 of Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations

likewise provides: If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in
accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election or a motion for
intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such
agreement.

Consequently, the existence of a duly registered Collective Bargaining Agreement between

the petitioner and URFA, which is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the
regular rank-and-file employees of the petitioner including the regular project employees with
more than one year of service, bars any other labor organization from filing a petition for
certification election except within the 60-day period prior to the expiration of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.

(2) Petition Beyond Freedom Period

 National Congress of Union in Sugar Industry v. Ferrer-

Calleja, 205 SCRA 478 (1992)NOGAN
Facts:

Dacongcong Sugar and Rice Milling Co. in Negros Occ. employ about 500 workers during
milling season, and 300workers during off milling season. Dacongcong has 2 competing labor
unions for these workers. Dacongcong entered into a CBA with Priv. Res. Nat’l Federation,
effective three years. The CBA was renewed, extended for another 3years, BUT with
reservation for amendments regarding wage increases, hours of work, and other terms of
conditions of employment.

The negotiation for the reservations in the CBA, went into a deadlock. The parties agreed to a
suspension and cooling off period. Meanwhile Pet. National Congress filed a direct
certification/certification election. They filed beyond the freedom period of 60days before CBA
expiry.

Issue: Whether or not a petition for certification election may be filed after the 60-day freedom
period.

Held: NO. It should be dismissed outright based on Rule V of the labor code’s IRR.

That the CBA was in deadlock is immaterial because CBA’s are deemed to continue to be in
force until a new CBA is executed. Pet. Stand: That IRR provisions should be liberally
construed in favor of workers exercising their right to self-organization. Petition was filed out
of time(More than a year after CBA expired) and should be dismissed outright. A careful
perusal of the provision shows that there is a clear mandate that the petition should be
dismissed outright for having been filed outside the 60-day freedom period. Only a certified
CBA may serve as a bar to certification elections. Despite the lapse of the formal effectivity of
the CBA the law still considers the same as continuing in force and effect until a new CBA
shall have been validly executed.
 (3) Filing Party/Misrepresentation by Union Officers, Book V, Rule
VIII, Sec. 1

 DHL Philippines Corporation United Rank and File

Association – Federation of Free Workers v. Buklod ng
Manggagawa ng DHL Phils. Corp., 434 SCRA 670
(2004)HIBALER
FACTS:

A certification election was conducted among the regular rank and file employees in the main
office and the regional branches of DHL Philippines Corporation. The contending choices
were petitioner and "no union."

On the basis of the results of the certification election, with petitioner receiving 546 votes and
"no union" garnering 348 votes, the election officer certified the former as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the corporation.

Respondent Buklod ng Manggagawa ng DHL Philippines Corporation (BUKLOD) filed with

the Industrial Relations Division of the DOLE a Petition for the nullification of the certification
election. The officers of petitioner were charged with committing fraud and deceit in the
election proceedings, particularly by misrepresenting to the voter-employees that it was an
independent union, when it was in fact an affiliate of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW).

This misrepresentation was supposedly the basis for their selection of petitioner in the
certification election. Allegedly supporting this claim was the fact that those whom it had
misled allegedly withdrew their membership from it and subsequently formed themselves into
an independent union. The latter union, BUKLOD, was issued a Certificate of Registration by
DOLE.

Med-Arbiter nullified the certification election and ordered the holding of another one with the
following contending choices: petitioner, respondent, and "no choice."

Setting aside the Decision of Med-Arbiter, DOLE Undersecretary held on appeal that the
issue of representation had already been settled with finality in favor of petitioner, and that no
petitions for certification election would be entertained within one year from the time the
election officer had issued the Certification Order.

Upon reaching the Court of Appeals, it held that the withdrawal of 704 out of 894 members of
the petitioner union was a valid impetus to hold a new certification election.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the certification election is valid.

RULING:

Under Section 13 of the Rules Implementing Book V (Labor Relations) of the Labor Code, as
amended, the election officers authority to certify the results of the election is limited to
situations in which there has been no protest filed; or if there has been any, it has not been
perfected or formalized within five days from the close of the election proceedings.

Petitioner argues that the CA gravely erred in rendering its assailed Decision, considering that
no protest or challenge had been formalized within five days, or raised during the election
proceedings and entered in the minutes thereof. Petitioner adds that respondent did not file
any protest, either, against the alleged fraud and misrepresentation by the formers officers
during the election.

When the med-arbiter admitted and gave due course to respondents Petition for nullification
of the election proceedings, the election officer should have deferred issuing the Certification
of the results thereof. Section 13 of the Implementing Rules cannot strictly be applied to the
present case.

Respondents contention is that a number of employees were lured by their officers into
believing that petitioner was an independent union. Since the employees had long desired to
have an independent union that would represent them in collective bargaining, they voted
"yes" in favor of petitioner. Having been misled, a majority of them eventually disaffiliated
themselves from it and formed an independent union, respondent herein, which thereafter
protested the conduct of the election. Having been formed just after such exercise by the
defrauded employees who were former members of petitioner, respondent could not have
reasonably filed its protest within five days from the close of the election proceedings.

Notably, after it had applied for registration with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR),
respondent filed its Petition to nullify the certification election. Petitioner insistently opposed
the Petition, as respondent had not yet been issued a certificate of registration at the time.
Because such certificate was issued in favor of the latter four days after the filing of the
Petition, on December 23, 1997, the misgivings of the former were brushed aside by the med-
arbiter. Indeed, the fact that respondent was not yet a duly registered labor organization when
the Petition was filed is of no moment, absent any fatal defect in its application for registration.

The circumstances in the present case show that the employees did not sleep on their rights.
Hence, their failure to follow strictly the procedural technicalities regarding the period for filing
their protest should not be taken against them. Mere technicalities should not be allowed to
prevail over the welfare of the workers. What is essential is that they be accorded an
opportunity to determine freely and intelligently which labor organization shall act on their
behalf. Having been denied this opportunity by the betrayal committed by petitioners officers
in the present case, the employees were prevented from making an intelligent and
independent choice.
The making of false statements or misrepresentations that interfere with the free choice of the
employees is a valid ground for protest. A certification election may be set aside for
misstatements made during the campaign, where 1) a material fact has been misrepresented
in the campaign; 2) an opportunity for reply has been lacking; and 3) the misrepresentation
has had an impact on the free choice of the employees participating in the election.A
misrepresentation is likely to have an impact on their free choice, if it comes from a party who
has special knowledge or is in an authoritative position to know the true facts. This principle
holds true, especially when the employees are unable to evaluate the truth or the falsity of the
assertions.

(4) Forced Intervention/Motion for Intervention, Book V, Rule VIII,

Secs. 8, 9

 Phil. Association of Free Labor Union v. Calleja, 169

SCRA 491 (1989)YANONG
F A C T S:
A petition for certification election among the rank-and-file workers of the Hundred Island
Chemical Corporation was filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) by respondent
MalayangSamahan ng mgaManggagawasa Hundred Island Chemical Corporation (Samahan,
for short). A motion to intervene, accompanied by the written consent of twenty percent (20%)
of the rank-and-file employees of the said corporation was filed by petitioner Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions (September Convention), or PAFLU.

The Katipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMAPI, for brevity) flied its motion to intervene,
but unaccompanied by a similar written consent of the employer's workers. Due to such want
of a written consent, PAFLU moved for the striking out of KAMAPI's motion for intervention.
Acting on said motion, Med-Arbiter issued an order denying KAMAPI's motion for intervention
and allowing PAFLU's inclusion in the certification election. KAMAPI appealed the said Med-
Arbiter's order to the respondent Director of the BLR. Thus, this petition was filed. And as
prayed for in the said petition, We issued a temporary restraining order.

Respondent Samahan has contested the issuance of said restraining order and has prayed
that it be lifted since the delay of the certification election only defeats the constitutional right
of labor to organize.

I S S U E:
Whether or not Kamapi should be allowed to participate in a certification election thru a
motion for intervention without a prior showing that it has a required support expressed in the
written consent of at least 20% of all employees in the collective bargaining unit.

H E L D:
NO,Under Art. 258. Petitions in unorganized establishments. — In any establishment where
there is no certified bargaining agent, the petition for certification election filed by a legitimate
labor organization shall be supported by the written consent of at least twenty (20%) percent
of all the employees in the bargaining unit. Upon receipt of such petition, the Med-Arbiter shall
automatically order the conduct of a certification election.
Considering the above provisions of law, We rule to dismiss the instant petition for certiorari.
The respondent Director did not abuse her discretion in issuing the contested order. It is
crystal clear from the said provisions that the requisite written consent of at least 20% of the
workers in the bargaining unit applies to petitioners for certification election only, and not to
motions for intervention. Nowhere in the aforesaid legal provisions does it appear that a
motion for intervention in a certification election must be accompanied by a similar written
consent. Not even in the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code (see Rule V, Rules
Implementing the Labor Code).

Obviously, the percentage requirement pertains only to the petition for certification election,
and nothing else. the reason behind the 20% requirement is to ensure that the petitioning
union has a substantial interest in the representation proceedings ** and, as correctly pointed
out by the Solicitor General, that a considerable number of workers desire their representation
by the said petitioning union for collective bargaining purposes. Hence, the mere fact that
20% of the workers in the bargaining unit signify their support to the petition by their written
consent, it becomes mandatory on the part of the Med-Arbiter to order the holding of a
certification election in an unorganized establishment.

b) Unorganized Establishment, Arts. 251, 269, 270. See RA 9481, 25 May

2007; Book V, Rule VII, Section 5; Rule VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2;
c) Filing of Petition

(1) Form of Petition, Book V, Rule VIII, Sec. 4

 National Mines and Allied Workers union v. Sec. of

Labor, 227 SCRA 821 (1993)HAMPAC
FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent FFW-SMQCC are local chapters of labor federations duly
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Petitioner is the exclusive
bargaining agent of all the rank and file workers of respondent QCC, a domestic corporation
engaged in the metal industry.

On September 27, 1991, 38 days before the expiration of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement between petitioner and respondent QCC, respondent FFW-SMQCC through
Reynito de Pedro filed with the DOLE Industrial Relations Division, National Capital Region a
petition for certification election. The petition was accompanied by a list of signatures of
company employees, who signified their consent to a certification election among the rank
and file employees of QCC.

Petitioner herein moved to dismiss the petition of respondent FFW-SMQCC on the grounds
that: (a) the required consent to the certification election of at least 25% of the rank and file
employees had not been met; (b) the petition was not verified as required by law; and (c)
Reynito de Pedro, who was also the president of petitioner, had no personality to file the
petition on behalf of FFW-SMQCC.

On October 30, 1991, respondent FFW-SMQCC, filed a second petition for certification
election, this time signed and verified by De Pedro.

On January 24, 1992, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification election of
respondent FFW-SMQCC

Petitioner appealed this decision to the Secretary of Labor. On June 17, 1992, the Secretary
of Labor rendered a decision, denying the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the order of
the Med-Arbiter.

ISSUE: WON the petition for certification election was verified as required by law

HELD: YES

Reasoning

-First, although Reynito de Pedro was the duly elected president of petitioner, he had
disaffiliated himself therefrom and joined respondent FFW-SMQCC before the petition for
certification election was filed on September 27, 1991. The eventual dismissal of De Pedro
from the company is of no moment, considering that the petition for certification election was
filed before his dismissal on August 22, 1992.

-Second, verification of a pleading is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite. Even if verification is

lacking and the pleading is formally defective, the courts may dispense with the requirement
in the interest of justice and order of correction of the pleading accordingly. Generally,
technical and rigid rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases; and this rule is
specifically applied in certification election proceedings, which are non-litigious but merely
investigative and non-adversarial in character. Nevertheless, whatever formal defects existed
in the first petition were cured and corrected in the second petition for certification election.

-Third, attached to the original petition for certification election was a list of 141 supporting
signatures out of the 300 employees belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit to be
represented by respondent FFW-SMQCC. Respondent QCC sought to delete from the list
some 36 signatures which are allegedly forged and falsified. Petitioner, likewise, submitted a
joint affidavit of 13 employees, disclaiming the validity of the signatures therein.

-Granting that 36 signatures were falsified and that 13 was disowned, this leaves 92
undisputed signatures which is definitely more than 75 i.e., 25% of the total number of
company employees required by law to support a petition for certification election. The
disclaimer of 13 employees by their respective signatures covers only their own personal
participation and cannot in any way be extended to include the rest of those who did not
question the same.

(2) Substantial Support, Art. 268; Book V, Rule VIII, Sec. 4 (g), Sec.
15 (e)

 Port Workers Union of the Philippines v. Laguesma,

 207 SCRA 329 (1992)ACAYLAR
FACTS:

The collective bargaining agreement of the International Container Terminal Services, Inc
(ICTSI) workers with private respondents Associate Port Checkers and Workers Union
(APCWU), the incumbent union, was due to expire.

The first challenge to APCWU was when the SandiganngManggagawasaDaungan

(SAMADA) filed a petition for certification election. The consent signatures of at least 25% of
the employees in the bargaining unit were submitted eleven days after the petition. Petitioner
PWUP filed a petition for intervention.Another petition for certification election was filed by the
Port Employees Association and Labor Union (PEALU).

APCWU filed a motion to dismiss them on the ground that they did not comply with the
requirement set forth in Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules. Specifically,
APCWU faulted both petitions for non-compliance with the requirement for the 25% consent
signatures at the time of filing.

PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor arguing that Article 256 of the Labor Code did not
require the written consent to be submitted simultaneously with the petition for certification
election.

Issue: Whether or not simultaneous submission is required.

Held:

No. In line with the policy, the Supreme Court ruled that the administrative rule requiring the
simultaneous submission of the 25% consent signatures upon the filing of petition for
certification election should not be strictly applied to frustrate the determination of the
legitimate representative of the workers. Significantly, the requirement in the rule is not found
in Article 256, the law it seeks to implement. This is all the more reason why the regulation
should at best be given only a directory effect. Accordingly, the magistrates hold that the mere
filing of a petition for certification election within the freedom period is sufficient basis for the
issuance of an order for the holding of a certification election, subject to the submission of the
consent signatures within a reasonable period from such filing. It is not denied that the petition
to intervene filed by PWUP did not carry the 25% consent signatures, but that the requirement
is in fact not applicable to a petition in intervention.

 Oriental Tin Can Labor Union v. Sec. of Labor, 294

SCRA 640 (1998)ABRIL
FACTS:
Oriental Tin Can and Metal Sheet Manufacturing Company is in the business of making tin
cans and metal sheets. On March 3, 1994, it entered into a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) with petitioner Oriental Tin Can Labor Union (OTCLU) as the existing CBA was due to
expire on April 15, 1994. Four days later, 248 of the company's rank-and-file employees
authorized the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) to file a petition for certification election.
On March 10, 1994, however, this petition was repudiated via a written waiver by 115 of the
signatories who, along with other employees totaling 897, ratified the CBA on the same
date.respondent Oriental Tin Can Workers Union — Federation of Free Workers (OTCWU-
FFW) filed a petition for certification election with the National Capital Region office of the
DOLE. This was opposed by OTCLU, citing that it did not comply with the 25% signature
requirement and maintaining that the new CBA was a bar to a certification election. It was
later on approved.
Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Later on, petitioners and
the company filed separate petitions for certiorari.
The company it justifies its "right to question the filing of the petition for certification election"
by the situation "where the small number of employees, the very ones who had earlier
supported the petition for certification election, subsequently changed their mind, and ratified
the CBA and thereafter reaped from its bounty. “Thus, in its desire to maintain industrial
peace, the company deemed it necessary to challenge the propriety of holding a certification
election.

ISSUE:Whether or not the company has a personality to challenge the conduct of a

certification elections.

RULING:
NO.
It is a well-established rule that certification elections are exclusively the concern of
employees; hence, the employer lacks the legal personality to challenge the same. Law and
policy demand that employers take a strict, hands-off stance in certification elections. The
bargaining representative of employees should be chosen free from any extraneous influence
of management. A labor bargaining representative, to be effective, must owe its loyalty to the
employees alone and to no other.
The only instance when an employer may concern itself with employee representation
activities is when it has to file the petition for certification election because there is no existing
CBA in the unit and it was requested to bargain collectively, pursuant to Article 258 of the
Labor code. After filing the petition, the role of the employer ceases and it becomes a mere
bystander. The company’s interference in the certification election below by actively opposing
the same is manifestly uncalled-for and unduly creates a suspicion that it intends to establish
a company union.
The designation or selection of the bargaining representative without, however, going through
the process set out by law for the conduct of a certification election applies only when
representation is not in issue. There is no problem if a union is unanimously chosen by a
majority of the employees as their bargaining representative, but a question of representation
arising from the presence of more than one union in a bargaining unit aspiring to be the
employees’ representative, can only be resolved by holding a certification election under the
supervision of the proper government authority.

d) Effect of Members’ Retraction on Petition

 S.S. Ventures International v. S.S. Ventures Labor Union, 559

SCRA 435 (2008)GOLING
FACTS: Petitioner S.S. Ventures International, Inc. (Ventures)is in the business of
manufacturing sports shoes. Respondent S.S. Ventures Labor Union (Union)is a labor
organization registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). On March 21,
2000, the Union filed with DOLE-Region III.Ventures faults both the BLR and the CA in finding
that there was no fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the Union sufficient to justify
cancellation of its registration. In this regard, Ventures makes much of, first, the separate
hand-written statements of 82 employees who, in gist, alleged that they were unwilling or
harassed signatories to the attendance sheet of the organizational meeting.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent union perpetrated fraud, forgery, misrepresentation and
misstatements in connection with the adoption and ratification of its constitution and by-laws,
and in the preparation of the list of members who took part in the alleged organizational
meeting?

THE COURT’S RULING: As aptly noted by both the BLR and CA, these mostly undated
written statements submitted by Ventures on March 20, 2001, or seven months after it filed its
petition for cancellation of registration, partake of the nature of withdrawal of union
membership executed after the Union's filing of a petition for certification election on March
21, 2000. We have in precedent cases said that the employees' withdrawal from a labor union
made before the filing of the petition for certification election is presumed voluntary, while
withdrawal after the filing of such petition is considered to be involuntary and does not affect
the same. Upon this light, the Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the BLR did not
abuse its discretion norgravely err when it concluded that the affidavits of retraction of the 82
members had no evidentiary weight.

The assailed inclusion of the said 82 individuals to the meeting and proceedings adverted to
is not really fatal to the Union's cause for, as determined by the BLR, the allegations of
falsification of signatures or misrepresentation with respect to these individuals are without
basis. Suffice it to say that, as aptly observed by the CA, the procedure for acquiring or losing
union membership and the determination of who are qualified or disqualified to be members
are matters internal to the union and flow from its right to self-organization.
  Eagle Ridge Golf & Country Club v. CA & EREU, 616
SCRA 116 (2010)Ahmed

WEEK FIVE (January 14-15)

2. The Employer as Initiating Party, Arts. 270, 271; Book V, Rule VIII, Sec. 1, par.
3 & 4. See RA 9841, 25 May 2007

 SMC Quarry Workers Union v. Titan Megabags Industrial Corporation,

428 SCRA 524 (2004)PURACAN
FACTS:

Petitioner SMC filed a petition for certification election with DOLE which alleged that it is a
legitimate labor organization that seeks to represent the regular rank-and-file workers of
respondent Titan Megabags Industrial Corporation.

Respondent opposed the petition, contending that members of petitioner union are not its
employees but of Stitchers Multi-Purpose Cooperative.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent (employer) has the right or material interest to assail the certification
election filed by petitioner.

RULING:

NO.

The court has held that in certification elections, the employer is a bystander, it has no right or
material interest to assail the certification election.

Thus, when a petition for certification election is filed by a legitimate labor organization, it is
good policy of the employer not to have any participation or partisan interest in the choice of
bargaining representative. While employers may rightfully be notified or informed of petitions
of such nature, they should not, however, be considered parties thereto with an inalienable
right to oppose it.

 Notre Dame of Greater Manila v. Laguesma, 433 SCRA 224

(2004)PAGUICAN
FACTS:

Private respondent Notre Dame of Greater Manila Teachers & Employees Union (NMGTEU),
a legitimate labor organization duly accredited and registered with the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) filed with Med-Arbitration Branch, NCR DOLE a petition for direct
certification election as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent or certification election among
the rank and file employees of petitioner NDGM.

A pre-election conference was conducted wherein the parties agreed among others, that the
certification election shall be conducted and that the eligible voters shall be those employees
appearing in the list submitted by management as agreed upon the parties. NDGM, however,
registered a motion to include probationary and substitute employees in the list of qualified
voters. The Med-Arbiter denied the motion by handwritten notation on the motion itself. He
then issued an order which certified private respondent as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the rank and file employees of petitioner.

Respondent undersecretary rendered the questioned decision dismissing the appeal for lack
of merit.

The Court of Appeal ruled that the petitioner has no standing to question the qualification of
the workers who should be included in the list of the voters because, in the process of
choosing their collective bargaining representative, the employer is definitely an intruder.

ISSUE: Whether or not the employer has legal capacity to question the election.

HELD:

No.

More important, unless it filed a petition for a certification election pursuant to Article 258 of
the Labor Code, the employer has no standing to question the election, which is the sole
concern of the workers. The Labor Code states that any party to an election may appeal the
decision of the med-arbiter. Petitioner was not such a party to the proceedings, but stranger
and had no right to interfere therein.

Clearly, petitioner did not sustain direct injury as a result of the non-inclusion of some of its
employees in the certification election. Hence, it does not have any material interest in the
case. Only Employees themselves, being the real parties-in-interest, may question their
removal from the voters’ list.

3. Responsible Agency, Arts. 232, 238, 268-272; Book V, Rule VIII, Secs. 14-17
(Note: Art. 226, now 232, was superseded by EO 251 30 January 1987
which created the NCMB, absorbing the conciliation and mediation
functions of the BLR; also, amended by RA 6715 21 March 1989)

 Hijo Resources Corp. v. EpifanioMejares plus 3 others, GR No.208986;

Jan. 13, 2016ESTRELLADO
Facts:
A, B, C, D were employed by HPI as farm workers occupying various positions as area
harvesters, packing house workers, loaders, or labelers. In 2001, A, B, C, D were absorbed
by HRC, but they were working under the contractor-growers. They asserted that these
contractor-growers received compensation from HRC and were under the control of HRC.
They further alleged that the contractor-growers did not have their own capitalization, farm
machineries, and equipment. On 1 July 2007, A, B, C, D formed their union NAMABDJERA-
HRC, which was later registered with the DOLE. On 24 August 2007, NAMABDJERA-HRC
filed a petition for certification election before the DOLE. When HRC learned that they formed
a union, the three contractor-growers filed with the DOLE a notice of cessation of business
operations. In September 2007, A, B, C, D were terminated from their employment on the
ground of cessation of business operations by the contractor-growers of HRC. On 19
November 2007, the DOLE Med-Arbiter issued an Order, dismissing NAMABDJERA-HRC’s
petition for certification election on the ground that there was no employer-employee
relationship between A, B, C, D (members of NAMABDJERA-HRC) and HRC. They did not
appeal the Order of the Med-Arbiter but pursued the illegal dismissal case they filed. HRC
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of (a) lack of jurisdiction under the principle of res
judicata, and (b) the Order of the Med-Arbiter finding that A, B, C, D were not employees of
HRC, which they did not appeal, had become final and executory. The Labor Arbiter ruled that
the decision of the Med-Arbiter in a certification election case, by the nature of that
proceedings, does not foreclose further dispute between the parties as to the existence or
non-existence of employer-employee relationship between them.
Issue:
Is the Labor Arbiter bound by the ruling of the Med-Arbiter regarding the existence or non-
existence of employer-employee relationship between the parties in the certification election
case?

Ruling:
No. The decision in a certification election case, by the very nature of that proceeding, does
not foreclose all further disputes between the parties as to the existence or non-existence of
an employer-employee relationship between them. As mentioned earlier, the Med-Arbiter’s
order in this case dismissing the petition for certification election on the basis of non-existence
of employer-employee relationship was issued after the members of the union were
dismissed from their employment. The purpose of a petition for certification election is to
determine which organization will represent the employees in their collective bargaining with
the employer. The union, without its member-employees, was thus stripped of its personality
to challenge the Med-Arbiter’s decision in the certification election case. Thus, the members
of the union were left with no option but to pursue their illegal dismissal case filed before the
Labor Arbiter. To dismiss the illegal dismissal case filed before the Labor Arbiter on the basis
of the pronouncement of the Med-Arbiter in the certification election case that there was no
employer- employee relationship between the parties, which the union could not even appeal
to the DOLE Secretary because of the dismissal of its members, would be tantamount to
denying due process to A, B, C, D in the illegal dismissal case.
 4. Nature of Proceeding/Effect of Private Agreement

 PLUM Federation of Industrial and Agrarian Workers v. Noriel, 119

SCRA 299 (1982)POLINAR
Facts:

PLUM filed a petition for certification election but this was opposed by PTGWO claiming that
they (PTGWO) are the recognized collective bargaining representative of the employees of
the company. PTGWO also invoked the Code of Ethics of TUCP, a federation were both of
them are members. The records of the case were forwarded to TUCP and TUCP declared
that PTGWO is the exclusive bargaining agent. BLR Director Noriel sustained TUCP’s
decision and ratiocinated that the internal rules of the federation must be kept intact. SC ruled
that TUCP has no authority to declare such and allowed PLUM to file their certification
election and let the employees vote who they want to be their collective bargaining
representative.

Issue: W/N the “No Union Raiding” Clause of the “Code of Ethics” adopted by the members of
the TUCP wherein both union are members are binding and will serve as a BAR to a PCE.

Ruling:

NO. the private agreement is void for being violativeof the worker’s protection to labor and
freedom of peaceful assembly and association guaranteed by the Constitution.

Certification Election is the fairest and most effective way of determining which labor
organization can truly represent the working force. It is a fundamental postulate that the win of
the majority if given expression in an honest election with freedom on the part of the voters to
make their choice, is controlling. Protection to labor and freedom of peaceful assembly and
association are guaranteed by the Constitution…However in the case at bar, instead of
ordering an election, respondent Director dismissed the appeal of PLUM based on the
decision of the TUCP, which the court considers an impairment of the freedom of the workers
to voice out their choice of the union to represent them. If there is any doubt as to the required
number having met, there would be no better way than the holding of a certification election to
ascertain which union really commands the allegiance of the rank-and-file employees. If the
desired goal is for the execution of a collective bargaining contract to protect the workers,
then certification election is the most appropriate means to attain said end.

 Port Workers Union of the Philippines, supraJulei

5. Process and Procedure

a) Preliminary Conference; Hearing, Book V, Rule VIII, Sec. 10

b) Consent Election; Agreement, Book V, Rule VIII, Sec. 11

c) Grounds for Denial of the Petition; Prohibited Grounds, Book V, Rule

 VIII, Secs. 15, 16, 17

d) Order/Decision on the Petition, Book V, Rule VIII, Sec. 14

e) Appeal, Art. 272; Book V, Rule VIII, Secs. 18-23

6. Conduct of Certification Election, Book V, Rule IX, Secs. 1-22, as amended by

D.O. 40-F-03 & D.O. 40-I-15

a) Pre-election Conference, Book V, Rule IX, Sec. 3, as amended

b) Voter List and Voters, Book V, Rule IX, Sec. 6; Book V, Rule I, Sec. 1
(q)

 Yokohama Tire Phil., Inc. v. Yokohama Employees Union, 539

SCRA 556 (2007)MABBORANG
Facts:

On October 7, 1999, respondent Yokohama Employees Union (Union) filed a petition for
certification election among the rank-and-file employees of Yokohama. Upon appeal from the
Med-Arbiter’s order dismissing the petition, the Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) ordered an election with (1) “Yokohama Employees’ Union” and (2) “No
Union” as choices. The election held on November 23, 2001 yielded the following result:
YOKOHAMA EMPLOYEES UNION – 131, NO UNION - 117, SPOILED - 2; Total votes cast =
250. Yokohama challenged 78 votes cast by dismissed employees. On the other hand, the
Union challenged 68 votes cast by newly regularized rank-and-file employees and another
five (5) votes by alleged supervisor-trainees. Yokohama formalized its protest and raised as
an issue the eligibility to vote of the 78 dismissed employees, while the Union submitted only
a handwritten manifestation during the election.

Issue:

Whether or not it is proper to appreciate the votes of the dismissed employees

HELD:

YES.

The votes of the dismissed employees shall be appreciated. Section 2, Rule XII (of the rules
implementing Book V of the Labor Code), the rule in force during the November 23, 2001
certification election clearly, unequivocally and unambiguously allows dismissed employees to
vote during the certification election if the case they filed contesting their dismissal is still
pending at the time of the election. Here, the votes of employees with illegal dismissal cases
were challenged by petitioner although their cases were still pending at the time of the
certification election on November 23, 2001. These cases were filed on June 27, 2001 and
the appeal of the Labor Arbiter’s February 28, 2003 Decision was resolved by the NLRC only
on August 29, 2003. Even the new rule has explicitly stated that without a final judgment
declaring the legality of dismissal, dismissed employees are eligible or qualified voters.

RULE IX CONDUCT OF CERTIFICATION ELECTION

Section 5. Qualification of voters; inclusion-exclusion. – . . . An employee who has been

dismissed from work but has contested the legality of the dismissal in a forum of appropriate
jurisdiction at the time of the issuance of the order for the conduct of a certification election
shall be considered a qualified voter, unless his/her dismissal was declared valid in a final
judgment at the time of the conduct of the certification election. x x x x

Thus, we find no reversible error on the part of the DOLE Acting Secretary and the Court of
Appeals in ordering the appreciation of the votes of the dismissed employees. Finally, we
need not resolve the other issues for being moot. The 68 votes of the newly regularized
rankand-file employees, even if counted in favor of “No Union,” will not materially alter the
result. There would still be 208 votes in favor of respondent and 189 votes in favor of “No
Union.” We also note that the certification election is already a fait accompli, and clearly
petitioner’s rank-and-file employees had chosen respondent as their bargaining
representative.

 NUWHRAIN – Manila Pavilion Hotel Chapter v. Secretary of

Labor & Employment, 594 SCRA 767 (2009)VIDAL
FACTS:
A certification election was conducted in 2006 among the rank-and-file employees of the
respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel (HIMPHLU). Petitioner now contends that the
segregated 22 votes must be opened and tallied. Eleven votes were initially segregated as
they were cast by dismissed employees while six (6) votes were cast by supervisory
employees and 5 were from probationary employees. Petitioner insisted that the votes of the
probationary employees must be counted as one of the voters is a probationary employee.
Problem arose when the Secretary of Labor ruled that probationary employees cannot
participate in a certification election and as such, it held that respondent HIMPHLU is the
proper exclusive bargaining agent.

ISSUE/s: 1. Whether probationary employees can participate in the certification election.

2. Whether respondent HIMPHLU met the required majority to be considered as the
exclusive bargaining agent.

HELD:
Yes. Porbationary employees have the right to vote in a certification election. In a certification
election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit whether probationary
or permanent are entitled to vote. The Labor Code makes no distinction as to their
employment status as basis for eligibility to support the certification election.

Applying the “double majority rule,” respondent HIMPHLU was not able to obtain a majority
vote. HIMPHLU obtained 169 votes and clearly did not meet the required majority because
the opening of the segregated 17 ballots resulted to the favor of petitioner NUWHRAIN.

RATIO:
“Double majority rule” For there to be a valid certification election, majority of the bargaining
unit must have voted and the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid votes
cast such that: (1) majority of the eligible voters cast their vote and (2) the winning union must
garner majority of the valid votes cast.

The true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for it to serve as basis
for computing the required majority, and not just to determine which union won the elections.
The two-fold objective of the certification election is (1) to determine the appropriate
bargaining unit and (2) to ascertain the majority representation of the bargaining
representative.

c) Posting Notice, Book V, Rule I, Sec. 1 (o); Book V, Rule IX, Sec. 7

d) Voting Day/Venue, Book V, Rule IX, Sec. 3

 Asian Design and Manufacturing Corp. v. Calleja, 174

SCRA 477 (1989)SAUZA
FACTS:

Upon petition of Buklod ng Manggagawang Pilipino (BMP), one of several labor unions at
ADMACOR'S factory, the Labor Relations Division, Regional Office VII (Cebu City) ordered a
certification election to be conducted on May 21, 1986, a regular business day. Several
factory workers of ADMACOR (petitioner) held a strike. No previous notice of strike was filed
by the factory workers with the Bureau of Labor Relations Regional Office. On May 20,1986,
ADMACOR filed a petition) for the indefinite resetting of the scheduled certification election,
which petition was not acted upon by the Labor Relations Division.

The scheduled certification election was conducted, despite the strike. Of the 423 workers
who voted, 413 voted for Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) as their exclusive
bargaining agent, On the same day, ADMACOR filed a complaint for illegal strike.

ADMACOR filed a petition to declare the certification election conducted on May 21, 1986 as
null and void on the ground that there being a strike by some workers in the premises of the
factory on the day of the certification election, such day cannot be considered a regular
business day, pursuant to Section 2, Rule VI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code.

Med-Arbiter dismissed ADMACOR's complaint to annul the May 21, 1986 certification election
and certified SPFL as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees
of ADMACOR. This dismissal was appealed by ADMACOR to the Bureau of Labor Relations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the certification election held during a regular business day (as required by
Sec 2 Rule VI, Book VI) was invalid considering that during such day, there was a strike held
by the Union.

HELD:
No, Certification election was valid as 413 employees voted out of 423. Furthermore, there is
no showing of any protest on the matter containing the election proceedings in the Minutes of
the Certification Election. The holding of the strike does not affect the regularity of the
business day.”
Doctrine: “Moreover, it cannot be denied that an actual election was
conducted on said date where, of the 423 workers who voted, 413 voted for SPFL as its
exclusive bargaining agent. In the "Minutes of the Certification Election among the Rank and
File Employees of Asian Design Manufacturing Corp.", the representatives of the contending
unions, and of the Ministry of Labor even attested that the election was peaceful and orderly
and none of the parties registered any protest on any matter concerning the election
proceedings. There is thus, no valid reason to annul the certification election.”

e) Conduct of Election, Book V, Rule IX, Secs. 1, 2, 14, 15

 The Hercules Industries, Inc. v. Secretary of DOLE, 214 SCRA

129 (1992)NABATAR
FACTS:
On July 1987, National federation of Labor filed a petition for certification election, alleging
that the CBA would expire in August 1987, and that it [NFL] enjoys the support of more than
20% of Hercules rank and file employees.
By the parties’ agreement, the Med -Arbiter issued an order for the conduct of a certification
election —1. NFL, 2. Hercules Employees Labor Union [HELU], 2. No Union.
In the pre-election conference, the parties were not able to agree on the list of
qualified voters, because the company charged that the list included 98 scabs, 16 capatazes,
8 security guards, and 9 managerial employees. The Med-Arbiter ordered the conduct of a
certification election, but excepted the following: managerial employees, security force
department, and the striker employees who executed quitclaims and accepted separation
pay.
NFL appealed this order to the BLR; however, pending its resolution, a certification
election was conducted. Eventually, the BLR director declared the election null and void, and
ordered a new election, saying that the July1987 payroll, excluding the 98 scab replacement,
will be the basis for the voters list.
NFL won in the certification election, garnering 89 out of 91 votes [2 votes were
spoiled / invalid], and so theMed-Arbiter declared and certified NFL as the SEBA of the rank-
and-files.
Hercules’ [the company] MfR was denied by the DOLE Undersecretary on the
following grounds:
1. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 6, Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code on
protests had not been followed.
2. The records disclose that no protest was made before the election, nor formalized
within 5 days after the election.
3. DOLE has not found any legal obstacle to NFL’s proclamation as the SEBA of the
rank-and-files

ISSUE:
Whether or not Hercules Industries, Inc., as employer, may question the validity of the
certification election among its rank-and-file employees.

HELD:
NO.
In a long line of decisions, this Court has undeviatingly ruled that the employer is not a party
to a certification election which is the sole or exclusive concern of the workers (Rizal Workers
Union v. Ferrer-Calleja, 186 SCRA 431). In the choice of their collective bargaining
representative, the employer is definitely an intruder. His participation, to put it mildly,
deserves no encouragement (Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, 84 SCRA 469; Filipino
Metals Corp. v. Ople, 107 SCRA 211).

The only instance when the employer may be involved in that process is when it is obliged to
file a petition for certification election on its workers’ request to bargain collectively pursuant to
Article 258 of the Labor Code. After the order for a certification election issues, the employer’s
involvement ceases, and it becomes a neutral bystander. (Rizal Workers’ Union v. Calleja,
supra.).

In this case, the Solicitor General correctly observed that while the employees themselves
never requested the petitioner to bargain collectively, still, they did not object to the results of
the certification election. Hence, petitioner’s appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations from the
Med-Arbiter’s Order certifying the NFL as the exclusive bargaining agent of its rank and file
employees, and its filing of this petition for certiorari with us, must be rejected. The employer’s
intervention in the certification election of its workers is frowned upon by law.

f) Challenging of Votes and On the Spot Questions, Book V, Rule IX,

Secs. 11-13; Rule I, Sec. 1 (p)

g) Protest Period, Book V, Rule IX, Secs. 13, 14; Rule I, Sec. 1 (p)

Note: Protest Period-Book V, Rule IX, Sees. 11 (Procedure in the challenge

of votes) renumbered as Sec. 10, amended by D.O. 40- F-03; 12
(On-the-spot Questions) renumbered as Sec. 11, amended by
D.O. 40-1-15; 13 (Protest; when perfected) renumbered as Sec. 12 by
D.O. 40-F-03 and again renumbered as Sec. 13, amended by D.O.
40-1-15); Rule I, Sec. 1 (p)

Note: Sec. 10 (Challenging of Votes) deleted by D.O. 40-F-03

 DHL Philippines Corporation United Rank and File

Association – Federation of Free Workers v. Buklod ng
Manggagawa ng DHL Phils. Corp., 434 SCRA 670
(2004)BELEN
Facts: A certification election was conducted among the regular rank and file employees in
the main office and the regional branches of DHL Philippines Corporation. The contending
choices were petitioner and "no union."
On January 19, 1998, on the basis of the results of the certification election, with petitioner
receiving 546 votes and "no union" garnering 348 votes, the election officer certified the
former as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the
corporation
Respondent Buklod ng Manggagawa ng DHL Philippines Corporation (BUKLOD) filed with
DOLE a Petition for the nullification of the certification election after the protest period. The
officers of petitioner were charged with committing fraud and deceit in the election
proceedings, particularly by misrepresenting to the voter-employees that it was an
independent union, when it was in fact an affiliate of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW).
Issue: WON the protest was valid
Held: Yes.
Related to discussion: Even though the employees only found out about the
misrepresentation of their union after the protest period, they werestill allowed to file a petition
to invalidate the certification election, since they could not have had sufficient time between
the misrepresentation and the election to check the truth of its claims, especially since it was
made by the union officers--the president no less.
Ratio: The making of false statements or misrepresentations that interfere with the free
choice of the employees is a valid ground for protest. A certification election may be set aside
for misstatements made during the campaign, where:
1) a material fact has been misrepresented in the campaign;
2) an opportunity for reply has been lacking; and
3) the misrepresentation has had an impact on the free choice of the employees participating
in the election.
A misrepresentation is likely to have an impact on their free choice, if it comes from a party
who has special knowledge or is in an authoritative position to know the true facts. This
principle holds true, especially when the employees are unable to evaluate the truth or the
falsity of the assertions.
The fact that the officers of petitioner especially its president, misrepresented it to the voting
employees as an independent union constituted a substantial misrepresentation of material
facts of vital concern to those employees. The materiality of such misrepresentation is self-
evident. The employees wanted an independent union to represent them in collective
bargaining, free from outside interference. Thus, upon knowing that petitioner was in fact an
affiliate of the FFW, the members disaffiliated from petitioner and organized themselves into
an independent union. Additionally, the misrepresentation came from petitioner’s recognized
representative, who was clearly in a position to hold himself out as a person who had special
knowledge and was in an authoritative position to know the true facts.
We are not easily persuaded by the argument of petitioner that the employees had sufficient
time between the misrepresentation and the election to check the truth of its claims. They
could hardly be expected to verify the accuracy of any statement regarding petitioner, made
to them by its officers. No less than its president stated that it was an independent union. At
the time, the employees had no reason to doubt him.

 Philippine Fruits and Vegetables Industries, Inc. v. Torres, 211

SCRA 95 (1992)CABADING
SUMMARY:

The petition raises the issue whether non-regular seasonal workers who have long been
separated from employment prior to the filing of the petition for certification election would be
allowed to vote and participate in a certification election.

A Certification Election (CE) was held for the selection of PFVI’s employee’s exclusive
bargaining representative. Out of the 291 votes cast in the election, 168 were challenged
votes—i.e. their voters still had an illegal dismissal or ULP case against the Company. The 60
yes votes failed to obtain the majority of the votes cast in theCE, hence, the necessity of
opening the 168 challenged votes to determine the true will of the employees.Company
opposed the opening of the yes votes and their inclusion in the tally since said voters are not
regular employees nor seasonal workers for having allegedly rendered work for less than 180
days.

The Med-Arbiter ordered the opening of said 168 challenged votes upon his observation that
said employees were illegally dismissed in accordance with the decision of a Labor Arbiter.
165 of the challenged votes were yes votes, increasing the number of yes votes to 225.The
Court dismissed the Company’s petition, and ruled in favor of the Union

Note: The Company also pointed out that the notice of certification election was posted only 4
days before the election, instead of the 5 days required by the Implementing Rules. The
Court, citing the Constitution, reasoned that since a substantial number of employees were
able to vote, the lack of one day in the posting of notice is not a compelling reason to nullify
the election. The Court also held that upon the score alone of the ‘Bystander Rule’, the
petition should have been dismissed outright.

DOCTRINE: Employees who have been improperly laid off but who have a present,
unabandoned right to or expectation of re-employment, are eligible to vote in certification
elections. Thus, if the dismissal is under question, as in the case now at bar whereby a case
of illegal dismissal and/or unfair labor practice was filed, the employees concerned could still
qualify to vote in the election.

h) Requisite for Validity of Election/Failure of Election, Art. 268; Book V,

Rule 1 (q); Rule IX, Secs. 19-20

 Benguet Electric Coop., Inc. v. Calleja, 180 SCRA 740

(1989)BARTOLATA
FACTS:
In 1985, the BENECO Worker’s Labor Union Association of Democratic Labor Organizations
(BWLU-ADLO) filed a petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of all the rank-and-file employees of BENECO. This was opposed by BELU
contending that it was already certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of
the rank-and-file employees of BENECO.

On the other hand, BENECO filed a motion to dismiss BWLU-ADLO’s petition citing as
grounds the fact that: (1) it is a non-profit electric cooperative and (2) the employees
represented by BWLU-ADLO are not eligible to form, join or assist labor organizations of their
own choosing because they are members and as such, considered as joint owners of the
cooperative.

The mediator-arbiter of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) issued an order
giving due course to the petition of BWLU-ADLO. It was, however, limited only among the 37
rank-and-file employees who were found to be non-members of the cooperative and without
any involvement in the actual ownership of BENECO.

A certification election was subsequently held which was protested to by BENECO’s counsel
due to the contention that employees who are members-consumers were allowed to vote
despite the prohibition under the Labor Code. BENECO certifies that of the 83 votes cast,
only 4 votes were made by employees who are not members of the cooperative.

BENECO, thus, asserts that the certification election held was null and void since members-
employees of BENECO who are not eligible to form and join a labor union for purposes of
collective bargaining were allowed to vote in the election in violation of Article 256 (now 268)
of the Labor Code which provides that in order to have a valid certification election, “at least a
majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving
the majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all
workers in the unit.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the employees of a cooperative are qualified to join a labor
organization for purposes of collective bargaining.

HELD: NO.

The Supreme Court held that the right to collective bargaining is not available to an employee
of a cooperative who at the same time, is a member and co-owner thereof. Only employees
who are neither members nor co-owners of the cooperative are entitled to exercise the rights
to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiation as mandated by the 1987
Constitution and applicable statues under the rationale that an owner certainly cannot bargain
with himself of his co-owners.
It was further clarified that “(i)t is the fact of ownership of the cooperative, and not involvement
in the management thereof, which disqualifies a member from joining any labor organization
within the cooperative. Thus, irrespective of the degree of their participation in the actual
management of the cooperative, all members thereof cannot form, assist or join a labor
organization for the purpose of collective bargaining.”

Thus, the certification election held was null and void since “x x x it cannot be determined
whether or not respondent union was duly elected by the eligible voters of the bargaining unit
since even employees who are ineligible to join a labor union within the cooperative because
of their membership therein were allowed to vote in the certification election. Considering the
foregoing, the Court finds that respondent director committed grave abuse of discretion in
certifying respondent union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank
and file employees of petitioner cooperative.”

i) Nullification of Election Results

 United Employees Union of Gelmart Industries v. Noriel, 67

SCRA 267 (1975)Darwin

j) Run-Off Election, Book V, Rule X, Secs. 1-2; Rule IX, Secs. 19

k) Re-Run Election, Book V, Rules IX, Sec. 18

l) Proclamation and Certification of the Result of the Election, Book V,
Rule IX, Secs. 16, 21

6. Where no Petition for Certification Election is Filed, Art. 264, 268 2nd par.

D. Certification of Designated Majority Union, Arts. 267, 268 3rd sentence; Book V,
Rule I, Sec. 1 (t); Book V, Rule IX, Secs. 16, 21; ILO Convention No. 135, Arts. 1-6

 Phil. Diamond Hotel and Resort, Inc. v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees
Union, 494 SCRA 195 (2006)PAMISARAN

Facts:

The Diamond Hotel Employee’s Union (the union) filed a petition for Certification Election
before the DOLE-National Capital Region (NCR) seeking certification as the exclusive
bargaining representative of its members. The DOLE-NCR denied said petition as it failed to
comply with the legal requirements.

The Union later notified petitioner hotel of its intention to negotiate for collective
bargaining agreement (CBA). The Human Resource Department of Diamond Hotel rejected
the notice and advised the union since it was not certified by the DOLE as the exclusive
bargaining agent, it could not be recognized as such. Since there was a failure to settle
the dispute regarding the bargaining capability of the union, the union went on to file a notice
of strike due to unfair labor pracritce (ULP) in that the hotel refused to bargain with it and the
rank-and-file employees were being harassed and prevented from joining it. In the meantime,
Kimpo filed a complaint for ULP against petitioner hotel.

After several conferences, the union suddenly went on strike. The following day, the National
Union of Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN) joined the strike
and openly extended its support to the union. The some of the entrances were blocked by the
striking employees. The National Labour Relations Commission (NLRC) representative who
conducted an ocular inspection of the Hotel premises confirmed in his Report that the strikers
obstructed the free ingress to and egress from the Hotel. The NLRC thus issued a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) directing the strikers to immediately “cease and desist from
obstructing the free ingress and egress from the Hotel premises. During the implementation of
the order, the striking employees resisted and some of the guards tasked to remove
the barricades were injured. The NLRC declared that the strike was illegal and that the union
officers and members who participated were terminated on the grounds of participating in an
illegal strike.

The union contended that the strike was premised on valid ground and that it had the capacity
to negotiate the CBA as the representatives of the employees of Diamond Hotel. The union
contended that their dismissal is tantamount to an unfair labour practice and union busting.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC Resolution dismissing the complaints of
Mary Grace, Agustin and Rowena and of the union. It modified the NLRC Resolution,
however, by ordering the reinstatement with back wages of union members

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent union has the capacity to negotiate the CBA as the
representatives of the employees of Diamond Hotel

Held:

No. Article 255 of the Labor Code provides:

ART. 255. EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING REPRESENTATION AND WORKERS'

PARTICIPATION IN POLICY AND DECISION-MAKING

The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in

an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the
employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. However, an individual
employee or group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to
their employer.

Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, workers shall have the right, subject to
such rules and regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment may promulgate, to
participate in policy and decision-making process of the establishment where they are
employed insofar as said processes will directly affect their rights, benefits and welfare. For
this purpose, workers and employers may form labor-management councils: Provided, That
the representatives of the workers in such labor management councils shall be elected by at
least the majority of all employees in said establishment. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

As the immediately quoted provision declares, only the labor organization designated or
selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit is
the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining.

The union (hereafter referred to as respondent) is admittedly not the exclusive representative
of the majority of the employees of petitioner, hence, it could not demand from petitioner the
right to bargain collectively in their behalf.

Respondent insists, however, that it could validly bargain in behalf of "its members," relying
on Article 242 of the Labor Code.Respondent's reliance on said article, a general provision on
the rights of legitimate labor organizations, is misplaced, for not every legitimate labor
organization possesses the rights mentioned therein.Article 242 (a) must be read in relation to
above-quoted Article 255.

On respondent's contention that it was bargaining in behalf only of its members, the appellate
court, affirming the NLRC's observation that the same would only "fragment the employees"
of petitioner,held that "what [respondent] will be achieving is to divide the employees, more
particularly, the rank-and-file employees of [petitioner] . . . the other workers who are not
members are at a serious disadvantage, because if the same shall be allowed, employees
who are non-union members will be economically impaired and will not be able to negotiate
their terms and conditions of work, thus defeating the very essence and reason of collective
bargaining, which is an effective safeguard against the evil schemes of employers in terms
and conditions of work.

It bears noting that the goal of the DOLE is geered towards "a single employer wide unit
which is more to the broader and greater benefit of the employees working force. The
philosophy is to avoid fragmentation of the bargaining unit so as to strengthen the employees'
bargaining power with the management. To veer away from such goal would be contrary,
inimical and repugnant to the objectives of a strong and dynamic unionism.
E. Bars to Certification Election, Arts. 238, 261, 264, 265, 268; Book V, Rule VIII,
Secs. 3, 15

1. One-Year Bar Rule, Book V, Rule VIII, Secs. 3 (a), 15 (c)

 Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino v. Trajano, 201 SCRA 453

(1991)GAJUNERA
Facts:
In 1981, by virtue of a BLR Resolution, the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) was
declared the exclusive bargaining representative
of all rank-and-file employees of Viron Garments (VIRON).In 1985, More than four years later,
another union, the Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMPIL Katipunan), filed with the
BLR a
petition for certification election among VIRON employees. The petition allegedly counted with
the support of more than thirty percent (30%) of VIRON workers. NAFLU opposed the
petition.

TheMed-Arbiter ordered that a certification election be held, after ascertaining that KAMPIL
had complied with all the requirements of law and that since NAFLU’s certification in 1981, no
CBA was executed.NAFLU contended that at the time the petition for certification election
was filed, it was in process of collective bargaining with VIRON; that there was in fact a
deadlock in the negotiations which had prompted it to file a notice of strike; and that these
circumstances constituted a bar to the petition for election in accordance with Section3, Rule
V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.

BLR director Trajano set aside the Med-Arbiter's Order and dismissed KAMPIL's petition for
certification election. The delay in the negotiations was attributed to the exhaustion of all legal
remedies in the representation question twice initiated in the company before the filing of the
present petition, as well as to the management who had been resisting the representations of
NAFLU in collective bargaining. It also considered the fact that NAFLU underwent a strike to
bring management to the negotiation table

Issue:
WON Kampi’s petition for certification election is barred?

Ruling: It is evident that the prohibition imposed by law on the holding of a certification
election “within one year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final certification
election result"—in this case from February 27, 1981, the date of the Resolution declaring
NAFLU the exclusive bargaining representative of rank-and-file workers of VIRON—can have
no application, to the case at bar. That one-year period—known as the “certification year”
during which the certified union is required to negotiate with the employer, and certification
election is prohibited—has long since expired.

Again it seems fairly certain that prior to the filing of the petition for election in this case, there
was no such “bargaining deadlock (which) had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or
had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.” To be sure, there are in the
record assertions by NAFLU that its attempts to bring VIRON to the negotiation table had
been unsuccessful because of the latter’s recalcitrance, and unfulfilled promises to bargain
collectively; but there is no proof that it had taken any action to legally coerce ce VIRON to
comply with its statutory duty to bargain collectively. It could have charged VIRON with unfair
labor practice; but it did not. It could have gone on a legitimate strike in protest against
VIRON’s refusal to bargain collectively and compel it to do so; but it did not. There are
assertions by NAFLU, too, that its attempts to bargain collectively had been delayed by
continuing challenges to the resolution pronouncing it the sole bargaining representative in
VIRON.

 R. Transport Corp. v. Laguesma, 227 SCRA 827 (1993)Gene

2. Negotiation Bar Rule, Book V, Rule VIII, Secs. 3 (b), 15 (d)

3. Deadlock Bar Rule, Book V, Rule VIII, Secs. 3 (c), 15 (d)

 Divine Word University of Tacloban v. Sec. of Labor and Employment,

213 SCRA 759 (1992)CABAÑOG
FACTS:

Divine Word University Employees Union (DWUEU) is the sole and bargaining agent of the
Divine Word University. Sometime in 1985, DWUEU submitted its collective bargaining
proposals. The University replied and requested a preliminary conference which unfortunately
did not take place due to the alleged withdrawal of the CBA proposals. Because of this, the
union filed a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice.
Then, an agreement between the University and DWUEU-ALU were held after the filing of the
notice of strike. DWUEU-ALU, consonant with the agreement, submitted its collective
bargaining proposals but were ignored by the University.

ISSUE: WON the complaint for unfair labor practice filed by the Union is with merit.

HELD:

A thorough study of the records reveals that there was no "reasonable effort at good faith
bargaining" specially on the part of the University. Its indifferent towards collective bargaining
inevitably resulted in the failure of the parties to arrive at an agreement. As it was evident that
unilateral moves were being undertaken only by the DWUEU-ALU, there was no
counteraction of forces or an impasse to speak of. While collective bargaining should be
initiated by the union, there is a corresponding responsibility on the part of the
employer to respond in some manner to such acts.

This is a clear from the provisions of the Labor Code Art250(a) of which states:
 a.) when a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice
upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall
make a reply thereto not later than 10 calendar days from receipt of such notice.

Hence, petitioner's contention that the DWUEU-ALU's proposals may not be unilaterally
imposed on it on the ground that a collective bargaining agreement is a contract wherein the
consent of both parties is indispensable is devoid of merit. A similar argument
had already been disregarded in the case of Kiok Loy v. NLRC, where we upheld the order
of the NLRC declaring the unions draft CBA proposal as the collective agreement which
should govern the relationship between the parties. Kiok Loy vs. NLRC is applicable in the
instant case, considering that the fact therein have also been indubitably established in this
case. These factors are: (a) the union is the duly certified bargaining agent; (b) it made a definite request to
bargain submitted its collective bargaining proposals, and (c) the University made no
further proposal whatsoever. As we said in Kiok Loy v. NLRC, a company's refusal to make
counter proposal if considered in relation to the entire bargaining process, may indicate bad
faith and this is especially true where the Union's request for a counter proposal is left
unanswered.

Moreover, the Court added in the same case that "it is not obligatory upon either side of a labor controversy
to precipitately accept or agree to the proposal of the other. But an erring party should not be
tolerated and allowed with impunity to resort to schemes feigning negotiations by going through empty
gestures

 San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, 304 SCRA 1 (1999)Kathy

4. Contract Bar Rule, Arts. 238, 264, 265 2nd sentence, 261; Book V, Rule VIII,
Secs. 3 (d), 15 (c)& (d), 26

 Colegio de San Juan de Letran v. Association of Employees and

Faculty of Letran, 340 SCRA 587 (2000)NOGAN
FACTS:

Then president of respondent union Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran,

Salvador Abtria initiated the renegotiation of the last 2 years of the 5 year CBA with petitioner
Letran .The union elected a new set of officers that year where private respondent Eleanor
Ambas emerged as the newly elected president, she then proceeded to initiate the
renegotiation of the CBA but Letran claimed that the CBA was already prepapred for signing.
The parties submitted the disputed CBA to a referendum where it was rejected. Petitioner
accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter ruled
for the petitioner but on appeal this decision was reversed. The parties then agreed to
disregard the unsigned CBA and start negotiation on a new 5 year CBA, they submitted their
proposals which was received by the Board of Trustees of the petitioner.

Ambas was then informed of a change in her work schedule to which she protested and
requested for the issue to be brought to a grievance machinery under the old CBA. Due to
petitioner’s inaction, the union filed a notice to strike, the parties then met to discuss the
ground rules on the negotiation but the petitioner stopped negotiations upon learning that a
new group of employees filed for a petition for certification election – because of this, the
union finally struck .Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction and ordered all the striking
employees to return to work and for the petitioner to accept them back – petitioner accepted
everyone EXCEPT Ambas prompting them to file pleadings.

Issue: Is petitioner guilty of unfair labor practices when it suspended negotiations?

HELD:

Yes. Petition is denied for lack of merit.Petitioner failed to show any justification for the Court
to depart from the ruling of the appellate court. Petitioner is guilty of violating Art. 250, and
252 of the Labor Code

Art. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining.—The following procedures shall be observed in

collective bargaining: (a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a
written notice upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall
make a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice.

Art. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively.—The duty to bargain collectively means the
performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good
faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. Petitioner violated Art. 250 by not filing any
reply or counter proposal when union submitted their proposals. Petitioner likewise violated
Art 252 when it delayed the negotiations numerous times, and showed complete lack of
interest to negotiate the CBA.

 PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Ricardo Dequilla, et al., 661 SCRA 732

(2011)Kristine

F. Suspension of Certification Election: Prejudicial Question

 LingkodManggagawa ng Rubberworld, Adidas-ANGLO v. RubberworldPhils.,

Inc., 513 SCRA 208 (2007)YANONG
FACTS:
On August 26, 1994, Rubberworld filed with the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) a Notice of Temporary Partial Shutdown due to severe financial crisis, therein
announcing the formal actual company shutdown a copy of which was served on the
recognized labor union of Rubberworld, the BisigPagkakaisa-NAFLU, the union with which
the corporation had a collective bargaining agreement. On September 1, 1994,
BisigPagkakaisa-NAFLU staged a strike. It set up a picket line in front of the premises of
Rubberworld and even welded its gate.
 As a result, Rubberworld's premises closed prematurely even before the date set for the
start of its temporary partial shutdown. On September 9, 1994, herein petitioner union, the
LingkodManggagawa Sa Rubberworld, Adidas-Anglo (Lingkod, for brevity), represented by its
President, Sonia Esperanza, filed a complaint against Rubberworld and its Vice Chairperson,
Mr. Antonio Yang, for unfair labor practice (ULP), illegal shutdown, and non-payment of
salaries and separation pay.

The said complaint was referred to Labor Arbiter Ernesto Dinopol for appropriate action.
On November 22, 1994, while the aforementioned complaint was pending with Labor Arbiter
Dinopol, Rubberworld filed with the SEC a Petition for Declaration of a State of Suspension of
Payments with Proposed Rehabilitation Plan. Notwithstanding the SEC's aforementioned
suspension order and despite Rubberworld's submission on January 10, 1995 of a Motion to
Suspend Proceedings, Labor Arbiter Dinopol went ahead with the ULP case and rendered his
decision denying respondents motion to suspend proceedings and declaring respondent
RubberworldPhils., Inc. to have committed unfair labor practice.

Its motion for reconsideration of the same Order having been denied by the NLRC in its
Resolution 7 of March 29, 1996, Rubberworld directly went to the Supreme Court on a
Petition for Certiorari. On April 22, 1998, the SEC issued an Order finding that the
continuance in business [of Rubberworld] would neither be feasible/profitable nor work to the
best of interest of the stockholders, parties-litigants, creditors, or the general public, xxx
Rubberworld Philippines, Inc. was hereby declared as DISSOLVED under Section 6(d) of
P.D. 902-A.

Accordingly, the suspension Order is LIFTED. Eventually, in the herein assailed

Decision dated January 18, 2002, the CA granted Rubberworlds petition in CAG.R. SP. No.
53356 on the finding that the Labor Arbiter had indeed committed grave abuse of discretion
when it proceeded with the ULP case despite the SECs suspension order of December 28,
1994, and accordingly declared the proceedings before it, including the subsequent orders by
the NLRC dismissing Rubberworlds appeal and the writ of execution, null and void. Hence,
the petition was filed.

ISSUES:
1) Whether the CA had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction or an excess in the exercise thereof when it gave due course to the petition
filed by Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. and annulled and set aside the decisions rendered by
the labor arbiter a quo and the NLRC, when the said decisions had become final and
executory warranting the outright dismissal of the aforesaid petition;

2) Whether the CA had committed grave abuse of discretion and reversible error when it
applied Section 5(d) and Section 6 (c) of P.D. No. 902-A, as amended, to the case at
bar.
HELD:
1. NO. CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

It cannot be said that the decision of the Labor Arbiter, or the decision/dismissal order
and writ of execution issued by the NLRC, could ever attain final and executory status. The
Labor Arbiter completely disregarded and violated Section 6(c) of Presidential Decree 902-A,
as amended, which categorically mandates the suspension of all actions for claimsagainst a
corporation placed under a management committee by the SEC. Thus, the proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter and the order and writ subsequently issued by the NLRC are all null
and void for having been undertaken or issued in violation of the SEC suspension Order
dated December 28, 1994. As such, the Labor Arbiters decision, including the dismissal by
the NLRC of Rubberworlds appeal, could not have achieved a final and executory status.

The Labor Arbiter's decision in this case is void ab initio, and therefore, non-existent. A
void judgment is in effect no judgment at all. No rights are divested by it nor obtained from it.
Being worthless in itself, all proceedings upon which the judgment is founded are equally
worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing
out of it are void. In other words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is
the same as it would be if there were no judgment. It accordingly leaves the party-litigants in
the same position they were in before the trial.

2. NO.The CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

The Court addressed the more substantial issue in this case, namely, the applicability of
the provisions of Section 5 (d) and Section 6 (c) of P.D. No. 902-A, as amended, reorganizing
the SEC, vesting it with additional powers and placing it under the Office of the President,
which respectively read:

Section 5. In addition to the regulatory adjudicative functions of the Securities and Exchange
Commission over corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it
as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:

xxxxxxxxx

d) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations to

be declared in the state of suspension of payments in cases
where the corporation, partnership or association possesses
sufficient property to cover all its debts but foresees the
impossibility of meeting them when they respectively fall due
or in cases where the corporation, partnership or association
 has no sufficient assets to cover its liabilities, but is under the
management of a rehabilitation receiver or management
committee created pursuant to this Decree.

Section 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the
following powers:

xxxxxxxxx

c) To appoint one or more receivers of the property, real or

personal, which is the subject of the action pending before
the Commission in accordance with the pertinent provisions
of the Rules of Court in such other cases whenever
necessary in order to preserve the rights of the parties-
litigants and/or protect the interest of the investing public and
creditors:

x xx

Provided, finally, That upon appointment of a management

committee, the rehabilitation receiver, board or body,
pursuant to this Decree, all actions for claims against
corporations, partnerships, or associations under
management or receivership pending before any court,
tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly.
[Emphasis supplied]

xxxxxxxxx x xx

The law is clear: upon the creation of a management committee or the appointment of a
rehabilitation receiver, all claims for actions "shall be suspended accordingly." No exception in
favor of labor claims is mentioned in the law. Since the law makes no distinction or
exemptions, neither should this Court. Ubilex non distinguitnecnosdistingueredebemos.
Allowing labor cases to proceed clearly defeats the purpose of the automatic stay and
severely encumbers the management committee's time and resources. The said committee
would need to defend against these suits, to the detriment of its primary and urgent duty to
work towards rehabilitating the corporation and making it viable again. To rule otherwise
would open the floodgates to other similarly situated claimants and forestall if not defeat the
rescue efforts. Besides, even if the NLRC awards the claims of private respondents, its ruling
could not be enforced as long as the petitioner is under the management committee.

 United CMC-Textile Workers v. Bureau of Labor Relations,

128 SCRA 316 (1984)HAMPAC
FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent FFW-SMQCC are local chapters of labor federations duly
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Petitioner is the exclusive
bargaining agent of all the rank and file workers of respondent QCC, a domestic corporation
engaged in the metal industry.

On September 27, 1991, 38 days before the expiration of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement between petitioner and respondent QCC, respondent FFW-SMQCC through
Reynito de Pedro filed with the DOLE Industrial Relations Division, National Capital Region a
petition for certification election. The petition was accompanied by a list of signatures of
company employees, who signified their consent to a certification election among the rank
and file employees of QCC.

Petitioner herein moved to dismiss the petition of respondent FFW-SMQCC on the grounds
that: (a) the required consent to the certification election of at least 25% of the rank and file
employees had not been met; (b) the petition was not verified as required by law; and (c)
Reynito de Pedro, who was also the president of petitioner, had no personality to file the
petition on behalf of FFW-SMQCC.

On October 30, 1991, respondent FFW-SMQCC, filed a second petition for certification
election, this time signed and verified by De Pedro.

On January 24, 1992, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification election of
respondent FFW-SMQCC

Petitioner appealed this decision to the Secretary of Labor. On June 17, 1992, the Secretary
of Labor rendered a decision, denying the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the order of
the Med-Arbiter.

ISSUE: WON the petition for certification election was verified as required by law

HELD: YES

Reasoning

-First, although Reynito de Pedro was the duly elected president of petitioner, he had
disaffiliated himself therefrom and joined respondent FFW-SMQCC before the petition for
certification election was filed on September 27, 1991. The eventual dismissal of De Pedro
from the company is of no moment, considering that the petition for certification election was
filed before his dismissal on August 22, 1992.

-Second, verification of a pleading is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite. Even if verification is

lacking and the pleading is formally defective, the courts may dispense with the requirement
in the interest of justice and order of correction of the pleading accordingly. Generally,
technical and rigid rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases; and this rule is
specifically applied in certification election proceedings, which are non-litigious but merely
investigative and non-adversarial in character. Nevertheless, whatever formal defects existed
in the first petition were cured and corrected in the second petition for certification election.

-Third, attached to the original petition for certification election was a list of 141 supporting
signatures out of the 300 employees belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit to be
represented by respondent FFW-SMQCC. Respondent QCC sought to delete from the list
some 36 signatures which are allegedly forged and falsified. Petitioner, likewise, submitted a
joint affidavit of 13 employees, disclaiming the validity of the signatures therein.

-Granting that 36 signatures were falsified and that 13 was disowned, this leaves 92
undisputed signatures which is definitely more than 75 i.e., 25% of the total number of
company employees required by law to support a petition for certification election. The
disclaimer of 13 employees by their respective signatures covers only their own personal
participation and cannot in any way be extended to include the rest of those who did not
question the same.

G. Effect of Petition for Cancellation of Trade Union Registration, Art. 246

 Samahan ng Manggagawasa Pacific Plastic v. Laguesma, 267 SCRA 303

(1997)ACAYLAR
FACTS:

Petitioner SAMAHAN and respondent MALAYANG NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG

PACIFIC PLASTIC are labor unions of rank and file employees at the Pacific Plastic
Corporation (PPC).

MNMPP filed a Petition for Certification Election, SAMAHAN countered by seeking the
cancellation of MNMPPs union registration. As a result, MNMPPs petition to be certified as
the bargaining agent was dismissed. MNMPP appealed to the Secretary of Labor who,
reversed the decision of the Med-Arbiter and ordered the holding of a certification election.
The motion for consideration was denied.

A pre-election conference was held, during which the PPC was required to submit the list of
its rank and file employees based on the company payroll three (3) months prior to the filing
of the petition. As respondent company failed to submit the list, it was given a stern warning
by DOLE that should it fail to appear at the next conference on June 3, 1991, the list to be
submitted by petitioner MNMPP would be used as basis for determining the eligible voters.
But the PPC again failed to appear. SAMAHAN also failed to appear at the June 3, 1991
conference. On June 18, 1991, it moved to defer the conference, alleging that proceedings for
the cancellation of union registration of MNMPP were still pending resolution before the Med-
Arbiter which constitute a prejudicial question and that there existed a collective bargaining
agreement between PPC and SAMAHAN which was a bar to the certification election.

ISSUE: Whether a CBA prematurely renewed is a bar to the holding of a certification

election.
HELD:

No.

Petitioner’s contention that the CBA between it and the PPC signed during the pendency of
the representation proceedings, rendered the certification election moot and academic. Rule
V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, 4 provides: The
representation case shall not, however, be adversely affected by a collective bargaining
agreement registered before or during the last 60 days of a subsisting agreement or during
the pendency of the representation case.

In ALU-TUCP v. Trajano , the magistrates held that the representation case will not be
adversely affected by a CBA registered before or during the freedom period or during the
pendency of the representation case.

Also, in ALU v. Calleja, the Supreme Court also held that a CBA, which was prematurely
renewed, is not a bar to the holding of a certification election. Hence, the CBA entered into
between petitioner and PPC during the pendency of the representation case and after the
filing of the petition for certification election on August 24, 1990, cannot possibly prejudice the
certification election nor render it moot.