122 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Jones vs. The Insular Government

[No. 2506. April 16, 1906.]
F. STEWART JONES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT,
defendant and appellant.

1. 1.ACTS OF THE COMMISSION; RESERVATION OF LANDS FOR PUBLIC USE.—

Where lands have been reserved by act of the Commission, a notice by the Governor-
General to the Court of Land Registration is sufficient to give that court' jurisdiction
of the cases mentioned in Act No. 648.

1. 2.ID.; PRESCRIPTION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.—The prescription of ten

years mentioned in Act No. 648 runs against the Government.

1. 3.ID. ; ADVERSE POSSESSION FOR TEN YEARS.—Held, That the evidence in the
case proved an adverse possession of the land in question for ten years.

1. 4.ID.; NULLITY; ACTS OF CONGRESS.—Act No. 648 is not void because not
previously submitted to the President and Congress. It is not included in the
provisions of section 13 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902.

1. 5.ID.; PHILIPPINE COMMISSION; GRANTING OF LAND.—The provisions of

section 14 authorizing the Commission to issue a patent for 16 hectares of land to a
native of the Islands who was in possession thereof on August 13, 1898, did not
prohibit the Commission from extending the provisions of Act No. 648 to foreigners.

APPEAL. from a judgment of the Court of Land Registration.

123
VOL. 6, APRIL 16, 1906 123
Jones vs. The Insular Government
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellant,
Pillsbury & Sutro, f or appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

On the 16th day of January, 1904, F. Stewart Jones presented a petition to the Court
of Land Registration asking that he be inscribed as the owner of a certain tract of
land situated in the Province of Benguet, and within the reservation defined in Act
No. 636. The Solicitor-General appeared in the court below and opposed the
inscription upon the ground that the property was public land. At the trial he objected
to any consideration of the case on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to
register land situated in that reservation. The objections were overruled and
judgment entered in favor of the petitioner, from which judgment the Government
appealed to this court.
 The act creating the Court of Land Registration (No. 496) gave it jurisdiction
throughout the Archipelago. By Act No. 1224, which was approved August 31, 1904,
and which applied to pending cases, the court was deprived of jurisdiction over lands
situated in the Province of Benguet. That act, however, contained a proviso by which
the court was given jurisdiction over applications for registration of title to land in all
cases coming within the provisions of Act No. 648. Act No. 648 provides in its first
section that—
"The Civil Governor is hereby authorized and empowered by executive order to reserve from
settlement or public sale and for specific public uses any of the public domain in the
Philippine Islands the use of which is not otherwise directed by law."

Section 2 provides: "Whenever the Civil Governor, in writing, shall certify that all
public lands within limits by him described in the Philippine Islands are reserved f
or civil public uses, either of the Insular Government, or of any provincial or
municipal government, and shall give notice thereof to the judge of the Court of Land
Registration, it shall be the duty of the judge of said court" to
124
124 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jones vs. The Insular Government
proceed in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 627. Act No. 627, which relates
to military reservations, provides that when notice is given to the Court of Land
Registration of the fact that any land has been so reserved, it shall be the duty of the
court to issue notice that claims for all private lands within the limits of the
reservation must be presented for registration under the Land Registration Act
within six months from the date of issuing such notice, and that all lands not so
presented within said time would be conclusively adjudged to be public lands, and all
claims on the part of private individuals for such lands, not so presented, would be
forever barred.
On the 26th day of August, 1903, the following letter was directed by Governor
Taft to the judge of the Court of Land Registration:
"SIR: You are hereby notified, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 648, entitled 'An
act authorizing the Civil Governor to reserve for civil public purposes, and from sale or
settlement, any part of the public domain not appropriated by law for special public purposes,
until otherwise directed by law, and extending the provisions of Act Numbered Six hundred
and twenty-seven so that public lands desired to be reserved by the Insular Government for
public uses, or private lands desired to be purchased by the Insular Government for such
uses, may be brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act;' that the Philippine
Commission has reserved for civil public uses of the Government of the Philippine Islands
the lands described in Act No. 636, entitled 'An act creating a Government reservation at
Baguio, in the Province of Benguet,' enacted February 11, 1903.
"It is therefore requested that the land mentioned be forthwith brought under the
operation of the Land Registration Act and become registered land in the meaning thereof,
and that you proceed in accordance with the pro visions of Act No. 648.
"Very respectfully,
(Signed) "WM. H. TAFT,
"Civil Governor."
 125
VOL. 6, APRIL 16, 1906 125
Jones vs. The Insular Government
The Court of Land Registration, acting upon this notice from the Governor, issued
the notice required by Act No. 627, and in pursuance of that notice Jones, the
appellee, within the six months referred to in the notice, presented his petition asking
that the land be registered in his name.
The first claim of the Government is that the provisions of Act No. 648 were not
complied with in the respect that this letter of the Governor did not amount to a
certificate that the lands had been reserved. The Solicitor-General says in his brief:
"To bring these lands within the operation of section 2 of Act No. 648 it was necessary for the
Civil Governor first to certify that these lands were reserved for public uses, and second, to
give notice thereof to the Court of Land Registration."

We do not think that this contention can be sustained. Act No. 648 conferred power
upon the Governor to reserve lands for public purposes, but it did not make that
power exclusive. The Commission did not thereby deprive itself of the power to itself
make reservations in the future, if it saw fit; neither did it intend to annul any
reservations which it had formerly made. The contention of the Government is true
when applied to a case where the land has not been reserved by the Commission. In
such a case it would be the duty of the Governor to first reserve it by an executive
order, and then to give notice to the Court of Land Registration, but where the land
had already been reserved by competent authority, it not only was not necessary for
the Governor to issue any executive order reserving the land but he had no power to
do so. In such cases the only duty imposed upon him was to give notice to the Court
of Land Registration that the land had been reserved. This notice was given in the
letter above quoted. The court had jurisdiction to try the case.
The petitioner Jones, on the 1st day of May, 1901, bought the land in question from
Sioco Cariño, an Igorot. He caused his deed to the land to be recorded in the office of
the registrar of property on the 8th day of May of the same year. Prior thereto, and
while Sioco Cariño was in possession of the land, he commenced proceedings
126
126 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jones vs. The Insular Government
in court for the purpose of obtaining a possessory information in accordance with the
provisions of the Mortgage Law. This possessory information he caused to be recorded
in the office of the registrar of property on the 12th day of March, 1901.
The evidence shows that Sioco Cariño was born upon the premises in question;
that his grandfather, Ortega, during the life of the latter, made a gift of the property
to Sioco. This gift was made more than twelve years before the filing of the petition
in this case—that is, before the 16th day of January, 1904. Sioco's grandfather,
Ortega, was in possession of the land at the time the gift was made, and had been in
possession thereof for many years prior to said time. Upon the gift being made Sioco
took possession of the property, and continued in such possession until his sale to
Jones, the petitioner. Since such sale Jones has been in possession of the land, and is
now in such possession. For more than twelve years prior to the presentation of the
petition the land had been cultivated by the owners thereof, and the evidence is
sufficient, in our opinion, to bring the case within section 41 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and to show such an adverse possession thereof for ten years as is required
by that section. The evidence of Sioco Cariño shows that what he did in the way of
presenting a petition to the Spanish Government in regard to a deed of the land was
done by order of the then comandante, and was limited to securing a measurement
thereof, as he then believed. These acts did not interrupt the running of the statute
of limitations.
Acts Nos. 627 and 648 provide that the provisions of section 41 of the Code of Civil
Procedure shall be applicable to all proceedings taken under either one of these acts.
These acts in effect provide that in determining whether the applicant is the owner
of the land or not, the general statute of limitations shall be considered, and shall be
applied against the Government The evidence showing, as we have said, such an
adverse possession, the petitioner proved his ownership of the land if the Commission
had authority to make the statute of limitations applicable to these proceedings.
127
VOL. 6, APRIL 16, 1906 127
Jones vs. The Insular Government
The claim of the Government is that this provision is void; that the act thereby
disposes of public lands; that Congress is the only authority that can take such action,
and that it has never authorized or approved the action of the Commission in applying
the statute of limitations to proceedings under Acts Nos. 648 and 627. We do not think
that this contention can be sustained. Section 12 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
provides as follows:
"SEC. 12. That all the property and rights which may have been acquired in the Philippine
Islands by the United States under the treaty of peace with Spain, signed December tenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, except such land or other property as shall be designated
by the President of the United States for military and other reservations of the Government
of the United States, are hereby placed under the control of the Government of said Islands,
to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof, except as provided in this act."

This gives the Government of the Philippine Islands power to dispose of these lands,
and of all public lands, and to pass the law in question, unless there is some provision
in other parts of the act of July 1, 1902, which takes away or limits that power. The
Government says that such limitation is found in section 13 of the act. That section
and sections 14 and 15 are as follows:
"SEC. 13. That the Government of the Philippine Islands, subject to the provisions of this Act
and except as herein provided, shall classify according to its agricultural character and
productiveness, and shall immediately make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other
disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands, but such rules and
regulations shall not go into effect or have the force of law until they have received the
approval of the President, and when approved by the President they shall be submitted by
him to Congress at the beginning of the next ensuing session thereof and unless disapproved
or amended by Congress at said session they shall at the close of such period have the force
and effect of law in the Philippine Islands: Provided, That a single homestead entry shall not
exceed sixteen hectares in extent.
128
128 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jones vs. The Insular Government
"SEC. 14. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and
empowered to enact rules and regulations and to prescribe terms and conditions to enable
persons to perfect their title to public lands in said Islands, who, prior to the transfer of
sovereignty from Spain to the United States, had fulfilled all or some of the conditions
required by the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the acquisition
of legal title thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of title; and the Philippine Commission
is authorized to issue patents, without compensation, to any native of said Islands, conveying
title to any tract of land not more than sixteen 'hectares in extent, which were public lands
and had been actually occupied by such native or his ancestors prior to and on the thirteenth
of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
"SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and
empowered, on such terms as it may prescribe, by general legislation, to provide for the
granting or sale and conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of said
Islands such parts and portions of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands,
of the United States in said Islands as it may deem wise, not exceeding sixteen hectares to
any one person, and for the sale and conveyance of not more than one thousand and twenty-
four hectares to any corporation or association of persons: Provided, That the grant or sale of
such lands, whether the purchase price be paid at once or in partial payments, shall be
conditioned upon actual and continued occupancy, improvement, and cultivation of the
premises sold for a period of not less than five years, during which time the purchaser or
grantee can not alienate or encumber said land or the title thereto; but such restriction shall
not apply to transfers of rights and title of inheritance under the laws for the distribution of
the estates of decedents."

It is first to be noted that section 13 does not apply to all lands. Timber and mineral
lands are expressly excluded. If the Commission should pass laws relating to mineral
lands without submitting them to Congress, as it
129
VOL. 6, APRIL 16, 1906 129
Jones vs. The Insular Government
has done (Act No. 624), their validity would not be determined by inquiring if they
had been submitted to Congress under section 13, but rather by inquiring if they were
inconsistent with other provisions of the act relating to mineral lands. In other words,
the fact that such laws were not submitted to Congress would not necessarily make
them void.
The same is true of legislation relating to coal lands, as to which sections 53 and
57 contain provisions. By section 57 this Government is authorized to issue all
needful rules and regulations for carrying into effect this and preceding sections
relating to mineral lands. Such regulations need not be submitted to Congress for its
approval. Act No. 1128, relating to coal lands, was not submitted.
 The act of Congress also contains provisions regarding the purchase of lands
belonging to religious orders. Section 65 provides as to those lands as follows:
"SEC. 65. That all lands acquired by virtue of the preceding section shall constitute a part
and portion of the public property of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and may be
held, sold, and conveyed, or leased temporarily for a period not exceeding three years after
their acquisition by said Government, on such terms and conditions as it may prescribe,
subject to the limitations and conditions provided for in this Act. * * * Actual settlers and
occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the Government shall have the preference
over all others to lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings within such reasonable time as
may be determined by said Government."

Does the clause "subject to the limitations and conditions of this act" require a
submission to Congress of legislation concerning such land? If it does, then Act No.
1120, which contains such provisions, is void, because it was never so submitted.
Section 18 of the act of Congress provides as follows:
"That the forest laws and regulations now in force in the Philippine Islands, with such
modifications and amendments as may be made by the Government of said Islands, are
hereby continued in force."
53445—9

130
130 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jones vs. The Insular Government
Must these modifications and amendments be submitted to Congress for its approval?
If they must be, then Act No. 1148, relating thereto, is void, because it was not so
submitted.
It seems very clear that rules and regulations concerning mineral, timber, and coal
lands, and lands bought from religious orders need not be submitted to Congress. If
they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the act of
Congress relating to the same subjects, they are valid. Congress, by section 12 of
the act, gave to the Philippine Government general power over all property acquired
from Spain. When it required the Commission to immediately classify the
agricultural lands and to make rules and regulations for their sale, we do not think
that it intended to virtually repeal section 12. Such, however, would be the effect of
the rule contended for by the Government. If, notwithstanding the provisions of
section 12, any law which in any way directly or indirectly affects injuriously the title
of the Government to public lands must be submitted to the President and Congress
for approval, the general power given by section 12 is taken away. An examination of
some of the laws of the Commission will show that a holding such as is contended for
by the Government in this case would apparently require a holding that such other
laws were also void. Act No. 496, which established the Court of Land Registration,
the court that tried this case, provides in section 38 that the decrees of the court shall
be conclusive on and against all persons, including the Insular Government, and all
the branches thereof. Neither the President nor Congress ever gave their consent to
this law. They never consented that the title of the Government to public lands should
be submitted to the judgment of the courts of the Islands. That this law provides a
means by which the Government may be deprived of its property in such lands is
apparent. In this very case, if the Government had not appealed from the judgment,
or if it should withdraw its appeal, the lands would be lost to it—lands which the
Attorney-General claims are public lands. The land could not be more effectually lost
by the law shortening the statute of limitations than by this law
131
VOL. 6, APRIL 16, 1906 131
Jones vs. The Insular Government
making the decrees of the Court of Land Registration binding on the Government. In
fact, the former law could not in any way prejudice the Government if it were not for
the latter law making the judgments of this court binding upon it. Both of these laws
in an indirect way affect the title to public lands, but we do not think that for that
reason they are included in the term "rules and regulations" used in section 13 of the
act of Congress.
Act No. 1039 granted to the Province of Cavite and to the pueblo of Cavite certain
public lands. This act never was submitted either to the President or to Congress.
Acts Nos. 660 and 732 authorized the leasing of parts of the San Lazaro estate. The
Government leased the sanitarium at Benguet, and provided for its sale. None of
these acts were ever submitted to the President or Congress. They all disposed of
public lands, and there are no provisions in Act No. 926, which was submitted to
Congress, which authorized such disposition. The Government owns many isolated
tracts of land, such as the Oriente Hotel, for example. It has reclaimed from the sea
a large tract of land in connection with the works of the port of Manila. If the
Government should desire to sell this reclaimed land or to lease a part of it for the
site of an hotel, or should desire to sell the Oriente Hotel building, we do not think
legislation to accomplish such purposes would require the previous approval of the
President and of Congress. The general purpose of section 13 was to require the
Government to classify agricultural lands and to pass a homestead law—that is, a
law which would state the rules and regulations by virtue of which title to the public
lands of which the Government was the undisputed owner might be acquired by
private persons. It is not necessary now to lay down any general rule by reference to
which it can be decided in every case whether an act of the Commission constitutes a
rule or regulation within the meaning of section 13. It is sufficient to say that the law
in question (Act No. 648.), making a statute of limitations run against the
Government when the title to a few scattered tracts of land throughout the
Archipelago is under consideration, is not such a rule or regulation as required
132
132 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jones vs. The Insular Government
previous submission to the President and Congress. It will be observed that by section
86 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, Congress reserves the right to annul all
legislation of the Commission.
There is nothing in section 14 which requires the rules and regulations therein
mentioned to be submitted to Congress. But it is said that although as to Act No. 648
submission to Congress was not required, it is nevertheless void when applied to one
not a native of the Islands, because forbidden by this section; and that this section
limits the power of the Commission to declare possession alone sufficient evidence of
title to cases in which the claimant is a native and in which the amount of land does
not exceed 16 hectares.
Section 14 is not limited to agricultural lands, as are sections 13 and 15. It includes
mineral and timber lands. So far as it relates to proceedings theretofore taken under
Spanish laws its benefits are not limited to natives of the Islands nor to tracts not
more than 16 hectares in extent. Where the only claim is possession, no possession
for any definite time prior to August 13, 1898, is required, nor is proof of any
possession whatever after that date demanded. According to the strict letter of the
section a native would be entitled to a patent who proved that he had been in
possession for the months of July and August only of 1898. It is not stated whether
or not one who receives such a patent must occupy the land for five years thereafter,
as required by section 15. Neither is it stated whether or not a person who was in
possession for the month of August, 1898, would be entitled to a patent in preference
to the actual settler spoken of in section 6. When legislating upon the subject-matter
of section 14, the Commission, in Act No. 926, did not make such a limitation as has
been suggested. Section 54, paragraph 6, of that act is as follows:
"All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands,
as defined by said act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona
fide claim of owner-
133
VOL. 6, APRIL 16, 1906 133
Jones us. The Insular Government
ship except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the taking
effect of this act, except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and to have
received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the
provisions of this chapter."

It is seen that this section does not exclude foreigners, nor is it limited to tracts not
exceeding 16 hectares in extent. To adopt the view that the power of the Commission
is so limited would require a holding that this section is void as to foreigners and as
to all tracts of land over 16 hectares in extent.
This paragraph of section 54 of Act No. 926 is in substance a continuation of Act
No. 648 and an extension of its provisions to all the lands of the Islands.
To adopt the construction contended for would lead to an unjust result. By the
terms of the first part of section 14 the Commission has the power to perfect the title
to 100 hectares of land as to which a Spaniard may have done nothing more than to
file an application relating thereto, and of which he never was in possession, while by
the last part of the section the Commission would be entirely without power to make
any rules by which a native who by himself and his ancestors had been in possession
of 100 hectares for fifty years or more could get more than 16 hectares. Such a
discrimination in favor of foreigners and against the natives could not have been
intended. It could not have been the purpose of Congress to give the Commission
ample power to legislate for the benefit of foreigners and to limit its power to legislate
for the benefit of natives.
The meaning of these sections is not clear, and it is difficult to give to them a
construction that will be entirely free from objection. But we do not think that
authority given by the Commission to issue to a native a patent for 16 hectares of
land of which he was in possession during the month of August, 1898, was intended
to limit the general power of control which by section 12 is given to the Commission.
134
134 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ramos vs. The Insular Government
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
the appellant. After the expiration of twenty days let final judgment be entered in
accordance herewith and ten days thereafter let the cause be remanded to the lower
court for proper procedure. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Tracey, JJ., concur.
Carson, J., concurs in the result.
Judgment affirmed.

____________

[No. 25010. October 27, 1926]

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINEISLANDS, plaintiff and
appellee, vs. PAULINO ABELLAET AL., claimants; MARIA DEL ROSARIO,
petitioner and appellant.
AGRICULTURAL LAND; FORESTRY LAND.—Following the decision of
Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil., 10), it is again held, that
whether a particular parcel of land is more valuable for forestry purposes than for
agricultural purposes, or vice versa, is a fact which must be established during the trial
of the cause. Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry or mineral is a question
to be settled in each particular case unless the Bureau of Forestry has,
492

492 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abella,
under the authority conferred upon it by law, prior to the intervention of private interest,
set aside said land for forestry or mineral purposes.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. Carballo,
J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
 Francisco, Lualhati & Lopez for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

This is a petition for the registration of a certain parcel or tract of land located
in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippine Islands. It
appears from the record that on the 21st day of September,
1915, the appellant Maria del Rosario presented a petition in the Court of First
Instance for the registration under theTorrens system, of the very land now in
question by virtue of her appeal. In that case, after issue joined and after
hearing the evidence, the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno, judge,
denied the registration of all of the northern portion of the land included in her
petition represented by Exhibit 1, which was the plan presented in that action,
upon the ground that said portion was more valuable for timber purposes than for
agricultural purposes. From that judgment Maria del Rosario appealed.
The Supreme Court after a consideration of theevidence
affirmed the decision of the lower court. In thecourse of that decision the Supreme
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Moir, said: "We have examined theplans and
all the evidence presented in this case and are of the opinion that the trial court
was correct in its declaration that this senda did not mean the old road to
Bongabon. The fact that nearly all the northern property is forestry land is a further
indication that the applicant's possessory informa-
493
VOL. 49, OCTOBER 27, 1926 493
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abella
tion title did not include the land running up to the road to Bongabon, because
all the papers which the applicant has regarding this property
call the land palayero." 1

Judge Nepomuceno in his decision directed that theappellant herein present an

amended plan in that case, showing the particular part or parcel of the land in
question which she was entitled to have registered. We have no evidence before us
showing that that order ofJudge Nepomuceno was ever complied with.
Nothing further seems to have occurred with reference
to the registration of the land included in the former case until the 26th
day of April, 1921, when the Acting Director of Lands presented the petition
in the present case for the registration, under the cadastral survey, of a
portion of land located in the municipality of San Jose, which included the very
land claimed by Maria delRosario in the former action. She presented her
opposition in the present action, claiming the very land which she claimed
in the former action. The only proof which she presented in support of her claim
in the present action was the proof which she had presented in theformer action. No
proof was adduced in addition thereto, which in the slightest degree showed that she
was entitled to the registration of any other parcel of land than those which had
been conceded to her in the first action.
 Upon the issue and the proof adduced in the present case the Honorable C.
Carballo, Auxiliary Judge of theSixth Judicial District, ordered registered
in the name ofMaria del Rosario, under the cadastral survey, lots 3238, 3240,
3242, and 3243, which are the very lots which had been ordered registered in her
name in the former action. From that judgment she appealed to this court upon the
_______________

1 Del Rosario vs. Director of Lands, R. G. No. 13226 . promulgated January 27, 1919, not reported.

494
494 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abella
ground that the lower court committed an error in not registering all of the land
included in her opposition in her name.
In this court she presented a motion for rehearing and in support thereof presents
some proof to show that thenorthern portion of the land in question is not forestry
land but that much of it is agricultural land. With reference to said motion for
rehearing, it may be said that all of the proof which is presented in support thereof
existed at the time of the trial and might, with reasonable diligence, have been
presented. It cannot, therefore, be considered now. It is not newly discovered
evidence. And moreover if it should be accepted it would not be sufficient to
justify the granting of a new trial.
After a careful examination of the entire record and theevidence adduced
during the trial of this cause as well as that adduced during the trial of the first
cause, we are fully persuaded that no error has been committed. Whether particular
land is more valuable for forestry purposes than for agricultural purposes, or vice
versa, is a question of fact and must be established during the trial of the cause.
Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral is a question to be
settled in each particular case, unless the Bureau of Forestry has,
under the authority conferred upon it, prior to the intervention of private interest,
set aside for forestry or mineral purposes theparticular land in question.
(Ankron vs. Government ofthe Philippine Islands, 40 Phil., 10.)
During the trial ofthe present cause the appellant made no effort to show
that the land which she claimed, outside of that which had been decreed in her favor,
was more valuable for agricultural than forestry purposes. For
all of theforegoing, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs. So
ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real,
JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.
495
 [No. 13756. January 30, 1919.]
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDSET AL., petitioners. V
ICENTE JOCSON ET AL., appellant, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY,
objector and appellee.

1. 1.PUBLIC LANDS; FORESTS; "MANGLARES."—That manglares are not forestry

lands, within the meaning of the words "timber lands" in the Act of Congress, has
been definitely decided by this court in the case of Montano vs.Insular Government
(12 Phil. Rep., 572.)

1. 2.ID.; CLASSIFICATION IN ACT OF CONGRESS OF JULY 1st, 1902.—Whatever

may have been the meaning of the term "forestry" under the Spanish law, the Act of
Congress of July 1st, 1902, classifies the public lands in the Philippine Islands as
timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not timber or
mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as
nipa swamps, manglares [mangroves], fisheries or ordinary farm lands.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros.

Romualdez, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mariano Locsin Rama and J. E. Blanco for appellants.
Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.

MOIR, J.:

In the cadastral land registration for the town ofHinigaran, Occidental

Negros, the appellants sought to register the three lots or parcels of land involved
in this appeal, which registration was opposed by the Director ofForestry.
The trial court found that lot 1104 was almost entirely "forestry" land, that a
small portion of lot 1154 and all oflot 1158 were "forestry" lands, to
which appellants had no title, and declared the lots public lands, and refused
registration of the parts of these lots to which opposition had been filed
by the Forestry Bureau. The claimants excepted and perfected their
bill of exceptions and brought the case to this court for review, setting
up the following assignments of error:
561
VOL. 39, JANUARY 30, 1919. 561
Jocson vs. Director of Forestry.

1. "1.The court; erred in not holding to have been proven the facts that the lots
1104, 1154, and 1158 of thecadastral survey of Hinigaran were possessed by
Bibiano Jocson as owner during his lifetime and from a time long prior
to the year 1880, and, after his death, by his heirs, on which lots nipa plants
 were planted and now exist and that these latter are not spontaneous plants
utilized by said heirs.
2. "2. The court erred in not holding to have been proven that a part of lot No.
1158 is rice and pasture land that was possessed as owner by
Bibiano Jocson during his lifetime and peaceably long before 1880, a
possession continued by his heirs who still enjoy the use of the land up
to thepresent time.
3. "3.The court erred in not holding to have been proven that on that same lot
1158, there has existed since the year 1890, and still exists, a fish
hatcherywhich has been possessed and enjoyed
by the heirs of Bibiano Jocson, as owners, for more than 27 years, not
counting the prior possession of their predecessor in interest.
4. "4.The court erred in holding that lot No, 1158 and part of lots 1104 and 1154
are forest land, finding this fact as sufficiently proven by the sole and absurd
testimony of the ranger to the effect that nipa is a plant of spontaneous
growth and is not planted; and, as the photographs only refer to small
portions of the area of the lot, the court also erred in holding
that the whole lot was covered with firewood trees, while in fact but a very
small portion of it is covered with trees which protect thenipa plants
and the fish hatchery, it having been proven that a large part of the lot was
sown with rice and used as pasture land.
5. "5.The court erred in not holding that the parts oflots 1104, 1154 and 1158,
covered by mangrove swamps, are agricultural land, and in not holding to
have been proven that these swamps are not available, inasmuch as they are
drained at low tide; errors committed with manifest violation of law and
disregard of the jurisprudence established by the Honorable Supreme
Court of the Philippines.

562
562 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jocson vs. Director of Forestry.

1. "6.The court erred in not holding that the claimants and appellants, by their
peaceable, public, and continuous possession for more than forty years, as
owners, including that held by their predecessors in interest, had acquired by
prescription lots 1104, 1154, and 1158, in conformity with Act No. 190, section
41, which, without exception, is applicable to the State as well as to private
parties, and by , extraordinary prescription of thirty years.
2. "7.The court erred in not adjudicating said lots to theclaimants
and appellants, in consideration of thepossession they have had for more
than forty years, from the time of their predecessor in interest to the present
time, thus violating the legal provision whereby the holders of land who
have been in its possession for ten years prior to the enactment ofthe land
law, Act No. 926, by the United States Philippine Commission, are to be
 deemed theabsolute owners of such land, and to be presumed to have applied
for the same and to have complied with the Spanish laws and
all the proceedings required by the Royal Decrees
on the composition of titles; and, therefore, pursuant to said Act now in
force, the land in question should be adjudicated to the possessors thereof.
3. "8.The court erred in not granting the new trial requested
by the appellants, the motion therefor being based on the ground that his
findings offacts, if there are any, are openly and manifestly contrary
to the weight of the evidence."

It is not necessary to consider all these assignments oferror, for the main question
involved is whether manglares[mangroves] are agricultural lands or timber lands. If
they are timber lands the claimants cannot acquire them by mere occupation for ten
years prior to July 26, 1904; if not, they can so acquire them under the Public Land
Act, and no grant or title is necessary.
This being a cadastral case there are no findings of f act, but the trial court states
that lot 1104 was in possession ofclaimants and their ancestors for more than thirty
years,
563
VOL. 39, JANUARY 30, 1919. 563
Jocson vs. Director of Forestry.
and lot 1154 for more than twenty-five years. Lot 1158 is declared to be wholly
"forestal." The area of the lots does not appear.
The evidence fully sustains the contention of theclaimants that they have been
in possesion of all of those lots quietly, adversely and continuously under
a claim ofownership for more than thirty years prior to the hearing in the trial
court. There is not a word of proof in the whole record to the contrary. They set up
no documentary title. They do claim the parts of the lands denied registration are
"mangles" with nipa and various other kinds of aquatic bushes or trees growing on
them, and that in 1890 on lot 1158 they constructed a fishpond (vivero de peces) which
was later abandoned as unprofitable, and that part of this lot is pasture land, part
palay and part "mangles."
The attorney-General contends in his brief that theparts of the lands denied
registration are public forest and can not be acquired by occupation, and that
all "manglaresare public forests."
In the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, there is a classification of all public
lands of the PhilippineIslands, and in
mentioning forestry land the Act ofCongress used the words "timber land." These
words are always translated in the Spanish translation of that Act as "terrenos
forestales." We think there is an error in this translation and that a better translation
would be "terrenos madereros." Timber land in English means land with trees
growing on it. The manglar plant would never be called a tree in English but a bush,
and land which has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it can not be
called "timber land."
 The photographs filed by the Government as exhibits in this case show that at
two places there were trees growing on this land, but the forester who testified
for theGovernment always calls these lots "mangles," and he says the trees which
are growing on the lands are of no value except for firewood. The fact that there are
a few trees growing
564
564 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jocson vs. Director of Forestry.
in a manglar or nipa swamp does not change the general character of the land
from manglar to timber land.
That manglares are not forestry lands within themeaning of the words "timber
lands" in" the Act ofCongress has been definitely decided by this Court
in thecase of Montano vs. Insular Government (12 Phil. Rep., 572). In that
case the court said:
"Although argued at different times, five of these cases have been presented substantially
together, all being covered by one brief ofthe late Attorney-General in
behalf of the Government in which, with many interesting historical and graphic citations
he described that part of the marginal seashore of the PhilippineIslands known
as manglares, with their characteristic vegetation. In brief, it may be said that they are mud
flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grow various kindred plants
which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their roots deep into the mud
and casting their seeds, which also germinate there. These constitute themangrove
flats of the tropics, which exist naturally, but which are also, to some extent, cultivated by
man for the sake of thecombustible wood of the mangrove, like trees, as well as
for theuseful nipa palm propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands,
yet we are of the opinion that they can not be so regarded in the sense in which the term is
used in thecases cited or in general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them
are not available for purpose of navigation, and they 'may be disposed of without
impairment of the public interest in what remains.'"

The court on page 573 further said:

"It is a kindred case to Cirilo Mapa vs. The Insular Government* * * (10 Phil. Rep., 175)."
"As some discussion has arisen as to the scope of that decision, it appears opportune to
reaffirm the principle there laid down. The issue was, whether lands used as a
fishery, for the growth ofnipa, and as salt deposits, inland
565
VOL. 39, JANUARY 30, 1919. 565
Jocson vs. Director of Forestry.
some distance f rom the sea, and asserted, though not clearly proved, to be overflowed at
high tide, could be registered as private property on the strength of ten years' occupation,
under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 of the PhilippineCommission. The point
decided was that such land within themeaning of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, was
agricultural, 'the reasoning leading up to that conclusion being that Congress having divided
all the public lands of the Islands into three classes it must be included in one of the three,
and being clearly neither forest nor mineral, it must of necessity fall
into thedivision of agricultural land."
In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this court said
that the phrase "agricultural lands" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands
acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term "forestry" under the Spanish
law, the Act of Congress ofJuly 1st, 1902, classifies the public lands
in thePhilippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public
lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands,
whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglaresfound in the Administrative
Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands thetrial court should have
considered them agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands
then the rights ofappellants are fully established by Act No. 926.
Paragraph 6 of section 54 of that Act provides as follows:
"All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands,
as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide
claim of
566
566 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jocson vs. Director of Forestry.
ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next
preceding the taking effect of this Act, except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to
a governmentgrant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter."
"* * * * * *"

This Act went into effect July 26th, 1904. Therefore, all persons who were in
possession of agricultural public lands under the conditions mentioned in the above
section of Act No. 926' on the 26th of July, 1894, are conclusively presumed to have
a grant to such lands and are entitled to have a certificate of title issued to them.
(Pamintuan 138.Insular Government, 8 Phil. Rep., 485.)
While we hold that manglares as well as nipa lands are subject to private
acquisition and ownership when it is fully proved that the possession has been
actual, complete and adverse, we deem it proper to declare that each case must stand
on its own merits.
One cannot acquire ownership of a mangrove swamp by merely cutting a few
loads of firewood from the lands occasionally. The possession must be more
complete than would be required for other agricultural lands.
The appellants were in actual possession of the lots in question from 1882, and
their ancestors before that date, and they should have been declared the owners and
title should have been issued to them.
There is no need to consider the other points raised on appeal.
 The judgment of the lower court is reversed and thecase is returned to the lower
court, with instruction to enter a decree in conformity with this decision. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Street, Araullo, and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed, case remanded with instructions.

[No. 48321. August 31, 1946]

OH CHO, applicant and appellee, vs. THE DIRECTOROF LANDS, oppositor and
appellant.

1. 1.LAND REGISTRATION ; PUBLIC LANDS; WHAT LANDS BELONG TO PUBLIC

DOMAIN; EXCEPTION.—All lands that were not acquired from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule
would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had
been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.

1. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR.—The earliest possession of the lot by the first
predecessor in interest of the applicant for registration began in 1880. Held: He does
not come under the exception.

1. 3.ID. ; PUBLIC LAND ACT, REGISTRATION UNDER; ALIEN DISQUALIFIED.—

An alien is not entitled to a decree of registration under the provisions of the Public
Land Act, because he is disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.

891

VOL. 75, AUGUST 31, 1946 891

Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands

1. 4.ID. ; PUBLIC LAND ACT, BENEFITS OF ; CONDITION PRECEDENT ; CASE AT

BAR.—The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's immediate
predecessors in interest are or constitute a grant or concession by the State; and
before they could acquire any right under such benefits, the applicant's immediate
predecessors in interest should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of
such benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of
which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the applicant's
immediate predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not have any vested right
in the lot amounting to title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right,
if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their
 predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its
registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas. Magsalin, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael
Amparo for appellant.
Vicente Constantino for appellee.
Ferrier, Gomez &, Sotelo and J. T. Chuidian as amici curiæ.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing theregistration of a residential lot

located in the municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas,
in the name of theapplicant.
The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's
lack of title to the lot, and on his disqualification, as alien, from
acquiring lands of thepublic domain.
The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880
to the filing ofthe application for registration on January 17, 1940.
892
892 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands
The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection ofthe opponent and adds
that the lower court committed an error in not declaring null and
void the sale of the lot to the applicant.
The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be
applicable to the case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act
(C. A. No. 141).
The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed
under the Land Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors
in interest had acquired the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by
grant, under the laws, orders and decrees promulgated by the Spanish Government
in thePhilippines, or by possessory information under theMortgage Law (section 19,
Act 496). All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to therule would be any land
that should have been in thepossession of an occupant and of his predecessors in
interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption
that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private
property even before the Spanish conquest. (Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.
S., 449; 53 Law. ed., 594.) Theapplicant does not come under the exception,
for theearliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.
As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is whether he is
entitled to a decree ofregistration thereof under the provisions of the Public Land
Act (C. A. No, 141), Under the provisions of the Act invoked by the applicant, he is
not entitled to a decree ofregistration of the lot, because he is an alien disqualified
from acquiring lands of the public domain (sections 48, 49, C. A. No. 141).
As the applicant failed to prove title to the lot and has
invoked the provisions of the Public Land Act, it seems unnecessary to make
pronouncement in this case on the
893
VOL. 75, AUGUST 31, 1946 893
Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands
nature, character or classification of the lot sought to be registered.
It may be argued that under the provisions of thePublic Land Act the applicant's
immediate predecessors in interest would have been entitled to a
decree ofregistration of the lot had they applied for its registration; and that he
having purchased or acquired it, the right ofhis immediate predecessors in interest
to a decree ofregistration must be deemed also to have been acquired by
him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's immediate
predecessors in interest are or constitute a grant or concession by the State; and
before they could acquire any right under such benefits, theapplicant's immediate
predecessors in interest should comply with the condition precedent
for the grant of such benefits. The condition precedent is to apply
for theregistration of the land of which they had been in possession at least since
July 26, 1894. This the applicant's immediate predecessors in interest failed to do.
They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to title which was
transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called, is their
possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in interest, may be
availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person
as the applicant who is disqualified.
It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null
and void. In a suit between vendor and vendee for the annulment of the sale, such
pronouncement -would be necessary, if the court were ofthe opinion that it is void.
It is not necessary in this case where the vendors do not even object
to the application filed by the vendee.
Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration dismissed,
without costs.
894
 [No. 46935. Abril 18, 1941]
GREGORIO REYES UY UN, recurrente, contraMAMERTA PÉREZ e ISIDORO
VILLAPLANA, recurridos

1. 1.TERRENOS PÚBLICOS; ARTÍCULO 45 DE LA LEY No. 2874; CASO DE

AUTOS.—De acuerdo con el artículo 45 de la Ley No. 2874, los recurridos y su
causante tenían derecho dominical incoativo sobre el terreno, que les capacitaban a
solicitar y obtener la confirmación de dicho derecho y a que se les expida el certificado
de título de acuerdo con la Ley del Registro de la Propiedad; tenían asimismo a su
favor la presunción juris et de jure de que habían cumplido con todas las condiciones
necesarias para la concesión del título; pero hasta que el título se expida no tenían
el concepto jurídico de ser los verdaderos dueños del terreno ni éste dejó de pertenecer
a los terrenos públicos del Estado susceptibles de enajenación.

1. 2.ID.; VENTA EN SUBASTA PÚBLICA; GRAVAMEN Y ENAJENACIÓN.—Como

quiera que el terreno era público del Estado cuando el Shériff vendió en subasta
pública al recurrente el 2.1 de septiembre de 1934 y V. V. no era aún dueño de él, es
obvio que el primero no adquirió el dominio del terreno que no lo tenía aún el
ejecutado V. V. y, consiguientemente, la venta era nula y de ningún efecto legal. La
venta, además, no puede declararse válida en virtud del precepto del artículo 116 de
la Ley No. 2874, tal como ha sido enmendado por el artículo 23 de la Ley No. 3517,
que prohibe el gravamen y enajenación, excepto al Gobierno e instituciones oficiales,
de los terrenos adquiridos por título gratuito desde la fecha de la aprobación de la
solicitud y durante los 5 años siguientes a la expedición del título o concesión.

SOLICITUD de revision mediante certiorari.

Los hechos aparecen relacionados en la decision del Tribunal.
D. Claro M. Recto en representación del recurrente.
D. Potenciano A. Magtibay en representación de los recurridos.

IMPERIAL, M.:

Se pide por el recurrente en su solicitud de certiorari que se revise y revoque la

decision que dictó el Tribunal de Apelaciones declarando nula la venta efectuada por
el Shériff
509
VOL. 71, APRIL 18, 1941 599
Uy Un vs. Villaplana
el 21 de septiembre de 1934 del terreno objeto del litigio, declarando válida la venta
de las mejoras existentes en el mismo y ordenando que se vendan dichas mejoras para
satisfacer la cantidad que el recurrente pagó como precio de la subasta que asciende
a P379.85, sin costas.
 El recurrente inició el asunto en el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Tayabas para
recobrar de los recurridos la propiedad y posesión de un terreno agrícola de 10
hectáreas de superficie, ubicado en el municipio de Guinayangan, Provincia de
Tayabas, así como también las mejoras que existen en el mismo consistentes en 333
ponos de cocos fructíferos de primera clase y 200 no fructíferos.
Los hechos pertinentes en el asunto los expone el Tribunal de Apelaciones en estos
términos:
"Martin Villaplana era poseedor de un terreno, en concepto de dueño, desde el tiempo del
Gobierno Español, habiéndolo declarado para fines de amillaramiento el año 1902, y
habiendo introducido en él mejoras consistentes en árboles de coco, los más antiguos de los
cuales tienen ahora 60 años de edad. El 27 de mayo de 1916, Martin Villaplana vendió el
terreno a su hijo Vicente Villaplana, casado con la demandada Mamerta Pérez. El 7 de
diciembre de 1922 Vicente Villaplana lo solicitó como "Free Patent." Habiendo Vicente
Villaplana contraído una deuda de P291.05 de Gregorio Reyes Uy Un el 13 de febrero de 1931,
y habiendo sido demandado para el pago de dicha cantidad y sentenciado a pagarla el 5 de
mayo de 1933, se expidió la correspondiente orden de ejecución, la cual fué cumplimentada
el 21 de septiembre de 1934, vendiéndose la finca al demandante (Exhibit A). El 20 de abril
de 1935 fué cuando se le expidió a Vicente Villaplana el título gratuito. El 13 de diciembre de
1934 se entregó la posesión del terreno a Gregorio Reyes Uy Un en virtud de una orden del
Juzgado de Paz de Guinayangan, Tayabas, pero el julio de 1935 los demandados, que son
esposa e hijo de Vicente Villaplana, volvieron a posesionarse del mismo, habiendo sido
lanzados de él el 10 de septiembre del mismo año en virtud de un interdicto prohibitorio
preliminar expedido en esta causa."
510
510 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Uy Un vs. Villaplana
El Tribunal de Apelaciones, declaró, después de revisar las pruebas presentadas en
primera instancia, que el terreno era público y que formaba parte de los terrenos
públicos del Estado que podían disponerse mediante consesión gratuita. En su primer
señalamiento de error el recurrente sostiene que tal conclusión es errónea e
inconsistente con los hechos que establece el propio Tribunal de Apelaciones. Arguye
que habiendo declarado el Tribunal de Apelaciones que Martin Villaplana poseyó el
terreno en concepto de dueño desde el año 1902, declarándolo en el amillaramiento
como propiedad suya y habiéndolo cultivado sembrando en el árboles de coco que
ahora tienen más de 60 años de edad y que su hijo Vicente Villaplana y la esposa de
éste lo poseyeron en el mismo concepto, el terreno dejó de ser terreno público y se
convirtió en privado y, por tanto, no le son aplicables las disposiciones de la Ley No.
2874, conocida por Ley de Terrenos Públicos.
Según el inciso (b) del artículo 45 de la Ley No. 2874, en vigor en las fechas en que
tuvieron lugar la posesión de los recurridos y su causante y la expedición del título
gratuito, los que, por si, o por medio de sus causantes, hubiesen estado en abierta,
continua, exclusiva y notoria posesión y ocupación de terrenos agrícolas del dominio
público, pretendiendo de buena fe adquirir la propiedad, excepto contra el Gobierno,
desde el veintiséis de julio de mil ochocientos noventa y cuatro, tienen derecho a la
confirmación de sus derechos y a la expedición de un certificado de título de acuerdo
con la Ley del Registro de la Propiedad, y tienen a su favor la presunción juris et de
jurede haber cumplido con todas las condiciones necesarias para la concesión del
Gobierno y tendrán derecho a un certificado de título bajo las disposiciones de dicha
Ley. De acuerdo con dicha disposición legal los recurridos y su causante tenían
derecho dominical incoativo sobre el terreno, que les capacitaban a solicitar y obtener
la confirmación de dicho derecho y a que se les expida el certificado de título de
acuerdo con la Ley del Registro de la Propiedad; tenían
511
VOL. 71, APRIL 18, 1941 511
Uy Un vs. Villaplana
asimismo a su favor la presunción juris et de jure de que habían cumplido con todas
las condiciones necesarias para la concesión del título; pero hasta que el título se
expida no tenían el concepto jurídico de ser los verdaderos dueños del terreno ni éste
dejó de pertenecer a los terrenos públicos del Estado susceptibles de enajenación. Que
ésta era la condición legal del terreno hasta que por el Gobierno se expidió el título
gratuito, lo confirma el artículo 54 de la misma ley que dispone que en lo sucesivo no
se podrá adquirir título, derecho legal o derecho por razón de equidad sobre terrenos
del dominio público por prescripción o por posesión u ocupación en concepto de dueño,
o de acuerdo o por virtud de alguna ley vigente antes de la ocupación americana,
excepto como expresamente se dispone por las leyes dictadas después de dicha
ocupación de las Islas Filipinas por los Estados Unidos. El hecho de que Vicente
Villaplana solicitó el 7 de diciembre de 1922 título gratuito del terreno es otro dato
que demuestra que en su sentir no había adquirido título perfecto del mismo y que
continuaba siendo terreno público del Estado. Concluímos, por consiguiente, que el
Tribunal de Apelaciones no erró al declarar que el terreno era público y estaba sujeto
a las disposiciones de la Ley No. 2874.
En el segundo señalamiento de error se pretende que el Tribunal de Apelaciones
debió haber declarado que el terreno objeto del litigio no podía concederse mediante
título gratuito y que este título, expedido el 20 de abril de 1935, es nulo y de ningún
valor y no puede afectar los derechos que el recurrente había adquirido sobre el
terreno. Habiéndose declarado que el terreno continuaba siendo público en la fecha
en que se expidió el título gratuito, es obvia la consecuencia de que continuaba sujeto
a las disposiciones de la Ley de Terrenos Públicos y, consiguientemente, el título
gratuito que se expidió a favor de Vicente Villaplana es legal y válido.
Para apoyar su teoría de que el terreno había pasado a ser propiedad privada, que
Vicente Villaplana y su causante Martin Villaplana eran los dueños exclusivos del
512
512 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Uy Un vs. Villaplana
mismo y que él sucedió en el título del primero al adquirirlo en subasta pública, el
recurrente cita lo resuelto por este Tribunal en los asuntos de Cariño vs. Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands, 212 U. S., 449, 53 Law. ed., 594, 597; 41 Phil.,
935, 940-941; Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. The Director of Lands, 27
Phil., 246, 248; y Susi vs. Razón and the Director of Lands, 48, Phil., 424, en donde se
declaró que el terreno agrícola que ha sido poseído en las condiciones prescritas por
la Ley de Terrenos Públicos ha dejado de ser terreno público para convertirse en
terreno privado, y que el que lo ha poseído tiene la presunción juris et de jure de haber
obtenido concesión del Gobierno y que tiene derecho a inscribirlo a su nombre de
acuerdo con la Ley del Registro de la Propiedad. Los asuntos citados se distinguen,
sin embargo, del presente en que en éste el que poseía el terreno y del cual deriva sus
derechos el recurrente es el mismo que reconoció la condición del terreno de ser
público de la propiedad del Estado y no sólo reconoció que continuaba siendo terreno
público sino que solicitó que se le expida título gratuito de conformidad con la Ley de
Terrenos Públicos.
En el último señalamiento de error el recurrente sostiene que el Tribunal de
Apelaciones debió haber confirmado la decisión del Juzgado de Primera Instancia que
declaró válida la venta en subasta pública del terreno efectuada por el Shériff a su
favor. Como quiera que el terreno era público del Estado cuando el Shériff vendió en
subasta pública al recurrente el 21 de septiembre de 1934 y Vicente Villaplana no era
aún dueño de él, es obvio que el primero no adquirió el dominio del terreno que no lo
tenía aún el ejecutado Vicente Villaplana y, consiguientemente, la venta era nula y
de ningún efecto legal. La venta, además, no puede declararse válida en virtud del
precepto del artículo 116 de la Ley No. 2874, tal como ha sido enmendado por el
artículo 23 de la Ley No. 3517, que prohibe el gravamen y enajenación, excepto al
Gobierno e instituciones oficiales, de los terrenos adquiridos por título gratuito desde
la
513
VOL. 71, APRIL 18, 1941 513
Manila Gas Corp. vs. Internal Revenue
fecha de la aprobación de la solicitud y durante los cinco años siguientes a la
expedición del título o concesión
Hallándose ajustada a derecho la decision recurrida del Tribunal de Apelaciones,
se deniega la petición de certiorari, con las costas al recurrente. Así se ordena.
Avanceña, Pres., Díaz, Laurel, y Horrilleno, MM., están conformes.
Se deniega el recurso.

VOL. 20, JULY 10, 1967 641

Mindanao vs, Director of Lands
No. L-19535, July 10, 1967
HEIRS OF PELAGIO ZARA: PIO, CLEMENTE, SERAFIA, PORFIRIO and
ESTEBAN, all surnamed MINDANAO; MARIA and GLICERIA, both surnamed
SEDARIA; DULCE CORDERO, VICTORIA DE LOS REYES and JOSE GARCIA,
applicants-appellants, vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY,
Government oppositor-appellees. VICENTE V. DE VILLA, JR., and VICENTE S. DE
VILLA, SR., private oppositorsappellees.
 Public Lands, Torrens System; Judgments; Res judicata;Judicial confirmation of title.—
A judgment in a land registration proceeding, that a tract of land is public land, does not bar
other persons from filing a subsequent land registration proceeding for the judicial
confirmation of their title to the same land, under section 48 of the Public Land Law, on the
basis of a "composicion" title and continuous and adverse possession thereof for more than
thirty years. Their imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or foreclosed by the prior
judicial declaration that the land is public land since the proceeding under section 48
presupposes that the land is public.
Same; Basis of decree of judicial confirmation of title.— A decree under section 48 of the
Public Land Law is not based on the fact that the land is already privately owned and, hence,
no longer a part of the public domain; its basis is that, by reason of the applicant's possession
for thirty years or more, he is conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant.
Same; Personality of oppositor.—Persons, who claim to be in possession of a tract of
public !and and who have applied to the Bureau of Lands for its purchase, may oppose its
registration under section 48 of the Public Land Law.

APPEAL from an order of dismissal rendered by the Court of First Instance of

Batangas, Lipa City Branch.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Jose L. Matias and H. A. Jambora for applicants-appellants.
Francisco Villanueva, Jr. and Gregorio L, Oquitaniafor private oppositors-
appellees.
Manuel Reyes Castro for oppositor-appellee Director of Forestry.

MAKALINTAL, J..

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas (Lipa City) dismissing
appellants' "application for registration of the parcel of land consisting of 107
642
642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mindanao vs. Director of Lands
hectares, more or less, situated in the barrio of Sampiro, Municipality of San Juan,
Province of Batangas, and designated in amended plan PSU-103696 as Lot A."
The proceedings in the court a quo are not disputed.
On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for registration of the land above
described pursuant to the provisions of Act 496. They alleged that the land had been
inherited by them from their grandfather, Pelagio Zara, who in turn acquired the
same under a Spanish grant known as "Composición de Terrenos Realengos" issued
in 1888. Alternatively, should the provisions of the Land Registration Act be not
applicable, applicants invoke the benefits of the provisions of Chapter VIII, Section
48, subsection (b) of C.A. 141 as amended, on the ground that they and their
predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous and adverse possession of the land in
concept of owner for more than 30 years immediately preceding the application.
 Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and by
Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. The latter's opposition recites:
"xxx that the parcel of land sought to be registered by the applicants consisting of 107
hectares, more or less, was included in the area of the parcel of land applied for registration
by Vicente S. de Villa, Sr. in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 in this Court, which was
decided by this same Court through the then incumbent Judge, the Honorable Juan P.
Enriquez, on September 30, 1949; that the parcel sought to be registered by the applicants
was declared public land in said decision; that they (the oppositors Vicente V. de Villa, Jr.
and Vicente S. de de Villa, Sr.) have an interest over the land in question because for a period
of more than sixty (60) years, the de Villas have been in possession, and which possession,
according to them, was open, continuous, notorious and under the claim of ownership; that
the proceeding being in rem, the failure of the applicants to appear at the case No. 26, L.R.
Case No. 601 to prove their imperfect and incomplete title over the property, barred them
from raising the same issue in another case; and that as far as the decision in Civil Case No.
26, L.R. Case No. 601 which was affirmed in the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 5847-R is
concerned, there is already 'res-adjudicata'—in other words, the cause of action of the
applicant is now barred by prior judgment; and that this Court has no more jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the decision of the Court in said case having transferred to the Director
of Lands."
643
VOL. 20, JULY 10, 1967 643
Mindanao vs. Director of Lands
On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. was subsequently included as
oppositor) filed a motion to dismiss, invoking the same grounds alleged in its
opposition, but principally the fact that the land applied for had already been declared
public land by the judgment in the former registration case.
The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the motion to dismiss
by order dated January 27, 1961, holding, inter alia, that "once a parcel of land is
declared or adjudged public land by the court having jurisdiction x x x it cannot be
the subject anymore of another land registration proceeding x x x (that) it is only the
Director of Lands who can dispose of the same by sale, by lease, by free patent or by
homestead."
In the present appeal from the order of dismissal neither the Director of Lands nor
the Director of Forestry filed a brief as appellee. The decisive issue posed by
applicantsappellants is whether the 1949 judgment in the previous case, denying the
application of Vicente S. de Villa, Sr., and declaring the 107 hectares in question to
be public land, precludes a subsequent application by an alleged possessor for judicial
confirmation of title on the basis of continuous possession for at least thirty years,
pursuant to Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public Land Law, C.A. 141, as amended.
This provision reads as follows:
"The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xx xx xx xx
 "(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this Chapter."
644
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mindanao vs. Director of Lands
The right to file an application under the foregoing provision has been extended by
Republic Act No. 2061 to December 31, 1968.
It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative: for registration
of their title of ownership under Act 496 or for judicial confirmation of their
"imperfect" title or claim based on adverse and continuous possession for at least
thirty years. It may be that although they were not actual parties in that previous
case the judgment therein is a bar to their claim as owners under the first alternative,
since the proceeding was in rem, of which they and their predecessor had constructive
notice by publication. Even so this is a defense that properly pertains to the
Government, in view of the fact that the judgment declared the land in question to be
public land. In any case, appellants' imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or
foreclosed by such declaration, for precisely the proceeding contemplated in the
aforecited provision of Commonwealth Act 141 presupposes that the land is public.
The basis of the decree of judicial confirmation authorized therein is not that the land
is already privately owned and hence no longer part of the public domain, but rather
that by reason of the claimant's possession f or thirty years he is conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant.
On the question of whether or not the private oppositorsappellees have the
necessary personality to file an opposition, we find in their favor, considering that
they also claim to be in possession of the land, and have furthermore applied for its
purchase from the Bureau of Lands.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the
Court a quo for trial and judgment on the merits, with costs against the private
oppositors-appellees.
Reyes, J.B.L., Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando,
JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon, J., did not take part.
Order of dismissal set aside.