THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION and DR. LEONCE VERSTUYFT, petitioners, vs. HON. BENJAMIN H.

AQUINO, as Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of Rizal, MAJOR WILFREDO CRUZ,
MAJOR ANTONIO G. RELLEVE, and CAPTAIN PEDRO S. NAVARRO of the Constabulary Offshore Action
Center (COSAC), respondents.

Facts:

Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional office in Manila as Acting Assistant
Director of Health Services. His personal effects, contained in twelve (12) crates, were allowed
free entry from duties and taxes. Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) suspected that
the crates “contain large quantities of highly dutiable goods” beyond the official needs
of Verstuyft. Upon application of the COSAC officers, Judge Aquino issued a search warrant for
the search and seizure of the personal effects of Verstuyft.

Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled
to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to members of
diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and requested that the search warrant be
suspended. The Solicitor General accordingly joined Verstuyft for the quashal of the search
warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the quashal. Verstuyft, thus, filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC. WHO joined Verstuyft in asserting diplomatic
immunity.

Issue:

Whether or not personal effect of Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure under the
diplomatic immunity.

Held:

Yes. The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to
diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally
advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General,
as principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to
diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers
that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look
beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of
diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in
the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity
upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General
in this case, or other officer acting under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their
jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarass the executive arm of the
government in conducting foreign relations.

The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse
of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the
diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft. (World Health Organization vs. Aquino, G.R. No.
L-35131, November 29, 1972, 48 SCRA 243)
Lol-lo & Saraw, 43 Phil. 19
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922.
MALCOLM, J.

FACTS:
• 2 boats of Dutch possession left matuta. In 1 of the boats was 1 individual, a Dutch subject, and in the
other boat 11 men, women, and children, subjects of Holland. The 2nd boat arrived between the Islands of
Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by 6 vintas manned by 24 Moros all
armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked
some of the men, and brutally violated 2 of the women. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, except the 2
young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge. The Moros
finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. 2 of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the
women, and Saraw. At Maruro the 2 women were able to escape.
• Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There
they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy
• All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high
seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
• Pirates are in law hostes humani generis.
• Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The
jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits.
• As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the
jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes."

ISSUE: W/N the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.

HELD: In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of
the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead.

YES.
Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the
Philippines.
The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of
persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to
whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed.
At least 3 aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately
augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior
strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be
taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.

G.R. No. L-27586

June 26, 1970

Petitioner: Ernesto Cuenca y Cuevas

Respondent: People of the Philippines and Court of Appeals
FACTS: Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that the CFI of Manila,
convicting appellant Ernesto Cuenca, who at the time of arrest of arrest on January 3, 1963 was
on duty at the Philippine Savings Bank as a special watchman and security guard of the Bataan
Veterans Security Agency to which the firearm, and Ithaca .45 pistol, of the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and seven rounds of ammunition and sentencing him to imprisonment for
one year and to pay the costs. Appellant's main argument for defense was that in his employment
with the above-mentioned security agency made him to believe that the license to possess the
firearm in question was with the owner of the agency, Jose Forbes.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is guilty of the crime charged owing to the failure of Jose
Forbes to comply with his duty to obtain such license, before he issued said firearm and
ammunition to his aforementioned employee.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. The appellant is not guilty of the crime charged.

It should be noted that the Bataan Veterans Security Agency is duly licensed to operate as such.
Consequently, it may legally engage the services of competent persons to discharge the duties of
special watchmen and security guards and provide them, as such, with the corresponding
firearms and ammunitions. The agency is this supposed to obtain the license necessary therefore.
Had it done so, there would be no question about the absence of any criminal liability on the part
of the appellant herein for the possession of the firearm and ammunition in question.

Petition is therefore GRANTED.

Urbano v. IAC
Facts:

On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his
ricefield. He found the place where he stored palay flooded with water coming
from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what
happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass.
Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued,
and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg
with the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an
amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On
November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw
and convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin
which infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the following day.
Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial
court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new
trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the
deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The
motion was denied; hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of
the latter’s death

Held:

A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural

and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the
final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that
the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act
or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."

If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by

tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should
have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of
tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14
days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have
been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from
the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound
was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was
not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with
tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding
Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few
but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we
are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the
victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The
medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of
the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the
time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus
may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner
had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an
action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or
give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such
injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is
the proximate cause."