72

(1) the venue was improperly laid; (2) the trial court did not acquire
RULE
Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
!
VDA DE MANALO VS. CA (2001)
Arcilla, Jay
! !
FACTS:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of Sampaloc, Manila, died intestate
in 1992. He was survived by his wife and his eleven children, who are all
of legal age. He left several real properties located in Manila and in
Tarlac including a business- Manalo’s Machine Shop with offices at
Quezon City and at Valenzuela. In November, the respondents, who
are eight of the surviving children filed a petition with the RTC for
the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for the
appointment of their brother, Romeo, ias administrator thereof. The trial
court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing and directing
the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and directing service
by registered mail of the order. The trial court issued an order declaring
the whole world in default, except the government, and set the
reception of evidence of the petitioners.
!
However, this order of general default was set aside by the trial court
upon motion of the petitioners who were granted ten(10) days within
which to file their opposition to the petition.
!
The trial court called resolved such issues in the following
manner:
1. admitted the opposition for the purpose of considering the merits 2.
denied the hearing for such affirmative defenses are irrelevant and
immaterial 3.declared that the court had jurisdiction 4.denied the motion
for inhibition 5.) set the application of Romeo Manalo for
appointment as regular administrator in the for hearing.
! !
The MR of the petitioners was denied; hence, they filed a petition
forcertiorari, contending that:
jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was
included in the intestate proceedings; (4)there was absence of
earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same
family, in accordance with Article 222 of NCC, and (5) no certification of
non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.
CA dismissed; MR was denied. Hence, this petition for review.
!
ISSUES:
W/N CA erred in upholding the questioned orders of the RTC
which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the
petition for judicial settlement of estate ?
!
RULING:
NO. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estate is a SPECIAL PROCEEDING and,
as such, it is a remedy whereby the respondents seek to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact..
!
In the determination of the nature of an action or
proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in
the complaint shall be controlling. A careful scrutiny of the petition belies
the claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said
petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a
petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such
as the fact of death and his residence which are foundation
facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest. It also contains an
enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list
of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be
settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the reliefs prayed
for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention
to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father.
DISPOSITION:Petition is denied for lack of merit
!!

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!
!!
!!
PATRICIA NATCHER VS. HON. COURT OFAPPEALS
Arcilla, Jay
!
FACTS:
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were
registered owners of a parcel of land in Manila .Upon the death of
Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children entered into
an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate. They adjudicated and
divided among themselves the real property .Under the agreement:
Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received
1/14 share of the said property .The heirs executed and forged an
"Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver
of Rights"- they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land.
Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of
his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only
447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name .The land was
further subdivided into two separate lots. Graciano sold the 1st lot to a
third person but retained ownership over the 2ndlot. Graciano married
petitioner Patricia Natcher .He sold the 2nd lot to Natcher, a title was
issued under her name. Graciano dies leaving his 6 children and Natcher
as heirs .
A civil case was filed a complaint before the RTC of Manila by the 6
children; alleging that Natcher through the employment of fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired the 2nd lot by making it appear that
Graciano executed a Deed of Sale in her favour; that their legitimes have been
impaired. In her reply, Natcher averred that she was legally married to
Graciano on 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise
considered a compulsory heir of the latter .RTC ruled that the deed of
sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia
Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity, that no
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 2
evidence that a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements nor there has been decreed a judicial separation of property
between them ,hence, the spouses are prohibited from entering into a
contract of sale. It is not also a valid donation BUT can be regarded as an
extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory
heir of the deceased. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the lower courts decision ratiocinating t is the probate court that
has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the
estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance/
annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts
proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a
deceased person.
ISSUE:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general
jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance/ annulment of title with
damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property
made by the decedent to any of the heirs?
!
HELD:
NO. CA decision is AFFIRMED.
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines
civil action and special proceedings, in this wise: a) A civil actionis one by
which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the
rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a
special civil action. A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact. There lies a marked
distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An actionis a
formal demand of ones right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the
court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to
definite established rules. The term special proceedingmay be defined as an
application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a
!
particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are should not have been terminated or dismissed by the trial court on
required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, account of the mere failure of the parties to submit the promised
the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion amicable settlement and/or the Motion for Judgment Based On An
Amicable Settlement. Given the non-contentious nature of special
It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings
proceedings (which do not depend on the will of an actor, but on a state
which are instituted and prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and
or condition of things or persons not entirely within the control of the
provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and that special
parties interested), its dismissal should be ordered only in the extreme
proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but
case where the termination of the proceeding is the sole remedy
is instituted and prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of
consistent with equity and justice, but not as a penalty for neglect of the
proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted without regular
parties therein. The third clause of Section 3, Rule 17, which authorizes
pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions.  A special proceeding
the motu propio dismissal of a case if the plaintiff fails to comply with
must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for
the rules or any order of the court, cannot even be used to justify the
particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by
convenient, though erroneous, termination of the proceedings herein. An
petition or motion upon notice
!
TABUADA VS. RUIZ
examination of the December 6, 2004 Order readily reveals that the trial
court neither required the submission of the amicable settlement or the
aforesaid Motion for Judgment, nor warned the parties that should they
Azarcon, Pia Lea
!
FACTS:
fail to submit the compromise within the given period, their case would
be dismissed. Hence, it cannot be categorized as an order requiring
compliance to the extent that its defiance becomes an affront to the court
Special proceeding # 5198 (settlement of intestate estate of
and the rules. And even if it were worded in coercive language, the
Calaliman) was filed in RTC Iloilo. RTC rendered a decision that they
parties cannot be forced to comply, for, as aforesaid, they are only
will no longer be setting any hearing as parties assured that they are
strongly encouraged, but are not obligated, to consummate a
going to submit a "Motion for judgment based on an amicable
compromise. An order requiring submission of an amicable settlement
settlement" on or before December 25, 2004. On March 2, 2005, RTC
does not find support in our jurisprudence and is premised on an
terminated the proceedings for failure to submit amicable settlement
erroneous interpretation and application of the law and rules.
invoking Sec.3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner and Calaliman
filed MR. On the ground that it was premature there being yet no
!
HILADO VS. CA
payment of debt and distribution of estate and that they have prepared
Azarcon, Pia Lea
necessary papers for amicable settlement. MR, denied.Hence this
petition.
!
!
ISSUE: whether or not Judge Ruiz is correct in dismissing the case for
Facts:
!
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15
failure of parties to submit amicable settlement?
!
RULING: Judge Ruiz erred when it dismissed the case for failure of
May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita
Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter,
Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. At the time of his death, there were two
parties to submit amicable settlement. While a compromise agreement or
pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first,
an amicable settlement is very strongly encouraged, the failure to
was then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City,
consummate one does not warrant any procedural sanction, much less
Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein.
provide an authority for the court to jettison the case. Sp. Proc. No. 5198

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 3

!
The second was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44,
with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding
Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.
!
Thereafter, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the
RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in
her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.
the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as
administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters
of administration in her favor. In January 2001, private respondent
submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real
Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband. In the
List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included
as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then
being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.
!
Subsequently, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/
Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying that they be furnished with
copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings.
petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a
deadline for the submission by private respondent of the required
inventory of the decedent's estate. Petitioners also filed other pleadings
or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private
respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the
inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete
and inaccurate.
! !
Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the
ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the
contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate
proceedings. CA likewise dismissed the petition.
!
ISSUE:
WON creditors whose credit is based on contingent claim have
the right to participate in the settlement proceeding by way of
intervention under Rule 19
! interests can be protected.
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 4
Won petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of the
deceased person, are entitled to copies of all processes and orders
pertaining to the intestate proceedings.
!
RULING:
Notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth
under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is
based on a contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule
19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.
!
Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an
intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition
of property in the custody of the court x x x" While the language of
Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening
in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal
interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct
and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant."
!
Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims
to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86. These
actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and
may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule
87.
#2
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide
a creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in
every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides
for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those
proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on
the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or
reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the
Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in
the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such
!
!
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the
intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than
mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In
either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are
being preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be
duly satisfied.
!
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do
require notice to any or all "interested parties" the petitioners as
"interested parties" will be entitled to such notice. The instances when
notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10,
Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the
account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89
concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell
personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates;
and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an
order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the
administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the
existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.
! !
RULE 73
Venue and Process
EUSEBIO V. EUSEBIO
! thereon; and Dr. Jesus Eusebio was not presented to testify on the matter.
Alvarez, Miguel Lorenzo
!
FACTS:
! In the instant case, petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed with the CFI
of Rizal a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of
his father, Andres Eusebio. He alleged that his father, who died on
November 28, 1952, resided in Quezon City. Eugenio’s siblings
(Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos),on the other hand,
who claim that they are illegitimate children of Andres, opposed the
petition and alleged that Andres was domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga. They prayed for the dismissal of the case on the ground that
the venue had been improperly laid.
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 5
           
The CFI of Rizal ruled in favor of Eugenio Eusebio. Hence the petition.
!
ISSUE:
Whether or not venue had been properly laid in Rizal?
!
RULING:
!
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Don Andres Eusebio
up to October 29, 1952, was and had always been domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga. He only bought a house and lot at 889-A Espana
Extension, Quezon City because his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated
him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City. Even before he was
able to transfer to the house he bought, Andres suffered a stroke and was
forced to live in his son’s residence. It is well settled that “domicile is not
commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one own’s health”
even if coupled with “knowledge that one will never again be able, on
account of illness, to return home. Having resided for over seventy years
in Pampanga, the presumption is that Andres retained such domicile.
Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City permanently.
There is no direct evidence of such intent – Andres did not manifest his
desire to live in Quezon City indefinitely; Eugenio did not testify
Andres did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando,
Pampanga. Some of his children remained in that municipality. In the
deed of sale of his house at 889 – A Espana Ext., Andres gave San
Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. The marriage contract signed by
Andres when he was married in articulo mortis to Concepcion Villanueva
two days prior to his death stated that his residence is San Fernando,
Pampanga.
! The requisites for a change of domicile include (1) capacity to
choose and freedom of choice, (2) physical presence at the place chosen,
(3) intention to stay therein permanently. Although Andres complied
with the first two requisites, there is no change of domicile because the
third requisite is absent. 
!
!
 With respect to the contention that appellants submitted
themselves to the authority of the CFI of Rizal because they introduced
evidence on the residence of the decedent, it must be noted that
appellants specifically made of record that they were NOT submitting
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of
assailing the same.
! In the whole, the Court found that Andres was, at the time of his
death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the CFI of Rizal had
no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the venue having been laid improperly.
! !
GARCIA FULE V. COURT OF APPEALS
Alvarez, Miguel Lorenzo
!
FACTS:
On April 26, 1973 Amado G. Garcia died, he owned property in
Calamba, Laguna. On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with CFI
Laguna a petition for letters of administration and exparte appointment
as special administratrix over the estate. Subsequently, the motion was
granted..There was an allegation that the wife was Carolina Carpio
! !
Preciosa B. Garcia, wife of deceased, and nn behalf of their child:
Agustina B. Garcia opposed, which was denied by CFI. Preciosa alleged
that Fule was a creditor of the estate, and as a mere illegitimate sister of
thedeceased is not entitled to succeed from him.
!
The Court of Appeals reversed and annulled the appointment of
Fule. Preciosa became special administratrix upon a bond of P30, 000.00.
!
ISSUES:
a.)What is the distinction between venue and jurisdiction
b.)What does the word “resides” in Revised Rules of Court Rule
73, Section 1 mean?
RULING:
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 6
Rule 73, Section 1.“if the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled at the CFI in theprovince in which he resides at the time of his
death, And if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFI of any
province in which he had estate.
! The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to theexclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of thelocation of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court,
inthe original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record. ”Fule’s own submitted Death Certificate shows that the deceased
resided in QC at the time of his death, therefore the venueof Laguna was
improper.
Venue is subject to waiver (Rule 4, Section 4), but Preciosa did
not waive it, merely requested for alternativeremedy to assert her rights
as surviving spouse. However, venue is distinct from “jurisdiction”
which is conferred by Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended to bewith CFIs
independently from the place of residence of the deceased.
Rule 79 Section 2, demands that the petition should show the
existence of jurisdiction to make the appointmentsought, and should
allege all the necessary facts such as death, name, last residence,
existence, situs of assets, intestacy, right of person who seeks
administration as next of kin, creditor or otherwise to be appointed.
! Resides – ex vi termini “actual residence”-Elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it isemployed.-Same meaning as “inhabitant”.
!
CUENCO VS. CA
Balanay, Rendel Bryan
!
FACTS:
!
!
In 1964, Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila Doctors’ Hospital
survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco and
their two (2) minor sons all residing at 69 Piy Margal St., Sta. Mesa
Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage,
respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco,
Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco
Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in
Cebu.
!
Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for
Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu,
alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu
with properties in Cebu and Quezon City.
!
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the
second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate
of the last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also
filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held
in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have
acted on the probate proceedings.
!
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on
ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that
CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The
opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in
favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.
!
The CA ruled in the following manner:
Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person, covers both testate and
intestate proceedings. The Special Proceeding of the Cebu CFI having
been filed ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and
which first attached. It is that court which can properly and exclusively
pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the decedent left or did not
leave a valid will, and (2) whether or not the decedent was a resident of
Cebu at the time of his death.
Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the
Cebu CFI), it follows that the said court must exercise jurisdiction to the
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 7
exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for probate was filed by
the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco. The said respondent should
assert her rights within the framework of the proceeding in the Cebu
CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another court.
!
The respondents try to make capital of the fact that the judge of the Cebu
CFI, stated that the petition for appointment of special administrator was
"not yet ready for the consideration of the Court today. It would be
premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly
acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ..." It is sufficient to state in
this connection that the said judge was certainly not referring to the
court's jurisdiction over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is
acquired from the moment a petition is filed, but only to the exercise of
jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all events,
jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does not depend on
the pronouncements of a trial judge.
!
ISSUE
Whether or not in Special Proceedings, the court with whom the
estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.
!
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing
the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding
with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders
and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last will and
testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix
thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.
!
Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts, not the court with whom the estate or intestate petition is first
filed. Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate
petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the
consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should
be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
!
!
The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element
of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this were
otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration of justice. It would
be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to
be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance
therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the
law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and
effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court every time she
has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court.
!
In the case at bar, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the
intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings
filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City
court to determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did
leave a last will and testament upon which would depend the proper
venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City.
!
Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of
jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly
presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City
was the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal
home and domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly given by
the Cebu court — could not be contested except by appeal from said
court in the original case. The last paragraph of said Rule expressly
provides:
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place
of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
(Rule 73)
!
The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears
on the record" could probably be properly invoked, had such deference
in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the
record, or had the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken
cognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.
! !
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 8
Finally, venue was properly assumed by and transferred to the Quezon
City court and that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance of
needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over
the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference and consent of
the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will and
testament and appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix
without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its
orders and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved
and authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had
and to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court
only to revert once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court
find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City
court on the strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of
record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the decedent.
!
SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS
Balanay, Rendel Bryan
!
FACTS:
During his lifetime, Felicisimo T. San Luis contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942
out of which were born six children. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo
married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However,
on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint
for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child
Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married
Felicidad San Luis (marriage solemnized at California, U.S.A.), then
surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with respondent but lived
with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992. Upon death of Felicisimo, Felicidad (respondent in
this case) sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and
the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a
petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City.
!
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of
Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed
that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in
the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence
prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally
married to Merry Lee.
!
The RTC ruled that Felicidad, as a widow of the decedent, possessed the
legal standing to file the petition and that the venue was properly laid.
Mila, one of the children by first marriage, filed a motion for inhibition
against Judge Tensuan. The motion was granted and the case was
reraffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Arcangel. Same issues were
raised at the second trial. However, the trial court dismissed the petition
for letters of administration. It held that, at the the time of Felicisimo’s
death, he was duly elected governor and a resident of Laguna. Hence,
the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in
Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to
file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with
the decedent was bigamous, thus, void ab initio.
!
On appeal to the CA, it reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate
court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term
"place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although
Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually
resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
administration was properly filed in Makati City.
!
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the
venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly
laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta.
Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v.
Guray and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, "residence" is
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 9
synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence
to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person
can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never
changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should
have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
!
Hence the instant petition for review on certiorari.
!
ISSUE:
! Whether venue was properly laid.
RULING:
Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition
for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in
the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time
of his death." The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence"
as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules -
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature -
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence
and not domicile in the technical sense. The word "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual
or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
!
In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary. There is a
distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and
"residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases,
"residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the
fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention
!
of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of
Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may
have his residence in one place and domicile in another. In the instant
case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in
Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. From the
foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa
for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. The
subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the
Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that
time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had
territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City
as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject
petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
!
Petition is DENIED.
!!
!!
!!
CAMAYA VS. PATULANDON
Borja, Catherine
!
FACTS:
On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a
notarized will wherein she devised Lot no. 288-A to her grandson
Anselmo Mangulabnan. During her lifetime, the testatrix herself filed the
petition for the probate. Later, the testatrix executed a codicil modifying
her will by devising the said Lot 288-A in favor of her four children
Bernardo (the executor), Simplicia, Huillerma and Juan, and her
grandson Mangulabnan – to the extent of 1/5 each.
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him by executor
Patulandong of the title of Lot 288-A, but Patulandong refused to heed
the request because of the codicil which modified the will of the testatrix.
Thus, Mangulabnan filed an ‘action for partition’ against Patulandong in
the RTC. The court in this partition ordered the partitioning of the
property. However, the court holds that the partition is without prejudice
to the probate of the codicil in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Hence, subsequently, Patulandong filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Nueva Ecija a petition for probate of the codicil of the testatrix.
Meanwhile, by virtue of the decision in the partition case, Mangulabnan
caused the cancellation of the title of the testatrix over Lot No. 288-A and
a new TCT was issued in his name. He later on sold the lot to herein
petitioner, Camayas.
Finally, when the RTC ruled on admitting the petition filed by
Patulandong for probate of the codicil, the RTC likewise declared that
the sale between Mangulabnan and Camayas, null and void.
ISSUE:
Does the RTC Nueva Ecija as probate court have jurisdiction to
declare the sale between Mangulabnan and Camayas null and void?
RULING:
It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of
proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine
title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally
claimed to belong to outside parties. All that said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should
not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered
by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is,
then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to
resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question
was in the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a
transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the
respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent
administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory
of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third
persons of their possession and ownership of the property
! 0
Moreover, Section 48 of the Property Registry Decree provides that
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.
!!
PACIOLES VS. CHUATOCO-CHING
Borja, Catherine
!
FACTS:
Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties, stock
investments, bank deposits and interests in certain businesses. She was
survived by her husband, petitioner, and their two minor children. Milio
Pacioles husband of deceased Miguelita filed with the RTC a verified
petition for the settlement of Miguelita’s estate.
Miguelita’s mother, Miguela, filed an opposition, on the grounds that
petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an
administrator; and the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of
“paraphernal properties.”
Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging
that the latter has no direct and material interest in the estate.
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the
estate because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on
condition that both of them “would undertake whatever business
endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners.”
Subsequently, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion
that an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2)
partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs; and 3)
payment of attorney’s fees. Respondent opposed on the ground that the
partition and distribution of the estate is “premature and precipitate,”
considering that there is yet no determination “whether the properties
specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint
venture.”
The intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and
attorney’s fees but denied petitioner’s prayer for partition and
distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed “premature.” It also
ordered that a hearing on oppositor’s claim as indicated in her
opposition to the instant petition is necessary to determine ‘whether the
properties listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are
entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership
venture.’”
!!
ISSUE:
May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass
upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of
the decedents estate?
RULING:
It is already recognized that probate court may hear and pass
upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether
or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such situations
the adjudication is merely incidental and provisional.
However, it is apparent from the Resolutions that the purpose of the
hearing set by the intestate court was actually to determine the propriety
of oppositors (respondents) claim. According to the intestate court, if it is
true that the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelitas)
properties, then it means that she has a material and direct interest in the
estate and, hence, she should be given her day in court. The intended
day in court or hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of
respondent’s contention that she is the true owner of the bulk of
Miguelitas estate.
Although, the respondent made it appear that her only intent was to
determine the accuracy of petitioner’s inventory, however, a close review
of the facts and the pleadings reveals her real intention.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its
jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off
stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and
reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to
ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased
person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse
to that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be
determined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings. The
intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such
contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.
!
! 1
REYES vs. SOTERO
Bueno, Jirene Mercy
!
FACTS:
! Private Respondent Corazon Chichioco filed a petition for the
settlement of estate of Elena Lising, claiming that she is the niece and
heir of the latter who died intestate.Petitioner Reyes filed for an
Opposition claiming that she was an adopted child of Elena Lising and
the latter’s husband Serafin Delos Santos, hence the petition should be
dismissed and that she be appointed administrator of the estate.
! !
In her Supplemental she attached Certification issued be the
Municipal Civil Registrar stating that she was adopted by the spouses
pursuant to a decision rendered by the Court of First Instance
promulgated and duly registered with the Office of Civil Registrar. Also
presenting a copy of Judicial Form indicating that the adoption decree
was on file in the RTC-Tarlac City and a Decree of Final Distribution
issued by the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) showing that
benefits were paid to Elena Lising, widow of Serafin Delos Santos and
his daughter Anna Joyce Delos Santos.
!
Respondent filed before the CA a petition for annulment of the adoption
decree claiming that no proceedings for adoption ever took place. Upon
Motion, RTC suspended the hearing, however CA dismissed the petition
which became final and executory.
!
Petitioner filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for immediate resolution of
her opposition. RTC issued a Resolution deferring resolution pending
the outcome of the criminal case filed against the Petitioner for
falsification of public documents.
!
Respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Appoint Special Administrator
before the RTC, praying that the Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Paulino
Saguyod be appointed as such, which the court granted.
!
Petitioner moved for reconsideration for the appointment of Atty
Saguyod reiterating his contention that she is the sole heir of the
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
decedent and that the former was appointed without being required to
file a bond. Petitioner subsequently filed a special civil action before the
CA alleging that said resolution. CA nullified the resolution of the RTC
and it held that the presiding Respondent Judge Cesar Sotero gravely
abused his discretion in appointing Atty. Saguyod as special
administrator.
!
ISSUE:
Whether Petitioner need to prove the validity of her adoption as
assailed by the respondents in the proceeding of settlement of estate.
RULING:
No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any
evidence other than those which she had already presented before the
trial court. The documents presented by the Petitioners were issued
under the seal of the issuing offices and were signed by the proper
officers.
!
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. Mere imputations of irregularities will not cast a
cloud of doubt on the adoption decree since the certifications and its
contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.
!
In this regard it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be
presented only in a separate action brought principally for the purpose
of nullifying the adoption decree. It cannot be assailed collaterally in a
proceeding for the settlement of decedent’s estate as held in Santos v.
Aranzanso.
!
Respondents cannot assail in these proceedings the validity of the
adoption decree in order to defeat petitioner’s claim that she is the sole
heir of the decedent. Absent a categorical pronouncement in an
appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is void, the
certifications regarding the matter as well as the facts stated should be
deemed legitimate, genuine and real.
!
! 2
Petitioner’s status as an adopted child of the decedent remains rebutted
and no serious challenge has been brought against her standing as such.
Therefore as long as petitioner’s adoption is considered valid,
respondents cannot claim any interest in the decedent’s estate.
!
COCA VS. BORROMEO
Bueno, Jirene Mercy
!
FACTS:
Spouses Juan and Teresa Pangilinan died intestate. They possessed
property namely Lot 1927 with an area of 3.97 hectares covered by OCT
under the name of Juan Pangilinan; Lot 1112 with an area of 18.02
hectares covered by OCT in the name of heirs of Juan Pangilinan and Lot
1920 with an area of 8 hectares which was surveyed in the name of
Concepcion Pangilinan. The spouses had 3 children namely, Prima,
Concepcion, and Francisco all surnamed Pangilinan.
!
A Special Proceeding was instituted for the settlement of estate of the
deceased spouses Pangilinan. The administrator presented a project
partition combining Lots 1927 and 1112 with an area of 22 hectares. The
partition are as follows: 3 hectares for Crispin Borromeo for his
attorney’s fees; 5.3 hectares for Francis; 6.33 hectares for Prima and 7.3
hectares for Concepcion. It was also provided therein that the sum of
5,O88.50 pesos as alleged debt of Concepcion should equally divided
among the 3 heirs.
!
Heirs of Francisco opposed the said partition contending that in an order
of the court in December 6, 1963, Francisco owned 12 hectares in 18
hectares of Lot 1112 because Prima sold her share to Francis and what is
left for Concepcion is only 6 hectares and that the payment for
Concepcion’s debt was not properly allowed.
!
The lower court deferred action on the partition until ownership of the
12 hectares is determined in an ordinary action.. Heirs of Francisco
moreover filed a supplemental opposition praying that Lot 1920 with 8
hectares should also be included in the project partition.
!
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
No separate action had been filed with regard to the ownership of the 12
hectare land hence the trial court approve the project partition excluding
the 12 hectares. Petitioners headed by Filomena Coca, as administrator
assailed the lower court’s decision, which however was sustained by the
CA.
!
Petitioners appealed contending that the lower court as a probate court
has no jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the 12 hectare portion of
Lot 1112.
!
ISSUE:
Whether the ownership of the 12 hectare land should be decided
in the intestate proceeding or in a separate action.
!
RULING:
! It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be
resolved by the CFI in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its
limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional question. It is
a procedural question involving a mode of practice which may be
waived.
!
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be
passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That question should
be ventilated in a separate action. However that general rule has
qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and convenience.
!
Although generally, probate court may not decide a question of title of
ownership yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one
of collation or advancement or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired then the probate court is competent to decide the question of
ownership.
!
We held that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the
general rule. Here the probate court had already received evidence on
the ownership of the 12 hectare land during the hearing of the motion for
! 3
its exclusion from the inventory. The only interested parties are the heirs
who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.
!
As pointed out by the appellees they belong to the poor stratum of
society, they should not be forced to incur additional expenses by
bringing a separate action to determine the ownership of the 12-hectare
land. The just, expeditious and inexpensive solution is to require the
heirs of Francisco to file in the intestate proceeding , Special Proceeding,
a motion in the form of a complaint wherein they should set forth their
claim for the 12 hectare land in question stating the ultimate facts in
support of their claim.
!!
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., VS.
LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN
Borlagdatan, April
!
FACTS:
! It appears from the records that Jose Portugal (Portugal, Sr.)
contracted two marriages.
!
1st marriage with Paz Lazo in 1942 whom he had a daughter named
Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal (respondent) 2nd marriage with Isabel
de la Puerta in 1948, who gave birth to a boy named Jose Douglas
Portugal, Jr. (petitioners).
!
By virtue of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights
executed by Portugal Sr. and his 4 siblings, over the estate of their father,
a parcel of land n Caloocan was issued a TCT in the name of “Jose Q.
Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo”.
!
Paz died in 1984, while Portugal Sr. died intestate in 1985.
!
In 1988, Leonila executed an “Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of
Estate of Deceased Person”, adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel
of land, and was subsequently registered (1988) in her name “Leonila
Portugal Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.”
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
!
In 1996, Isabel and Portugal, Jr. (petitioners) filed a complaint against
Leonila for cancellation of Affidavit of Adjudication and TCT issued in
her name, alleging that Leonila is not related whatsoever to the deceased
Portugal, Sr., hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land,
and accordingly prayed that said TCT be cancelled and a new one be
issued in their (petitioner’s) name.
!
A Pre-Trial Order was issued & after trial, the trial court dismissed the
case for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction without resolving
the issues as stated in the pre-trial order, on the ground that petitioner’s
status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a
probate court.
!
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to CA, citing the case of Carino vs.
Carino. In this case, the SC ratiocinates that the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even
in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage,
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
!
However, the CA found Carino to be inapplicable. The appellate court
held that in Carino case, the main issue was the validity of the two
marriages, whereas in the instant case, the main issue is the annulment
of title to property. Thus, the CA affirmed the TC’s dismissal of the case.
!
Hence, the present petition.
!
ISSUE:
WON petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to
determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for
annulment of respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT
issued in her name.
!
RULING: NO.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that
she was the sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15, 1988
the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of
Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception
! 4
to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should deceased be declared as the absolute owner. The probate proceedings of
be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a the deceased were instituted in accordance with Act No. 3176.
qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case
the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor ISSUE: Whether the debts may be recovered against the husband of the
therein.
!
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A
deceased.

RULING:No.
probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are
the heirs of a deceased.
! Under Act No. 3176, there are two actions/remedies for the liquidation
of conjugal property:
CALMA VS. TANEDO 1) Institution of testate or intestate proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased spouse
Shain Ann C.
2) An ordinary action for the liquidation and partition of the property of
Doctrine: Debts chargeable against the conjugal property should be filed in the
a conjugal partnership.
testamentary proceeding of the deceased wife.
These remedies cannot be availed of at the same time.
FACTS:
In the present case, a testamentary proceeding was already instituted for
Spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were owners of the
the partition of the conjugal property. It follows then that when
subject property, being their conjugal property. They were indebted to
respondent filed a suit, the power of Eulalio Calma as legal
respondent Esperanza Tanedo, chargeable against the conjugal property.
administrator of the conjugal property while Fausta was living had
Fausta died leaving a will wherein she appointed her daughter, Maria
ceased and passed to Maria Calma as administratrix appointed in the
Calma as administratrix of her properties. In the probate proceedings,
testamentary proceedings.
Maria was appointed as judicial administratrix of the properties of the
deceased. Hence, the claim for the debts which is chargeable against the conjugal
property should have been filed in the testamentary proceedings of the
While probate proceedings were pending, respondent Tanedo filed a
deceased and not against the husband of the deceased who had already
complaint against Eulalio Calma for the recovery of the debt. The RTC
ceased as administrator of the conjugal property.
rendered judgment in favor of respondent. In the execution of the
judgment, the subject property was sold by the sheriff. The court also annulled the sale of the subject property. The property
should be demed subject to the testamentary proceedings of the
Maria Calma ,as administratrix of the estate of Fausta, filed the present
deceased Fausta.
action to annul the sale of the property and prays that the estate of the
OCAMPO VS. POTENCIANO

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1

! 5
Castillo, Shain Ann (2) Whether the surviving spouse (Potenciano) has the authority
!
Doctrine: Husband is no longer an administrator of the conjugal estate of
to enter in anagreement of repurchase after the death of his wife.
!!
deceased wife.
!
FACTS:
RULING:
!
Spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco executed a deed to (1) The real contract entered into between petitioner and
convey to spouses Conrado Potenciano and Rufina Reyes by way of sale respondent was an equitable mortgage. Therefore, the
with pacto de retro a town lot with a house. The subject property though consolidation of title effected by respondent Potenciano was
registered in the name of Ocampo, in reality it belonged to him and his null and void. As a consequence, Potenciano’s children has no
wife as conjugal property. right over the subject property, since the property never passed
!
On the same day, Ocampo signed another document, making it appear !to their parents.

that, for an annual rental, the spouses Potenciano were leasing the house (2) Potenciano had no such authority. The rule that upon the
to him for the duration of the redemption period. dissolution of the marriage by the death of the wife, the
!
Petitioner spouses failed to repurchase the property. Thus, an affidavit ! husband must liquidate the partnership affairs is now obsolete.

for consolidation of title was filed by Potenciano, on the strength of The present rules of court now provides that,“when the marriage
which, the Register of Deeds issued TCT in the name of spouses is dissolved by the death of either husband or wife, the
Potenciano. partnership affairs must be liquidated in the testate or intestate
!
When Edilberto Ocampo and Rufina Reyes died, respondent Potenciano
proceedings of the deceased spouse.”
!!
gave Paz Yatco another option to repurchase the property. Yatco sought
to exercise the option and deposited the money in court, when !
74
Potenciano rejected the same. Yatco brought an action to compel
respondent to accept the money and to have the property reinstated in RULE
her name and that of her husband. She also alleged that the real
Summary Settlement of Estates
transaction between them was an equitable mortgage.
! MALAHACAN VS. IGNACIO
!
Potenciano’s children intervened and filed a cross-complaint, alleging
Castillo, Rochelle Jane
that the option to repurchase was null and void as to the share of their
mother Rufina Reyes in the property which share passed to them by !
FACTS:
right of inheritance.
!! This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
of the subprovince of Marinduque, Province of Tayabas, the Hon. J.S.
Powell presiding, awarding the possession of the lands described in the
ISSUES:
complaint to the plaintiff, with costs. The action is brought by Simon
(1) What is the real contract between the parties?
! Malahacan as administrator of the goods, chattels, and credits of
Guillerma Martinez, deceased, against the defendants, the only heirs at

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! 6
law of the said deceased, to recover possession of the real estate of which
the said Guillerma Martinez died seized, which said real estate the
defendants had been occupying for some years before the
commencement of this action.
!
ISSUE:
Whether or not Simon Malahacan can validly demand the
recovery of possession from the Ignacio?
!
RULING:
No. Under the provisions of the Civil Code the ownership of real
estate passes to the heirs of the owner instantly in his death. Guillerma
Martinez, having died seized of the lands involved in this suit, leaving
the defendants as her only heirs at law, it follows that said heirs instantly
became the owners and were entitled to the immediate possession
thereof. It is not alleged in the complaint nor does it appear from the
record or the evidence in this case that there were debts outstanding
against Guillerma Martinez at the time of her death. The only ground
upon which an administrator can demand of the heirs at law possession
of the real estate of which his intestate died seized is that such land will
be required to be sold to pay the debts of the deceased. In the case of
Ilustre, administrator of the estate of the deceased Calzado vs. Alaras
Frondosa (17 Phil. Rep., 321), this court said: "x x x The Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a
petition for partition in case they can not mutually agree in the division.
When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no
occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the settlement and
partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful
age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate should be
burdened with the costs and expenses of an administrator. The property
belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against
the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way
whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs."
!
ARCILLAS VS. MONTEJO
Castillo, Rochelle Jane
!
FACTS:
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
Filed before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga on
November 12 and 16, 1962, respectively, are two separate petitions
having direct and special reference to Lot No. 276. This lot, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-244 (2155 (0-656), forms a major part
of the estate of the late Eustaquio Arcillas who died intestate on March 8,
1958 in the City of Zamboanga. In the petition dated November 12
Geronimo Arcillas, one of the heirs of the deceased, sought the
cancellation of TCT No. RT-244 in the name of the deceased and prayed
for the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the heirs in
the enumerated proportions alleged in the petition. It was claimed that at
various dates after the death of the deceased, several transactions
affecting Lot No. 276 transpired, prominent among which were the
separate sales of their respective shares and participation in Lot No. 276
executed by four (4) other children of the deceased in favor of co-heir
Vicente Arcillas. Invoking section 112 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration
Act), Geronimo Arcillas argued that the proportion of each heir's
participation in said lot should be accurately reflected in a new certificate
of title. But before any other material pleading could be filed with respect
to this petition, five (5) other children of the deceased filed the
November 16 petition aforementioned. This later petition, docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 632, prayed for the issuance of letters of
administration in favor of herein petitioner preparatory to the final
settlement of the deceased's estate.
!
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge acted properly in dismissing
the administration proceedings under the authority of section 1, rule 74
of the New Rules of Court upon averments that the estate left no debts
and all the heirs entitled to share in its distribution are all of age?
!
RULING:
No. Under section 1, Rule 74 of the New Rules of Court, if the
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of
age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties
may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among
themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the
office of the Register of Deeds and should they disagree, they may do so
in an ordinary action of partition. And primarily anchored on the
! 7
proposition that inasmuch as in the present case the minimum 2) Deceased left no will;
requirements of the aforementioned section obtain, i.e. the decedent left
no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, respondents claim that 3) There are no creditors;
there is no necessity for the institution of special proceedings and the
appointment of an administrator for the settlement of the estate for the 4) He left several properties his death benefits to PAL, PALEA,
reason that it is superfluous and unnecessary. In other words, PESALA and SSS as well as savings deposit with PNB and
respondents apparently view section 1 of Rule 74 as mandatory upon the PCIB
heirs so long as the deceased left no will nor any pending obligations to
be paid and his heirs are all of age. We cannot entirely agree with the 5) 300 sqm lot
respondents. On a similar contention in the past, we had occasion to
explain in Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan, et al., 92 Phil. 273: ... section I does not 6) That the spouse is working in London as an auxiliary nurse
preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if and ½of her salary forms part of the estate.
the estate has no debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for
good reasons to an ordinary action of partition. While section 1 allows • Petitioner filed her opposition and a motion to dismiss alleging
the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to
that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of
resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do so
if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. Said section administration and if an estate exists, the letters of
is not mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made administration be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse.
therein of the word may. If the intention were otherwise the framer of the
rule would have employed the word shall as was done in other • RTC appointed Rita administratrix of the estate of the deceased
provisions that are mandatory in character. Note that the word may its upon a bond posted by her in the amount of 1k. The Trial Court
used not only once but in the whole section which indicates an intention ordered her to take custody of the real and personal properties
to leave the matter entirely to the discretion of the heirs.
!
PEREIRA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
and make an inventory thereof.

• Petitioner appealed to CA but CA affirmed the decision.

Cadavis, Albert
!
FACTS:
ISSUES:

1) WON there exists an estate of the deceased Andres for purposes

• Andres Pereira is an employee of PAL. He died without a will of administration?
and survived by his spouse victoria herein petitioner and his
sister Rita herein private respondent. 2) WON a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where
there are no debts lefts by decedent?
• Rita instituted a special proceeding before the RTC for the
issuance of letters of administration in her favor alleging that: RULING:

1) She and Victoria are the only surviving heirs; 1) Petitioner contends that there exists no estate for purposes of
administration for the reason: First, the death benefits from

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! 8
 PAL, PALEA, PESALA and SSS belong exclusively to her, being
the sole beneficiary and she submitted letter-replies to support
her claim showing that she is the exclusive beneficiary. Second,
the savings deposit of her husband from PNB and PCIB had
been used to defray the funeral expenses. Finally, only real
property of the deceased extrajudicially settled between them as
the only surviving heirs.
Respondent argues that it is not for petitioner to decide what
properties form part of the estate and to appropriate for herself.
She also points out that this function is vested in the court in
charge of the intestate proceedings.
Petitioner asks this court to declare that the properties specified
do not belong to the estate of the deceased on the basis of her
bare allegations and handful documents. Since this court is the
trier of facts, the court cannot order unqualified and final
exclusion or non-exclusion of the property involved from the
estate.
The resolution is better left to the probate court before which the
administration proceeding are pending. The trial court is in the
best position to receive evidence. The function of resolving WON
the property should be included in the inventory or list of
properties is one clearly within the competence of the probate
court.
! disposed in fraudulently.
2) The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the
same should be judicially administered and the competent court
should appoint a qualified administrator established in sec. 6
rule 78, in case the deceased left no will or in case he had left
one, or should he fail to name an executor therein. An exception
to this rule, when all of the heirs of lawful age and there are no
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
debts due to the estate, they may agree in writing to partition
the property without instituting the judicial administration or
applying for the appointment of an administrator.
Sec.1 of Rule 74, does not preclude the heirs from instituting
administration proceedings even if the estate has no debts or
obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an
ordinary action for partition. While Sec. 1 allows the heirs to
divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to
resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does
not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a
different course of action. It should be noted that recourse to an
administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is
sanctioned only if the heirs have good reason for not resorting to
an action for partition.
When partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate
should not be burdened with an administration proceeding
without good or compelling reasons.
The court see no reason not to apply the doctrine to the case at
bar. There are 2 surviving heirs, and admitted that there are no
debts. What is apparent is that these 2 are not in good terms. The
reason why private respondent seeks the appointment is her to
obtain possession for her own purposes, since these properties
are presently in the hands of the petitioner who supposedly
The court is of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason
which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of
the deceased.
The Court hold that, the Trial court which the administration
proceedings are pending was not justified in issuing the letters of
! 9
 administration there being no good reasons for burdening the
estate.
PADA-KILARIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Cadavis, Albert
!
FACTS:
• Jacinto  Pada had  six  children, namely,  Marciano,
Ananias, Amador,  Higino,  Valentina  and  Ruperta.
He died intestate.
•
!
His estate included a parcel land a residential and coconut land
in Leyte. It is the northern portion cadastral Lot which is the
subject to the instant controversy.
! • During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, feliciano
Pada, obtained permission from him to build  a house on the
northern. Then feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living
in the house together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona
Pada hilario, one of Pastor/s children, has been living in that
house.
! • The heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extrajudicial
partition of his estate. For this  purpose, they  executed
a  private document which  they, however, never  registered in
the office of the Registrar of Deed.
! • Both Ananias and Marciano, represented by his daughter, Maria,
that cadastral Lot as allocated during  the said partition. Then
Ananias died, his daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-
owner of said property. Juanita Pada sold to engr. ernesto
Paderes, the right of his father, Ananias, as co-owner.
! • Later  on,  Maria  Pada  sell  the  coownership  right 
o f h i s   f a t h e r,   M a r c i a n o . P r i v a t e respondent, who is
the first cousin of Maria, was the buyer.
! be put in a public document and registeredhas for its purpose the prote
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 2
• Private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the
northern portion so his family can utilize the said area. The
amicable settlement was failed.
! • Private respondent filed in the MCTC, a complaint for ejectment
with  prayer for damages against petitioner spouses. However,
the heirs of Amador Pada executed a Deed of Donation
transferring to petitioner Verona Pada hilario, their respective
shares as co-owners of the lot. Petitioner spouses alleged that the
northern portion of the Lot had already been donated to them
•
by the heirs of Amador Pada.
They contended that the extra-judicial partition of the estate of
Jacinto Pada executed was invalid and ineffectual since no
special  power  of  attorney was  executed by  Marciano,  Amador
or Higino in favor of their respective children presented them in
the extrajudicial partition.
• Moreover, it was effectuated only through a private document
that was never registered in the office of the Registrar of Deeds
of leyte. the MCTC rendered judgment in  favor of petitioner
spouses.
• Private  respondent appealed to the Regional trial court and
render the reversal of judgment. Petitioners filed in the court of
Appeals a petition for  relief and later on,  a Motion
for  Reconsideration, however, bot here dismissed. Hence
this petition.
!
ISSUE:
!
Whether or not the extrajudicial partition of the estate is valid
!
RULING:
We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto
Pada among his heirs made in 1951 is valid albeit executed in an
unregistered private document. No law requires partition among heirs to
be in writing and be registered in order to be valid. The requirement in
sec. 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of court that a partition
ction  of creditors  and  the  heirs  themselves against tardy claims. The
! 0
object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. it follows
then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the
prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are involved.
Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs
of an estate to enter into agreement for distribution thereof in manner
and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from which,
in the first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing and be registered
in order to be valid. The partition of inherited property need not be
embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards the heirs
that participated therein. The 1951 extrajudicial partition of Jacinto
Pada’s estate being legal and effective as among his heirs, Juanita and
maria pada validly transferred their ownership rights over the lot to
engr. Paderes and private respondent.
! delivered all of the properties to the respective devisees and legatees
! leaving no property of the estate in his hands.
MCMICKING VS. SY CONBIENG
dela Cruz, Kyzeth
FACTS:
Margarita Jose, a native of the Philippines, died sometime on
February 1902 in Amoy, China. Engracio Palanca was appointed as
administrator of the estate left by Jose, which estate was partly
located in Hong Kong and partly in the Philippines. Mariano
Ocampo Lao Sempco and Dy Cunyao executed bonds as sureties of
Palanca who thereafter took possession of all the properties of Jose.
Upon the death of Mariano Ocampo in 1904, Palanca was required
to furnish a new bond, which new bond was subsequently filed
through new sureties.
Mariano Ocampo (Palanca’s former surety) left an estate and
Doroteo Velasco was appointed as its administrator with sureties
Mariano Velasco and Pio de la Guardia Barretto. Mariano Ocampo
was also survived by his heirs; a daughter to whom he left 2/3 of his
estate and 3 sons in China to whom he left the remaining 1/3 of his
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 2
estate. Doroteo, Mariano Ocampo’s estate administrator filed a
complete report and inventory of the latter’s properties, together
with a statement of all his debts and liabilities. As a part of said
report, Doroteo filed an instrument signed by all of the persons
interested in the estate of Mariano Ocampo agreeing to the
partitition of the estate among themselves without proceedings in
court, at the same time assuming the payment of all obligations
against the estate. Such partition agreed to was affirmed and
approved by an order of the court and Doroteo, in pursuance of
such order and after having settled all liabilities of the estate
Sometime in 1908, Engracio Palanca was removed from office as the
administrator of Margarita Jose’s estate by reason of the fact that
Palanca failed and refused to render an account of the property and
funds of the said estate and even failed and refused to deliver such
property and funds to his successor Jose McMicking who was
appointed as administrator of Margarita Jose’s estate in Palanca’s
stead. Palanca retained possession of said property and funds,
absconded with the same, and never returned to the Philippines.
Due to these circumstances McMicking instituted a claim against
the estate of Mariano Ocampo who was a surety of Palanca. The
court approved such claim and directed that Doroteo Velasco, the
administrator of Mariano Ocampo’s estate, pay it if he had sufficient
funds. No payment was made to Margarita Jose’s estate.
McMicking then instituted a claim against the estate of Pio de la
Guardia Barretto who died in 1905. Pio was one of the sureties of
Doroteo Velasco when he was appointed as administrator of
Mariano Ocampo’s estate. Pio left an estate to which the defendant
! 1
Benito Sy Conbieng was appointed as administrator. The committee
appointed by the court to appraise and hear claims against Pio’s
estate disallowed McMicking’s claim and such finding of the
committee was affirmed by said lower court.
!
ISSUE:
Whether or not Benito Sy Conbieng as administrator of Pio de la
Guardia Barretto’s estate is liable for the claim made by Jose
McMicking in favor of Margarita Jose’s estate.
! between themselves, duly executed in writing, apportion and
HELD:
Judgment of the lower court disallowing the claim against Pio de la
Guardia Barretto’s estate affirmed.
Doroteo Velasco, for whom the deceased Pio was surety, would not
have been liable himselfhad this action been commenced against
him. If the principal is not liable upon the obligation, the surety
cannot be. The basis of the liability of a surety on administrator's
bond is the fault or failure of the principal. If the latter incurs no
liability, the former incurs none. The administrator who complies
with the law incurs no liability to any person.
The estate of Mariano Ocampo against which McMicking’s original
claim was made and to which Doroteo Velasco was appointed as
administrator was already partitioned at the time the claim was
made.
A partition of the property of a deceased person may be made under
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 2
the provisions of sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, notwithstanding that an administrator with the will
annexed has been appointed and the administration of the estate
under said appointment is in progress. Such provisions are
applicable no matter what stage the administration has reached.
"SEC. 596. Settlement of intestate estates, without
legalproceedings, in certain cases.—Whenever all the heirs of
a deceased person are of lawful age and legal capacity, and
there are no debts due from the intestate estate, or all the
debts have been paid by the heirs, the heirs may, by a family
council as known under Spanish law, or by agreement
divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit,
without proceedings in court."
"SEC. 597. In such case distributees liable for debts.—But if it
shall appear, at any time within two years after such
settlement and distribution of the estate, that there are debts
outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, any
creditor may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts
in the manner hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall be
paid, with interest; and the administrator appointed by the
court may recover the assets of the estate from those who
have received them, for the purpose of paying the debts; and
the real estate belonging to the deceased shall remain
charged with the liability to creditors for the full period of two
years after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers
thereof that may have been made."
These sections provide for the voluntary division of the whole
property of the decedent without proceedings in court.
Where, after the appointment of an administrator with the will
! 2
annexed of a deceased person and the due making of the inventory
of the property and the taking possession thereof by such
administrator, an agreement is made between the owners thereof
under the will already probated partitioning the same between them
under said sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, the delivery of
the property to such partitioning owners by such administrator,
under proper proceedings and order of court and after compliance
with the provisions of such sections, is, in effect, a discharge of such
administrator as to all future obligations and responsibilities in
relation to said property. In other words, if he turns such property
over to the owners thereof after a partition among them was made
in complete accordance with said sections, and he performs his full
duty as such administrator, neither he nor his bondsmen are liable
to any person for such act. An administrator cannot be held to
accountability for property over which he has no power or control
or jurisdiction and in which he has no legal interest. The thing on
which he was appointed to operate having been withdrawn wholly
beyond his ken by the very power (the law, secs. 596 and 597)
which appointed him, there is a complete revocation of the original
appointment dating from the day of the removal from his hands of
the property which he was appointed to administer.
The administrator has no power or control or jurisdiction and no
legal interest in the property anymore because by such partition, the
estate passes out of existence. The whole property is taken from the
administrator and passed on to the owners. They become the
absolute owners thereof, subject only to the liability of divestiture
on the happening of certain events; but even such divestiture may
be avoided by paying the debt, which is the moving cause thereof.
While at any time within two years after such partition the property,
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 2
or a portion thereof, then in possession of the partitioning parties,
may be placed again in administration in the event of the discovery
of unpaid debts "within two years after such settlement and
distribution of the estate," it would not be the same estate
represented by the prior administrator, and he would not be the
administrator of the new estate by virtue of his appointment in the
old. It would be necessary to appoint, upon proper application and
notice, another administrator for the purposes set forth in said
sections. Before this, it is necessary that the requisite conditions are
present; the unpaid debt must be discovered and the creditor must
make his application. In the case at bar, neither of the above
conditions being present, there could be no administration after
partition. No new administrator was or could be appointed. There
was no administration. The appointment of commissioners to hear
plaintiff's claim was without authority. It was an appointment in
respect to an estate that did not legally exist and in relation to an
administration that had never been inaugurated. The acts of such
commissioners were without legal effect.
In effect, Section 597 creates a statute of limitations, which deprives
all debtsnot discovered within the prescribed time, of the power of
requiring an administration of the estate remaining. Such
administration, after partition, depends upon the discovery of the
debt "at any time within two years after the settlement and
distribution of the estate." These sections do not operate unless that
discovery is made within the time prescribed.
The partition provided for in these sections is binding and valid even
though not all of the debts actually outstanding were paid before the
partition was made. The discovery of an unpaid obligation after
partition does not destroy the partition. It simply furnishes ground
for the application of the creditor for the appointment of an
! 3
administrator. The discovery of a debt after partition does not permit
the whole property in possession of the partitioning parties to be
thrown into administration. Only so much of the property is subject
to such administration as is sufficient to pay the claim discovered,
leaving the partitioning persons in undisturbed possession of the
remainder.Even after the discovery of a debt subsequent to partition,
the partitioning persons may prevent any administration whatever by
paying the debt discovered, thereby preserving the partition intact in
all its parts.
! extrajudicial settlement, insofar as it deprives them of their
! participation of 1/8th of the properties in litigation. On the other
GERONA V. DE GUZMAN
dela Cruz, Kyzeth
! Marcelo de Guzman, shebeing merely a spurious child of the latter,
FACTS:
Petitioners herein, namely, Ignacio, Maria Concepcion, Francisco
and Delfin, all surnamed Gerona, alleged that they are the
legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman;
that the latter, who died on August 9, 1941 was a legitimate
daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la
Cruz; thatafter the death of his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman
married Camila Ramos, who begot him several children, namely,
respondents Carmen, Jose, Clemente, Francisco, Rustica, Pacita and
Victoria, all surnamed De Guzman; that Marcelo de Guzman died
on September 11, 1945; that subsequently, or on May 6, 1948
respondents executed a deed of "extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman", fraudulently
misrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving heirs of the
deceased although they well knew that petitioners were, also, his
forced heirs. Thatrespondents had thereby succeeded fraudulently in
causing the transfer certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of land,
issued in the name of said deceased, to be cancelled and new
transfer certificates of title to be issued in their own name, in the
proportion of 1/7th individual interest for each; that such fraud was
discovered by the petitioners only the year before the institution of
the case; that petitioners forthwith demanded from respondents their
share in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th Interest thereon.
Petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying said deed of
hand, respondents maintained that petitioners' mother, the deceased
Placida de Guzman, was not entitled to share in the estate of
and that petitioners' action is barred by the statute of limitations.
The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the action has
prescribed, which decision was affirmed by the CA.
!
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action of the petitioners to annul the
extrajudicial settlement executed by the respondents has prescribed.
!
HELD:
The SC affirmed the decision of the CA affirming the RTC’s dismissal
of the case on the ground that the action has prescribed.
Upon appeal, petitioners contended that since they and the
respondents were co-heirs of Marcelo, the action for partition does

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! 4
not prescribe.
The SC held that although, as a general rule, an action for partition
among coheirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the
defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse
title. The statute of limitations operates, as in other cases; from the
moment the possessor of the property asserts such adverse title.
When respondents executed the deed of extrajudicial settlement
stating therein that they are the sole heirs of the deceased, and
secured new transfer certificates of title in their own name, they
thereby excluded the petitioners from the estate of the deceased,
and consequently, set up a title adverse to them.
The action to annul a deed of extrajudicial settlement upon the
ground of fraud may be filed within four years from the discovery of
the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said
instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates
of title were issued in the name of the respondents exclusively.
!!
PEDROSA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
De guzman , Jabrielle
!
FACTS:
Spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated
proceedings before the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption of
herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. CFI granted the
petition. Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina
entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguels estate, adjudicating
between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel. Private
respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner before the
CFI of Ozamiz City. CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of
the adoption. Thereafter, the private respondents appealed said decision
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 2
to the Court of Appeals. While said appeal was pending, the
Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with respondent
Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister,
Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel
Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his brothers and sisters. Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal but upheld the validity of the adoption of
petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to
claim their share of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter
refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they
were not their blood relatives. Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul
the 1983 partition. Said complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987
to include the allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise were
made between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed. The
Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint. The appellate court
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUES:
(1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition had already prescribed (2) whether
or not said deed is valid
HELD:
Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to
persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section
1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or
heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or
are represented by themselves or through guardians. Petitioner, as the
records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition.
Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her
case. The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years.
Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28,
! 5
1987, or three years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial
settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her action
against the respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on
publication of extrajudicial settlement. It states: The fact of the
extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next
succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon
any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved
in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said
persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issued
before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a
notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of
extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was when
publication was done in the instant case.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of
extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A
deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the
heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent
and vicious. Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting
mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes the
collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate, following
the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code. The private respondent
Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not aware of Maria Elenas
adoption since they even filed an action to annul the decree of adoption.
Neither can they claim that their actions were valid since the adoption of
Maria Elena was still being questioned at the time they executed the
deed of partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed
only twenty six (26) years after the decree of adoption, patently a much
delayed response to prevent Maria Elena from inheriting from her
adoptive parents. The decree of adoption was valid and existing. With
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 2
this factual setting, it is patent that private respondents executed the
deed of partition in bad faith with intent to defraud Maria Elena.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in
question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned.
The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case
was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to
equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof. As the partition was a total nullity and
did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to
hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two
years from its execution in 1941. To say that Maria Elena was represented
by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted
child, was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only
represented her own interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since Miguel
predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate automatically vested to his child and
widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes interests did not
include Miguels estate but only Pilars estate.
Petition is GRANTED.
ESTATE OF FRANCISCO VS. CARREON
De guzman , Jabrielle
!
FACTS:
Rosa Aldana Francisco petitioned the Court of First Instance of Rizal
summarily to settle the estate of her husband Jose M. Francisco. Alleging
that they had three minor children who were his legal heirs, and that the
deceased left a parcel of land with house thereon, and no creditors, she
asked for declaration that the persons entitled to share in his estate are
the said three minor children, with herself as usufructuary. She requested
for appointment as guardian ad item of her three minor children, and her
! 6
request was granted in due course. Petition was approved and was
registered.
Rosa Aldana Francisco mortgaged her share of the realty to the sisters
Fausta Carreon and Catalina Carreon and was duly registered.
Afterwards, she conveyed by absolute deed of sale, to the aforesaid
creditors, her interest and participation in the land. This sale was
likewise inscribed in the office of the Register of Deeds.
However, in a motion, Tiburcia Magsalin Vda.de Francisco, mother of the
deceased Jose M. Francisco, allegedly in representation of the minor Jose
Francisco y Palumpon, averred that this minor was a recognized natural
son of the deceased, with legal right to participate in his estate, that the
previous proceedings were void because Rosa Aldana Francisco had
concealed such fact, and because she had interests in conflict with those
of her three sons, the truth being that the land was private property of
Jose M. Francisco of which she could not have been awarded a portion in
fee simple.
When the motion to annul or reopen was called for hearing, Macaria
Palumpon requested in open court the dismissal, without prejudice, of
Jose Francisco y Palumpon's demand for recognition. Her request was
granted.
Both Rosa Aldana and the Carreons moved for reconsideration,
contending that, inasmuch as Jose Francisco y Palumpon had
withdrawn, there was no authority to continue, for the matter became a
closed incident. Thereafter, Tiburcia Magsalin Vda. de Francisco, as
guardian ad item of the three legitimate, submitted an "amended
motion" wherein she made practically the same allegations of her
previous motion and prayed for identical remedies — except those
touching the recognition of Jose Francisco y Palumpon. Overruling
objections, the court admitted the amended motion, heard it granting the
interested parties opportunity to present their evidence and arguments,
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 2
and rendered judgment holding the realty was private property of the
deceased Jose Francisco, who had acquired it four years before his
marriage to Rosa Aldana. Wherefore it held that the whole property
passed to the ownership of the three legitimate children of the deceased,
subject to usufructuary rights of the widow; it annulled the mortgage
and the sale executed by Rosa Aldana in favor of the Carreon sisters, and
then issued other appropriate instructions to the Register of Deeds.
ISSUES:
WON the court erred: (1) in continuing to hear the motion for reopening,
even after the natural child had withdrawn from the litigation and (2) in
taking cognizance of the annulment of the mortgage and sale, which it
could validly consider as a probate court.
HELD:
Supposing the original motion did not afford legal standing to the three
legitimate children, and that it could not be "amended", as contended by
appellants, we perceive no reason to prevent the court below from
considering such amended motion as a new and independent petition in
the expediente, filed expressly on behalf of the three minor children. The
matter of time might conceivably be material in regard in considering the
"amended" motion as "original" motion; but in this case it happens to be
immaterial, because under section 5 of Rule 74 such motion may be
lodged with the court within one year after the minors have reached
majority; and they are still minors now. Incidentally this section 5 fully
answers appellants' contention that Tiburcia's moves should have been
initiated within two years after November 8, 1947.
Appellants may not justly complain that they thought such petition for
readjustment or reopening could take place only within two years as
prescribed by section 4 of Rule 74 and as annotated in the certificate of
title; because they are conclusively presumed to know the existence and
provisions of section 5, Rule 74. As the trial judge correctly observed:
! 7
But the whole trouble is that they accepted the mortgage with the
encumbrance annotated; and while it referred to Rule 74, Section 4, and
did not specifically mention section 5, the fact that section 4, Rule 74 was
therein noted should have been sufficient warning to them that the title
was subject to the interest of persons unduly prejudiced hereby. We take
judicial notice of the fact that in the adjudication in summary settlements
more often that not, the order merely says that the sale shall be subject to
the provisions of section 4, Rule 74. This is the case because the Court can
not foresee whether the movant would be affected; but section 5 being an
imposition of the law, and being a mere sequence to the provisions of
Section 4; we hold that where the title on its face shows that it was
subject to the provisions of Rule 74, section 4, a third person who accepts
it must take notice that he is running the risk of interferring with the
rights of minors as provided under section 5, Rule 74.
Contrary to appellants' claim, relief for the minors cannot be directed
against the bond which, according to appellants, should have been
demanded under section 3, Rule 74, because that section applies where
personal property is distributed — not where, as here, realty is the subject
of partition.
Several decisions hold that "If during the summary proceeding some of
the heirs claim, by title adverse to that of the decedent, some parcels of
land, the probate court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue which
must be decided in a separate suit". But here there is no question that the
realty belonged to the decedent; and a separate suit was unnecessary,
specially remembering that in these summary settlements the judge is
expected to "proceed summarily" and "without delay""to determine who
are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate, and to
apportion and divide it among them."
The resolution under review apportions property admittedly belonging
to the decedent among his legal heirs. It is no objection that it affects the
herein appellants. They knew or ought to know the rule permitting such
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 2
to reapportionment even after two years, and they have been given every
chance to be heard, having been by their own petition, regarded as
parties to the entire proceedings. And section 4, Rule 74 (which must be
deemed extensible to situations covered by section 5, Rule 74) expressly
authorizes the court to give to every heir his lawful participation in the
real estate "notwithstanding any transfers of such real estate" and to
"issue execution" thereon. All this implies that, when within the
amendatory period the realty has been alienated, the court in re-dividing
it among the heirs has authority to direct cancellation of such alienation
in the same estate proceedings, whenever it becomes necessary to do so.
To require the institution of a separate action for such annulment would
run counter to the letter of the above rule and the spirit of these
summary settlements.
From the foregoing, the conclusion follows that no prejudicial error was
committed by the lower court, whose order is, consequently, affirmed
with costs.
!
SAMPILO ET. AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Dimaliwat, Dianne
!
FACTS:
Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January, 1945. Teodoro left four
parcels of land in Pangasinan. He left as heirs his widow, Leoncia de
Leon, and several nephews and nieces. Without any judicial proceedings,
Leoncia (his widow) executed an affidavit (Exhibit A) stating that "the
deceased Teodoro Tolete left no children or respondent neither
ascendants or acknowledged natural children neither brother, sisters,
nephews or nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, the legitimate wife
of the deceased, the one and only person to inherit the above properties”.
Leoncia then executed a deed of sale (Exhibit B) of all the above parcels
of land in favor of Benny Sampilo. Benny then sold (Exhibit C) the
! 8
parcels of land to Honorato Salacup. These three documents were
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan.
Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of
the estate of Teodoro Tolete. The complaint alleges that the widow
Leoncia de Leon, had no right to execute the affidavit of adjudication
and that Honorato Salacup acquired no rights to the lands sold to him,
and that neither had Benny Sampilo acquired any right to the said
properties
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Felisa Sinopera's right of action to
recover her and her co-heirs' participation to the lands in question had
not prescribed at the time the action to recover was filed.
RULING:
It is argued that as the action was instituted almost four years
after the affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A", was registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds Of Pangasinan, the right of action of the
administratrix has prescribed and lapsed because the same was not
brought within the period of two years as Prescribed in Section 4 of Rule
74 of the Rules of Court.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial
settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any
reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution would
affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the death of the
decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no
mention of such effect is made, either directly or by implication.
Following the above-quoted decision of this Court in the case of
Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, we are of the opinion and so hold that the
provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 2
objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years
from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to persons who
have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial
partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74
have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the
decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are
represented by themselves or through guardians.
The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because
not all the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial
settlement, the Court of Appeals having found that the decedent left
aside from his widow, nephews and nieces living at the time of his death.
!!
RULE 75
Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary
!!
US VS. CHIU GUIMCO
Dimaliwat, Dianne
!
FACTS:
Joaquin Cruz, a chinese merchant living for many years in the
municipality of Gingoog, Province of Misamis, died while visiting China.
Before his departure from the Philippines he had executed a will before
Anastacio Servillon, a notary public, in which Chiu Guimco and Co-Iden
were named as executors. Chiu Guimco is Joaquin Cruz’s brother.
Guimco, as attorney in fact and manager of the estate of his
deceased brother, entered into an agreement with his brother’s Filipina
wife, whereby she relinquished her claims to the estate for a
consideration. He also entered into an agreement with Uy Cuan, his
! 9
brother’s Chinese wife, for the distribution of the estate and for the
payment of rentals on her interest in the real estate. No payments have,
however, been made by Guimco.
Ramon Contreras, acting on behalf of Uy Cuan, wrote a letter to Guimco
urging him to produce the will of the decedent for the institution of
lawful proceedings in accordance therewith. Guimco replied that the will
in question had never been in his possession and that he had never seen
it.
A complaint was filed under section 628 of the Code of Civil
Procedure charging Guimco with the failure to produce the will within
the time required by law. The court found the accused guilty and
imposed upon him a fine of P1800. Subsequently, the court, believing
that the will was in his possession, ordered him to produce it but Guimco
still failed to do so. The court ordered the confinement of Guimco in the
provincial jail.
ISSUE:
Whether the judge was acting within his power when he ordered
the commitment of Guimco to the provincial jail?
RULING:
No. Section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 5 of
Rule 75), which allows imprisonment of a person who neglects to deliver
a will after the death of the testator without reasonable cause, can only
be applied when a court is acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over
the administration of the estates of deceased persons. Where
administration proceedings are not already pending, the court, before
taking action under this section, should require that there be before it
some petition, information, or affidavit of such character as to make
action by the court under this section appropriate.
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 3
The remedy provided in section 629 of the Code of Procedure is clearly a
totally different remedy, having no relation with that provided in section
628 (now section 4 of Rule 75). It is not permissible in a prosecution
under Sec. 628 to superimpose upon the penalty of fine therein
prescribed the additional penalty of imprisonment prescribed under Sec.
629.
To enforce the production of the will by the accused at a trial under Sec.
628 would virtually compel him to convict himself, since the mere
production of the will by him would be conclusive that he had
possession of it as charged in the criminal complaint. This would
constitute an infringement of the provision of law which says that in a
criminal action the defendant shall be exempt from testifying against
himself.
!!
!
GUEVARRA VS. GUEVARRA
Dimaampao, Mahadodin
!
PALACIOS VS. CATIMBANG-PALACIOS
Dumapias, Gay
!
FACTS:
June 25, 1946 - Juan Palacios executed his last will and
testament. Availing himself of the provisions of the new Civil Code, he
filed on May 23, 1956 before the Court of First Instance of Batangas a
petition for its approval. In said will, he instituted as his sole heirs his
natural children Antonio C. Palacios and Andrea C. Palacios.
June 21, 1956 - an opposition was filed by Maria Catimbang to the
probate of the will. Ground: she is the acknowledged natural daughter of
petitioner but that she was completely ignored in said will thus
impairing here legitime. She objects to its intrinsic validity or to the
legality of the provisions of the will.
July 6, 1956 – court issued an order ADMITTING the will to
probate. After proper hearing concerning the intrinsic validity of the will,
! 0
the court issued another order declaring oppositor to be the natural child
of petitioner and annulling the will insofar as it impairs her legitime,
with costs against petitioner.
Petitioner appealed in order to secure the probate of his will availing
himself of the provisions of Article 838 (2) NCC, which permit a testator
to petition the proper court during his lifetime for the allowance of his
will.
ISSUE:
WON the opposition can be entertained/heard.
RULING:
NO. Its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been
executed in accordance with the requirements of the law, much less if the
purpose of the opposition is to show that the oppositor is an
acknowledged natural child who allegedly has been ignored in the will
for issue cannot be raised here but in a separate action. This is especially
so when the testator, as in the present case, is still alive and has merely
filed a petition for the allowance of his will leaving the effects thereof
after his death.
In Montañano vs. Suesa, court said: "The authentication of the will decides
no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator
and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of a will. It does not determine nor even by
implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions; that may
be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its
authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely un-
affected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated."
On the other hand, "after a will has been probated during the lifetime of
a testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the
same before he has had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary
probate proceedings after the testator's death would be in order".The
reason for this is that the rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of the death of the decedent (Article 777, new Civil Code.).
Trial court erred in entertaining the opposition and in annulling the
portion of the will which allegedly impairs the legitime of the oppositor
on the ground that, as it has found, she is an extraneous matter which
should be treshed out in a separate action.
!!
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 3
FERNANDEZ VS. DIMAGIBA
Dumapias, Gay
!
FACTS:
The heirs intestate of the late Benedicta de los Reyes have
petitioned for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in a Special Proceeding,
admitting to probate the alleged last will and testament of the deceased,
and overruling the opposition to the probate.
On January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba (respondent), submitted
to the Court of First Instance a petition for the probate of the purported
will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930. The
will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased.
The petition was set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez,
Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar,
Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs
intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked.
Grounds: forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of
the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of
the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the
proponent in 1943 and 1944, but conveyances were finally set aside by
this Supreme Court.
CFI: will was genuine and properly executed; but deferred
resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation "until such time
when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will or when the question of adjudication of the properties is
opportunely presented."
Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration,
and/or new trial, insisting that the issues of estoppel and revocation be
considered and resolved.
Court overruled the claim that proponent was in estoppel to ask for the
probate of the will, but "reserving unto the parties the right to raise the
issue of implied revocation at the opportune time."
1960, the CFI appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for the sole
purpose of submitting an inventory of the estate, and this was done on
February 9, 1960.
On the question of whether the execution by the testatrix of
deeds of sale of the larger portion of her estate in favor of the
! 1
testamentary heir, subsequent to the execution of her 1930 testament, had
revoked the latter, the trial Court resolved against the oppositors and
held the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and
unrevoked by the deeds of sale." Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals.
!
ISSUES:
(a) whether or not the decree of the CFI allowing the will to probate had
become final for lack of appeal.
(b) whether or not the order of the Court of origin overruling the
estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise become final.
(c) whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been
impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of
the proponent.
RULING:
(a) It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively
settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper
execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of
whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. As such,
the probate order is final and appealable; Section 1 of Rule 109
specifically prescribes that "any interested person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order or judgment . . . where such order or
judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will."
Appellants argue: they were entitled to await the trial Court's
resolution on the other grounds of their opposition before taking an
appeal, as otherwise there would be a multiplicity of recourses to the
higher Courts. This contention is without weight.
The probate decree of the Court was not appealed on time, the same had
become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no longer
revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon which it is made to
rest.
The revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express
one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly
evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or
devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect
the will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy. Only the total
and absolute revocation can preclude probate of the revoked testament
(Trillana vs. Crisostomo, supra.).
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 3
(b) The presentation and probate of a will are requirements of
public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's,
expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the
decedent's ownership and right of disposition within legal limits.
Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the
same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its
violation (Revised Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow public
policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel.
(c) Article 957(2) of the Civil Code of 1950 (Art. 869 of the Code
of 1889), which recites:
Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect:
(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing
bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter case
the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to the part
thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should again belong to the
testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or
devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall have
been effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of repurchase.
As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change
or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her
1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the
subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the
legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. As found by the Court of Appeals in
its decision annulling these conveyances, "no consideration whatever
was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby
rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying the property to
her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with
what she had ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or
departure therefrom. Revocation being an exception, we believe, that in
the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.
If the annulment was due to undue influence, then the transferor was not
expressing her own free will and intent in making the conveyances.
Hence, it cannot be concluded, either, that such conveyances established
a decision on her part to abandon the original legacy.
The recovery of the alienated property "even if it be by reason of the
nullity of the contract" does not revive the legacy. An alienation through
undue influence in no way differs from one made through violence or
! 2
intimidation. In either case, the transferor is not expressing his real
intent, and it cannot be held that there was in fact an alienation that
could produce a revocation of the anterior bequest.
Appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed.
!
PASCUAL VS COURT OF APPEALS
Dorado, Czaybeeh
!
IN RE JOHNSON
Espino, Carla
!
FACTS:
Emil Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the
United States. He died in the city of Manila leaving a will. The will is an
holographic instrument, being written in the testator's own handwriting,
and is signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of three
witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A
petition, however, was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at
the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of
America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of
that State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to
section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The hearing on said
application was set for March 6, 1916, and three weeks publication of
notice was ordered in the "Manila Daily Bulletin." Due publication was
made pursuant to this order of the court.
However, after the will had been probated, her daughter from
first marriage, EbbaIngeborg, moved for the annulment of the decree of
probate and put the estate into intestate administration, thus preparing
the way for the establishment of the claim of the petitioner as the sole
legitimate heir of her father. She contended, among others, that the order
admitting the will to probate was made without notice to her. In the
argument submitted in behalf of the petitioner, that, at the time the court
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 3
made the order of publication, it was apprised of the fact that the
petitioner lived in the United States and that as daughter and heir she
was necessarily interested in the probate of the will. It is, therefore,
insisted that the court should have appointed a date for the probate of
the will sufficiently far in the future to permit the petitioner to be present
either in person or by representation; and it is said that the failure of the
court thus to postpone the probate of the will constitutes an infringement
of that provision of the Philippine Bill which declared that property shall
not be taken without due process of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order admitting the will to probate was
beyond the jurisdiction of the court and void because it was made
without notice to the petitioner; and
RULING:
The proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that
the publication was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain
the proceeding and to allow the will to be probated.
In the case of In re Davis, the Court ruled that "the proceeding as
to the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of
things the state is allowed a wide latitude in determining the character of
the constructive notice to be given to the world in a proceeding where it
has absolute possession of the res. It would be an exceptional case where
a court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his property
without due process of law, the proceeding being strictly in rem, and the
res within the state, upon the ground that the constructive notice
prescribed by the statute was unreasonably short."
Further, section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that
“Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or his
legal representative from a judgment, order or other proceeding taken
! 3
against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect; Provided, That application therefor be made within a reasonable
time, but in no case exceeding six months after such judgment, order, or
proceeding was taken.” The use of the word "judgment, order or other
proceeding" in this section indicates an intention on the part of the
Legislature to give wide latitude to the remedy here provided, and is not
to be restricted to judgments or orders entered in ordinary contentious
litigation. In other words the utility of the provision is not limited to
actions proper but extends to all sorts of judicial proceedings. The word
"party," used in this section, means any person having an interest in the
subject matter of the proceeding who is in a position to be concluded by
the judgment, order, to other proceeding taken.
Therefore, also in conformity with the doctrine announced in the
Davis case, the petitionerin this case could have applied at any time
within six months for March 16, 1916, and upon showing that she had
been precluded from appearing in the probate proceedings by conditions
over which she had no control and that the order admitting the will to
probate had been erroneously entered upon insufficient proof or upon a
supposed state of facts contrary to the truth, the court would have been
authorized to set the probate aside and grant a rehearing. It is no doubt
true that six months was, under the circumstances, a very short period of
time within which to expect the petitioner to appear and be prepared to
contest the probate with the proof which she might have desired to
collect from remote countries. Nevertheless, although the time allowed
for the making of such application was inconveniently short, the remedy
existed; and the possibility of its use is proved in this case by the
circumstance that on June 12, 1916, she in fact here appeared in court by
her attorneys and excepted to the order admitting the will to probate.It
follows that the order of March 16, 1916, admitting the will of Emil H.
Johnson to probate cannot be declared null and void merely because the
petitioner was unavoidably prevented from appearing at the original
hearing upon the matter of the probate of the will in question.
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 3
!
MANAHAN VS. MANAHAN
Espino, Carla
!
FACTS:
The petitioner, Tiburcia Manahan instituted special proceedings
No. 4162, for the probate of the will of the deceased Donata Manahan.
The court set the date for the hearing and the necessary notice required
by law was accordingly published. It, later on, entered the decree
admitting the will to probate as prayed for. The will was probated on
September 22, 1930 and appointed the herein petitioner as the executrix.
On May 11, 1932, the appellant herein, Engracia Manahan, filed a motion
for reconsideration and a new trial, praying that the order admitting the
will to probate be vacated and the authenticated will declared null and
void ab initio. She claimed that she was an interested party in the
testamentary proceedings and, as such, was entitled to and should have
been notified of the probate of the will.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner was entitled to and should have
been notified of the probate of the will: and
(2) Whether or not the will is null and void ab initio on the ground
that the external formalities prescribed by the Code of Civil
Procedure have not been complied with in the execution
thereof.
RULING:
(1) The appellant's contention is obviously unfounded and
untenable. She was not entitled to notification of the probate of the will
and neither had she the right to expect it, inasmuch as she was not an
interested party, not having filed an opposition to the petition for the
! 4
probate thereof. Her allegation that she had the status of an heir, being
the deceased's sister, did not confer on her the right to be notified on the
ground that the testatrix died leaving a will in which the appellant has
not been instituted heir. Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not
acquire any successional right.
(2) No. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the
due execution thereof and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds
authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent
action or proceedings. Also, inasmuch as the proceedings followed in a
testamentary case are in rem, the trial court's decree admitting the will to
probate was effective and conclusive against her, in accordance with the
provisions of section 306 of the said Code of Civil Procedure which reads
as follows:
SEC. 306.EFFECT OF JUDGMENT. — . . . .
1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to
the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased
person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or
relation of a particular person the judgment or order is conclusive upon
the title of the thing, the will or administration, or the condition or
relation of the person: Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of
letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of
the testator or intestate; . . . .
!
ALABAN VS COURT OF APPEALS
Hipolito, Nina Anthonette
!
FACTS
Respondent Francisco Provido filed a petition for the probate of the
Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado a.
ALLEGATION: he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her
will. b. RTC’s RULING: allowed the probate of the will and directed the
issuance of letters testamentary to respondent
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 3
Petitioners after 4 months filed a motion for the reopening of the
probate proceedings a. CLAIMs: 1) they are the intestate heirs of the
decedent. 2) RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to
non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective publication, and lack of
notice to the other heirs.
! will could not have been probated because: a) the signature of
the decedent was forged; b) the will was not executed in accordance with
law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the attestation clause; c)
the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will;
d) the will was executed by force and under duress and improper
pressure; e) the decedent had no intention to make a will at the time of
affixing of her signature; and f)she did not know the properties to be
disposed of, having included in the will properties which no longer
belonged to her. b. RTC’s Ruling: denied motion 1) petitioners were
deemed notified of the hearing by publication and that the deficiencyin
the payment of docket fees is not a ground for the outright dismissal of
the petition. 2) RTC’s Decision was already final and executory even
before petitioners’ filing of the motion to reopen 3. Petitioners filed a
petition to annule RTC’s decision a.CLAIM: there was a compromise
agreement between petitioners and respondents and they learnt the
probate proceeding only in July 2001 b.CA’s RULING: petition
dismissed 1) no showing that petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the
ordinary remedies of newtrial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment,
or other appropriate remedies through no fault of their own.
!
ISSUE:
W/N the allowance of the will to probate should be annulled for
failure to mention the petitioners asparties
!
RULING:
No 1. Probate of a will is considered action in rem a. Under the
Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any
other personinterested in the estate may, at any time after the death of
the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will must
bepublished for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province, as well as furnished to the designated or
! 5
other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator b. Petitioners
became parties due to the publication of the notice of hearing 2.The filing
of motion to reopen is similar to a motion for new triala.The ruling
became final and executor because the motion was filed out of time.
Given that they knew of the decision 4 months after they could have
filed a petition for relief from judgment after the denial of their motion to
reopen. 3. Petition for annulment of judgment must still fail for failure to
comply with the substantive requisites, a. An action for annulment of
judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the
judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. PURPOSE: to have the
final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of
litigation. 4. Notice is required to be personally given to known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator a. the will states that the respondent
was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent thus he has no legal
obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate or personally
notify them.
! shall pass either real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed.
76
RULE
Allowance or Disallowance of Will
!
SANTOS VS. CASTILLO
Hipolito, Nina Anthonette
!
FACTS:
Petitioner Emerita Santos, in her behalf and as guardian of the
minor acknowledge natural children of the deceased, filed a petition for
probate of the will of Nicolas Azores. She also filed a motion for the
appointment of a special administrator. At the hearing, respondents Jose,
Sinfrosa and Antonio Azores, legitimate children of the deceased filed
their opposition, on the ground that the court had not acquired
jurisdiction on the case. Petitioner's allegations being insufficient to
confer jurisdiction because she did not allege that she had the custody of
the will, and therefore, was not entitled to present it for probate and
furtherance because the will that should be probated is the original and
not a copy thereof, as the one presented by the petitioner. Petitioner filed
an amended petition prayingthat respondents be required to present the
copies of the will and the codicil in their possession. Court issued an
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 3
order denying the petition for the appointment of a special administrator
by petitioner and ordered Jose Azores, who has custody of the last will
and testament and all other documents in relation thereto, to deliver said
papers to the court within the date from notice. Consequently, petitioner
filed a motion praying that her amended petition be admitted. However,
before this motion was decided, respondents, after their father's death,
presented the original of the will and codicil, and petitioned that they be
admitted for probate. The court issued an order dismissing the petition
filed by the petitioner.
!
ISSUE:
Who is entitled to apply for probate? WON the court acquired
jurisdiction over the case
!
RULING:
Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that no will
For this purpose, section 626 provides that the person who has the
custody of he will shall, within 4 days after he knows of the death of the
testator, deliver the will to the court which has jurisdiction, or to the
executor named in the will. Sections 628 and 629 proscribed coercive
means to compel a person having the custody of a will to deliver it to the
court which has jrisdiction. Petitioner alleged that the deceased
designated nobody as custodian of his will but that he directed his
nephew Manuel Azores to deliver a copy thereof to her, to keep one in
his possession, and to turn over the other two copies to his son Jose
Azores, with instructions to the effect that if petitioner or his son failed to
present said will for probate, Manuel should take charge of presenting it
to the court. +aking everything into account therefore, it is of the court's
vieww that Jose Azores, the son of the deceased, had the custody of the
will because the original thereof was turned over to him. For the sake of
argument, however, admitting that the testator had designated nobody
as custodian of the will, it cannot be denied that his act of subsequentl$
making a codicil and entrusting the custody thereof to his legitimate
children, clearly modified his last will. In this sense, the custody of both
is entrusted to his legitimate children and not to Manuel Azores or to
petitioner. Hence, as the legitimate children of the deceased had custody
of the originals of the will and of the codicil, they alone could, had the
! 6
right and where bound by law to apply for the probate of their father'
last will. In order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the case for
the probate of a will and for the administration of the properties left by a
deceased person, the application must allege, in addition to the residence
of the deceased and other indispensable facts or circumstances, that the
applicant is the executor in the will or is the person who had custody of
the will to be probated. The original of said document must be presented
or sufficient reasons given to justify the nonrepresentation of said
original and the acceptance of the copy or duplicate thereof. Inasmuch as
these requisites had not been complied with in the application filed by
the petitioner, the respondent judge did not exceed in jurisdiction in
dismissing the application in question.
!!
PEREZ VS. PEREZ
Katigbak , Paula Margareth
!
FACTS:
On May 25, 1973, the plaintiffs-appellants executed a deed of real
estate mortgage in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines
over the property located in Bataan as security for an agricultural loan of
P6,500.00. The mortgage contract was registered in the Registry of Deeds
of Bataan. The plaintiffs failed to pay their obligation which prompted
DBP in extrajudicially foreclosing the property. the application was filed
And the necessary notice of Sheriffs sale was issued and posted by the
deputy sheriff at three (3) public places in Morong, Bataan, where the
mortgaged property is located and duly published for three (3)
consecutive weeks in the Olongapo News. On December 19, 1978, the
public auction sale was conducted at the municipal building in Morong,
Bataan, wherein Democrito Perez emerged as the winning bidder for
P11,000.00. Certificate of sale in favor of Democrito Perez was issued and
registered in the Registry of Deeds. Since plaintiffs-appellants failed to
exercise their right to redeem the foreclosed property, original defendant
Democrito Perez executed an affidavit of consolidation which resulted in
the issuance of a new TCT. On 1985, a civil case for Annulment of Public
Auction Sale with Damages coupled with Preliminary Injunction and
Prayer for Restraining Order was filed by herein petitioners against the
respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Balanga, Bataan. The
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 3
case was dismissed. Petitioners filed an appeal alleging that the RTC
erred in holding that the public auction sale of the subject mortgaged
property was valid despite the lack of notice to them, thus, depriving
them of their right to property without due process of law. They further
alleged that the notice of public auction sale was not validly published in
a newspaper of general circulation, as required by law. But CA affirmed
RTC's decision. Motion for reconsideration was filed but the same was
denied.
!
ISSUE/s:
WHETHER THERE WAS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS ON POSTINGS. WHETHER THERE WAS NO
PUBLICATION IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION
WHERE THE REAL PROPERTY IS SITUATED.
!
RULING:
No. The requirement on the posting of notices is found in Section
3 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, viz: Sec. 3. Notice shall be
given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at
least three public places of the municipality or city where the property is
situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos,
such notice shall also be published once a week for at least three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
municipality or city. Their position that the puericulture center and the
municipal building should be considered one and the same place
because they were located in one place is pure fallacy and totally
unacceptable for being contrary to the actual state of things. The
petitioners further contend that even after the sheriff had posted the
notice, he may not have posted it anymore for the remaining nineteen
(19) days, as required by Act No. 3135. It could also be, according to
petitioners, that after the notice was posted, the same may have been
removed from where it was posted either by an act of man or by an act of
nature. But such contention was not supported with evidence. As
correctly held by the trial court and the appellate court, the deputy
sheriff has in his favor the presumption that his official duty was
regularly performed. The petitioners herein were unable to topple this
presumption in the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and now in this
Court. -No. To be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that it
! 7
is published for the dissemination of local news and general information;
that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; and that it
is published at regular intervals. The newspaper must not also be
devoted to the interests or published for the entertainment of a particular
class, profession, trade, calling, race or religious denomination. The
newspaper need not have the largest circulation so long as it is of general
circulation. Based from the testimonies of the witnesses, it was proven
that Olongapo News was indeed a newspaper of general circulation.
That although in 1978, it was not published in Morong, Bataan, under
P.D. No. 1079, it is categorical that in the event there is no newspaper or
periodical published in the locality, the same may be published in the
newspaper or periodical published, edited and circulated in the nearest
city or province. Since no newspaper of general circulation was being
published in Morong, Bataan, in the year 1978, then the respondents
were right in availing themselves of the services of the Olongapo News,
which, as found by the trial court, was the nearest publication in Bataan.
!!
DE ARANZ VS. GALING
Katigbak , Paula Margareth
!
FACTS:
On 3 March 1986, private respondent Joaquin R-Infante filed
RTC Pasig a petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and
testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola. The petition
specified the names and ad- dresses of herein petitioners as legatees and
devisees. The probate court issued an order setting the petition for
hearing. Said order was published in the "Nueva Era" A newspaper of
general circulation in Metro Manila once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks. On the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared. The hearing
was then reset and private respondent presented his evidence ex-parte
and placed Arturo Arceo one of the testamentary witnesses, on the
witness stand. During the proceedings, private respondent was
appointed executor. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
alleging that, as named legatees, no notices were sent to them as required
by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and they prayed that they be
given a period of ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to
the probate of the will. This was denied by the Court. Petition for
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 3
certiorari was filed and referred to CA which was also dismissed. Hence,
present petition.
!
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in ruling that the requirement of notice
on heirs, legatees, and devisees is merely a procedural convenience to
satisfy the requirements of due process?
!
RULING:
Yes. Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Cof reads: SEC. 4. Heirs,
devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally.—
The court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed
for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at
their places of residence, and deposited in the post office with the
postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if
such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like
manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not, the
petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if
their places of residence be known. Personal service of copies of the
notice at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent
to mailing. It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and
place of the hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the
Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence be
known. There is no question that the residences of herein petitioners
legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. But despite such
knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent
to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will
was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3)
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
!
BASA VS. MERCADO
Lee, Mariline
!
MANINANG VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Lee, Mariline
!
! 8
ACAIN VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT evidence submitted to the RTC were already sufficient to allow probate
Lectura, Erika of will.
!
GAN VS. YAP
           
ISSUE:
Lectura, Erika WON it was necessary to prove the foreign law.
! !
RULINGS:
RODELAS VS ARANZA
Lim, Justin NO.The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of
wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows:
RULE 76 (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2)
the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the
Allowance of Will Proved Outside of the Philippines and Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4)
Administration of Estate Thereunder
!
LEON & GHEZZIE VS.MANUFACTURERS LIFE INS.
the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a
foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Except for the first
and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
Lim, Justin
!! The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the
probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our
courts cannot take judicial notice of them .Petitioner must have
SUNTAY VS. SUNTAY perceived the omission of the fifth requirement above as in fact she
Lubay, Angela
!
VDA. DE PEREZ VS. TOLETE
moved for more time to submit the pertinent procedural and substantive
New York laws but which request respondent Judge just glossed over.
While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should
Lubay, Angela
!
FACTS:
relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of
which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or
denied probate
Subject of this case is the probate of the will of Spouses Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens
!
Respondent Judge was ordered to give the petitioner a reasonable time
and practicing doctors in New York, U.S.A. The spouses executed within which to submit evidence.
separate wills for the benefit of each other. The spouses and their family
perished when they were trapped by fire that gutted their home.
!!
Thereafter, their wills were admitted to probate with the ANCHETA VS GUERSAY-DALAYGON
Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. Then, petitioner Mercado, Trish
who is the mother of Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan filed for the reprobate of
the will with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The
!
ANCHETA v. GUERSEY-DALAYGON
will was denied probate for the reason that the documents did not
establish the law of New York on the procedure and allowance of wills.
GR NO. 139868; June 8, 2006
The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration to be given sufficient time to
prove New York law was denied. On appeal, petitioner contend that the

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 3

! 9
TOPIC: Rule 77 –Allowance of Will Proved Outside of the
Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder
Facts: Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey
(Richard) were American citizens who have resided in the
Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle
Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey died in 1979. She left a will wherein
she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard consisting of Audrey’s
conjugal share in real estate improvements at Forbes Park, current
account with cash balance and shares of stock in A/G Interiors.
Two years after her death, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-
Dalaygon. Four years thereafter, Richard died and left a will
wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for
his shares in A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter. 
 Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated


Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where Audrey’s
will was admitted to probate, filed a motion to declare Richard
and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audrey’s
estate. The motion and project of partition were granted.
Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator with regards to Richard’s
will also filed a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richard’s
undivided interest in the Forbes property was allocated to
respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof was allocated to their
three children. Respondent opposed on the ground that under the
law of the State of Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a
legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the
property subject to the legacy. 



Issue: Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be
annulled under the circumstances. 
 Facts:
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 4
Held: A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person
vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if
erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes
final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. 



However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the
estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in
Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested in a
probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he
is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. 



Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of
by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA
Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and
April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
!
RULE 78
Letters Testamentary and of Administration, When and to
Whom issued
!
NGO THE HUA VS. CHUNG KIAT HUA
Mercado, Trish
!
NGO THE HUA v. CHUNG KITA HUA
GR NO. L-17091; Sept. 30, 1963
! 0
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal !
MALOLES II VS. PHILLIPS
appointing Chung Kiat Hua as administrator of the estate of the
Mansul, Nabral
deceased Chung Liu.
!
REPUBLIC VS. MARCOS
Ngo The Hua, claiming to be the spouse of the deceased, filed a petition
Pangilinan, Legis
to be appointed administratix of the estate of the aforementioned
deceased. The petition was opposed by the children of the deceased
!
TORRES VS. JAVIER
claiming that Ngo Hua is morally and physically unfit to execute the Pangilinan, Legis
duties of the trust as administratix, and that the she and the deceased
procured an absolute divorce in Taiwan. The lower court found that Ngo
!!
Hua and the deceased were validly divorced in Taipei. The court issued DE GUZMAN VS. LIMCOLIOC
Rabanal, Michelle
an order appointing Chung Kiat Hua as administrator instead.
!
FACTS:
Issue:

Whether or not the lower court erred in passing upon the validity of the !
divorce obtained by Ngo Hua and the deceased and upon the filiation of
Proceso de Guzman died on January 1, 1937, without leaving a will. The
the oppositors?
deceased was first married to Agatona Santos, with whom he had four
Held: children, named Nicolasa, Apolinario, Ana and Tomasa. After Agatona's
death, the deceased contracted a second marriage with Angela
No. It is well settled that the declaration of heirs shall only take place Limcolioc, with whom he did not have any child.
after all the debts, expenses and taxes have been paid. A cursory reading
of the pertinent section discloses that what the court is enjoined from !
doing is the assignment or distribution of the residue of the deceased’s
On the 7th of the same month of January, 1937, the Court of First Instance
estate before the above-mentioned obligations chargeable to the estate
of Rizal appointed Nicolasa de Guzman judicial administratrix of the
are first paid. Nowhere from the said section may it be inferred that the
properties of the deceased Proceso de Guzman. On the 8th of the same
court cannot make a declaration of heirs prior to the satisfaction of these
month of January, 1937, Angela Limcolioc, widow of the deceased, asked
obligations. It is to be noted, however, that the court in making the
that this appointment be set aside and that she had named administratrix
appointment of the administrator did not purport to make a declaration
instead, on that ground of her preference as the widow. The court denied
of heirs.
this petition and sustained the appointment of Nicolasa. From these
! resolutions, Angela appealed.
MEDINA ET. AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Mansul, Nabral !

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 4

! 1
ISSUE: equal to that corresponding to one of the children who has received no

! betterment.

Whether the trial court erred in not appointing her

administratrix of the estate of the deceased Proceso de Guzman and in
appointing Nicolasa de Guzman as such administratrix without first
setting the case for hearing.
! On August 25, 1950, Luis Morales, married to Hermenegilda
RULING:
! letter of administration in favor of Atty. Pedro B. De Jesus, for the
The application filed by Nicolasa de Guzman for her
appointment alleges that during the marital life of the deceased with his
first wife Agatona Santos, both, through their mutual labor, acquired all
the properties left by the deceased, not having acquired any property
during his second marriage with Angela Limcolioc. The court bore these
allegations in mind. It is true that the case was not heard for the purpose
of establishing these allegations, but when Angela asked for the
reconsideration of the appointment of Nicolasa, she did not deny these
allegations and merely stated that they do not justify her appointment as
administratrix. For failure of Angela to deny these allegations, thus
taking them for granted, the court was justified in considering them
when it denied the reconsideration of its resolution and when it
sustained the appointment of Nicolasa.
! !
If the properties left by the deceased Proceso de Guzman were acquired
during his marriage with Agatona Santos, his children, among them
Nicolasa, have more interest therein than his now widow, Angela
Limcolioc, who would only be entitled, by way of usufruct, to a portion
!!
TORRES VS. SICAT
Rabanal, Michelle
!
FACTS:
Sicat, died in the municipality of Tarlac, Tarlac Seven days later, Jose
Torres alleging to be a creditor of the conjugal partnership commenced
this special proceeding in the Tarlac court petitioning for the issuance of
purpose of settling the estate of the deceased.
!
Twelve days afterwards the widow voiced her opposition, and claimed
preference to be appointed as administratrix. She said the only close
relatives and forced heirs were her six legitimate minor children, besides
herself.
!
RTC:
!
The petitioner presented evidence. The oppositor submitted none. Then
the trial judge, disregarding the preference established by law for the
surviving widow, entered on August 16, 1951 an order appointing Atty.
Pedro B. De Jesus as administrator.
!
Under section 6, rule 79 of the Rules of Court, when a person dies
intestate, administration should be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be
(b) if such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, . . . it may
be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and
willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 4

! 2
!
The trial judge was cognizant of this statutory preference. But he
expressly stated his reason for disregarding it, saying in effect:
"Apparently the amount of credits exceeds the value of the conjugal
assets; therefore the interest of the creditors deserves paramount
consideration. Now inasmuch as the widow has shown hostility to the
creditors by openly disputing their credits, she is therefore unsuitable,
for having adverse interests."
!
A probate court cannot arbitrarily disregard the preferential rights of the
surviving spouse to the
administration of the estate of a deceased person; but if the person
enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable the court may appoint
another person.
!
Unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may consist in adverse
interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the
estate of such an extent as to render the appointment inadvisable.
!
"The surviving widow" the trial judge stated, "has always consistently
refused to recognize the credits" and manifested her determination to
"resist the claims of creditors."
!
ISSUE:
Whether RTC’s appointment should be upheld, ignoring the
surviving widows preferential right.
!
RULING:
In our opinion it is a sound juridical principle that the
administrator should not adopt attitudes nor take steps inimical to the
interests of the creditors. The administration of the intestate is
undertaken for the benefit of both the heirs and the creditors. but by
creditors we mean those declared to be so in appropriate proceedings.
Before their credits are fully established they are not "creditors" within
the purview of the above principle. So it is not improper — it is even
proper — for the administrator or whoever is proposed for appointment
as such, to oppose, or to require competent proof of, claims advanced
against the estate. "The propriety of contesting particular claims must
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 4
frequently be left largely to his discretion and no presumption of bad
faith or misconduct will be made against him." (34 C. J. S., p. 259.)
!
At the hearing of the petition for the appointment of administrator, this
widow practically did nothing more than to inform the alleged creditors,
"prove your credit before I honor it." That is not necessarily dishonest
nor contrary to real creditors. And then, not having opposed all creditors,
because she did not deny the estate's liability to the People's Bank, she
could not strictly be considered hostile to the creditors. Had she
acknowledged indebtedness to every one coming forward with a claim,
regardless of its merit, she would be useless, even harmful, both to the
heirs and the actual creditors.
!
Under the rules (Rule 87) creditors; claims may be filed, and considered,
only after the regular administrator has been appointed. Hence, in
selecting the administrator, the court could not yet normally accord
priority treatment to the interests of those whose credits were in dispute.
And counsel for herein appellant did well in opposing the presentation
of evidence of the objected credits at the hearing, arguing in part,
!
. . . the time has not yet arrived when this court can even entertain the
presentation of those exhibits because the stage of presenting claims has
not yet arrived. Consequently, this court can not even receive as evidence
the said documents as evidence of indebtedness, because if those
evidence will be accepted then we will be in a position to rebut them and
to enter into actual trial to show that they are not really evidence of
indebtedness, and in that case we will not terminate because then we
will be contending as to whether those were really executed or really
contracted. ...
!
On the other hand, the appealed order conceding that the evidence
"showed clearly that the surviving widow is fully competent in a high
degree to administer the intestate of her deceased husband", plainly
indicates that except for her supposed hostility to creditors she was
suitable for the trust. Consequently, having found that her attitude did
not per se constitute antagonism to the creditors, we must necessarily
declare and enforce her superior right to appointment as administratrix
under Rule 79.
! 3
!
Wherefore, the questioned order appointing Atty. Pedro B. De Jesus is
annulled, and one will be entered requiring the issuance by the court a
quo of letters of administration to the widow appellant subject to such
terms and conditions as are appropriate under the Rules. Costs against
the appellee.
!!
SUNTAY III VS. COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
Rivera, Hiezll Wynn
! !
FACTS:
  On June 4,  1990, the decedent, Cristina married to Dr. Federico
died intestate. In 1979, their only  son, Emilio Suntay (Emilio I),
predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At the time of her death,
Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and several
grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio Suntay III (Emilio III)
and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio I was married to Isabel
Cojuangco, and they begot three  children, namely: respondent, Isabel;
Margarita; and Emilio II. Emilio I’s first marriage was subsequently annulled.
Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of  wedlock, Emilio III and
Nenita Suntay, by two different women. Respondent and her siblings
Margarita and Emilio II, lived separately from their father and paternal
grandparents. After her spouse’s death, Federico adopted their illegitimate
grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita. On October 26, 1995, respondent
filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor.
Federico filed his opposition. Being the surviving spouse of Cristina, he
is capable of administering her estate and he should be the one
appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of conjugal
properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference in the
administration. After a failed attempt by the  parties to settle the
proceedings amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation dated March
13,  1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the
decedent’s estate on his behalf. The trial court granted Emilio III’s Motion for
Leave to Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of the case. In
the course of the proceedings, Federico died. The trial court rendered a
decision appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of decedent
Cristina’s intestate estate. Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 4
CA, which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the
Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III. The CA zeroed in on Emilio III’s
status as an illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus, barred from
representing  his deceased father in the estate of the latter’s legitimate mother,
the decedent.
!
ISSUE :
Who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified to act as
administrator of the decedent’s estate.
HELD:
The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is
to give preference to the wishes and presumed will of the decedent,
absent a valid and effective will.  The basis for Article 992 of the Civil
Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule, is quite the opposite
scenario in the facts obtaining herein for the actual relationship between
Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was akin
to the normal relationship of legitimate relatives.  Emilio III was reared
from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico, who
both acknowledged him as their grandchild.   Emilio III is a legally
adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of the
latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, not simply
representing his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
 
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in
excluding Emilio III from the administration of the decedent’s estate. As
Federico’s adopted son, Emilio III’s interest in the estate of Cristina is as
much apparent to this Court as the interest therein of respondent,
considering that the CA even declared that under the law, Federico,
being the surviving spouse, would have the right of succession over a
portion of the exclusive property of the decedent,  aside from his share
in the conjugal partnership.
 
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of
preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate:
 
SEC. 6.  When and to whom letters of administration
granted.  If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust,
! 4
 or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to
such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next
of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;
 
(b)  If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may
be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow,
or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death
of the person to apply for administration or to request
that administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors,
if competent and willing to serve;
 
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to
serve, it may be granted to such other person as the
court may select.
However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends
on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case. Jurisprudence has
long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound
discretion of the trial court.  In the main, the attendant facts and
circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration
by both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmothers, Cristina’s
estate.
 
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the
basis of intestate succession,  i.e., love first descends, for the decedent,
Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate
grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally
raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a
legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly
pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 4
Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism
between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.
 The petition is GRANTED.
!
RULE 79
Opposing Issuance of Letters Testamentary, Petition and
Contest for Letters of Administration
!!
GUTIEREZ VS VILLEGAS
Rodriguez, Maria Lorraine
!
FACTS:
In 1954, Irene Santos died intestate, leaving as her only heirs her
surviving spouse Jose Villegas and two nieces — daughters of a deceased
brother, Rizalina and Adela Gutierrez. Thereafter, the surviving spouse
filed with the Rizal CFI- Pasay, a petition for Letters of Administration ,
and was appointed administrator of the estate. In the petition, he named
as intestate heirs, besides himself, the 2 nieces of his deceased wife.
Under the unverified manifestation signed by Adela Gutierrez,
accompanied by a public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihan at
Salinan", renounced all her rights , interests and participation in the
estate of Irene in favor of her sister.
However, Adela averred that the deed of assignment of her
rights, participation and interest in the estate of Irene Santos and the first
manifestation were obtained thru fraud practiced by the administrator
upon her and were vitiated by mistake or undue influence. Therein, she
narrated that due to stringent financial conditions, she (Adela) requested
the administrator for an advance of P2,000.00 from the estate. The
administrator refused on the ground that it is against the law, but
suggested that she might obtain a loan from her sister Rizalina, offering
to help. Thereafter, the administrator informed Adela that he was able to
secure the conformity of Rizalina to give her a loan of P10,000.00 instead
of only P2,000.00. Adela was then brought by Villegas and Rizalina to the
office of their lawyer, where she was made to sign a document she could
! 5
not read. The lawyer asked Adela to sign another document, which he
said was to be presented in Court and explained the contents of the
document signed the day before. It was only then that Adela came to
know that said document was a deed of sale. When Adela protested,
Villegas told her that the matter could be discussed better in his house.
During the discussion, Villegas informed Adela that the amount of
P50,000.00 which Rizalina was paying for her share in the inheritance,
was probably more than what she would get in the estate, because the
estate is not valuable and had plenty of debts. Although Adela did not
want to accept the money, Villegas refused to take them back. When she
was made to sign the deed of assignment, Adela did not know the true
value of the estate.
The administrator Villegas and Rizalina denied the allegations of
fraud, undue influence and the like.
Adela presented with the Probate Court, a motion praying that
the administrator and/or his attorneys be required to furnish her all
copies of pleadings filed or to be filed in the intestate proceedings, it
appearing that the administrator presented pleadings in Court without
serving her copies thereof.
An opposition was interposed by the administrator, who alleged
that the movant, although originally a party to the probate proceeding,
has voluntarily and expressly desisted from being so, and that having
assigned by sale, all her rights, interests and participations in the estate,
she has no longer any legal standing in the case.
CFI: Favored Adelina and ordered the administrator to furnish
the former copies of pleadings.
Rizalina and the Administrator appealed.
! !
ISSUE:
Whether or not Adela Santos Gutierrez has a right to intervene
in the probate proceeding.
RULING:
! estate, in view of the deed of transfer and renunciation, in the
YES. It cannot be successfully denied that Adela Santos
Gutierrez is an indispensable party to the proceedings in question. Her
interest in the estate is not inchoate, it was established at the time of
death of Irene Santos. While it is true that she executed a deed of
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 4
assignment, it is also a fact that she asked the same to be annulled, which
action is now pending before the CFI-Pasig Although Adela had filed a
manifestation dropping herself from the proceedings and presenting
therewith the supposed Deed of Assignment, the record, nevertheless
fails to show that action thereon had been taken by the probate Court.
Every act intended to put an end to in division among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should
purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction. No serious argument can be offered to deny the co-heirship
of appellee in the estate under probate. It appearing (if We assume the
due execution of the Deed of Assignment), that the transaction is in the
nature of extrajudicial partition, court approval is imperative, and the
heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over the estate and
over their persons, by the mere act of assignment and desistance. Even if
the partition had been judicially approved on the basis of the alleged
deed of assignment, an aggrieved heir does not lose her standing in the
probate court. Adela was not a third person; she was an original party
therein.
DURAN VS. DURAN
Rodriguez, Maria Lorraine
!
FACTS:
Pio Duran died intestate. Among his alleged heirs are Josefina, as
surviving spouse; several brothers and sisters; nephews and nieces.
Subsequent to his death, Cipriano, one of the surviving brothers,
executed a public instrument assigning and renouncing his hereditary
rights to decedent’s estate in favor of Josefina for consideration.
However, a year later, Cipriano filed in CFI-Albay a petition for intestate
proceedings to settle Pio’s estate and an ex parte motion to be appointed
as Special Administrator. Josefina opposed and moved for the dismissal
upon the ground that the petitioner is not an interested person in the
alternarive, she asked to be appointed administratrix. Whereas Cipriano
alleged that Josefina was not the decedent’s wife and that the deed of
assignement was procured through fraud, with gross inadequacy of
consideration and vitiated by lesion.
! 6
 Meanwhile, Miguel, another brother of decedent, filed a petition
to be joined as co-petitioner of Cipriano. Josefina moved to strike out
said petition as an improper attempt to intervene in the case.
CFI: dismissed the petition of Cipriano for lack of interest in the
estate premised on the deed of assignment signed by Cipriano.
Cipriano and Miguel appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner Cipriano can be considered as an “interested
person” in the estate
RULING:
No.Petitioner Cipriano is not an interested person in the estate of
the decedent. In the present case, there was really no settlement
proceedings. The remedy of the petitioner is to rescind or to annul the
deed of assignment or the extrajudicial partition. The assignment took
place without pending settlement proceeding. The properties subject
matter of the assignment were not under the jurisdiction of the
settlement court. Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a
partition between the assignor and assignee, the same does not need
court approval to be effective between parties. An extrajudicial partition
is valid as between participants even if the requisites of Sec. 1 Rule 74 are
not followed, since such requisites are for purposes of binding creditors
and non-participating heirs only.
Under the Rules of Court, a petition for administration and
settlement of an estate must be filed by an interested person. And in the
meanwhile, the assigning heir cannot initiate a settlement proceedings,
for until the deed of assignment is annulled or rescinded, it is deemed
valid and effective against him, so that he is left without that “ interest”
in the estate required to petition for settlement proceedings.
!
TAYAG VS. TAYAG-GALLOR
Salayog, Benny Rico
!FACTS:
Respondent, Tayag-Gallor or TG, filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration over the estate of Ismael
Tayad. She claims that she is 1 of 3 illegitimate children of
Ismael. Ismael was married to petitioner but they didn't have
any children of their own.
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 4
!
Ismael died intestate, leaving behind 2 lots and one
motor vehicle, both in possession of petitioner. Petitioner
promised respondent and her brothers 100K each as their share
in the proceeds of the sale of the motor vehicle. Petitioner only
gave half.
!
Respondent alleged that petitioner intends to dispose of
the properties of Ismael to the respondents prejudice, Petitioner
opposed this petition of TG asserting that the properties were
purchased by her using her own money, she even denied all of
petitioners allegations.
!
Petitioner filed for dismissal for failure to state a cause of
action. Petitioner reiterated that she is the sole owner of the
properties by presenting TCTs. She also averred that it was
necessary for respondent to show proof that she was
acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag. There being no
such allegation, the action becomes one to compel recognition.
DENIED. CA also denied petitioners motion and directed the
trial court to proceed with the dispatch. CA ruled that the
allegation of respondent that she is an illegitimate child suffices
for a cause of action, without the need to state that she had been
recognized or acknowledged.
!
Petitioner came to the SC and asserts that respondent
should not be allowed to prove her filiation in the settlement of
Ismael's estate. Because the claim of filiation should not be
allowed to be proved in an action for settlement of an estate.
!
ISSUE: Whether respondent's petition for the issuance of letters
of administration sufficiently states a cause of action
considering that she merely alleged she is an illegitimate child?
!
RULING: YES.
! 7
 80
Petition for issuance of letters of administration must be filed
by an interested person. An interested party is one who would RULE
be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a Special Administrator
claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be
material and direct.
!
FULE VS. COURT OF APPEALS
! Salayog, Benny Rico
The petition for the issuance is a suit for the settlement of the !!
intestate estate of Ismael Tayag. The right of respondent to
maintain such a suit is dependent on whether she is entitled to FACTS:
successional rights as an illegitimate child which may be - Amado Garcia died - left property in Calamba, Laguna.
established through voluntary or compulsory recognition. - Virginia Garcia Fule (illeg sis) àpet for letters of admin & ex parte
! appointment as special administratix in CFI Laguna
- Motion was granted.
Petitioner’s ground is essentially based on her contention that
- Preciosa Garcia (wife) and in behalf of their child - opposed
by Ismael's death, respondent can no longer establish her - failure to satisfy jurisdictional requirement & improper
filiation. However, petitioner overlooked the fact that venue (avers no domicile/residence of deceased as
respondent's successional rights may be established not just by required by Rule 79 Sec. 21) - death certs presented by Fule
judicial action to compel recognition but also by proof that she show QC as deceased’s last residence
had been voluntarily acknowledged. - Fule was a creditor of the estate, and as a mere illegitimate
! sister of the deceased is not entitled to succeeding
Respondent was yet to show her proof of filiation because of from him2
petitioner's opposition. So, there is no way yet to determine if - CFI - denied opposition
her petition is actually one to compel recognition or whether she - CA reversed and annulled the appointment of Fule
- Preciosa became special administratrix upon a bond of P30k.
has a material and direct interest to maintain the suit. So, the
allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child suffices even !
ISSUES/HELD
without stating that she has been recognized or acknowledged.
! a) Venue v. Jurisdiction
➢ JURISDICTION –power/authority of court over subject matter
This petition by petitioner is DENIED.
!! o Jurisdiction over all probate cases is w/ CFIs independently
from the place of residence of the deceased (Judiciary act 1948)

! o Not changed by procedure

1Rule 79 Sec 2 - petition should show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts such as death, name, last residence, existence,
situs of assets, intestacy, right of person who seeks administration as next of kin, creditor or otherwise to be appointed

2NCC Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestado from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child.

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 4

! 8
 o
There are cases though that if such power is not exercised - Popular sense –the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
conformably w/ procedure, court loses power to exercise it person, actual residence or place of abode
legally. However, this doesn’t amount to loss of jurisdiction - No particular length of time required but must be more than
over subject matter but only over the person or that judgment temporary
may be rendered defective for lack of something essential to ➢ legal residence or domicile –requires bodily presence and an
sustain it. intention to make it one’s domicile.
➢ VENUE –place where each case shall be brought
o Because there are many CFIs, ROC fixed the venue (of
!!
settlement of estates, probate of will & issuance of letters of DISPOSITION: Fule’s petition DENIED.

▪
admin) - place of residence of deceased / province
Death Certificate àdeceased resided in QC at the time of
his death, therefore the venue of Laguna was improper
(death cert admissible to prove residence of deaceased at
time of his death)
o Rule 73 Sec 13 - really a matter of venue
▪ Clause “so far….”
▪ Caption “Settlement of estate of Deceased Person. Venue
and Processes
▪ Contained in a law of procedure - merely a matter of
method & convenience to parties
o Rule 4 Sec 4 - Venue is subject to waiver
▪ but Preciosa did not waive it, merely requested for
alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse
!
b) What does the word “resides”in Rule 73 Sec 1 mean
➢ Resides –“actual residence”
- Requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place
- In statutes fixing venue “residence”&“domicile”synonymous
àeven when statue uses “domicile”, it is still construed as
residence & not domicile in its technical sense
- Elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed.
!
DE GUZMAN VS. GUADIZ
Sumaway, Dylan
!
FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, Branch V, Gapan, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 865
for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by one Catalina
Bajacan instituting the herein petitioner as sole and universal heir and
naming him as executor.
The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss and/or opposition
contending, among others, that all the real properties of Catalina Bajacan
are now owned by them by virtue of a Deed of Donation Intervivos
executed on June 19, 1972 by Arcadia Bajacan and Catalina Bajacan in
their favor; that on September 30, 1977, the respondent judge resolved to
defer resolution on the said motion to dismiss until the parties shall have
presented their evidence; that a motion for the appointment of a special
administrator was filed by the petitioner on September 23, 1977 alleging
that the unresolved motion to dismiss would necessarily delay the
probate of the will and the appointment of an executor.
The respondent judge issued an order denying the motion for
appointment of a special administrator.
ISSUE: whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order

3RULE 73 Sec.1. if the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled at the CFI in the province in which he resides at the time of his death. And if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFI of any province in which he had estate.
The court 1st taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings, except
in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 4

! 9
d denying petitioner's motion for the appointment of a special
administrator
RULING: Rule 80, Sec. 1, of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1 — Appointment of Special Administrator — When there is delay
in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause
including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the
court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge
of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are
decided and executors or administrators appointed.
Under the above rule, the probate court may appoint a special
administrator should there be a delay in granting letters testamentary or
of administration occasioned by any cause including an appeal from the
allowance or disallowance of a will. Subject to this qualification, the
appointment of a special administrator lies in the discretion of the Court.
This discretion, however, must be sound, that is, not whimsical, or
Contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.
The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad
enough to include any cause or reason for the delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration as where a contest as to the will is
being carried on in the same or in another court, or where there is an
appeal pending as to the proceeding on the removal of an executor or
administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot agree among
themselves. Likewise, when from any cause general administration
cannot be immediately granted, a special administrator may be
appointed to collect and preserve the property of the deceased.
The facts justifying the appointment of a special administrator are:
(1) Delay in the hearing of the petition for the probate of the win.
(2) The basis of the private respondents' claim to the estate of Catalina
Bajacan and opposition to the probate of the will is a deed of donation
dated June 19, 1972 allegedly executed by the deceased Catalina Bajacan
and her late sister Arcadia Bajacan in their favor.
There is an immediate need to file an action for the annulment of such
deed of donation in behalf of the estate. Precisely, the petitioner filed
Civil Case No. 1080 in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija Branch
V, against the herein private respondents.
Upon the filing of this petition, the respondent judge, on motion of the
private respondents, postponed the hearing of the probate of the will
which was then scheduled on August 23, 1978 to September 20, 1978.
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 5
The reasons for the appointment of a special administrator are:
The reason for the practice of appointing a special administrator rests in
the fact that estates of decedents frequently become involved in
protracted litigation, thereby being exposed to great waste and losses if
there is no authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the assets
in the interim. The occasion for such an appointment usually arises
where, for some cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof
of the will, regular administration is .delayed. No temporary
administration can be granted where there is an executor in being
capable of acting, however.
Principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is to
preserve estate until it can pass into hands of person fully authorized to
administer it for benefit of creditors and heirs.
It appears that the estate the properties registered under the Torrens
system in the name of the deceased Catalina Bajacan consisting of eighty
(80) hectares of first class agricultural land. It is claimed that these 80
hectares produce P50,000.00 worth of palay each harvest twice a year.
Obviously there is an immediate need for a special administrator to
protect the interests of the estate as regards the products.
All the facts which warrant the appointment of a special administrator in
accordance with Rule 80, Sec. 1 of the Revised Rules of Court are present
in the case at bar.
!
RELUCIO VS SAN JOSE
Sumaway, Dylan
!
FACTS: Petitioner, Julita Relucio, was appointed administratrix of the
testate estate of Felipe Relucio, Sr., Upon petition filed on June 27, 1950
by Lorenzo, Rolando and Leticia Relucio, to which the petitioner filed an
opposition, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order on
January 15, 1951, appointing Rolando Relucio as administrator in
substitution of the petitioner.
Before the appeal could be perfected, Rolando Relucio moved for the
immediate execution of the order appointing him as administrator.
The court merely made reference to the letters of administration issued
in favor of Rolando Relucio and did not pass on the motion for
immediate execution.
! 0
Rolando Relucio filed a motion praying that the petitioner be declared in
contempt of court for failing to deliver to him, after demand, all papers,
documents, titles and properties of the estate under her administration.
In the order dated April 10, 1951, the Court of First Instance of Manila
denied this motion for contempt and appointed the Equitable Banking
Corporation as special administrator pending the appeal of the petitioner
from the order of January 15, 1951.
RULING: From the very position taken by the respondent Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, it is plain that the motion for
immediate execution of the order of January 15, 1951, was in effect
denied, with the result that the petitioner must be deemed as having the
right to continue as administratrix until her appeal is finally disposed of.
It is noteworthy that the petitioner was named in the will of Felipe
Relucio, Sr., (already duly probated) not only as administratrix but as
executrix, and her substitution by Rolando Relucio in virtue of the
appealed order of January 15, 1951 is not for any cause, but is based
solely on the circumstance that Rolando Relucio is an heir
The cases in which a special administrator may be appointed are
specified in section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court which provides as
follows: "When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will, or from any other cause, the court may appoint a
special administrator to collect and take charge of the estate of the
deceased and executors or administrators thereupon appointed." A
special administrator may also be appointed in a case covered by section
8 of Rule 87 which provides as follows: "If the executor or administrator
has a claim against the estate he represents, he shall give notice thereof,
in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special
administrator who shall, in the adjustment of such claim, have the same
power and be subject to the same liability as the general administrator or
executor in the settlement of other claims. The court may order the
executor or administrator to pay to the special administrator necessary
funds to defend such claim."
There is no pretense that the case at bar is one falling under either section
1 of Rule 81 or section 8 of Rule 87. In any view of the case, there is a
regular administrator. Pending her appeal from the order of January 15,
1951, the petitioner had the right to act as administratrix. 
! and issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of a decedent for the
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 5
DE GUZMAN VS ANGELES
Tomarong, Marian
FACTS:
On May 5, 1987 Private Respondent Elaine de Guzman filed a petition
for the settlement of the intestate estate of Manolito de Guzman before
RTC of Makati City. The petition alleges among others that petitioner as
the surviving spouse of the decedent is most qualified and entitled to the
grant of letters of administration. On May 22, 1987, PR filed a motion for
writ of possession over 5 vehicles registered under the name of the said
deceased person, alleges to be conjugal properties of the de Guzmans
and in order to preserve the assets of her late husband, but which are at
present in the possession of PR’s father-in-law, herein Petitioner Pedro
de Guzman.
On May 28, 1987, PR filed her “ex-parte motion to appoint petitioner as
Special Administratix of the estate of Manolito de Guzman”. Hearing
was set on June 5, 1987, however, no notice was given to petitioner. In the
order dated June 5, 1987, the RTC granted the PR’s motion to be
appointed as special administratix. The RTC issued another order dated
June 8, 1987, granting the Urgent ex-parte Motion for assistance filed by
PR for appointment of two deputy sheriffs with some military/
policemen to assist her in preserving the estate of her late husband.
Petitioner resisted on taking the subject vehicles on the ground that they
were his personal properties. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition to
annul the RTC’s orders dated June 5 and June 8, 1987. He alleges that the
appointment of a special administrator constitutes an abuse of discretion
for having been made without giving petitioner an opportunity to
oppose said appointment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate court may appoint a special administratix
! 1
preservation of the estate of the said deceased person even before the On January 25, 1989, Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo Almoradie,
probate court causes notice be served upon all interested parties died in Malabon City leaving behind a sizable inheritance consisting
mostly of real estate and shares of stock. A month after her death,
HELD: Crisanta’s mother commenced an intestate proceedings before RTC of
Malabon City docketed as Spc. Proc. No. 192-MN. She prayed among
No. In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent court
others that the letters of administration be issued to her son, Mariano
acquired jurisdiction over the proceedings upon the filing of a petition
Yanga, brother of Crisanta. RTC appointed Lorenzo as administrator.
for the settlement of an intestate estate by the private respondent. Verily,
However, the marriage between Lorenzo and Crisanta was declared void
notice through publication of the petition for the settlement of the estate
for being bigamous. Then, RTC removed Lorenzo as administrator and
of a deceased person is jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court
appointed Mariano.
orders affecting other persons, subsequent to the petition void and
subject to annulment. In the instant case, no notice as mandated by On October 16, 1989, Belinda Dahlia Castillo filed a motion for
section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court was caused to be given intervention, claiming that she is the only legitimate child of Lorenzo
by the probate court before it acted on the motions of the private and Crisanta but on June 2, 1990 Belinda Castillo died. On November 3,
respondent to be appointed as special administratrix, to issue a writ of 1989, Roberto Y. Gabriel filed before RTC a petition for probate of an
possession of alleged properties of the deceased person in the widow's alleged will and for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favour. He
favor, and to grant her motion for assistance to preserve the estate of alleged that he discovered his mother’s will on Oct. 25, 1989 in which he
Manolito de Guzman. was instituted as the sole heir and designated as alternate executor for
the named executor therein, Francisco Yanga, brother of Crisanta, who
A special administrator has been defined as the "representative of
had predeceased the latter. The RTC of Malabon City dismissed the
decedent appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve his
intestate proceedings of Spec. Proc. No. 192-MN. The probate court
estate until an executor or general administrator is appointed." The
appointed Roberto Y. Gabriel as special administrator of his mother’s
petitioner as creditor of the estate has a similar interest in the
estate. However, on April 16, 2001, Roberto died. His widow Dolores
preservation of the estate as the private respondent who happens to be
filed a Manifestation and Motion where she informed the probate court
the widow of deceased Manolito de Guzman. Hence, the necessity of
about her husband’s death and prayed that she be admitted as substitute
notice as mandated by the Rules of Court. It is not clear from the records
in place of her late husband and be appointed as administratix as well.
exactly what emergency would have ensued if the appointment of an
Heirs of Belinda opposed to it contended that she was not Crisanta’s
administrator was deferred at least until the most interested parties were
next of kin. RTC appointed Dolores as special administratix. The Heirs of
given notice of the proposed action. No unavoidable delay in the
Belinda moved to reconsider but it was denied by the probate court. CA
appointment of a regular administrator is apparent from the records.
affirmed the decision of the lower court.
!
HEIRS OF CASTILLO VS. GABRIEL ISSUE:
Tomarong, Marian
!
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 5
! 2
Whether the appointment of Dolores as special administratix by probate
court is proper
HELD:
Yes. The Court has repeatedly held that the appointment of a special
administrator lies in the sound discretion of the probate court. A special
administrator is a representative of a decedent, appointed by the probate
court to care for and preserve his estate until an executor or general
administrator is appointed. When appointed, a special administrator is
regarded not as a representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the
appointment, but as the administrator in charge of the estate, and, in fact,
as an officer of the court. As such officer, he is subject to the supervision
and control of the probate court and is expected to work for the best
interests of the entire estate, especially its smooth administration and
earliest settlement. The principal object of appointment of temporary
administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into hands of
person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and
heirs. In many instances, the appointment of administrators for the
estates of decedents frequently become involved in protracted litigations,
thereby exposing such estates to great waste and losses unless an
authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the assets in the
interim is appointed. The occasion for such an appointment, likewise,
arises where, for some cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning the
proof of the will, regular administration is delayed. The new Rules have
broadened the basis for the appointment of an administrator, and such
appointment is allowed when there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or administration by any cause, e.g. , parties cannot agree
among themselves. It needs to be emphasized that in the appointment of
a special administrator (which is but temporary and subsists only until a
regular administrator is appointed), the probate court does not
determine the shares in the decedents estate, but merely appoints who is
entitled to administer the estate. The issue of heirship is one to be
determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on
the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of
distribution. Thus, the preference of respondent is sound, that is, not
whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle. The
petitioners strenuous invocation of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 5
Court is misplaced. The rule refers to the appointment of regular
administrators of estates; Section 1, Rule 80, on the other hand, applies to
the appointment of a special administrator. It has long been settled that
the appointment of special administrators is not governed by the rules
regarding the appointment of regular administrators
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
CORONA VS COURT OF APPEALS
Tresvalles, Kris
!
FACTS:
On November 10, 1980, Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New York,
U.S.A., leaving two Wills: one, a holographic Will dated October 3, 1980,
which excluded her husband, respondent Romarico G. Vitug, as one of
her heirs, and the other, a formal Will sworn to on October 24, 1980, or
about three weeks thereafter, which expressly disinherited her husband
Romarico "for reason of his improper and immoral conduct amounting
to concubinage, which is a ground for legal separation under Philippine
Law"; bequeathed her properties in equal shares to her sisters Exaltacion
L. Allarde, Vicenta L. Faustino and Gloria L. Teoxon, and her nieces
Rowena F. Corona and Jennifer F. Way; and appointed Rowena F.
Corona, herein petitioner, as her Executrix. On November 21, 1980,
Rowena filed a petition for the probate of the Wills before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal and for the appointment of Nenita Alonte as
Administrator because she (Rowena) is presently employed in the
United Nations in New York City. The probate Court appointed Alonte
as Special Administratix. On On December 12, 1980, the surviving
! 3
husband, Romarico Vitug, filed an "Opposition and Motion" and prayed
that the Petition for Probate be denied and prayed for his appointment as
Special Administrator because the Special Administratix appointed is not
related to the heirs and has no interest to be protected. On December 18,
1980, Nenita P. Alonte posted her Php100,000 bond and took her oath of
office before a Notary Public. On February 6, 1981, the Probate Court set
aside its Order of December 2, 1980 appointingNenita as Special
Administratrix, and appointed instead the surviving husband, Romarico
as Special Administrator for the reasons that under Section 6, Rule 78, of
the Rules of Court, the surviving spouse is first in the order of preference
for appointment as Administrator as he has an interest in the estate; that
the disinheritance of the surviving spouse is not among the grounds of
disqualification for appointment as Administrator; that the next of kin is
appointed only where the surviving spouse is not competent or is
unwilling to serve besides the fact that the Executrix appointed, is not
the next of kin but merely a niece, and that the decedent's estate is
nothing more than half of the unliquidated conjugal partnership
property.
ISSUE:
Whether the Appellate Court erred in upholding the appointment of the
surviving husband as special administrator
HELD:
This Court, in resolving to give due course to the Petition taking into
account the allegations, arguments and issues raised by the parties, is of
the considered opinion that petitioner's nominee, Nenita F. Alonte,
should be appointed as co-Special Administrator. The executrix's choice
of Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the
wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her Will, is
entitled to the highest consideration. Objections to Nenita's appointment
on grounds of impracticality and lack of kinship are over-shadowed by
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 5
the fact that justice and equity demand that the side of the deceased wife
and the faction of the surviving husband be represented in the
management of the decedent's estate.
En passant, it is apropos to remind the Special Administrators that while
they may have respective interests to protect, they are officers of the
Court subject to the supervision and control of the Probate Court and are
expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, its smooth
administration, and its earliest settlement.
!!
!
MATIAS VS GONZALES
Tresvalles, Kris
!
FACTS:
On May 15, 1952, Aurea Matias initiated said special proceedings with a
petition for the probate of a document purporting to be the last will and
testament of her aunt, Gabina Raquel, who died single on May 8, 1952, at
the age of 92 years. The heir to the entire estate of the deceased — except
the properties bequeathed to her other niece and nephews, namely,
Victorina Salud, Santiago Salud, Policarpio Salud, Santos Matias and
Rafael Matias — is, pursuant to said instrument, Aurea Matias, likewise,
appointed therein as executrix thereof, without bond. Basilia Salud, a
first cousin of the deceased, opposed the probate of her alleged will, and,
after appropriate proceedings, the court, presided over by respondent
Judge, issued an order, sustaining said opposition and denying the
petition for probate. Subsequently, Aurea Matias brought the matter on
appeal. Meanwhile, or on February 17, 1956, Basilia Salud moved for the
dismissal of Horacio Rodriguez, as special administrator of the estate of
the deceased, and the appointment, in his stead of Ramon Plata. The
motion was set for hearing on Feb 23, 1956 but was postponed to Feb 27,
1956. Although notified of this order, Rodriguez did not appear on the
! 4
date last mentioned. Instead, he filed an urgent motion praying for
additional time within which to answer the charges preferred against
him by Basilia Salud and for another postponement of said hearing. This
motion was not granted, and Basilia Salud introduced evidence in
support of said charges, whereupon respondent Judge by an order, dated
February 27, 1956, found Rodriguez guilty of abuse of authority and
gross negligence, and, accordingly, relieved him as special administrator
of the estate of the deceased and appointed Basilia Salud as special
administratrix thereof, to "be assisted and advised by her niece, Miss
Victorina Salud," who "shall always act as aide, interpreter and adviser of
Basilia Salud." Said order, likewise, provided that "Basilia Salud shall be
helped by Mr. Ramon Plata . . . who is hereby appointed as co-
administrator."
! and that Ramon and Victorina were authorized to collect the rents and
Aurea asked that said order be set aside and that she be appointed
special co-administratix with Horacio on the ground that Basilia is over
80 years of age, totally blind and physically incapacitated to perform the
duties of said office and the said movant is the universal heiress of the
deceased and the person appointed by the latter as executrix of her
alleged will. This motion was denied and maintained the appointment of
the three. However, on March 17, 1956, Basilia Salud tendered her
resignation as special administratix by reason of physical disability, due
to old age and recommended the appointment of victorina Salud.
Shortly afterwards, or on June 18, 1956, respondents Ramon Plata and
Victorina Salud requested authority to collect the rents due, or which
may be due, to the estate of the deceased and to collect all the produce of
her lands, which was granted on June 23, 1956. On June 27, 1956, said
respondents filed another motion praying for permission to sell the palay
of the deceased then deposited in different rice mills in the province of
Cavite, which respondent judge granted on June 10, 1956. Later on, or on
July 10, 1956, petitioner instituted the present action against Judge
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 5
Gonzales, and Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata, for the purpose of
annulling the above mentioned orders of respondent Judge, upon the
ground that the same had been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner argued that she should have preference in the choice of special
administratix of the estate of the decedent being the universal heiress to
said estate and the executrix appointed in the alleged will of the
deceased, that until its final disallowance — which has not, as yet, taken
place she has a special interest in said estate, which must be protected by
giving representation thereto in the management of said estate; that,
apart from denying her any such representation, the management was
given to persons partial to her main opponent. That the Rules of Court
do not permit the appointment of more than one special administrator
sell the palay without previous notice to petitioner.
Respondents maintain that respondent Judge acted with the scope of his
jurisdiction and without any abuse of discretion; that petitioner can not
validly claim any special interest in the estate of the deceased, because
the probate of the alleged will and testament of the latter — upon which
petitioner relies — has been denied; that Horacio Rodriguez was duly
notified of the proceedings for his removal; and that Victorina Salud and
Ramon Plata have not done anything that would warrant their removal.
ISSUE: whether the judge committed grave abuse of discretion for not
appointing the named executrix and the propriety of appointing more
than one administratix
HELD:
Although Horacio Rodriguez had notice of the hearing of the motion for
his removal, dated February 17, 1956, the record shows that petitioner
herein received copy of said motion of February 24, 1956, or the date
after that set for the hearing thereof. Again, notice of the order of
! 5
respondent Judge, dated February 23, 1956, postponing said hearing to
February 27, 1956, was not served on petitioner herein.
In her motion of February 17, 1956, Basilia Salud prayed for the dismissal
of Horacio Rodriguez, and the appointment of Ramon Plata, as special
administrator of said estate. Petitioner had, therefore, no notice that her
main opponent, Basilia Salud, and the latter's principal witness, Victorina
Salud, would be considered for the management of said. As a
consequence, said petitioner had no opportunity to object to the
appointment of Basilia Salud as special administratrix, and of Victorina
Salud, as her assistant and adviser, and the order of February 27, 1956, to
this effect, denied due process to said petitioner.
The rule, laid down in Roxas vs. Pecson to the effect that "only one
special administrator may be appointed to administrator temporarily"
the estate of the deceased, must be considered in the light of the facts
obtaining in said case. The lower court appointed therein one special
administrator for some properties forming part of said estate, and a
special administratrix for other properties thereof. Thus, there were two
(2) separate and independent special administrators. In the case at bar
there is only one (1) special administration, the powers of which shall be
exercised jointly by two special co-administrators. Moreover, there are
authorities in support of the power of courts to appoint several special
co-administrators.
!!
ROXAS VS. PECSON
Tuason, Jannelle
!
FACTS:
Pablo M. Roxas died leaving properties in Bulacan. The petitioner,
widow of the deceased, filed a petition for the probate of an alleged will
of her deceased husband and for her appointment as executrix of his
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 5
estate designated in said will. Petitioner was appointed as special
administratrix and qualified as such over the objection of the
respondents who sought the appointment of Maria, sister of the
deceased. Upon petition by the respondents, the respondent judge
rendered his resolution appointing the petitioner as special
administratrix only of all the conjugal properties of the deceased, and
Maria Roxas as special administratrix of all capital or properties
belonging exclusively to the deceased Pablo M. Roxas.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge acted in excess of the court's
jurisdiction in appointing two special co-administratices of the estate of
the deceased.
RULING:
Yes. There is absolutely no reason for appointing two separate
administrators. As under the law, only one general administrator may be
appointed to administer, liquidate and distribute the estate of a deceased
spouse, it clearly follows that only one special administrator may be
appointed to administer temporarily said estate, because a special
administrator is but a temporary administrator who is appointed to act
in lieu of the general administrator. "When there is delay in granting
letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from
the allowance or disallowance of will, or from any other cause, the court
may appoint a special administrator to collect and take charge of the
estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided
and executors or administrators thereupon appointed," (sec. 1, Rule 81).
Although his powers and duties are limited to "collect and take charge of
the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and
preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards
appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as
administrator, and may sell such perishable and other property as the
! 6
court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any
debts of the deceased." (Section 2, Rule 81.)
!
DE GALA VS. GONZALES
Tuason, Janelle
FACTS:
Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de Gala, a niece of
Severina, was designated executrix. The testatrix died leaving no heirs
by force of law, and Serapia, through her counsel, presented the will for
probate. Apolinario Gonzales, a nephew of the deceased, filed an
opposition to the will on the ground that it had not been executed in
conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Serapia de Gala was appointed special administratrix of the
estate of the deceased.
On the other hand,Sinforoso, husband of the deceased, filed a motion
asking the appointment of Serapia de Gala as special administratrix be
cancelled and that he, be appointed in her stead. The motion was
opposed by both Apolinario Gonzales and by Serapia de Gala, but it was
nevertheless granted.Serapia was removed, and Sinforoso was appointed
special administrator in her place, principally on the ground that he had
possession of the property in question and that his appointment would
simplify the proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be removed as a special administratix of
the estate of the deceased
RULING:
Yes. The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the sound
discretion of the court; the function of such an administrator is only to
collect and preserve the property of the deceased and to return an
inventory thereof; he cannot be sued by a creditor and cannot pay any
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 5
debts of the deceased. The fact that no appeal can be taken from the
appointment of a special administrator indicates that both his
appointment and his removal are purely discretionary, SC cannot find
that the court below abused its discretion in the present case. In
removing Serapia de Gala and appointing the present possessor of the
property pending the final determination of the validity of the will, the
court probably prevented useless litigation.
LIWANAG, vs. REYES
Umbalin, Norissa
FACTS:
On July 14, 1960, the late Liwanag executed in favor of the
mortgagee Rotegaan Financing, Inc., a real estate mortgage on a parcel of
residential land to secure the payment of a loan. It was stipulated in the
mortgage contract that the total amount of mortgage debt shall be fully
paid on or before July 14, 1961. Before the one year period expired,
Liwanag died intestate.
As the mortgage obligation of the deceased was not fully paid,
the mortgagee, instituted a complaint for foreclosure against the Estate of
Pio D. Liwanag and Gliceria Liwanag as administratrix of the estate
before the RTC. The action also prayed for the appointment of a receiver.
Gliceria filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that she may not be
sued as special administratrix. She also filed an opposition to the prayer
for the issuance of a writ of receivership on the ground that the property
subject of the foreclosure proceedings is in custodia legis, since
administration proceedings had already been instituted for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.
ISSUES:
1. WON Gliceria Liwanag can be sued as special administratix.
! 7
 2. WON there was abuse of discretion on the part of the lower
court in the issuance of its order for the appointment of a
receiver.
HELD:
1. YES.
Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making the
special administratrix a defendant in a suit against the estate.
Otherwise, creditors would find the adverse effects of the statute
of limitations running against them in cases where the
appointment of a regular administrator is delayed. So if the court
is to deny the present action on this technical ground alone, and
the appointment of a regular administrator will be delayed, the
very purpose for which the mortgage was constituted will be
defeated.
2. NO.
It is to be noted that the contract of mortgage between
the deceased and the Rotegaan Financing, states the in case of
judicial foreclosure, the “Mortgagor hereby consents to the
appointment of the president of the mortgagee corporation or any of its
officers as receiver, without any bond, to take charge of the mortgaged
property at once, and to hold possession of the same, and the rents and
profits derived from the mortgaged property, before the sale, x x x.”
Hence, the will of the deceased himself allowed that, in case of
foreclosure, the property be put into the hands of a receiver, and
this provision should be respected by the administratrix of the
estate. The cases cited by petitioner in favor of the theory that
property in custodia legis can not be given to a receiver is not
applicable, considering that this is an action to enforce a superior
lien on certain property of the estate and the appointment of a
receiver, which is a very convenient and feasible means of
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 5
preserving and administering the property, has been agreed
upon by the contracting parties.
!!
ANDERSON VS. PERKINS
Umbali, Norissa
FACTS :
!
Special proceedings were commenced by Dora Perkins
Anderson seeking the probate of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins’ will.
Dora also filed an urgent petition for the appointment of Alfonso Ponce
Enrile as special administrator of the estate. On the same day, Alfonso
was appointed upon his posting of a P50,000 bond. Idonah Slade
Perkins, surviving spouse of Eugene, entered an opposition to the
probate of the will. Later, the special administrator Alfonso submitted an
inventory of all the assets which have come to his knowledge as
belonging to Eugene at the time of his death.
About two years later, special administrator Alfonso submitted a
petition seeking authority to sell, or give away to some charitable or
educational institution/s, some personal effects (clothes, books, gadgets,
electrical appliances, etc.) which were allegedly deteriorating both
physically and in value. The court required a specification of the
properties sought to be sold. Instead, the special administrator submitted
a copy of the inventory of the personal properties belonging to the estate
with the items sought to be sold marked with a check in red pencil.
! 8
 Idonah filed an opposition to the proposed sale. But, the lower 1.
court approved the proposed sale. Idonah moved to reconsider on the
following grounds:
1. The order in effect authorized the special administrator to
sell the entire personal estate of the deceased;
2. There was no showing that the goods sought to be sold
were perishable;
3. The goods sought to be sold represented her lifetime
savings and collections;
4. There were unauthorized withdrawals from the properties
of the estate, and the sale of the inventoried lot would
prevent identification and recovery of the articles removed;
and
2.
5. There is evidence showing Idonah’s separate rights to a
substantial part of the personal estate.
! was asked for and judicially approved, no proceeding had been
ISSUES:
1. Is the special administrator’s power to sell limited to
“perishable property.”
2. WON the lower court erred in authorizing the special
administrator to sell certain personal properties of the estate. –
YES. It was premature. RATIO
! strong opposition and objection of Idonah who may later be
! question. After all, most of the items sought to be sold can easily
HELD:
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 5
NO.
Section 2, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court, provides that the
special administrator "may sell such perishable and other
property as the court orders sold", which shows that the special
administrator's power to sell is not limited to "perishable"
property only. The function of a special administrator is only to
collect and preserve the property of the deceased until a regular
administrator is appointed. But it is not alone the specific
property of the estate which is to be preserved, but its value as
well, as shown by the legal provision for the sale by a special
administrator of perishable property. It is in line with this
general power to preserve not only the property of the estate but
also its value, that Section 2, Rule 81 also empowers such
administrator to sell "other property as the court ordered sold".
YES. It was premature.
The records show that up to the time the proposed sale
taken to segregate the alleged exclusive property of Idonah from
the mass of the estate supposedly left by Eugene or to liquidate
the conjugal partnership property of the spouses. Until the issue
of the ownership of the properties sought to be sold is heard and
decided, and the conjugal partnership liquidated or at least an
agreement be reached with Idonah as to which properties of the
conjugal partnership she would not mind being sold to preserve
their value, the proposed sale is premature. Also, there are no
reasons of extreme urgency to justify the proposed sale over the
adjudged owner of a substantial portion of the personalities in
be preserved in either or both of two residential houses (Manila
and Baguio City).
! 9
 Re: special administrator Alfonso’s claim that Idonah
should have indicated the alleged "fine furniture" which she did
not want sold and that her refusal to do so is an indication of her
unmeritorious claim – Idonah was not given a reasonable
opportunity to point out which items she did not want sold. Her
opposition and motion for reconsideration were overruled by the
lower court without reasons. The records do not even show that
an inquiry was made as to the validity of the grounds of her
opposition.
!
CO VS. ROSARIO
Uy, Charles
!
FACTS:
Upon the death of the father of herein parties, Co Bun Chun, the
RTC of Makati City appointed petitioner Luis Co as co-administrator
together with a Vicente Yu. Subsequently, petitioner nominated his son,
Alvin Co, as special co-administrator, which motion was granted by the
trial court. About four years later, numerous criminal charges have been
filed against Alvin Co, and at the basis of the same, the other heirs asked
that he be removed as special co-administrator. Said motion was granted
by the trial court. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but upon the denial of the same, he brought the matter
to the CA under Rule 65. The CA affirmed the decision, hence, this
appeal
!!
ISSUE:
! would appear, however, that respondents opposed the appointment of
! Whether or not it is proper for the trial court to dismiss the
services of Alvin Co on the basis of the criminal charges filed against him
even if he had not yet been convicted
RULING:
! ISSUE:
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 6
The Court ruled in the affirmative. As a special co-administrator,
Alvin Co may be removed by the trial court even if the grounds for his
removal are not enumerated under the rules. This is because he is a
special administrator, not a regular administrator, and special
administrators are not covered by the rules covering regular
administrators. The appointment of special administrators are left to the
sound discretion of the courts, and thus, the removal of special
administrators are also left to the sound discretion of the courts.
!
ALCASID VS SAMSON
Uy, Charles
!
FACTS:
An application for the issuance of letters of administration was
filed by herein respondents in favor of one of their numbers, herein
respondent Jesus V. Samson, in the CFI of Albay. Such application was
granted and on the same day, Jesus Samson was appointed special
administrator for the estate. Said appointment was opposed by herein
petitioner Josefina Samson, the widow of Jose Samson, the deceased,
together with her three minor children. They asked that Josefina, and not
Jesus be appointed administrator. After two years of hearing, the trial
court appointed Antonia Codia, city treasurer, petitioner, as regular
administrator. The court also ordered Jesus to turn over to Codia all
papers regarding the administration of the estate in the March 12, 1956
order. Upon motion of the widow, the April 3, 1956 Order was issued,
ordering Jesus to turn over all documents to Codia within three days. It
Codia but their motion was denied, hence, they went up to the CA who
decided in favor of herein respondents on the basis of Cotia v Pecson
where it was ruled that the appeal stayed the appointment of Codia.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed this petition before the Court
Whether or not Codia qualifies as administrator of the estate
! 0
RULING:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. At the outset, it must be
noted that the appointment of Jesus Samson was as special
administrator, while that of Codia was of a regular administrator. The
appointment of a special administrator is discretionary upon the court,
hence, the court may also remove the said special administrator,
including when a regular administrator is appointed. Section 3, Rule 81
of the Rules of Court provides that the authority of the special
administrator ends when a regular administrator is appointed. Even
assuming that Cotia v Pecson applies – which it does not because that is
the removal of a regular administrator – still, the authority of Jesus
Samson has ended because the April 3 Order is a special order as was
required by Section 2, Rule 39. It boils down to the fact that the
appointment of special administrators is up to the discretion of the court.
JUNQUERA VS. BORROMEO
Viernes , Wayne
RULE 81
Bonds of Executors and Administrators
!
COSME DE MENDOZA V. PACHECO, 64 PHIL 134 (1937)
!
FACTS:



Manuel Soriano was former administrator of the estate of Cosme. As
such administrator, he filed a bond for P5,000 with Januario Pacheco
and Raymundo Cordero as sureties. When an account was made,
Soriano was indebted to the estate. Thus, the lower court ordered the
execution of his bond.
Some time later, Soriano and the new administratrix entered into a
settlement whereby Soriano ceded certain real properties to the estate,
thereby reducing his indebtedness to P5,000. The sureties now
question the jurisdiction of the court to execute the bond.
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 6


ISSUE:



Whether or not a probate court has the power to order the execution of
an administrator's bond?
HELD:

To begin with, it lies within discretion of the court to select an
administrator of the estate of a deceased person. Before an
administrator, or an executor, enters upon the execution of his trust,
and letters testamentary or of administration are issued, the person to
whom they are issued is required to give a bond in such reasonable
sum as the court directs, with one or more sufficient sureties,
conditioned upon the faithful performance of his trust. The
administrator is accountable on his bond along with the sureties for
the performance of certain legal obligations.


It is clear that the Court of First Instance, exercising probate
jurisdiction, is empowered to require the filing of the administrator's
bond, to fix the amount thereof, and to hold it accountable for any
breach of the administrator's duty. Possessed, as it is, with an all-
embracing power over the administrator's bond and over
administration proceedings, a Court of First Instance in a probate
proceeding cannot be devoid of legal authority to execute and make
that bond answerable for the very purpose for which it was filed. It is
true that the law does not say expressly or in so many words tat such
court has power to execute the bond of an administrator, but by
necessary and logical implication, the power is there as eloquently as
if it were phrased in unequivocal term.
!
WARNER, BARNES & CO. VS. LUZON SURETY CO, INC.
Vizcarra, William
!
FACTS:
Warner, Barnes and Co., Ltd.(WBC), filed a complaint against
Luzon Surety Co., Inc.(LSC), of the recovery of the sum of P6,000. The
basis of the complaint was a bond in the sum of P6,000 filed by Agueda
Gonzaga as administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Agueda Gonzaga in
! 1
Special Proceedings No. 452, the condition being that said bond would
be void if the administratrix "faithfully prepares and presents to the
Court a correct inventory of all the property of the deceased which may
have come into his possession or into the possession of any other person
representing him according to law, if he administers all the property of
the deceased which at any time comes into his possession or into the
possession of any other person representing him; faithfully pays all
debts, legacies, and bequests which encumber said estate, pays whatever
dividends which the Court may decide should be paid, and renders a
just and true account of his administrations to the Court within a year or
at any other date that he may required so to do, and faithfully executes
all orders and decrees of said court."
! Under the second assignment of error, LSC claims that there are genuine
It was alleged in the complaint that WBC had a duly approved claim
against the Estate of Aguedo Gonzaga in the sum of P6,485.02, plus 2 per
cent annual interest; that the administratrix violated the conditions of her
bond "(a) by failing to file an inventory of the assets and funds of the
estate that had come into her hands; (b) by failing to pay or discharge the
approved claim of the plaintiff; (c) by failing to render a true and just
account of her administration in general, and of the said war damage
payments in particular."; that the defendant, as surety in the bond, failed
to pay to the plaintiff, notwithstanding the latter's demand.
! inventory, to pay the plaintiff's claim, and to render a true and just
The LSC filed an answer setting up the special defenses that the
complaint did not state a cause of action.
! !
On January 6, 1953, the WBC filed a motion for summary judgment,
alleging that "the special defenses relied upon by the LSC in her Answer
raise only questions of law, and the WBC believes that LSC cannot
produce counter-affidavits that would raise any 'genuine issues as to any
material facts.'
The CFI rendered a summary judgment sentencing LSC to pay WBC the
sum of P6,000. From this judgment the defendant appealed.
!
RULING:
Under the first assignment of error, LSC contends that the lower
court had no jurisdiction to pass upon its liability under the bond in
question, because it is only the probate court that can hold a surety
accountable for any breach by the administratrix of her duty, citing the
case of Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil., 134. It is, however, noteworthy that
while the citation is to the effect that the probate court has jurisdiction
over the forefeiture or enforcement of an administrator's bond, it was not
held therein that the same matter may not be litigated in an ordinary
civil action brought before the court of first instance.
!
controversies between the parties litigant, and that, contrary to the
allegations of the complaint, the administratrix made a return to the
court of the war damage payments she received; the administratrix
cannot be charged with having failed to pay plaintiff's claim because
there is no showing that she was ever authorized to pay approved
claims; the administratrix may be presumed to have rendered an
accounting of her administration, likely in 1948, in accordance with
section 8 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. In answer, it is sufficient to
state that the allegations that the administratrix failed to file an
account of her administration, are factual and remained uncontroverted
by counter-affidavits which the appellant could have easily filed.
Under the third and fourth assignments of error, it is insisted for LSC
that the bond in question was executed in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines and that the proper procedure would seem to be that it
might be enforced in the administration proceedings were it was filed.
This view is likewise not tenable. Though nominally payable to the
Republic of the Philippines, the bond is expressly for the benefit of the
heirs, legatees and creditors of the Estate of the deceased Aguedo

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 6

! 2
Gonzaga. There is no valid reason why a creditor may not directly in his the premiums and the documentary stamps. In 1957, the Court approved
name enforce said bond in so far as he is concerned. the project of partition, while in 1962, Luzon Surety demanded payments
! of premiums from 1955 onwards. It was also in the same year when the
court granted the motion of the defendants to have both bonds cancelled.
Under the fifth assignment of error, it is alleged that the WBC should
Hence, plaintiff files a case in the CFI. The court (CFI) allowed the
have first filed a claim against the Estate of the deceased administratrix plaintiff to recover since the bonds were in force and effect from the
Agueda Gonzaga, in conformity with section 6 of Rule 87 of the Rules of filing until 1962. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme
Court providing that "Where the obligation of the decedent is joint and Court on questions of law.
several with another debtor, the claim shall be filed against the decedent
as if he were the only debtor, without prejudice to the right of the estate ISSUE:
to recover contribution from the other debtor." Apart from the fact that Are the bonds still in force and effect from 1955 to 1962
his defense was not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer and was therefore waived (section 10, Rule 9 of the Rules of RULING
Court), it appears that even as late as September 17, 1952, when the
YES. Under Rule 81 (Sec.1) of the Rules of Court, the
present complaint was filed, (more than two years after the death of administrator is required to put up a bond for the purpose of
Agueda Gonzaga), there were no proceedings for the administration of indemnifying creditors, heirs, legatees and the estate. It is conditioned
her estate, with the result that section 6 of Rule 87 loses its applicability. upon the faithful performance of the administrator's trust. Hence, the
Moreover, it is to be noted that the LSC had also chosen to file a third- surety is then liable under the administrator's bond.
party complaint in the present case against Romualdo Araneta, joint and
Even after the approved project of partition, Quebrar as administrator
several counter-guarantor of the deceased administratrix, instead of
still had something to do. The administration is for the purpose of
presenting a claim against the latter's estate.
! liquidation of the estate and the distribution of the residue among the
heirs and legatees. Liquidation means the determination of all the assets
Wherefore, it being understood that the defendant-appellant is sentenced of the estate and the payment of all debts and expenses. It appears that
to pay to the plaintiff-appellee only the sum of P6,000, plus the cost, the there are still debts and expenses to be paid after 1957.
same is hereby affirmed.
! Moreover, the bond stipulation did not provide that it will terminate at
the end of the 1st year if the premium remains unpaid. Hence, it does not
LUZON SURETY CO., INC. VS. QUEBAR
necessarily extinguish or terminate the effectivity of the counter bond in
Vizcarra, William
! the absence of an express stipulation to this effect. As such, as long as the
defendant remains the administrator of the estate, the bond will be held
FACTS
liable and the plaintiff's liabilities subsist being the co-extensive with the
Luzon Surety issued two administrator's bond in behalf of defendant
administrator.
Quebrar  as administrator of 2 estates (Chinsuy and Lipa). The plaintiff
and both Quebrar and Kilayko bound themselves solidarily after
executing an indemnity agreement where both the defendants agreed to
pay the premiums every year. In the years 1954-55, the defendants paid RULE 82
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 6
! 3
 Revocation of Administration, Death, Resignation and
Removal of Administrator or Executor
!
BORROMEO VS BORROMEO
Yatco, Nathaniel
FACTS:
Dr. MaximoBorromeo died testate designating Borromeo
Brothers Estate, Inc. as sole heir. His brother CanutoBorromeo acted as
executor of the said will. The said corporation is owned by the testator
and his brothers and sisters. Proceedings have been instituted. The
widow, Johanna Hofer Borromeo filed an Urgent Motion to remove the
executordue to negligence in the performance of duties and unfitness to
continue as executor. While the action was still pending,
CanutoBorromeo withdrew his joint bank account with the decedent and
deposited it on his and his other brother Exequiel’s joint account without
authority from the Court. In time the petition was heard and the judge
relieved Canuto as executor for some reasons including that of the
unauthorized withdrawal of the decedent’s joint account with the
executor.Canuto appealed. Canuto claims that they were joint owners of
such account and either of them (decedent or Canuto) has right over it.
ISSUE: WON a conflict of interest arose in such withdrawal made by
Canuto which is a ground for removal as executor of the estate.
RULING:
Yes.It was found by the SC that the money taken from the joint
account in the Bank was done by Canuto with representation as executor
of the estate of deceased Dr.Maximo. There was bad faith in the
concealment of property belonging to the decedent’s estate. Canuto
should have deposited the P23, 930.39 on the estate andnot at his
disposal. It then constituted as hiding such property from the widow and
he, as executor of the estate, bypassed judicial adjudication of the said
property.Conflict between the interest of the executor and the interest of
the deceased is ground for removal or resignation of the former, who has
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 6
thereby become unsuitable to discharge the trust. According to Rule 82,
sec 2, if an executor neglects to settle his account and settle the estate
according to law, the court may remove him or, in its discretion permit
him to resign.
!
OCAMPO VS OCAMPO
Yatco, Nathaniel
!
FACTS:
Vicente and Maxima Ocampo died intestate leaving 3 children
namely Leonardo, Renato and Erlinda. The 3 siblings divided the profits
of the decedents’ estate among themselves. Subsequently, Leonardo died
leaving his surviving spouse Dalisay and 3 children namely Vince,
Merlinda and Leonardo, Jr. When Leonardo died, Renato and Erlinda
took over to the exclusion of the widowed wife Dalisay.Dalisay and her 3
children filed a petition for intestate proceedings of the estate of Vicente,
Maxima and her deceased husband Leonardo. It seeks to settle the estate
and appoint an administrator to divide such as they were not receiving
any profit anymore. Respondents Renato and Erlinda countered assailing
the petition defective as it sought two estates in one proceeding (Estate
of Vicente and Maxima; and Leonardo’s estate.)There was a motion to
appoint Renato and Erlinda as administrators but was countered by
Dalisay as it would cause further injustice and nominated Binan Rural
Bank as administrator. Trial Court accepted that respondent Renato and
petitioner Dalisay be appointed as joint administrators. Petitioner
Dalisay was revoked of her appointment as her nomination of Binan
Rural bank constituted a waiver and the court found that she is unfit to
such office.Renato and Erlinda, as special administrators, was ordered by
the court to produce a true inventory of the estate. RTC later on revoked
the appointment of Renato and Erlinda for failure to comply with the
order and failure to pay the bond as prescribed by the rules and that
there was an alleged sale made by them involving a real property
belonging to the estate. Renato and Erlinda (Respondents herein)
appealed to the CA and CA ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in appointing Melinda (daughter of Dalisay) as a regular
administrator.
! 4
ISSUE:
WON the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion on the
revocation of the respondents as special administrators and appointment
of Merlinda (daughter of Dalisay) as regular administratrix.
RULING”
The court finds no abuse of discretion on the revocation but
finds it improper for Merlinda to be a “regular” administratrix. The
probate court may at its discretion appoint or remove special
administrators toher than the groundsenumerated in the Rules. The
respondents were not able to comply with the payment of the bond
which is required in Rule 81 and also, there was evident bad faith on the
part of the respondents as administrators when an alleged sale of the
property included in the estate was done thru a conditional deed of sale.
As a result of such transaction, it deprived the estate of profits accruing
from the said real property (monthly rentals.) Such reason of the
probate court being grounded on equity, justice and legal principles. As
to the appointment of Merlinda, it must be as a “special” administrator
and not a “regular” administrator. Rule 78 determines the persons to be
appointed as regular administrators. She is neither an heir or a creditor
to the estate. However, the SC held her as a special administratrix due to
her competency in filing the bond and true inventory of the estate as
soon as the RTC appointed her of such responsibility. Such acts clearly
manifested her intention to serve willingly. Pending the proceeding for
regular administration, Merlinda is designated as special administratrix
of the estate.
RULE 83
Inventory and Appraisal . Provision for Support of Family
! asked the Cebu CFI to order petitioners to deliver the salt to him. The
! Cebu CFI granted the same.
SEBIAL VS. SEBIAL
Alvarez, Miguel Lorenzo
!
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 6
GARCIA VS. GARCIA
Arcilla, Jay
!
CUIZON VS. RAMOLETE
Azarcon, Pia Lea
!
FACTS:
As early as 1961, Marciano Cuizon applied for the registration of
several parcels of land in Mandaue City docketed as L.R. Case No.
N-179. In 1970, he distributed his property between his two daughters,
Rufina and Irene, to whom the salt beds subject of the controversy was
given. In 1971, Irene executed a Deed of Sale with Reservation of
Usufruct involving the said salt beds in favor of petitioners Franciso et
al. Although the decision in L.R. Case No. N-179 was rendered way back
in 1972, the decree of registration and the corresponding O.C.T. was
issued only in 1976 in the name of Marciano Cuizon. In that same year,
T.C.T No. 10477 covering the property in question was issued to Irene.
The latter died in 1978. During the extrajudicial settlement of the estate,
Rufina, the mother of Francisco et al., adjudicated to herself all the
property of Irene including the salt beds in question. She then executed a
deed of Confirmation of Sale wherein she confirmed and ratified the
1971 deed of sale and renounced and waived whatever rights and
interests and participation she may have in the property in question in
favor of the petitioners. The deed was annotated in T.C.T. No. 10477.
Subsequently, T.C.T. No. 12665 was issued in favor of the petitioners. In
1978, Domingo Antigua, who allegedly was chosen by the heirs of Irene
to act as administrator, was appointed administrator by the CFI of Cebu.
Antigua included the salt bed in the inventory of Irene’s estate and
ISSUE:
! 5
 Whether a court handling the intestate proceedings has
jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a TCT issued in
favor owners who are not parties to the intestate proceedings if the said
parcels of have been?
RULING:
No. It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge
of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which
are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All said court could do
is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there
is dispute, then the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort
to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
title because the probate court cannot do so. In the instant case, the
property involved is not only claimed by outside parties but it was sold
seven years before the death of the decedent and is duly titled in the
name of the vendees who are not party to the proceedings. In Bolisay vs.
Alcid, the Court held that “if a property covered by Torrens Title is
involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given
due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the
contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the
property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an
appropriate ordinary action.” Having been apprised of the fact that the
property in question was covered by a TCT issued in the name of third
parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the
respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from
the inventory of the property of the estate.
! pertaining to himself and DionisiaOlarte.
! !
!
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 6
!
GUINGUING VS. ABUTON
Balanay, Rendel Bryan
!
FACTS:
Ignacio Abuton died, testamentary, leaving two sets of children
by two different wives. First from DionisiaOlarte whom he had 12
children and 3 already died. Second from, Teodora Guinguing whom he
had 4 children, all still living. Upon allowance of the will, Gabriel
Binaoro was appointed as administrator. Binaoro submitted the
inventory to the court but he included only the lands which the testator
had devised to the children of the second marriage, omitting other lands
possessed by him at the time of his death and which were claimed by the
children of the first marriage as having been derived from their mother.
!
This prompted Teodora Guinguing to file a motion, asking that
the administrator be required to amend his inventory and to include
therein all property pertaining to the conjugal partnership of Ignacio
Abuton and DionisiaOlarte, including property actually in the hands of
his children by her which (the motion alleged) had been delivered to her
four minor children as an advancement. The purpose of the motion was
to force the first set of children to bring into collation the properties that
had been received by them, in conformity with article 1035 of the Civil
Code; and the motion was based partly on the supposition that Ignacio
Abuton had never in fact effected a liquidation of the conjugal property
! 6
 This motion was formally opposed by two of the children of the obligation to collate may be determined in the course of the
first marriage, namely, Agapito and CalixtoAbuton y Olarte. administration proceedings.

! Among the properties remaining in possession of Ignacio

The trial judge found that after the death of the first wife the
testator had acquired no property after the first marriage and the testator
liquidated the ganacial estate and had divided among the first set of
children all of the property that pertained to the first wife in the division,
with the exception of the home-place in the  poblacion, in which the
testator had continued to reside till death. The share pertaining to the
testator in said division was, so the court found, retained in his own
hands; and this property constituted the proper subject matter of the
present administration proceedings.
Abuton at the time of his death was a piece of land covered by a
composition title No. 11658, issued in 1894 in the name of DionisiaOlarte.
At the same time that this title was issued, AgapitoAbuton procured two
other titles, Nos. 11651 and 11654, covering adjacent properties to be
issued in his own name. From the circumstance that title No. 11658 was
issued in the name of DionisiaOlarte the opponents, theAbutons , appear
to believe that this land was her particular property and should now vest
exclusively in her heirs. This conclusion is erroneous. There is nothing to
show that the land covered by title No. 11658 was not acquired by the
spouses during their marriage, and the circumstance that the title was

! taken in the name of the wife does not defeat its presumed character as
ganacial property. Therefore, in liquidating the ganacial property of the
ISSUE: first marriage it was within the power of the surviving husband to assign
other property to the first set of children as their participation in the
Whether or not the provisional inventory should include all estate of their mother and to retain in his own hands the property for
property pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the deceased. which a composition title had been issued in the name of the wife.

! !
RULING:

Yes.The making of the inventory is necessarily of a preliminary

RULE 84
General Powers and Duties of Executors and Administrators
and provisional nature, and the improper inclusion of property therein
or the improper omission of property therefrom is not absolutely
!
WILSON VS REAR
decisive of the rights of persons in interest. In addition, the inclusion of a Borja,Catherine
property in the inventory does not deprive the occupant of possession;
and if it is finally determined that the property has been properly
!
FACTS:
included in the estate, the occupant heir is liable for the fruits and
interest only from the date when the succession was opened (art. 1049, July 14, 1925, Charles C. Rear was murdered by some Moros on
Civ. Code). The provisions of the Civil Code with reference to collation his plantation. The whole plantation consisted of public lands. J.J. Wilson
clearly contemplate that disputes between heirs with respect to the qualified as special administrator of the estate on November 17, 1925.

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! 7
 Later, the property of the estate was appraised at P20,800, of
which the commissioners filed an inventory and report, which was also
signed by Wilson. January 4, 1927, the commissioners made and filed a
report of claims against the estate, but by reason of the fact that it was
claimed and alleged that the administrator did not have any funds to
pay, on March 30, 1927, the court ordered the administrator to sell a
portion of the property.
After due notice, the public sale took place, and the property was sold to
Wm. Mannion for P7,600. April 26, 1927,
March 23, 1928, Wilson filed his final account which later was amended
on June 10, 1928, to which the heirs made numerous and specific
objections, including that Wilson, as special administrator and as
administrator, was neglectful and imprudent and he committed waste.
He is, therefore, liable. 
ISSUE:
Is Wilson, as special administrator, liable?
RULING:
The law does not impose upon an administrator a high degree of care in
the administration of an estate, but it does impose upon him ordinary
and usual care, for want of which he is personally liable. In the instant
case there were no complications of any kind and in the usual and
ordinary course of business, the administrator should have wound up
and settled the estate within eight months from the date of his
appointment.  -It is executed without previous authority or approval of the Court
When he was appointed and qualified as administrator, the law imposed
upon him legal duties and obligations, among which was to handle the
estate in a business-like manner, marshal its assets, and close the estate
without any unreasonable or unnecessary delay. He was not appointed
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 6
to act for or on behalf of the creditors, or to represent the interests of the
heirs only. He should have administered the affairs of the estate for the
use and benefit alike of all interested persons, as any prudent business
man would handle his own personal business. When appointed, it is the
legal duty of the administrator to administer, settle, and close the
administration in the ordinary course of business, without any
unnecessary delay. Neither does an administrator, in particular, without
a specific showing or an order of the court, have any legal right to
continue the operation of the business in which the deceased was
engaged, or to eat up and absorb the assets of the estate in the payment
of operating expenses. Yet, in the instant case, the administrator on his
own volition and without any authority or process of court continued the
operation of the plantation, and in the end, as shown by his own report,
the estate, which was appraised at P20,800, with actual debts of the
deceased of only P1,655.54, was all wiped out and lost, and left with a
deficit of P1,809.69. 
!!
SAN DIEGO VS. NOMBRE
Borlagdatan, April
!
FACTS:
-AdeloNombre as duly constituted judicial administrator leased
a fishpond to Pedro Escanlar (respondent)
-Terms of the lease : 3yrs
where the proceedings was pending
-Nombre was removed as administrator by Order of the court and one
SofronioCampillanos was appointed in his stead
! 8
-Campillanos filed a motion asking for authority to execute a lease
contract of the same fishpond in favor of petitioner for 5 years from 1961
- Nombre opposed this alleging that to grant such motion by the new
administrator would nullify the contract of lease validly executed
! -While it may be admitted that the duties of a judicial administrator and
RULING OF TRIAL COURT:
! apply to a judicial administrator
-It held that the contract with Escanlar was null and void, for want of
judicial authority and that unless he would offer the same as or better
conditions than the prospective lessee - San Diego
-No good reason why the motion for authority to lease the property to
San Diego should not be granted
RULING OF CA:
-It reversed the trial court's decision explaining that even in the absence
of such special powers, a contract or lease for more than 6 years is not
entirely invalid
-No such limitation on the power of a judicial administrator to grant a
lease of property placed under his custody is provided for in the present
law
-In accordance with Article 1647, CC it is only when the lease is to be
recorded in the Registry of Property that it cannot be instituted without
special authority
-However under Rule 85, Section 3, of the Rules of Court it authorizes a
judicial administrator, among other things, to administer the estate of the
deceased not disposed of by will which includes leasing the property
!
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 6
ISSUE: WON a judicial administrator can validly lease property of the
estate without prior judicial authority and approval
RULING:
-The court denied the petition & affirmed CA's ruling.
an agent (petitioner alleges that both act in representative capacity), are
in some respects, identical, the provisions on agency this should not
-A judicial administrator is appointed by the Court. He is not only the
representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of the estate.
-A judicial administrator before entering into his duties, is required to file
a bond.
-This is not applicable in case of agency wherein agent is only
answerable to his principal. The protection which the law gives the
principal, in limiting the powers and rights of an agent, stems from the
fact that control by the principal can only be thru agreements, whereas
the acts of a judicial administrator are subject to specific provisions of
law and orders of the appointing court.
!
!
!
!!
JARODA VS. CUSI
Bueno, Jirene
!
FACTS:
! 9
! respondent Tan has sold and continues to sell the subdivision lots on the
Antonio Tan filed for a Special Proceeding before the respondent court
stating that the deceased Carlos Villa Abrille died intestate leaving
estates consisting of his conjugal share in real and personal properties
and some of them are shares in the co-ownership in Juna Subdivision
and cash on bank.
! which approved the power of attorney of Special Administrator Tan to
The heirs of the deceased are his surviving spouse, nine (9) children
(among them the herein petitioner, Natividad V. A. Jaroda), and four (4)
grandsons, among them the herein respondent, Antonio V. A. Tan. After
Respondent Tan was appointed special administrator he petitioned for
the withdrawal of sums of P109,886.42 and P72,644.66 from the
Philippine National Bank, which sums were not listed in his petition for
administration as among the properties left by the deceased instead
actually belong to and were held in trust for the co-owners of the Juna
Subdivision. Powers of attorney purportedly signed by the co-owners
authorizing the late Carlos Villa Abrille to sell the lots in the Juna
Subdivision and to deposit the proceeds thereof with the Philippine
National Bank were exhibited. The court granted the petition.
Tan executed, together with the other co-owners of the Juna Subdivision
a power of attorney appointing himself as attorney-in-fact to sell (or)
dispose the lots in the 99.546-hectare subdivision. Tan filed before the
court for the approval of the power of attorney executed authorizing
himself to sell the lots, which the court also granted.
Petitioner Natividad V. A. Jaroda moved to nullify the order that allowed
the withdrawal of the bank deposits, as well as the order which
approved the power of attorney which was granted by the respondent
court. Jaroda appealed but it was also dismissed. Petitioner Jaroda filed
the present petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction alleging,
among other things, that appeal would not be speedy and adequate as
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 7
strength of the respondent court's order, to her irreparable prejudice and
that of the other heirs which the Court gave due and issued an order
restraining the respondent from selling the share of the intestate estate.
!
ISSUE: Whether Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion when
it granted the withdrawal of the bank deposits, as well as the order
sell or dispose the lots co-owned by the deceased in Juna Subdivision.
!
RULING:
!
Yes. We agree with petitioner that the order allowing the special
administrator to withdraw the bank deposits standing in the name of the
decedent is in abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In
the first place, said withdrawal is foreign to the powers and duties of a
special administrator, which, as Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court
provides, are to —take possession and charge of the goods, chattels,
rights, credits and estate of the decease and preserve the same for the
executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose
may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only
such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special
administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless
so ordered by the court.
!
In the second place, the order was issued without notice to, and hearing
of, the heirs of the deceased. The withdrawal of the bank deposits may
be viewed as a taking of possession and charge of the credits of the
! 0
estate, and apparently within the powers and duties of a special the estate to be sold" and admittedly, administrator Tan did not furnish
administrator; but actually, said withdrawal is a waiver by the special such notice.
administrator of a prima facie exclusive right of the intestate estate to the
bank deposits in favor of the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision, who !
were allegedly claiming the same as alleged by the administrator in his
It is well settled that an executrix holds the property of her testator's
motion.
estate as a trustee and that an executrix will not be permitted to deal
! with herself as an individual in any transaction concerning the trust
property.
The bank deposits were in the name of the deceased; they, therefore,
belong prima facie to his estate after his death. And until the contrary is !
shown by proper evidence at the proper stage, when money claims may
The opinion of some commentators that, as a general rule, auto-contracts
be filed in the intestate proceedings, the special administrator is without
are permissible if not expressly prohibited and that there is no express
power to make the waiver or to hand over part of the estate, or what
provision of law prohibiting an administrator from appointing himself as
appears to be a prima facie part of the estate, to other persons on the
his own agent, even if correct, cannot and should not apply to
ground that the estate is not the owner thereof. If even to sell for valuable
administrator of decedent's estates, in view of the fiduciary relationship
consideration property of the estate requires prior written notice of the
that they occupy with respect to the heirs of the deceased and their
application to the heirs, legatees, or devisees under Rule 89 of the Rules
responsibilities toward the probate court. A contrary ruling would open
of Court, such notice is equally, if not more, indispensable for disposing
the door to fraud and maladministration, and once the harm is done, it
gratuitously of assets of the decedent in favor of strangers. Admittedly,
might be too late to correct it.
no such notice was given, and without it the court's authority is invalid
and improper. !
! A concrete example would be for administrator Tan to authorize agent
Tan to sell a lot for P50, with the condition that if he can sell it for more
b) The order approving the power of attorney executed by administrator
he could keep the difference; agent Tan sells the lot for P150.00; he retains
Tan and appointing himself as attorney-in-fact to sell the subdivision lots
P100.00 and deposits in the bank P50.00 "in the name of Antonio V. A.
for a price at his discretion is, likewise, void for want of notice and for
Tan, in trust for Juna Subdivision" (as worded in the power of attorney.
approving an improper contract or transaction.
Annex "F-1"); thus, administrator Tan's accounting to the estate for the
! sale of the lot for P50 would be in order, but the estate would have been
actually cheated of the sum of P100, which went to agent Tan in his
As provided under Section 4 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court , power of individual capacity.
attorney for the sale of the  pro-indiviso  share of the estate requires
"written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees who are interested in !

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 7

! 1
The court below also failed to notice that, as alleged in the
administrator's petition after the death of Carlos Villa Abrille the
administrator Tan, in his personal capacity, had replaced said deceased
as manager of the Juna Subdivision by authority of the other co-owners.
By the court's questioned order empowering him to represent the
interest of the deceased in the management of the subdivision, the
administrator Tan came to be the agent or attorney-in-fact of two
different principals: the court and the heirs of the deceased on the one
hand, and the majority co-owners of the subdivision on the other, in
managing and disposing of the lots of the subdivision. This dual agency
of the respondent Tan rendered him incapable of independent defense of
the estate's interests against those of the majority co-owners. It is highly
undesirable, if not improper, that a court officer and administrator, in
dealing with property under his administration, should have to look to
the wishes of strangers as well as to those of the court that appointed
him. A judicial administrator should be at all times subject to the orders
of the appointing Tribunal and of no one else.
! •
Jaroda's interest in the estate demands that she be heard by the court in
all matters affecting the disposal of her share, and that the administrator
should primarily protect the interest of the estate in which she is a
participant rather than those of the decedent's co-owner. The partial
partition approved by the court has no effect, one way or the other, upon
the orders contested in the present case because it is not definite whether
the lots described in the 57 pages of the partition agreement correspond
to those of the Juna Subdivision as described in the power of attorney.
!!
MANANQUIL VS. VILLEGAS
Cadavis , Lloyd
!
FACTS:
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 7
• A verified complaint for disbarment case filed by Mauro
Mananquil against Atty. Villegas w/ gross misconduct or
malpractice committed while acting as counsel of record of one
Felix Leong in the latter’s capacity as administrator of the
Testate Estate of the late Felomina Zerna. The complainant was
appointed special administrator after Felix Leong died.
• March 21, 1961, respondent was retained as counsel of record
for Felix Leong, one of the heirs of the late Felomina Zerna, who
was appointed as administrator of the Testate Estate of the
Felomina Zerna.
• A lease contract was executed between Felix and the Heirs of
Jose Villegas represented by respondent’s brother in law
Marcelo involving, among others, sugar lands of the Estate.
• Felix Leong was designated as administrator and owner, by
testamentary disposition, of 5/6 of all said parcels of land.
The lease contract was for 4 sugar crop years, w/ 10% yearly
rental of the value of the sugar produced from the leased land.
• April 20, 1965,the formal partnership of Hijos De Jose Villegas
was formed among the heirs of Jose Villegas, of which
respondent was a member.
• Another lease contract was executed bet. Felix and the
partnership, containing basically the same terms and conditions
as the 1stcontract , w/ Marcelo signing again as representative of
the lessee.
• After the demise of Marcelo, respondent was appointed
manager of Hijos De Jose Villegas by the majority of partners.
! 2
 • Renewals of the lease contract were executed bet. Felix and
Hijos De Jose Villegas and respondent signing therein as
representative of the lessee.
• In 1980, respondent was replaced by his nephew Geronimo
Villegas as the manager of the family partnership.
• Villegas was both counsel of Felix Leong and a partner in the
partnership of Hijos De Jose Villegas.
• When Felix died, this disbarment case was filed by Mananquil.
He alleged that the lease contracts were made iniquitous terms
and conditions. He also alleged that Villegas should have
notified and secured the approval of the probate court in Zerna’s
estate before contracts were renewed, Villegas being counsel of
that estate’s administrator.
ISSUES: 1. WON Villegas should have first secured the probate court’s
approval regarding the lease?
2. WON Villegas should be disbarred?
RULING:
1. NO. Pursuant to sec.3 of the Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a
judicial executor or administrator has the right to the possession and
management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so
long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of
administration. He may, therefore, exercise acts of administration
without special authority from the court having jurisdiction of the estate.
For instance, it has long been settled that an administrator has the power
to enter into the lease contracts involving the properties of the estate
even without prior judicial authority and approval.
Thus, considering that administrator Felix was not required
under the law and prevailing jurisprudence to seek prior authority from
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 7
the probate court in order to validly lease real properties of the estate,
Villegas, as counsel of Felix, cannot be taken to task for failing to notify
the probate court of the various lease contracts involved herein and to
secure its judicial approval thereto.
2. NO. there is no evidence to warrant disbarment, although Villegas
should be suspended from the practice of law because he participated in
the renewals of the lease contracts involving the properties of Zerna’s
estate in favor of the partnership of Hijos De Jose Villegas. Under Art.
1646 of the Civil Code, “lawyers, with respect to the property and rights
which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by
virtue of their profession” are prohibited from leasing, either in person
or through the mediation of another, the properties or things mentioned.
Such act constituted gross misconduct, hence, suspension for 4 months.
!
RULE 85
Accountability and Compensation of Executors and
Administrators
!
JOSON VS. JOSON
Castillo, Shain Ann
!
FACTS:
Tomas Joson died on July 5, 1945 in Nueva Ecija leaving behind
heirs and properties. He married three times and was survived by nine
(9) heirs: two (2) children and grandchildren by his first wife Eufemia de
la Cruz; two (2) daughters by his second wife Pomposa Miguel and his
third wife and surviving widow Dominga M. Joson.
!
Upon his death, his will was presented to the RTC of Nueva Ecija by his
son Felicisimo Joson for probate. In August, said will having been duly
probated, Felicisimo Joson was appointed administrator of the estate
and, accordingly, he filed an inventory of the properties left by the
deceased.
! 3
!
The administrator filed his first account and second account for the year
1945-1946 and 1946-1947 respectively. This was ordered by the court to
be examined by the clerk of court but the same has never been
approved.On, 1948, the administrator filed another account for the year
1947-1948 and, upon motion of the heirs, he was ordered to file an
accounting covering the properties under his administration.
! !
Eduardo Joson, one of the heirs, filed an opposition to all the accounts
filed by theadministrator where he alleged that the administrator
diminished the shares of the heirs and had padded his expenses of
administration.
!
The heirs were able to compromise their differences and entered into an
extrajudicial settlement and partition of the entire estate under the
provisions of the Rules of Court which provides for the settlement of the
estate without court intervention. This settlement was contained in two
documents executed on the same date wherein they manifested that they
are entering into it because of their desire to put an end to the judicial
proceeding and administration.
! Without said accounts having been heard or approved, the
administrator filed a motion to declare the proceedings closed and
terminated and to relieve him of his duties as such. Heir Eduardo Joson
filed an opposition to said motion but, after hearing, the court issued an
order declaring the proceedings terminated and relieving the
administrator not only of his duties as such but also of his accounts
notwithstanding the heirs' opposition to said accounts.
! The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner.
!
ISSUES:
(1) Is the duty of an administrator to make an accounting of his
administration a mere incident which can be avoided once the estate has
been settled?
! his accounts a shortage in the amount of P132,600.00 which certainly
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 7
(2) Are the proceedings deemed terminated by the mere execution of an
extrajudicial partition of the estate without the necessity of having the
accounts of the administrator heard and approved by the court?
!(3) Is the administrator ipso facto relieved of his duty of proving his
account from the moment said partition has been executed?
RULING:
(1) No.The duty of an administrator to render an account is not a mere
incident of an administration proceeding which can be waived or
disregarded when the same is terminated, but that it is a duty that has to
be performed and duly acted upon by the court before the
administration is finally ordered closed and terminated.
!
The trial court erred in acceding to the motion for in doing so it
disregarded the express provisions of our rules relative to the settlement
of accounts of a judicial administrator specifically Section 1, Section 8,9
and 10.
!
(2) No. The proceedings is not deemed terminated by the mere execution
of an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The fact that all the heirs of the
estate have entered into an extrajudicial settlement and partition in order
to put an end to their differences cannot in any way be interpreted as a
waiver of the objections of the heirs to the accounts submitted by the
administrator not only because to so hold would be a derogation of the
pertinent provisions of our rules but also because there is nothing
provided in said partition that the aforesaid accounts shall be deemed
waived or condoned.
!
(3) No.The administrator is not yet relieved of his duty of proving his
account.While the attitude of the heirs in concluding said extrajudicial
settlement is plausible and hascontributed to the early settlement of the
estate, the same cannot however be considered as release of the
obligation of the administrator to prove his accounts.This is more so
when, according to the oppositors, the administrator has committed in
cannot just be brushed aside by a mere technicality.
!
! 4
!
TUMANG VS. LAGUIO
Castillo, Rochelle Jane
!
FACTS:
In Special Proceeding No. 1953 involving the estate of the late
Dominador Tumang and pending before the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, the widow of the deceased, namely Magdalena A. Tumang,
administratrix and executrix of the will, filed a petition to declare the
testate proceedings definitely terminated and closed with respect to
herself and two of her children — Melba Tumang Ticzon and Nestor A.
Tumang. The petition was premised on the fact that the aforesaid heirs
had already acknowledged receipt of the properties adjudicated to them,
and in order for such properties to be transferred in their names, there
was need for an order of the court declaring the proceedings closed with
respect to the aforesaid heirs. The petition was opposed by appenee's
daughter, Guia T. Laguio and her children on the ground that appellee,
as administratrix and executrix, had not yet delivered all properties
adjudicated to them. Moreover, the oppositors contended that there
could be no partial termination of the proceedings. Thereafter, the
administratrix withdrew the aforementioned petition.
!
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court should have required the executrix to
render an accounting of the cash and stock dividends received after the
approval of her final accounts.
RULING:
! possession was the sum of P57.75 representing the balance of the
Yes. Section 8 of Rule 85 provides that the "executor or
administrator shall render an account of his administration within one
(1) year from the time of receiving letters testamentary or of
administration ..., and he shall render such further accounts as the court
may requite until the estate is wholly settled." In the instant case, further
accounts by the executrix appear to be in order, in view of the fact that
the dividends sought to be accounted for are not included in the final
accounts rendered by the executrix. It appears that the interests of all the
parties will be better served and the conflict between petitioners and
respondent will be resolved if such additional accounting is made.
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 7
Further, "it has been held that an executor or administrator who receives
assets of the estate after he has filed an account should file a
supplementary account thereof, and may be compelled to do so, but that
it is only with respect to matters occuring after the settlement of final
account that representatives will be compelled to file supplementary
account." It is only in a case where the petition to compel an executor to
account after he has accounted and has been discharged fails to allege
that any further sums came into the hands of the executor, and the
executor specifically denies the receipt of any further sums that the
accounting should be denied.
!!
RODRIGUEZ VS. SILVA
Dela Cruz, Kyzeth
!
PHIL. TRUST CO., VS. LUZON SURETY
Deguzman, Jabrielle
!
FACTS:
Court of First Instance of Manila appointed Francis R. Picard, Sr.
as Administrator the Intestate Estate of the deceased James R. Burt upon
a bond. Thereafter he submitted and the Court approved his bond in the
required amount, with appellant Luzon Surety Co., Inc. as his surety.
Court dismissed Picard, as administrator and appointed the Philippine
Trust Co. in his place. The latter submitted an inventory-report showing
that the only asset of the Intestate Estate of Burt that had come into its
checking account of said deceased with the Philippine National Bank. A
review, however, of the record of the case reveals that former
Administrator Francis Picard, filed an inventory of the estate of the
deceased, from which it appears that the sole property he found was the
amount of P8,873.73 in current account with the Philippine National
Bank. This amount was reduced to P7,986.53 after deducting therefrom
his expenses in the amount of P887.22; and as reported by him in his
petition , the further expenses in the amount of P865.20 were deducted,
thereby leaving the balance of P7,121.33. Court hereby orders said
Francis Picard, to deliver within 48 hours from the receipt of a copy of
the order the difference of P7,063.58 to the present Administrator,
! 5
Philippine Trust Company. Picard, submitted an itemized statement of
disbursements made by him as administrator of the estate, showing that
the estate funds amounted to P7,986.53; that he reported to the Court
additional expenses incurred amounting to P865.20, thus leaving a
balance of P7,121.33; that thereafter he disbursed the sum of P250.00 to
defray the burial expenses of the deceased, thus leaving a balance of
P6,871.33; that on several occasions he had delivered to Feliciano Burt
adoptive son of the deceased James R. Burt different sums of money
totalling P5,825.00, thus leaving a balance of P972.33. After considering
this statement, the Court, issued an order finding Picard, guilty of having
disbursed funds of the estate amounting to about P8,000.00, without
authority. Picard was prosecuted for estafa. Having pleaded guilty to the
charge, judgment of conviction was accordingly rendered, and he was,
besides, held civilly liable. Court issued an order requiring appellant
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. to show cause why the administrator's bond filed
by it on behalf of Picard would not be confiscated. Appellant filed a
motion to set aside said order. Court denied appellant's motion and
ordered the confiscation of its bond. After the denial of appellant's lotion
for reconsideration, it took the present appeal.
!
ISSUES: WON (1) the Court cannot order the confiscation of the
administrator's bond, on prejudice or injury to creditors, legatees or heirs
of the estate of James R. Burt having been shown, and (2) a probate court
cannot, ex proprio motu, prosecute the probate bond.
!
RULING:
Appellant's contention that the probate court, ex proprio motu,
cannot order the confiscation or forfeiture of an administrator's bond, is
clearly without merit. Whatever may be the rule prevailing in other
jurisdictions, in ours probate court is possessed with an all-embracing
power not only in requiring but also in fixing the amount, and executing
or forfeiting an administrator's bond. The execution or forfeiture of an
administrator's bond, is deemed be a necessary part and incident of the
administration proceedings as much as its filing and the fixing of its
amount. The rule, therefore, is that the probate court may have said bond
executed in the same probate proceeding. Moreover, the condition of the
administrator's bond in question is that Francis L. Picard shall faithfully
execute the orders and decrees of the court; that if he did so, the
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 7
obligation shall become void, otherwise it shall remain in full force and
effect. In having been established that Picard disbursed funds of the
estate without authority, the conclusion follows that he had and his
surety became bound upon the terms of their bond. Appellant also
contends that it was not proper for the lower court to order the
confiscation of its bond because no prejudice or injury to any creditor,
heir or other interested person has been proved. This is also without
merits. According to the record, the claims against the estate filed by
Antonio Gardiner and Jose Teruel for the sum of P200.00 and P3,205.00,
respectively, were approved by the probate court but the same have
remained unpaid because of lack of funds. Finally, appellant claims that
it had been released from liability as surety because it received no notice
of the proceedings for the determination of the accountability of the
administrator. This contention we also find to be untenable. From the
nature of the obligation entered into by the surety on an administrator's
bond — which makes him privy to the proceedings against his principal
— he is bound and concluded, in the absence of fraud and collusion, by a
judgment against his principal, even though said surety was not a party
to the proceeding. In the case of the De Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil.
135, the sureties on the administrator's bond were held liable thereon
altho they were not parties to the proceeding against the administrator,
nor were they notified in connection therewith prior to the issuance of
the court order for the confiscation of the bond. Lastly, according to
Section 11, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, upon the settlement of the
account of an executor or administrator, his sureties "may upon
application, be admitted as a party to such accounting." The import of
this provision is that the sureties are not entitled to notice but may be
allowed to intervene in the settlement of the accounts of the executor or
administrator if they ask for leave to do so in due time. WHEREFORE,
the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
!
QUASHA-PENA VS. LCN CONS.
Dimaliwat, Dianne
FACTS:
!
!
Raymond Triviere passed away on December 14, 1987. On
January 13, 1988, proceedings for the settlement of his intestate estate
! 6
were instituted by his widow, Amy Consuelo Triviere, before the RTc of
Makati City Atty. Enrique P. Syquia and Atty. William H. Quasha of the ISSUE:
!
Quasha Law Office, representing the widow and children of the late Whether or not Quasha Law Office is entitled to payment of the
Raymond Triviere, respectively, were appointed administrators of the expenses incurred as executor or administrator of the estate of Triviere.
estate of the deceased in April 1988. As administrators, Atty. Syquia and
Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real estate taxes, HELD:
!
security services, and the preservation and administration of the estate, No. Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
as well as litigation expenses. reads: Section 7. What expenses and fees allowed executor or
!
In February 1995, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the
administrator. Not to charge for services as attorney. Compensation
provided by will controls unless renounced. When the executor or
RTC a Motion for Payment of administrator is an attorney, he shall not charge against the estate any
their litigation expenses but the RTC denied the said motion in professional fees for legal services rendered by him.
May 1955.
! !
The afore-quoted provision is clear and unequivocal and needs
In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. Redentor Zapata no statutory construction. Here, in attempting to exempt itself from the
also of the Quasha Law Office, coverage of said rule, the Quasha Law Office presents conflicting
took over as the counsel of the Triviere children, and continued arguments to justify its claim for attorney's fees against the estate. At one
to help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of the estate. On 6 September 2002, point, it alleges that the award of attorney's fees was payment for its
Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion for Payment, for their administration of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere; yet, it would
own behalf and for their respective clients. later renounce that it was an administrator.
!On the other hand, LCN, the only remaining claimant against the
!
SISON VS. TEODORO
Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere filed its Comment on/ Mahadodin Dimaampao
Opposition to the Motion on 2. LCN countered that the RTC had already
resolved the issue of payment of litigation expenses when it denied the
!!
first Motion for Payment filed by Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha for UY TIOCO VS. IMPERIAL
failure of the administrators to submit an accounting of the assets and Dorado, Czaybeeh
expenses of the estate as required by the court.
! !
Eventually, the RTC granted the second Motion for Payment;
however, it reduced the sums to be paid. LCN, then filed a motion for
RULE 86
Claims against Estate
reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC. Recourse was then
resorted to the Court of Appeals. On May 2006, the Court of Appeals !
AFAN VS DE GUZMAN
promulgated a Decision essentially ruling in favor of LCN. While the
Espino, Carla
Court of Appeals conceded that Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law Office,
as the administrators of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere, were !
FACTS:
entitled toadministrator's fees and litigation expenses, they could not
claim the same from the funds of the estate.

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 7

! 7
On July 12 1957, De Guzman filed a claim in the special proceeding for
the settlement of intestate estate of ArsenioAfan. The claim was allegedly
due from Afan, with interest thereon, within 30 days from August 16,
1949, as set forth in a promissory note then issued by Afan. On July 22,
1957, theadministratix objected to the consideration of the claim upon
the ground, among others, that it had been filed long after the expiration
of the period for the presentation of claim against said estate. The lower
court issued the order refusing to entertain the aforementioned claim. De
Guzman invokes, in support of his appeal, section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules
of Court. He maintains that his claim was filed prior to the distribution
of the estate of the deceased. Further, he now alleges, for the first time, a
"cause" why the lower court should allegedly have considered his claim.
He says, in his brief that he had no actual knowledge of the fact that the
estate of the deceased was then already in the process of settlement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim of De Guzman should be granted
RULING:
No. First, as provided in Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Time within which claims shall be filed.—In the notice
provided in the preceding section, the court shall state
the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which
shall not be more than twelve nor less than six months
after the date of the first publication of the notice.
However, at any time before an order of distribution is
entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to
file his claim within the time previously limited, the
court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are
equitable, allow such claims to be filed within a time not
exceeding one month.
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 7
The second sentence thereof clothes the court with authority to permit
the filing of a claim after the lapse of the period stated in the first
sentence, but prior to and distribution, subject to the following
conditions, namely (1) there must be tin application therefor; (2) a cause
must be shown why the permission should be granted; and (3) the
extension of time granted for the filing of the claim shall not exceed one
(1) month.In this case, De Guzman has not sought permission to file the
claim. Moreover, the same does not allege any reason why he should be
excused for his failure to file the claim in this proceeding within the
period stated in the Rules of Court.
Second, on his contention that he had no actual knowledge of the fact
that the estate of the deceased was then already in the process of
settlement, the Court found otherwise. He had actual knowledge of the
present proceeding long before the filing of his claim therein on July 27,
1957. It appears that, during the lifetime of Afan, or on May 24, 1950, De
Guzman instituted, against him, a civil case to recover the amount of the
promissory note. The Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the trial
court in favor of De Guzman and ordered a trial de novo. Sometime after
the records had been remanded to the lower court, Afan died. On August
15, 1955, that court issued an order requiring counsel for his heirs to
submit to the court the number of the intestate estate proceedings of the
deceased Arsenio R. Afan. This order was complied with on August 30,
1955 and a copy of "notification" containing the required information
was served upon counsel for De Guzman, as plaintiff therein. On
January 18, 1956, his counsel filed in said case a motion for the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased Afan, to substitute
him as defendant therein. On January 24, 1956 De Guzman filed,
therefore, a statement, entitled "compliance", setting forth the names,
ages and addresses of the heirs of the deceased, "as shown by the records
in Special Proceedings No. 26858, entitled 'Instance estate of Arsenio R.
Afan' before the Court of First Instance of Manila," with the prayer that
said "heirs be substituted as party defendants" in Case No. 1148, "in place
of the deceased Arsenio R. Afan." Yet, De Guzman choose not to file his
! 8
claim in such proceeding until July 27, 1957, one year and a half after the
filing of his aforementioned "compliance."Instead of furnishing a "cause"
for the extension of the reglementary period for the filing of his claim,
this omission on the part of De Guzman fully justifies the denial of such
extension and the order appealed from. In one case, the Court have
already held that failure to file a claim within the time provided therefor
upon the sole ground that the claimant was negotiating with one of the
heirs for payment, is not sufficient to justify extension. Lastly, the Court
also ruled in another case that where a claimant knew of the death of the
decedent and for four or five months thereafter he did nothing to present
his claim, this can hardly be considered as a good excuse for such
neglect.
Therefore, De Guzman’s claim should not be granted on the ground that
it was filed out of time.
!
HEIRS OF PIZARRO vs. CONSOLACION
Hipolito, Nina Anthonette
!
FACTS:
Petitioners are the oppositors in the special proceeding case filed
by private respondent Luis Tan for the settlement of the estate of the late
Dominga Garcia. In 1977, Luis Tan, allegedly the only surviving son of
Dominga Garcia who died sometime in 1930 in Canton, China, filed for
the issuance of the letters of administration in favor of Alfonso Atilano.
Garcia left a parcel of land located in Davao City which is under the
possession of the heirs of Ramon Pizarro. Respondent court set the
petition for hearing and the said order and petition were duly published.
After the private respondent Tan had begun presentation of evidence, the
parties entered into a compromise and the petitioners withdrew their
opposition to the intestate proceedings. Meanwhile in 1979, Tan and the
City of Davao filed a joint motion asking the respondent court to take
notice of the agreement which in substance seeks to proceed with the
determination of the heirs of Dominga Garcia which shall be
determinative of their respective claims against the estate. Petitioners
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 7
filed their opposition and the respondent court issued an order taking
note of the agreement. Private respondent Tan filed a motion to drop and
exclude the petitioners on the ground that they do not even claim to be
heirs of the deceased Garcia. Respondent court dismissed both claims of
the petitioners on the ground that they are barred for having been filed
out of time.
ISSUE:
WON the order of the respondent court which directed that the
filing of claims against the estate be filed within 6 months after the first
publication of the notice is null and void and violative of Sec 2, Rule 86
of Revised Rules of Court.
!
RULING:
Yes. The range of period specified in the Rules is intended to
give the probate court the discretion to fix period for the filing of claims.
The probate court is permitted by the rule to set the period provided it is
not less than 6 months nor more than 12 months from the date of the first
publication of notice. Since the notice issued and the period set by the
court was not in accordance with the requirements of Sec 2, Rule 86,
what should apply then is the period as provided for by the rules which
is not less than 6 months nor more than 12 months from the date of first
publication. The first publication of notice in the Mindanao Times was on
March 30? 1978. Thus, the two claims of the petitioners against the estate
which were filed on March 5, 1979 and March 29, 1979 respectivelu were
filed on time.
!
GUTIERREZ VS. DATU
Katigbak, Paula
!
FACTS:
In 1940, Maria Gerardo Vda. De Barretto, owner of fishpond
lands in Pampanga, leased to Ricardo Gutierrez for a term to expire on
May 1, 1947. On November 1, 1941, it was found that the dikes were
opened, resulting in their destruction and in the loss great quantities of
fish inside, to the damage and prejudice of the lessee.
!
! 9
 Gutierrez, while the testate proceeding was opened, filed a 87 "Upon all contracts by the decedent broken during his lifetime, even
complaint for 2 items: first, for the sum of P32,000.00 representing though they were personal to the decedent in liability, the personal
advance rentals he had to the decedent and second, the sum of representative is answerable for the breach out of the assets." A claim for
P60,000.00 as damages in the concept of earned profits, that is, profits breach of a covenant in a deed of the decedent must be presented under
which the claimant failed to realize because of the breach of the lease a statute requiring such presentment of all claims grounded on contract.
contract. !
! The only actions that may be instituted against the executor or
On June 7, 1957, appellant commenced an ordinary civil action administrator are those to recover real or personal property from the
against the executrix of the testate for the recovery of the same amount of estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an
P60,000 referred to as the second item. In July 1957 appellant amended injury to person or property, real or personal. The instant suit is not one
his claim in the testate proceeding by withdrawing therefrom the item of of them.
P60,000.00, leaving only the one for refund of advance rentals in the sum !!
of P32,000.00.
! AGUAS VS. LLEMOS
Lee, Mariline
After the issues were joined in the present, the court dismissed
the action for abandonment by both parties. Appellant moved to
!
BPI VS. CONCEPCION AND HIJOS
reconsider; the court denied the motion for reconsideration on the Lectura, Erika
ground that the claim should have been prosecuted in the testate
proceeding and not by ordinary civil action.
!
IMPERIAL INS., VS. DAVID
! Lim, Justin
!
ISSUE:
STRONGHOLD VS. REPUBLIC
Whether or not Gutierrez’s claim for damages based on
Lubay, Angela
unrealized profits is a money claim against the estate of the deceased FACTS:
Maria Gerardo Vda. de Barretto?
! Republic Asahi Glass contracts with JDS for the construction of
RULING: roadways and drainage systems in RAG's compound.  JDS does so
Yes. The word "claims" as used in statutes requiring the andfiles the required compliance bond with Stronghold Insurance acting
presentation of claims against a decedent's estate is generally construed as surety.  The contract is 5.3M the bond is 795k.  JDS falls woefully
to mean debts or demands of a pecuniary nature which could have been behind schedule, prompting RAG to rescind the contract and demand
enforced against the deceased in his lifetime and could have been the compliance bond. The owner of JDS dies and JDS disappears. Shire
reduced to simple money judgments; and among these are those fuses to pay the bond claiming that the death of JDS owner extinguishes
founded upon contract. The claim in this case is based on contract — the obligation. 
specifically, on a breach thereof. It falls squarely under section 5 of Rule
ISSUE:

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 8

! 0
 WON petitioner’s liability under the performance bond was
automatically extinguished by the death of Santos, the principal.
RULING::
As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor
does not extinguish the obligation.Obligations are transmissible to
theheirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the law, the
stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation.Only
obligations that are personal  or are identified with the  persons
themselves are extinguished by death.Furthermore, the liability of
petitioner is contractual in nature, because it executed a performance
bond, as a surety, petitioner is solidarilyliable with Santos in accordance
with the Civil Code.
Section 5 of Rule 86  of the Rules of Court expressly allows the
prosecution of money claims arising from a contract against the estate of
a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually
extinguished.What is extinguished is only the obligee’s action or suit
filed before the court, which is not then acting as a probate court.
In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos
had under his contracts with respondent were not intransmissible by
their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law. Hence, his death did
not result in the extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which
merely passed on to his estate. Death is not a defense that he or his estate
can set up to wipe out the obligations under the performance bond.
Consequently, petitioner as surety cannot use his death to escape its
monetary obligation under its performance bond.
! YES.
!!
!
MBTC VS. ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORP
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 8
Mercado, Trish
!
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. ABSOLUTE
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 170498. January 9, 2013
!
FACTS:
On October 5, 2000, Sherwood Holdings Corporation, Inc.
(SHCI) filed a complaint for sum of money against Absolute
Management Corporation (AMC). The complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-00-42105 and was assigned to
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 80. SHCI alleged in its complaint that it
made advance payments to AMC for the purchase of 27,000 pieces of
plywood and 16,500 plyboards in the sum of P12,277,500.00, covered by
Metrobank Check Nos. 1407668502, 140768507, 140768530, 140768531,
140768532, 140768533 and 140768534. These checks were all crossed, and
were all made payable to AMC. They were given to Chua, AMC’s
General Manager, in 1998. Chua died in 1999, and a special proceeding
for the settlement of his estate was commenced before the RTC of Pasay
City. This proceeding was pending at the time AMC
filed its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint. SHCI
made demands on AMC, after Chua’s death, for allegedly undelivered
items worth P8,331,700.00. According to AMC, these transactions could
not be found in its records. Upon investigation, AMC discovered that in
1998, Chua received from SHCI 18 Metrobank checks worth
P31,807,500.00. These were all payable to AMC and were crossed or for
payee’s account only
!
ISSUE:
Whether Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint against Chua’s
estate should be allowed.
HELD:
!
!
RATIO:
The specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court
should prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the
! 1
Rules of Court; the settlement of the estate of deceased persons (where
claims against the deceased should be filed) is primarily governed by the
rules on special proceedings, while the rules provided for ordinary
claims,including Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, merely apply
suppletorily.
!
SANTOS VS. MANARANG
Mansul, Nabral
!
ESTATE OF OLAVE VS. REYES
Pangilinan , Legis
!
SALONGA-HERNANDEZ VS. PASCUAL
Rabanal Michelle
!!
RULE 87
Actions by and Against Executors and Administrators
!
HEIRS OF GREGOIRE VS. BAKER
Rivera, Hiezll Wynn
!
FACTS: J. H. Ankrom died, and thereafter, A. L. Baker, qualified as his
administrator. The administrator filed his inventory of the assets
pertaining to the estate of his decedent, in which inventory was included
a tract of land covered by Torrens certificate of title and containing an
area of more than 930 hectares. The heirs of Rafael Gregoire filed a claim
against the estate of Ankrom for the sum of $35,438.78, U. S. currency, or
P70, 877.56, based upon a judgment rendered in the Supreme Court of
the Republic of Panama. It appears that the total recognized claims
against the estate amounted originally to P76,645.13, but four of the
creditors, having claims in the amount of P1,639.82, have been paid in
full, leaving a balance owing by the estate of P75,005.31, the greater part
of which is comprised of the claim of the appellants. As the affairs of the
estate stood upon the original inventory, there appeared to be sufficient
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 8
assets to pay all claimants; but while these intestate proceedings were
being conducted, the administrator discovered that a year and a half
before his death, Ankrom had executed a mortgage on the property here
in question in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Two days after this
mortgage had been executed, Ankrom appears to have made an
assignment of all his interest in the mortgaged property to one J. G. Jung,
of Cincinnati, Ohio, for a purported consideration of the sum of P1 and
other good and valuable considerations. In view of these conveyances by
his intestate, the administrator presented an amended inventory,
omitting therefrom the tract of 930 hectares with its improvements
thereon, the same being the land covered by the transfers above
mentioned. The court made an order, approving of the omission by the
administrator of said property from the inventory; and its is from this
order that the present appeal is here being prosecuted.
HELD: When there is a deficiency of assets in the hands of an executor or
administrator to pay debts and expenses, and when the deceased person
made in his life-time such fraudulent conveyance of such real or personal
estate or of a right or interest therein, as is stated in the preceding
section, any creditor of the estate may, by license of the court, if the
executor or administrator has not commenced such action, commence
and prosecute to final judgment, in the name of the executor or
administrator, an action for the recovery of the same and may recover for
the benefit of the creditors, such real or personal estate, or interest
therein so conveyed. But such action shall not be commenced until the
creditor files in court a bond with sufficient surety, to be approved by the
judge, conditioned to indemnify the executor or administrator against
the costs of such action. Such creditor shall have a lien upon the
judgment by him so recovered for the costs incurred and such other
expenses as the court deems equitable. The remedy of the heirs of
Gregoire is, therefore, to indemnify the administrator against costs and,
by leave of court, to institute an action in the name of the administrator
to set aside the assignment or other conveyance believed to have been
made in fraud of creditors.
! 2
!!
SINFOROSO PASCUAL VS. PONCIANO PASCUAL
Rodriguez, Maria Lorraine
!
FACTS:
The plaintiff and defendants are legitimate children of the
testratix, Eduarda de los Santos.In 1940, while the proceedings for the
probate of the will of the deceased Eduarda de los Santos were pending
in CFI-Rizal plaintiff, Sinforoso Pascual, instituted in the CFI-Pampanga
against Ponciano S. Pascual and others, an action for the annulment of a
contract of sale of a fishpond situated in Pampanga, supposedly
executed without consideration by said deceased in her lifetime in favor
of the defendants.
Defendants filed of a motion to dismiss, alleging want of cause
of action, limitation of action, wrong venue and pendency of another
action. RTC: granted the motion on the ground that the action should
have been brought by the executor or administrator of the estate left by
the deceased, and directed the plaintiff to amend his complaint. Plaintiff
filed an amended complaint. However, RTC declared that such
amendment did not cure the insufficiency of the complaint, dismissed
the action.
!
ISSUE: Whether the action should have been filed by the executor and
not by the plaintiff-heir?
HELD: No.
Under Rule 86, section 1, of the new Rules of Court, actions for
the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased for
causes which survive may be prosecuted or defended by his executor or
administrator. Upon the commencement of the testate or intestate
proceedings the heirs have no standing in court in actions of the above
character, except when the executor or administrator is unwilling or fails
or refuses to act, in which event to heirs may act in his place.
Here, the fictitious sale is alleged to have been made to the
defendants, one of them, Miguel S. Pascual, being the executor
appointed by the probate court. Such executor naturally would not bring
an action against himself for recovery of the fishpond. His refusal to act
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 8
may, therefore, be implied. And this brings the case under the exception.
It should be noted that in the complaint the prayer is that the fishpond
be delivered not to the plaintiff but to the executor, thus indicating that
the action is brought in behalf of the estate of the deceased.
!!
VELASQUEZ VS. GEORGE
Salayog, Benny Rico
!!
RIOFERIO ET. AL. VS COURT OF APPEALS
Sumaway, Dylan
!
MODESTO VS. MODESTO
Tomarong, Marian
!
FACTS:

Bruno Modesto died leaving several heirs, among them, Cerilio
Modesto and Jesus Modesto. In the course of the intestate proceeding,
Jesus, acting as administrator of the estate of Bruno, filed in the CFI of
Tacloban, Leyte, motion to cite and examine under oath several persons,
especially Cerilio regarding the properties concealed, embezzled or
fraudulently conveyed which was granted by the lower court. Joint
commissioners were appointed by CFI. Thereafter, submitted their
report. Jesus filed a motion in court to require Cerilio to turn over to him
the personal properties belonging to the intestate supposed to be in
Cerilio’s possession. Thereafter, writ of execution was issued. By virtue
of it, the provincial sheriff issued notice of attachment against the real
property described in COT of the Register of Deeds and under the tax
assessment in the name of Cerilio. Cerilio filed an urgent motion to set
aside the writ of execution and for writ of preliminary injunction which
was opposed by Jesus. The public auction was set and Jesus Modesto
named as the highest and only bidder. Then, Certificate of final sale in
favour of Jesus was issued by the Provincial Sheriff. Cerilio filed motion
for reconsideration, however, it was denied by the CFI. In pursuance to
! 3
the writ of possession filed by Jesus, the Provincial Sheriff issued a
notification to Cerilio placing Jesus in possession of the real property
sold to him. Cerilio filed petition for certiorari to annul the proceedings
had before the CFI of Leyte.
ISSUE:
Whether the CFI had the authority to decide whether the properties, real
or personal belong to the estate or to the persons examined
HELD:
No.
If an executor or administrator or any interested individuals in the estate
of the deceased, complains to the court having jurisdiction of the estate
that a person/s are suspected of having possessed or having knowledge
of the properties left by a deceased person, or of having concealed,
embezzled or conveyed any of the said properties of the deceased, the
court may cite such person/s to appear before it and may examine him
or them on oath on the matter of such complaint. In such proceedings the
trial court has no authority to decide whether or not said properties, real
or personal, belong to the estate or to the persons examined. If, after such
examination there is good reason to believe that said person or persons
examined are keeping properties belonging to the estate, then the next
step to be taken should be for the administrator to file an ordinary action
in court to recover the same.
!
VALERA VS. INSERTO
Tresvalles, Kris
!
FACTS: In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the
decedent spouses, Rafael Valera and Consolacion Sarrosa — in which
Eumelia Cabado and Pompiro Valera had been appointed administrators
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 8
— the heirs of a deceased daughter of the spouses, Teresa Garin, filed a
motion asking that the Administratrix, Cabado, be declared in contempt
for her failure to render an accounting of her administration. Cabado
replied that no accounting could be submitted unless Jose Garin, Teresa's
husband and the movant heirs' father, delivered to the administrator an
18-hectare fishpond in Baras, Barotoc Nuevo, Iloilo, belonging to the
estate and she in turn moved for the return thereof to the estate, so that it
might be partitioned among the decedents' heirs. Jose Garin opposed the
plea for the fishpond's return to the estate, asserting that the property
was owned by his children and this was why it had never been included
in any inventory of the estate.
The Court viewed the Garin Heir's motion for contempt, as well as
Carbado's prayer for the fishpond's return within the purview of Section
6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. The incident was set for hearing and
thereafter, the court issued an order commanding the heir of Teresa
Garin to reconvey immediately the fishpond to the estate of the spouses.
There seems little doubt, however, that the Court's pronouncement
regarding the estate's title to the fishpond was merely provisional in
character, made solely to determine whether or not the fishpond should
be included in the inventory of estate assets. So it was evidently
understood by the administrators who have more than once asserted that
"the probate court has jurisdiction to determine the ownership of the
fishpond for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the properties. So
it was made clear by the Probate Court itself which, at the outset, stated
that the hearing on the matter was meant "merely to determine whether
or not the fishpond should be included as part of the estate and whether
or not the person holding it should be made to deliver and/or return **
(it) to the estate. And so it was emphasized in another Order, denying
reconsideration of the Order of September 17, 1980. Judge Adil
afterwards granted the administrators' motion for execution of the order
pending appeal, and directed the sheriff to enforce the direction for the
Garin Heirs to reconvey the fishpond to the estate. The corresponding
! 4
writ was served on Manuel Fabiana, the supposed caretaker. Voicing no
objection to the writ, and declaring to the sheriff that he was a mere
lessee, Fabiana voluntarily relinquished possession of the fishpond to the
sheriff. The latter, in turn, delivered it to the administrators.
Later however, Fabiana filed a complaint-in-intervention with the
Probate Court seeking vindication of his right to the possession of the
fishpond, based on a contract of lease between himself, as lessee, and
Jose Garin, as lessor. 16 But Judge Adil dismissed his complaint.
In the meantime, Jose Garin — having filed a motion for reconsideration
of the above mentioned order of Judge Adil (declaring the estate to be
the owner of the fishpond), in which he asserted that the Probate Court,
being of limited jurisdiction, had no competence to decide the ownership
of the fishpond, 22 which motion had been denied 23-filed a notice of
appeal from said Order. 24 But he quickly abandoned the appeal when,
as aforestated 25 Judge Adil authorized execution of the order pending
appeal, instead, he initiated a special action for certiorari prohibition and
mandamus )with prayer for preliminary injunction) in the Court of
Appeals
! Court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive,
ISSUE: whether the probate court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of
and decide the issue of title covering a fishpond being claimed by an heir
adversely to the decedent spouses
HELD:
Jurisdiction of Probate Court
Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court), acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and
thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title
to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 8
the claimant and all the Other parties having legal interest in the
property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the
question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third
persons are not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception being
that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be
resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its
limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g., probate, land registration, etc.,
is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one,
involving a mode of practice which may be waived.
The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application
of the exception to the rule. As already earlier stressed, it was at all times
clear to the Court as well as to the parties that if cognizance was being
taken of the question of title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose
of settling the issue definitely and permanently, and writing "finis"
thereto, the question being explicitly left for determination "in an
ordinary civil action," but merely to determine whether it should or
should not be included in the inventory. This function of resolving
whether or not property should be included in the estate inventory is, to
be sure, one clearly within the Probate Court's competence, although the
and is subject to the final decision in a separate action that may be
instituted by the parties. 32
The same norm governs the situation contemplated in Section 6, Rule 87
of the Rules of Court, expressly invoked by the Probate Court in
justification of its holding a hearing on the issue arising from the parties'
conflicting claims over the fishpond. 33 The examination provided in the
cited section is intended merely to elicit evidence relevant to property of
the decedent from persons suspected of having possession or knowledge
thereof, or of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away the same.
Of course, if the latter lays no claim to the property and manifests
willingness to tum it over to the estate, no difficulty arises; the Probate
Court simply issues the appropriate direction for the delivery of the
! 5
property to the estate. On the other hand, if the third person asserts a
right to the property contrary to the decedent's, the Probate Court would
have no authority to resolve the issue; a separate action must be
instituted by the administrator to recover the property. 34
Parenthetically, in the light of the foregoing principles, the Probate Court
could have admitted and taken cognizance of Fabiana's complaint in
intervention after obtaining the consent of all interested parties to its
assumption of jurisdiction over the question of title to the fishpond, or
ascertaining the absence of objection thereto. But it did not. It dismissed
the complaint in intervention instead. And all this is now water under
the bridge.
Possession of Fishpond Pending
Determination of Title Thereto
Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to
the fishpond was merely provisional, not binding on the property with
any character of authority, definiteness or permanence, having been
made only for purposes of in. conclusion in the inventory and upon
evidence adduced at the hearing of a motion, it cannot and should not be
subject of execution, as against its possessor who has set up title in
himself (or in another) adversely to the decedent, and whose right to
possess has not been ventilated and adjudicated in an appropriate action.
These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens
title to the property is not in the decedents' names but in others, a
situation on which this Court has already had occasion to rule.
In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a
property covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive
conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the
absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof
should be consider as the owner of the property in controversy until his
title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action,
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 8
particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is
in the persons named in the title
!
!!
ABS-CBN VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
Tuason, Jannelle
!
FACTS:
Petitioners executed separate complaint-affidavits charging private
respondents of several violation of penal laws when they went to the
premises of ABS CBN and informed the employees thereof regarding the
forced closure of the premises of the station and stoppage of its operation
due to the LOI No. 1 issued by then Pres. Marcos during Martial Law.
Benedicto, PH ambassador to Japan and the principal stockholder of
RPN 9, the only station allowed to broadcast during martial law, rented
the studios owned by ABSCBN and occupied the same during
negotiation about the monthly rentals. Due to failure to reach the desired
monthly rental rate, the counsel for petitioner demanded RPN 9 to
vacate the studios and pay rentals but respondents refused to do so. At
the end of Marcos’ regime, ABS CBN was returned to the Lopez’ and
allowed operation. Unfortunately, the complaints previously filed were
dismissed by the Ombudsman for lack of probable cause. Hence, the
present petition. Noteworthy is the fact that Benedicto died during the
pendency of the case and was dropped as party herein.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil liability of Benedicto subsists even after his
death, which extinguished his criminal liability.
RULING:
! 6
No.  The rules on whether the civil liability of an accused, upon death, is
extinguished together with his criminal liability, has long been clarified
and settled in the case of People v. Bayotas:
1. Death of an accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and  only  the civil
liability  directly  arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in sensostrictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of
the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x xx
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only
by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure15 as amended.
The separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending
on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 8
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of
his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases
where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to
its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations
on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency
of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155
of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension
on a possible [de]privation of right by prescription.
Applying the foregoing rules, ABS-CBN's insistence that the case at
bench survives because the civil liability of the respondents subsists is
stripped of merit.
!
RULE 88
Payment of the debts of the Estate
ALDAMIZ VS. JUDGE OF CFI-MINDORO
!
Umbalin, Norissa
!
BUAN VS. LAYA
Uy, Charles
!FACTS:
A contingent claim for P50,000 was filed by Sylvia Laya against the
intestate estate of the deceased Florenica and Rizalina Buan. The
contingent claim was based on the fact that a Philippine Rabbit Bus,
owned and operated by the spouses Buan, collided with a private car
resulting to the death of Juan Laya, the father of Sylvia Laya. The driver
of the bus was charged with homicide and serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence and was sentenced therefor. The heirs of
Juan Laya had reserved the right to file a separate civil action, and they
did so. Administrators of the estate opposed the contingent claim,
! 7
arguing that the same could not be allowed because it has not been filed
before the death of the spouses. The CFI of Tarlac admitted the claim, but
denied that a portion of the estate be set aside to answer for the claim.
Counsel for administrator then moved to set aside the order, but before
they could do so, the civil action instituted in Manila was declared
premature because the criminal conviction is not yet final, and ordered
plaintiffs therein to file an amended complaint, which they did so. The
CFI of Tarlac then dismissed the contingent claim on the ground that the
reason for the same had ceased to exist. Assuming that an amended
complaint had been filed, still, the same had not yet been acted upon.
ISSUE
Whether or not the contingent claim may be admitted
RULING
The Court ruled in the affirmative. A contingent claim is one that, by its
nature, is dependent upon the happening of an uncertain event. it may
or may not develop into a valid claim, depending upon that uncertain
event. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased, Juan C. Laya, would
succeed in the action brought in Manila against the administrators of the
estate of the deceased spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, is
the uncertain event or contingency upon which the validity of the claim
presented in the administration proceedings depends.  Demetrio, Jose, Guillermo, Alfredo, and Paz, all surnamed Orellano; that
While the contingent event had not yet happened, Sylvia has no claim
upon the intestate estate, for such claim would only arise after the event
happened. As such, the contingent claim may not be dismissed.
Contingent claims follow the result of the action, and as such, the fact
that the case is temporarily dismissed may not terminate the claim, as
only the final results of the action could do that.  The rules provide that a
contingent claim is to be presented in the administration proceedings in
the same manner as any ordinary claim, and that when the contingency
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 8
arises which converts the contingent claim into a valid claim, the court
should then be informed that the claim had already matured.
!
!!
DINGLASA VS. ANG CHIA
Viernes, Wayne
!!
RULE 89
Sales, Mortgages, and other Encumbrances of Property of decedent
!!
GODOY VS. ORELLANO
Vizcarra, William
!
FACTS :
In consideration of P1,000 received by Felisa Pañgilinan, a
document was executed by her giving Eusebio A. Godoy, an option to
buy a dredge for the sum of P10,000. It appears from that document that
the dredge is the common property of the vendor and of the brothers
the condition was that Godoy was to pay the whole price of the dredge
within twenty days; and that said option was granted in accordance with
the power of attorney executed by her coowners who reserved the right
to ratify whatever sale might be made, or option granted by Pañgilinan,
their attorney-in-fact. The latter's co-owners did not ratify the option
contract. Before the expiration of twenty days, the Godoy was ready to
make complete payment of the price, but Pañgilinan failed to deliver the
dredge. Then the Godoy brought suit in the CFI against Feliza
Pañgilinan, Paz Orellano, Jose Orellano, Demetrio Orellano, Guillermo
! 8
Orellano, and Alfredo Orellano, praying that they be ordered to deliver
the dredge, upon payment by him of the sum of P9,000; to pay him the
sum of P10,000 as damages, and to return to the plaintiff the sum of
P1,000 should the carrying out of the sale become impossible.
The defendants Orellano set up in their answer a general denial
of the facts alleged in the complaint and, as a special defense, alleged
that the dredge in question was the property of the intestate estate of
Julio Orellano, pending in the CFI, and under the administration of
Felisa Pangilinan; that Godoy perfectly knows that said dredge is under
judicial control and could not be disposed of without judicial authority,
and that the court has never authorized the sale mentioned in the
complaint filed herein; and that the defendants Jose, Guillermo, and
Alfredo surnamed Orellano are at present under age, and the defendant
Paz Orellano is a married woman who had not obtained the consent of
her husband before executing the power of attorney in favor of the
Pañgilinan.
The defendant Felisa Pañgilinan filed a separate answer, and
alleges: that Godoy, as well as the defendants, and the notary who
prepared the aforesaid option sale, were all aware of these facts, and they
led her to believe that she had the authority to dispose of the dredge in
her name and by themselves; that believing herself to be under
obligation to comply with the aforesaid option deed, she applied to the
court of probate for permission to sell the dredge in the sum of P10,000;
that on the day of the hearing of the motion, her co-defendants who had
themselves authorized her by means of a power of attorney on the
ground that there were higher bidders and the best thing to do was to
sell it at public auction; that in view of this opposition, Pañgilinan asked
the court that it be sold at public auction, and the court authorized said
defendant to sell it at public auction; that the Pañgilinan did not at any
time refuse to make delivery of the dredge to the Godoy, but that it was
the court that would not give her the authority to do so; and that she is
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 8
all times ready to return the P1,000 received from the plaintiff and that
she has tendered it several times, but that the Godoy refused to accept it.
The judge  a quo  rendered judgment, ordering Pañgilinan to pay
Godoy the sum of P2,000 with legal interest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the option contract between Pañgilinan and
Godoy is void because of absence of authority of the court.
RULING:
Under the law, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize the sale
of properties like the one under consideration and the power of attorney
executed by the heirs of Orellano in favor of Pañgilinan, without
authority of court, has no legal effect, and this is the more so, since two
of the said heirs are under age, and the others did not ratify the option
contract, as provided in the aforesaid power of attorney.
!
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the
Pañgilinan was not, in her capacity as judicial administratrix of the
intestate estate of Julio Orellano, legally authorized to sell, or contract to
sell, any property belonging to said estate without the authority of the
court, and the contract entered into by her with the plaintiff, without this
authority, is null and void.
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint against the
appellant Felisa Pañgilinan is hereby dismissed.
!
CFI OF RIZAL VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Yatco, Nathaniel
!
! 9
FACTS:
Elena OngEscutin, executrix of testate estate of late
PoncianoOngLacson asked for authority from probate court to sell a real
property to pay taxes and claims against the estate. It was granted and
thus was sold to GanHeng for P400K. The sale was perfected and taxes
were paid for the estate. Felix Ong filed an opposition on the approval by
the court of such sale and offered P450K for such real property and
prayed for the acceptance of such offer. Probate court dismissed Felix
Ong’s petition, and so did the CA. However upon MR of Felix Ong, the
CA found that the probate court committed grave abuse of discretion as
such offer by Felix Ong was at a higher price and thus more beneficial for
the estate.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the
probate court’s approvale of the sale to GanHeng.
RULING:
Yes. The sale to be annulled was a private sale and not thru
public auction. Felix Ong had no legal personality to impugn such sale of
real property to GanHeng. Felix was neither a creditor nor an heir to the
estate. Also, he did not comply with the bond requirement of Rule 89, sec
3 of the Rules. Persons interested on such property of the estate may be
prevented by posting a bond which is fixed by the court. Furthermore,
the subsequent motion filed by the executrix to withdraw the sale as the
property in question is now worth P1M is denied. GanHeng was a
purchaser in good faith and the estate had already benefitted from the
payment made by GanHeng. The SC affirmed the private sale made by
the executrix and GanHeng.
!
JARODA VS. CUSI
Alvarez, Miguel Lorenzo
!Facts:
! Ruling:
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 9
The Special Proceeding was commenced by Antonio Tan
(Tan) allegingin the petition that Carlos Villa Abrille died
intestate and that his heirsare his surviving spouse, 9 children
(among them is petitioner NatividadJaroda) and 4 grandsons,
among them respondent Tan.
!
Tan was appointed special administrator.
!
Tan filed a petition for the withdrawal of sums from PNB
alleging thatthese sums were registered in the name of the
deceased but they wereactually held in trust for co-owners of
Juna Subdivision. CFI grantedthis motion.
!
CFI issued to Tan letters of administration. Tan filed a
petition allegingthat the deceased was a manager and co-owner
of Juna Subdivision andpraying for approval by the court of the
power of attorney executed by him, on behalf of the intestate
estate, appointing himself to sell share of
the estate in the subdivision lots. CFI granted the petition.
!
Jaroda moved to nullify the 2 CFI orders. CFI denied the
motion for lack of merit. Jaroda elevated the case to the SC.
!
Issue:
!
(1) Whether or not the CFI Order allowing the withdrawal of
bank deposits was in abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction? .
!
(2) Whether or not the CFI Order approving the power of
attorney is valid.
!
! 0
! ofindependent defense of the estate's interests against those of
! themajority co-owners.
On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the !!
affirmative. Said withdrawal is foreign to the powers
and duties of a specialadministrator. (Rule 80.2) !!
! PAHAMOTANG VS. PNB
The CFI order was issued without notice to, and hearing Arcilla, Jay
of, the heirs of
the deceased. The withdrawal of the bank deposits may be
!
viewed aswithin the powers and duties of a special
administrator; but actually, it isa waiver by the special
RULE 90
Distribution and Partition of the Estate
administrator of a prima facie exclusive right ofthe intestate
estate to the bank deposits in favor of the co-owners of theJuna
!!
Subdivision. The bank deposits were in the name of the GATMAITAN VS. MEDINA
deceasedso they belong prima facie to his estate after his death. Azarcon, Pia Lea
And until thecontrary, the special administrator is without power !
FACTS:
to make the waiveror to hand over part of the estate to other
On March 10, 1956, Felicisimo Gatmaitan filed a petition, seeking
persons on the ground that theestate is not the owner thereof.
! his appointment as administrator of the property of his wife, Veronica
Medina, who died intestate. Gorgonio Medina and Dominica Medina, as
On the second issue, the High Tribunal ruled in the heirs of the deceased (she being their full-blooded sister), filed an
negative. The CFI order is void for want of notice and for opposition, praying that Gorgonio Medina, or a neutral third party, or
approving animproper contract or transaction. Felicisimo Gatmaitan and Gorgonio Medina, jointly, be appointed as
! administrator or administrators of the estate. The court appointed
Felicisimo Gatmaitan as administrator of the estate with a bond and
An administrator is not permitted to deal with himself as
Gorgonio Medina as co-administrator without compensation and bond.
an individual in any transaction concerning trust property.
On March 14, 1957, administrator Gatmaitan filed an amended inventory
This isbecause of the n view of the fiduciary relationship that of the estate but was opposed on the ground that the same did not
theyoccupy with respect to the heirs of the deceased and represent the true and faithful list of the properties left by the deceased.
theirresponsibilities toward the probate court. In view of the opposition, the hearing and consideration of the amended
! inventory was postponed until further assignment. On April 2, 1957, the
heirs of the deceased, through counsel, filed a "Motion for Partial
By the CFI’s order, administrator Tan came to be the
Partition and Distribution," The court heard counsel for administrator
agent of two different principals: the court and the heirs of
Gatmaitan and for the heirs or oppositors, but without receiving any
the deceasedon the one hand, and the majority co-owners of the evidence whatsoever. The administrator, Gatmaitan, filed a motion for
subdivisionon the other, in managing and disposing of the lots of reconsideration, calling attention to the fact that, contrary to what the
thesubdivision. This dual agency of Tan rendered him incapable

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 9

! 1
order states, "he has not agreed to the partial distribution of the estate in
the manner contained in the order", and urging that "the sums ordered to
be partially distributed are not warranted by the circumstances
obtaining" in the case and that, moreover, "the manner of distribution
will work difficulties to the estate and to the heirs themselves". Motion
was denied for lack of merit. Gatmaitan filed a notice of appeal from the
foregoing orders. Appellant filed a record on appeal and notified counsel
for the oppositors of the date he would move for the approval thereof by
the court. The court approved the record on appeal presented by
appellant for failure to file written opposition thereto as required in the
order of the court notwithstanding the length of time that had already
elapsed. In his brief, appellant only made one assignment of error, and it
reads thus: The lower court gravely abused its discretion in directing a
partial distribution of the intestate estate of the deceased Veronica
Medina in favor of appellees, without requiring the distributees to file
the proper bonds pursuant to the provisions of Rule 91, Section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
!
ISSUE:
WON the lower court gravely abused its discretion in directing a
partial distribution of the intestate estate of the deceased Veronica
Medina in favor of appellees, without requiring the distributees to file
the proper bonds pursuant to the provisions of Rule 91, Section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
!
RULING:
! The lower court, erred in rendering the order appealed from. A
partial distribution of the decedent's estate pending the final termination
of the testate or intestate proceedings should as much as possible be
discouraged by the courts and, unless in extreme cases, such form of
advances of inheritance should not be countenanced. The reason for this
strict rule is obvious — courts should guard with utmost zeal and
jealousy the estate of the decedent to the end that the creditors thereof be
adequately protected and all the rightful heirs assured of their shares in
the inheritance. Why the appealed order is unwarranted is evident on
three counts. Firstly, the partial distribution was prematurely ordered by
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 9
the lower court. It appears that at the time the questioned order was
rendered, the amended inventory and appraisal filed by the
administrator-appellant was not yet even accepted, and it was still under
consideration by the court, in view of an opposition to the admission
thereof by some of the heirs. Moreover, it seems that notices for the
presentation of claims by possible creditors of the estate had not yet been
published, so that the period for the presentation of claims had not as yet
elapsed. Consequently, it cannot be safely said that the court had a
sufficient basis upon which to order a partial distribution of the
properties, having in mind the adverse effects that it might have on the
rights of the creditors and the heirs alike. Second, and more important,
no bond was fixed by the court as a condition precedent to the partial
distribution ordered by it, a bond which, because of the reasons already
adduced, becomes all the more imperative. Rule 91, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, specifically provides as follows: When the debts, funeral
charges, and expenses of administration, the allowances to the widow,
and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with
law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing
upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the person entitled to
the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which is
entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective
shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having
the same in his possession. . . . No distribution shall be allowed until the
payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided
for, unless the distributees or any of them, give a bond, in the sum to be
fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations
within such time as the courts directs. Appellees contend that the order
of partial distribution having been issued pursuant to an agreement of
the parties, the same could not now be assailed by the appellant. While
the wording of the appealed order seem to indicate that it was rendered
with the conformity of the heirs, there is reason to believe that it was just
a mistaken impression on the part of the court. Soon after the order was
! 2
rendered, the administrator-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration,
among other things, calling the attention of the court that he never
agreed to the partial distribution of the estate in the manner ordained in
the appealed order. Although said motion was denied for lack of merit,
the court did not deny categorically appellant's imputation, which could
have been easily averred to by it; nor did the appellees at any time prior
to this appeal controvert the aforesaid allegation of the administrator.
There is plausibility in appellant's statement that the agreement referred
to in the order was actually one between the appellees among
themselves. It should be noted, furthermore, that the bond required by
the Rules is not solely for the protection of the heirs then appearing, but
also for the benefit of creditors and subsequent claimants who have not
agreed to the advances. Lastly, appellees urged that this appeal was
prematurely taken in that appellant has not as yet formally objected to
the proffered bond as mentioned in an alleged order of the court, dated
May 16, 1957. The tenor of the order of May 16, 1957, as well as the fact
that neither said order nor the "constancia" of appellees are included in
the Record on Appeal, indicates that the belated offer to file a bond
amounted to no more than an attempt of appellees to settle the particular
issue between the parties that was rejected by the appellant. That the
record on appeal was approved much later, on July 15, 1957, and yet
without the written opposition . . . required in the order of this Court
dated June 12, 1957, notwithstanding the length of time that has already
elapsed and the absence of proof that the bond offered was ever filed and
approved by the Court, fortify that conclusion. Anyway, since the
purpose of the bond required by section 1, paragraph 2, of Rule 91 is to
protect not only the appellant but also the creditors and subsequent
claimants to the estate, in order that they may not be prejudiced by the
partial distribution, the amount of the bond could not be fixed without
hearing such interested parties, and there is no showing that they were
consulted. Hence, the bond offered could not affect the merits of this
appeal, although the Court below is not precluded for approving a new
bond. Wherefore, the order of partial distribution appealed from is set
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 9
aside, without prejudice to the issue of another order after strict
compliance with the Rules of Court. The records are ordered remanded to
the lower court for further proceedings.
!
QUASHA-PENA VS. LCN CONSTRUCTION*
Balanay, Rendel Bryan
!
FACTS:
! In December 1987, Raymond Triviere died intestate and the
proceedings for the settlement of his estate were instituted by his widow,
Amy Consuelo Triviere. Atty. Enrique P. Syquia (Syquia) and
Atty.William H. Quasha (Quasha) of the Quasha Law Office,
representing the widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere,
respectively, were appointed administrators of the estate of the deceased.
As administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for
the payment of real estate taxes, security services, and the preservation
and administration of the estate, as well as litigation expenses. Atty.
Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of
their litigation expenses.
!
RTC denied their motion citing their failure to submit an accounting of
the assets and liabilities of the estate under administration in May 1995.
!
In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. Redentor Zapata (Zapata),
also of the Quasha Law Office, took over as the counsel of the Triviere
children, and continued to help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of the
estate. On 6 September 2002, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another
Motion for Payment, for their own behalf and for their respective clients,
claiming for the payment of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
!
LCN Construction Corp., as the only remaining claimantagainst the
Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere in Special Proceedings,
filed its Comment on/Opposition to the afore-quoted Motion on 2
October 2002. LCN countered that the RTC had already resolved the
issue of payment of litigation expenses when it denied the first Motion
! 3
for Payment filed by Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha for failure of the
administrators to submit an accounting of the assets and expenses of the
estate as required by the court.
! !
Among others, LCN argued that its claims are still outstanding and
chargeable against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere; thus, no
distribution should be allowed until they have been paid; especially
considering that as of 25 August 2002, the claim of LCN against the
estate of the late Raymond Triviere amounted to P6,016,570.65 as against
the remaining assets of the estate totaling  P4,738,558.63, rendering the
latter insolvent.
!
RTC issued its Order, taking note that the widow and the heirs of the
deceased Triviere, after all the years, have not received their respective
shares in the Estate, declaring that there was no more need for
accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate considering that the
estate has no more assets except the money deposited with the Union
Bank of the Philippines and that both the Co-Administrator and counsel
for the deceased are entitled to the payment for the services they have
rendered and accomplished for the estate and the heirs of the deceased
as they have over a decade now spent so much time, labor and skill to
accomplish the task assigned to them; and the last time the
administrators obtained their fees was in 1992.
!
LCN sought recourse from CA maintaining, among others, that the
awards violate Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, as there still
exists its (LCN's) unpaid claim in the sum of P6,016,570.65.
! !
CA conceded that Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law Office, as the
administrators of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere, were entitled to
administrator's fees and litigation expenses, they could not claim the
same from the funds of the estate reasoning that the award of expenses
and fees in favor of executors and administrators is subject to the
qualification that where the executor or administrator is a lawyer, he
shall not charge against the estate any professional fees for legal services
rendered by him. Instead, the Court of Appeals held that the attorney's
fees due Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law Offices should be borne by
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 9
their clients, the widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere,
respectively.
The appellate court likewise revoked the  P450,000.00 share
and P150,000.00 share awarded by the RTC to the children and widow of
the late Raymond Triviere, respectively, on the basis that Section 1, Rule
90 of the Revised Rules of Court proscribes the distribution of the residue
of the estate until all its obligations have been paid.
!
Petitioners, maintain that the RTC Order should not be construed as a
final order of distribution, but a mere interlocutory order that does not
end the estate proceedings. Only an order of distribution directing the
delivery of the residue of the estate to the proper distributees brings the
intestate proceedings to a close and, consequently, puts an end to the
administration and relieves the administrator of his duties. That the said
Order grants the payment of certain amounts from the funds of the estate
to the petitioner children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere
considering that they have not received their respective shares therefrom
for more than a decade. Out of the reportedP4,738,558.63 value of the
estate, the petitioner children and widow were being awarded by the
RTC, their shares in the collective amount of P600,000.00. Evidently, the
remaining portion of the estate still needs to be settled. The intestate
proceedings were not yet concluded, and the RTC still had to hear and
rule on the pending claim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond
Triviere and only thereafter can it distribute the residue of the estate, if
any, to his heirs.
ISSUE:
!
Whether or not the awards of the RTC in favor of the petitioner, children
and widow constitute a partial distribution of the estate and is
proscribed by Rule 90 Section 1.
!
RULING:
!
Yes. Petitioners, insist that the awards in favor of the petitioner children
and widow of the late Raymond Triviere is not a distribution of the
! 4
residue of the estate, thus, rendering Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised
Rules of Court inapplicable.
!
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
!
Section 1.  When order for distribution of residue made. - When the
debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to
the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in
accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the
executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and
after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts,
to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover
their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other
person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before
the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to
the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
!
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations
above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees,
or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs.
!
While the awards in favor of petitioner children and widow made in the
RTC Order dated 12 June 2003 was not yet a distribution of the residue of
the estate, given that there was still a pending claim against the estate,
still, they did constitute a partial and advance distribution of the estate.
Virtually, the petitioner children and widow were already being awarded
shares in the estate, although not all of its obligations had been paid or
provided for.
!
Section 2, Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly recognizes
advance distribution of the estate, thus:
Section 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. -
Notwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in proceedings to
settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 9
such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the
estate as may not be affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed
among the heirs or legatees,upon compliance with the conditions set
forth in Rule 90 of these rules. (Emphases supplied.)
!
The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of
Court allows the distribution of the estate prior to the payment of the
obligations mentioned therein, provided that "the distributees, or any of
them, gives a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs."
!
In sum, although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to
permit the advance distribution of the estate, its exercise of such
discretion should be qualified by the following:
!
[1] only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending controversy
or appeal may be the subject of advance distribution (Section 2, Rule
109); and
[2] thedistributees must post a bond, fixed by the court, conditioned for
the payment of outstanding obligations of the estate (second paragraph
of Section 1, Rule 90).
!
There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner children
and widow their shares in the estate prior to the settlement of all its
obligations, complied with these two requirements or, at the very least,
took the same into consideration. Its Order is completely silent on these
matters. It justified its grant of the award in a single sentence which
stated that petitioner children and widow had not yet received their
respective shares from the estate after all these years. Taking into account
that the claim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere
allegedly amounted to  P6,016,570.65, already in excess of
the P4,738,558.63 reported total value of the estate, the RTC should have
been more prudent in approving the advance distribution of the same.
!
Petitioners invoked  Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court,where the
Court sustained an Order granting partial distribution of an estate.
!
! 5
However,  in Dael  is the estate has  sufficient assets  to ensure equitable
distribution of the inheritance in accordance with law and the final
judgment in the proceedings and it  does not appear there are unpaid
obligations,  as contemplated in Rule 90, for which provisions should
have been made or a bond required, such partial distribution may be
allowed.
!
No similar determination on sufficiency of assets or absence of any
outstanding obligations of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere was
made by the RTC in this case. In fact, there is a pending claim by LCN
against the estate, and the amount thereof exceeds the value of the entire
estate.
!
Furthermore, in  Dael, the Court actually cautioned that partial
It appears that in the above-entitled intestate estate, the
commissioners appointed by the court submitted on February 8, 1944, a
project of partition, in which the land in question, which is and was then
in the possession of the herein petitioners, was included as property of
the estate and assigned to one Miguel B. Dayco, one of Marcelo de
Borja’s heirs. Although the administratrix of Quintin de Borja’s estate
was the party named in the partition in behalf of that estate, the present
petitioners took active part in the proceeding for the reason that they had
been declared their father’s sole heirs in the settlement of their father’s
estate. Moreover, one of these children was herself the duly appointed
administratrix of the last named intestate estate. 

ISSUE:
distribution of the decedent's estate pending final termination of the
testate or intestate proceeding should as much as possible be
Can the remedy to recovery the property be done by motion in
discouraged by the courts, and, except in extreme cases, such form of
advances of inheritance should not be countenanced. The reason for this the same intestate proceeding?
rule is that courts should guard with utmost zeal and jealousy the estate
of the decedent to the end that the creditors thereof be adequately RULING:
protected and all the rightful heirs be assured of their shares in the
Pertinent to the question posed by the petitioners is section 1 of
inheritance.
!! Rule 91 which provides as follows:

TORRES VS. ENCARNACION 


Borja, Catherine "When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the
!
FACTS:
allowances to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the
estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the
application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in
The petitioners contest the jurisdiction of the respondent Judge
the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the
to issue the order herein sought to be reviewed directing them to deliver
estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the
to the administrator of the intestate estate of Marcelo de Borja, a certain
proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may
parcel of land which is in petitioners’ possession and to which they
demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or
assert exclusive ownership. They contend that the administrator’s
administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If
remedy to recover that property is an action at law and not by motion in
there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the intestate proceeding. 

the deceased person or as to the distributive share to which each person


is entitled under the law, the testimony as to such controversy shall be

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 9

! 6
taken in writing by the judge, under oath. 
 -This resulted in the approval by the Court a quo on 1967 of the


"No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations
above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees,
or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs."cralairtua1aw library



Applying this Rule, the probate court, having the custody and
control of the entire estate, is the most logical authority to effectuate this
provision within the same estate proceeding, said proceeding being the
most convenient one in which this power and function of the court can
be exercised and performed without the necessity of requiring the parties
to undergo the inconvenience, delay and expense of having to commence
and litigate an entirely different action.
!!
IMPERIAL VS. MONOZ
Borlagdatan, April
! (adopted), should get only the remaining of the estate.
FACTS:
-On 1957, Luis Santos surviving spouse of the deceased Fermina
Bello Santos, who died intestate filed Special Proceeding No. 1049,
entitled "Intestate Estate of Fermina Bello Santos", in CFI Bulacan
-Luis was appointed regular Administrator on 1958, as there was
no opposition filed by the only other heir, herein petitioner Purificacion
Santos Imperial
-Later on petitioner Purificacion Santos Imperial entered her
appearance in the abovementioned intestate proceedings as Oppositor,
and filed a motion to require the regular administrator to render an
accounting
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 9
project of partition with the following awards:
1. To Dr. Luis U. Santos, citizen of the Philippines, of age, married to
Socorro Manankil and resident of Malolos, Bulacan, is hereby awarded
and adjudicated an undivided FIVE-EIGHTH(5/8) share in each of the
above-described properties; and
2. To Purificacion Santos-Imperial, citizen of the Philippines, of age,
married to Eloy Imperial and resident of Malolos, Bulacan, is hereby
awarded and adjudicated an undivided THREE-EIGHTH(3/8) share in
each of the properties described above;
Santos filed a Motion for Correction of both the Amended
Project of Partition of 1966, approved by the Court on June 6, 1967, and
the Final Partial Project of Partition of March 22, 1968, likewise approved
by the same court on April 26, 1968, claiming that the partition submitted
to the Court was erroneous, as the same did not conform with the ruling
laid down in the case of Santillon vs. Miranda
-Luis contended that he should get the properties partitioned
while oppositor-petitioner Purificacion Santos Imperial, the only child
ISSUES:
WON:
(1) An order of a probate court in testate or intestate proceedings
approving a project of partition which clearly fixed the distributive share
to which each heir is entitled is merely interlocutory in nature so that the
probate court can correct and set aside the same anytime; or is final and,
therefore, appealable within the 30 day period for appeal; and
(2) A court can order the correction of an erroneous final decision after it
had become final and executory.
RULING:
! 7
(1)
-The contention of petitioner to the effect that the orders of the court a
quo dated 1967 as well as that of 1968, are final as the same have
determined the distributive shares of the known forced heirs, finds
support in the very same case cited by the respondents as their authority.
-This Court citing the case of Santillon held that in deciding the issue as
to whether the order of the lower court is final and appealable, went on
to say:
It is clear that the order of the lower court is final and, therefore,
appealable to this Court.
Under Rule 109, section 1, a person may appeal in special proceedings
from an order of the Court of First Instance where such order
"determines ... the distributive share of the estate to which such person is
entitled."
The two (2) questioned orders, being final in character, should have been
appealed by the party adversely affected within the 30-day reglementary
period provided for appeal. This was not done.
(2)
-The contention of petitioner that an order which has already become
final and therefore executory is not subject to correction, finds support in
Chereau vs. Fuentebella, where it was held that an erroneous decree or
judgment although granted without legal authority and contrary to the
express provision of the statute, is not void. Here, as no appeal was
taken, the decree must be conceded to have full force and effect. An
erroneous decree is not a void decree.
-The questioned orders having become final and, therefore, executory
because of the failure of the herein respondent Luis U. Santos to appeal
on time by allowing the period for appeal to lapse before filing his
motion for correction on June 18, 1968, he has to suffer the misfortune
brought about by his own negligence and fatal inadvertence
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 9
LOPEZ VS. LOPEZ
Bueno, Jirene
!
FACTS:


Concepcion Lopez filed a petition in the intestate proceedings of the
deceased Emeterio Lopez, claiming to be an acknowledged natural
daughter of the deceased and praying that she be declared his universal
heiress entitled to a summary award of his estate, same being valued at
less than six thousand pesos (P6,000). The oppositors-appellants filed an
opposition, denying petitioner’s claim and praying that, as they are
nephews and nieces of the deceased, they be adjudged entitled to the
property.
! Concepcion Lopez filed later an amended petition, alleging that,
according to a new assessment, the estate was worth nine thousand
pesos (P9,000) and that, therefore, its distribution could not be made
summarily but thru regular administration proceedings. Accordingly, an
administrator was appointed who, but appellants filed a motion that
they be declared heirs of the deceased. The court issued an order
declaring the petitioner an acknowledged natural daughter of the
deceased entitled to the rights accorded her by law. The oppositors
appealed. 


ISSUE: Whether Concepcion Lopez is an acknowledged natural
daughter of Emeterio Lopez who died intestate, leaving no legitimate
descendants, ascendants or widow. 

!
RULING:
!
Yes. Concepcion Lopez is an acknowledged daughter of the deceased
and is the only heiress.
Contrary to appellants’ contention it is a well-settled rule that a person
claiming to be an acknowledged natural child of a deceased need not
maintain a separate action for recognition but may simply intervene in
the intestate proceedings, by alleging and proving therein his or her
! 8
status as such, and claiming accordingly the right to share in the GUY VS. COURT OF APPEALS
inheritance. Cadavis, Lloyd
!
The petition filed by Concepcion Lopez in the intestate proceedings is
!
FACTS:
alleged to be insufficient. It is said that there is no prayer therein that she
be declared an acknowledged natural child, but only that she be • Private respondents-minors Karen and Kamille Oanes Wei,
adjudged universal heiress, of the deceased. In the body of the petition represented by their mother Remedios filed a petition for letters
there is an allegation that she is a natural child of the based and has been of administration.
in an uninterrupted possession of such status.
!
The court ruled that inasmuch as the recognition of her status is a
• Private respondents alleged that they are the duly
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died
prerequisite to her right to heirship, her prayer that she be declared
intestate leaving an estate valued at P10m consisting of real and
universal heiress implies a like prayer that she be recognized as an
acknowledged natural child. Furthermore, it is a well-settled rule of personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse
pleadings, applicable to motions or petitions, that the prayer for relief, Shirley Guy and children Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and
though part of the pleading, is no part of the cause of action or defense Michael.
alleged therein, and the pleader is entitled to as much relief as the facts
duly pleaded may warrant.  In previous cases, similar facts were held • Private Respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular
to be sufficient to entitle a natural child to recognition. administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei Estate.

 Prayed by Petitioner Michael, son of the decedent, be appointed
Appellants claim that they had no notice either of the petition for the
as special administrator of the estate.
declaration of heirs or of the date set for the hearing thereof. We find in
the record no evidence affirmatively showing that they had no such
• Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted
notice; therefore, the presumption of regularity of proceedings should
that his father left no debts and that his estate can be settled
stand.
!
In the motion for reconsideration filed by them, the lack of notice is
without securing letters of administration pursuant to sec.1, rule
74. He argued that private respondents should have established
alleged; but the motion is not even verified. Besides, according to the their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima
record Attorney Simplicio B. Peña was the counsel for both the wei pursuant to Art.175 of the family code.
administrator and the oppositors-appellants. The petition for declaration
of heirs, although signed by Attorney Simplicio B. Peña as "abogado del • The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss on the ground that
administrador", was, in fact, a petition filed in behalf of the oppositors- the certification against forum shopping has been signed by the
appellants as their right to succession is therein asserted and prayed for.
private respondents and not their counsel. They contended that
Under these circumstances, there exists sufficient ground for holding, as
we do hold, that the oppositors-appellants had notice of the petition as Remedios should have executed the certification on behalf of her
well as of the hearing where the said attorney was present. 
 minor daughters.
!!

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 9

! 9
 • Petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private respondents
claim have been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise
extinguished by reason of Remedios Release and waiver of
claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational
assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor
children discharge the estate of SimaWei from any and all
liabilities.
• RTC-denied the motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental
motion to dismiss. It ruled that while the Release and waiver of
claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been established that
she was the duly constituted guardian of her minor daughters.
No renunciation of right occurred. Trial court also rejected
petitioner’s objections on the certification against forum
shopping.
• Petitioner mover for reconsideration but was denied. He filed a
petition for certiorari before CA which affirmed the RTC orders.
CA denied the MFR. Hence this petition.
• Petitioner argues that the CA disregarded existing rules on
certification against forum shopping; that the release and waiver
of claim executed by Remedios released and discharged the Guy
family and estate of Sima Wei from any claims or liabilities; and
that private respondents do not have the legal personality to
institute the petition for letters of administration as they failed
to prove their filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei.
• Private respondents contended that their counsels certification
can be considered substantial compliance with the rules on
certification of non-forum shopping.
ISSUES: 1. Whether private respondents should be dismissed for failure
to comply w/ the rules on certification of non-forum shopping?
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
2. whether the release and waiver of claim precludes private
respondents from claiming their successional rights?
3. whether private respondents are barred by prescription from
proving their filiation?
RULING:
1. Rule 7, sec.5 of the ROC provides that the certification on non-forum
shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party.
Failure to comply with the requirement shall be cause for dismissal of the
case. However, liberal application of the rules is proper where the higher
interest of justice would be served. In Sy Chin vs CA, we ruled that while
a petition may have been flawed where the certificate of non-forum
shopping was signed only by counsel and not by the party, this
procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice.
So it is in the present controversy where the merits of the case and the
absence of an intention to violate the rules with impunity should be
considered as compelling reasons to temper the strict application of the
rules.
2. As regards Remedios release and waiver of claim, the same does not
bar private respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid
and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms
which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or
benefit which legally pertains to him. In this case, we find that there was
no waiver of hereditary rights. The release and waiver of claim does not
state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that
remedies received 300k and an educational plan for her minor daughters
by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims
of whatsoever nature and kind against the estate of the late Rufino Guy
Susim. Considering that the document did not specifically mention
private respondents hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot
be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
! 00
Even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of
private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter’s claim. Under
article 1044 of CC, parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate
the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. Not having
been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the
instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting
their rights as heirs of the deceased.
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived
their successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as
acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased.
3. Anent the issue on private respondents filiation, we agree with the CA
that a ruling on the same would be premature considering that private
respondents have yet to present evidence. Before the family code took
effect, the governing law on actions for recognition of illegitimate
children was article 285 of the Civil code, to wit:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the
ff.cases:
1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in
which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of
4 years from the attainment of his majority;
Xxxx
In this case, the action must be commenced within 4 years from the
finding of the document.
We ruled in Bernabe vs Alejo, that illegitimate children who were still
minors at the time of the Family code took effect and whose putative
parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition
for a period of up to 4 years from attaining majority age.
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
Under the family code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is
established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for
recognition may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime.
However, if the action is based upon open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the
rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription
depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents
in proving their filiation. However, it would be impossible to determine
the same in this case as there has been no reception of evidence yet. This
court is not a trier of facts. Such matters may be resolved only by the
RTC.
!
!
!
!!
RULE 91
Escheats
!!
INRE ESTATE OF LAO SAYCO
Castillo, Shainn
!
FACTS:
This is an appeal by the Chinaman Lao Chiama, administrator of
the estate of the decedent Bernardo Rafanan Lao Sayco, aliasSaya, and
! 01
guardian of the minor Lay Chuyting from the judgment rendered in a
special proceeding.
The municipal council of Mambajao appeared in the said
proceedings and prayed that, since Bernardo Rafanan died in that pueblo
without leaving any known legitimate successor,the real and personal
property left by the said decedent within the district of the property left
by the said decedent within the district of the aforementioned
municipality be awarded to the latter. The administrator also prayede
that his administration be closed, and, as the guardian of the Chiaman
Lay Chuyting, requested that the property referred to be delivered to the
latter as the son and sole heir of the decedent Rafanan.
The municipal council of Mambajao,which believed that it was
entitled to the said property, opposed the delivery of the property to the
alleged heir.
The lower court, rendered judgment ordering that the property
left by the decedent, Bernardo Rafanan Lao Sayco, be assigned to the
municipality of Mambajao, Province of Misamis, to be administered by
its municipal council and placed at the disposal of the school in the same
manner as other property intended for the same use.
!
ISSUE:
Whether the municipality of Mambajao is entitled to the
property left by the decedent.
!
RULING:
No. Rule 91 of the Civil Procedure provides the rules for filing a
petition for escheat. In the present case,it does not appear that there was
made, at the request of counsel for the president and the municipal
council of Mambajao, the inquisition provided by law, for the record is
not accompanied by any certified copy of the investigatory of the real
and personal property that belonged to the said decedent, with a
statement of the places where the realty is located.Moreover, the notice
summoning the persons who believed they were entitled to his property
should have been published for at least six consecutive weeks, and not
for three.Furthermore, the person who lays claim to the property left by
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
the decedent at death, as the latter's successor or heir, must prove his
identity and rights.
! In the present case, counsel for the municipality of Mambajao
merely prayed for an order of reversion and for the adjudication in
behalf of the municipality of the property aforementioned; he did not
comply with the provisions of the law by furnishing the required proofs
in regard to the matters hereinabove indicated, which must be the subject
of an investigation.
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Castillo, Rochelle Jane
!
FACTS:
For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to 1985) private
respondent Amada Solano served as the all-around personal domestic
helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French national.
During Ms. Hankins' lifetime and most especially during the waning
years of her life, respondent Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a
constant companion since no close relative was available to tend to her
needs. In recognition of Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Ms.
Hankins executed in her favor two (2) deeds of donation involving two
(2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 of the Registry of
Deeds. Private respondent alleged that she misplaced the deeds of
donation and were nowhere to be found. While the deeds of donation
were missing, the Republic filed a petition for the escheat of the estate of
Elizabeth Hankins before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. During
the proceedings, a motion for intervention was filed by Romeo Solano,
spouse of private respondent, and one Gaudencio Regosa, but on 24 June
1987 the motion was denied by the trial court for the reason that "they
miserably failed to show valid claim or right to the properties in
question." Since it was established that there were no known heirs and
persons entitled to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower court
escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner Republic of the
Philippines.
! 02
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court had jurisdiction to declare the
same escheated in favor of the state.
RULING: (A)We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike
that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of its
sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person
who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a
property is claimed by the state to forestall an open "invitation to self-
service by the first comers." Since escheat is one of the incidents of
sovereignty, the state may, and usually does, prescribe the conditions and
limits the time within which a claim to such property may be made. The
procedure by which the escheated property may be recovered is
generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed within which
such action must be brought. (b) In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an
escheated property must file his claim "within five (5) years from the
date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of and title to
the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him
for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim not made shall be
barred forever." The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured
by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it is decidedly
prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in
asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final
judgment. (c) In a special proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and
751 the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any
person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to
be escheated is likewise an interested party and may appear and oppose
the petition for escheat. In the present case, the Colegio de San Jose, Inc.
and Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a material interest in the
Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan; the former because it claims to be the
exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he claims to be
the lessee thereof under a contract legally entered with the former
(underscoring supplied). (d) A judgment in escheat proceedings when
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive against all
persons with actual or constructive notice, but not against those who are
not parties or privies thereto. As held in Hamilton v. Brown,"a judgment
of escheat was held conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement
to all persons interested. Absolute lack on the part of petitioners of any
dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right, or in any way injure
him, constitutes due process of law, proper notice having been
observed." With the lapse of the 5-year period therefore, private
respondent has irretrievably lost her right to claim and the supposed
"discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough justification to nullify
the escheat judgment which has long attained finality.
RULE 109
Appeals in Special Proceedings
!
TESTATE ESTATE OF VDA.DE BIASCAN VS. BIASCAN
Dela Cruz, Kyzeth
!
REPUBLIC VS. NISHINA
De guzman, Jabrielle
!
FACTS:
Nisaida Sumera Nishina (respondent), represented by her
mother Zenaida Sumera Watanabe, filed before the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan a verified petition for cancellation of birth record and change of
surname. In her petition, respondent alleged the following: She was born
on October 31, 1987 in Malolos, Bulacan to her Filipino mother Zenaida
and Japanese father Koichi Nishina who were married. Her father later
died. Her mother married another Japanese, Kenichi Hakamada. As they
could not find any record of her birth at the Malolos civil registry,
respondents mother caused the late registration of her birth under the
surname of her mothers second husband, Hakamada. Her mother and
Hakamada eventually divorced. Her mother married another Japanese,
Takayuki Watanabe, who later adopted her by a decree issued by the
Tokyo Family Court. It was filed and recorded in the civil registry of
! 03
Manila. It surfaced that her birth was in fact originally registered at the
Malolos Civil Registry under the name Nisaida Sumera Nishina,hence,
her filing before the RTC of her petition praying that her second birth
certificate bearing the surname Hakamada, issued through late
registration be cancelled; and that in light of the decree of adoption, her
surname Nishina in the original birth certificate be changed to Watanabe.
After hearing the petition, RTC, granted respondents petition and
directed the Local Civil Registry of Malolos to cancel the second birth
record of Nisaida Sumera Hakamada and to change it from NISAIDA
SUMERA NISHINA to NISAIDA SUMERA WATANABE. Before the
Court of Appeals, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal,
alleging that petitioner adopted a wrong mode of appeal since it did not
file a record on appeal as required under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41
(appeal from the RTCs) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
appellate court dismissed petitioners appeal, holding that since
respondents petition before the RTC is classified as a special proceeding,
petitioner should have filed both notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within 30 days from receipt of the October 8, 2007 Order granting
respondents petition, and by not filing a record on appeal, petitioner
never perfected its appeal
! !
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in dismissing the appeal.
! !
RULING:
SECTION 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
specifies the orders or judgments in special proceedings which may be
the subject of an appeal, viz: SECTION 1. Orders or judgments from
which appeals may be taken. An interested person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First
Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order
or judgment: (a) Allows or disallows a will; (b) Determines who are the
lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate
to which such person is entitled; (c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in
part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim
presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it; (d) Settles
the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian; (e)
Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final
determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing,
except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
administrator; and (f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case,
and affects the substantial rights of the person appealing unless it be an
order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.
The above-quoted rule contemplates multiple appeals during the
pendency of special proceedings. A record on appeal in addition to the
notice of appeal is thus required to be filed as the original records of the
case should remain with the trial court to enable the rest of the case to
proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by said
court and held to be final. In the present case, the filing of a record on
appeal was not necessary since no other matter remained to be heard and
determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed order granting
respondents petition for cancellation of birth record and change of
surname in the civil registry. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
!
RULES 99-100
Adoption and Custody of Minors
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND BOBILES
Dorado, Czaybeeh
REPUBLIC VS. TOLEDANO AND SPOUSES CLOUSE
Espino, Carla
!
FACTS:
On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born US Citizen
and Evelyn Clouse, a former Filipino who became a naturalized US
citizen, filed a petition to adopt Solomon Alcala, a minor who is Evelyn's
youngest brother. The trial court granted the petition. Republic, through
the Office of the Solicitor General appealed contending that the lower
court erred in granting the petition for the spouses are not qualified to
adopt under Philippine Law.
ISSUE:
! 04
Whether or not Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt
RULING:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of The Family Code of the Philippines,
private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting
Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) expressly enumerates the persons who are not
qualified to adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino
spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly
with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens, not included in the foregoing exceptions, may adopt Filipino
children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may
be provided by law.
There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not
qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional
cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former
Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America.
In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by
consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place,
when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to
adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent
Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in
1988.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to
qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184. She was a former
Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately,
the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without
violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband
and wife. It reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the
following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a
condition that must be read along together with Article 184.
Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
between the spouses.
!!
REPUBLIC VS. MILLER
Hipolito, Nina Anthonette
!
FACTS:
On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed
with the RTC, Angeles City a verified petition to adopt Michael Magno
Madayag, a Filipino child, under the provision of the Child and Youth
! 05
Welfare Code which allows aliens to adopt. The natural parents executed
affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption and the DSWD
recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation. On
May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition for
adoption. On August 3, 1998, the Family Code became effective,
prohibiting the adoption of a Filipino child by aliens. The Solicitor
General appealed to the granting of the petition for adoption by the RTC.
ISSUE:
! sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
Whether or not aliens may be allowed to adopt a Filipino child
when the petition for adoption was filed prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code prohibiting the same.
! !
RULING:
Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition,
acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent
enactment of a new law disqualifying him. The enactment of the Family
Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents
who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become
vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be
governed by the law then in force. A vested right is one whose existence,
effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of
the holder. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations
created after the right has vested. As long as the petition for adoption
was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in
governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and
retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of
the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in
criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent
happenings or events, although of a character which would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. Therefore, an
alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family
code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code,
may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the
Family Code. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They
are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of
society and family in the person of the adopter, as well as childless
couples or persons to experience the joy of parenthood and give them
legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their
natural parent instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be
objectives of the law.
!
IN RE MICHELLE LIM
Katigbak, Paola Margareth
FACTS:
 
Monina Lim (petitioner) is an optometrist by profession. On
1974, she married Primo Lim. Being childless, they registered the minor
children entrusted to them by certain Ayuban as their own----named
Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
!
When Primo died, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American
citizen. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the
amnesty given under RA 8552 to those individuals who simulated the
birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions
for the adoption of Michelle and Michael. At the time of the filing of the
petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married,
while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
!
RTC dismissed the petitions on the ground that since the petitioner had
remarried, she should have filed the petition jointly with her new
husband. Motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied. Mere
consent of the husbend was insufficient because the law gives additional
requirements, such as residency and certification of his qualification,
which the husbandmust comply. As to the argument that the adoptees
are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the joint
exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that even an
emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes
certain obligations and responsibilities.
! 06
Hence, the present petition. between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the
  case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required. 
ISSUE:  

 
Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt? !
CANG VS. CLAVANO
RULE: Lectura, Erika
Denied. Under Section 7 of RA 8552, the use of the word
“shall” means that  joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
!
DSWD VS. BELEN
mandatory. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for Lim, Justin
adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption
were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband,
!!
Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption
on this ground.
!
REPUBLIC VS HERNANDEZ
! Lubay, Angela
Even if Olario gave his consent, there are requirements that must be
complied, as set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove
!
FACTS:
that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl
three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the
(3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement
(4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee
the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his
is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters adopted child.
None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial. adoption.
These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7.  Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the
  same petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore adoption and the petitions for the change of name in a single proceeding,
necessary since the children have been emancipated having reached the arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two
age of majority. This is untenable. It is true that when the child reaches separate proceedings.
the age of emancipation that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18
years of age emancipation terminates parental authority over the person Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of
and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for
name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are
all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just one of the
effects of legal adoption. Other effects were enumerated in Article V of different from and are not related to each other, being respectively
RA 8552. governed by distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends
!
Petitioner further insist that joint adoption was possible since Olario
that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as
a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural
already filed a case for dissolution of marriage, the court ruled that until consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the
and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1

! 07
change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would
involve a substantial change of one’s legal name, a petition for change of
name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the
substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for
adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5,
Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to
avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging
protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no
prohibition in the Rules against the joinderof adoption and change of
name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a
single petition.
ISSUE:
WON respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change
of the given or proper name if the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
RULING:
No.
Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of
adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of
parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the
surname of the adopters;
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear
the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is
the change of the adoptee’s surname to follow that of the adopter which
is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if
not prayed for by petitioner.
H o w e v e r , t h e  g i v e n o r p r o p e r  n a m e , a l s o k n o w n a s
the  first  or  Christian  name, of the adoptee must remain as it was
originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive
relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the
adoptee’s registered Christian or first name. The automatic change
thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the
purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an
adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively
inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be
granted.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register
is the name appearing therein. If a change in one’s name is desired, this
can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive
and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of
name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the
reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly
determined.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding  in rem, strict
compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order
to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an
independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed
by its own set of rules. Afortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any
other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of
another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and
significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law
system.
IN RE STEPHANIE GARCIA
Mercado, Trish
!
! 08
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY
ASTORGA GARCIA, HONORATO B. CATINDIG
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
!
FACTS:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner,
filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was
born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and
that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He
prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to “Garcia”
her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to
“Catindig” his surname.
!
ISSUE:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father,
use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name?
!
HELD:
YES.
!
RATIO:
An adopted child is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right
to bear the surname of her father and her mother. Being a legitimate
child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all
the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of
any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother.
!
Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her
natural father to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, the Court
finds no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
!!
!
BRIONES VS. MIGUEL
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
Dumapias, Gay*
!
SY VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Rivera, Hiezll Wynn
!
FACTS:
  On  19 January 1994, Mercedes Tan  Uy-Sy  filed a petition for
habeas corpus against Wilson  Sy  before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 48, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 94-69002.
Mercedes prayed that said writ be issued ordering Wilson to produce
their minor children Vanessa and Jeremiah before the court and that after
hearing, their care and custody be awarded  to her as their mother. 
                   In his answer, Wilson prayed that the custody of the minors be
awarded to him instead. Petitioner maintained that Mercedes was unfit
to take custody of the minors. He adduced the following reasons: firstly,
respondent abandoned her family in 1992; secondly, she is mentally
unstable; and thirdly, she cannot provide proper care to the children.
!
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the custody of the minor children be given
to the mother.
2. Whether or not the father is obligated to provide financial
support to the minor children not in his custody.
RULING:
!
1. Yes. Section 213 of the Family Code states that:
“In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take
into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child
over seven years of age, unless the parent is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.”         
In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and
foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral
welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents.
! 09
 However, the law favors the mother if she is a fit and proper
person to have custody of her children so that they may not only receive
her attention, care, supervision but also have the advantage and benefit
o f a m o t h e r ’ s l o v e a n d d e v o t i o n f o r w h i c h t h e re i s n o
substitute.  Generally, the love, solicitude and devotion of a mother
cannot be replaced by another and are worth more to a child of tender
years than all other things combined.
!
2. Yes.
Article 203 of the Family Code states that the obligation to give
support is demandable from the time the person who has a right to
receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except
from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.
The Court likewise affirms the award of  P50,000.00  as support for the
minor children. As found by both courts, petitioner’s representations
regarding his family’s wealth and his capability to provide for his family
more than provided a fair indication of his financial standing even
though he proved to be less than forthright on the matter.  In any event,
this award of support is merely provisional as the amount may be
modified or altered in accordance with the increased or decreased needs
of the needy party and with the means of the giver.
!!
! ingratitude to the memory of the latter and to his adoptive mother who
RULE 103
Change of Name
! requires an adopted child to use the surname of the adopter.
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS (May 21, 1992)
Rodriguez, Maria Lorraine
!
FACTS:
Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of
Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina. When he was but 2 and a half years
old and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret Alcala,
was then 9 years old, they were, with the consent of their natural
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
parents and by order of the court, adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and
Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong Wong, now
deceased, was an insurance agent while Concepcion Ty Wong was a high
school teacher. They decided to adopt the children as they remained
childless after 15 years of marriage. Upon reaching the age of 22, private
respondent, by then married and a junior Engineering student, filed a
petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his
use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his
relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in
truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien
nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname,
thus hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother
does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.
!
RTC: resolved in favor of private respondent, decreeing that, the
jurisdictional requirements having been fully complied with.
!
Republic through the Solicitor General appealed. The Solicitor General
contends that private respondent's allegations of ridicule and/or
isolation from family and friends were unsubstantiated and cannot
justify the petition for change of name. He claims that for private
respondent to cast aside the name of his adoptive father is crass
is still alive, despite her consent to the petition for change of name.
Further, the Solicitor General posits that the reversion of Maximo Wong
to his old name violates Articles 341 and 365 of the Civil Code, which
CA: Affirmed.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
!
ISSUE:
Whether the reasons given by private respondent in his petition
for change of name are valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the
granting of said petition.
!
RULING: YES. The assertion of the Solicitor General was unacceptable.
The testimony of private respondent in the lower court bears out the
! 10
existence of valid cause in his bid for change of name: that he observed
that “Wong” as a surname embarrassed him to his friends and when he
goes with Chinese friends he cannot talk Chinese; that private
respondent was living in Campo Muslim, a Muslim community but no
one can believe that he is a Muslim; that he has a little business of
Furniture but has little customer because no one believes that he is
Muslim. Hence, the SC upheldthe decision of respondent appellate court.
The purpose of the law an allowing of change of name as contemplated
by the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is to give a person an
opportunity to improve his personality and to provide his best interest.In
granting or denying the petition for change of name, the question of
proper and reasonable cause is left to the discretion of the court. The
evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the
best evidence available is required.In the present case, the court had
exercised its discretion judiciously when it granted the petition.
Justice dictates that a person should be allowed to improve his
social standing as long as in doing so, he does not cause prejudice or
injury to the interest of the State or other persons .Nothing whatsoever is
shown in the record of this case that such prejudice or injury to the
interest of the state or of other persons would result in the change of
petitioner's name.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not
only some proper or compelling reason therefor but also that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds
for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) When the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b)
When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c)
When the change will avoid confusion; (d) Having continuously used
and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her
alien parentage; (e) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the
question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of
the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court
and not all the best evidence available. Summarizing, in special
proceedings for change of name, what is involved is not a mere matter of
allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of
the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support
thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and
with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in
the courts.
While it is true that under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the
effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must
nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the surname of the adopted
child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption proceedings.0 The
act of adoption fixes a status, viz., that of parent and child. More
technically, it is an act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are
recognized as legally existing between persons not so related by nature.
It has been defined as the taking into one's family of the child of another
as son or daughter and heir and conferring on it a title to the rights and
privileges of such. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect this
new status of relationship between the child and its adoptive parents, the
change of name which frequently accompanies adoption being more an
incident than the object of the proceeding. 31 The welfare of the child is
the primary consideration in the determination of an application for
adoption.
!!
SILVERIO VS. REPUBLIC
Salayog, Benny Rico
!
PEOPLE VS. CAGANDAHAN
Sumaway, Dylan
!
REPUBLIC VS. AQUINO
Tomarong, Marian
!
! 11
REPUBLIC VS. MARCOS
Tresvalles, Kris
!
FACTS: On March 30, 1968, a verified petition was filed by private
respondent Pang Cha Quen alleging that she is a citizen of Nationalist
China, married to Alfredo De la Cruz, a Filipino citizen; that she had
resided in Baguio City since her birth on January 29, 1930; that by a
previous marriage to Sia Bian alias Huang Tzeh Lik, a citizen of
Nationalist China, she gave birth to a daughter, May Sia alias Manman
Huang on January 28, 1958 in the City of Manila; that on January 12,
1959, she caused her daughter to be registered as an alien under the
name of Mary Pang, i.e., using the maternal surname, because the child's
father had abandoned them; that her daughter has always used the name
Mary Pang at home and in the Baguio Chinese Patriotic School where
she studies; that on August 16, 1966, petitioner Pang Cha Quen married
Alfredo De la Cruz; that as her daughter has grown to love and
recognize her stepfather, Alfredo De la Cruz, as her own father, she
desires to adopt and use his surname "De la Cruz" in addition to her
name "Mary Pang" so that her full name shall be Mary Pang De la Cruz;
that Alfredo De la Cruz gave his conformity to the petition by signing at
the bottom of the pleading; that the petition was not made for the
purpose of concealing a crime as her ten-year old daughter has not
committed any, nor to evade the execution of a judgment as she has
never been sued in court, and the petition is not intended to cause
damage or prejudice to any third person. She prayed that her daughter
be allowed to change her name from May Sia, alias Manman Huang, to
Mary Pang De la Cruz.
On April 4, 1968, respondent Judge issued an order setting the hearing of
the petition on September 16, 1968 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning and
inviting all interested persons to appear and show cause, if any, why the
petition should not be granted. The order also directed that it be
published at the expense of the petitioner in the Baguio and Midland
Courier, a newspaper of general circulation in Baguio City and Mountain
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
Province, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, the first
publication to be made as soon as possible. The order also commanded
that the Solicitor General and the City Attorney of Baguio be furnished
copies of the order and petition.
On September 16, 1968, when the petition was called for hearing, nobody
opposed it. Upon motion of petitioner's counsel, respondent Judge
authorized the Clerk of Court or his deputy to receive the evidence of the
petitioner, Pang Cha Quen.
Then, respondent Judge issued an order on February 12, 1969
authorizing the name of the minor, May Sia alias Manman Huang, also
known as Mary Pang, to be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz.
The Government, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the Supreme
Court on the ground that the court's order is contrary to law
ISSUE: whether respondent Judge erred in granting the petition
although private respondent Pang Cha Quen failed to adduce proper
and reasonable cause for changing the name of the minor "May Sia" alias
Manman Huang."
HELD: The Government's contention is well-taken.
1. We accordingly hold that for a publication of a petition for a change of
name to be valid, the title thereof should include, first, his real name, and
second, his aliases, if any. this Court explained the reason for the rule
requiring the inclusion of the name sought to be adopted and the other
names or aliases of the applicant in the title of the petition, or in the
caption of the published order. It is that the ordinary reader only glances
fleetingly at the caption of the published order or the title of the petition
in a special proceeding for a change of name. Only if the caption or the
title strikes him because one or all of the names mentioned are familiar to
him, does he proceed to read the contents of the order. The probability is
! 12
great that he will not notice the other names or aliases of the applicant if
they are mentioned only in the body of the order or petition.
In the case at bar, the caption of both the verified petition dated March
30,1968, and the published order of the trial court dated April 4, 1968
read, thus:
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF THE MINOR MAY SIA
ALIAS MANMAN HUANG TO MARY PANG DE LA CRUZ, PANG
CHA QUEN, Petitioner. (P. 15, Rollo.)
The omission of her other alias-- "Mary Pang"-- in the captions of the
court's order and of the petition defeats the purpose of the publication.
In view of that defect, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
subject of the proceedings, i.e., the various names and aliases of the
petitioner which she wished to change to "Mary Pang De la Cruz."
! them to adopt the surname of their mother's husband, who is not their
2. The following have been considered valid grounds for a change of
name:
(1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce;
(2) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
(3) when the change will avoid confusion (Haw Liong vs. Republic,
L-21194, April 29,1966; Chill Hap Chin vs. Republic, L-20018, April 30,
1966; Republic vs. Tanada, et al., L-31563, November 29, 1971; Alfon vs.
Republic, I,51201, May 29, 1980);
(4) having continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, unaware of his alien parentage (Josefina Ang Chay vs.
Republic, L-28507, July 31, 1980); or
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
(5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage all in good faith and not to prejudice anybody (Uy vs. Republic,
L-22712, November 29, 1965).
As may be gleaned from the petition filed in the lower court, the reasons
offered for changing the name of petitioner's daughter are: (1) that "her
daughter grew up with, and learned to love and recognize Alfredo de la
Cruz as her own father. (2) to afford her daughter a feeling of security
and (3) that "Alfredo de la Cruz agrees to this petition, and has signified
his conformity at the foot of this pleading"
Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a change of name. The general
rule is that a change of name should not be permitted if it will give a
false impression of family relationship to another where none actually
exists. we specifically held that our laws do not authorize legitimate
children to adopt the surname of a person not their father, for to allow
father, can result in confusion of their paternity.
Another reason for disallowing the petition for change of name is that it
was not filed by the proper party.
Clearly, the petition for change of name must be filed by the person
desiring to change his/her name, even if it may be signed and verified
by some other person in his behalf. In this case, however, the petition
was filed by Pang Cha Quen not by May Sia.Hence, only May Sia herself,
alias Manman Huang, alias Mary Pang, when she shall have reached the
age of majority, may file the petition to change her name. The decision to
change her name, the reason for the change, and the choice of a new
name and surname shall be hers alone to make. It must be her personal
decision.
!!
IN RE: PETITION OF JULIAN WANG
! 13
Tuason, Jannelle dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
!
FACTS:
change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and
been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City to parents
alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
each other. When his parents subsequently got married, they executed a
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is
deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed
no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.16
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in
The present petition seeks to drop the middle name altogether. Decided
Singapore for a long time because they will let him study there together
cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for change of name usually
with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore.
deal with requests for change of surname. There are only a handful of
Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother
cases involving requests for change of the given name and none on
are not carried in a person’s name, they anticipate that Julian Lin
requests for changing or dropping of the middle name. Does the law
Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current
allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name? We have
registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might
to answer in the negative because middle names serve as to identify the
also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they have
maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish
different surnames. Hence, they filed a petition for change of name and/
him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he
or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin
has.
Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have
his registered name changedto Julian Lin Wang.RTC denied the petition In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the
because the reasons for the change of name were not within the grounds dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of
recognized by law. Appeal made thereon was subsequently denied. name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and
convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his
ISSUE:
middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute
Whether or not the denial to grant the change of name was proper. proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete
RULING: name.

Yes. The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be !
REPUBLIC VS. CAPOTE
‘proper and reasonable cause’ for which the change is sought. To justify a
Umbalin, Norissa
request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper
or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the
!!
use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name
which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
RA 9048 & 10172

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1

! 14
! Clerical Error Law
BATBATAN VS. OFFICE OF LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
Uy, Alexander
!
FACTS:
Petitioner Eligia Batbatan is the mother of two minor children,
Jorge Batbatan Ang and Delia Batbatan Luy. The surnames were taken
from then name and alias of their father, Ang Kiu Chuy, alias Sioma Luy.
Petitioner and Sioma Luy were never married, and Sioma Luy is married
to another woman. Petitioner filed the petition to remove the name of the
father so that the son would be Jorge Batbatan and the daughter would
be Delia Batbatab. The petition was denied by the trial court on the
grounds that the records show that it was the petitioner who supplied
the information in the birth certificate of her son, and that entries in the
records of birth are correctable only if the effect would not change status,
citizenship, or any substantial alterations. Such changes must be decided
in the appropriate proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the name change could be allowed
RULING:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. The changes sought by
petitioner would not affect the status of the children because they are
illegitimate in the first place. The law requires that illegitimate children
should carry the surname of their mothers and that is precisely what the
petitioner was trying to achieve here. A clerical error implies mistakes by
the clerk in copying or writing, the making of wrong entries in the public
records contrary to existing facts. It is not a clerical error if it would bring
about a substantial change.
! !
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
!!
!!
!
LEE VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 118387, 367 SCRA 110
OCTOBER 11, 2001
Meiki , Merlin
!
FACTS:
The private respondents are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful
wife, Keh Shiok Cheng. The petitioners are children of Lee Tek Sheng
and his concubine, Tiu Chuan.
!
Private Respondents—Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K. Lee-
Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin, Lucia K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong, Julian K.
Lee, Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-
Miguel and Thomas K. Lee, filed two (2) separate petitions for the
cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of the
petitioners—Marcelo Lee, Albina Lee-Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee,
Helen Lee, Catalino K. Lee, Eusebio Lee, and Emma Lee.
!
A case was filed against all petitioners, except Emma Lee, before RTC
Manila assigned to respondent Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion. A similar
petition against Emma Lee was filed before the RTC of Kalookan and
assigned to the sala of respondent Judge Jaime T. Hamoy.
!
Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous
entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or
canceling therein the name of “Keh Shiok Cheng” as their mother, and
by substituting the same with the name “Tiu Chuan”, who is allegedly
the petitioners’ true birth mother.
!
The private respondents alleged in their petitions that they are the
legitimate children of spouses Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng who
were legally married in China.
! 15
Tiu Chuan was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his family as their new
housemaid but immediately became his mistress. As a result of their
illicit relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to petitioners.
!
Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu
Chuan gave birth to each of the petitioners, their father, falsified the
entries in the records of birth of petitioners by making it appear that
petitioners’ mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.
! !!
Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who took care of the
petitioners. They all lived in the same compound Keh Shiok Cheng and
private respondents were residing in. All was well, therefore, before
private respondents’ discovery of the dishonesty and fraud perpetrated
by their father, Lee Tek Sheng.
!
When Keh Shiok Cheng died, Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names of
all his children, including those of petitioners’, be included in the
obituary notice of the former’s death that was to be published in the
newspapers.
!
The private respondents requested the NBI to conduct an investigation.
After investigation, the NBI prepared a report that the false entries in
the records of birth of petitioners made it appear that the latter were
legitimate children of Kek Shiok Cheng.
! !
It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the petitions
for cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners’ records of
birth with the lower courts.
!
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions on the grounds
that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate objective is to
assail the legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, which
is essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was filed prematurely; and
(3) the action to impugn has already prescribed.
!
Respondent Judge Veneracion denied the motion to dismiss for failure of
the petitioners to appear at the hearing of the said motion.
! !
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued an Order stating
that the petitioners have complied with the jurisdictional requirements
for the Court to take cognizance of this case.
!
Petitioners’ attempts at seeking a reconsideration of the above-
mentioned orders failed and they appealed to the CA. The CA, however,
found no merit in their arguments and dismissed their petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
is proper
2. Whether or not the private respondent’s suits amounted to a
collateral attack against petitioner’s legitimacy in the guise of a Rule
108 proceeding
!!
HELD:
The proceedings are simply aimed at establishing a particular fact,
status and/or right. The thrust of said proceedings was to establish the
factual truth regarding the occurrence of certain events which created or
affected the status of persons and/or otherwise deprived said persons of
rights.
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court establishes the status or right of
a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed by private respondents
for the correction of entries in the petitioners’ records of birth were
intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was
impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the
petitioners as shown in their birth records.
!
Contrary to petitioners’ contention that the petitions before the lower
courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is
not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok
Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter’s children.
There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between
Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.
! 16
In Republic vs. Valencia, this Court, held that even substantial errors in
a civil register may be corrected and the true facts established provided
the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. A proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of
entries in the civil register under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in
nature and takes on the characteristics of an appropriate adversary
proceeding when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are
complied with.
!“Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant
facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel
have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and
where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit
or proceeding is ‘appropriate.’
!
The pertinent sections of rule 108 provide:
!
‘SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties
to the proceeding.’
! !
‘SEC. 4.Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the
court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the
same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province.’
!
‘SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is
sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from
the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.’
“Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning
the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are - (1) the
civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the
duty of the court to - (1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled
to oppose the petition: - (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having
or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction
is sought.
“If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for
correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if
filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no
longer be described as “summary”. There can be no doubt that when an
opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any
person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be
cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the
proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings.” (Underscoring
supplied.)
!
According to the Court of Appeals, the proceedings taken in both
petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of
birth of petitioners in the lower courts are appropriate adversary
proceedings.
We agree. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
!
In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of
entries of birth was filed by private respondents and pursuant to the
order of the RTC-Manila, dated February 17, 1993, a copy of the order
setting the case for hearing was ordered published once a week for three
(3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines. In the RTC-Kalookan, there was an actual publication of
the order setting the case for hearing in “Media Update” once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks. In both cases notices of the orders were
ordered served upon the Solicitor General, the Civil Registrars of Manila
and Kalookan and upon the petitioners herein. Both orders set the case
for hearing and directed the Civil Registrars and the other respondents
in the case below to file their oppositions to the said petitions. A
motion to dismiss was consequently filed by herein petitioners Marcelo,
Mariano, Pablo, Helen, Catalino and Eusebio, all surnamed Lee, and
! 17
Albina Lee-Young in the RTC-Manila, and an opposition was filed by
Emma Lee in the RTC-Kalookan.
!
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the petitions filed by the private
respondents in the courts below by way of a special proceeding for
cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil registers with the
requisite parties, notices and publications could very well be regarded as
that proper suit or appropriate action. (Underscoring supplied.)
!
The petitioners assert, however, that making the proceedings adversarial
does not give trial courts the license to go beyond the ambit of Rule 108
which is limited to those corrections contemplated by Article 412 of the
New Civil Code or mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous
nature. The petitioners point to the case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,
which is of a later date than Republic vs. Valencia, where this
Courtreverted to the doctrine laid down in earlier cases, starting with
Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic, prohibiting the extension of the application of
Rule 108 beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections.
Petitioners contend that as held in Go, et al. vs. Civil Registrar,
allowing substantial changes under Rule 108 would render the said rule
unconstitutional as the same would have the effect of increasing or
modifying substantive rights.
!
At the outset, it should be pointed out that in the cited case of Labayo-
Rowe vs. Republic, the reason we declared null and void the portion of
the lower court’s order directing the change of Labayo-Rowe’s civil
status and the filiation of one of her children as appearing in the latter’s
record of birth, is not because Rule 108 was inappropriate to effect such
changes, but because Labayo-Rowe’s petition before the lower court
failed to implead all indispensable parties to the case.
!
Far from petitioners’ theory, this Court’s ruling in Labayo-Rowe vs.
Republic[ does not exclude recourse to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court to effect substantial changes or corrections in entries of the civil
register. The only requisite is that the proceedings under Rule 108 be an
appropriate adversary proceeding as contra-distinguished from a
summary proceeding. Thus:
! must be conceded, however, that even after Republic vs. Valenciathere
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
“If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or correction of
entries in the civil register] is merely to correct the clerical errors which
are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may,
under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a
mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect
the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are
substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed
after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of
the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship
of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a
proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy,
and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are
notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the
allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted. x x
x.” (Underscoring supplied.)
!
It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing may
be dispensed with, and the remedy granted upon mere application or
motion. But this is not always the case, as when the statute expressly
provides. Hence, a special proceeding is not always summary. One only
has to take a look at the procedure outlined in Rule 108 to see that what
is contemplated therein is not a summary proceeding per se. Rule 108
requires publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e., once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec. 4). The Rule also requires inclusion as
parties of all persons who claim any interest which would be affected by
the cancellation or correction (Sec. 3). The civil registrar and any person
in interest are also required to file their opposition, if any, within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication
of such notice (Sec. 5). Last, but not the least, although the court may
make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court
shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same (Sec.
7).
!
Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in Republic vs.
Valencia, that Rule 108, when all the procedural requirements thereunder
are followed, is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect
substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register. It
! 18
continues to be a seesawing of opinion on the issue of whether or not
substantial corrections in entries of the civil register may be effected by
means of Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. The
more recent cases of Leonor vs. Court of Appealsand Republic vs.
Labradordo seem to signal a reversion to the Ty Kong Tin ruling which
delimited the scope of application of Article 412 to clerical or
typographical errors in entries of the civil register.
!
In Republic vs. Labrador, the Court held that Rule 108 cannot be used to
modify, alter or increase substantive rights, such as those involving the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child. We ruled thus:
!‘On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize the cancellation of any
entry regarding “marriages” in the civil registry for any reason by the
mere filing of a verified petition for the purpose. However, it is not as
simple as it looks. Doctrinally, the only errors that can be canceled or
corrected under this Rule are typographical or clerical errors, not
material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage. A
clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding; error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in
copying or writing (Black vs. Republic, L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958); or some
harmless and innocuous change such as a correction of name that is
clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent
(Ansalada vs. Republic, L-10226, Feb. 14, 1958).’
!
‘Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil
status of petitioner and her children from legitimate to illegitimate, the
same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial x x x.’
! !
‘Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule 108, and
for that matter under Article 412 of the Civil Code cannot be used by
Mauricio to change his and Virginia’s civil status from married to single
and of their three children from legitimate to illegitimate. x x x’
!
“Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry in a civil registry will
change the status of a person from “legitimate” to “illegitimate,” as in
Sarah Zita’s case, the same cannot be granted in summary proceedings.”
! Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
It is, therefore, high time that we put an end to the confusion sown by
pronouncements seemingly in conflict with each other, and perhaps, in
the process, stem the continuing influx of cases raising the same
substantial issue.
The basis for the pronouncement that extending the scope of Rule 108 to
substantial corrections is unconstitutional is embodied in the early case
of Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic[40] that first delineated the extent or scope
of the matters that may be changed or corrected pursuant to Article 412
of the New Civil Code. The Supreme Court ruled in this case that:
!
“x x x. After a mature deliberation, the opinion was reached that what
was contemplated therein are mere corrections of mistakes that are
clerical in nature and not those that may affect the civil status or the
nationality or citizenship of the persons involved. If the purpose of the
petition is merely a clerical error then the court may issue an order in
order that the error or mistake may be corrected. If it refers to a
substantial change, which affects the status or citizenship of a party, the
matter should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the
nature of the issue involved. Such action can be found at random in our
substantive and remedial laws the implementation of which will
naturally depend upon the factors and circumstances that might arise
affecting the interested parties. This opinion is predicated upon the
theory that the procedure contemplated in article 412 is summary in
nature which cannot cover cases involving controversial issues.”
!
This doctrine was taken a step further in the case of Chua Wee, et al. vs.
Republicwhere the Court said that:
“From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950 until
the promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court on January 1, 1964, there
was no law nor rule of court prescribing the procedure to secure judicial
authorization to effect the desired innocuous rectifications or
alterations in the civil register pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil
Code. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court now provides for such a
procedure which should be limited solely to the implementation of
Article 412, the substantive law on the matter of correcting entries in the
civil register. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of
! 19
making authority under Section 13 of Art. VIII of the Constitution,
which directs that such rules of court ‘shall not diminish or increase or
modify substantive rights.’ If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond
innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible
to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend
substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule
108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or
modifying substantive rights, which changes are not authorized under
Article 412 of the New Civil Code.”[43] (Underscoring supplied).
We venture to say now that the above pronouncements proceed from a
wrong premise, that is, the interpretation that Article 412 pertains only
to clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, effectively excluding
from its domain, and the scope of its implementing rule, substantial
changes that may affect nationality, status, filiation and the like. Why
the limited scope of Article 412? Unfortunately, Ty Kong Tin does not
satisfactorily answer this question except to opine that the procedure
contemplated in Article 412 is summary in nature and cannot, therefore,
cover cases involving controversial issues. Subsequent cases have
merely echoed the Ty Kong Tin doctrine without, however, shedding
light on the matter.
!
The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412 contemplates
a summary procedure.
First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows:
“No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a
judicial order.”
It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed except
to say that the corrections or changes must be effected by judicial order.
As such, it cannot be gleaned therefrom that the procedure contemplated
for obtaining such judicial order is summary in nature.
!
Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms
“corrected” and “changed”. In its ordinary sense, to correct means “to
make or set right”;“to remove the faults or errors from” while to change
means “to replace something with something else of the same kind or
with something that serves as a substitute”. The provision neither
qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor does it
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
distinguish on the basis of the effect that the correction or change may
have. Hence, it is proper to conclude that all entries in the civil register
may be changed or corrected under Article 412. What are the entries in
the civil register? We need not go further than Articles 407 and 408 of
the same title to find the answer.
!
Thirdly, Republic Act No. 9048 which was passed by Congress on
February 8, 2001 substantially amended Article 412 of the New Civil
Code, to wit:
!
“SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and
Change of First Name or Nickname.- No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.”
!
The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical errors in entries
of the civil register are now to be corrected and changed without need of
a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the
correction or changing of such errors in entries of the civil register.
Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial
changes and corrections in entries of the civil register. This is precisely
the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and other cases of its genre had said,
perhaps another indication that it was not sound doctrine after all.
!
It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congress’
response to the confusion wrought by the failure to delineate as to what
exactly is that so-called summary procedure for changes or corrections
of a harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from that
appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of a
substantial kind. For we must admit that though we have constantly
referred to an appropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed to
categorically state just what that procedure is. Republic Act No. 9048
now embodies that summary procedure while Rule 108 is that
appropriate adversary proceeding. Be that as it may, the case at bar
! 20
cannot be decided on the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which has
prospective application. Hence, the necessity for the preceding treatise.
!!
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REPUBLIC VS. KHO
GR. NO. 170340
JUNE 29, 2007
Meiki , Merlin
!
FACTS:
!
On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and
Heddy Moira filed before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for
correction of entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes
in their respective birth certificates. Carlito also asked the court in
behalf of his minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of
some entries in their birth certificates.
!
In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate
of the citizenship of his mother to "Filipino" instead of "Chinese," as
well as the deletion of the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of
marriage of parents" because his parents, Juan Kho and Epifania
Inchoco (Epifania), were allegedly not legally married. The same request
to delete the "married" status of their parents from their respective birth
certificates was made by Carlito’s siblings Michael, Mercy Nona, and
Heddy Moira. With respect to the birth certificates of Carlito’s children,
he prayed that the date of his and his wife’s marriage be corrected from
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the date appearing in their marriage
certificate.
!
On April 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition3 in which it
was additionally prayed that Carlito’s second name of "John" be
deleted from his record of birth; and that the name and citizenship of
Carlito’s father in his (Carlito’s) marriage certificate be corrected from
"John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and "Filipino" to "Chinese," respectively.
!
On September 14, 2001,7 the OSG entered its appearance with an
authorization to the city prosecutor of Butuan City to appear in the case
and render assistance to it (the OSG).
!
On January 31, 2002, respondents presented documentary evidence
showing compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the petition
and testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies of Carlito and his
mother, Epifania. During the same hearing, an additional correction in
the birth certificates of Carlito’s children was requested to the effect
that the first name of their mother be rectified from "Maribel" to
"Marivel."
!
RTC Ruling:
!
The trial court directed the local civil registrar of Butuan City to correct
the entries in the record of birth of Carlito, as follows: (1) change the
citizenship of his mother from "Chinese" to "Filipino"; (2) delete "John"
from his name; and (3) delete the word "married" opposite the date of
marriage of his parents. The last correction was ordered to be effected
likewise in the birth certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona,
and Heddy Moira. As well as the prayer for the correction in the birth
certificates of Carlito’s minor children are granted. Further, the trial
court granted the correction prayed for in Carlito’s marriage certificate.
!
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to
the CA, faulting the trial court in granting the petition for correction of
entries in the subject documents despite the failure of respondents to
implead the minors’ mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party and to
offer sufficient evidence to warrant the corrections with regard to the
! 21
questioned "married" status of Carlito and his siblings’ parents, and the
latter’s citizenship.
!
CA Ruling;
!
By the assailed Decision of October 27, 2005, the CA denied petitioner’s
appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
!!
ISSUE:
!
Whether the failure to implead Marivel and Carlito’s parents rendered
the trial short of the required adversary proceeding and the trial court’s
judgment void. NO
!!
HELD:
!
A similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court of Appeals. That
case stemmed from a petition for correction of entries in the birth
certificate of a minor, June Salvacion Maravilla, to reflect the name of
her real father (Armando Gustilo) and to correspondingly change her
surname. The petition was granted by the trial court.
!
Barco, whose minor daughter was allegedly fathered also by Gustilo,
however, sought to annul the trial court’s decision, claiming that she
should have been made a party to the petition for correction. Failure to
implead her deprived the RTC of jurisdiction, she contended.
!
In dismissing Barco’s petition, this Court held that the publication of
the order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to
implead an indispensable party.
! !
The essential requisite for allowing substantial corrections of entries in
the civil registry is that the true facts be established in an appropriate
adversarial proceeding. This is embodied in Section 3, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court, which states:
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
Section 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties
to the proceeding.
!
xxxx
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule
108. Her interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any
judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando would
affect her ward’s share in the estate of her father. x x x.
!
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of
Appeals correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance
with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication x x x.
!
xxxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world
to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision
would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section
3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out. x x x
!
xxxx
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a
thing and not against a person. The decision on the petition binds not
only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the
whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all
who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right
sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings
in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule on whether
Marivel or respondents’ parents should have been impleaded as parties
to the proceeding. It may not be amiss to mention, however, that during
the hearing on January 31, 2002, the city prosecutor who was acting as
representative of the OSG did not raise any objection to the non-
inclusion of Marivel and Carlito’s parents as parties to the proceeding.
! 22
!
Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivel was unaware
of the proceedings to correct the entries in her children’s birth
certificates, especially since the notices, orders and decision of the trial
court were all sent to the residence she shared with Carlito and the
children.
!
It is also well to remember that the role of the court in hearing a petition
to correct certain entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the truth
about the facts recorded therein.
!
With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their
certificate of marriage25 shows that indeed they were married on
January 21, 2000, not on April 27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito
declared that the date "April 27, 1989" was supplied by his helper,
adding that he was not married to Marivel at the time his sons were
born because his previous marriage was annulled only in 1999.Given the
evidence presented by respondents, the CA observed that the minors
were illegitimate at birth, hence, the correction would bring about no
change at all in the nature of their filiation.
!
With respect to Carlito’s mother, it bears noting that she declared at the
witness stand that she was not married to Juan Kho who died in 1959.
Again, that testimony was not challenged by the city prosecutor.
!
The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from Carlito’s and
his siblings’ birth certificates of the entry "Married" opposite the date of
marriage of their parents, moreover, consisted of a certification issued
on November 24, 1973 by St. Joseph (Butuan City) Parish priest Eugene
van Vught stating that Juan Kho and Epifania had been living together
as common law couple since 1935 but have never contracted marriage
legally.
!
A certification from the office of the city registrar, which was appended
to respondents’ Amended Petition, likewise stated that it has no record
of marriage between Juan Kho and Epifania. Under the circumstances,
the deletion of the word "Married" opposite the "date of marriage of
parents" is warranted.
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
!
With respect to the correction in Carlito’s birth certificate of his name
from "Carlito John" to "Carlito," the same was properly granted under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the
cancellation or correction of entries involving changes of name falls
under letter "o" of the following provision of Section 2 of Rule 108:
!
Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.— Upon good and
valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled
or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e)
judgments of annulment of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election,
loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and
(o)changes of name. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
!
Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs
petitions for change of name) were not complied with, observance of the
provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought for.
!
More importantly, Carlito’s official transcript of record from the Urious
College in Butuan City, certificate of eligibility from the Civil Service
Commission, and voter registration record satisfactorily show that he
has been known by his first name only. No prejudice is thus likely to
arise from the dropping of the second name.
!
The correction of the mother’s citizenship from Chinese to Filipino as
appearing in Carlito’s birth record was also proper. Of note is the fact
that during the cross examination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he
did not deem fit to question her citizenship. Such failure to oppose the
correction prayed for, which certainly was not respondents’ fault, does
not in any way change the adversarial nature of the proceedings.
!
Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of Carlito’s siblings
uniformly stated the citizenship of Epifania as "Filipino." To disallow
the correction in Carlito’s birth record of his mother’s citizenship would
! 23
perpetuate an inconsistency in the natal circumstances of the siblings
who are unquestionably born of the same mother and father.
!
Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is the correction
of the name of Carlito’s wife from "Maribel" to "Marivel." The mistake
is clearly clerical or typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes,
but is also obvious to the understanding considering that the name
reflected in the marriage certificate of Carlito and his wife is "Marivel."
!
Apropos is Yu v. Republic which held that changing the appellant’s
Christian name of "Sincio" to "Sencio" amounts merely to the righting
of a clerical error. The change of name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz
Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo was also held to be a mere innocuous
alteration, which can be granted through a summary proceeding. The
same ruling holds true with respect to the correction in Carlito’s
marriage certificate of his father’s name from "John Kho" to "Juan
Kho." Except in said marriage certificate, the name "Juan Kho" was
uniformly entered in the birth certificates of Carlito and of his siblings.
!
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
!!
!!
!!
KILOSBAYAN VS. ONG
G.R. NO. 177721
JULY 3, 2007
Meiki , Merlin
!!
FACTS:
!
On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of
the Office of the President, announced an appointment in favor of
respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
fill up the vacancy created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of
Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. The appointment was reported
the following day, May 17, 2007, by the major daily publications.
!
On May 18, 2007, the major daily publications reported that the
appointment was "recalled" or "held in abeyance" by Malacañang in
view of the question relating to the citizenship of respondent Gregory S.
Ong. There is no indication whatever that the appointment has been
cancelled by the Office of the President.
!
On May 19, 2007, the major daily publications reported that respondent
Executive Secretary stated that the appointment is "still there except
that the validation of the issue is being done by the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC)."
!
Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong
through respondent Executive Secretary is patently unconstitutional,
arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
!
Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact
is plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate indicates
his Chinese citizenship. Petitioners attached a copy of said birth
certificate as Annex "H" to the petition. The birth certificate, petitioners
add, reveals that at the time of respondent Ong’s birth on May 25, 1953,
his father was Chinese and his mother was also Chinese.
!
Petitioners invoke the Constitution:
!
Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "No
person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower
collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines ."Sec. 2 of Art. IV defines "natural-born citizens as those
who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine Citizenship."
!
Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after
respondent Ong’s birth his father was finally granted Filipino
! 24
citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make
respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen.
!
Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling
the appointment issued to respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this
Court.
!
Subsequently, on May 24, 2007, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), praying that a
TRO be issued, in accordance with the Rules of Court, to prevent and
restrain respondent Executive Secretary from releasing the appointment
of respondent Ong, and to prevent and restrain respondent Ong from
assuming the office and discharging the functions of Associate Justice of
this Court.
!
Executive Secretary’s Comment:
!
Respondent Executive Secretary accordingly filed his Comment,
essentially stating that the appointment of respondent Ong as Associate
Justice of this Court on May 16, 2007 was made by the President
pursuant to the powers vested in her by Article VIII, Section 9 of the
Constitution, thus:
!
SEC. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and Judges of lower courts
shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.
!
Respondent Executive Secretary added that the President appointed
respondent Ong from among the list of nominees who were duly screened
by and bore the imprimatur of the JBC created under Article VIII,
Section 8 of the Constitution. Said respondent further stated: "The
appointment, however, was not released, but instead, referred to the JBC
for validation of respondent Ong’s citizenship."
!
Ong’s Comment:
! Ong’s birth certificate, unless corrected by judicial order in non-
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition, maintaining
that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen; that petitioners have no
standing to file the present suit; and that the issue raised ought to be
addressed to the JBC as the Constitutional body mandated to review the
qualifications of those it recommends to judicial posts. Furthermore, the
petitioners in his view failed to include the President who is an
indispensable party as the one who extended the appointment.
!
As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces his ancestral lines to one
Maria Santos of Malolos, Bulacan, born on November 25, 1881, who was
allegedly a Filipino citizen5 who married Chan Kin, a Chinese citizen;
that these two had a son, Juan Santos; that in 1906 Chan Kin died in
China, as a result of which Maria Santos reverted to her Filipino
citizenship; that at that time Juan Santos was a minor; that Juan Santos
thereby also became a Filipino citizen;6 that respondent Ong’s mother,
Dy Guiok Santos, is the daughter of the spouses Juan Santos and Sy
Siok Hian, a Chinese citizen, who were married in 1927; that, therefore,
respondent’s mother was a Filipino citizen at birth; that Dy Guiok
Santos later married a Chinese citizen, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, thereby
becoming a Chinese citizen; that when respondent Ong was eleven years
old his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was naturalized, and as a result
he, his brothers and sisters, and his mother were included in the
naturalization.
!
Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of Immigration
and the DOJ a certification and an identification that he is a natural-
born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the
Constitution, since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born.
Petitioners, in turn, filed a Consolidated Reply, in which they asserted
their standing to file this suit on the strength of previous decisions of
this Court, e.g., Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona8 and Kilosbayan,
Incorporated v. Morato,9 on the ground that the case is one of
transcendental importance. They claim that the President’s appointment
of respondent Ong as Supreme Court Justice violates the Constitution
and is, therefore, attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Finally, they reiterate that respondent
summary proceedings for the purpose, is binding on all and is prima
! 25
facie evidence of what it states, namely, that respondent Ong is a
Chinese citizen. The alleged naturalization of his father when he was a
minor would not make him a natural-born Filipino citizen.
!!
ISSUE:
!
Whether or not respondent Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen. NO
!!
HELD:
!
He is still required to submit evidentiary documents.
!
In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, docketed as B.E. No.
1398-N filed on September 14, 1979, under O.R. No. 8131205 of that date,
respondent Ong alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the
Philippine bar because, among others, he is a Filipino citizen; and that
he is a Filipino citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a
Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was
a minor of eleven years and thus he, too, thereby became a Filipino
citizen. As part of his evidence, in support of his petition, be submitted
his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his father. His birth
certificate states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth and that his
mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen and his father, Eugenio
Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese citizen.
!
It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted
evidence of naturalization that this Court allowed respondent Ong to
take the oath as a lawyer.
!
It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong
is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of
his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ
cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that
respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.
! !
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or
correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial
order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial
change.
!
Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary
administrative proceeding to correct clerical or typographical errors in a
birth certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality. Substantial
corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the
civil registry should, therefore, be effected through a petition filed in
court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
!
The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the
nationalities of respondent Ong’s ancestors, by various births,
marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be
threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing
records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to
show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong’s mother, was a Filipino
citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of this Court.
Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral
tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions.
Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to this
Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason,
he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.
!!
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