G.R. No.
97995 January 21, 1993 Mata by sending a telegraphic transfer through banks for credit to
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND B.P. MATA AND CO.,
INC., respondents.
Roland A. Niedo for petitioner.
Benjamin C. Santos Law Office for respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
Rarely is this Court confronted with a case calling for the
delineation in broad strokes of the distinctions between such
closely allied concepts as the quasi-contract called "solutio
indebiti" under the venerable Spanish Civil Code and the species
of implied trust denominated "constructive trusts," commonly
regarded as of Anglo-American origin. Such a case is the one
presented to us now which has highlighted more of the affinity
and less of the dissimilarity between the two concepts as to lead
the legal scholar into the error of interchanging the two.
Presented below are the factual circumstances that brought into
juxtaposition the twin institutions of the Civil Law quasi-contract
and the Anglo-American trust.
Private Respondent B.P. Mata & Co. Inc. (Mata), is a private
corporation engaged in providing goods and services to shipping
companies. Since 1966, it has acted as a manning or crewing
agent for several foreign firms, one of which is Star Kist Foods,
Inc., USA (Star Kist). As part of their agreement, Mata makes
advances for the crew's medical expenses, National Seaman's
Board fees, Seaman's Welfare fund, and standby fees and for the
crew's basic personal needs. Subsequently, Mata sends monthly
billings to its foreign principal Star Kist, which in turn reimburses
the latter's account.
Against this background, on February 21, 1975, Security Pacific
National Bank (SEPAC) of Los Angeles which had an agency
arrangement with Philippine National Bank (PNB), transmitted a
cable message to the International Department of PNB to pay the
amount of US$14,000 to Mata by crediting the latter's account
with the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA), per order of
Star Kist. Upon receipt of this cabled message on February 24,
1975, PNB's International Department noticed an error and sent a
service message to SEPAC Bank. The latter replied with
instructions that the amount of US$14,000 should only be for
US$1,400.
On the basis of the cable message dated February 24, 1975
Cashier's Check No. 269522 in the amount of US$1,400
(P9,772.95) representing reimbursement from Star Kist, was
issued by the Star Kist for the account of Mata on February 25,
1975 through the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA).
However, fourteen days after or on March 11, 1975, PNB effected
another payment through Cashier's Check No. 270271 in the
amount of US$14,000 (P97,878.60) purporting to be another
transmittal of reimbursement from Star Kist, private respondent's
foreign principal.
Six years later, or more specifically, on May 13, 1981, PNB
requested Mata for refund of US$14,000 (P97,878.60) after it
discovered its error in effecting the second payment.
On February 4, 1982, PNB filed a civil case for collection and
refund of US$14,000 against Mata arguing that based on a
constructive trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, it has a
right to recover the said amount it erroneously credited to
respondent Mata.1
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila rendered judgment
dismissing the complaint ruling that the instant case falls squarely
under Article 2154 on solutio indebiti and not under Article 1456
on constructive trust. The lower court ruled out constructive trust,
applying strictly the technical definition of a trust as "a right of
property, real or personal, held by one party for the benefit of
another; that there is a fiduciary relation between a trustee and
a cestui que trust as regards certain property, real, personal,
money or choses in action."2
In affirming the lower court, the appellate court added in its
opinion that under Article 2154 on solutio indebiti, the person who
makes the payment is the one who commits the mistake vis-a-
vis the recipient who is unaware of such a
mistake.3 Consequently, recipient is duty bound to return the
amount paid by mistake. But the appellate court concluded that
petitioner's demand for the return of US$14,000 cannot prosper
because its cause of action had already prescribed under Article
1145, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code which states:
The following actions must be commenced within
six years:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Upon a quasi-contract.
This is because petitioner's complaint was filed only on
February 4, 1982, almost seven years after March 11,
1975 when petitioner mistakenly made payment to private
respondent.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari proceeding seeking to
annul the decision of the appellate court on the basis that Mata's
obligation to return US$14,000 is governed, in the alternative, by
either Article 1456 on constructive trust or Article 2154 of the Civil
Code on quasi-contract.4
Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides:
If property is acquired through mistake or fraud,
the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.
On the other hand, Article 2154 states:
If something is received when there is no right to
demand it, and it was unduly delivered through
mistake, the obligation to return it arises.
Petitioner naturally opts for an interpretation under constructive
trust as its action filed on February 4, 1982 can still prosper, as it
is well within the prescriptive period of ten (10) years as provided
by Article 1144, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code.5
If it is to be construed as a case of payment by mistake or solutio
indebiti, then the prescriptive period for quasi-contracts of six
years applies, as provided by Article 1145. As pointed out by the
appellate court, petitioner's cause of action thereunder shall have
prescribed, having been brought almost seven years after the
cause of action accrued. However, even assuming that the
instant case constitutes a constructive trust and prescription has
not set in, the present action has already been barred by laches.
To recall, trusts are either express or implied. While express
trusts are created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties,
implied trusts come into being by operation of law.6 Implied trusts
are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the
nature of the transaction as matters of intent or which are
superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of
equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties.7
In turn, implied trusts are subdivided into resulting and
constructive trusts.8 A resulting trust is a trust raised by
implication of law and presumed always to have been
contemplated by the parties, the intention of which is found in the
nature of the transaction, but not expressed in the deed or
instrument of conveyance.9 Examples of resulting trusts are found
in Articles 1448 to 1455 of the Civil Code.10 On the other hand, a
constructive trust is one not created by words either expressly or
impliedly, but by construction of equity in order to satisfy the
demands of justice. An example of a constructive trust is Article
1456 quoted above.11
A deeper analysis of Article 1456 reveals that it is not a trust in
the technical sense 12 for in a typical trust, confidence is reposed
in one person who is named a trustee for the benefit of another
who is called the cestui que trust, respecting property which is
held by the trustee for the benefit of the cestui que trust.13 A
constructive trust, unlike an express trust, does not emanate
from, or generate a fiduciary relation. While in an express trust, a
beneficiary and a trustee are linked by confidential or fiduciary
relations, in a constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor
any fiduciary relation to speak of and the so-called trustee neither
accepts any trust nor intends holding the property for the
beneficiary.14
In the case at bar, Mata, in receiving the US$14,000 in its
account through IBAA, had no intent of holding the same for a
supposed beneficiary or cestui que trust, namely PNB. But under
Article 1456, the law construes a trust, namely a constructive
trust, for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes,
in this case PNB, for reasons of justice and equity.
At this juncture, a historical note on the codal provisions on trust
and quasi-contracts is in order.
Originally, under the Spanish Civil Code, there were only two
kinds of quasi contracts: negotiorum gestio and solutio indebiti.
But the Code Commission, mindful of the position of the eminent
Spanish jurist, Manresa, that "the number of quasi contracts may
be indefinite," added Section 3 entitled "Other Quasi-Contracts."15
Moreover, even as Article 2142 of the Civil Code defines a quasi-
contract, the succeeding article provides that: "The provisions for
quasi-contracts in this Chapter do not exclude other quasi-
contracts which may come within the purview of the preceding
article."16
Indubitably, the Civil Code does not confine itself exclusively to
the quasi-contracts enumerated from Articles 2144 to 2175 but is
open to the possibility that, absent a pre-existing relationship,
there being neither crime nor quasi-delict, a quasi-contractual
relation may be forced upon the parties to avoid a case of unjust
enrichment.17 There being no express consent, in the sense of a
meeting of minds between the parties, there is no contract to
speak of. However, in view of the peculiar circumstances or
factual environment, consent is presumed to the end that a
recipient of benefits or favors resulting from lawful, voluntary and
unilateral acts of another may not be unjustly enriched at the
expense of another.
Undoubtedly, the instant case fulfills the indispensable requisites
of solutio indebiti as defined in Article 2154 that something (in this
case money) has been received when there was no right to
demand it and (2) the same was unduly delivered through
mistake. There is a presumption that there was a mistake in the
payment "if something which had never been due or had already
been paid was delivered; but he from whom the return is claimed
may prove that the delivery was made out of liberality or for any
other just cause."18
In the case at bar, a payment in the corrected amount of
US$1,400 through Cashier's Check No. 269522 had already been
made by PNB for the account of Mata on February 25, 1975.
Strangely, however, fourteen days later, PNB effected another
payment through Cashier's Check No. 270271 in the amount of
US$14,000, this time purporting to be another transmittal of
reimbursement from Star Kist, private respondent's foreign
principal.
While the principle of undue enrichment or solutio indebiti, is not
new, having been incorporated in the subject on quasi-contracts
in Title XVI of Book IV of the Spanish Civil Code entitled
"Obligations incurred without contract,"19 the chapter on Trusts is
fairly recent, having been introduced by the Code Commission in
1949. Although the concept of trusts is nowhere to be found in the
Spanish Civil Code, the framers of our present Civil Code
incorporated implied trusts, which includes constructive trusts, on
top of quasi-contracts, both of which embody the principle of
equity above strict legalism.20
In analyzing the law on trusts, it would be instructive to refer to
Anglo-American jurisprudence on the subject. Under American
Law, a court of equity does not consider a constructive trustee for
all purposes as though he were in reality a trustee; although it will
force him to return the property, it will not impose upon him the
numerous fiduciary obligations ordinarily demanded from a
trustee of an express trust.21 It must be borne in mind that in an
express trust, the trustee has active duties of management while
in a constructive trust, the duty is merely to surrender the
property.
Still applying American case law, quasi-contractual obligations
give rise to a personal liability ordinarily enforceable by an action
at law, while constructive trusts are enforceable by a proceeding
in equity to compel the defendant to surrender specific property.
To be sure, the distinction is more procedural than substantive.22
Further reflection on these concepts reveals that a constructive
"trust" is as much a misnomer as a "quasi-contract," so far
removed are they from trusts and contracts proper, respectively.
In the case of a constructive trust, as in the case of quasi-
contract, a relationship is "forced" by operation of law upon the
parties, not because of any intention on their part but in order to
prevent unjust enrichment, thus giving rise to certain obligations
not within the contemplation of the parties.23
Although we are not quite in accord with the opinion that "the
trusts known to American and English equity jurisprudence are
derived from the fidei commissa of the Roman Law,"24 it is safe to
state that their roots are firmly grounded on such Civil Law
principles are expressed in the Latin maxim, "Nemo cum alterius
detrimento locupletari potest," 25 particularly the concept of
constructive trust.
Returning to the instant case, while petitioner may indeed opt to
avail of an action to enforce a constructive trust or the quasi-
contract of solutio indebiti, it has been deprived of a choice, for
prescription has effectively blocked quasi-contract as an
alternative, leaving only constructive trust as the feasible option.
Petitioner argues that the lower and appellate courts cannot
indulge in semantics by holding that in Article 1456 the recipient
commits the mistake while in Article 2154, the recipient commits
no mistake. 26 On the other hand, private respondent, invoking the
appellate court's reasoning, would impress upon us that under
Article 1456, there can be no mutual mistake. Consequently,
private respondent contends that the case at bar is one of solutio
indebiti and not a constructive trust.
We agree with petitioner's stand that under Article 1456, the law
does not make any distinction since mutual mistake is a
possibility on either side — on the side of either the grantor or the
grantee.27 Thus, it was error to conclude that in a constructive
trust, only the person obtaining the property commits a mistake.
This is because it is also possible that a grantor, like PNB in the
case at hand, may commit the mistake.
Proceeding now to the issue of whether or not petitioner may still
claim the US$14,000 it erroneously paid private respondent under
a constructive trust, we rule in the negative. Although we are
aware that only seven (7) years lapsed after petitioner
erroneously credited private respondent with the said amount and
that under Article 1144, petitioner is well within the prescriptive
period for the enforcement of a constructive or implied trust, we
rule that petitioner's claim cannot prosper since it is already
barred by laches. It is a well-settled rule now that an action to
enforce an implied trust, whether resulting or constructive, may
be barred not only by prescription but also by laches.28

While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches

deals with the effect of unreasonable delay.29 It is amazing that it
took petitioner almost seven years before it discovered that it had
erroneously paid private respondent. Petitioner would attribute its
mistake to the heavy volume of international transactions handled
by the Cable and Remittance Division of the International
Department of PNB. Such specious reasoning is not persuasive.
It is unbelievable for a bank, and a government bank at that,
which regularly publishes its balanced financial statements
annually or more frequently, by the quarter, to notice its error only
seven years later. As a universal bank with worldwide operations,
PNB cannot afford to commit such costly mistakes. Moreover, as
between parties where negligence is imputable to one and not to
the other, the former must perforce bear the consequences of its
neglect. Hence, petitioner should bear the cost of its own
negligence.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing

petitioner's claim against private respondent is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Melo, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs in the result.

G.R. No. 175256 August 23, 2012 Lim’s] appeal, alleging that in filing said civil case, Lily Lim
violated the rule against forum shopping as the elements of litis
LILY LIM, Petitioner, pendentia are present.
vs.
KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, Respondent. This Court agrees.3

x-----------------------x xxxx

G.R. No. 179160 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appeal is

KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, Petitioner,
vs.
LILY LIM, Respondent.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
PERLAS-BERNABE,**
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Is it forum shopping for a private complainant to pursue a civil
complaint for specific performance and damages, while appealing
the judgment on the civil aspect of a criminal case for estafa?
Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review assailing
the separate Decisions of the Second and Seventeenth Divisions
of the Court of Appeals (CA) on the above issue.
Lily Lim’s (Lim) Petition for Review assails the October 20, 2005
1
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.4
On the other hand, Charlie Co’s (Co) Petition for Review5 assails
the April 10, 2007 Decision6 of the Seventeenth Division in CA-
G.R. SP No. 93395 for ruling on the same issue in the negative:
We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent
judge. The elements of litis pendentia and forum-shopping were
not met in this case.7
xxxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition
is DENIED. This case is REMANDED to the court of origin for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.8
Factual Antecedents

Resolution2 of the Second Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138,
which ruled on the above issue in the affirmative:
Due to the filing of the said civil complaint (Civil Case No.
5112396), Charlie Co filed the instant motion to dismiss [Lily
In February 1999, FR Cement Corporation (FRCC),
owner/operator of a cement manufacturing plant, issued several
withdrawal authorities9 for the account of cement dealers and
traders, Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt. These withdrawal
authorities state the number of bags that the dealer/trader paid for
and can withdraw from the plant. Each withdrawal authority
contained a provision that it is valid for six months from its date of
issuance, unless revoked by FRCC Marketing Department.
Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt, through their administrative
manager, Gail Borja (Borja), sold the withdrawal authorities
covering 50,000 bags of cement to Co for the amount of ₱ 3.15
million or ₱ 63.00 per bag.10 On February 15, 1999, Co sold these
withdrawal authorities to Lim allegedly at the price of ₱ 64.00 per
bag or a total of ₱ 3.2 million.11
Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew the cement bags
from FRCC on a staggered basis. She successfully withdrew
2,800 bags of cement, and sold back some of the withdrawal
authorities, covering 10,000 bags, to Co.
Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the
remaining 37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal authorities. Lim
clarified the matter with Co and Borja, who explained that the
plant implemented a price increase and would only release the
goods once Lim pays for the price difference or agrees to receive
a lesser quantity of cement. Lim objected and maintained that the
withdrawal authorities she bought were not subject to price
fluctuations. Lim sought legal recourse after her demands for Co
to resolve the problem with the plant or for the return of her
money had failed.
The criminal case
An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion
was filed against Co before Branch 154 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The accusatory portion thereof reads:
On or about between the months of February and April 1999, in
San Juan, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, with intent to defraud Lily Lim, with
grave abuse of confidence, with unfaithfulness, received in trust
from Lily Lim cash money in the amount of ₱ 2,380,800.00 as
payment for the 37,200 bags of cement, under obligation to
deliver the 37,200 bags of cement to said Lily Lim, but far from
complying with his obligation, misappropriated, misapplied and
converted to his own personal use and benefit the said amount of
₱ 2,300,800.00 [sic] and despite demands, the accused failed
and refused to return said amount, to the damage and prejudice
of Lily Lim in the amount of ₱ 2,380,800.00.
Contrary to Law.12
The private complainant, Lily Lim, participated in the criminal
proceedings to prove her damages. She prayed for Co to return
her money amounting to ₱ 2,380,800.00, foregone profits, and
legal interest, and for an award of moral and exemplary damages,
as well as attorney’s fees.13
On November 19, 2003, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 154,
rendered its Order14 acquitting Co of the estafa charge for
insufficiency of evidence. The criminal court’s Order reads:
The first and second elements of the crime of estafa [with abuse
of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1(b)] for which the
accused is being charged and prosecuted were not established
by the prosecution’s evidence.
xxxx
In view of the absence of the essential requisites of the crime of
estafa for which the accused is being charged and prosecuted, as
above discussed, the Court has no alternative but to dismiss the
case against the accused for insufficiency of evidence.15
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to
Evidence is GRANTED, and the accused is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa charged against him
under the present information for insufficiency of evidence.
Insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned, however,
set this case for the reception of his evidence on the matter on
December 11, 2003 at 8:30 o’clock [sic] in the morning.
SO ORDERED.16
After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the Pasig
City RTC also relieved Co of civil liability to Lim in its December
1, 2004 Order.17 The dispositive portion of the Order reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered holding the accused CHARLIE CO not civilly liable to
the private complainant Lily Lim.
SO ORDERED.18
Lim sought a reconsideration of the above Order, arguing that
she has presented preponderant evidence that Co committed
estafa against her.19
The trial court denied the motion in its Order20 dated February 21,
2005.
On March 14, 2005, Lim filed her notice of appeal21 on the civil
aspect of the criminal case. Her appeal was docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 85138 and raffled to the Second Division of the CA.
The civil action for specific performance
On April 19, 2005, Lim filed a complaint for specific performance
and damages before Branch 21 of the RTC of Manila. The
defendants in the civil case were Co and all other parties to the
withdrawal authorities, Tigerbilt, Fil-Cement Center, FRCC,
Southeast Asia Cement, and La Farge Corporation. The
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-112396, asserted two
causes of action: breach of contract and abuse of rights. Her
allegations read:
ALLEGATIONS COMMON
TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
xxxx
23. Charlie Co obligated himself to deliver to Lily Lim 50,000 bags
of cement of ₱ 64.00 per bag on an x-plant basis within 3 months
from the date of their transaction, i.e. February 15, 1999.
Pursuant to said agreement, Lily Lim paid Charlie Co ₱ 3.2 Million
while Charlie Co delivered to Lily Lim FR Cement Withdrawal
Authorities representing 50,000 bags of cement.
24. The withdrawal authorities issued by FR Cement Corp.
allowed the assignee or holder thereof to withdraw within a six-
month period from date a certain amount of cement indicated
therein. The Withdrawal Authorities given to Lily Lim were dated
either 3 February 1999 or 23 February 1999. The Withdrawal
Authorities were first issued to Tigerbilt and Fil-Cement Center
which in turn assigned them to Charlie Co. Charlie Co then
assigned the Withdrawal Authorities to Lily Lim on February 15,
1999. Through these series of assignments, Lily Lim acquired all
the rights (rights to withdraw cement) granted in said Withdrawal
Authorities.
25. That these Withdrawal Authorities are valid is established by
the fact that FR Cement earlier allowed Lily Lim to withdraw 2,800
bags of cement on the basis thereof.
26. However, sometime 19 April 1999 (within the three (3)-month
period agreed upon by Charlie Co and Lily Lim and certainly
within the six (6)-month period indicated in the Withdrawal
Authorities issued by FR Cement Corp.), Lily Lim attempted but
failed to withdraw the remaining bags of cement on account of FR
Cement’s unjustified refusal to honor the Withdrawal Authorities.
xxx
xxxx
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
BREACH OF CONTRACT
30. Charlie Co committed and is therefore liable to deliver to Lily
Lim 37,200 bags of cement. If he cannot, then he must pay her
the current fair market value thereof.
31. FR Cement Corporation is also liable to deliver to Lily Lim the
amount of cement as indicated in the Withdrawal Authorities it
issued. xxx FR Cement Corporation has no right to impose price
adjustments as a qualification for honoring the Withdrawal
Authorities.
32. Fil-Cement Center, Tigerbilt and Gail Borja as the original
holders/ assignees of the Withdrawal Authorities repeatedly
assured Lily Lim that the same were valid and would be honored.
They are liable to make good on their assurances.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
33. Charlie Co’s acts of falsely representing to Lily Lim that she
may be able to withdraw the cement from FR Cement Corp.
caused Lily Lim to incur expenses and losses. Such act was
made without justice, without giving Lily Lim what is due her and
without observing honesty and good faith, all violative of the law,
more specifically Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Such willful
act was also made by Charlie Co in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy, in violation of Article 21 of the Civil
Code.
34. FR Cement Corporation’s unjust refusal to honor the
Withdrawal Authorities they issued also caused damage to Lily
Lim. Further, FR Cement Corporation’s act of withholding the
37,200 bags of cement despite earning income therefor
constitutes as an unjust enrichment because FR Cement
Corporation acquired income through an act or performance by
another or any other means at the expense of another without
just or legal ground in violation of Article 22 of the Civil Code.
35. Fil-Cement Center, Tigerbilt and Gail Borja’s false assurances
that Lily Lim would be able to withdraw the remaining 37,200
bags of cement caused Lily Lim to incur expenses and losses. x x
x Moreover, Fil-Cement Center admitted receiving payment for
said amount of cement, thus they are deemed to have come into
possession of money at the expense of Lily Lim without just or
legal ground, in violation of Article 22 of the Civil Code.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES and
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT22
Lim prayed for Co to honor his contractual commitments either by
delivering the 37,200 bags of cement, making arrangements with
FRCC to allow Lim to withdraw the cement, or to pay for their
value. She likewise asked that the defendants be held solidarily
liable to her for the damages she incurred in her failed attempts to
withdraw the cement and for the damages they inflicted on her as
a result of their abuse of their rights.23
Motions to dismiss both actions
In reaction to the filing of the civil complaint for specific
performance and damages, Co filed motions to dismiss the said
civil case24 and Lim’s appeal in the civil aspect of the estafa case
or CA-G.R. CV No. 85138.25 He maintained that the two actions
raise the same issue, which is Co’s liability to Lim for her inability
to withdraw the bags of cement,26 and should be dismissed on the
ground of lis pendens and forum shopping.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Second Division in CA-G.R CV
No. 85138
The appellate court (Second Division) favorably resolved Co’s
motion and dismissed Lim’s appeal from the civil aspect of the
estafa case. In its Resolution dated October 20, 2005, the CA
Second Division held that the parties, causes of action, and
reliefs prayed for in Lim’s appeal and in her civil complaint are
identical. Both actions seek the same relief, which is the payment
of the value of the 37,200 bags of cement.27 Thus, the CA Second
Division dismissed Lim’s appeal for forum shopping.28 The CA
denied29 Lim’s motion for reconsideration.30
Lim filed the instant petition for review, which was docketed as
G.R. No. 175256.
Ruling of the Manila Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 05-
112396
Meanwhile, the Manila RTC denied Co’s Motion to Dismiss in an
Order31 dated December 6, 2005. The Manila RTC held that there
was no forum shopping because the causes of action invoked in
the two cases are different. It observed that the civil complaint
before it is based on an obligation arising from contract and
quasi-delict, whereas the civil liability involved in the appeal of the
criminal case arose from a felony.
Co filed a petition for certiorari,32 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
93395, before the appellate court. He prayed for the nullification
of the Manila RTC’s Order in Civil Case No. 05-112396 for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion.33
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Seventeenth Division in CA-
G.R. SP No. 93395
The CA Seventeenth Division denied Co’s petition and remanded
the civil complaint to the trial court for further proceedings. The
CA Seventeenth Division agreed with the Manila RTC that the
elements of litis pendentia and forum shopping are not met in the
two proceedings because they do not share the same cause of
action.34
The CA denied35 Co’s motion for reconsideration.36
Co filed the instant Petition for Review, which was docketed as
G.R. No. 179160.
Upon Co’s motion,37 the Court resolved to consolidate the two
petitions.38
Kou Co Ping’s arguments
Co maintains that Lim is guilty of forum shopping because she is
asserting only one cause of action in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 (the
appeal from the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 116377) and in
Civil Case No. 05-112396, which is for Co’s violation of her right
to receive 37,200 bags of cement. Likewise, the reliefs sought in
both cases are the same, that is, for Co to deliver the 37,200
bags of cement or its value to Lim. That Lim utilized different
methods of presenting her case – a criminal action for estafa and
a civil complaint for specific performance and damages – should
not detract from the fact that she is attempting to litigate the same
cause of action twice.39
Co makes light of the distinction between civil liability ex contractu
and ex delicto. According to him, granting that the two civil
liabilities are independent of each other, nevertheless, the two
cases arising from them would have to be decided using the
same evidence and going over the same set of facts. Thus, any
judgment rendered in one of these cases will constitute res
judicata on the other.40
In G.R. No. 179160, Co prays for the annulment of the CA
Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395, for a
declaration that Lim is guilty of forum shopping, and for the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-112396.41
In G.R. No. 175256, Co prays for the affirmation of the CA
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 (which dismissed Lim’s
appeal from the trial court’s decision in Criminal Case No.
116377).42
Lily Lim’s arguments
Lim admits that the two proceedings involve substantially the
same set of facts because they arose from only one
transaction.43 She is quick to add, however, that a single act or
omission does not always make a single cause of action.44 It can
possibly give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender – (1) ex delicto or civil liability arising from crimes, and
(2) independent civil liabilities or those arising from contracts or
intentional torts. The only caveat provided in Article 2177 of the
Civil Code is that the offended party cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission.45 Because the law allows her
two independent causes of action, Lim contends that it is not
forum shopping to pursue them.46
She then explains the separate and distinct causes of action
involved in the two cases. Her cause of action in CA-G.R CV No.
85138 is based on the crime of estafa. Co violated Lim’s right to
be protected against swindling. He represented to Lim that she
can withdraw 37,200 bags of cement using the authorities she
bought from him. This is a fraudulent representation because Co
knew, at the time that they entered into the contract, that he could
not deliver what he promised.47 On the other hand, Lim’s cause of
action in Civil Case No. 05-112396 is based on contract. Co
violated Lim’s rights as a buyer in a contract of sale. Co received
payment for the 37,200 bags of cement but did not deliver the
goods that were the subject of the sale.48
In G.R. No. 179160, Lim prays for the denial of Co’s petition.49 In
G.R. No. 175256, she prays for the reversal of the CA Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 85138, for a declaration that she is not guilty of
forum shopping, and for the reinstatement of her appeal in
Criminal Case No. 116377 to the CA.50
Issue
Did Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific
performance and damages during the pendency of her appeal on
the civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa?
Our Ruling
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party
may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender51 - (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising
from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code,52 and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that
may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The
independent civil liability may be based on "an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony," as
provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of
contract or for tort53 ). It may also be based on an act or omission
that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated
independently from the criminal action by specific provision of
Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases of defamation, fraud and
physical injuries").
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on
the acts or omissions that constitute the criminal offense; hence,
its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this
reason, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the
criminal offense.54 If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is
instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action,
its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the
criminal action.55 The civil liability based on delict is extinguished
when the court hearing the criminal action declares that "the act
or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist."56
On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate
from the criminal action and may be pursued independently, as
provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which state that:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such
civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. (Emphasis
supplied.)
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds
of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended party may
pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or
cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis
pendentia, or res judicata.57 As explained in Cancio, Jr. v. Isip:58
One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action.
In the instant case, it must be stressed that the action filed by
petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains separate
and distinct from any criminal prosecution based on the same act.
Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa
criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no
bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely
different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual.
In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the
dismissal of the estafa cases against the offender did not amount
to forum-shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the filing of
multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a
favorable judgment. Although the cases filed by [the offended
party] arose from the same act or omission of [the offender], they
are, however, based on different causes of action. The criminal
cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action
for collection is anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there
can be no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law
expressly allows the filing of a separate civil action which can
proceed independently of the criminal action.59
Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising from
other sources of obligations are authorized by law to proceed
independently of each other, the resolution of the present issue
hinges on whether the two cases herein involve different kinds of
civil obligations such that they can proceed independently of each
other. The answer is in the affirmative.
The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been
instituted together with the criminal action.60
On the other hand, the second action, judging by the allegations
contained in the complaint,61 is a civil action arising from a
contractual obligation and for tortious conduct (abuse of rights). In
her civil complaint, Lim basically alleges that she entered into a
sale contract with Co under the following terms: that she bought
37,200 bags of cement at the rate of ₱ 64.00 per bag from Co;
that, after full payment, Co delivered to her the withdrawal
authorities issued by FRCC corresponding to these bags of
cement; that these withdrawal authorities will be honored by
FRCC for six months from the dates written thereon. Lim then
maintains that the defendants breached their contractual
obligations to her under the sale contract and under the
withdrawal authorities; that Co and his co-defendants wanted her
to pay more for each bag of cement, contrary to their agreement
to fix the price at ₱ 64.00 per bag and to the wording of the
withdrawal authorities; that FRCC did not honor the terms of the
withdrawal authorities it issued; and that Co did not comply with MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
his obligation under the sale contract to deliver the 37,200 bags Associate Justice
of cement to Lim. From the foregoing allegations, it is evident that
Lim seeks to enforce the defendants’ contractual obligations, WE CONCUR:
given that she has already performed her obligations. She prays
that the defendants either honor their part of the contract or pay TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
for the damages that their breach has caused her. Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
Lim also includes allegations that the actions of the defendants
were committed in such manner as to cause damage to Lim
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA,
without regard for morals, good customs and public policy. These LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
JR.
allegations, if proven, would constitute tortious conduct (abuse of Associate Justice
Associate Justice
rights under the Human Relations provisions of the Civil Code).

Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 involves only the obligations ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
arising from contract and from tort, whereas the appeal in the Associate Justice
estafa case involves only the civil obligations of Co arising from
the offense charged. They present different causes of action, ATTESTATION
which under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and
independent"62 from each other. Both cases can proceed to their I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
final adjudication, subject to the prohibition on double recovery reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
under Article 2177 of the Civil Code.63 writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Lily Lim’s Petition in G.R. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
No. 175256 is GRANTED. The assailed October 20, 2005 Associate Justice
Resolution of the Second Division of the Court of Appeals in CA- Acting Chairperson
G.R. CV No. 85138 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Lily Lim’s
appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 is ordered REINSTATED and CERTIFICATION
the Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to RESOLVE the same
with DELIBERATE DISPATCH. I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
Charlie Co’s Petition G.R. No. 179160 is DENIED. The assailed writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
April 10, 2007 Decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395 is AFFIRMED in toto. ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
SO ORDERED. (Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 200444, August 15, 2018
SUPREME TRANSPORTATION LINER, INC. AND
FELIX Q. RUZ, Petitioners, v. ANTONIO SAN
ANDRES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The requirement for the reservation of the civil action
does not anymore apply to the independent civil actions
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.
Such actions may be filed at anytime, provided the
plaintiff does not recover twice upon the same act or
omission.
The Case
Petitioners Supreme Transportation Liner Inc. and Felix
Q. Ruz hereby assail the decision promulgated on
January 27, 2011,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. T- 2240
on November 24, 2008 by the Regional Trial Court in
Tabaco City dismissing their counterclaim on the ground
that to allow their counterclaim was tantamount to
double recovery of damages, considering that the same
was not prosecuted in the criminal action against the
respondent's driver.2
Antecedents
The relevant factual background was summarized by the
CA thusly:
On November 5, 2002, at around 5:00 in the morning,
Ernesto Belchez was driving a passenger bus, Mabel
Tours Bus with body number 1896-C and plate Number
TB EBJ (old)/TB EVL-648 (new), owned by [respondent]
Antonio San Andres, along Maharlika Highway in
Barangay Malabanban Norte, Candelaria, Quezon, going
towards the direction of Manila. While traversing
Maharlika Highway, the Mabel Tours Bus sideswiped a
Toyota Revo it was overtaking. The Mabel Tours Bus
immediately swerved to the left lane but in the process,
it hit head-on the Supreme Bus owned and registered in
the name of [petitioner] Supreme Bus Transportation
Line, Inc., and driven by [petitioner] Felix G. Ruz, that
was negotiating in the opposite lane. Because of the
strong impact of the incident, the Supreme Bus was
pushed to the side of the road and the Mabel Tour Bus
continuously moved until it hit a passenger jeepney that
was parked on the side of the road which later on fell on
the canal. Nobody died but all the vehicles were
damaged.
Investigation of the incident and photographs of the
damaged buses as well as the other two (2) vehicles
were conducted and undertaken by SPO1 Rafael Ausa of
Candelaria, Municipal Police Station.
[Respondent] then brought the Mabel Tours Bus to the
RMB Assembler and Body Builder to have it repaired. The
cost of repair was estimated in the amount of One
Hundred Forty Four Thousand and Five Hundred Pesos
(Php144,500.00).
On December 12, 2002, a complaint for damages before
the Court a quo was instituted by [respondent] Antonio
San Andres against [petitioners] alleging actual damage
to Mabel Tours Bus and unrealized profits for the non-use
of the Mabel Tours Bus at the time it underwent repairs
in the amount of P144,500.00 and P150,000.00,
respectively. Claims for attorney's fees of P30,000.00,
appearance fee of P1,000.00, litigation expenses of
P20,000.00 and cost of the suit were also lodged in the
complaint.
xxxx
Subsequently, [petitioners] filed their Answer with
Counterclaim. They alleged among others that plaintiff
has no cause of action against them; the proximate
cause of the vehicular accident is the reckless
imprudence of the [respondent's] driver, Ernesto Belchez
operated the Mabel Tours Bus recklessly and in violation
of traffic laws and regulations in negotiating the
overtaking of another vehicle without regard to the
rightful vehicle occupying the right lane coming from the
opposite direction resulting to head on collision on the
lane of defendant Supreme Bus and, at the time of the
accident, [respondent] operated the Mabel Tours Bus
outside his franchise and without a registered plate.
By way of counterclaim, [petitioner] Supreme
Transportation Liner, Inc. alleged that it suffered
damages in the aggregate amount of P500,000.00 and
another P100,000.00 for the medical expenses of its
employees and passengers. The unwarranted filing of the
case forced them to secure the services of a counsel for
P50,000.00 plus appearance fee of P5,000.00 and
litigation expenses in the amount of P3,000.00 including
traveling expenses.
xxxx
After all the issues have been joined, the case was set for
pre-trial conference wherein the parties, in an effort to
amicably settle the case, referred the case to conciliation.
The parties, however, failed to hammer out an amicable
settlement. Hence, trial on the merits ensued.
[The parties] presented oral and documentary evidence
to support their claims and contentions. [Respondent]
presented himself and Ernesto Belchez who later became
a hostile witness. On the part of [petitioner and Ruz],
Felix Ruz, SPO1 Rafael B. Ausa and Assistant for
Operations of [petitioner] Supreme Transportation Liner,
Inc., Jessi Alvarez, were presented.
In the course of trial, Jessi Alvarez stated that he filed a
criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting to
damage to property against Ernesto Belchez before the
Court in Candelaria, Quezon. The case is now terminated
and the accused was convicted because of his admission
of the crime charged. In the said criminal complaint, he
did not reserve their civil claim or asked (sic) the fiscal to
reserve it, which, if itemized, would also be the amount
of their counterclaim in the present civil action filed by
[respondent]. He added that they did not receive any
compensation for the civil aspect of the criminal case,
and although the Supreme Bus was covered by
insurance, they did not claim for any reimbursement in
connection with the subject incident.3
Judgment of the RTC
On November 24, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment
dismissing the respondent's complaint as well as the
petitioners' counterclaim,4 decreeing:
From the foregoing, the instant complaint for damages
filed by the plaintiff is hereby dismissed for having failed
to prove liability on the part of the defendant. The
counterclaim that was filed by the defendants hereof is
also dismissed for failure to adhere to procedural
requirements.
SO ORDERED.5
The RTC opined that the respondent was not able to
prove the petitioners' liability;6 and that the petitioners'
counterclaim should also be dismissed pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,7 whose
pertinent portions the RTC quoted in its judgment as
follows:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. –
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Article 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission of the accused.
xxxx
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil
actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to
present its evidence and under circumstances affording
the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make
such reservation.8
The RTC indicated that the petitioners' failure to reserve
the right to institute a separate civil action precluded
their right to recover damages from the respondent
through their counterclaim.9
Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed, submitting that:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE
COUNTERCLAIM
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE NO RESERVATION WAS MADE
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 02-253 FILED AGAINST
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S DRIVER ERNESTO BELCHEZ.10
Decision of the CA
In the assailed decision promulgated on January 27,
2011,11 the CA dismissed the petitioners' appeal, stating
that the RTC had correctly ruled that the counterclaim
could not prosper because their recourse was limited to
the enforcement of the respondent's subsidiary liability
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code;12 that "to
allow the counterclaim of [petitioners] is tantamount to
double recovery of damages, a prohibition under Article
2177 of the New Civil Code and Sec. 3, Rule 111 of the
Rules;"13 and that their failure to reserve the separate
civil action meant that their right to recover under Article
2176 of the Civil Code was deemed instituted with the
criminal action.14
The CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration
through the resolution promulgated on January 26,
2012.15
Hence, this appeal.
Issue
The Court is called upon to decide whether or not the
petitioners' counterclaim was correctly denied by the
RTC.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
The petitioners' counterclaim is allowed and should not
have been dismissed by the RTC and the CA despite their
failure to reserve the right to file a separate civil action in
the criminal case they had brought against respondent's
driver. However, whether or not they could recover
damages upon their counterclaim presents a different
story, as they should first show that they will not recover
damages twice for the same incident.
1.
Petitioners' counterclaim, being in the
nature of an independent civil action,
required no prior reservation
As we see it, the CA concluded that the petitioners' cause
of action should be limited to the recovery of civil
liability ex delicto by virtue of their having initiated
against the respondent's driver the criminal complaint for
criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code. The CA was seemingly of the opinion that
the petitioners' recourse against the respondent was
limited to recovering from him, as the driver's employer,
his subsidiary liability under and pursuant to Article
10316 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, the CA
pointed out that the petitioners' failure to reserve the
civil aspect of the criminal case proscribed them from
instituting a separate civil action based on Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, to wit:
Corollary, appellants should have reserved the civil
aspect of the criminal case they have filed. Without so
doing, they were deemed to have elected to recover
damages from the bus driver on the basis of the crime.
Therefore, the right of appellants to institute a separate
civil case to recover liability from appellee based under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code is deemed instituted with
the criminal action. Evidently, appellant's cause of action
against appellee will be limited to the recovery of the
latter's subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. x x x17
The CA thereby erred. It incorrectly appreciated the
nature of the petitioners' cause of action as presented in
their counterclaim.
We only need to look at the facts alleged in the
petitioners' counterclaim to determine the correct nature
of their cause of action.18 The purpose of an action or
suit and the law to govern the suit are to be determined
not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his
argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its
allegations and prayer for relief.19
The counterclaim relevantly reads:
xxxx
5. That the proximate cause of the subject vehicular
accident is the reckless imprudence of the plaintiffs
driver, one ERNESTO BELCHEZ, by operating said Mabel
Tours bus recklessly and in violation of traffic laws and
regulations in negotiating the overtaking of another
vehicle without regards (sic) to the rightful vehicle
occupying the right lane coming from the opposite
direction resulting to head on collission (sic) on the lane
of defendant's SUPREME bus;
6. That at the time of the accident, plaintiff operated the
subject Mabel Tour bus outside his franchise, hence, in
violation of his franchise and allied rules and regulations;
operated the san1e without registered plate and using
the route of another franchise holder; and
COUNTERCLAIM
7. Defendants replead the precedings (sic) paragraphs as
they may be relevant;
8. That as a result of plaintiff's violation of his franchise
and gross negligence of his driver, the defendant's
SUPREME bus suffered damage in the aggregate amount
of P500,000.00; medical expenses for its employee and
passengers in the amount of P100,000.00;20
xxxx
Contrary to the conclusion thereon by the CA, the
petitioners' cause of action was upon a quasi-delict. As
such, their counterclaim against the respondent was
based on Article 2184,21 in relation to Article 218022 and
Article 2176,23 all of the Civil Code. It is relevant to state
that even the RTC itself acknowledged that the
counterclaim was upon a quasi-delict, as its ratiocination
bears out, to wit:
The question is whether despite the absence of such
reservation, private respondent may nonetheless bring
an action for damages against the plaintiff under the
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned task, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
Art. 2177 states that responsibility for fault or negligence
under the above-quoted provisions is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Revised Penal Code.
However, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, while reiterating that a civil action under the
above quoted provisions of the New Civil Code may be
brought separately from the criminal action, provides
that the right to bring it must be reserved.24
Yet, the RTC likewise erred on its outcome because its
ratiocination was founded on the obsolete version of
the Rules of Court. By the time when the RTC rendered
judgment on November 24, 2008, the revised relevant
rule of procedure had already been promulgated and
taken effect,25 and it had specifically deleted the
erstwhile reservation requirement vis-a-vis the
independent civil actions, as follows:
Section 1. Institution of Criminal and Civil Actions. — (a)
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the
civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability
against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate, or exemplary dan1ages without specifying
the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the
filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is
specified in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended
party upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing
fees shall be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint
may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any
cause of action which could have been the subject
thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil
action. No reservation to file such civil action separately
shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil
actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees
based on the amount of the check involved, which shall
be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the
complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated,
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the
offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on
the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so
alleged but any of these damages are subsequently
awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the
amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial
thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated
with the criminal action upon application with the court
trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the
trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with
section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil
and criminal actions.
The en-or committed by the CA emanated from its failure
to take into consideration that the omission of the driver
in violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code could
give rise not only to the obligation ex delicto,26 but also
to the obligation based on culpa aquiliana under Article
2176 of the Civil Code. Under the factual antecedents
herein, both obligations rested on the common element
of negligence. Article 217727 of the Civil Code and
Section 3,28 Rule 111 of the Rules of Court allow the
injured party to prosecute both criminal and civil actions
simultaneously. As clarified in Casupanan v. Laroya:29
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is
"deemed instituted" with the criminal action is only the
action to recover civil liability arising from the crime
or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are
no longer "deemed instituted," and may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even
without any reservation in the criminal action. The
failure to make a reservation in the criminal action
is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and
independent civil action based on these articles of
the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil
actions based on these articles of the Civil Code
continues to run even with the filing of the criminal
action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of
the Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of
the civil action "deemed instituted" in the criminal action.
(Bold emphasis supplied)
The foregoing notwithstanding, the petitioners as the
injured parties have to choose the remedy by which to
enforce their claim in the event of favorable decisions in
both actions. This is because Article 2177 of the Civil
Code bars them from recovering damages twice upon the
same act or omission. As ruled in Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc. v. Tangco:30
An act or omission causing damage to another may give
rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or
omission complained of as a felony, e.g.,
culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under
Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under
Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article
2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is
granted a right to file an action independent and distinct
from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil
Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against
the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of
the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission or under
both causes.
As can be seen, the latest iteration of Rule 111, unlike
the predecessor, no longer includes the independent civil
actions under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil
Code as requiring prior reservation to be made in a
previously instituted criminal action. Had it been cautious
and circumspect, the RTC could have avoided the error.
2.
Petitioners should first show that
they would not recover damages
twice from the same act or omission.
Nonetheless, we are constrained not to award outright
the damages prayed for by the petitioners in their
counterclaim.
Article 2177 of the Civil Code and the present version of
Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which is the
applicable rule of procedure, expressly prohibit double
recovery of damages arising from the same act or
omission. The petitioners' allegation that they had not
yet recovered damages from the respondent was not
controlling considering that the criminal case against the
respondent's driver had already been concluded. It
remains for the petitioners to still demonstrate that the
RTC as the trial court did not award civil damages in the
criminal case. Consequently, Civil Case No. T-2240
should be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings,
if only to afford to the petitioners the opportunity to
present evidence on their counterclaim subject to the
prohibition against double recovery of damages.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the

appeal; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on January 27, 2011; and REMANDS Civil
Case No. T-2240 to the Regional Trial Court in Tabaco
City for further proceedings to allow the petitioners to
present evidence on their counterclaim, subject to the
foregoing clarifications.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro (Chairperson), Leonen, A. Reyes, Jr.,

and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO
CAPITULO, petitioners, vs. MARIO LLAVORE
LAROYA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside
the Resolution1 dated December 28, 1999 dismissing
the petition for certiorari and the Resolution2 dated
August 24, 2000 denying the motion for
reconsideration, both issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil
Action No. 17-C (99).
The Facts
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore
Laroya (Laroya for brevity) and the other owned by
petitioner Roberto Capitulo (Capitulo for brevity) and
driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan (Casupanan
for brevity), figured in an accident. As a result, two
cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a
criminal case against Casupanan for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other hand,
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against
Laroya for quasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case No.
2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was
then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya,
defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss
the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping
considering the pendency of the criminal case. The
MCTC granted the motion in the Order of March 26,
1999 and dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and
Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil
action which can proceed independently of the criminal
case. The MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration
in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan and Capitulo
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
Regional Trial Court (Capas RTC for brevity) of Capas,
Tarlac, Branch 66,3 assailing the MCTCs Order of
dismissal.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28,
1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of
merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal
issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of
the case and therefore the proper remedy should have
been an appeal. The Capas RTC further held that a
special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a
lost appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even
on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the
civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and
not an abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the same in
the Resolution of August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:
In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties,
each one of them may think and believe that the
accident was caused by the fault of the other. x x x
[T]he first party, believing himself to be the aggrieved
party, opted to file a criminal case for reckless
imprudence against the second party. On the other
hand, the second party, together with his operator,
believing themselves to be the real aggrieved parties,
opted in turn to file a civil case for quasi-delict against
the first party who is the very private complainant in
the criminal case.4 crä läwvirt uali brä ry
Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a
pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can
validly file, simultaneously and independently, a
separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private
complainant in the criminal case.
The Courts Ruling
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No.
2089, which the MCTC dismissed on the ground of
forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the
criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue that if
the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim
against the private complainant, he may file the
counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper
time. They contend that an action on quasi-delict is
different from an action resulting from the crime of
reckless imprudence, and an accused in a criminal
case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising
from the same incident. They maintain that under
Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case
can proceed independently of the criminal action.
Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the
only one who filed the independent civil action based
on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator
of the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal
case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is
fatally defective as it does not state the real
antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan
and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the order
of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper
remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no
question of law to be resolved as the order of
dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari is
not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that
the petition raises the legal question of whether there
is forum-shopping since they filed only one action -
the independent civil action for quasi-delict against
Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on
the ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not
state in its order of dismissal5 that the dismissal
was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular,
the order of dismissal is without prejudice to refiling
the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly
states it is with prejudice.6 Absent a declaration that
the dismissal is with prejudice, the same is deemed
without prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being
silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 417 provides that an order dismissing
an action without prejudice is not appealable. The
remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil
action under Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly
states that where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly,
the Capas RTCs order dismissing the petition for
certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an
ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple
suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure
a favorable judgment.8 Forum-shopping is present
when in the two or more cases pending, there is
identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs
sought.9 However, there is no forum-shopping in the
instant case because the law and the rules expressly
allow the filing of a separate civil action which can
proceed independently of the criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property based on the Revised
Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil
action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. Although these two actions arose from the same
act or omission, they have different causes of action.
The criminal case is based on culpa criminal
punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the
civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. These
articles on culpa aquiliana read:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under
the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles
provided he proves, by preponderance of evidence,
that he has suffered damage because of the fault or
negligence of another. Either the private complainant
or the accused can file a separate civil action under
these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that
state only the private complainant in a criminal case
may invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure (2000 Rules for
brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a)
x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint
may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but
any cause of action which could have been the subject
thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
(Emphasis supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a
criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate
civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the
accused files such separate civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure (1985 Rules for brevity), as amended in
1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action
independently of the criminal action provided the
offended party reserved the right to file such civil
action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil
action before the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution, all civil actions arising from the same act
or omission were deemed impliedly instituted in the
criminal case. These civil actions referred to the
recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of
damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery of
damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the
Civil Code on Human Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for
quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules, the offended party
had to reserve in the criminal action the right to bring
such action. Otherwise, such civil action was deemed
impliedly instituted in the criminal action. Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules provided as follows:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party waives
the action, reserves his right to institute it separately,
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity
under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines arising from the same act
or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the
others. The institution of, or the reservation of the
right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives
the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate
civil actions shall be made before the prosecution
starts to present its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity
to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the accused.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended
on December 1, 2000 and now provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a)
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with
the criminal action unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the
civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity
to make such reservation.
xxx
(b) x x x
Where the civil action has been filed separately and
trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application
with the court trying the latter case. If the application
is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with section 2 of this rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
(Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is
deemed instituted with the criminal action is only the
action to recover civil liability arising from the crime
or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer
deemed instituted, and may be filed separately and
prosecuted independently even without any
reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make
a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of
the right to file a separate and independent civil action
based on these articles of the Civil Code. The
prescriptive period on the civil actions based on these
articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with
the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the civil actions
based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate,
distinct and independent of the civil action deemed
instituted in the criminal action.10c räläwvi rtual ibrä ry
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still
given the option to file a separate civil action to
recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right
in the criminal action before the prosecution presents
its evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to
make such reservation if he files a separate civil action
before filing the criminal action. If the civil action to
recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but
its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may
be consolidated with the criminal action. The
consolidation under this Rule does not apply to
separate civil actions arising from the same act or
omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code.11c räläwvi rtual ib räry
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules,
a separate civil action, if reserved in the criminal
action, could not be filed until after final judgment was
rendered in the criminal action. If the separate civil
action was filed before the commencement of the
criminal action, the civil action, if still pending, was
suspended upon the filing of the criminal action until
final judgment was rendered in the criminal action.
This rule applied only to the separate civil action filed
to recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply to
independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code, which could proceed
independently regardless of the filing of the criminal
action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules continues this procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After
the criminal action has been commenced, the separate
civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until
final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil
action has already been instituted, the latter
shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be
found before judgment on the merits. The
suspension shall last until final judgment is
rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless,
before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil
action, the same may, upon motion of the offended
party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the
court trying the criminal action. In case of
consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil
action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in
the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the
prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented
by the offended party in the criminal case and of the
parties to present additional evidence. The
consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried
and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the
running of the period of prescription of the civil action
which cannot be instituted separately or whose
proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not
change the rule that the separate civil action, filed to
recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the
filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the present
Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after commencement
of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to
recover damages ex-delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and
Capitulo, who are not the offended parties in the
criminal case, can file a separate civil action against
the offended party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule
111 of the 2000 Rules provides as follows:
SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. -
In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent
civil action may be brought by the offended party. It
shall proceed independently of the criminal action and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged
in the criminal action. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart
in the amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the
offended party to bring an independent civil action
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.
As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended
party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action.
There is no question that the offended party in the
criminal action can file an independent civil action for
quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the
present Rule 111 expressly states that the offended
party may bring such an action but the offended party
may not recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly,
Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in
the criminal action, not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling
in Cabaero vs. Cantos12 where the Court held that
the accused therein could validly institute a separate
civil action for quasi-delict against the private
complainant in the criminal case. In Cabaero, the
accused in the criminal case filed his Answer with
Counterclaim for malicious prosecution. At that time
the Court noted the absence of clear-cut rules
governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted civil
actions and the necessary consequences and
implications thereof. Thus, the Court ruled that the
trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect
of the case and disregard any counterclaim for civil
liability. The Court further ruled that the accused may
file a separate civil case against the offended party
after the criminal case is terminated and/or in
accordance with the new Rules which may be
promulgated. The Court explained that a cross-claim,
counterclaim or third-party complaint on the civil
aspect will only unnecessarily complicate the
proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal
case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was
incorporated in the 2000 Rules precisely to address
the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this
provision, the accused is barred from filing a
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint in
the criminal case. However, the same provision states
that any cause of action which could have been the
subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil action.
The present Rule 111 mandates the accused to file his
counterclaim in a separate civil action which shall
proceed independently of the criminal action, even as
the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the
criminal action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the
independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with
the criminal action but may be filed separately by the
offended party even without reservation. The
commencement of the criminal action does not
suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action
under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension
in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the
civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is
reserved or filed before the commencement of the
criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for
the same act or omission. The first a criminal case
where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-
delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case
for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-
forum shopping. The two cases can proceed
simultaneously and independently of each other. The
commencement or prosecution of the criminal action
will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The
only limitation is that the offended party cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will
have no reason to file a second civil action since he
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused. In some instances, the
accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of
another case against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-
delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in
the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in
paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which
states that the counterclaim of the accused may be
litigated in a separate civil action. This is only fair
for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from
setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is
deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is
therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim
against the offended party. If the accused does not file
a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive
period may set in since the period continues to run
until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a
right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the
same way that the offended party can avail of this
remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To
disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action
for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his
counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due
process of law, access to the courts, and equal
protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed
separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The
order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089
on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the
decision of the trial court in the criminal case may vary
with the decision of the trial court in the independent
civil action. This possibility has always been
recognized ever since the Civil Code introduced in
1950 the concept of an independent civil action under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But the law
itself, in Article 31 of the Code, expressly provides that
the independent civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter. In Azucena vs.
Potenciano,13 the Court declared:
x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion
than this, for to subordinate the civil action
contemplated in the said articles to the result of the
criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or
acquittal would render meaningless the independent
character of the civil action and the clear injunction in
Article 31 that this action 'may proceed independently
of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter.
More than half a century has passed since the Civil
Code introduced the concept of a civil action separate
and independent from the criminal action although
arising from the same act or omission. The Court,
however, has yet to encounter a case of conflicting
and irreconcilable decisions of trial courts, one hearing
the criminal case and the other the civil action
for quasi-delict. The fear of conflicting and
irreconcilable decisions may be more apparent than
real. In any event, there are sufficient remedies under
the Rules of Court to deal with such remote
possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000 while the
MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December 28,
1999 or before the amendment of the rules. The
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given
retroactive effect considering the well-settled rule that
-
x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural
laws are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent.14cräläwvi rt ualib räry
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated December
28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action
No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089
is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.
 SECOND DIVISION
April 20, 2016
G.R. No. 200302
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
GERRY LIPATA y ORTIZA, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
G.R. No. 200302 is an appeal 1 assailing the
Decision2 promulgated on 31May2011 by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04461. The CA affirmed the
Decision3 dated 23 March 2010 of Branch 85 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. Q-05-136584.
The RTC found appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza (appellant) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The RTC also
ordered appellant to pay damages to the heirs of Rolando Cueno
(Cueno).4
The Facts
Appellant was charged with the crime of Murder in an Information
which reads as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of September, 2005, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating with two
(2) other persons whose true names, identities and definite
whereabouts have not as
yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, with
intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery, and
taking advantage of superior strength, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of
one RONALDO CUENO Y BONIFACIO, by then and there
stabbing him repeatedly with bladed weapons, hitting him on the
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and
mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause
of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Ronaldo
Cueno y Bonifacio.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Appellant was arraigned on 11 October 2005, and entered a plea
of not guilty to the charge. Pre-trial conference was terminated on
26 October 2005, and trial on the merits ensued.
The CA summarized the parties’ evidence as follows:
The Prosecution[’s] Evidence
Mercelinda Valzado, sister-in-law of the victim Rolando Cueno,
testified that on September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m., she was
in her house located in [sic] Lot 34, Block 4, Sipna Compound,
Bagong Silangan, Quezon City. She was about to leave the
house to go to the market when she saw appellant, his brother
Larry Lipata and a certain [Rudy] attacking the victim by
repeatedly stabbing him. She was at a distance of more or less
ten (10) meters from the incident. Shocked at what she had just
witnessed, she shouted for help and pleaded the assailants to
stop, but they did not stop stabbing the victim. In her account, she
recalled that the assailants, including appellant, used a tres
cantos, an ice pick and a broken piece of glass of Red Horse
[bottle]. At one point, the victim managed to take the knife away
from appellant and brandished the same at his attackers.
Thereafter, the victim fell on the ground. Upon seeing the victim
fall, appellant and the other assailants left the scene. Through the
help of some neighbors, Mercelinda rushed the victim to a
hospital but he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Criz Reymiluz Cueno, daughter of the victim, testified that she
saw appellant together with Larry Lipata and Rudy Lipata [stab]
her father to death in front of their house. She recounted that
upon arriving at home from work on September 1, 2005 at around
6:00 p.m., her father immediately went to the house of her aunt
Mercelinda Valzado, which was located only a block away from
their house, to ask for malunggay leaves.
Upon coming home from her aunt’s house, the victim was
attacked by the Lipatas which prompted the victim to run away.
Thinking that his assailants were no longer around, the victim
proceeded to their [sic] house but then the Lipatas stabbed him to
death. She was at a distance of six (6) to eight (8) meters away
from the scene. She further testified that she had no knowledge
of any reason why the Lipatas would kill her father, but her
father’s death brought her pain and sadness and anger against
the perpetrators of her father’s killing.
The Defense[’s] Evidence
The defense presented a sole witness in the person of appellant
himself. According to appellant, he was resting in his house in
Sipna Compound, Brgy. Bagong Silangan, Quezon City on
September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m. when two children,
namely John Paul Isip and a certain Rommel, called him and told
him to help his brother, Larry Lipata. He immediately rushed to
his brother and upon arrival he saw Larry being stabbed by the
victim. He instantaneously assisted his brother but the victim
continued stabbing Larry, causing Larry to fall to the ground.
Thereafter, appellant managed to grab the knife from the victim
and stab the victim. Then he fled from the scene [of the crime]
because he was wounded. Appellant’s sister-in-law, a certain
Lenlen, brought him to the Amang Medical Center for treatment of
his stab wound where he was apprehended by police officers.6
The RTC’s Ruling
The RTC noted that since appellant raised the justifying
circumstance of defense of a relative, he hypothetically admitted
the commission of the crime. Hence, the burden of proving his
innocence shifted to appellant. The RTC found that the defense
failed to adequately establish the element of unlawful aggression
on the part of Cueno. There was no actual or imminent danger to
the life of appellant or of his brother Larry. On the contrary, the
three Lipata brothers (appellant, Larry, and Rudy)7 employed
treachery and took advantage of their superior strength when
they attacked Cueno after Cueno left the house of his sister-in-
law. Cueno suffered 17 stab wounds on his trunk from the Lipata
brothers. The existence of multiple stab wounds on the trunk of
the unarmed Cueno is inconsistent with appellant’s theory of
defense of a relative. The RTC, however, ruled that the
prosecution failed to show conclusive proof of evident
premeditation.
The dispositive portion of the RTC’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the
Court here[b]y renders judgment finding the accused GERRY
LIPATA Y ORTIZA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and
one (1) day to forty (40) years.
The accused is hereby adjudged to pay the heirs of Rolando
Cueno the following amounts:
(a) Php 50,000.00 representing civil indemnity ex
delicto of the accused;
 (b) Php 120,550.00 representing the actual damages
incurred by the heirs of Rolando Cueno, incident to his
death plus 12% interest per annum computed from 6
September 2005 until fully paid;
(c) Php 50,000.00 as moral damages for the mental and
emotional anguish suffered by the heirs arising from the
death of Rolando Cueno; and
(d) Php 25,000[.00] as exemplary damages.
The accused shall be credited with the full period of his
preventive imprisonment, subject to the conditions imposed under
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
SO ORDERED.8
Appellant, through the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), filed a
notice of appeal9 on 6 April 2010. The RTC granted appellant’s
notice in an Order10 dated 19 April 2010.
The CA’s Ruling
The CA dismissed appellant’s appeal and affirmed the decision of
the RTC. The CA agreed with the RTC’s ruling that appellant’s
claim of defense of a relative must fail. There was no actual or
imminent threat on the life of appellant or of his brother Larry.
There was also no reason for appellant to stab Cueno. Cueno
was outnumbered by the Lipata brothers, three to one. The
requirement of lack of provocation on the part of appellant is
negated by the multiple stab wounds that Cueno sustained.
The CA disagreed with appellant’s contention that the prosecution
failed to establish treachery. The CA pointed out that Cueno was
not forewarned of any impending threat to his life. Cueno was
unarmed, and went to his sister-in-law’s house to
gather malunggay leaves. The Lipata brothers, on the other hand,
were readily armed with tres cantos, an icepick, and a broken
piece of glass from a Red Horse bottle. The execution of the
Lipata brothers’ attack made it impossible for Cueno to retaliate.
The CA also disagreed with appellant’s contention that there was
no abuse of superior strength. The three Lipata brothers were all
armed with bladed weapons when they attacked the unarmed
Cueno. The Lipata brothers refused to stop stabbing Cueno until
they saw him unconscious.
The dispositive portion of the CA’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the appeal to be bereft of merit, the same
is hereby DISMISSED. The appealed decision of the trial court
convicting appellant of the crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.11
The PAO filed a notice of appeal12 on behalf of appellant on 10
June 2011. The CA ordered the immediate elevation of the
records to this Court in its 30 June 2011 Resolution.13
Appellant’s Death Prior to Final Judgment
This Court, in a Resolution dated 13 June 2012,14 noted the
records forwarded by the CA and required the Bureau of
Corrections (BuCor) to confirm the confinement of appellant. The
BuCor, in a letter dated 26 July 2012, informed this Court that
there is no record of confinement of appellant as of date. In a
Resolution dated 10 September 2012,15 this Court required the
Quezon City Jail Warden to transfer appellant to the New Bilibid
Prison and to report compliance within ten days from notice. The
Quezon City Jail Warden, in a letter dated 22 October
2012,16 informed this Court that appellant passed away on 13
February 2011. The former Quezon City Jail Warden wrote to the
RTC about appellant’s demise in a letter dated 23 February 2011.
Attached to the 22 October 2012 letter were photocopies of
appellant’s death certificate and medical certificate, as well as the
former Quezon City Jail Warden’s letter.17 In a Resolution dated 7
January 2013,18 this Court noted the 22 October 2012 letter from
the Quezon City Jail Warden, and required the parties to submit
their supplemental briefs on the civil aspect of the case if they so
desire.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation dated 18
March 2013,19 which stated that it had already exhaustively
argued the relevant issues in its appellee’s brief. The PAO, on the
other hand, filed a supplemental brief on 26 March 2013.20
In view of appellant’s death prior to the promulgation of the CA’s
decision, this Court issued a Resolution dated 25 September
2013 which ordered the PAO "(1) to SUBSTITUTE the legal
representatives of the estate of the deceased appellant as party;
and (2) to COMMENT on the civil liability of appellant within ten
(10) days from receipt of this Resolution."21
The PAO filed its Manifestation with Comment on the Civil
Liability of the Deceased Appellant on 29 November
2013.22 According to the Public Attorney’s Office-Special and
Appealed Cases Service, the relatives of the deceased appellant
have not communicated with it since the case was assigned to its
office on 29 September 2010. The PAO sent a letter on 4
November 2013 to Lilia Lipata, who was appellant’s next of kin
per official records. Despite receipt of the letter, the relatives of
appellant still failed to communicate with the PAO.
In its Manifestation, the PAO stated that:
xxxx
9. Considering that the civil liability in the instant case arose from
and is based solely on the act complained of, i.e. murder, the
same does not survive the death of the deceased appellant.
Thus, in line with the abovecited ruling [People v. Jaime Ayochok,
G.R. No. 175784, 25 August 2010, 629 SCRA 324, citing People
v. Rogelio Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236
SCRA 239], the death of the latter pending appeal of his
conviction extinguished his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon.
10. This being so, it is respectfully submitted that the necessity to
substitute the legal representatives of the estate of the deceased
as party does not arise.23
On 9 July 2014, this Court issued a Resolution which declared
that "the [PAO] shall continue as the legal representative of the
estate of the deceased [appellant] for purposes of representing
the estate in the civil aspect of this case."24
The Court’s Ruling
At the outset, we declare that because of appellant’s death prior
to the promulgation of the CA’s decision, there is no further need
to determine appellant’s criminal liability. Appellant’s death has
the effect of extinguishing his criminal liability. Article 89(1) of the
Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and
as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxxx
What this Court will discuss further is the effect of appellant’s
death with regard to his civil liability. In 1994, this Court, in People
v. Bayotas,25 reconciled the differing doctrines on the issue of
whether the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his civil liability. We concluded that
"[u]pon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted
therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal."26
We also ruled that "if the private offended party, upon extinction
of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from
the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 ([of the then applicable] 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this
time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other
sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the
separate civil action is premised determines against whom the
same shall be enforced."27
We proceeded to distinguish the defendants among the different
causes of action. If the act or omission complained of arises from
quasidelict or, by provision of law, results in an injury to person or
real or personal property, the separate civil action must be filed
against the executor or administrator of the estate pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.28 On the other hand, if
the act or omission complained of arises from contract, the
separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the
accused pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.29
We summarized our ruling in Bayotas as follows:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which
the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may
be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This
separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil
action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155
of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
 apprehension on a possible deprivation of right by
prescription.30 (Emphases supplied)
The promulgation of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure in
2000 provided for the effect of the death of the accused after
arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action to
reflect our ruling in Bayotas:
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death of the
accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the
criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the
delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under
Section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce
liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued
against the estate or legal representative of the accused after
proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may be.
The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the deceased
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator
and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of
thirty (30) days from notice.1âw phi1
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be
enforced in the manner especially provided in these rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be
dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended party
may file against the estate of the deceased.
Contrary to the PAO’s Manifestation with Comment on the Civil
Liability of the Deceased Appellant,31 Cueno died because of
appellant’s fault. Appellant caused damage to Cueno through
deliberate acts.32 Appellant’s civil liability ex quasi delicto may now
be pursued because appellant’s death on 13 February 2011,
before the promulgation of final judgment, extinguished both his
criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto.
Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability for
claims under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, as
well as from sources of obligation other than delict in both
jurisprudence and the Rules, and our subsequent designation of
the PAO as the "legal representative of the estate of the
deceased [appellant] for purposes of representing the estate in
the civil aspect of this case,"33 the current Rules, pursuant to our
pronouncement in
Bayotas,34 require the private offended party, or his heirs, in this
case, to institute a separate civil action to pursue their claims
against the estate of the deceased appellant. The independent
civil actions in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176, as well as claims
from sources of obligation other than delict, are not deemed
instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by
the offended party even without reservation.35 The separate civil
action proceeds independently of the criminal proceedings and
requires only a preponderance of evidence.36 The civil action
which may thereafter be instituted against the estate or legal
representatives of the decedent is taken from the new provisions
of Section 16 of Rule 337 in relation to the rules for prosecuting
claims against his estate in Rules 86 and 87.38
Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found that there
was no separate civil case instituted prior to the criminal case.
Neither was there any reservation for filing a separate civil case
for the cause of action arising from quasi-delict. Under the
present Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a separate civil case
in order to obtain financial retribution for their loss. The lack of a
separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasidelict
leads us to the conclusion that, a decade after Cueno’s death, his
heirs cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts awarded
by the CA.
However, for similar cases in the future, we refer to the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court for study and
recommendation to the Court En Banc appropriate amendments
to the Rules for a speedy and inexpensive resolution of such
similar cases with the objective of indemnifying the private
offended party or his heirs in cases where an accused dies after
conviction by the trial court but pending appeal.
In Lumantas v. Calapiz,39 this Court declared that our law
recognizes that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt of the
guilt of the accused does not exempt the accused from civil
liability ex delicto which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence. This Court’s pronouncement in Lumantas is based on
Article 29 of the Civil Code:
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted
on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of
any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of
the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
We also turn to the Code Commission’s justification of its
recognition of the possibility of miscarriage of justice in these
cases:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case
also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious
flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the
acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court
as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that
inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal
offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be
demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails
to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and
civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the
distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each
other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights.
One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the
other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved
party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other
that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus:
"There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a
crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty
shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for
the purpose of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the
offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the
purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the
offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the
invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person
any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by
the criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of
the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our
law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice – a cause
for disillusionment on the part of innumerable persons injured or
wronged.40
In similar manner, the reform in procedure in these cases to be
recommended by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of
Court shall aim to provide the aggrieved parties relief, as well as
recognition of their right to indemnity. This reform is of course
subject to the policy against double recovery.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision promulgated on 31
May 2011 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
04461. The criminal and civil liabilities ex delicto of appellant
Gerry Lipata y Ortiza are declared EXTINGUISHED by his death
prior to final judgment.
Let a copy, of this Decision be forwarded to the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
CASTILLO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
G.R. No. 163753 January 15, 2014
DR. ENCARNACION C. LUMANTAS, M.D., Petitioner,
vs.
HANZ CALAPIZ, REPRESENTED BY HIS PARENTS, HILARIO
CALAPIZ, JR. and HERLITA CALAPIZ, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The acquittal of the accused does not necessarily mean his
absolution from civil liability.
The Case
In this appeal, an accused desires the reversal of the decision
promulgated on February 20, 2003,1 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered on August 6, 1999
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, in Oroquieta City
ordering him to pay moral damages despite his acquittal of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries
charged against him.2
Antecedents
On January 16, 1995, Spouses Hilario Calapiz, Jr. and Herlita
Calapiz brought their 8-year-old son, Hanz Calapiz (Hanz), to the
Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital, Oroquieta City, for an
emergency appendectomy. Hanz was attended to by the
petitioner, who suggested to the parents that Hanz also undergo
circumcision at no added cost to spare him the pain. With the
parents’ consent, the petitioner performed the coronal type of
circumcision on Hanz after his appendectomy. On the following
day, Hanz complained of pain in his penis, which exhibited
blisters. His testicles were swollen. The parents noticed that the
child urinated abnormally after the petitioner forcibly removed the
catheter, but the petitioner dismissed the abnormality as normal.
On January 30, 1995, Hanz was discharged from the hospital
over his parents’ protestations, and was directed to continue
taking antibiotics.
On February 8, 1995, Hanz was confined in a hospital because of
the abscess formation between the base and the shaft of his
penis. Presuming that the ulceration was brought about by Hanz’s
appendicitis, the petitioner referred him to Dr. Henry Go, an
urologist, who diagnosed the boy to have a damaged urethra.
Thus, Hanz underwent cystostomy, and thereafter was operated
on three times to repair his damaged urethra.
When his damaged urethra could not be fully repaired and
reconstructed, Hanz’s parents brought a criminal charge against
the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting to serious
physical injuries. On April 17, 1997, the information3 was filed in
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Oroquieta City (MTCC), to
which the latter pleaded not guilty on May 22, 1998.4 Under the
order of April 30, 1999, the case was transferred to the RTC
pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No. 11-99.5
At the trial, the Prosecution presented several witnesses,
including Dr. Rufino Agudera as an expert witness and as the
physician who had operated on Hanz twice to repair the damaged
urethra. Dr. Agudera testified that Hanz had been diagnosed to
have urethral stricture and cavernosal injury left secondary to
trauma that had necessitated the conduct of two operations to
strengthen and to lengthen the urethra. Although satisfactorily
explaining that the injury to the urethra had been caused by
trauma, Dr. Agudera could not determine the kind of trauma that
had caused the injury.
In his defense, the petitioner denied the charge. He contended
that at the time of his examination of Hanz on January 16, 1995,
he had found an accumulation of pus at the vicinity of the
appendix two to three inches from the penis that had required
immediate surgical operation; that after performing the
appendectomy, he had circumcised Hanz with his parents’
consent by using a congo instrument, thereby debunking the
parents’ claim that their child had been cauterized; that he had
then cleared Hanz on January 27, 1995 once his fever had
subsided; that he had found no complications when Hanz
returned for his follow up check-up on February 2, 1995; and that
the abscess formation between the base and the shaft of the
penis had been brought about by Hanz’s burst appendicitis.
Ruling of the RTC
In its decision rendered on August 6, 1999,6 the RTC acquitted
the petitioner of the crime charged for insufficiency of the
evidence. It held that the Prosecution’s evidence did not show the
required standard of care to be observed by other members of
the medical profession under similar circumstances. Nonetheless,
the RTC ruled that the petitioner was liable for moral damages
because there was a preponderance of evidence showing that
Hanz had received the injurious trauma from his circumcision by
the petitioner. The decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, this court renders
judgment acquitting the accused, Dr. Encarnacion Lumantas, of
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries, but
ordering him to pay Hanz Calapiz ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC,7 sustaining the award of
moral damages. It opined that even if the petitioner had been
acquitted of the crime charged, the acquittal did not necessarily
mean that he had not incurred civil liability considering that the
Prosecution had preponderantly established the sufferings of
Hanz as the result of the circumcision.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the
motion on April 28, 2004.8
Hence, this appeal.
Issue
Whether the CA erred in affirming the petitioner’s civil liability
despite his acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
in serious physical injuries.
Ruling
The petition for review lacks merit.
It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable.9 Nevertheless, the acquittal of an accused of the
crime charged does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In
Manantan v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court elucidates on the two
kinds of acquittal recognized by our law as well as on the different
effects of acquittal on the civil liability of the accused, viz:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on
the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground
1âwphi1
that the accused is not the author of the act or omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a
person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or
omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or
omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of
the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted
must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of.
This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of
the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance
of evidence only.
The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the
judgment shall state "whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the
judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist."11
Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the acquittal of an
accused does not prevent a judgment from still being rendered
against him on the civil aspect of the criminal case unless the
court finds and declares that the fact from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist.
Although it found the Prosecution’s evidence insufficient to
sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the
crime charged, the RTC did not err in determining and adjudging
his civil liability for the same act complained of based on mere
preponderance of evidence.12 In this connection, the Court
reminds that the acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence did not
require that the complainant’s recovery of civil liability should be
through the institution of a separate civil action for that purpose.13
The petitioner’s contention that he could not be held civilly liable
because there was no proof of his negligence deserves scant
consideration. The failure of the Prosecution to prove his criminal
negligence with moral certainty did not forbid a finding against
him that there was preponderant evidence of his negligence to
hold him civilly liable.14 With the RTC and the CA both finding that
Hanz had sustained the injurious trauma from the hands of the
petitioner on the occasion of or incidental to the circumcision, and
that the trauma could have been avoided, the Court must concur
with their uniform findings. In that regard, the Court need not
analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the
proceedings a quo. The Court, by virtue of its not being a trier of
facts, should now accord the highest respect to the factual
findings of the trial court as affirmed by the CA in the absence of
a clear showing by the petitioner that such findings were tainted
with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.
Every person is entitled to the physical integrity of his
body. Although we have long advocated the view that any
1âw phi1
physical injury, like the loss or diminution of the use of any part of
one’s body, is not equatable to a pecuniary loss, and is not
susceptible of exact monetary estimation, civil damages should
be assessed once that integrity has been violated. The
assessment is but an imperfect estimation of the true value of
one’s body. The usual practice is to award moral damages for the
physical injuries sustained.15 In Hanz’s case, the undesirable
outcome of the circumcision performed by the petitioner forced
the young child to endure several other procedures on his penis
in order to repair his damaged urethra. Surely, his physical and
moral sufferings properly warranted the amount of ₱50,000.00
awarded as moral damages.
Many years have gone by since Hanz suffered the injury. Interest
of 6% per annum should then be imposed on the award as a
sincere means of adjusting the value of the award to a level that
is not only reasonable but just and commensurate. Unless we
make the adjustment in the permissible manner by prescribing
legal interest on the award, his sufferings would be unduly
compounded. For that purpose, the reckoning of interest should
be from the filing of the criminal information on April 17, 1997, the
making of the judicial demand for the liability of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
February 20, 2003, with the modification that legal interest of 6%
per annum to start from April 17, 1997 is imposed on the award
of:₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and ORDERS the petitioner to
pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
 MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO- MARTIN S. VILLARAMA,

DE CASTRO JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify

that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 160110 June 18, 2014
MARIANO C. MENDOZA and ELVIRA LIM, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES LEONORA J. GOMEZ and GABRIEL V.
GOMEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Assailed in the present appeal by certiorari is the Decision1 dated
29 September 2003 of the Special Fourth Division of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71877, which affirmed with
modification the Decision2 dated 31 January 2001 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 172, Valenzuela City in Civil Case No.
5352-V-97, and which effectively allowed the award of actual,
moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and
costs of the suit in favor of respondent Spouses Leonora and
Gabriel Gomez (respondents).
Antecedent Facts
On 7 March 1997, an Isuzu Elf truck (Isuzu truck) with plate
number UAW 582,3 owned by respondent Leonora J. Gomez
(Leonora)4 and driven by Antenojenes Perez (Perez),5 was hit by
a Mayamy Transportation bus (Mayamy bus) with temporary plate
number 1376-1280,6 registered under the name of petitioner
Elvira Lim (Lim)7 and driven by petitioner Mariano C. Mendoza
(Mendoza).8
Owing to the incident, an Information for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was
filed against Mendoza.9 Mendoza, however, eluded arrest, thus,
respondents filed a separate complaint for damages against
Mendoza and Lim, seeking actual damages, compensation for
lost income, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees
and costs of the suit.10 This was docketed as Civil Case No. 5352-
V-97.
According to PO1 Melchor F. Rosales (PO1 Rosales),
investigating officer of the case, at around 5:30 a.m., the Isuzu
truck, coming from Katipunan Road and heading towards E.
Rodriguez, Sr. Avenue, was travelling along the downward
portion of Boni Serrano Avenue when, upon reaching the corner
of Riviera Street, fronting St. Ignatius Village, its left front portion
was hit by the Mayamy bus.11 According to PO1 Rosales, the
Mayamy bus, while traversing the opposite lane, intruded on the
lane occupied by the Isuzu truck.12
PO1 Rosales also reported that Mendoza tried to escape by
speeding away, but he was apprehended in Katipunan Road
corner C. P. Garcia Avenue by one Traffic Enforcer Galante and
a security guard of St. Ignatius Village.13
As a result of the incident, Perez,as well as the helpers on board
the Isuzu truck, namely Melchor V. Anla (Anla), Romeo J. Banca
(Banca), and Jimmy Repisada (Repisada), sustained injuries
necessitating medical treatment amounting to ₱11,267.35,which
amount was shouldered by respondents. Moreover, the Isuzu
truck sustained extensive damages on its cowl, chassis, lights
and steering wheel, amounting to ₱142,757.40.14
Additionally, respondents averred that the mishap deprived them
of a daily income of ₱1,000.00. Engaged in the business of
buying plastic scraps and delivering them to recycling plants,
respondents claimed that the Isuzu truck was vital in the
furtherance of their business.
For their part, petitioners capitalized on the issue of ownership of
the bus in question. Respondents argued that although the
registered owner was Lim, the actual owner of the bus was SPO1
Cirilo Enriquez (Enriquez), who had the bus attached with
Mayamy Transportation Company (Mayamy Transport) under the
so-called "kabit system." Respondents then impleaded both Lim
and Enriquez.
Petitioners, on the other hand, presented Teresita Gutierrez
(Gutierrez), whose testimony was offered to prove that Mayamy
Bus or Mayamy Transport is a business name registered under
her name, and that such business is a sole proprietorship. Such
was presented by petitioners to rebut the allegation of
respondents that Mayamy Transport is a corporation;15 and to
show, moreover, that although Gutierrez is the sole proprietor of
Mayamy Transport, she was not impleaded by respondents in the
case at bar.16
After weighing the evidence, the RTC found Mendoza liable for
direct personal negligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
and it also found Lim vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the
same Code.
As regards Lim, the RTC relied on the Certificate of Registration
issued by the Land Transportation Office on 9 December 199617 in
concluding that she is the registered owner of the bus in question.
Although actually owned by Enriquez, following the established
principle in transportation law, Lim, as the registered owner, is the
one who can be held liable.
Thus, the RTC disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
[respondents] and against the [petitioners]:
1. Ordering the [petitioners] except Enriquez to pay
[respondents], jointly and severally, the costs of repair of
the damaged vehicle in the amount of ₱142,757.40;
2. Ordering the defendants except Enriquez to pay
[respondents], jointly and severally, the amount of
₱1,000.00 per day from March 7, 1997 up to November
1997 representing the unrealized income of the
[respondents] when the incident transpired up to the time
the damaged Isuzu truck was repaired;
3. Ordering the [petitioners] except Enriquez to pay
[respondents], jointly and severally, the amount of
₱100,000.00 as moral damages, plus a separate amount
of ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. Ordering the [petitioners] except Enriquez to pay
[respondents], jointly and severally, the amount of
₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees; 5. Ordering the
[petitioners] except Enriquez to pay [respondents] the
costs of suit.18
Displeased, petitioners appealed to the CA, which appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 71877. After evaluating the
damages awarded by the RTC, such were affirmed by the CA
with the exception of the award of unrealized income which the
CA ordered deleted, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is PARTLY
GRANTED. The judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela City, Branch 172 dated January 31, 2001, is
MODIFIED, in that the award of ₱1,000.00 per day from March
1997 up to November 1997 representing unrealized income is
DELETED. The award of ₱142,757.40 for the cost of repair of the
damaged vehicle, the award of ₱100,000.00 as moral damages,
the award of ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages, the award of
₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit are hereby
MAINTAINED.19
The Present Petition
Unsatisfied with the CA ruling, petitioners filed an appeal by
certiorari before the Court, raising the following issues:20
1. The court a quo has decided questions of substance in
a way not in accord with law or with the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court when it awarded:
a. Moral damages in spite of the fact that the
[respondents’] cause of action is clearly based on
quasi-delict and [respondents] did not sustain
physical injuries to be entitled thereto pursuant to
Article 2219 (2) of the New Civil Code and
pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court to that
effect. The court a quo erroneously concluded that
the driver acted in bad faith and erroneously
applied the provision of Article 21 of the same
code to justify the award for bad faith is not
consistent with quasi-delict which is founded on
fault or negligence.
b. Exemplary damages in spite of the fact that
there is no finding that the vehicular accident was
due to petitioner-driver’s gross negligence to be
entitled thereto pursuant to Article 2231 of the
New Civil Code and pertinent decisions of the
Supreme Court to that effect. The factual basis of
the court a quo that "the act of the driver of the
bus in attempting to escape after causing the
accident in wanton disregard of the consequences
of his negligent act is such gross negligence that
justifies an award of exemplary damages" is an
act after the fact which is not within the
contemplation of Article 2231 of the New Civil
Code.
c. Attorney’s fees in spite of the fact that the
assailed decisions of the trial court and the court a
quo are bereft with jurisdictions for the award of
attorney’s fees pursuant to the pertinent decisions
of the Supreme Court on the matter and provision
Article 2208 of the New Civil Code. The court a
quo erroneously applied the decision of the
Supreme Court in Bañas, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,
325 SCRA 259.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is partially meritorious.
Respondents anchor their claim for damages on Mendoza’s
negligence, banking on Article 2176 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
In impleading Lim, on the other hand, respondents invoke the
latter’s vicarious liability as espoused in Article 2180 of the same
Code:
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business of industry.
The first question to address, then, is whether or not Mendoza’s
negligence was duly proven. Negligence is defined as the failure
to observe for the protection of the interests of another person,
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury.21
As found by the RTC, and affirmed by the CA, Mendoza was
negligent in driving the subject Mayamy bus, as demonstrated by
the fact that, at the time of the collision, the bus intruded on the
lane intended for the Isuzu truck. Having encroached on the
opposite lane, Mendoza was clearly in violation of traffic laws.
Article2185 of the Civil Code provides that unless there is proof to
the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle
has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating
any traffic regulation. In the case at bar, Mendoza’s violation of
traffic laws was the proximate cause of the harm.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event
in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.22
The evidence on record shows that before the collision, the Isuzu
truck was in its rightful lane, and was even at a stop, having been
flagged down by a security guard of St. Ignatius Village.23 The
mishap occurred when the Mayamy bus, travelling at a fast speed
as shown by the impact of the collision, and going in the opposite
direction as that of the Isuzu truck, encroached on the lane
rightfully occupied by said Isuzu truck, and caused the latter to
spin, injuring Perez, Anla, Banca, and Repisada, and
considerably damaging the Isuzu truck.
Having settled the fact of Mendoza’s negligence, then, the next
question that confronts us is who may beheld liable. According to
Manresa, liability for personal acts and omissions is founded on
that indisputable principle of justice recognized by all legislations
that when a person by his act or omission causes damage or
prejudice to another, a juridical relation is created by virtue of
which the injured person acquires a right to be indemnified and
the person causing the damage is charged with the
corresponding duty of repairing the damage. The reason for this
is found in the obvious truth that man should subordinate his acts
to the precepts of prudence and if he fails to observe them and
causes damage to another, he must repair the damage.24 His
negligence having caused the damage, Mendoza is certainly
liable to repair said damage.
Additionally, Mendoza’s employer may also be held liable under
the doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed negligence. Under
such doctrine, a person who has not committed the act or
omission which caused damage or injury to another may
nevertheless be held civilly liable to the latter either directly or
subsidiarily under certain circumstances.25 In our jurisdiction,
vicarious liability or imputed negligence is embodied in Article
2180 of the Civil Code and the basis for damages in the action
under said article is the direct and primary negligence of the
employer in the selection or supervision, or both, of his
employee.26
In the case at bar, who is deemed as Mendoza’s employer? Is it
Enriquez, the actual owner of the bus or Lim, the registered
owner of the bus?
In Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas,27 we held that the
registered owner is deemed the employer of the negligent driver,
and is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176, in relation to
Article 2180, of the Civil Code. Citing Equitable Leasing
Corporation v. Suyom,28 the Court ruled that in so far as third
persons are concerned, the registered owner of the motor vehicle
is the employer of the negligent driver, and the actual employer is
considered merely as an agent of such owner. Thus, whether
there is an employer-employee relationship between the
registered owner and the driver is irrelevant in determining the
liability of the registered owner who the law holds primarily and
directly responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by
the operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways.29
As early as Erezo v. Jepte,30 the Court, speaking through Justice
Alejo Labrador summarized the justification for holding the
registered owner directly liable, to wit:
x x x The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the
owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or
injury is caused by the vehicles on the public highways,
responsibility therefore can be fixed on a definite individual, the
registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicle running
on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or
other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or
drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall
these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public,
that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the
interest of the determination of persons responsible for damages
or injuries caused on public highways.
"‘One of the principal purposes of motor vehicles legislation is
identification of the vehicle and of the operator, in case of
accident; and another is that the knowledge that means of
detection are always available may act as a deterrent from lax
observance of the law and of the rules of conservative and safe
operation. Whatever purpose there may be in these statutes, it is
subordinate at the last to the primary purpose of rendering it
certain that the violator of the law or of the rules of safety shall not
escape because of lack of means to discover him." The purpose
of the statute is thwarted, and the displayed number becomes a
"snare and delusion," if courts will entertain such defenses as that
put forward by appellee in this case. No responsible person or
corporation could be held liable for the most outrageous acts of
negligence, if they should be allowed to place a "middleman"
between them and the public, and escape liability by the manner
in which they recompense their servants.31
Generally, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law
that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer
either in the selection of the servant or employee (culpa in
eligiendo) or in the supervision over him after the selection (culpa
vigilando), or both. The presumption is juris tantum and not juris
et de jure; consequently, it may be rebutted. Accordingly, the
general rule is that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the
court that in the selection and supervision of his employee he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved of liability.32 However,
with the enactment of the motor vehicle registration law, the
defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code - that the
employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it
exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage – are no longer available to the registered owner of the
motor vehicle, because the motor vehicle registration law, to a
certain extent, modified Article 2180.33
As such, there can be no other conclusion but to hold Lim
vicariously liable with Mendoza.
This does not mean, however, that Lim is left without any
recourse against Enriquez and Mendoza. Under the civil law
principle of unjust enrichment, the registered owner of the motor
vehicle has a right to be indemnified by the actual employer of the
driver; and under Article 2181 of the Civil Code, whoever pays for
the damage caused by his dependents or employees may
recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in
satisfaction of the claim.
Having identified the persons liable, our next question is what
may be awarded.
Actual or Compensatory Damages. Actual or compensatory
damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense
for, loss or injury sustained. They simply make good or replace
the loss caused by the wrong.34
Article 2202 of the Civil Code provides that in crimes and quasi
delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are
the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been
foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the
defendant. Article 2199 of the same Code, however, sets the
limitation that, except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary
loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. As such, to warrant
an award of actual or compensatory damages, the claimant must
prove that the damage sustained is the natural and probable
consequences of the negligent act and, moreover, the claimant
must adequately prove the amount of such damage.
In the case at bar, the RTC, basing on the receipts submitted by
respondents and which receipts petitioners had the opportunity to
examine, found that the total repairs on the Isuzu truck amounted
to ₱142,757.40, and that the full hospitalization and medical
expenses of Perez, Anla, Banca, and Repisada amounted to
₱11,267.35. As such, these are the amounts that respondents
are entitled to as actual and compensatory damages.
Although respondents alleged in their complaint that the damage
to their Isuzu truck caused them the loss of a daily income of
₱1,000.00, such claim was not duly substantiated by any
evidence on record, and thus cannot be awarded in their favor.
Moral Damages. Moral damages are awarded to enable the
injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will
serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by
reason of the defendant's culpable action.35
In prayers for moral damages, however, recovery is more an
exception rather than the rule. Moral damages are not meant to
be punitive but are designed to compensate and alleviate the
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar harm unjustly caused to a person. To be
entitled to such an award, the claimant must satisfactorily prove
that he has suffered damages and that the injury causing it has
sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of
the Civil Code. Moreover, the damages must be shown to be the
proximate result of a wrongful act or omission. The claimant must
thus establish the factual basis of the damages and its causal tie
with the acts of the defendant.36
In fine, an award of moral damages calls for the presentation of 1)
evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or
psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; 2)a culpable
act or omission factually established; 3) proof that the wrongful
act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the
damages sustained by the claimant; and 4) the proof that the act
is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by
Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code.37
A review of the complaint and the transcript of stenographic notes
yields the pronouncement that respondents neither alleged nor
offered any evidence of besmirched reputation or physical,
mental or psychological suffering incurred by them. All that
Leonora and her counsel had to say on the matter of damages
other than actual or compensatory damages is this:38
Q: Did you ever spend covering attorney’s fees?
A: Yes, sir. ₱50,000.00.
Q: Aside from the actual damage that you have mentioned x x x,
how much more would you like this Court to award you by way of
moral damages?
A: ₱100,000.00, sir.
Q: How about exemplary damages?
A: ₱50,000.00, sir.
Q: What happened to you, what did you feel when the defendants
failed to immediately repair your vehicle that was damaged
Madam Witness?
A: I have incurred expenses and I was forced to apply for a loan,
sir.
In Kierulf v. CA,39 we observed that this Court cannot remind the
bench and the bar often enough that in order that moral damages
may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral
suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. Citing Francisco v.
GSIS,40 the Court held that there must be clear testimony on the
anguish and other forms of mental suffering. Thus, if the plaintiff
fails to take the witness stand and testify as to his social
humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, moral damages
cannot be awarded.
Moreover, respondents were not able to show that their claim
properly falls under Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code.
Respondents cannot rely on Article 2219 (2) of the Civil Code
which allows moral damages in quasi-delicts causing physical
injuries because in physical injuries, moral damages are
recoverable only by the injured party,41 and in the case at bar,
herein respondents were not the ones who were actually injured.
In B.F. Metal (Corp.) v. Sps. Lomotan, et al.,42 the Court, in a
claim for damages based on quasi-delict causing physical
injuries, similarly disallowed an award of moral damages to the
owners of the damaged vehicle, when neither of them figured in
the accident and sustained injuries.
Neither can respondents rely on Article 21 of the Civil Code as
the RTC erroneously did. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus
mores, and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which
is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public
order, or public policy; (3) and it is done with intent to injure.43 In
the present case, it can hardly be said that Mendoza’s negligent
driving and violation of traffic laws are legal acts. Moreover, it was
not proven that Mendoza intended to injure Perez, et al. Thus,
Article 21 finds no application to the case at bar. All in all, we find
that the RTC and the CA erred in granting moral damages to
respondents. Exemplary Damages. Article 2229 of the Civil Code
provides that exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by
way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Article
2231 of the same Code further states that in quasi-delicts,
exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with
gross negligence.
Our jurisprudence sets certain conditions when exemplary
damages may be awarded: First, they may be imposed by way of
example or correction only in addition, among others, to
compensatory damages, and cannot be recovered as a matter of
right, their determination depending upon the amount of
compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant.
Second, the claimant must first establish his right to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Third, the
wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the award
would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.44
In motor vehicle accident cases, exemplary damages may be
awarded where the defendant’s misconduct is so flagrant as to
transcend simple negligence and be tantamount to positive or
affirmative misconduct rather than passive or negative
misconduct. In characterizing the requisite positive misconduct
which will support a claim for punitive damages, the courts have
used such descriptive terms as willful, wanton, grossly negligent,
reckless, or malicious, either alone or in combination.45
Gross negligence is the absence of care or diligence as to
amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of persons or
property. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences
without exerting any effort to avoid them.46
In the case at bar, having established respondents’ right to
compensatory damages, exemplary damages are also in order,
given the fact that Mendoza was grossly negligent in driving the
Mayamy bus. His act of intruding or encroaching on the lane
rightfully occupied by the Isuzu truck shows his reckless
disregard for safety.
In Baño v. Bachelor Express, Inc., et al.,47 where an erring bus, in
the process of overtaking a jeepney, also encroached on the
opposite lane, and consequently collided with a dump truck, the
Court held the driver of the bus grossly negligent and affirmed the
award of exemplary damages. Attorney’s Fees. Article 2208 of
the Civil Code enumerates the instances when attorney’s fees
may be recovered:
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be
recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled
the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the
plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or
proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad
faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s valid and
demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household
helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s
compensation and employer’s liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising
from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered;
In all cases, the attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be
reasonable.
From the very opening sentence of Article 2208 of the Civil Code,
it is clearly intended to retain the award of attorney’s fees as the
exception in our law, as the general rule remains that attorney’s
fees are not recoverable in the absence of a stipulation thereto,
the reason being that it is not sound policy to set a premium on
the right to litigate.48
As such, in Spouses Agustin v. CA,49 we held that, the award of
attorney’s fees being an exception rather than the general rule, it
is necessary for the court to make findings of facts and law that
would bring the case within the exception and justify the grant of
such award. Thus, the reason for the award of attorney’s fees
must be stated in the text of the court’s decision; otherwise, if it is
stated only in the dispositive portion of the decision, the same
must be disallowed on appeal.
In the case at bar, the RTC Decision had nil discussion on the
propriety of attorney’s fees, and it merely awarded such in the
dispositive. The CA Decision, on the other hand, merely stated
that the award of attorney’s fees is merited as such is allowed
when exemplary damages are awarded.50 Following established
jurisprudence,51 however, the CA should have disallowed on
appeal said award of attorney’s fees as the RTC failed to
substantiate said award. Costs of suit. The Rules of Court provide
that, generally, costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party as a
matter of course, thus:52
Section 1. Costs ordinarily follow results of suit.- Unless otherwise
provided in these rules, costs shall be allowed to the prevailing
party as a matter of course, but the court shall have power, for
special reasons, to adjudge that either party shall pay the costs of
an action, or that the same be divided, as may be equitable. No
costs shall be allowed against the Republic of the Philippines,
unless otherwise provided by law.
In the present case, the award of costs of suit to respondents, as
the prevailing party, is in order. Interests. Interest by way of
1âw phi1
damages has been defined as interest allowed in actions for
breach of contractor tort for the unlawful detention of money
already due. This type of interest is frequently called "moratory
interest." Interest as a part of damage, is allowed, not by
application of arbitrary rules, but as a result of the justice of the
individual case and as compensation to the injured party.53
The legal provision on interests in quasi-delicts is Article 2211 of
the Civil Code which provides that in crimes and quasi-delicts,
interest as part of the damage, may, in a proper case, be
adjudicated in the discretion of the court.
Generally, interest is allowed as a matter of right for failure to pay
liquidated claims when due.54 For unliquidated claims, however,
Article 2213 of the Civil Code provides that interest cannot be
recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages, except when the
demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
In the case at bar, although the award of exemplary damages is
unliquidated in the sense that petitioners cannot know for sure,
before judgment, the exact amount that they are required to pay
to respondents, the award of actual or compensatory damages,
however, such as the truck repairs and medical expenses, is
arguably liquidated in that they can be measured against a
reasonably certain standard.55 Moreover, justice would seem to
require that the delay in paying for past losses which can be
made reasonably certain should be compensated through an
award of interest.56
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court Resolves to
PARTIALLY GRANT the appeal by certiorari, as follows:
1) DECLARE Mariano Mendoza and Elvira Lim solidarily
liable to respondent Spouses Leonora and Gabriel
Gomez;
2) MAINTAIN the award of actual or compensatory
damages in the amount of ₱142,757.40 for the repair of
the Isuzu Elf truck, with legal interest beginning 31
January 2001 until fully paid;
3) GRANT additional actual or compensatory damages in
the amount of ₱11,267.35 for the medical expenses
shouldered by respondent Spouses Leonora and Gabriel
Gomez, with legal interest beginning 31 January 2001
until fully paid;
4) DELETE the award of moral damages;
 5) MAINTAIN the award of exemplary damages at
₱50,000.00;
6) DELETE the award of attorney's fees; and
7) MAINTAIN the award of costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL JOSE CATRAL

CASTILLO MENDOZA**
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 84516 December 5, 1989
DIONISIO CARPIO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SERGIO DOROJA, (Presiding Judge, MTC, Branch IV,
Zamboanga City) and EDWIN RAMIREZ Y WEE, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Before us is a petition to review by certiorari the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch IV, which denied
petitioner's motion for subsidiary writ of execution against the owner-
operator of the vehicle which figured in the accident.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
Sometime on October 23, 1985, accused-respondent Edwin
Ramirez, while driving a passenger Fuso Jitney owned and operated
by Eduardo Toribio, bumped Dionisio Carpio, a pedestrian crossing
the street, as a consequence of which the latter suffered from a
fractured left clavicle as reflected in the medico-legal certificate and
sustained injuries which required medical attention for a period of (3)
three months.
An information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious
Physical Injuries was filed against Edwin Ramirez with the Municipal
Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch IV. On January 14, 1987, the
accused voluntarily pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and was
accordingly convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Less
Serious Physical Injuries under an amended information punishable
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion
of the decision handed down on May 27, 1987 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDWIN RAMIREZ y WEE guilty
as a principal beyond reasonable doubt of the Amended Information
to which he voluntarily pleaded guilty and appreciating this mitigating
circumstance in his favor, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of One (1) month and One (1) day to Two (2) months of Arresto
Mayor in its minimum period. The accused is likewise ordered to
indemnify the complainant Dionisio A. Carpio the amount of P45.00
representing the value of the 1/2 can of tomatoes lost; the amount of
P200.00 which complainant paid to the Zamboanga General
Hospital, to pay complainant the amount of Pl,500.00 as attorney's
fees and to pay the cost of this suit. SO ORDERED. (p. 7, Rollo)
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation.
At the early stage of the trial, the private prosecutor manifested his
desire to present evidence to establish the civil liability of either the
accused driver or the owner-operator of the vehicle. Accused's
counsel moved that the court summon the owner of the vehicle to
afford the latter a day in court, on the ground that the accused is not
only indigent but also jobless and thus cannot answer any civil
liability that may be imposed upon him by the court. The private
prosecutor, however, did not move for the appearance of Eduardo
Toribio.
The civil aspect of the above-quoted decision was appealed by the
private prosecutor to the Regional Trial Court Branch XVI, appellant
praying for moral damages in the amount of P 10,000.00,
compensatory damages at P6,186.40, and attorney's fees of P
5,000.00. The appellate court, on January 20, 1988, modified the trial
court's decision, granting the appellant moral damages in the amount
of Five Thousand Pesos (P 5,000.00), while affirming all other civil
liabilities.
Thereafter, a writ of execution dated March 10, 1988 was duly
served upon the accused but was, however, returned unsatisfied due
to the insolvency of the accused as shown by the sheriffs return.
Thus, complainant moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against
the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator of the vehicle. The same
was denied by the trial court on two grounds, namely, the decision of
the appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary liability of
Eduardo Toribio, and the nature of the accident falls under "culpa-
aquiliana" and not culpa-contractual." A motion for reconsideration of
the said order was disallowed for the reason that complainant having
failed to raise the matter of subsidiary liability with the appellate
court, said court rendered its decision which has become final and
executory and the trial court has no power to alter or modify such
decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner relies heavily on the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, 87 SCRA
275, which enunciates that "the subsidiary liability of the owner-
operator is fixed by the judgment, because if a case were to be filed
against said operator, the court called upon to act thereto has no
other function than to render a decision based on the indemnity
award in the criminal case without power to amend or modify it even
if in his opinion an error has been committed in the decision."
Petitioner maintains that the tenor of the aforesaid decision implies
that the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in
the same proceeding and a separate action is no longer necessary in
order to avoid undue delay, notwithstanding the fact that said
employer was not made a party in the criminal action.
It is the theory of respondent that the owner-operator cannot be
validly held subsidiarily liable for the following reasons, namely: (a)
the matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal; (b)
contrary to the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, the injuries sustained by
the complainant did not arise from the so-called "culpa-contractual"
but from "culpa-aquiliana"; (c) the judgments of appellate courts may
not be altered, modified, or changed by the court of origin; and (d)
said owner was never made a party to the criminal proceedings.
Thus, the underlying issue raised in this case is; whether or not the
subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the
same criminal proceeding against the driver where the award was
given, or in a separate civil action.
The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article
100, both of the Revised Penal Code, which reads thus:
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary
liability established in the next preceding article shall apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind
of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
Respondent contends that the case of Pajarito v. Seneris cannot be
applied to the present case, the former being an action involving
culpa-contractual, while the latter being one of culpa-aquiliana. Such
a declaration is erroneous. The subsidiary liability in Art. 103 should
be distinguished from the primary liability of employers, which is
quasi-delictual in character as provided in Art. 2180 of the New Civil
Code. Under Art. 103, the liability emanated from a delict. On the
other hand, the liability under Art. 2180 is founded on culpa-
aquiliana. The present case is neither an action for culpa-contractual
nor for culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an action to enforce the civil
liability arising from crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code.
In no case can this be regarded as a civil action for the primary
liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code, i.e.,
action for culpa-aquiliana.
In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the
employee's civil liability in the criminal action, it should be shown (1)
that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that the
employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and
(3) that he is insolvent (Basa Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA
156). The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only
after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. All these
requisites present, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily
liable upon the employee's conviction and upon proof of the latter's
insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all these
requirements.
Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-operator has been
deprived of his day in court, because the case before us is not one
wherein the operator is sued for a primary liability under the Civil
Code but one in which the subsidiary civil liability incident to and Finally, the position taken by the respondent appellate court that to
dependent upon his employee's criminal negligence is sought to be grant the motion for subsidiary writ of execution would in effect be to
enforced. Considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon the amend its decision which has already become final and executory
employer by law, he is in substance and in effect a party to the cannot be sustained. Compelling the owner-operator to pay on the
criminal case. Ergo, the employer's subsidiary liability may be basis of his subsidiary liability does not constitute an amendment of
determined and enforced in the criminal case as part of the execution the judgment because in an action under Art. 103 of the Revised
proceedings against the employee. This Court held in the earlier Penal Code, once all the requisites as earlier discussed are met, the
case of Pajarito v. Seneris, supra, that "The proceeding for the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a
enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be considered as part separate action. Such being the case, the subsidiary liability can be
of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which enforced in the same case where the award was given, and this does
an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all not constitute an act of amending the decision. It becomes
proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. There is incumbent upon the court to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of
no question that the court which rendered the judgment has a execution (but only after the employer has been heard), upon
general supervisory control over its process of execution, and this conviction of the employee and after execution is returned
power carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and unsatisfied due to the employee's insolvency.
law which may be involved in the execution."
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent court disallowing the motion
The argument that the owner-operator cannot be held subsidiarily for subsidiary writ of execution is hereby SET ASIDE. The Court a
liable because the matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on quo is directed to hear and decide in the same proceeding the
appeal and in like manner, the appellate court's decision made no subsidiary liability of the alleged owner-operator of the passenger
mention of such subsidiary liability is of no moment. As already jitney. Costs against private respondent.
discussed, the filing of a separate complaint against the operator for
recovery of subsidiary liability is not necessary since his liability is SO ORDERED.
clear from the decision against the accused. Such being the case, it
is not indispensable for the question of subsidiary liability to be Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
passed upon by the appellate court. Such subsidiary liability is
already implied from the appellate court's decision. In the recent
case of Vda. de Paman v. Seneris, 115 SCRA 709, this Court Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.
reiterated the following pronouncement: "A judgment of conviction
sentencing a defendant employer to pay an indemnity in the absence
of any collusion between the defendant and the offended party, is
conclusive upon the employer in an action for the enforcement of the
latter's subsidiary liability not only with regard to the civil liability, but
also with regard to its amount." This being the case, this Court stated
in Rotea v. Halili, 109 Phil. 495, "that the court has no other function
than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the
criminal case and has no power to amend or modify it even if in its
opinion an error has been committed in the decision. A separate and
independent action is, therefore, unnecessary and would only unduly
prolong the agony of the heirs of the victim."
 EN BANC to the plaintiffs in the sum of P294,984.00, representing death
compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988 expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees
. On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was
3

JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved . 4

AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA,

JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition
AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the respondent
VICENTE A. AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de
AMADORA, petitioners San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an
vs. academic institution of learning. It also held that the students were
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE- not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the
RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., semester had already ended, that there was no clear identification of
CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON the fatal gun and that in any event the defendant, had exercised the
thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR necessary diligence in preventing the injury. 5

GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A.

FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.
Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises
where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school
diploma. These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned out, though, fate would
intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of
their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit
Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. The victim was only seventeen years old. 1
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence
. Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a
2
civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against
the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to the San
Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was
shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate. On the implications and
consequences of these facts, the parties sharply disagree.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his
physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he
was then under the custody of the private respondents. The private
respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school
only for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was
no longer in their custody because the semester had already ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the
petitioners consider important because of an earlier incident which
they claim underscores the negligence of the school and at least one
of the private respondents. It is not denied by the respondents that
on April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated
from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him
without making a report to the principal or taking any further action
. As Gumban was one of the companions of Daffon when the latter
6

principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with fired the gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this was
Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The the same pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban and that
complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the their son would not have been killed if it had not been returned by
Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable
Damaso. The respondents say, however, that there is no proof that
the gun was the same firearm that killed Alfredo.
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the
interpretation of Article 2180 which, as it happens, is invoked by both
parties in support of their conflicting positions. The pertinent part of
this article reads as follows:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices so long as
they remain in their custody.
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection
with the above-quoted provision, to wit: Exconde v.
Capuno Mercado v. Court of Appeals, and Palisoc v.
7 8
Brillantes. These will be briefly reviewed in this opinion for a better
9
resolution of the case at bar.
In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School and a Boy Scout, attended a Rizal Day parade on
instructions of the city school supervisor. After the parade, the boy
boarded a jeep, took over its wheel and drove it so recklessly that it
turned turtle, resulting in the death of two of its passengers. Dante
was found guilty of double homicide with reckless imprudence. In the
separate civil action flied against them, his father was held solidarily
liable with him in damages under Article 1903 (now Article 2180) of
the Civil Code for the tort committed by the 15-year old boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on June
29,1957, exculpated the school in an obiter dictum (as it was not a
party to the case) on the ground that it was riot a school of arts and
trades. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and
Alex Reyes concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the school
authorities who should be held liable Liability under this rule, he said,
was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools of
arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause "of establishments
of arts and trades" should apply only to "heads" and not "teachers."
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an
elaboration. A student cut a classmate with a razor blade during
recess time at the Lourdes Catholic School in Quezon City, and the
parents of the victim sued the culprits parents for damages. Through
Justice Labrador, the Court declared in another obiter (as the school
itself had also not been sued that the school was not liable because
it was not an establishment of arts and trades. Moreover, the custody
requirement had not been proved as this "contemplates a situation
where the student lives and boards with the teacher, such that the
control, direction and influences on the pupil supersede those of the
parents." Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take part but the other
members of the court concurred in this decision promulgated on May
30, 1960.
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16-year old
student was killed by a classmate with fist blows in the laboratory of
the Manila Technical Institute. Although the wrongdoer — who was
already of age — was not boarding in the school, the head thereof
and the teacher in charge were held solidarily liable with him. The
Court declared through Justice Teehankee:
The phrase used in the cited article — "so long as
(the students) remain in their custody" — means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school
and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils
and students for as long as they are at attendance in
the school, including recess time. There is nothing in
the law that requires that for such liability to attach,
the pupil or student who commits the tortious act
must live and board in the school, as erroneously
held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as
well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be
deemed to have been set aside by the present
decision.
This decision was concurred in by five other members, including
10
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who stressed, in answer to the dissenting
opinion, that even students already of age were covered by the
provision since they were equally in the custody of the school and
subject to its discipline. Dissenting with three others, Justice
11
Makalintal was for retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado
and submitted that the rule should apply only to torts committed by
students not yet of age as the school would be acting only in loco
parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice Reyes'
dissent in the Exconde Case but added that "since the school
involved at bar is a non-academic school, the question as to the
applicability of the cited codal provision to academic institutions will
have to await another case wherein it may properly be raised."
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
has been directly impleaded and is sought to be held liable under
Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and
trades but an academic institution of learning. The parties herein
have also directly raised the question of whether or not Article 2180
covers even establishments which are technically not schools of arts
and trades, and, if so, when the offending student is supposed to be
"in its custody."
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come
to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply
to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school
is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the
provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of
arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held
liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in
general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the
school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who
shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula
singulis "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students"
and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word
"apprentices."
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by
Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde where he said in part:
I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of
the Old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and
not to academic ones. What substantial difference is
there between them insofar as concerns the proper
supervision and vice over their pupils? It cannot be
seriously contended that an academic teacher is
exempt from the duty of watching that his pupils do
not commit a tort to the detriment of third Persons,
so long as they are in a position to exercise authority
and Supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in the
phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades" used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code,
the words "arts and trades" does not qualify
"teachers" but only "heads of establishments." The
phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent
terms "preceptores y artesanos" used in the Italian
and French Civil Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the
presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in
some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers,
etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of
their authority, it would seem clear that where the
parent places the child under the effective authority
of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should
be the one answerable for the torts committed while
under his custody, for the very reason/that the
parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline
of the school nor with the authority and supervision
of the teacher while the child is under instruction.
And if there is no authority, there can be no
responsibility.
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and
the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their
students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the
teacher over the students under his control and supervision,
whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. The
suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is that the provision
would make the teacher or even the head of the school of arts and
trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody but if
that same tort were committed in an academic school, no liability
would attach to the teacher or the school head. All other
circumstances being the same, the teacher or the head of the
academic school would be absolved whereas the teacher and the
head of the non-academic school would be held liable, and simply
because the latter is a school of arts and trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be
exercised by the school authorities on the basis only of the nature of
their respective schools. There does not seem to be any plausible
reason for relaxing that vigilance simply because the school is
academic in nature and for increasing such vigilance where the
school is non-academic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is
caused by the student and not by the school itself nor is it a result of
the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury
contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of the
school where he is registered. The teacher certainly should not be
able to excuse himself by simply showing that he is teaching in an
academic school where, on the other hand, the head would be held
liable if the school were non-academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the
academic school is to be held answerable for the torts committed by
his students, why is it the head of the school only who is held liable
where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the
case of the academic or non- technical school, why not apply the rule
also to the head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the
teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically
the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage
over his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old
schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of
artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly
instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft. The head
of the school of arts and trades was such a master and so was
personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually
even boarded with him and so came under his constant control,
supervision and influence. By contrast, the head of the academic
school was not as involved with his students and exercised only
administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly
dealing with the students. The head of the academic school had then
(as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students.
Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of
the students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of
his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view
of the expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the consequent
increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the
direct and personal contract of their heads with the students. Article
2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the
provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and
original mandate until the legislature, taking into account the charges
in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the
necessary amendment.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of
the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the
students. Is such responsibility co-extensive with the period when the
student is actually undergoing studies during the school term, as
contended by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the
petitioners themselves?
From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear that
while the custody requirement, to repeat Palisoc v. Brillantes, does
not mean that the student must be boarding with the school
authorities, it does signify that the student should be within the
control and under the influence of the school authorities at the time
of the occurrence of the injury. This does not necessarily mean that
such, custody be co-terminous with the semester, beginning with the
start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the
time before or after such period, such as the period of registration,
and in the case of graduating students, the period before the
commencement exercises. In the view of the Court, the student is in
the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the
control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether
the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline
of the school only upon the start of classes notwithstanding that
before that day he has already registered and thus placed himself
under its rules. Neither should such discipline be deemed ended
upon the last day of classes notwithstanding that there may still be
certain requisites to be satisfied for completion of the course, such as
submission of reports, term papers, clearances and the like. During
such periods, the student is still subject to the disciplinary authority of
the school and cannot consider himself released altogether from
observance of its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises
in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student
continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more
than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and
friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he
is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school
authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who
must answer for his students' torts, in practically the same way that
the parents are responsible for the child when he is in their custody.
The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean, principal,
or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the
pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned.
It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be
physically present and in a position to prevent it. Custody does not
connote immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the
influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a
result of such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the student,
the teacher and not the parent shag be held responsible if the tort
was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its
authority could be validly exercised over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this
article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the
school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its
teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle
of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability
by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head
of the school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort
committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show that
he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury
complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by
Article 2180, which also states that:
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the Persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held
liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not
require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the
parent, who wig be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher
is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him
regardless of the student's age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability
attached to the teacher and the head of the technical school
although the wrongdoer was already of age. In this sense, Article
2180 treats the parent more favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by
Justice Makalintal in his dissenting opinion in Palisoc that the school
may be unduly exposed to liability under this article in view of the
increasing activism among the students that is likely to cause
violence and resulting injuries in the school premises. That is a valid
fear, to be sure. Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the
present ruling, it is not the school that will be held directly liable.
Moreover, the defense of due diligence is available to it in case it is
sought to be held answerable as principal for the acts or omission of
its head or the teacher in its employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting
the head or its teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in
the custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and
regulations for the maintenance of discipline among them. In almost
all cases now, in fact, these measures are effected through the
assistance of an adequate security force to help the teacher
physically enforce those rules upon the students. Ms should bolster
the claim of the school that it has taken adequate steps to prevent
any injury that may be committed by its students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would
otherwise be unfair to hold him directly answerable for the damage
caused by his students as long as they are in the school premises
and presumably under his influence. In this respect, the Court is
disposed not to expect from the teacher the same measure of
responsibility imposed on the parent for their influence over the child
is not equal in degree. Obviously, the parent can expect more
obedience from the child because the latter's dependence on him is
greater than on the teacher. It need not be stressed that such
dependence includes the child's support and sustenance whereas
submission to the teacher's influence, besides being coterminous
with the period of custody is usually enforced only because of the
students' desire to pass the course. The parent can instill more las
discipline on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a
greater accountability than the teacher for the tort committed by the
child.
And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is responsible for
the damage caused by the student or apprentice even if he is
already of age — and therefore less tractable than the minor — then
there should all the more be justification to require from the school
authorities less accountability as long as they can prove reasonable
diligence in preventing the injury. After all, if the parent himself is no
longer liable for the student's acts because he has reached majority
age and so is no longer under the former's control, there is then all
the more reason for leniency in assessing the teacher's responsibility
for the acts of the student.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the
following conclusions:
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the
custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It
was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics
experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is
important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As previously
observed, even the mere savoring of the company of his friends in
the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would have
also brought him in the custody of the school authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot
be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as
previously defined. Each of them was exercising only a general
authority over the student body and not the direct control and
influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular
classes or sections and thus immediately involved in its discipline.
The evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-
charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo
Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his physics
report did not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent
Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is
no showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon
Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations
of the school or condoned their non-observance. His absence when
the tragedy happened cannot be considered against him because he
was not supposed or required to report to school on that day. And
while it is true that the offending student was still in the custody of the
teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically absent when the
tort was committed, it has not been established that it was caused by
his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the contrary,
the private respondents have proved that they had exercised due
diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in
maintaining that discipline.

4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of

boys who should be held liable especially in view of the unrefuted
evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one
of the students and returned the same later to him without taking
disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While
this was clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves
sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link him to the
shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he confiscated
and returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.

5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-

Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because
only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made
responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice.
Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the
other private respondents for none of them has been found to have
been charged with the custody of the offending student or has been
remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody.

In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record
and in the light of the principles herein announced that none of the
respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on
Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium
of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972. While we
deeply sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son
under the tragic circumstances here related, we nevertheless are
unable to extend them the material relief they seek, as a balm to their
grief, under the law they have invoked.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement

as to costs. It is so ordered.

Yap, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes

and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Fernan, Padilla and Teehankee, C.J., JJ, took no part.

 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN
D. LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL.
PEDRO SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court,
Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D.
BAUTISTA, respondents.
Balgos and Perez for petitioners.
Collantes, Ramirez & Associates for private respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of
Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine
School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of
the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch
47) presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals justice) Regina
Ordoñez-Benitez, for damages against the said PSBA and its
corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in
the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that
his assailants were not members of the school's academic
community but were elements from outside the school.
Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school
authorities: Juan D. Lim (President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-
President), Antonio M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro
Sacro (Chief of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of
Security). Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private respondents)
sought to adjudge them liable for the victim's untimely demise due to
their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security
precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack
on the victim. During the proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano
terminated his relationship with the other petitioners by resigning
from his position in the school.
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit
dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably sued under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of
action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect
that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit
of the rule in the afore-stated article.
The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners' contention
and thru an order dated 8 December 1987, denied their motion to
dismiss. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was similarly dealt
with by an order dated 25 January 1988. Petitioners then assailed
the trial court's disposition before the respondent appellate court
which, in a decision * promulgated on 10 June 1988, affirmed the trial
court's orders. On 22 August 1988, the respondent appellate court
resolved to deny the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence,
this petition.
At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent appellate court
primarily anchored its decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as
enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Pertinent
1
portions of the appellate court's now assailed ruling state:
Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code
is an adoption from the old Spanish Civil Code. The
comments of Manresa and learned authorities on its
meaning should give way to present day changes.
The law is not fixed and flexible (sic); it must be
dynamic. In fact, the greatest value and significance
of law as a rule of conduct in (sic) its flexibility to
adopt to changing social conditions and its capacity
to meet the new challenges of progress.
 Construed in the light of modern day educational
system, Article 2180 cannot be construed in its
narrow concept as held in the old case of Exconde
vs. Capuno and Mercado vs. Court of
2
Appeals; hence, the ruling in the Palisoc case that
3 4
it should apply to all kinds of educational institutions,
academic or vocational.
At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of
the school staff liable unless they relieve themselves
of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of
Article 2180 by "proving that they observed all the
diligence to prevent damage." This can only be done
at a trial on the merits of the case. 5
While we agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion
to dismiss the complaint was correctly denied and the complaint
should be tried on the merits, we do not however agree with the
premises of the appellate court's ruling.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
establishes the rule of in loco parentis. This Court discussed this
doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and,
more recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. In all such cases, it
6 to the petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract of carriage. In
had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the
damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or
students of he educational institution sought to be held liable for the
acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this
material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier
indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the
PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.
However, does the appellate court's failure to consider such material
facts mean the exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It does not
necessarily follow.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there
is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part,
7
the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that
would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and
skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand,
the student covenants to abide by the school's academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in"
obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting
knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of
physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and
other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the
air or where there looms around the school premises a constant
threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that
adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the
campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual
relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-
delict do not really govern. 8 A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from
quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise
bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court
from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France
vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted
expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred
effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the
act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231).
This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918,
this Court was already of a similar mind. In Cangco vs. Manila
Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus:
The field of non-contractual obligation is much
broader than that of contractual obligation,
comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical
human relations. These two fields, figuratively
speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact
that a person is bound to another by contract does
not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such
person. When such a contractual relation exists the
obligor may break the contract under such
 conditions that the same act which constitutes a
breach of the contract would have constituted the
source of an extra-contractual obligation had no
contract existed between the parties.
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on
Human Relations, particularly Article 21, which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
custom or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage. (emphasis supplied).
Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which
emboldened the petitioner's employee to forcibly oust the private
respondent to cater to the comfort of a white man who allegedly "had
a better right to the seat." In Austro-American, supra, the public
embarrassment caused to the passenger was the justification for the
Circuit Court of Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award damages to the
latter. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that should the act
which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be violative of
Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a
quasi-delict.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is,
as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista
had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper
security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine.
And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give
rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the
test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be
relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material
only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista.
In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to
the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist
independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under
the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the
obligation of schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a school,
like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students
against all risks. This is specially true in the populous student
communities of the so-called "university belt" in Manila where there
have been reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to
other forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of
schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their
premises, for notwithstanding the security measures installed, the
same may still fail against an individual or group determined to carry
out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should
this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the
breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its
negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree
of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place. 9
As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance
of the private respondents' complaint, the record is bereft of all the
material facts. Obviously, at this stage, only the trial court can make
such a determination from the evidence still to unfold.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is
DENIED. The court of origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered
to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.