1. Engquist versus Oregon Department of Agriculture, 553 U.S.

591 (2008)
Facts
Petitioner Engquist, an Oregon public employee, filed suit against respondents—her agency, her supervisor, and
a co-worker—asserting, inter alia, claims under the Equal Protection Clause: She alleged she had been
discriminated against based on her race, sex, and national origin, and she also brought a so-called “class-of-one”
claim, alleging that she was fired not because she was a member of an identified class (unlike her race, sex, and
national origin claims), but simply for arbitrary, vindictive, and malicious reasons. The jury rejected the class-
membership equal protection claims, but found for Engquist on her class-of-one claim. The Ninth Circuit
reversed in relevant part. Although recognizing that this Court had upheld a class-of-one equal protection
challenge to state legislative and regulatory action in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U. S. 562 , the court
below emphasized that this Court has routinely afforded government greater leeway when it acts as employer
rather than regulator. The Court concluded that extending the class-of-one theory to the public-employment
context would lead to undue judicial interference in state employment practices and invalidate public at-will
employment.
Held: The class-of-one theory of equal protection does not apply in the public employment context. Pp. 4–16.
(a) There is a crucial difference between the government exercising “the power to regulate or license, as
lawmaker,” and acting “as proprietor, to manage [its] internal operation.” Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886 . Thus, in the public-employment context, the Court has recognized that
government has significantly greater leeway in its dealings with citizen employees than in bringing its sovereign
power to bear on citizens at large. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. 709 . The relevant precedent establishes
two main principles: First, government employees do not lose their constitutional rights when they go to work,
but those rights must be balanced against the realities of the employment context. See, e.g., id., at 721. Second, in
striking the appropriate balance, the Court considers whether the claimed employee right implicates the
relevant constitutional provision’s basic concerns, or whether the right can more readily give way to the
requirements of the government as employer. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138 . Pp. 4–8.
(b) The Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has typically been concerned with governmental classifications
that “affect some groups of citizens differently than others.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 . Olech did
recognize that a class-of-one equal protection claim can in some circumstances be sustained. Its recognition of
that theory, however, was not so much a departure from the principle that the Equal Protection Clause is
concerned with arbitrary government classification, as it was an application of that principle to the facts in that
case: The government singled Olech out with regard to its regulation of property, and the cases upon which the
Court relied concerned property assessment and taxation schemes that were applied in a singular way to
particular citizens. What seems to have been significant in Olech and the cited cases was the existence of a clear
standard against which departures, even for a single plaintiff, could be readily assessed. This differential
treatment raised a concern of arbitrary classification, and therefore required that the State provide a rational
basis for it. There are some forms of state action, however, which by their nature involve discretionary decision
making based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments. In such cases treating like individuals
differently is an accepted consequence of the discretion granted to governmental officials. This principle applies
most clearly in the employment context, where decisions are often subjective and individualized, resting on a
wide array of factors that are difficult to articulate and quantify. Unlike the context of arm’s-length regulation,
such as in Olech, treating seemingly similarly situated individuals differently in the employment context is par
for the course. It is no proper challenge to what in its nature is a subjective and individualized decision that it
was subjective and individualized. That the Court has never found the Equal Protection Clause implicated in this
area is not surprising, given the historical understanding of the at-will nature of government employment.
See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886 . Recognition of a claim that the State treated
an employee differently from others for a bad reason, or for no reason at all, is simply contrary to the at-will
concept. The Constitution does not require repudiating that familiar doctrine. Finally, the Court is guided, as in
the past, by the “common-sense realization that government offices could not function if every employment
decision became a constitutional matter.” Connick, supra, at 143. If class-of-one claims were recognized in the
employment context, any personnel action in which a wronged employee can conjure up a claim of differential
treatment would suddenly become the basis for a federal constitutional claim. The Equal Protection Clause does
not require “[t]his displacement of managerial discretion by judicial supervision.” Garcetti v.Ceballos, 547 U. S.
410 . Pp. 8–16.
478 F. 3d 985, affirmed.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito,
JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.

2 Biraogo versus Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, 637 SCRA 78 (2010)

Facts
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC
has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle,
or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much
less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin
the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate
funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because
the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity
and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth
Commission.”

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial
powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ
created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and
personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and power of control
necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any
event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled
jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere
allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-
finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to
appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

Held:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act
or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the
extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the
validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators. With regard to Biraogo, he has
not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of
E. O. No. 1. Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed
by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit.” Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who
asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to
show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order
and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer. The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however,
finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of
their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are
faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the
recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The
purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to
know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement
of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no
usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount
to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the
commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is
limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution
and enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the
equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Equal protection requires
that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted
authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1)
The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. The classification will be regarded as invalid if all
the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.Executive Order No. 1
should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and
find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to
single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that
is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification. The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other
laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws
that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional. WHEREFORE, the petitions are
GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution

B. Bases for Classification

2. Bradwell versus Illinois, 83 US (16 Wall) 130 (1873)
Facts
Bradwell v. State of Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873),[1] was a United States Supreme Court case that solidified the
narrow reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and determined that the right to practice
a profession was not among these privileges. The case is also notable for being an early 14th Amendment challenge to sex
discrimination in the United States.
Background of the case
Myra Bradwell applied for admission to the Illinois bar in accordance with a state statute that permitted any adult of good
character and with sufficient training to be admitted to the practice of law. Because she was a woman, however, the Illinois
Supreme Court denied her admission, noting that the "strife" of the bar would surely destroy femininity. Bradwell appealed the
decision to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that her right to practice law was protected by the Privileges or
Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court's Decision
Majority
The Supreme Court disagreed with Bradwell. In an 8-1 ruling, it upheld the decision of the Illinois court, ruling that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not include the right to practice a profession, so it was
properly regulable by the states. The majority opinion forgoes lengthy discussion of this point by referring to the discussion of
privileges and immunities in the Slaughterhouse Cases.
The majority also dismissed any claim under the privileges and immunities clause of the unamended Constitution—Article IV,
Section 2, Clause 1. Bradwell argued that because she had been born in Vermont but later moved to Illinois, Illinois' denial of a
law license was inter-state discrimination. But the Court noted that under the recently enactedFourteenth Amendment, "All
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside." Because Bradwell had been a resident of Illinois for several years, she was now a citizen of
Illinois, and the interstate provision of Article IV did not apply.
Other opinions
Although the majority opinion makes virtually no reference to Bradwell's sex and does not decide the case on the basis of her
being a woman, three justices found her sex critical. Justice Bradley's opinion concurring in the Court's judgment posits that
“[t]he natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations
of civil life... The paramount destiny and mission of women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is
the law of the Creator.” 83 U. S. 130, 142. This is at odds with Bradley's dissent in the Slaughterhouse Cases, where he had
argued (with respect to men) that "the right of any citizen to follow whatever lawful employment he chooses to adopt
(submitting himself to all lawful regulations) is one of his most valuable rights, and one which the legislature of a State cannot
invade, whether restrained by its own constitution or not." 83 U.S. 36, 114.
The sole dissenter, Chief Justice Chase, was unable to file an opinion due to deteriorating health.[2]
Subsequent History
Because the Court limited the application of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution to the privileges of non-
citizens in foreign United States states and because the Court extremely limited the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in the Slaughterhouse Cases, subsequent parties alleging discrimination turned to the Equal
Protection Clause.
In 1971, the Court would, for the first time, overturn, using the Equal Protection Clause, a gender-based distinction in Reed v.
Reed. While the Court in Reed applied only a rational basis review to strike down a decision giving males preference to females
for administrator of estates positions, the Court would later apply intermediate scrutiny in Craig v. Boren. Today, the Court's
approach in Craig is still applied.

3. Michael M. Versus Superior Court, 450 U.S 464 (1981)

Facts Petitioner, then a 17 1/2-year-old male, was charged with violating California's "statutory rape" law, which defines
unlawful sexual intercourse as "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where
the female is under the age of 18 years." Prior to trial, petitioner sought to set aside the information on both state and federal
constitutional grounds, asserting that the statute unlawfully discriminated on the basis of gender since men alone were
criminally liable thereunder. The trial court and the California Court of Appeal denied relief, and on review the California
Supreme Court upheld the statute.

Held: The judgment is affirmed. Pp. 450 U. S. 468-476; 450 U. S. 481-487.

25 Cal.3d 608, 601 P.2d 572, affirmed.

JUSTICE REHNQUIST, joined by CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, JUSTICE STEWART, and JUSTICE POWELL, concluded that the statute
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 450 U. S. 468-476.

(a) Gender-based classifications are not "inherently suspect" so as to be subject to so-called "strict scrutiny," but will be upheld
if they bear a "fair and substantial relationship" to legitimate state ends. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71. Because the Equal
Protection Clause does not "demand that a statute necessarily apply equally to all persons" or require "things which are
different in fact . . . to be treated in law as though they were the same," Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U. S. 305, 384 U. S. 309, a statute
will be upheld where the gender classification is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not
similarly situated in certain circumstances. Pp. 450 U. S. 468-469.

(b) One of the purposes of the California statute in which the State has a strong interest is the prevention of illegitimate
teenage pregnancies. The statute protects women from sexual intercourse and pregnancy at an age when the physical,
emotional, and psychological consequences are particularly severe. Because virtually all of the significant harmful and
identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on the female, a legislature acts well within its authority when it

Page 450 U. S. 465 elects to punish only the participant who, by nature, suffers few of the consequences of his conduct. Pp.450
U. S. 470-473.

(c) There is no merit in petitioner's contention that the statute is impermissibly underinclusive, and must, in order to pass
judicial scrutiny, be broadened so as to hold the female as criminally liable as the male. The relevant inquiry is not whether the
statute is drawn as precisely as it might have been, but whether the line chosen by the California Legislature is within
constitutional limitations. In any event, a gender-neutral statute would frustrate the State's interest in effective enforcement,
since a female would be less likely to report violations of the statute if she herself would be subject to prosecution. The Equal
Protection Clause does not require a legislature to enact a statute so broad that it may well be incapable of enforcement.
Pp.450 U. S. 473-474.

(d) Nor is the statute impermissibly overbroad because it makes unlawful sexual intercourse with prepubescent females,
incapable of becoming pregnant. Aside from the fact that the statute could be justified on the grounds that very young females
are particularly susceptible to physical injury from sexual intercourse, the Constitution does not require the California
Legislature to limit the scope of the statute to older teenagers and exclude young girls. P. 450 U. S. 475.

(e) And the statute is not unconstitutional as applied to petitioner who, like the girl involved, was under 18 at the time of
sexual intercourse, on the asserted ground that the statute presumes in such circumstances that the male is the culpable
aggressor. The statute does not rest on such an assumption, but instead is an attempt to prevent illegitimate teenage
pregnancy by providing an additional deterrent for men. The age of the man is irrelevant, since young men are as capable as
older men of inflicting the harm sought to be prevented. P. 450 U. S. 475.

BLACKMUN, J., concluded that the California statutory rape law is a sufficiently reasoned and constitutional effort to control at
its inception the problem of teenage pregnancies, and that the California Supreme Court's judgment should be affirmed on the
basis of the applicable test for gender-based classifications as set forth in Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 404 U. S. 76, and Craig v.
Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 429 U. S. 197. Pp. 450 U. S. 481-487.

REHNQUIST, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which BURGER, C.J. and STEWART and
POWELL, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 450 U. S. 476. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in
the judgment, post, p. 450 U. S. 481. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE and MARSALL, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 450 U. S. 488. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p.450 U. S. 496.

4. Garcia versus Drilon, 699 SCRA 352 (2013)

FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity emotionally wounded
private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up
their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away their children and
deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from him.
After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of access to full information about their
businesses. Hence, no source of income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against respondent and her children
and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA 9262.Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark
legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's
intimate partners.

Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.

RULING: No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against classification.
The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance
to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and
culturally endowed differences between men and women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of domestic
violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and
empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and
children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the
intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the
equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.

5. Government Service Insurance System versus Montescarlos 434 SCRA 441 (2004)
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] dated 13 December 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 48784. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cebu City (trial court), which
held that Milagros Orbiso Montesclaros is entitled to survivorship pension.
The Facts
Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros (Nicolas) married Milagros Orbiso (Milagros) on 10 July
1983.[3] Nicolas was a 72- year old widower when he married Milagros who was then 43 years old.
 On 4 January 1985, Nicolas filed with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) an application for retirement
benefits effective 18 February 1985 under Presidential Decree No. 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
1977 (PD 1146). In his retirement application, Nicolas designated his wife Milagros as his sole beneficiary. [4] Nicolas last day of
actual service was on 17 February 1985.[5] On 31 January 1986, GSIS approved Nicolas application for retirement effective 17
February 1984, granting a lump sum payment of annuity for the first five years and a monthly annuity thereafter.[6] Nicolas
died on 22 April 1992. Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship pension under PD 1146. On 8 June 1992, GSIS denied
the claim because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the surviving
spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension.[7] According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of retirement on 17
February 1984. On 2 October 1992, Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for declaratory relief questioning the
validity of Section 18 of PD 1146 disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension. On 9 November 1994, the trial court
rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for survivorship pension. The trial court ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the
benefits due including interest. Citing Articles 115[8] and 117[9] of the Family Code, the trial court held that retirement benefits,
which the pensioner has earned for services rendered and for which the pensioner has contributed through monthly salary
deductions, are onerous acquisitions. Since retirement benefits are property the pensioner acquired through labor, such
benefits are conjugal property. The trial court held that the prohibition in Section 18 of PD 1146 is deemed repealed for being
inconsistent with the Family Code, a later law. The Family Code has retroactive effect if it does not prejudice or impair vested
rights.
GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition for review. In the
meantime, in a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros informed the Court that she has accepted GSIS decision disqualifying her
from receiving survivorship pension and that she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. [10] Commenting on Milagros
letter, GSIS asserts that the Court must decide the case on the merits. [11] The Court will resolve the issue despite the
manifestation of Milagros. The issue involves not only the claim of Milagros but also that of other surviving spouses who are
similarly situated and whose claims GSIS would also deny based on the proviso. Social justice and public interest demand that
we resolve the constitutionality of the proviso.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the retirement benefits are onerous and conjugal because the pension
came from the deceased pensioners salary deductions. The Court of Appeals held that the pension is not gratuitous since it is a
deferred compensation for services rendered.

The Issues

GSIS raises the following issues:

1. Whether Section 16 of PD 1146 entitles Milagros to survivorship pension;
2. Whether retirement benefits form part of conjugal property;
3. Whether Articles 254 and 256 of the Family Code repealed Section 18 of PD 1146.[12]

The Courts Ruling

The pertinent provisions of PD 1146 on survivorship benefits read:

SEC. 16. Survivorship Benefits. When a member or pensioner dies, the beneficiary shall be entitled to survivorship benefits
provided for in sections seventeen and eighteen hereunder. The survivorship pension shall consist of:

(1) basic survivorship pension which is fifty percent of the basic monthly pension; and

(2) dependents pension not exceeding fifty percent of the basic monthly pension payable in accordance with the rules and
regulations prescribed by the System.

SEC. 17. Death of a Member. (a) Upon the death of a member, the primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to:
(1) the basic monthly pension which is guaranteed for five years; Provided, That, at the option of the beneficiaries, it may be
paid in lump sum as defined in this Act: Provided, further, That, the member is entitled to old-age pension at the time of his
death; or

(2) the basic survivorship pension which is guaranteed for thirty months and the dependents pension; Provided, That, the
deceased had paid at least thirty-six monthly contributions within the five-year period immediately preceding his death, or a
total of at least one hundred eighty monthly contributions prior to his death.

(b) At the end of the guaranteed periods mentioned in the preceding sub-section (a), the survivorship pension shall be paid as
follows:

(1) when the dependent spouse is the only survivor, he shall receive the basic survivorship pension for life or until he
remarries;

(2) when only dependent children are the survivors, they shall be entitled to the survivorship pension for as long as they are
qualified;

(3) when the survivors are the dependent spouse and the dependent children, they shall be entitled to the survivorship
pension so long as there are dependent children and, thereafter, the surviving spouse shall receive the basic survivorship
pension for life or until he remarries.

(c) In the absence of primary beneficiaries, the secondary beneficiaries designated by the deceased and recorded in the
System, shall be entitled to:

(1) a cash payment equivalent to thirty times the basic survivorship pension when the member is qualified for old-age
pension; or

(2) a cash payment equivalent to fifty percent of the average monthly compensation for each year he paid contributions, but
not less than five hundred pesos; Provided, That, the member paid at least thirty-six monthly contributions within the five-year
period immediately preceding his death or paid a total of at least one hundred eighty monthly contributions prior to his death.

(d) When the primary beneficiaries are not entitled to the benefits mentioned in paragraph (a) of this section, they shall
receive a cash payment equivalent to one hundred percent of the average monthly compensation for each year the member
paid contributions, but not less than five hundred pesos. In the absence of primary beneficiaries, the amount shall revert to the
funds of the System.

SEC. 18. Death of a Pensioner. Upon the death of a pensioner, the primary beneficiaries shall receive the applicable pension
mentioned under paragraph (b) of section seventeen of this Act: Provided, That, the dependent spouse shall not be entitled
to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner is contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for
the pension. When the pensioner dies within the period covered by the lump sum, the survivorship pension shall be paid only
after the expiration of the said period. This shall also apply to the pensioners living as of the effectivity of this Act, but the
survivorship benefit shall be based on the monthly pension being received at the time of death. (Emphasis supplied)

Under PD 1146, the primary beneficiaries are (1) the dependent spouse until such spouse remarries, and (2) the
dependent children.[13] The secondary beneficiaries are the dependent parents and legitimate descendants except dependent
children.[14] The law defines dependent as the legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted, acknowledged natural or illegitimate
child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one years of age or is over twenty-one years of age but
physically or mentally incapacitated and incapable of self-support. The term also includes the legitimate spouse dependent
for support on the member, and the legitimate parent wholly dependent on the member for support.[15]
The main question for resolution is the validity of the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146, which proviso prohibits the
dependent spouse from receiving survivorship pension if such dependent spouse married the pensioner within three years
before the pensioner qualified for the pension (the proviso).
We hold that the proviso, which was the sole basis for the rejection by GSIS of Milagros claim, is unconstitutional because
it violates the due process clause. The proviso is also discriminatory and denies equal protection of the law.
Retirement Benefits as Property Interest
 Under Section 5 of PD 1146, it is mandatory for the government employee to pay monthly contributions. PD 1146
mandates the government to include in its annual appropriation the necessary amounts for its share of the contributions. It is
compulsory on the government employer to take off and withhold from the employees monthly salaries their contributions
and to remit the same to GSIS.[16] The government employer must also remit its corresponding share to GSIS. [17] Considering
the mandatory salary deductions from the government employee, the government pensions do not constitute mere gratuity
but form part of compensation.
In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that employees have contractual or
vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of employment. [18] The reason for providing retirement
benefits is to compensate service to the government. Retirement benefits to government employees are part of emolument to
encourage and retain qualified employees in the government service. Retirement benefits to government employees reward
them for giving the best years of their lives in the service of their country. [19]
Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is
protected by the due process clause.[20] Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to
immediate payment under pre-existing law.[21] Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as
provided under the terms of the public employees pension statute. [22] No law can deprive such person of his pension rights
without due process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be heard.[23]
In addition to retirement and disability benefits, PD 1146 also provides for benefits to survivors of deceased government
employees and pensioners. Under PD 1146, the dependent spouse is one of the beneficiaries of survivorship benefits. A
widows right to receive pension following the demise of her husband is also part of the husbands contractual compensation. [24]
Denial of Due Process
The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that [n]o person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. The
proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent spouses claim for survivorship pension if the dependent
spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited period. There is outright confiscation of benefits
due the surviving spouse without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard. The proviso undermines the purpose
of PD 1146, which is to assure comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance benefits to government employees
and their dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, and retirement of the government employees.
The whereas clauses of PD 1146 state:

WHEREAS, the Government Service Insurance System in promoting the efficiency and welfare of the employees of the
Government of the Philippines, administers the laws that grant to its members social security and insurance benefits;

WHEREAS, it is necessary to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the System; to guarantee
to the government employee all the benefits due him; and to expand and increase the benefits made available to him and his
dependents to the extent permitted by available resources;

WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws have impeded the efficient and effective discharge by the System of its functions and
have unduly hampered the System from being more responsive to the dramatic changes of the times and from meeting the
increasing needs and expectations of the Filipino public servant;

WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws that have prejudiced, rather than benefited, the government employee; restricted,
rather than broadened, his benefits, prolonged, rather than facilitated the payment of benefits, must now yield to his
paramount welfare;

WHEREAS, the social security and insurance benefits of government employees must be continuously re-examined and
improved to assure comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance programs that will provide benefits
responsive to their needs and those of their dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, retirement, and other
contingencies; and to serve as a fitting reward for dedicated public service;

WHEREAS, in the light of existing economic conditions affecting the welfare of government employees, there is a need to
expand and improve the social security and insurance programs administered by the Government Service Insurance System,
specifically, among others, by increasing pension benefits, expanding disability benefits, introducing survivorship benefits,
introducing sickness and income benefits, and eventually extending the compulsory coverage of these programs to all
government employees regardless of employment status.
 PD 1146 has the following purposes:
a. to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the System;
b. to guarantee to the government employee all the benefits due him; and
c. to expand, increase, and improve the social security and insurance benefits made available to him and his
dependents such as:
increasing pension benefits
expanding disability benefits
introducing survivorship benefits
introducing sickness income benefits
extending compulsory membership to all
government employees irrespective of status[25]
The law extends survivorship benefits to the surviving and qualified beneficiaries of the deceased member or pensioner
to cushion the beneficiaries against the adverse economic effects resulting from the death of the wage earner or pensioner. [26]

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

The surviving spouse of a government employee is entitled to receive survivors benefits under a pension
system. However, statutes sometimes require that the spouse should have married the employee for a certain period before
the employees death to prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary gain. One example is the Illinois Pension Code
which restricts survivors annuity benefits to a surviving spouse who was married to a state employee for at least one
year before the employees death. The Illinois pension system classifies spouses into those married less than one year before
a members death and those married one year or more. The classification seeks to prevent conscious adverse risk selection of
deathbed marriages where a terminally ill member of the pension system marries another so that person becomes eligible for
benefits. In Sneddon v. The State Employees Retirement System of Illinois, [27] the Appellate Court of Illinois held that such
classification was based on difference in situation and circumstance, bore a rational relation to the purpose of the statute, and
was therefore not in violation of constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the
law.[28] The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all
members of the same class.[29] Thus, the law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided there are
real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another.[30]
The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso discriminates against the dependent spouse
who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. [31] Under the
proviso, even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the pensioners death, the
dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within three years before the
pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the
purpose of the proviso is to preventdeathbed marriages, then we do not see why the proviso reckons the three-year
prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date the pensioner died. The classification does
not rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages contracted within three years before
the pensioner qualified for pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of pension benefits.
Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably the reason Congress deleted the proviso in
Republic Act No. 8291 (RA 8291),[32] otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance Act of 1997, the law revising the
old charter of GSIS (PD 1146). Under the implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving spouse who married the member
immediately before the members death is still qualified to receive survivorship pension unless the GSIS proves that the
surviving spouse contracted the marriage solely to receive the benefit.[33]
Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted within three years before retirement or death of a
member are sham marriages contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. The present GSIS law does not automatically forfeit
the survivorship pension of the surviving spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within three years before the
members retirement or death. The law acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to
receive survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer prescribes a sweeping classification that unduly
prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted the social legislation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for want of merit. We declare VOID for being violative of the constitutional
guarantees of due process and equal protection of the law the proviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146, which
proviso states that the dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner is contracted
within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. The Government Service Insurance System cannot deny the
claim of Milagros O. Montesclaros for survivorship benefits based on this invalid proviso.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concu

6. U.S versus Windsor, 570 U.S )____ (No 12-307, 26 June 2013)
Statement of the Facts:
Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer were legally married in Canada in 2007. The couple returned to New York, a state which
recognized the marriage. Thea died in 2009, leaving her estate to her wife, Windsor. Windsor claimed the federal tax
exemption surviving spouses receive, but was denied any exemption under a section of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).
Under the code’s provision marriage was defined as a “union between one man and one woman” and spouse as a member of
the opposite sex. After paying the federal tax, Windsor brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the restriction in
federal court.

The Attorney General notified Congress that the Department of Justice(DOJ) would no longer defend DOMA, though it would
continue to enforce the provision. The House then authorized BLAG to defend DOMA.

Procedural History:

The district court held the provision was unconstitutional entitling Windsor to a tax refund. The court of appeals affirmed the
lower court’s decision and the government and BLAG appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Issue and Holding:

1. Whether a reviewing court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal if the appellant is not seeking redress from an adverse
judgment? Yes.
2. Whether a federal statute excluding same-sex couples from the definition of marriage for purposes of receiving federal
benefits constitutional? No.
Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:

Reviewing court have jurisdiction to hear an appeal even if the appellant is not seeking redress from adverse judgment, so long
as the party retains a sufficient stake in the outcome to satisfy Article III requirements.

A Federal statute excluding same-sex couples from the definition of marriage to prevent them from receiving federal benefits is
unconstitutional.

Judgment:

The Court affirmed the district court’s judgment that the DOMA provision was unconstitutional.

Reasoning:
1. The issue at hand is justiciable. Under Article III of the United States Constitution, federal courts may adjudicate actual cases
or controversies only. Standing requires the plaintiff to have an actual, redressable injury caused by the defendant. Being
forced to pay an unconstitutional tax is a redressable injury sufficient to confer standing and as a result, Windsor had standing
to sue.
The Court looks to INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), where it held that standing was proper even though the executive had
concluded the statute at issue was unconstitutional. There the Immigration and Naturalization Service continued enforcement
of the statute, and that alone was sufficient to satisfy the case or controversy requirement. The Court held there may be an
adequate controversy “where ‘the Government largely agrees with the opposing party.” Here, a true controversy still existed
because the government continued to enforce the law and refused to refund Windsor’s payment. Though this case presents an
unusual dilemma, this Court has the “primary role in determining the constitutionality of a law.” If the Court refused to hear
this claim, the power would then be given to the president, which is inconsistent withseparation of powers.

2. DOMA’s provision defining marriage, which excludes same-sex couples, is a deprivation of liberty guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Under Due Process each individual has a right to equal protection. DOMA governs the
definition of marriage in over a thousand federal statutes and was created by Congress in 1996 in response to efforts to
legalize same-sex marriage. DOMA treats same-sex couples as “second-class” absent legitimate interests justifying
discrimination.

Congress may enact laws that impact marriage, however, regulation of marriage is within the states’ exclusive power over
domestic relations. Many now see this limitation on marriage as unjust and at this time eleven states have legalized same-sex
marriage. The Court held that DOMA “departs from th[e]…tradition of reliance on state law to define marriage.” Essentially
the federal government is denying equal treatment to a group New York deems equal in status to opposite-sex married
couples. This violates both equal protection and due process. Those guarantees require that Congress not discriminate for the
purpose of harming a “politically unpopular group.” Legislative history makes it clear that both the purpose and effect of
DOMA are to disadvantage married same-sex couples. The Court held that “DOMA writes inequality into the entire United
States code” ensuring disparate treatment of legally married couples. DOMA not only degrades same-sex couples, but harms
their children and is invalid under the Fifth Amendment.
Concurring and Dissenting opinion:
Dissenting (Scalia):

The Court has no authority to overturn DOMA. The majority paints the Court as the ultimate arbiter of constitutionality above
elected branches, however, the Framer’s intended to create co-equal branches. Primary authority to decide the
constitutionality of laws does not rest with the judiciary. Courts may only decide cases or controversies. The power to
interpret “what the law is” is incidental.

Windsor won at trial and on appeal, both parties advocated the same positions. As a result, the case should have been
dismissed. The majority cites Chadha to support its position, but that case was only justiciable because the House and Senate
were adverse parties, unlike the case presented here. Jurisdiction requires controversy as well as standing.

Legitimate justifications for DOMA exist. DOMA settled choice of law questions and preserved federal benefits for opposite-sex
married couples. A constitutional law should not be invalidated due to Congress’s improper motives. The majority claims that
DOMA’s only purpose was to dehumanize same-sex married couples and is false. The majority demeans Congress through this
accusation based on the preservation of what was the universal definition of marriage until recently. This question should be
answered through the democratic process.

Dissenting (Alito):
Windsor’s constitutional rights were not violated. In addition, the federal government’s position was not adverse to Windsor’s,
resulting in the majority opinion as an advisory opinion. In Chadha, Congress had standing, because the ruling impacted its
power to legislate. That is not the case here.
DOMA merely clarifies the category of people entitled to benefits under federal law. Same-sex marriage is an issue of public
policy to which the Constitution is silent. Substantive due process protects “fundamental rights…deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history.” There are no historical roots in same-sex marriage. Windsor argues that DOMA violates equal protection,
classifications based on sexual orientation and should be subject to heightened scrutiny which DOMA cannot survive. The
Court holds the scrutiny structure for equal protection claims is not well suited for marriage- related laws. The applicable
standard is a question for the political branches. The majority correctly says this should be decided by the states.
Significance:

United States v. Windsor as a landmark case outlined the federal definition of marriage as between members of the opposite
sex, for purposes of tax benefits, as unconstitutional. The Court held that this definition violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment and put the nation one step closer to the national recognition of same-sex marriage.

7. Labine versus Vincent, 401 U.S 532 (1971)

Ezra Vincent died intestate, survived by only collateral relations and an illegitimate daughter, whose guardian (appellant) sued
to have her declared Vincent's sole heir. The trial court ruled that, under Louisiana law, the collateral relations took the
decedent's property to the exclusion of the daughter, who had been acknowledged by her father but not legitimated. The
Louisiana Court of Appeal affirmed. The State Supreme Court denied certiorari. Appellant, relying on Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.
S. 68, contends that Louisiana's intestate succession laws that bar an illegitimate child from sharing equally with legitimate
children in the father's estate constitute an invidious discrimination violative of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
of the Constitution.

Held: The Louisiana statutory intestate succession scheme is within the State's power to establish rules for the protection and
strengthening of family life and for the disposition of property, and, in view of various statutory alternatives, none of which
was chosen by Vincent, did not (unlike the situation in Levy) constitute an insurmountable barrier to illegitimate children.
Pp. 401 U. S. 535-540.

255 La. 480, 231 So.2d 395, affirmed. See: 229 So.2d 449.

BLACK, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and HARLAN, STEWART, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined.
HARLAN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 401 U. S. 540. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS,
WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 401 U. S. 541.

Page 401 U. S. 533

8. Stanley versus Illinois, 405 U.S. 645(1972)

RULE:

As a matter of due process of law, an unwed father is entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children are
taken from him; by denying him a hearing and extending it to all other parents whose custody of their children is challenged,
the State denies the father the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

FACTS:
In a dependency proceeding by respondent State, the children of plaintiff, an unwed father, were declared wards of the State.
Plaintiff appealed from the order, claiming that he had never been shown to have been an unfit parent and that he had been
deprived of equal protection of the laws, as guaranteed by U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The state supreme court held that plaintiff
could properly be separated from his children upon proof of the single fact that he and the children's mother, who was
deceased, had not been married. Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court of the United States granted
plaintiff's petition for certiorari, reversed the state supreme court's holding and remanded the case to the state supreme court
for proceedings not inconsistent with the Court's opinion.

ISSUE:
Were the equal protection rights of plaintiff, an unwed father, violated by respondent State when he was denied hearing on his
parental fitness?

ANSWER:
Yes.

CONCLUSION:
The State's interest in caring for plaintiff's children was de minimis if plaintiff was shown to be a fit father. Plaintiff was denied
equal protection of the law because all parents were constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children
were removed from their custody. Thus, plaintiff, as an unwed father, was also entitled to a hearing.

9. Republic versus Manalo,- SCRA- (G.R No. 221029, 24 April 2018)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MANALO G.R. No. 221029 Apr 24, 2018 FACTS: Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo
(Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a
judgment of divorce rendered by the Japanese court. Manalo was allowed to testify. Among i the documents that were offered
and admitted were: (1) Court Order finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form and in substance; (2)
Affidavit of Publication; (3) Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband; (4) Divorce Decree of
the Japanese court; (5) Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the
Notification of Divorce; and (6) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce. The Office of the Solicitor’s General, as it appeared for the
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo. The trial
court denied the petition for lack of merit. It opined that, based on Article of Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law
“does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to
Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country. On appeal, the CA
overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines is applicable even if it was Manalo
who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the
former capacitating him to remarry.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between a foreigner and a Filipino was dissolved through a divorce filed abroad by the
latter?
HELD: Yes. Article 26 of the Family Code which reads: Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on the Philippine Courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. It authorizes our courts to
adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot
try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction
recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care, and
support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our court. The Court state the twin
elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitation him or her
to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. Moreover,
invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15of the Civil Code, is not an absolute and
unbending rule. In fact, the mere existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an
exception thereto. Also, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination
and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The Court, however, asserts that it
cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo’s petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered
by the Japanese Court. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for
further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
10. Tablarin versus Guittierez, 152 SCRA 730 (1987)
FACTS Republic Act 2382 known as the “Medical Act of 1959”, was enacted for the purpose of standardization and regulation
of medical education. It created the Board of Medical Education to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the
proper implementation requirements into medical school. Ministry of Education Culture and Sports (MECS), a member of the
board established NMAT, an aptitude test, as an additional requirement into medical school. The Center for Educational
Measurement, one of the respondents, conducted NMAT for SY 1986-1987. Petitioners sought admission into colleges or
schools of medicine for the next school year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully
take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT). Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court a Petition for Declaratory
Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, contending that there
was undue delegation in enacting RA 2382 because it failed to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate.
The trial court denied the petition. Petitioner prayed with the Supreme Court for reversal. ISSUE Whether or not there was
undue delegation of power of the legislative department to the Board of Medical Education.
RULING The Supreme Court dismissed the petitioner’s petition and finds that there was no undue delegation of legislative
power when it delegated the Board of Medical Education for the determination of requirements for admission into a
recognized college of medicine. There was an implied standard which shall be followed by the delegate, which is Sec 5(a) and
Sec 7 and the body of the statute itself. And these considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the
non-delegation principle. Petition is dismissed.

11. Sameer Placement Agency Inc versus Cabiles , 732 SCRA 22(2014)
FACTS:

Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency. Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired
thus signed a one-year employment contractfor a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan
Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control
for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter. Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from
Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that “she should immediately report to their office to
get her salary and passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate repatriation.” Joy claims that she was told that from
June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her
plane ticket to Manila. On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against petitioner and
Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations
Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the
cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s fees

Issue: Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal dismissal.

Held: YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of respondent’s salary should be increased to the
amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment contract. In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process. A statute or provision which
was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.” The Court said that they are aware that the clause “or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of
Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.

Ruling on the constitutional issue

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of thegovernment may exercise its powers in any
manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution
cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a
nullity Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot
be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was
already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional
rights to equal protection and dueprocess.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling
change in the circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the precedent.The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

12. Almario versus Executive Secretary, 701 SCRA 269 (2013)

FACTS: The National Artists Awards Committee. and the NCCA decided to team up and jointly administer the National Artists
Award. There were three deliberations for determining the nominees and on the final deliberation, a final list of four names
was agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos, Lazaro Francisco and Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz. They submitted this
recommendation to the President. According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the
President to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly received nominations from various
sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing private respondents. Acting on this recommendation, a series of
Proclamations were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz and private respondents, Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Masa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists. Hence, the petition. All of the petitioners claim that former
President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and selection
process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation Panels.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the President amounted to grave abuse of discretion with regards to the violation of the right
to equal protection

RULING: Yes. It should be recalled that one of the respondents was disqualified to be nominated for being the Executive
Director of the NCCA at that time while respondents Masa and Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and
respondent Moreno was not included in the second shortlist. Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered
favorably when they were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the CCP and conferred the Order of
National Artists. The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno fails to pass
rational scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would
justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional position. In
view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an interest that is substantial enough
to confer him standing in this case.

13. Vacco versus Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997)

Facts
In New York, as in most States, it is a crime to aid another to commit or attempt suicide, but patients may refuse even lifesaving
medical treatment. Respondent New York physicians assert that, although it would be consistent with the standards of their
medical practices to prescribe lethal medication for mentally competent, terminally ill patients who are suffering great pain
and desire a doctor's help in taking their own lives, they are deterred from doing so by New York's assisted suicide ban. They,
and three gravely ill patients who have since died, sued the State's Attorney General, claiming that the ban violates the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The Federal District Court disagreed, but the Second Circuit reversed,
holding (1) that New York accords different treatment to those competent, terminally ill persons who wish to hasten their
deaths by self administering prescribed drugs than it does to those who wish to do so by directing the removal of life support
systems, and (2) that this supposed unequal treatment is not rationally related to any legitimate state interests.
Held: New York's prohibition on assisting suicide does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Pp. 3-14.

(a) The Equal Protection Clause embodies a general rule that States must treat like cases alike but may treat unlike cases
accordingly. E.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 . The New York statutes outlawing assisted suicide neither infringe
fundamental rights nor involve suspect classifications, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, ante, at 14-24, and are therefore entitled
to a strong presumption of validity, Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 . On their faces, neither the assisted suicide ban nor the law
permitting patients to refuse medicaltreatment treats anyone differently from anyone else or draws any distinctions between
persons. Everyone, regardless of physical condition, is entitled, if competent, to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment;
no one is permitted to assist a suicide. Generally, laws that apply evenhandedly to all unquestionably comply with equal
protection. E.g., New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 . This Court disagrees with the Second Circuit's
submission that ending or refusing lifesaving medical treatment "is nothing more nor less than assisted suicide." The
distinction between letting a patient die and making that patient die is important, logical, rational, and well established: It
comports with fundamental legal principles of causation, see, e.g., People v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436, 470-472, 527 N. W. 2d
714, 728, cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1083 , and intent, see, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 -406; has been recognized,
at least implicitly, by this Court in Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 -280; id., at 287-288 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); and has been widely recognized and endorsed in the medical profession, the state courts, and the overwhelming
majority of state legislatures, which, like New York's, have permitted the former while prohibiting the latter. The Court
therefore disagrees with respondents' claim that the distinction is "arbitrary" and "irrational." The line between the two acts
may not always be clear, but certainty is not required, even were it possible. Logic and contemporary practice support New
York's judgment that the two acts are different, and New York may therefore, consistent with the Constitution, treat them
differently. Pp. 3-13.

(b) New York's reasons for recognizing and acting on the distinction between refusing treatment and assisting a suicide--
including prohibiting intentional killing and preserving life; preventing suicide; maintaining physicians' role as their patients'
healers; protecting vulnerable people from indifference, prejudice, and psychological and financial pressure to end their lives;
and avoiding a possible slide towards euthanasia--are valid and important public interests that easily satisfy the constitutional
requirement that a legislative classification bear a rational relation to some legitimate end. See Glucksberg, ante. Pp. 13-14.

80 F. 3d 716, reversed.

Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined in part. Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J., filed
opinions concurring in the judgment.

14. League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) versus Commission on Elections , 571 SCRA 263 (2008), 608 SCRA 636
(2009), 628 SCRA 819(2010), 634 SCRA 149 (2011), 648 SCRA 344 (2011), and 652 SCRA 798 (2011)
Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the
constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent
municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

Facts:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did
not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA
9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal
Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which
sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not
approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and
forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice
of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16
cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in
RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills
in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood
Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to
hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their
municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the
wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment
because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local
Government Code.

Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive
application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government
Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the
national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a
municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an
intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a
law passed in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption
would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
 C. Underinclusiveness Argument and Inverse Equal Protection
16. Philippine Judges Association versus Prado, 227 SCRA 703 ( 1993)
Facts: The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to implement Section 35 of RA 7354 withdrawing the
franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration Commission and with certain other government
offices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory becasue while withdrawing the franking privilege from judiciary, it retains
the same for the President & Vice-President of the Philippines, Senator & members of the House of Representatives, COMELEC,
National Census & Statistics Office and the general public. The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the
law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

Held: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Section 1 of the
Constitution to provide for amore specific guarantee against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of
an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. Equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared unconstitutional. Circular No. 92-28 is set aside insofar

15. De Guzman, Jr. versus Commission on Elections, 336 SCRA 188 (2000)
FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The
Voters Registration Act of 1996".
SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or municipality for more
than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for
at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station
outside the original congressional district.

Petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, were reassigned to different stations by the COMELEC.

Petitioners contend that the said law is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clause guaranteed by the 1987
Constitution because it singles out the City and Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in
the same city or municipality for more than four (4) years. They maintain that there is no substantial distinction between them
and other COMELEC officials, and therefore, there is no valid classification to justify the objective of the provision of law under
attack.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 44 of RA 8189 violates the equal protection clause.

HELD:

No. The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from
developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment" does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

Lutz vs. Araneta: "the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of all or none".

This is so for underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification. It may be true that all the other officers of
COMELEC referred to by petitioners are exposed to the same evils sought to be addressed by the statute. However, in this case,
it can be discerned that the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be sufficiently served by breaking an
important link in the chain of corruption than by breaking up each and every link thereof. Verily, under Section 3(n) of RA
8189, election officers are the highest officials or authorized representatives of the COMELEC in a city or municipality. It is safe
to say that without the complicity of such officials, large-scale anomalies in the registration of voters can hardly be carried out.

The petition is dismissed and upheld the constitutionality of Section 44 of RA 8189.

D. Doctrine of Relative Constitutionality
18. Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. Versus Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 299 (2004)
Facts: The New Central Bank Act abolished the old Central Bank and created the new BSP on 1993 through RA No 7653.
Central Bank Employees Association assailed the provision of RA No 7653, Art II Sec 15(c). They contend that it makes an
unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers as exempt class of Salary
Standardization Law (RA 6758) and (2) the rank-and-file non-exempt class. BSP contends that the exemption of officers (SG 20
and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers
and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file.
Issue: Whether or not Section 15(c) violates equal protection right of the BSP r&f employees?
Decision: Sec 15(c) unconstitutional. Judicial notice that other Govt Financial Institution undertook amendment of their
charters from 1995 to 2004 – a blanket provision for all employees to be covered by SSL. The said subsequent enactments
constitute significant changes in circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last
proviso of Section 15(c). Legal history shows that GFIs have long been recognized as comprising one distinct class, separate
from other governmental entities. There is no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the
other rank-and-file of the seven GFIs. The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
Those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is equally
binding on the rest. It is clear that the enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of
the challenged proviso anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be declared as an outlaw.