Fire & Gas System Philosophy

January/2019 DOCUMENT NUMBER :
West-African Exploration and Production
Classification Status: Unrestricted
Fire & Gas System Philosophy
Proprietary Information: This document contains proprietary information and may not be partly or wholly reproduced without prior written
permission from Shell Petroleum Development Company
The Process Manager for this procedure is the Project Manager, the Process Owner is the Installation Manager
Revision Date Description Originator Checker Approver
R01 18-Jan-2019 Issued for Internal Review I.Oghene
This document is controlled electronically and is uncontrolled when printed

KALAEKULE OFFSHORE PLATFORM

Doc No. Page 2 of 37
CHANGE RECORD PAGE
REV. N° Status Description of Revision

R01 INT Issued for Internal Review
A01 IFR Issued for Review
C01 AFC Approved for Construction


CONTENTS
1.0 PROJECT DESCRIPTION ................................................................................................................ 6
1.1 Objective 6
1.2 Definition and Abbreviation ................................................................................................................ 6
1.2.1 Definition 6
1.2.2 Abbreviation 7
1.3 Site Environmental Conditions .......................................................................................................... 8
2.0 APPLICABLE CODES & STANDARDS .......................................................................................... 10
2.1 List of Applicable Codes & Standards ............................................................................................. 10
2.1.1 Master Practices–WAEP Local Engineering Practices ................................................................... 10
2.1.2 International Standards.................................................................................................................... 11
2.1.3 WAEP Loss prevention procedures documents .............................................................................. 11
2.1.4 Project Documents .......................................................................................................................... 11
2.2 Order of Precedence ....................................................................................................................... 12
2.3 Health, Safety And Environmental Requirements ........................................................................... 12
3.0 F&G SYSTEM PHILOSOPHY ......................................................................................................... 12
3.1 FGS Scope 12
3.2 FGS Purpose 13
3.2.1 General 13
3.3 Hazards 13
3.3.1 Controlling Flammable Gas Hazards ............................................................................................... 13
3.3.2 Controlling Fire Hazards .................................................................................................................. 13
3.4 Fire Zones 13
3.5 Voting 14
3.6 Executive Actions ............................................................................................................................ 14
3.7 Design Efficiency ............................................................................................................................. 15
4.0 FLAMMABLE GAS DETECTION .................................................................................................... 15
4.1 Detection Requirement .................................................................................................................... 15
4.2 Detection Technology Selection ...................................................................................................... 15
4.3 Selection Hierarchy.......................................................................................................................... 15
4.3.1 Boundaries/Areas Monitoring .......................................................................................................... 15
4.3.2 Significant Potential Leak Sources .................................................................................................. 15
4.3.3 Congested Plant Modules................................................................................................................ 15
4.3.4 Ducting and Air Intakes.................................................................................................................... 15
4.3.5 Difficult Access or Conditions .......................................................................................................... 16
4.3.6 Building Interior 16
4.3.7 Oil Mist Area 16
4.4 Flammable Gas Connection Alarm Limits ....................................................................................... 16
5.0 FIRE DETECTIION .......................................................................................................................... 17
5.1 Detection Requirements .................................................................................................................. 17
5.2 Detector Technology Selection ........................................................................................................ 17
5.3 Selection Hierarchy.......................................................................................................................... 17
5.3.1 Wide Area Coverage ....................................................................................................................... 17
5.3.2 Single Point Coverage ..................................................................................................................... 17
5.3.3 Congested Platform/Plant Modules ................................................................................................. 17
5.3.4 Inside Enclosures ............................................................................................................................ 17
5.4 Other Selection Scenarios ............................................................................................................... 18
5.4.1 Building Interiors .............................................................................................................................. 18
5.4.2 Critical / High Value Equipment ....................................................................................................... 18
5.4.3 Wellheads 18


5.4.4 Gas Generator Enclosures .............................................................................................................. 19

5.4.5 Low Hydrocarbon Fires.................................................................................................................... 19
5.4.6 Manned Areas 19
6.0 SYSTEM DESIGN ........................................................................................................................... 19
6.1 General 19
6.2 Main Fire And Gas Detection System (FGS)................................................................................... 20
6.3 FGS input 20
6.4 Voting Modules 20
6.5 FGS output 20
6.6 FGS Power Supply .......................................................................................................................... 21
6.7 FGS and SIS Physical Location ...................................................................................................... 21
6.8 Civil Facilities 21
6.8.1 FGS Separation & Architecture: ...................................................................................................... 21
6.8.2 F&G Alarm Panel Interface: ............................................................................................................. 21
6.8.3 Detectors: 21
6.8.4 Annunciators: 21
6.9 Complex Equipment Package FGS Systems .................................................................................. 22
6.9.1 Package FGS Integration ................................................................................................................ 22
6.9.2 Package Independence ................................................................................................................... 22
6.9.3 Field Cabling and Terminations ....................................................................................................... 22
6.9.4 Vendor Testing and Package Integration ........................................................................................ 22
6.9.5 Hardware 22
6.9.6 Standard Compliance ...................................................................................................................... 22
6.10 Simple Equipment Packages ........................................................................................................... 23
6.11 Sequence Of Event Recording ........................................................................................................ 23
6.12 Maintenance Overrides.................................................................................................................... 23
6.13 Scalability 23
6.14 Certification 23
7.0 HUMAN MACHINE INTERFACE .................................................................................................... 23
7.1 PAS Displays 24
7.2 Geographic Mimic Panels ................................................................................................................ 24
7.3 Alarm Annunciators ......................................................................................................................... 24
7.4 FGS Response Time ....................................................................................................................... 24
8.0 DETECTION AND FIELD MOUNTED EQUIPMENT ...................................................................... 24
8.1 General 24
8.2 Detector and Annunciator Layout .................................................................................................... 25
8.3 Field Device Hazardous Area Protection Rating ............................................................................. 25
8.4 Ingress Protection ............................................................................................................................ 25
8.5 Gas Detection Elements .................................................................................................................. 25
8.6 Calibration Gas 26
8.7 Line-Of-Sight Gas Detectors ........................................................................................................... 26
8.7.1 Boundary Monitoring........................................................................................................................ 26
8.7.2 Area Monitoring ............................................................................................................................... 26
8.7.3 Installation 26
8.7.4 Sensor Robustness ......................................................................................................................... 26
8.8 Point Gas Detectors ......................................................................................................................... 26
8.9 Air Intake / Outlet Gas Detectors ..................................................................................................... 27
8.10 Accoustic Leak Detection ................................................................................................................ 27
8.11 Gas Detector Location And Mounting .............................................................................................. 27
8.12 Flame Detection ............................................................................................................................... 27
8.12.1 Technologies 27


8.13 Smoke Detection ............................................................................................................................. 28

8.13.1 Technologies 28
8.13.3 High Sensitivity Smoke Detection: ................................................................................................... 28
8.14 Heat Detection 28
8.14.1 Voting 29
8.14.2 Point Heat Detection ........................................................................................................................ 29
8.14.3 Linear Heat Detection ...................................................................................................................... 29
8.15 Manual Call Point ............................................................................................................................. 29
8.16 Audible Alarm Sounders .................................................................................................................. 30
8.16.1 Site Siren 30
8.16.2 Individual Alarm Sounder................................................................................................................. 30
8.16.3 Civil Facilities 30
8.16.4 Visual Alarm Device ......................................................................................................................... 30
8.17 Lightning Protection ......................................................................................................................... 31
9.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE AND CONTROL....................................................................................... 31
9.1 Cause And Effects Review .............................................................................................................. 31
9.2 FGS Risk Assessment (SIL classification) ...................................................................................... 31
9.3 SIL Verification (FMEDA / PFD Calculation) ................................................................................... 31
9.4 Reviews and Audit by the WAEP .................................................................................................... 32
10.0 APPENDIX 1- FLAMMABLE GAS SENSING TECHNOLOGIES .................................................... 33
11.0 APPENDIX 2 – COMBUSTION (FIRE & SMOKE) SENSING TECHNOLOGIES ........................... 34
12.0 APPENDIX 3 - TONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ALARM SOUNDERS ........................................ 36
13.0 APPENDIX 4 – FIRE ZONE SCHEDULE........................................................................................ 37


1.0 PROJECT DESCRIPTION
OML’s 71 and 72 are located at approximately 27km and 50 km respectively south of the Bonny
River inside the shallow Offshore Waters – Water depths are 65ft (OML71) and 131ft (OML72). To
date while oil production is from OML 72 only in the KALAEKULE field which was discovered in 1984
and production from the field started in July 1986. OML 71 is largely undeveloped.
KCPPA: A single train 3 stage (XHP, HP, LP) three phase Gas Separation (250 MMSCFD) and Oil
(25 MBBLs/Day). The KCDP-A and KCPP-A are located 30m apart and linked by a walk way bridge
while KCDPB and KCJV-A are located about 970m and 600m respectively from KCPP -A.
In an effort to monetize oil and gas in OML 72 based on the available resources, the COMPANY
has planned to re-furbish the existing facilities on KCPP-A and KCDP-A by installing new process
modules/packages.
1.1 Objective
This document provides the philosophy that defines the basic principles for the design of the Fire
and Gas detection and protection system and field devices for the KALAEKULE Platform re-
furbishment Project Facilities.
This document forms part of the overall safety philosophy with respect to project hazard
identification, risk assessment and mitigation and hence it is imperative that it is read in conjunction
with the project applicable documents. listed in Section 2.1.4
The primary design objective shall be to provide instrumentation, control and automation systems
that are:
 Safe
 Fit for purpose
 Cost effective
 Reliable and offer a high availability
 Simple to operate and maintain
 Capable of integrating and inter-operating with the rest of SPDC’s control and
communications infrastructure seamlessly
 Flexible and capable of accommodating future modifications, updates, upgrades and
expansions
 Based on the latest mature technology
 Suitable for and supported through the project design lifespan
 Maintainable by specialist personnel resident within easy reach
 Centralized and offer enterprise-wide monitoring and control of all facilities within the
Project from a central location.
 Standardized to afford spare parts commonality / Interchangeability, and reduction in
training effort and maintenance costs.
1.2 Definition and Abbreviation

1.2.1 Definition
COMPANY NNPC/WAEP JV
Contractor The party that carries out all or part of the design, engineering,
procurement, construction, commissioning or management of a
project or operation of a facility. The Principal may undertake all or
part of the duties of the Contractor.


Vendor Party(s) responsible for manufacturing and/or supplying materials, equipment,

technical documents/drawings and services to perform the duties specified by
COMPANY.
Principal The party that initiates the project and pays for its design and construction, in this
case West-African Exploration and Production (WAEP)/NNPC JV.
Shall This indicates a mandatory requirement.
Should This indicates a preferred (but not mandatory) course of action
May This indicates a possible course of action
1.2.2 Abbreviation
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable
API American Petroleum Institute
BS British Standards
CEM Cause and Effect Matrix
CR Control Room
ESD Emergency Shutdown
EWS Engineering Work Station
RTU Remote Terminal Unit
F&G Fire and Gas
F&GDM Fire & Gas Detection Mapping
F&GS Fire & Gas System
FDS Functional Design Specification
FEED Front End Engineering Design
FMEDA Failure Mode Effects and Diagnostic Analysis
FIREPRAN FIRE PRotection ANalysis
GOR Gas Oil Ratio
HART Highway Addressable Remote Transducer
HMI Human Machine Interface
HSE Health, Safety and Environment
HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
I/O Input / Output
IC&A Instrumentation, control and automation
IASS Integrated Automation and Shutdown System
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission.


IP Institute of Petroleum
IR Infra Red
IS Intrinsically Safe
ISA Instrumentation, Systems and Automation Society
LED Light Emitting Diode
LFL Lower Flammable Limit
LFLm Lower Flammable Limit meter
NAG Non Associated Gas
OPC Object Linking & Embedding for Process Control
OSD Operational Shutdown
PA Public Address
PAS Process Automation System
PFD Probability of Failure on Demand
ROR Rate Of Rise
SER Sequence Of Event Recorder
SIF Safety Instrumented Function
SIL Safety Integrity Level
SIS Safety Instrumented System
WAEP West-African Exploration and Production
JV Joint Venture
KCDP-A Kaleakule Drilling Platform
KCPP-A Kaleakule Central Processing Platform
SCSSV Surface Control Sub-Surface Safety Valve
TDC Target Detection Coverage
TDO Target Detection Objectives
TDP Target Detection Perfromance
TuV Technischer Uberwachungsverein (German body, Translates to
Technical Inspection Agency).
UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply
VCE Vapour Cloud Explosion
1.3 Site Environmental Conditions

Kaleakule Platform where the instruments and equipment shall be installed are located within the
Niger Delta area; approximately 27km and 50 km respectively south of the Bonny River inside the
shallow Offshore Waters – Water depths are 65ft (OML71) and 131ft (OML72).; . This means that
for most part of the year, equipment and instrumentation will be installed and operated in


environment with potential for saline corrosion and water ingress. The environmental data listed
below give an overview of the conditions prevalent over these locations in general, for the purpose
of selection and protection of the instruments.
The environmental conditions (weather and MetOcean) at the Kalaekule field are considered typical
of any shallow offshore location in the Niger Delta region. Available data shows that the extreme
conditions in this region are driven by both sea wind and swells. Company is in the process of
acquiring recent MetOcean data specific to OML-71 and -72.
Water Depth: The Mean Sea Level (MSL) at Kalaekule platforms’ location (OML 72) is 19.0m.
Tides: The highest astronomical tide and storm tide shall be assumed to occur simultaneously.
This total effect shall be considered in conjunction with both storm and operating waves and winds.
The astronomical and storm tides are 0.75m each. Tables 1 below provide the available data on
the wind and wave characteristics of the region for both operating and 100 year
Table 1: Operating and 100 Year Return MetOcean Data
Parameter Operating 100 Year Storm

Condition Condition
Wave Height (m) 4.8 9.8
Wave Time Period 8.3 14.5

(sec)
Current Speed at 0.7 1.6
Surface (m/s)
Current Speed at 0.3 0.8

2.3m from mudline
(m/s)
Wind at one minute 16.5 31
mean velocity (m/s)
Marine Growth: A 50mm radius increase shall be applied to the outside of all structural members
between the mudline and elevation +3m above MSL for the purpose of simulating marine growth.
Meteorological Data: The available meteorological data for the area are summarized in table 2 below.
Table 2: Meteorological Data
Minimum Air Temperature 20oC
Maximum Air Temperature 33oC
Minimum Seawater Temperature 22oC
Maximum Seawater Temperature 30oC
Wind Speed Gusting to 19m/s
Average Wind Speed 5.4m/s


Maximum Wind Speed 8m/s
Pre-dominant Wind Direction (rainy South-West

season)
Pre-dominant Wind Direction (dry North East
season)
Raining Season March-October
Dry season (harmattan, dusty air) November - March
Maximum mean monthly rainfall 600mm.
Humidity :Maximum mean monthly 93%

value
Humidity: Maximum recorded 100%
Between 0.65 in winter and 1.45m

in Summer
Significant Wave Height HS
Wave Period Between 4.0 and 5.0s
Barometric pressure Approx. 1010 mbar (fairly constant

all year)
All field devices, fittings and installation materials shall be suitable for and unaffected by the
indicated climatic conditions.
2.0 APPLICABLE CODES & STANDARDS

2.1 List of Applicable Codes & Standards
Design of the F&G system and the field devices shall be based on the standards and codes listed
below in this document.
2.1.1 Master Practices–WAEP Local Engineering Practices
MPL 41-P-19 Diesel Systems
WLP 70-P-01 Loss Prevention - Facilities
WLP 70-P-03 Hazard Assessment
WLP 70-P-04 Offshore Platform Layout
WLP 70-P-05 Fireproofing
WLP 70-P-09 Fire and Gas Detection
WLP 70-P-13 Use of Composite Pipe in Offshore Firewater Service


2.1.2 International Standards

ANSI 1638 Visual Signalling Appliances – Private Mode
Emergency and General Utility Signalling
BS 5839 Fire Detection and Fire Alarm Systems for Buildings
EN 54 Fire Detection and Fire Alarm Systems
EN 61779 1-5 Combustible (flammable) gas detectors
EP 95-0230 HSE Manual, Design
EP 95-0351 Fire Control & Recovery
IEC 60079 Electrical Apparatus for Explosive Gas Atmospheres
IEC 60529 Degrees of protection provided by enclosures (IP
Code)
IEC 61000-4-3 Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) – Testing and
Measurement Techniques – radiated, radio frequency,
electromagnetic field Immunity test.
IEC 61000-6-2 Generic Standard for Immunity in Industrial
Environment
IEC 61000-6-4 Generic Standard for Emission in Industrial
Environment
IEC 61131 Programmable Controllers – programming languages
IEC 61508 Functional Safety of Electrical / Electronic /
Programmable Electronic Safety Related Systems
IEC 61511 Functional Safety of Safety Instrumented Systems for
the Process Industry
2.1.3 WAEP Loss prevention procedures documents

- WLP 70-P-05 Loss Prevention Fireproofing
- WLP 70-P-07 Loss Prevention FIREWATER SYSTEMS AND DEVICES
- WLP 70-P-09 Loss Prevention Fire and Gas Detection
- WLP 70-P-11 Loss Prevention PORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
- WLP 70-P-13 Loss Prevention USE OF COMPOSITE PIPE IN OFFSHORE
FIREWATER SERVICE
- WLP 70-P-05 Loss Prevention Fireproofing
- WLP 70-P-07 Loss Prevention FIREWATER SYSTEMS AND DEVICES
- WLP 70-P-09 Loss Prevention Fire and Gas Detection
2.1.4 Project Documents

--- Platform Layout
---- PAS Architecture Diagram
--- Safety Instrumented System Specification


--- ESD & Safeguarding Philosophy

--- Instrumentation & Control Philosophy
--- Fire and Gas Specification
--- General Specification for Instruments
--- Process Automation System Specification
--- Process Safeguarding Memoranda
--- KCPP/KCDP Fire and Gas Cause and Effect
Matrix
--- Safety Instrumented Function (SIF)
Classification and Report
2.2 Order of Precedence

In the event of conflicts between the above listed applicable regulations, codes and standards, the
following priority order shall be applied:
 Nigerian Government legislation
 Project Specification and Datasheets
 WAEP LPPs
 Industry standards
 Vendor / contractor codes and working standards
Latest editions of all codes and standards as at the date of issue of this philosophy shall apply.
Deviations from applicable rules, codes and standards shall be subject to written consent from
WAEP.
2.3 Health, Safety And Environmental Requirements

The Vendor shall at all times, maintain awareness of the Health, Safety and Environmental (HSE)
legislation and regulations concerning safe and environmentally friendly working practices, and
comply with these in the manufacturing, fabrication and testing operations pertaining to this
specification.
The Vendor shall institute and adopt the use of safe working practices and encourage, train and
require their workforce / personnel and his sub-suppliers to comply with such practices at all times.
The Vendor shall operate a formal Health, Safety and Environmental Management System and
demonstrate in their bid how they comply with Health, Safety and Environmental policies and the
requirements of HSE regulations. The HSE management system shall ensure compliance during
design, manufacture and testing processes.
3.0 F&G SYSTEM PHILOSOPHY

3.1 FGS Scope
Within the scope of this refurbishment project, the FGS is responsible for detecting fire and
flammable gas. Toxic gas detection is not required; however the system shall be capable of
incorporating this function in the future if required.


3.2 FGS Purpose

3.2.1 General
The primary purpose of the FGS is the protection of personnel, environment, equipment and
reputation by:
 Continuous monitoring of designated areas for release or accumulation of gas, fire or
products of combustion (smoke),
 Initiation of alarms to alert personnel to the hazard,
 Initiation of executive actions to mitigate such events and to prevent escalation
It is unlikely that the FGS will act quickly enough to reduce the size of the initial event. However
the FGS shall annunciate the hazard and effect appropriate executive actions, to reduce the
potential for escalation
3.3 Hazards
The following hazards are expected from the facilities:
 Cellulosic fire
 Electrical fire
 Gas ingress
 Hydrogen build up from batteries
 Diesel fire
 Lube oil fire
 Gas Cloud
 VCE
 Jet fire
 Spray fire
3.3.1 Controlling Flammable Gas Hazards
The role of flammable gas detection is to detect accumulations of gas, or gas migrating between
areas, sufficiently early for shutdown actions to be initiated before flammable concentrations
reaches key ignition sources. If process shutdown is initiated before the cloud has grown to such
a size that its ignition could threaten the shutdown devices, the system can be considered to have
performed its function.
The detection of fugitive leaks is outside of the scope of the FGS
3.3.2 Controlling Fire Hazards
The fire detection system shall detect fires early enough to allow shutdown actions to be reliably
taken which minimise the risk to personnel and damage to facility.
Priority should be given to gas detection over fire detection, as gas detection has a more
‘preventative’ role than that of fire detection. However, in cases where specific executive actions
require a high reliability of incident detection, use of fire detection as an input may be appropriate
3.4 Fire Zones
The fire & gas detection philosophy shall be developed around the concept of zones (often referred
to as “Fire Zones”)
Zones are identified process or geographic areas to which a particular fire & gas detection, alarm,
and executive action strategy is assigned. Such strategy takes account of hazard characteristics
such as platform layout and separation, boundary isolations, stored inventory, meteorological
conditions, location of personnel and escape routes.


Individual process modules are normally treated as separate zones except where the modules are
in close proximity to one another and there is a high likelihood of a gas cloud or a fire enveloping
more than one module. In this case, the modules concerned may be treated as a single zone. A
key consideration is the location of effective boundaries or boundary isolations with respect to the
likely events.
Non-process areas such as offices, warehouses and other buildings are regarded as civil structures
and treated as separate zones, often on a per room or per building basis.
A detailed fire zones arrangement for the Kalaekule platform is shown in Appendix 4.
3.5 Voting
FGS voting is the configuration of the FGS to consider the indicated status of more than one
detector before executive actions are triggered. Detector voting is generally employed on a per
zone basis.
The purpose of voting is two-fold:
1. Removal of spurious alarms and executive actions by the fire system that would otherwise
result from detector falsely indicating hazardous situations.
2. Allowing detector redundancy and online maintenance to be performed more readily and
without compromising plant safety.
The voting scheme shall be 2ooN (Fire,gas and smoke detection systems) and shall be done taking
into account a number of factors including:
 Relevant standards
 The reliability of the detector correctly sensing a hazardous situation.
 The sensor placement and plant layout.
 Required SIL Rating of FGS.
 Sensor redundancy
 The magnitude of the risk being controlled
To ensure full consideration of plant operation, reliability, production continuance and maintenance
activities, WAEP’s approval of the voting system is required.
3.6 Executive Actions
In response to detected hazards, the FGS may trigger executive actions such as:
 Fire suppression systems
 Blowdown of platform or area
 Isolation of fuel or energy supply
 Annunciations such as sounders and lighting
 Activation or isolation of ventilation systems
 Remove notification of authorities’/emergency response groups
A Cause and Effects Matrix shall be prepared indicating a list of executive actions and their trigger
conditions.
Operator approval for particular executive actions shall be required in areas where automatic blow
down of facilities is not required. For instance, in certain plant locations it may not be appropriate
to blow down automatically as it will cause escalation of the hazardous event (e.g. a fire event
affecting the flare/vent system itself) executive action shall be manually initiated at the discretion
of the control system Operators.


3.7 Design Efficiency

There can be a tendency to adopt a ‘more and better’ approach to FGS, especially regarding
detector selection and position. Typically the largest component of the life-cycle cost of a FGS is
maintenance. The design shall take into account the practicality, maintainability and overall lifecycle
cost of the system.
4.0 FLAMMABLE GAS DETECTION

4.1 Detection Requirement
Flammable gas detection shall be provided in all hydrocarbon process areas where accumulation
of a flammable atmosphere is likely, or in open areas where early detection of large migrating gas
release is beneficial.
4.2 Detection Technology Selection
The remainder of this section outlines the various flammable gas detection techniques allowable
on the project, and the philosophy to be applied for their selection and application.
A table of the various detection techniques and their characteristic strengths and weaknesses is
included in the appendices.
4.3 Selection Hierarchy
This section lists various typical detection scenarios and the technologies to be used, in order of
descending preference.
4.3.1 Boundaries/Areas Monitoring
The first preference for gas detection is the application of Line-Of-Sight (LOS) techniques, due to
its reliable and cost effective coverage of large areas.
This technology is especially useful for detecting the migration of significant gas clouds between
process modules and the accumulation of gas clouds within process modules.
4.3.2 Significant Potential Leak Sources
In areas where there is a significant risk of leak (e.g. flanged or screwed joints), additional IR point
gas detectors shall be employed e.g. combustion and ventilation air intakes.
Acoustic Leak Detection may be considered for use in areas of open plant where there is little
chance of accumulation and operator attendance is infrequent so that significant leaks may go
undetected for some time. An example is the flanged sections where there is a risk of jet fire due
to high pressure leaks.
Acoustic Leak Detection may be used for detection of high pressure gas releases as the prime
detection technology or in combination with conventional detection (open path / point).
4.3.3 Congested Plant Modules
In congested areas within process modules where LOS detection is unsuitable due to the absence
of any substantial sight lines, or where there is increased risk of accumulation due to confinement,
then additional point gas detection shall be employed.
4.3.4 Ducting and Air Intakes
Due to the potential difficultly of high air flows and maintenance access, it is preferable to protect
an air inlet/duct from hydrocarbon gas using IR Point Detection in the vicinity of the intake, rather
than inside the duct itself. Typically the installations protected would be combustion air intakes for
gas generator, emergency diesel generators, HVAC inlets etc.


If it is possible that concentrated gas might flow into the duct undetected using point detection, then
Line-Of-Sight detectors across the duct cross-section shall be employed, with consideration given
to how these detectors may be tested by maintenance in the future.
Where maintenance access is an issue, then remote testing facilities or aspirated detection should
be considered.
4.3.5 Difficult Access or Conditions
For high temperatures such as inside motor enclosures, or difficult access conditions such as
under-floor, aspirated detection systems may be employed.
For forced ventilation enclosures, the outlet may be monitored for gas.
Detection requirements for gas engine enclosures should be in accordance with applicable
international standard/industry practice (Gas generator/turbines for the petroleum, chemical, and
gas industry services).
4.3.6 Building Interior
The first preference for protecting building interiors from hydrocarbon build-up is the detection of
hydrocarbons much closer to their release in the field. If this is not possible then protection of the
building air inlet is preferred. If this is not possible, then detection within the building should be
employed.
4.3.7 Oil Mist Area
A pressurised leak of flammable fluid may produce an explosive oil mist that cannot be detected
by any of the previously described methods. In locations where this may occur, especially indoors,
then Oil Mist Detection shall be considered.
4.4 Flammable Gas Connection Alarm Limits
The following table indicates the alarm limits to be universally applied for gas detection systems,
according to their application and technology. Approval from WAEP is required to vary from these
values:
Application/ Low Alarm High Alarm Comment /
Detection Limit Limit Explanation
Technology
IR Point 20% LEL 60% LEL If only a single alarm limit is used, then set to
Detection 50% LEL
Catalytic Point 20% LEL 60% LEL
Detection
Gas 15% LEL 40% LEL Figures chosen to protect turbine from over-
Turbine/generator speed due to gas ingress into combustion air
Ingression inlet
Line Of Sight 1.0 LFLm 3.0 LFLm i.e. High Alarm on :
Detection (IR)  10m gas cloud of 30% LEL, or
 100m gas cloud of 3% LEL.
Suggest calibrated FSD=5.0 LFLm.


5.0 FIRE DETECTIION

5.1 Detection Requirements
The primary purposes of fire detection are to:
 Detect any fire in its early stages
 Alert the operator and personnel
 Minimise the potential for escalation by isolating the flammable inventory and where
appropriate, depressurize the affected and/or adjacent unit or system.
 Contribute to possible firefighting actions.
 Contribute to the safety of both on and off site personnel.
5.2 Detector Technology Selection
A critical aspect of all of the fire detection goals is the earliest practical reliable detection of a fire
or potential fire. Fire detection technologies are used either to detect flame directly, or detect the
heat and smoke by-products of combustion.
A table of the various detection techniques and their characteristic strengths and weaknesses is
included in the appendices. Further details can be obtained from WAEP LPPs (Loss Prevention
Procedure for Fire, gas and smoke detection systems).
The specification and Installation section later in this document details implementation and project
standards associated with each technology.
5.3 Selection Hierarchy
In contrast to gas detection which must address the migration of gas throughout a processing plant,
fires generally start in defined locations where fuel is known to be available, and then move / spread
relatively slowly. Hence fire detection is typically more focussed on specific locations where fuel is
located and likely to combust (such as generator/turbine enclosures or LPG loading bays, etc).
This section lists various typical detection requirements that typically exist on platform/plant, and
the technologies to be used, in order of descending preference.
5.3.1 Wide Area Coverage
The first preference for wide area coverage (e.g. load-out jetty) is Triple Band IR Flame Detection,
due to its fast response time and cost effective coverage of large areas.
Depending upon location / installation, backup protection may be implemented using heat
detection, due to its high reliability and very low false trigger rates.
5.3.2 Single Point Coverage
The first preference for covering a single area (e.g. metering skid) is Triple Band IR Flame
Detection, with possible heat detection (e.g. fusible loop) employed as a backup.
In applications where IR Flame Detection is not attractive (due to requirements for ultra-low
maintenance, or sub-zero temperatures, etc) then heat detection mounted directly above the area
may be employed and no IR is required.
5.3.3 Congested Platform/Plant Modules
The same approach as for Single Point Coverage (above) shall be applied.
5.3.4 Inside Enclosures
Triple Band IR Flame Detection is the preferred option, where adequate sight lines exist inside the
package and the ambient temperature of the enclosure allows installation of the sensors.
Consideration shall be given to installing heat detectors near the ventilation outlet as a backup to


the IR detectors. Where no substantial enclosure ventilation occurs, then consideration shall be
given to installing heat detectors high-up in the enclosure.
For heat producing packages such as diesel engines housed inside an enclosure, compensated
rate-of-rise heat detectors shall be installed as a back up to the IR detectors. Activation of a single
heat detector shall be regarded by the associated FGS as a confirmed fire and all associated
executive actions shall be triggered.
Where enclosure temperatures exceed the capability of the IR detectors, alternative techniques
may be employed. One option is the use of UV type fire detectors, however they shall not be
employed in dusty environments, for fires that produce heavy smoke, or where airborne oil droplets
may exists. WAEP approval is required for the use of UV type sensors due to their tendency to
false trip due to welding, X-rays (as used in on-site non-destructive testing), sunlight and lightning.
UV type sensor shall not be used to trigger potentially destructive executive actions.
5.4 Other Selection Scenarios
The following is a discussion of other typical scenarios where fire detection system selection is
required for projects:
5.4.1 Building Interiors
All non-process buildings/carbins shall be fitted with redundant optical type smoke detectors in their
interiors. All HVAC intakes shall have redundant ionisation type smoke detectors.
Where a building is not adequately sealed from dusty / dirty conditions then consideration may be
given to the use of ceiling mounted point heat detection in lieu of smoke detection.
Single detection of smoke or heat shall be regarded as a confirmed fire for that zone, and all
executive actions shall be triggered.
5.4.2 Critical / High Value Equipment
For location with critical and /or high value equipment installed, such as instrument, telecoms and
switchgear equipment, the use of a High Sensitivity Smoke Detection (e.g. VESDATM type) system
may be considered, especially for detection of combustion in difficult access areas such as under
floor and ceiling areas.
These High Sensitivity Smoke Detection systems detect pre-combustion emissions from material,
and hence allow intervention prior to the equipment being damaged by smoke and /or effort to
contain the subsequent fire that might develop.
High Sensitivity Smoke Detection systems are sensitive to dust ingression, can be prone to false
alarms, and also require significant maintenance. Hence the genuine usefulness of the early
warning offered by these high sensitivity systems need to be well demonstrated to justify their
usage.
A high sensitivity smoke detection system shall be used for alarm only.
Approval of the Principal is required for inclusion of this type of system.
5.4.3 Wellheads
Wellheads shall be protected by heat detectors which perform the executive action to close the
well in the event of a 2ooN detection indicating confirmed fire.
This shall be implemented using suitably rated fusible alloy plugs installed in the hydraulic supply
lines to the SSSV, SCSSV and Wing valve actuators, at the wellhead. In the event of fire at the
wellhead, the fusible alloy plugs will fail causing the hydraulic pressure to be vented from the spring-
return valve actuators, resulting in closure of the SSSV, SCSSV and Wing valves.


The hydraulic control system shall include low pressure alarms to alert the operator to loss of
hydraulic pressure.
5.4.4 Gas Generator Enclosures
Detection requirements for gas generator enclosures shall use triple band IR detectors, and
compensated rate-of-rise heat detectors installed in accordance with applicable international
standard.
IR detector locations shall be selected so that all possible fire locations inside the enclosure are
monitored from two different angles / detector locations. A single detector location indicating fire
triggers an alarm. Two different detector locations indicating fire in the same location shall trigger
executive action. Additionally, each detector location shall have a pair of detectors installed for
equipment redundancy.
UV type flame detection shall not be used.
5.4.5 Low Hydrocarbon Fires
For outdoor applications, heat detection shall be used.
Multiple point detection is preferred. Fusible Loop (linear) detection may be employed where an
excessive number of point detectors would be required for coverage, or where a mechanical /
hydraulic triggered automatic deluge is required.
For indoor applications, UV type flame detection may be considered only with the approval of
WAEP. Careful consideration of redundancy, voting systems and operator approval of executive
actions shall be considered.
5.4.6 Manned Areas
Manual alarm call points shall be provided in all living quaters, located adjacent to fire points and
exits. They shall also be provided at designated locations on personnel egress routes within the
platform facilities.
Activation of any manual call point in either a building or process area shall be regarded by the
associated FGS as a confirmed fire in that zone and all associated executive actions shall be
triggered.
6.0 SYSTEM DESIGN

6.1 General
The process facility shall have a suite of Instrumentation, Control and Automation (IC&A) systems,
which comprises Process Automation System (PAS), Safety Instrumented System (SIS) and Fire
& Gas Detection System (FGS) installed in the refurbished Kalaekule Platform.
The new FGS shall seamlessly integrate with the SIS but shall be functionally separate from the
SIS.
All the F&G devices installed shall interface with the new PAS, SIS / F&G system cabinets provided
for the Project except where advised otherwise by the Company.
All fire & gas detection and safeguarding functions shall be executed separately from the SIS. The
PAS shall act as the main human-machine interface for all IC&A system including FGS.
The FGS shall be responsible for all logic and shutdown functions associated with the detection of
flame, heat, smoke and flammable gases. Any executive actions required (e.g. shutdowns,
depressurization and inventory isolations) shall be performed indirectly, via the main SIS system.


The well head shall be supplied with fusible loop for fire detection and shut down of the wells.
6.2 Main Fire And Gas Detection System (FGS)
The main FGS shall be located in the Kalaekule Platforms control room.
The FGS shall continuously monitor each zone for any potential hazards, and on detection the FGS
shall raise an alarm, bring up the appropriate displays, and (may) initiate executive actions in
accordance with the voting system adopted.
The FGS shall have native compatibility with the full range of detection and manual initiation
devices required in the design. Complex interface conversion devices shall not be employed
between the FGS processor and its field devices.
The FGS shall have in-built self diagnostic capability with data interfacing facilities to the PAS for
fault reporting and visual display of project wide FGS status and alarm conditions.
The FGS shall be capable of driving hard-wired mimics.
Provision shall be made for hardware to be tested on-line using maintenance overrides.
6.3 FGS input
The FGS shall be designed with hard-wired field detector inputs. All input circuits shall be
continuously monitored for open circuit and closed circuit fault conditions. Alternatively, inputs may
use digital data bus connections to the field sensors; however consideration of the SIL
requirements and approvals ratings of the detectors shall be considered in accordance with
company LPP and process control philosophy.
The use of 0-20 mA transmitters which communicate sensor diagnostic messages in the 0-4 mA
range is encouraged over simple open / closed switch indicating type sensors is preferred.
Input cards as a minimum shall have status LEDs to indicate input status, override status and fault
status.
For process area related detectors, there shall be one input to the FGS per detector, allowing each
individual detector to be identified on the HMI interface, unless another approach is approved by
the Company.
For detectors in buildings, the inputs may be combined on a per zone basis, allowing many
detectors to be combined using field wiring and then connected to a single FGS input. (Field circuit
integrity monitoring must be maintained).
6.4 Voting Modules
Voting modules shall have status LEDs to indicate the status of each input channel / the output
status (vote) and fault status as a minimum.
6.5 FGS output
Output channels as a minimum shall not have output overrides. Output channels shall have status
LEDs to indicate output status and fault status.
All output circuits shall be continuously monitored for open circuit and closed circuit fault conditions.
Executive actions derived from automatic or manual initiation of the FGS shall be routed by hard-
wired connection to the ESD/OSD system, except for certain executive actions which shall be
performed directly from the FGS system (such as local deluge systems).
Output shall be fail-safe (normally closed or normally energised) unless the consequences of a
spurious trigger of the executive action might result in excessive damage to plant or personnel, or
pose an unnecessary hindrance to plant operations (for example, deluge/foam systems).


6.6 FGS Power Supply

The FGS shall have a separate power supply to the PAS and SIS systems. Failure of the PAS or
SIS power supply shall not affect the FGS.
The FGS systems shall be powered from redundant Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS).
UPS output shall conform to the following:
 Output Voltage: 230 VAC +5%
 Frequency: 50 Hz +1%
 Max THD: 5%
6.7 FGS and SIS Physical Location
As part of the integrated IASS system, the design, implementation, geographical locations and
architectural layout of the processors, communications and interfaces of the FGS shall be similar
to the SIS or process control system..
6.8 Civil Facilities
Civil facilities are enclosed structures not directly related to the plant processes. Examples of civil
facilities include crib-rooms, sleep quarters, etc. However, analysers’ houses, FAR or switchroom
buildings/contaniners are directly related to the process and hence are not civil facilities.
Civil facilities shall be subject to the same philosophy as the rest of the process facility, except for
variations listed in this section.
6.8.1 FGS Separation & Architecture:
Civil facilities shall have fire detection systems entirely separate from the process FGS and these
shall be in accordance with the relevant building codes.
Each civil facility building shall have a separate FGS control unit that interfaces to the building’s
detectors and alarm indicators. The FGS systems shall be designed with hard-wired field detector
inputs and outputs, with all input and output circuits continuously monitored for fault conditions.
6.8.2 F&G Alarm Panel Interface:
The F&G alarm panel shall include status LEDs to indicate power supply status, input status,
override status and fault status as a minimum, and these indications shall be provided at or near
the FAR’s (Control room carbin) main entrance.
6.8.3 Detectors:
Typically the FGS system will employ smoke detectors, and possibly heat detectors, in accordance
with the building interiors section of this document. Where addressable detectors are used they
shall have a unique address (e.g. IP) for each detector head.
Additionally, manual alarm call points (break glass units) shall be easily triggered by personnel
leaving the building from any of the building exits. Typically this requires manual alarm call points
be installed near the buildings access points. Where practical manual alarm call points shall be
installed on the outside of the building, as this allows personnel to operate the call points without
having to enter or remain inside the building.
6.8.4 Annunciators:
Each building shall have an audible alarm fitted to its interior (typically hallway mounted), as a
minimum. External audible alarms are recommended.
Audible fire alarms for buildings shall be either a continuous bell or intermittent alarm. There shall
be no all-clear signal in keeping with corporate HSE policies.


6.9 Complex Equipment Package FGS Systems

Complex equipment packages have their own dedicated package FGS embedded within the
package.
All package FGS shall comply fully with all the requirements detailed in this philosophy for the main
FGS.
6.9.1 Package FGS Integration
The package FGS shall be fully integrated into the main FGS as a daughter node, using either
hardwired connection or a certified digital network.
Integration includes propagation of FGS information to the PAS HMI and SER. Wherever practical,
alarms and status information from the package FGS shall be transmitted in full to the PAS and not
grouped into common alarms prior to transmission.
6.9.2 Package Independence
All FGS functions required for packages shall be managed locally by the package FGS so that
failure of the communication link between the package FGS and main FGS does not impede the
local FGS from safeguarding the package.
Exception to this is where operator intervention is required prior to triggering executive actions
(such as operator triggered deluge of compressor enclosures).
6.9.3 Field Cabling and Terminations
The main Automation Contractor (MAC) shall be responsible for ensuring the supply of the required
field cabling between the equipment package and the main FGS and SIS systems, marshalling,
field termination assemblies (FTAs), I/O and logic.
6.9.4 Vendor Testing and Package Integration
The FGS shall be fully tested and pre-commissioned as a component of the Vendor’s integration
and testing activities, preferably at the Vendors’ workshop. Where the package is composed of
separate modules, it is preferable that these are integrated and the FGS tested as a completed
package prior to shipment to site.
Reducing the amount of on-site modification and re-testing of the FGS improves the overall final
system integrity. Hence the Vendor’s site shall be used to perform all practical system testing and
integration prior to shipment of the package.
6.9.5 Hardware
Preferably, the package FGS will be implemented using hardware identical to the rest of the project.
If this is not practical then packages shall employ FGS equipment consistent with the facilities to
ensure seamless integration with the process FGS.
Careful consideration shall be given to rationalisation of hardware spares and maintenance
activities. Even if it is not practical to use the FGS processor as the main, it is preferred that the
same field equipment be employed as this simplifies spares, maintenance, troubleshooting and
calibration activities for the lifetime of the system.
6.9.6 Standard Compliance
All safety functions implemented in package controls shall be designed in accordance with IEC
61508 / 61511 standards. External third-party certification such as TüV compliance of the hardware
and software implementation of the safety-related functions shall utilise the standards of IEC-61508
/ 61511.


6.10 Simple Equipment Packages

Simple equipment packages (e.g. electric motor driven pumps) are packaged systems supplied
without their own FGS.
Simple equipment packages shall be considered part of the general platform; hence any fire and
gas detection shall be performed using the main FGS system.
The ICSS Contractor shall be responsible for ensuring that all F&G sensors, junction boxes and
connecting cables that are deemed within the scope of supply of the equipment package supplier
shall be identical in make, model and technical specification as those specified for the general plant
in which the equipment package is located.
The equipment package supplier shall be responsible for correctly installing and terminating the
package F&G detection sensors, cables and junction boxes.
The FGS system supplier shall be responsible for the supply and designation of the required FGS
marshalling, FTAs I/O equipment and logic for inclusion into the main FGS protection scheme.
6.11 Sequence Of Event Recording
Sequence of Event Recording (SER) for acquisition, storage and short-term retrieval of time-
stamped event data shall reside within the PAS.
In summary, all SER information from the ESD/OSD and FGS systems shall be time stamped at
source, then transmitted with the time stamp to the PAS. The PAS shall by default combine SER
information from various sub-systems with its own alarm list and audit trail, so that a complete
sequence of events can be presented to the operator.
6.12 Maintenance Overrides
All input to the FGS that initiate executive actions shall be provided with maintenance override
facilities to allow testing of such inputs. Operation of the override shall only affect the input to the
voting logic and alarm functions shall not be affected. Initiation of an input override shall be
indicated locally on the FGS input card, repeated on the FGS mimic display and recorded as a
time-stamped event in the PAS based sequence of events recorder.
Logic output overrides are not allowed.
6.13 Scalability
In keeping with the requirements for the SIS, of which the FGS is a modular part, the FGS hardware
and software shall be of scalable and modular design with adequate segregation to permit
bumpless incorporation of new modules and shutdown of existing modules with minimal disruption
of safeguarding functions.
A shutdown and electrical isolation of a plant module shall not adversely impact any of the FGS
functions within the active modules.
6.14 Certification
External third-party certification such as TüV of the FGS hardware and software shall be fully
compliant with IEC-61508 / 61511 standards. The FGS processor and architecture shall be
selected to be capable of a minimum of SIL 3, even if the SIL assessment identified lower SIL
capability as being required. This allows for future implementation of SIL3 functions without having
to change out the entire FGS system. Higher SIL level assessments might be indicated by the
structured risk assessment.
7.0 HUMAN MACHINE INTERFACE


7.1 PAS Displays

Mimic displays on the PAS shall allow an operator to view the status of the F&G .
The PAS HMI shall give the operator sufficient information to quickly assess an incident and initiate
the appropriate emergency procedures. This information shall include an overview of the status,
identity, current value and location of individual F&G end elements in alarm and shall provide early
warnings of impending problems with the ability to track the course of an individual event. The
information displayed shall include (where applicable):-
 I/O status
 Diagnostic information
 Abnormal situations
 Analogue values from trip transmitters
 Status of maintenance overrides
 Deluge/extinguisher release status
 Metrological data such as wind speed and direction
7.2 Geographic Mimic Panels
Executive actions dependent upon operator intervention shall require a hard-wired FGS
Geographic Mimic Panel. The mimic panel shall be provided in the platform control room.
The mimic panel shall display the zone of a detected hazardous event with sufficient precision to
identify the location of the event.
7.3 Alarm Annunciators
Zone alarms shall be annunciated through the PAS mimic displays. Each zone shall have a detailed
mimic display in the PAS indicating the precise detector in alarm.
FGS system audible alarms shall be compliant with industry standard (Fire, gas and smoke
detection systems), and comprise a combination of site sirens supplemented by individual alarm
sounders mounted in strategic locations where it may not be possible to hear the site siren (e.g. in
areas of high noise and within site buildings).
Sounders shall be located to provide adequate coverage of the platform facilities. In areas with a
high ambient noise level, visual alarm shall be provided.
7.4 FGS Response Time
The FGS system has the potential to be multiple-layer architecture, with potentially a large number
of processors, bus networks and communications links between the field sensor(s) raising an
alarm, the voting logic, the executive action being triggered in the field, and the HMI indication(s).
Considerations shall be given to the system’s architecture, interfaces, buffers and processors to
ensure the safety of the asset protected by the FGS is not degraded due to communications delays.
8.0 DETECTION AND FIELD MOUNTED EQUIPMENT

8.1 General
The correct installation and positioning of detectors and annunciators is of critical importance. This
section provides additional information on the selection and installation of field mounted equipment.
Device selection shall observe the Company’s preferred Vendor list(s).


8.2 Detector and Annunciator Layout

Detector and annunciator layout shall be shown in the Fire and Gas Detection Plan. The
optimization of this plan shall include as minimum the following:
 Final device numbers
 Types
 Locations (including height)
 Orientations
Optimization shall include the use of analysis tools such as FIREPRAN (Fire Protection Analysis)
which are used to assess the hazards.
Development of the Fire and Gas Detection Plan takes into account a large number of factors.
Below is subset of typical considerations:
 Likely fuel release points (Flanges, vessels, vents, etc.)
 Gas release type, velocity, density, temperature, JT-Cooling on release.
 Likely accumulation areas for fuel (such as densely packed process structures for gas,
bunds for liquid).
 Explosion intensity (affected by structure density and plant topology).
 Potential ignition sources (flares, kilns, etc.).
 Gas sensitive process equipment (Gas Generator over-speed due to ingestion).
 Likely migration paths of gas clouds (from release to an ignition source or populated area).
 Provision and protection of escape paths and safe refuges.
 Manning levels, maintenance activities and behaviours, and typical personnel locations.
 Triggers for hazard release (an unmanned site is likely to experience leaks during
maintenance, which is when personnel are there and at risk).
 Secondary damage as a result of initial event, such as shockwave damage to tanks, heat
affecting structural integrity of structures.
In accordance with WAEP HSE systems, the analysis performed to develop the fire and gas
detection plan shall be performed addressing all four possible risk types:
1. People
2. Assets
3. Environment
4. Reputation
8.3 Field Device Hazardous Area Protection Rating
Field devices used in process and utility areas shall be ex-certified for use in Zone 1 hazardous
areas as a minimum.
8.4 Ingress Protection
All field instrumentation shall be protected to a minimum of IP65. Painting and other exterior
treatment shall be proven suitable for the environmental conditions specified in the project design
data sheets.
8.5 Gas Detection Elements
Most common gas detection elements (irrespective of their packaging) rely on one of these two
principles:
1. IR Absorption
2. Catalytic (Pellistor)


Where practical, IR technology is preferred unless the catalytic technology is required to ensure
sensitivity to specific fuel types (such as hydrogen, which cannot be detected by IR absorption).
8.6 Calibration Gas
Where a single gas type is being detected, the sensor shall be calibrated on this type of gas.
Where a range of gas types are being detected, the Manufacturer shall be consulted to determine
which of the possible gases the sensor is least sensitive to (for hydrocarbons, the worst-case gas
is most likely to be methane). The sensor shall be calibrated using the worst-case gas mixed in air.
This ensures the minimum required sensitivity is achieved for all gas types.
8.7 Line-Of-Sight Gas Detectors
Flashgun (pulse light) type detectors are preferred as these are the most reliable.
Detectors of the type that utilise a separate transmitter and receiver shall be selected. Combined
transmitter-receiver types that utilise retro-reflectors shall not be used as these halve the effective
path length.
8.7.1 Boundary Monitoring
Consideration should be given to using two pairs of detectors for each path, with 2ooN voting
applied, where two detectors are employed on a single path, they shall be configured with both a
transmitter and a receiver at opposing ends of the path (i.e two opposing beams).
8.7.2 Area Monitoring
At minimum, two detectors shall be used for area monitoring.
8.7.3 Installation
The recommended path length for open path detectors is 20 to 30 meters for offshore applications,
and 30 to 60 meters for onshore applications.
LOS detectors must be mounted on substantial, laterally-braced supports that do not flex or vibrate
to ensure consistent alignment.
Typically the optical alignment accuracy is of the order of 0.5 to 1 degree, and this must be taken
into consideration for structures that experience varying structural loading, or are subjected to
differential heating, as both of these can lead to ongoing sensor alignment problems.
Typically, LOS detectors are mounted 3 to 5 m off grade or deck.
Where possible, floor markings should be used to show LOS optical paths in order to avoid
inadvertent obstruction.
8.7.4 Sensor Robustness
LOS detectors shall be unaffected by short-term beam blockages. Blockages greater than 60
seconds duration shall result in a beam blocked warning. Blockages greater than typically 5
minutes shall indicate that the detector is in fault.
Routine maintenance of IR LOS type detectors requires cleaning of the sensor windows only.
Calibration tests require the introduction of a piece of calibrated film into the beam path.
Each instrument shall be provided with software to compensate for drift by utilisation of an auto-
zero tracking system.
8.8 Point Gas Detectors
Test gas inlet to be provided for calibration and testing of sensor operation. Remote facilities shall
be provided where sensors are not readily accessible, e.g. inside ducting.


8.9 Air Intake / Outlet Gas Detectors

The Company’s list of approved Vendor and detector list shall be consulted when selecting
detectors for air inlet / outlet and ducting, and the units selected shall be specifically suited to this
task.
Consideration shall be given to the following:
 Ease of maintenance, testing and calibration
 Vibration resistance and vibration free mounting
 Poison resistance
 Response time
 Detectors employing a filter element or flame arrestor between the ambient air and the
detection element shall be avoided, as the high air flows in the duct will lead to clogging.
8.10 Accoustic Leak Detection
Acoustic Leak Detectors (ALD) are suitable for early detection of significant gas leaks from
pressurised sources above 15 barg by detection of ultrasound generated by the leak source.
Acoustic leak detectors do not differentiate between flammable and non-flammable gas leaks.
ALD should be considered for use in areas of open plant where there is little chance of
accumulation and where operator attendance is infrequent so that significant leaks may go
undetected for some time. Cognisance should be taken of the module / area risk contribution.
ALD may detect ultrasound from other sources such as gas turbines, compressors, pipe work,
valves and routine operations such as venting. Detection (alarm) threshold settings should be at
least +6 dB above background level. Default alarm threshold settings of 74 dB and 84 dB are
recommended for quiet and noisy areas respectively. Time delays may need to be set to allow for
short-term venting operations and / or operation of pneumatically actuated valves.
Detector types that include integrated self-test capability are preferred.
ALD should be commissioned initially to operate in ‘alarm only’ mode and any executive actions
will be overridden.
8.11 Gas Detector Location And Mounting
Gas sensors should not be mounted less than 1 meter above grade or decking to avoid damage
or fouling by splash water.
In all cases the location of detectors shall accommodate access for maintenance, with either
specific maintenance access provided or alternative facilities such as remote calibration provided.
8.12 Flame Detection
8.12.1 Technologies
The primary means of detecting hydrocarbon-based fires shall employ triple-band infrared (IR) type
optical flame detectors, as this type of detector provides high reliability without spurious alarms. IR
detectors shall not be used for the detection of methanol fires.
Ultraviolet type flame detectors are suitable for the detection of non-hydrocarbon fires such as
methanol and hydrogen, with the Company’s approval. They shall not be used for detection of
hydrocarbon fires.
Optical integrity features shall be built into the electronics for self-checking and diagnostic
purposes. The detectors shall be solar-blind.


8.12.2 Installation
Flame detectors shall be located as determined by the Fire Safety Assessment, to monitor
equipment containing major flammable inventories and likely fire sources. Detector location and
coverage, spacing and orientation shall take into account any obstructions.
Detectors shall be supplied complete with adjustable mounting brackets that allow the detector
alignment to be adjusted on both vertical and horizontal planes and shall be mounted in accordance
with manufacturers’ recommendations.
Detectors shall be located and oriented such that they cannot be accidentally triggered by detection
of flare systems (including reflections off equipment) under high flame conditions.
8.13 Smoke Detection
8.13.1 Technologies
Typically Ionisation type smoke detection will be employed, due to their high sensitivity to fully
formed fires.
Optical type detection is suited to detecting smouldering fires, but relatively insensitive to fully
formed fire. Hence when Optical Smoke Detection is employed, additional heat detection shall be
included to detect fires that build up rapidly without smouldering.
8.13.2 Installation
Smoke detectors are suitable for indoor use only.
All smoke detectors covering a single zone may be ‘daisy chained’ to a single FGS input card such
that activation of any single detector raises an alert and triggers executive actions for that zone.
Other types of detector in the same zone shall not be connected on the same loop.
The detectors shall incorporate a latching indicator that preferentially is an LED which illuminates
when the detector is in the alarm condition. It shall be reset from the fire and gas control panel only.
Detectors in inaccessible areas (e.g. floor / ceiling voids) shall have the capability of driving a
remote indicator lamp. The system certification for the detector shall include its use with the
indicator. Maintenance access (e.g. hatches) shall be provided.
Detectors shall be plug-in type. The sensor head assemblies shall be constructed so that the base
may be installed without the sensing element and all field wiring terminations made and sealed
against the atmosphere until subsequent installation of the sensing element at the pre-
commissioning stage.
8.13.3 High Sensitivity Smoke Detection:
High sensitivity smoke detection systems if fitted should be of the optical type and should include
an alarm to denote when any of the sampling system flow rates fall below acceptable limits.
High sensitivity smoke detectors of the type that detect chlorine emissions from overheated PVC
type cable insulation are not recommended as experience has shown that they are ineffective at
detecting emissions from low-chlorine emission cables which are now in common usage.
8.14 Heat Detection
Heat detection shall be employed where high reliability and low spurious trips is required and slow
response time can be tolerated.
Heat detection shall be considered as a backup to optical system which is faster but less reliable.
In open, naturally ventilated areas point heat detectors should be sited with a density in the order
of one detector per 25 m² and at a maximum spacing of up to approximately 7 meter apart. The
maximum distance from a bulkhead should be approximately 3.5 meter.


In enclosed mechanically ventilated modules, point heat detectors should be sited at a density of
at least one per 37 m² and at a maximum spacing of up to approximately 9 meter apart. The
maximum distance from a bulkhead should be approximately 4.5 meter.
8.14.1 Voting
Confirmation of fire detection is typically required before Executive Action is taken in response.
In a 2ooN voted configuration, triggering of two detectors in a zone is classed as “Confirmed fire”.
Point heat type devices shall not be voted.
Pneumatic fire detection systems may be voted at the discretion of the Principal. If voting is
deployed, then first detection loop provides an alarm, with the second loop detection providing
Executive Action.
Detectors used to automatically shut down machinery / plant equipment and initiate the fire
protection system shall be voted in a 2ooN configuration.
8.14.2 Point Heat Detection
The preferred heat detector characteristic shall be combined rate-of-rise-compensated and fixed
temperature threshold type. These characteristic detectors alarm on when either:
 Absolute temperature exceeds a predetermined value in degrees, OR
 Temperature rises at a rate faster than a predetermined value in degrees-per-minute.
The sensor head assembly shall be constructed so that the base may be installed without the
sensing element, all field terminations made and then ingress protected until the subsequent
installation of sensing element at the commissioning stage. The detector package shall consist of
the detector, base and termination box.
8.14.3 Linear Heat Detection
Linear heat detection is performed using Pressurised Fusible Loop (polyflo tubing or fusible plug)
type fire detection systems, which offer slow response times and high reliability.
Fire detected inputs to the FGS from fusible loop shall be via a pressure transmitter interfaced with
the FGS I/O via an analogue input card.
Executive actions may be triggered directly from the pressure drop in the detection loop, such as
deluge system valves opening or well head SSSV closure on loss of detector loop pressure.
The installation shall give careful consideration to the mechanical integrity and protection of the
loop, especially where polyethylene piping is involved.
Approval from the Company is required for the use of pressurised fusible loop systems.
8.15 Manual Call Point
Manual call points associated with civil facilities shall be of the break-glass type.
Manual call points associated with process facilities shall lock on activation and require a separate
action to release the switch.
Manual Call Points shall be installed at strategic locations around the facilities.
Manual call points shall be positioned so that they stand out against the background, i.e. they shall
be clearly recognizable from a distance. If necessary they shall be provided with signs to enhance
their visibility from access routes.
Manual call points should be positioned as follows:


1. Along routes in the platform area at intervals not exceeding 100 m, preferably at or near to lamp
posts;
2. Near or at locations having a higher risk such as remote pump floors, manifolds, motor control
centres and Wells.
3. Inside Carbins, office/control room entrance etc.
4. Inside the process area and positioned:
 Outside room(s)
 Outside hazardous enclosed areas
 Along logical escape routes
8.16 Audible Alarm Sounders
FGS system audible alarms shall comprise a combination of
 Site siren
 Individual alarm sounders
 Visual indications
 Civil facilities sirens.
Field-mounted fire and gas alarm annunciators shall be powered from critical supplies that have
the same (high) availability as the main FGS system supply.
The tonal characteristics of each alarm are dependent upon the location / type of the alarm
annunciator and the type of hazard triggering the alarm. The tonal characteristics of the alarms
shall be in accordance with the Alarm Tone Table in appendix 3.
8.16.1 Site Siren
Wide area coverage shall be implemented using high-reliability electric-motor operated sirens that
emit an on-off modulated tone.
8.16.2 Individual Alarm Sounder
Where additional local enunciation is required, individual alarm sounders shall be installed.
They shall have facilities for adjustment to the sound level.
In area where there is a public address (PA) system the local audible alarms shall be temporarily
silenced during PA announcements.
8.16.3 Civil Facilities
Fire, gas and smoke alarms in buildings, including auxiliary/control rooms and offices, shall be
annunciated in the buildings themselves by means of a sounder with the same sonic characteristics
as individual alarm sounders.
These alarms shall be temporarily muted during public address (PA) system announcements.
8.16.4 Visual Alarm Device
Where it has been identified that beacons are required for high noise areas, e.g. compressor or
generator area, weatherproof flashing xenon beacon(s) shall be employed.
The beacon assembly shall be a tough impact resistant material and coloured red (See Appendix
3).


8.17 Lightning Protection

It is major concern that all systems shall be designed to have a very high tolerance to lightning
strikes, which are prevalent in the area.
In order to reduce the effects of lightning strikes on the electronic control and safeguarding
systems, the following steps shall be taken; safeguarding systems denote any Safety or F&G loop
devices and system hardware. Control denotes any electronic control or indication loop device and
system hardware.
Cabling systems for both power and signalling shall be protected by means of the installation of
proprietary anti-surge devices, which route surges to earth thus protecting the equipment. Typically
anti-surge devices shall be installed on the main power incomers to the control room or equipment
enclosure. Additionally, individual electronic systems shall be protected by surge protection
devices in their power supplies and individual signal and data lines. Surge protectors shall also be
installed on antenna connections to the various radio systems.
For field instruments, locally mounted surge protection devices shall be used depending on their
criticality and consequences of failure of the particular instrument.
9.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE AND CONTROL

The following quality assurance reviews and studies shall be performed, as a minimum, to verify
conformance of the Fire and Gas System’s design with the relevant industry, corporate and WAEP
standards and specifications. All QA / QC reviews shall be the EPC Contractor’s responsibility,
performed according to the Principal's approved methodology as stated herein and in the relevant
specifications, devolved to the respective equipment manufacturers where applicable and
witnessed by the Principal (WAEP).
9.1 Cause And Effects Review
A multi-disciplinary review of the Fire Zone Schedule and FGS Cause and Effects shall be
performed, covering all facilities, modules, packages and systems, and involving the relevant
Process, Safety, Operations, Maintenance, Rotating Equipment and Control & Automation
personnel. Its purpose shall be to assure that the design is safe, operable and robust; aligns with
the operating and maintenance procedures; guarantees overall safety of the facilities and affords
the necessary operational and maintenance flexibilities without introducing any unwarranted
conditions or constraints.
9.2 FGS Risk Assessment (SIL classification)
Following the detailed HAZOP of each facility, module, package or system within the facility, all
proposed safety instrumented functions identified in the FGS shall be classified according to the
methodology defined in the WAEP’s specification documents.
9.3 SIL Verification (FMEDA / PFD Calculation)
Following the SIL classification and equipment selection for use in the respective safety functions,
failure and reliability analysis shall be undertaken in accordance with the requirements of IEC-
61508 to verify that all equipment making up each safety function in each facility, module, package
or system provide the necessary risk reduction and meet the SIL classification applicable to that
function. In the absence of certified failure rate data for any specific equipment, it shall be verified
that the “proven-in-use” criteria in the context of IEC 61508 are fulfilled and substantiated.


9.4 Reviews and Audit by the WAEP

WAEP shall perform a variety of technical reviews and audits to verify conformance with the
pertinent specification requirements. Participation in these audits and implementation of the
recommendations arising from them shall form part of the scope of design and delivery for all
control and automation systems and equipment.


10.0 APPENDIX 1- FLAMMABLE GAS SENSING TECHNOLOGIES

Name Method of Usage Strengths Weaknesses
Detection
Line Of Detects Boundary Cost effective Sturdy structures for

Sight (LOS) absorption of coverage with coverage of large mounting required.
IR wavelengths single instrument areas and Can trigger on large
by hydrocarbon Area coverage with boundaries. size/low concentration gas
gas, from a two instruments Fast response. clouds.
beam of light (crossed beams) High reliability. Cannot detect all gases
directed along Lengths 4 to 200 m (such as H2).
the sensitive possible.
area. Typically 20-30m
offshore & 40-60m
on shore.
Point Detects Point detection of Fast response. Sturdy structures for
Detection absorption of hydrocarbons. High reliability & mounting required.
(IR IR wavelengths Used around point failsafe behaviour. Can trigger on large/low
absorption) by hydrocarbon releases, Low maintenance. concentration gas clouds.
gas, from a congested areas, Poison resistant. Cannot detect all gases
beam of light ducting, air inlets. Self-diagnostic. (such as H2).
contained
entirely within a
ventilated
sensor head
Point Detects the Point detection of Detect a wide Only detects high pressure
Detection ultrasonic noise hydrocarbons in a range of gases. releases. (Low pressure
(Acoustic ) associated with well ventilated area Detects a gas leak release or evaporating
a high pressure where gas build-up in high ventilation pools will not trigger).
(sonic) release may not occur area well before Well
of gas adequately for gas build-up can understood/predictable
other detection occur. ultrasonic background
systems. noise level required for
sensor to operate reliably.
Must be proven-in-use prior
to use for executive action
Relatively unproven
technology.
Point Gas is drawn Point or line Can monitor wide Moving parts.
Detection from detection detection of range of gases Requires maintenance.
(Aspirated ) point to remote hydrocarbons in and conditions.
gas sensing harsh
element. environments
Various (such as turbine
sensing enclosures) or
elements can confined spaces.
be employed.


11.0 APPENDIX 2 – COMBUSTION (FIRE & SMOKE) SENSING TECHNOLOGIES

Name Method of Usage Strengths Weaknesses
Detection
Infrared Detects Rapid hydrocarbon Reliable and proven Unsuitable for high
(Multi-band) flickering fire detection within technology. temp environments.
Flame infrared light a given area. Fast response. Unsuitable for low
Detector from hydrocarbon fires
hydrocarbon fire. (Hence cannot detect
Multiple IR Hydrogen or
bands are Methanol fires)
monitored to
reduce false
triggers.
Infrared Detects Rapid hydrocarbon Reliable and proven Unsuitable for high
(single band) flickering fire detection within technology. temp environments.
Flame infrared light a given area. Fast response. Unsuitable for low
Detector from hydrocarbon fires
hydrocarbon fire. (Hence cannot detect
Hydrogen or
Methanol fires)
Can be prone to false
triggers from sunlight
Multi-band version is
preferred
UV Flame Detection of UV Rapid hydrocarbon Suitability for hot Affected by oil
Detector emissions from fire detection within environments. droplets, dust and
flame a given area, suited Can detect non- smoke.
to heated hydrocarbon fires. False triggering due
environments. to light sources such
Suitable for non- as arc welding.
hydrocarbon fires False triggering due
(eg. Hydrogen, to radiation sources.
Methanol) Principal Approval
Required
Manual Call Flame and Plant-wide fire and Highly discriminating Reliant upon staff
Point Smoke smoke detection in sensor – ultra being present to raise
(Flame, Detection: manned areas– very reliable. manual alarm.
Smoke & Human detects versatile Smoke, heat and
Heat) fire/smoke and flame sensitive.
manually raises
alarm
Optical Smoke detection Point or open-path Best suited to Reduced sensitivity to
Scattering by scattering of detection of smoke detection of fully formed fires
Smoke light by smoke from smouldering smouldering fires. Some sensitivity to
Detector particles fires Can be used as fog
Line-Of-Sight Use indoors only
detector.


Ionisation Smoke detection Point detection Best suited to Reduced sensitivity to

Smoke by ionisation of smoke from detection of fully smouldering fires
Detector smoke particles smouldering fires formed fires. Point detection only
Shall be combined
with heat detectors
for detecting
smouldering files.
Use indoors only
Combined Combined Can detect Detection of Not as flexible as
Heat/Smoke detection of a combustion from a combustion from a separate smoke and
thermistor type broad range of fuels range of different heat sensors
heat detector and fire types. combustion Principal Approval
and an optical processes. Required
type smoke, in a
single sensor
Ultra-High Smoke detection Single or multipoint Very early sensitivity, High sensitivity can
Sensitivity by proprietary aspirated system for often before a lead to false triggers
Smoke means very early detection human inspecting and hard to find
Detectors of smouldering fires can identify the sources of smoke.
source of the alarm. High maintenance
Susceptibility to dust.
Use indoors only.
Heat Various means Point or line Very reliable. Slow response rate
Detectors including detection, for fire Low spurious alarm
bimetallic, glass that builds up rate.
bulb and fusible quickly or is very Suitable for high
plugs. Detects hot. temperature
either rate rise of Often employed in environments.
temperature, or high temperature
absolute environments or as
temperature, or backup for other
a combination. faster but less
reliable detection
techniques


12.0 APPENDIX 3 - TONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ALARM SOUNDERS

Title Location Trigger Type Frequency Mark- Cycle
Space Time
Ratio
Site Siren Site Wide Fire and Bell or Motor Driven 520 Hz ON for 4..10
Signalling Flammable Gas Siren pulsing 3..5 sec, seconds
OFF for
1..5 sec
Individual Process Fire and Loudspeaker Two tone 1:1 2
Alarm Areas Flammable Gas warbling, 1 seconds
Sounder kHz & 2 kHz
Civil Civil Fire and Bell 1:1 2
Facilities Building Flammable Gas seconds


13.0 APPENDIX 4 – FIRE ZONE SCHEDULE

Hazard zones Leakage scenarios Scenarios
15 mm hole size leak flanges joints and Gas dispersion & Jet fire
Flowlines (typical)
instrument fittings.
Manifold
instrument fittings.
instrument fittings at the gas phase.
Slug catcher
15 mm hole size leak flanges joints and Jet fire
instrument fittings at the liquid phase.

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January/2019 DOCUMENT NUMBER :

West-African Exploration and Production

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