Cal Berkeley-Fleming-Gray-Aff-Georgetown-Semis

1AC
Plan
The United States federal government should negotiate restrictions on
speed and interceptor quantity on midcourse ballistic missile defense
systems in Europe, including verification by the Russian federation of
reductions.
Advantage – Nuclear Arms Racing
Despite actual capability, Russian perception that BMD nullifies their
deterrent causes crisis instability
Toucas 17 [Boris Toucas is a visiting fellow with the Europe Program at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, expressing personal views. Previously, he served in the
nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament office at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs from
2013 to 2016 and was responsible for nuclear deterrence and ballistic missile defense as a
member of the negotiating team during the NATO summit in Warsaw. "Ballistic Missile Defense:
Proceed With Caution." https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-11/features/ballistic-missile-
defense-proceed-caution]
interception capabilities against advanced systems could have an impact

In the longer run, a policy to develop
on strategic stability and crisis stability . Concerns expressed by China and Russia that U.S.
missile defenses already undermine strategic stability are far-fetched . Their views are mostly
unrelated to current deployment but nurtured by an insecure view of the future, including
extreme interpretation of projections that in 2030 the United States could possess 350 to 550
missiles4 on Aegis ships with enhanced detection and interception capacities.
In theory, missile defenses coupled with continued investment in conventional long-range, precision-strike capabilities could help
disable significant portions of an adversary’s arsenal during a first strike while complicating retaliation, with the consequence of
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s 2008
increasing the risk of escalation to early use of nuclear weapons. Russian
statement that “it is most likely that in the foreseeable future we will hear of hundreds and even
thousands of interceptor missiles in various parts of the world, including Europe,”5 indicates that such
concerns, although exaggerated, are real. This is a reminder that, on the international stage,
mutual confidence matters as much as observable facts .
BMD’s Russia’s central concern – it’s the main stumbling block in arms
control and strategic stability, even though ICBMs and SLBMs overwhelm
interception
Arbatov 18 [Alexey Arbatov is the head of the Center for International Security at the
Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations. Arbatov is
a former scholar in residence and the chair of the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Nonproliferation
Program. Formerly, he was a member of the State Duma, vice chairman of the Russian United
Democratic Party (Yabloko), and deputy chairman of the Duma Defense Committee. "The
vicissitudes of Russian missile defense."
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00963402.2018.1486595?journalCode=rbul20]
For more than a decade now, one

of the main military threats seen by Moscow emanates from the
deployment of a ballistic missile defense system in the U nited S tates, with regional segments in
the Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific regions. The final version of the system, announced by the United States in 2013, is
well known. In addition to its vast communications, command, control and intelligence network, the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) system will consist of 44 ground-based interceptors – longrange strategic anti-missiles based in Alaska and
California and designed for use against single- or limited-ICBM attacks against the United States by Iran, North Korea, and other so-
called rogue states. Under the current Republican administration, this deployment may be extended to 64 interceptors.
The GMD system is supplemented by theater deployments, foremost among them Standard Missiles (SM-3 Block-IA) on ships in
the Mediterranean Sea, enhanced capability SM-3 (Block-IB) interceptors in Rumania, and a modernized version of the SM-3
(Block-IIA) interceptors in Poland and possibly on ships in northern European seas. These anti-missiles will defend European allies
against a limited strike with intermediate-range ballistic missiles, presumably from Iran (Wilkening 2013, 113–119). Additional SM-3
deployments may follow in Japan and on ships in the Pacific Ocean, to guard against North Korean missiles.
Assessment by some Russian missile industry executives (Voenno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona 2011, 85–86) indicates this
system has a negligible capability for use against Russian strategic forces: Russian ICBMs and
SLBMs are numerous and survivable , being equipped with effective missile defense
penetration aids . This opinion is shared by many Russian and US defense and security
experts (Dvorkin and Pyriev 2013, 183–203). A number of respected retired high-ranking military and
civilian professionals also agree that present and projected US/NATO anti-missile defenses are
unable to threaten Russia’s strategic retaliation capability (Rogov et al. 2012).
Nonetheless , the top leadership of Russia has insisted that US ballistic missile defense
undercuts Russian nuclear deterrence and bilateral strategic stability , and thus is the
principal stumbling block to follow-on negotiations toward further reductions in offensive
nuclear weapons . To some extent, this attitude may be motivated by political factors – and very personal ones, at that –
which makes it all the more persistent.
Russia will balance theater BMD with arms racing, nuke mod, and next gen
weapons which are all comparatively more destabilizing – also prevents
dialogue on strategic stability and future weapons
Toucas 17 [Boris Toucas is a visiting fellow with the Europe Program at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, expressing personal views. Previously, he served in the
nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament office at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs from
2013 to 2016 and was responsible for nuclear deterrence and ballistic missile defense as a
member of the negotiating team during the NATO summit in Warsaw. "Ballistic Missile Defense:
Proceed With Caution." https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-11/features/ballistic-missile-
defense-proceed-caution]
Yet, efforts
to obtain a capability to reliably shoot down advanced ballistic missiles would
almost certainly trigger a renewed arms race with the greatest powers . It would not only
increase the risks of a misunderstanding , but also justify a surge in modernized nuclear
stockpiles and delivery systems , harming prospects for nuclear disarmament. Potential adversaries would
use an ambitious U.S. missile defense policy as a pretext to infringe on existing multilateral
regimes if they believe that such accords will eventually become obsolete anyway due to
technologically driven developments. For instance, this could be used by Russia to justify formal withdrawal from the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and deployment of more short-range ballistic missiles in Kaliningrad.
For the same reasons, an

increased level of ambition for missile defense programs would harm the
prospects for U.S.-Russian talks on strategic stability . Instead, a competition on missile defense
systems accompanied by a diversification of offensive arsenals would encourage new , therefore
unstable weapons concepts and doctrines , fueling the risk of misunderstanding. Russia’s
delivery of the advanced S-300 air defense systems to Iran and Russian efforts to field S-400
area defense capabilities against air and missile threats have spread alarm within NATO,
worried that anti-access/area denial capabilities might give Russia tactical superiority in
disputed areas, such as the Baltic Sea, Black Sea, and Syria.
Notably, these
concerns have been high in peacetime, a period during which Russia never
activated them against NATO assets. This suggests that any U.S. sense that relying more on
missile defenses will lead to increased stability and security could vanish as China and
Russia also invest in this sector and start implementing similar strategies
Block IIA deployment causes Russian nuclear drone subs and shreds arms
control – but, the system fails to countermeasures. Only a BMD concession
saves the deal
Grego 19 [Laura Grego is a senior scientist in the Union of Concerned Scientists Global
Security Program. "The SM-3 Block IIA Interceptor." Union of Concerned Scientists.
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2019/08/SM-3%2520IIA.pdf]
Block IIA interceptors operate similarly to GBIs, targeting long-range missiles in the midcourse phase of flight, above the
atmosphere, using an infrared-homing kill vehicle that attempts to collide with its warhead target. While
the Aegis missile
defense interceptors have a better test record than the GMD system, neither system has
been tested under operationally realistic conditions (DOT&E 2018). Furthermore, both systems are
similarly vulnerable to midcourse countermeasures such as lookalike decoys (Sessler et al. 2000)
against which neither system has been tested (DOT&E 2015). Despite the system’s weaknesses,
such a large deployment of strategic-capable interceptors cannot be overlooked by China or
Russia.
How Russia and China Are Likely to Respond
In short, these plans

call for the U nited S tates to have the capability to deploy, on a short time scale,
hundreds of strategically capable interceptors. This interceptor inventory is comparable to the total
number of ICBMs fielded by Russia and China. Russia fields around 312; China around 60 (Patton, Podvig, and
Schell 2013).
Thus, the Block IIA deployments will make arms control vastly more difficult . The 2010 New START
Treaty, which limits US and Russian strategic nuclear weapons, is unlikely to survive in such an environment. Russia
has made it clear that further cuts to its offensive nuclear weapons would require limits on US
missile defenses. Additionally, Russia and China have already started responding to the United States’
thus-far modest BMD deployments by developing new strategic delivery systems that can evade or
overwhelm defenses , such as Russian nuclear-armed drone submarines and China’s
addition of multiple warheads to its large ballistic missiles.
As James Miller, a former undersecretary' of defense for policy during the Obama administration, has noted, the objective “to bring
the SM-3 IIA missile into the national defense architecture ... means that China
and Russia must expect the U nited
S tates by 2025-2030 to have many hundreds of available interceptors for national missile defense.” He
warned, “We should expect the Chinese nuclear arsenal to grow substantially and Russia to
resist reductions below the 2010 New St rategic A rms R eduction T reaty—and to prepare seriously to
break out ” (Reif 2019).
Poseidon nuclear drones cause instability, nuclear tsunamis, carrier
attacks, and first strikes – the threat is underestimated BUT limiting BMD
fears with arms control solves
Episkopos 11/7/19 [Mark Episkopos is a frequent contributor to The National Interest and
serves as a research assistant at the Center for the National Interest. Mark is also a Ph.D.
student in History at American University. This article first appeared last January. "Russia Is
Preparing To Deploy Its Nuclear Doomsday Drones On Submarines."
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-preparing-deploy-its-nuclear-doomsday-drones-
submarines-94151]
Poseidon is an underwater drone weapon, armed with a 2-megaton nuclear or conventional

payload that can be detonated “thousands of feet” below the surface. This is meant to generate a
radioactive tsunami capable of destroying coastal cities and other infrastructure several
kilometers inland. Poseidon can remain submerged at up to one kilometer, travels at a maximum speed of 200 kilometers per hour,
and is programmed to execute three-dimensional evasive maneuvers in response to interception attempts. When unveiling
Putin was especially keen to stress the
Poseidon at his March 1st weapons address, Russian President Vladimir
drone’s maneuverability : “We have developed unmanned submersible vehicles that can move
at great depths – I would say extreme depths – intercontinentally, at a speed multiple times
higher than the speed of submarines, cutting-edge torpedoes and all kinds of surface vessels.”
While the full range of Poseidon-compatible submarines has not yet been revealed, the TASS report confirmed that one of
Poseidon’s first fittings will be the Project 09851 Khabarovsk submarine. Oscar II-class submarines will also fit Poseidon "after their
appropriate upgrade," though it isn’t clear how many Oscar-II vessels will be repurposed to this end. TASS asserts that the each of
these submarines will be able to carry and deploy up to 8 Poseidon drones. Poseidon’s precise mega-tonnage has varied wildly
over the years, with reports ranging from 100 to 2, but even several megatons would be enough to destroy major coastal cities if
Poseidon works as described. The more serious charge against Poseidon is that it doesn’t add anything to the Russian arsenal that
traditional ICBMs and hypersonic gliders like Avangard don’t already offer. It is true, after all, that the latter boast a larger blast
radius and reach the United States in less than an hour even as Poseidon takes several days at best. However, there are
strategic benefits to a weapon like Poseidon that may not be readily apparent . First and foremost,
Poseidon enhances Russia’s nuclear threat by diversifying its first-strike capability . That is,
the Russian military believes that it travels too fast and too deep underwater to be
intercepted by torpedoes or otherwise countered. To the Kremlin, Poseidon is yet another
way to circumvent America’s formidable strategic missile defense network. But even if
countermeasures can reliably prevent Poseidon from destroying coastal cities, it still possesses
a large destabilizing potential. For example: detonating Poseidon off America’s coast will at
the very least inflict mass political panic and military confusion, which can be used as cover for
a different offensive operation. Secondly, Russian media have floated the possibility of Poseidon
being deployed against aircraft carriers and other surface vessels; to this end, it can be armed with a
conventional payload. Depending on Poseidon’s production costs and price-to-performance
numbers, this can prove to be a more cost-effective way to neutralize carriers than swarms of
conventional air and surface-launched missiles. Finally, the unconventional threat posed by
Poseidon may be a source of Russian leverage in ongoing arms reduction talks with the
US.
A single use causes extinction

Lockie 19 [Alex, Senior Front Page Editor at Business Insider. “The real purpose of Russia’s
100-megaton underwater nuclear doomsday device.” Business Insider. February 11, 2019.
https://www.businessinsider.my/the-real-purpose-of-russias-poseidon-nuclear-doomsday-
device-2019-2/?fbclid=IwAR2_pCU5-
NG5lbhBdriP9OhMAj4zYPWEB8OPJ6rHHhHRi9HMjXl2ZBFdBkw]
Russia is said to have built a new 100-megaton underwater nuclear doomsday device, and it has
threatened the US with it. The device goes beyond traditional ideas of nuclear warfighting and
poses a direct threat to the future of humanity or life on Earth . Nobody has ever built a weapon like this
before, because there’s almost no military utility in so badly destroying the world. But an expert on nuclear strategy told Business
Insider the weapon might have a larger role in helping Russian President Vladimir Putin break down NATO with the threat of nuclear
destruction. Since 2015, when images of a Russian nuclear torpedo first leaked on state television, the world has asked itself why
Moscow would build a weapon that could end all life on Earth. While all nuclear weapons can kill thousands in the blink of an eye
and leave radiation poisoning the environment for years to come, Russia’s new doomsday device, called
“Poseidon,” takes steps to maximize this effect. If the US fired one of its Minutemen III nuclear weapons at a target, it would
detonate in the air above the target and rely on the blast’s incredible downward pressure to crush it. The fireball from the nuke may
not even touch the ground, and the only radiation would come from the bomb itself and any dust particles swept up in the explosion,
Stephen Schwartz, the author of “Atomic Audit,” previously told Business Insider. But Russia’s Poseidon is said to use
a warhead many times as strong, perhaps even as strong as the largest bomb ever detonated. Additionally, it’s
designed to come into direct contact with water, marine animals, and the ocean floor, kicking up
a radioactive tsunami that could spread deadly radiation over hundreds of thousands of
miles of land and sea and render it uninhabitable for decades. In short, while most nuclear
weapons can end a city, Russia’s Poseidon could end a continent . Read more: Why Putin’s new
‘doomsday’ device is so much more deadly and horrific than a regular nuke Even in the mania at the height of the Cold War, nobody
took seriously the idea of building such a world-ender, Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute,
told Business Insider. So why build one now? A NATO-ender A briefing slide captured from Russian state TV is said to be about the
Poseidon nuclear torpedo. A briefing slide captured from Russian state TV is said to be about the Poseidon nuclear torpedo. BBC
the Poseidon a “third-strike vengeance weapon” – meaning Russia would attack a
Davis called
NATO member, the US would respond, and a devastated Russia would flip the switch on a
hidden nuke that would lay waste to an entire US seaboard. According to Davis, the Poseidon would
give Russia a “coercive power” to discourage a NATO response to a Russian first strike. Read
more: Navy chief says the US needs to hit first and get ‘muscular’ with Russian and Chinese ships Russia here would seek to not
only reoccupy Eastern Europe “but coerce NATO to not act upon an Article 5 declaration and thus lose credibility,” he said, referring
to the alliance’s key clause that guarantees a collective response to an attack on a member state. Russian President Vladimir Putin
“has made it clear he seeks the collapse of NATO,” Davis continued. “If NATO doesn’t come to the aid of a member state, it’s pretty
much finished as a defense alliance.” Essentially, Russia could use the Poseidon as an insurance policy while it picks apart NATO.
The US, for fear that its coastlines could become irradiated for decades by a stealthy underwater torpedo it has no defenses
against, might seriously question how badly it needs to save Estonia from Moscow’s clutches. “Putin may calculate that NATO will
blink first rather than risk escalation to a nuclear exchange,” Davis said. “Poseidon accentuates the risks to NATO in responding to
any Russian threat greatly, dramatically increasing Russia’s coercive power.” Davis also suggested the Poseidon would make a
capable but heavy-handed naval weapon, which he said could most likely take out an entire carrier strike group in one shot.
Russia’s new nuclear ferocity A news briefing in Moscow in January organized by Russia's defense and foreign ministries and
dedicated to cruise-missile systems. A news briefing in Moscow in January organized by Russia’s defense and foreign ministries
and dedicated to cruise-missile systems. REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov Russia
has recently signaled its
willingness to use nuclear weapons to coerce the West with its violation of the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Davis said. These missiles are purpose-built for taking out
European capitals from the Russian mainland.
Advanced US BMD capability causes hypersonic prolif and arms racing –

that forces launch on warning posture which independently causes nuclear
miscalc
Democratic Party (Yabloko), and deputy chairman of the Duma Defense Committee. June-July.
"Mad Momentum Redux? The Rise and Fall of Nuclear Arms Control."
https://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/2019/survival-global-politics-and-strategy-junejuly-
2019/613-02-arbatov] Avangard = Avangard hypersonic boost glide vehicle
The same boomerang dialectics may arise with advanced hypersonic weapon systems .
Russia’s programme has been justified by the need to penetrate the American BMD system on the
US continent, in Europe, in Asia and on surface ships. Putin declared the last successful test of the boost-glide Avangard in
December 2018 as ‘a New Year’s present to the country’ and even compared it with the Sputnik launch of 1957.58 Describing its
unique qualities, he said: ‘It flies to its target like a meteorite, as a burning ball, fireball … As you understand nobody in the world
has anything comparable … Sometime probably there will be, but in the meantime our guys will invent something else.’59 On
cue, the U nited S tates has accelerated its hypersonic-development programme.60 The future
strategic importance of the new weapon systems remains uncertain. It will be defined by their
cost and scale of deployment, accuracy and class of warhead (nuclear or conventional), resistance of
command-and-control and navigation assets to countermeasures, and the availability of
opposing tracking and intercept systems. From a strategic perspective, such a system might be needed
if the U nited S tates could create a BMD system capable of defending against 1,500 Russian ballistic
missiles’ nuclear warheads, or at least a few hundred of those surviving a counterforce strike. But
this is impossible in the foreseeable future , and the expansion of US BMD, envisioned by
the ballistic-missile-defence review of 2019, does not imply anything like SDI’s notional
capabilities.61 (In fact, the Soviet Union initiated development of a nuclear boost-glide system called Albatross in the mid-1980s
as a countermeasure to SDI.) Hence, Avangard , like a number of other advanced arms programmes that Putin announced in
2018, may look exciting to Russia as a technological achievement, but is obviously excessive as a response to the
U nited S tates’ BMD systems. If deployed at limited scale, hypersonic arms will not tangibly affect the strategic balance. But if
both sides were to deploy them in large numbers, with nuclear or highly accurate conventional
warheads, they could disrupt Moscow’s nuclear deterrence strategy and Russia’s national
security. At the Valdai Discussion Club in Sochi in October 2018, Putin formulated the main concept of the Russian nuclear
doctrine: Our concept is based on a launch-on-warning strike … This means that we are prepared and
will use nuclear weapons only when we know for certain that some potential aggressor is
attacking Russia, our territory … A missile attack early warning system … monitors the globe, warning
about the launch of any strategic missile … and identifying the area from which it was launched. Second, the system tracks the
trajectory of a missile flight. Third, it locates a nuclear warhead impact zone. Only when we know for certain – and this
takes a
few seconds to understand – that Russia is being attacked we will deliver a retaliatory
strike .62 This launch-on-warning concept is extremely controversial, leaving supreme national command
authority only a few minutes for a decision, which may be triggered by a technical mishap ,
strategic miscalc ulation or psychological stress . Some 50 years ago, Herbert York warned about ‘a state of affairs in
which the determination of whether or not doomsday has arrived will be made either by an automatic device … or by a pre-
programmed President who, whether he knows it or not, will be carrying out orders written years before by some operations
analyst’.63 Hypersonic systems are prone to making the situation still more dangerous . Launched to
fly at an altitude of 50–60 kilometres, their trajectory goes largely under the BMD radars’ beams with broadly
changing azimuths, which makes their flight path unpredictable and precludes interception at a pre-
programmed rendezvous point. Moscow emphasises this very characteristic in its BMD penetration
strategy. At the same time, however, the characteristic precludes confirmation of a missile attack by tracking radars after the
launch of hypersonic boosters is detected by early-warning satellites (at least as long as there are no space-based infrared systems
for tracking hypersonic gliders). After satellites detect a missile launch 60 to 90 seconds later, the next time radars will see a
hypersonic glider will be three to four minutes before impact, which does not leave time for authorisation of a launch-on-warning
strike.64 While the air-defence challenges presented by hypersonic systems may be addressable
through the deployment of different sensors and other technical innovations, this remedy would
take time to develop and its feasibility remains uncertain. If the US and Russia broadly
introduce hypersonic arms, both nations will face this problem. But, according to Putin, launch on warning amounts to
Russia’s main deterrence concept. About half of its strategic warheads are deployed on silo-based ICBMs (including the forthcoming
Sarmat heavy missiles and Avangard boosters). They are the primary weapon systems for launch on warning due to both their
vulnerability to counterforce strike and their high (‘hair-trigger’) launch readiness. For the US, the concept is secondary since only a
quarter of its force (by actual loading) is deployed on silo-based ICBMs. Thus, Moscow, having initiated the hypersonic arms
race, may in the future face the threat of a disarming strategic strike and would have to consider several fraught options. One would
be to sustain ‘the infliction of the assigned level of damage on an aggressor in any conditions’, envisioned by the current military
doctrine, without launch on warning.65 This would imply mammoth costs in relocating the strategic force in sufficient numbers to
highly survivable ground-mobile, sea- and air-basing modes, along with their command-and-control complexes. Another option
might be to retain the launch-on-warning concept, under which retaliation should be authorised upon receiving
information from early-warning satellites. This would mean neglecting the history of satellites’ false
alarms over the course of their decades of service. In addition, the reliability of space systems
could become compromised by growing anti-satellite capability or cyber warfare.
Hypersonics cause US first strike and nuke war even if they’re never used
Speier 18 [Richard Speier, Rand, BA from Harvard in Physics and PhD in PoliSci from MIT.
He is a member of the faculty at the RAND Pardee graduate school, was a lecturer at the
University of California, San Diego, and taught space related courses at Northrop Grumman.
George Nacouzi received his Ph.D. in Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering from the
University of California, Irvine. Richard M. Moore, RAND. Carrie Lee is an assistant professor at
the U.S. Air War College. How to defeat Hypersonic-Missile: Weapons of the World.
Transcribed 6:17-9:30. October 19, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GjT-LMgQW44]
OODA = Observe, Orient, Decide, Act
countries use some form of what we call an OODA-loop when they’re making decisions
Lee: Most
about whether to respond to a threat or not. You observe a threat, you figure out where it is
coming from , then decide whether or not you are going to respond and then act on that decision.
Speier: How are you going to shoehorn all those steps into six minutes?
Lee: There are two implications here. The first is that people will become more trigger happy . The
compressed timeframe to make a decision makes people much more likely to want to be the first
strike as opposed to the second strike , because you can’t preserve your second-strike
capabilities. The second implication is that if you can’t defend against a decapitation attack, then you
have to devolve command and control of your weapons into the field .
Speier: Tothe military, rather than to the national leaders, that runs the risk of an accidental
strategic war . Another possibility is to disperse your strategic weapons . That runs the risk of the
weapons being used by terrorists . Another possibility is to go to a strategic doctrine called launch
on warning . And finally, you can just decide in a crisis that there is going to be a full-scale
strategic conflict and you strike first . None of these options are very good.
Russia war causes extinction – regional nuclear wars don’t

Cotton-Barratt 17 [Owen Cotton-Barratt, et al, PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer
in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute, 2/3/2017,
Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf]
The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However,
even in an all-out nuclear war between the U nited S tates and Russia , despite horrific casualties, neither
country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast , fire,
and radiation.8 The aftermath could be much worse : the burning of flammable materials could send
massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling,
severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear winter .
According to one model 9 , an

all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons10 could lead to a drop in global
temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could
leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious
situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great. An exchange on
this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the
world’s nuclear weapons, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally
deployed.11 Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons
would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate
might be pessimistic .13 Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction ,
but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation. It should be
emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area
where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors
might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns.
It is very difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war over the
next century, and existing attempts leave very large confidence intervals. According to many experts, the most likely nuclear
war at present is between India and Pakistan.14 However, given the relatively modest size of their
arsenals, the risk of human extinction is plausibly greater from a conflict between the U nited
S tates and Russia . Tensions between these countries have increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out
the possibility of them rising further in the future.
Risk of Russia nuke war is higher than the Cold War – miscalc alone is
enough
Perry 17 [William J. Perry was the nineteenth secretary of defense for the United States,
serving from February 1994 to January 1997. He previously served as deputy secretary of
defense (1993–94) and as undersecretary of defense for research and engineering (1977–81).
He currently heads the William J. Perry Project, which aims to prevent the use of nuclear
weapons in the future. He is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at Stanford
University and serves as codirector of the Nuclear Risk Reduction initiative and the Preventive
Defense Project. 4/25. "Have we forgotten the Cold War? Nuclear threat more real than ever."
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/foreign-policy/330418-have-we-forgotten-the-cold-war-
nuclear-threat-more-real]
I lived most of my adult life during the Cold War, and, throughout, I never lost sight of one overwhelming reality — at any time, the
Cold War could turn hot, resulting in the extinction of our civilization . Now, inexplicably, we are
recreating many of the conditions of the Cold War. In fact, I believe that, today, the likelihood of a nuclear
catastrophe is actually greater than it was during the Cold War. The relations between the
United States and Russia are as hostile as they were during the Cold War. Russia has
dropped its long-term policy of "No First Use" of nuclear weapons and is rebuilding its
nuclear arsenal. It is threatening its neighbors with these deadly weapons and indirectly
threatening the U.S. Responding to this challenge, the U.S. has begun rebuilding its nuclear arsenal.
We seem determined to replay the Cold War arms race , with costs estimated at more than $1 trillion —
with predictably terrible dangers. Have we simply forgotten the immense dangers of the Cold War? Several times
during the Cold War, we faced the prospect of a nuclear war by miscalculation , most dramatically
during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. After that crisis, President Kennedy said that he believed we had a one-in-three chance of
nuclear war. But Kennedy did not know — which we now know — that the Soviet Union had already placed tactical nuclear
weapons on the island that were fully operational. If Kennedy had accepted the unanimous recommendation of his Joint Chiefs of
Staff to invade Cuba, our troops would have been decimated on the beachheads by tactical nuclear weapons and a general nuclear
war would surely have followed. The
miscalculations of Soviet and U.S. leaders almost subjected the
world to a nuclear holocaust . I believe we avoided that catastrophe as much by good luck as by
good management. Today, because of the ongoing hostility between the U.S. and Russia, we
are recreating the conditions that could lead to a nuclear war by miscalculation. A higher
risk is that of an accidental nuclear war . Because of our " Launch on Warning" policy , a
nuclear war could result by accident if our missile attack warning system experienced a false
alarm . During the Cold War, there were three such false alarms in the U.S. and two that we know about in
the Soviet Union. In 1979, I personally experienced one of the false alarms in the U.S., and it changed forever my way of thinking
about nuclear dangers. I was awoken at 3 a.m. by the watch officer at the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)
saying that the computer was showing 200 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) on the way from the Soviet Union to the United
States. We were spared a disaster because the watch officer correctly concluded that the computer was giving a false reading — as
it turns out, due to human error. But what if that false alarm had occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis? In that context, the watch
officer surely would have passed the alarm on to the president, who, after being awoken at 3 a.m., would have had less than 10
minutes to decide whether to launch our ICBMs before they were destroyed in their silos. Humans will err again. Machines will
malfunction again. Today,
just as in the Cold War, we face the possibility of an accidental war
destroying our civilization . Besides the return of those Cold War dangers, we now have two new dangers: the possibility
of a regional nuclear war or a nuclear attack by a terror group.
US-Russia nuclear arms racing causes nuclear prolif and nuclear terror by
increasing production of nuclear weapons in unstable regions – causes
extinction
Democratic Party (Yabloko), and deputy chairman of the Duma Defense Committee. June-July.
"Mad Momentum Redux? The Rise and Fall of Nuclear Arms Control."
https://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/2019/survival-global-politics-and-strategy-junejuly-
2019/613-02-arbatov]
The world’s ability to muddle through the next phase of international tensions without a major
crisis , and to prevent such a crisis from escalating to nuclear Armageddon , is in doubt.
Falling dominoes The evidence

of arms-control disintegration is obvious and nowadays broadly
discussed among states, within the world’s professional community and mass media. Still, the array of emerging systemic
crises is worth examining. The United States’ and Russia’s withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty appears virtually inevitable. Given the US renunciation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, this would
remove the remaining cornerstone of the nuclear-arms-reduction regime launched by the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START I). Eight years have passed since Russia and the United States have discussed any option for the
START follow-on agreement – the longest pause in strategic-arms talks for 50 years. Although
both parties fulfilled their reduction obligations under the current New START by the February 2018 deadline (albeit
with a number of reservations from Russia), the treaty will expire in 2021. The chances for successful
negotiations on a new agreement after the abrogation of the INF Treaty, and given deep
disagreements between the two parties on ballistic-missile defence ( BMD ) and other important issues, are
bleak indeed. Meanwhile, Washington has been reluctant to extend New START to 2026 under the
terms of the treaty, though Russia nowadays tepidly favours such an extension.
Against this background of the apparent abandonment of bilateral nuclear arms control, the
U nited S tates and Russia are entering a new cycle of the arms race . Unprecedentedly, it will include
competition not only in offensive nuclear weaponry but also in offensive and defensive non-
nuclear strategic and medium-range weapons, as well as in the development of space
weapons and cyber warfare.
Russia has been modernising its strategic triad for more than a decade, deploying and
developing two new intercontinental-ballistic-missile ( ICBM ) systems (the SS-27 Mod 2/3 Yars and SS-29 Sarmat), one
submarine-launched ballistic-missile ( SLBM ) system (the SS-N-32 Bulava-30), two heavy-bomber systems (the Tu-160M
Blackjack and PAK DA), and long-range nuclear and dual-purpose air-, ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles (the Kh 102/101
(AS-23A/B), 9M2729 (SSC-8) and 3M14 (SS-N-30), respectively). Russia is also developing and deploying a new generation of
nuclear and dual-purpose weapon systems unveiled in Putin’s 1 March 2018 address: the Avangard strategic nuclear boost-glide
hypersonic system; Poseidon long-range, high-speed, nuclear-propelled and nuclear-armed heavy torpedoes; Burevestnik nuclear-
powered intercontinental nuclear cruise missiles; Kinzhal air-launched hypersonic middle-range missiles; and a number of other
sub-strategic nuclear and dual-purpose systems.6 Given
the probable demise of the INF Treaty, intermediate-
range land-based Kalibr-type cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles may be deployed. (Indeed,
the US government has alleged that Russia has already deployed a ground-launched cruise missile similar to the Kalibr 3M14.)
The United States, for its part, is developing strategic systems for limited nuclear strikes. These include Trident-2 SLBMs with low-
yield W-76-2 warheads, B-61-12 variable-yield gravity bombs for heavy bombers and tactical-strike aircraft, long-range stand-off air-
launched nuclear cruise missiles, and nuclear sea-based cruise missiles. The pending US withdrawal from the INF Treaty has lent
further momentum to the development of land-based medium-range cruise, ballistic and hypersonic systems. In the longer term,
beginning in the mid-2020s, the United States plans to modernise its whole strategic triad, replacing heavy bombers, ICBMs and
nuclear submarines with SLBMs.7
Unlike the Cold War version, the

new nuclear arms race will be multilateral , involving states such as
China , India , Pakistan , Israel and No rth Ko rea as well as the U nited S tates and Russia. The
intensification of the arms race would undoubtedly undermine the nuclear non-proliferation
regime . The review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2015 ended in failure, and the next conference in 2020
is likely to fail as well. The nuclear-weapons states have reneged on their obligation under the NPT’s Article VI to ‘undertake to
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament’. Further aggravations include the US withdrawal from the 2015 multilateral nuclear deal on the Iranian atomic
programme, the deadlock over the concept of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, and the deep split
between nuclear and non-nuclear NPT states over the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons approved by the UN General
Assembly on 6 July 2017.8 The probable degradation of NPT norms will prevent the treaty from effectively addressing the
challenges of the significant future growth of the world’s atomic energy and trade in nuclear materials and technologies. As a
consequence, the line between peaceful and military use of nuclear energy through the nuclear fuel cycle will become even blurrier.
The new cycle of the arms race among nuclear-weapons states will probably encourage a new
round of nuclear proliferation: Iran and Saudi Arabia could well join the nuclear club, as could
Brazil, Egypt, Japan, Nigeria, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, among others. This
would eventually seal the fate of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty ( CTBT ), which for 23 years has not
entered into legal force because of the refusal of the United States and several other nations to ratify it. Under the thunder of
nuclear explosions, the F issile M aterial C ut-Off T reaty, on which negotiations have been stalled for more than a
quarter-century, will
die a quiet death . Increased production of weapons-grade uranium and
plutonium, and nuclear-arms proliferation in the unstable regions of the world, will sooner or
later afford international terrorists access to nuclear explosives . This could end current
civilisation , if a war between nuclear states does not do so earlier.
Nuclear prolif guarantees war

Kroenig 15 [Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the
Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 2015.
“The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?” Journal of Strategic Studies,
Volume 38, Issue 1-2, 2015]
The spread of nuclear weapons poses at least six severe threats to international peace and
security including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained
US freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. Each of these threats
has received extensive treatment elsewhere and this review is not intended to replicate or even necessarily to improve upon these
we
previous efforts. Rather the goals of this section are more modest: to usefully bring together and recap the many reasons why
should be pessimistic about the likely consequences of nuclear proliferation. Many of these threats will
be illuminated with a discussion of a case of much contemporary concern: Iran’s advanced nuclear program. Nuclear War The
greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of
nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a
catastrophic nuclear war. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States
used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus-year
tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will
never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide
economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting later in
the decade and the Great Recession of the late 2000s.48 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used
again sometime in his lifetime. Before
reaching a state of MAD , new nuclear states go through a
transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both
states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first . For example, if Iran
acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though
it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be
confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike.
Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it
first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these
pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear
advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore,
decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this
incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes
preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might
feel use them or lose them pressures . That is, in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather
than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war
could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.49 If there are advantages to striking first, one state
might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first
than to go second. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still
possible. In an Israeli–Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first
rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure,
second-strike capabilities, there is still a risk of nuclear war . Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed
states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have
Iran’s theocratic
applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future.
government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains
leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We
cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader
somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does
not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from
nuclear-
intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above,
armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed
adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.50 This strategy might be especially attractive to
states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to the nuclear level. During the
Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s
conventional inferiority.51 As Russia’s conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to
rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in
a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly,
Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals
openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also
discussed above, leaders can make a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’.52 They can initiate
a nuclear crisis . By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increase
the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down.
Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis,
have come close . And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.53 When we
think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, with fewer sources of stability than
existed during the Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that a future crisis could
result in a devastating nuclear exchange . Nuclear Terrorism The spread of nuclear weapons also
increases the risk of nuclear terrorism .54 While September 11th was one of the greatest tragedies in American
history, it would have been much worse had Osama Bin Laden possessed nuclear weapons. Bin Laden declared it a
‘religious duty’ for Al- Qa’eda to acquire nuclear weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas
declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West.55 Unlike states, which
can be more easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they
would use them.56 Indeed, in recent years, many US politicians and security analysts have argued that nuclear terrorism
poses the greatest threat to US national security.57 Analysts have pointed out the tremendous hurdles that
terrorists would have to overcome in order to acquire nuclear weapons.58 Nevertheless , as

nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that they will eventually fall into terrorist hands
increases . States could intentionally transfer nuclear weapons , or the fissile material required to build
them, to terrorist groups. There are good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but,
as nuclear weapons spread , the probability that a leader might someday purposely arm a
terrorist group increases . Some fear, for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hizballah, might be at a
heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear
capabilities to terrorists, a
new nuclear state, with underdeveloped security procedures, might be
vulnerable to theft, allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or ideologically-motivated insiders to
transfer dangerous material to terrorists. There is evidence, for example, that representatives from Pakistan’s atomic
energy establishment met with Al-Qa’eda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal.59 Finally, a nuclear-armed state
could collapse, resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a loose nukes problem. US officials
are currently very concerned about what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear
weapons spread, this problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a government with a
tenuous hold on power. The regime change that Washington has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a nightmare
if a nuclear-armed Iran suffered a breakdown in authority, forcing us to worry about the fate of Iran’s nuclear arsenal. Regional
Instability The spread of nuclear weapons also emboldens nuclear powers , contributing to
regional instability . States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct military attack from
other states, but states with nuclear weapons can be confident that they can deter an
intentional military attack, giving them an incentive to be more aggressive in the conduct of their
foreign policy. In this way, nuclear weapons provide a shield under which states can feel free to
engage in lower-level aggression . Indeed, international relations theories about the ‘stability-instability paradox’
maintain that stability at the nuclear level contributes to conventional instability.60 Historically , we have seen that the
spread of nuclear weapons has emboldened their possessors and contributed to regional
instability . Recent scholarly analyses have demonstrated that, after controlling for other
relevant factors, nuclear-weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear-
weapon states and that this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have
less experience with nuclear diplomacy.61 Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that
Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged them to
initiate militarized disputes against India.62 Currently, Iran restrains its foreign policy because it fears major military retaliation from
nuclear-armed Iran would likely
the United States or Israel, but with nuclear weapons it could feel free to push harder. A
step up support to terrorist and proxy groups and engage in more aggressive coercive
diplomacy. With a nuclear-armed Iran increasingly throwing its weight around in the region, we could witness an
even more crisis prone Middle East. And in a poly-nuclear Middle East with Israel, Iran, and, in the
future, possibly other states, armed with nuclear weapons, any one of those crises could result in a
catastrophic nuclear exchange.
Nuclear terrorism causes extinction – 1 detonation is enough

Webber 5/28/19 [Dr Philip Webber has written widely on nuclear issues and is Chair of
Scientists for Global Responsibility (SGR) – a membership organisation promoting responsible
science and technology. We will all end up killing each other and one nuclear blast could do it.
May 18, 2019. https://metro.co.uk/2019/05/18/we-will-all-end-up-killing-each-other-and-one-
nuclear-blast-could-do-it-9370115/]
The nuclear armed nations have inadvertently created a global Doomsday machine , built with
15,000 nuclear weapons . Most (93%) have been built by Russia and in the US, 3,100 of them are ready to fire within
hours. Pre-programmed targets include main cities as well as a range of military and civilian targets
across the world primarily in the UK, Europe, US, Russia and China but also in Japan, Australia and South America. One
nuclear blast , one mistake, one cyber attack could trigger it. But first a reminder about the incredible destructive power
of a nuclear weapon. Modern nuclear warheads are typically 20 times larger than either of the two bombs that obliterated Hiroshima
and Nagasaki at the end of the Second World War. What just one nuclear warhead can do is unimaginable.
We’ve drawn some of the key features to scale against cityscapes in the UK for a Russian SS-18 RS 20V (NATO designation
‘Satan’) 500kT warhead. US submarines deploy a similar weapon - the Trident II Mk5, 475kT warhead. A deafening, terrifying noise
will be created, like an intense thunder that lasts for 10 seconds or longer. After a blinding flash of light bright destroying the retina of
anyone looking, and a violent electromagnetic pulse (EMP) knocking out electrical equipment several miles away, a bomb of this
size quickly forms an incandescent fireball 850 metres across. This is about the same height as the world’s tallest building, the Burj
Khalifa. Drawn against the London Canary Wharf financial district or the Manchester skyline, the huge fireball dwarfs one Canary
Sq. (240m), the South Tower Deansgate (201m) and the Beetham Tower Hilton, (170m). The fireball engulfs both city centres
completely, melting glass and steel and forms an intensely radioactive 60m deep crater zone of molten earth and debris. A
devastating supersonic blast wave flattens everything within a radius of two to three km, the entire Manchester centre, an area
larger than the City of London, with lighter damage out to eight km. Most people in these areas would be killed or very seriously
injured. The fireball quickly rises forming an enormous characteristic mushroom shaped cloud raining highly radioactive particles
(fallout). It rises to 60,000 ft (18,000m) - twice the altitude of Everest - and is 15 miles, 24km across. This is one warhead. There are
10 such warheads on each of Russia’s 46 missiles (460 in total) and 48 on each of eight US Trident submarines (384 in total). In
reality, in a nuclear conflict all of these warheads and a further 956 ready-to-fire are likely to be launched. Whilst this scale of
destruction is horrific and hundreds of millions of people would be killed in a few hours from a combination of blast, radiation and
huge city-wide firestorms combined
huge fires, there are also terrible longer-term effects. Scientists predict that
with very the high-altitude debris clouds would severely reduce sunlight levels and disrupt the
world’s climate for a decade causing drought , a prolonged winter , global famine and
catastrophic impacts for all life on earth and in the seas due to intense levels of UV with
the destruction of the ozone layer. But even at the level of a few hundred nuclear warheads, the consequences of a
nuclear war would be extremely severe across the world far beyond the areas hit directly. A nuclear conflict between India and
Pakistan with ‘only’ 100 small warheads would kill hundreds of millions and cause climate damage leading to a global famine. The
sheer destructive nature of nuclear explosions combined with long lasting radiation, means that nuclear weapons are of no military
use. ‘Enemy’ territory would be unusable for years because of intense radiation -especially when nuclear power stations and
reprocessing plants are hit. Even if your own country is not hit, radiation and climate damage will spread across the globe. No one
escapes the consequences. But the nuclear nations argue that they build and keep nuclear weapons to make sure that they are
never used. After all no one would be stupid enough to actually launch a nuclear weapon facing such terrible retaliation? It sounds
obvious. If you threaten any attacker with terrible nuclear devastation of course they won’t attack you. That might be true most of the
time. It is very unlikely that any country would launch a nuclear attack deliberately. But there are two very major problems. First, a
terrorist organisation with a nuclear weapon cannot be deterred in this way. Secondly, there are
several ways in which a nuclear war can start by mistake . A report by the prestigious Chatham House in
2014 documents 30 instances between 1962 and 2002 when nuclear weapons came within minutes of being launched due to
miscalculation, miscommunication, or technical errors. What prevented their use on many of these occasions was the intervention of
individuals who, against military orders, either refused to authorise a nuclear strike or relay information that would have led to
launch. Examples include a weather rocket launch mistaken for an attack on Russia, a US satellite misinterpreting sunlight reflecting
off clouds as multiple missiles firings, a 42c chip fault creating a false warning of 220 missiles launched at the United States. Such
risks are heightened during political crises. The risk of mistake is very high because, in a hangover from the Cold War,
the USA and Russia each keep 900 warheads ready to fire in a few minutes , in a ‘launch on
warning’ status, should a warning of nuclear attack come in. These nuclear weapons form a dangerous nuclear
stand-off - rather like two people holding guns to each other’s heads. With only a few minutes to evaluate a
warning of nuclear attack before warheads would strike, one mistake can trigger disaster . A similar nuclear
stand-off exists between India and Pakistan.
Limiting speed and quantity of BMD to that sufficient to deter other nuclear
states solves war and rogue strikes, but preserves strategic stability with
Russia – verification is key
a
If both presidents showed enough determination, and there were a US domestic political environment that permitted it,
compromise on missile defense might be reached . The basis of such compromise may consist
in agreeing on definitions that separate the class of ballistic missile defenses that could
tangibly affect strategic stability by intercepting a large number of US or Russian ICBMs and
SLBMs from those missile defenses that are aimed against other states and rogue regimes.
The first class of BMD would be restricted, but the second - which would enhance US-Russian
mutual security - could be given a “green light."
An illustration of a possible deal:

An agreement could limit strategic BMD systems to two to three
deployment areas inside each country, with no more than 200 to 300 long-range missile
interceptors (of the ground-based missile defense and Nudol’types) in total. Such arrays would be enough to
deal with other nuclear states , rogue regimes , or accidental launches. Regional BMD
systems (Aegis or S-500 types) might be limited as to the speed of their interceptors (for instance, to 5
km/sec*'), so forward-deployed US BMD systems could not be used for boost-phase intercepts
of Russian ICBMs.*28
***Footnote 28 Begins***
At the same time, these systems would be sufficient to cope with third states’ or rogue
regimes’ medium-range missiles and to defend Russia (if deployed around urbanindustrial
centers) and the United States’ European and Pacific allies. These limited BMD systems
would also provide for some protection of Russian strategic forces and command and control
complex against US/NATO cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons (at the terminal phase of
flight of the latter).
***Footnote 28 Ends***
Washington may also want to repeat its proposal of 2011 to allow Russia to monitor Aegis
missiles tests , which could provide assurance that the system is not intended for boost-
phase intercept. A boost-phase capability is exactly what most concerns Moscow regarding
the US BMD deployments close to Russian territory (Le. on land in Rumania and Poland, and on ships, if'
deployed in the Black, Baltic, and Northern seas). If, however, the United States decides to enhance the Aegis-type system for
boost-phase intercepts of ballistic missiles of third states or rogue regimes, then certain limits
on deployment geography
would be needed to alleviate Russia's concerns.29 It goes without saying that any such agreement
would be based on reciprocity (thus affecting Russian Air-Space Defense) and would have a standard
withdrawal provision .
With all that said, and taking in account the peculiarities of Russia’s decision-making paradigm, it
is not totally
unimaginable that, in some circumstances and with certain incentives. Moscow might proceed with strategic
offensive arms control talks anyway , putting aside its present , strident complaints about US
missile defenses and the conditions the U nited S tates would have to meet regarding missile defense
before talks could begin (like “nondirecting” it against Russia). After all, in an interview with NBC television correspondent
Meagan Kelly on March 2 (the day after his famous Statement to the Federal Assembly). President Putin said; “The term of
START III soon expires. We are ready for ... reduction of delivery vehicles, reduction of
warheads. Now when we have weapons which can easily penetrate all BMD systems, (further)
reduction of missiles and warheads is no longer so critical for us."30
Russia says yes – threat of American modernization, improved defense,

and Chinese rise increase incentives
Nonetheless, if the political environment improves or some arms control venues are considered
important enough to be made a “safe haven" from other Russian-American controversies, a
number of strategic changes now under way might actually be conducive to new arms
control agreements: • The massive American nuclear modernization program envisioned by
the most recent US N uclear P osture R eview may revive Russia’s interest in strategic arms
limitations after 2021, when the New START arms control agreement expires (or after 2026 if the treaty term
is extended). • The new Russian ballistic and hypersonic systems advertized in Putin's statement earlier this year
to the Federal Assembly may alleviate Russia's real or self-inspired alarm about US ballistic missile
defenses. Those Russian systems could also serve to politically justify a shift of Moscow's
position on the BMD issue (as artificial as the linkage may actually be). • Expansion of Russia's air-space
defense program and system may make its position on BMD limitation more flexible. • The
United States may be motivated to continue strategic talks with Russia by an interest in
limitation of and transparency on Russia’s new ballistic, hypersonic. and underwater nuclear
weapon programs. • The growing nuclear potential of China may make both Washington and
Moscow more interested in limiting their bilateral offensive-defensive arms race and
corresponding expenses.
Regional BMD is operationally useless but plays an outsized role in

Russian threat perceptions – that’s enough to cause instability
Hence, from 2012 on, a concept has been forged in Moscow: The U nited S tates has a “grand
design” of devaluing (sometimes called “nullifying”) the Russian nuclear deterrent through a combination of
long-range, precision-guided offensive conventional systems capable of delivering a disarming strike and a
conventional “global” antimissile system to fend off a weakened Russian retaliation (Ivanov 2018, 1–8.). The
principal value of conventional offense-defense capability is supposedly low collateral damage,
which provides an incentive for the victim of attack to think twice before implementing nuclear
retaliation that would provoke a devastating nuclear strike by the initial aggressor.
The intellectual appeal of this construct is huge , especially for non-professionals on strategic and
technical matters, i.e. the vast majority of politicians, bureaucrats, public figures, and journalists in
Russia. On the one hand, this concept looks sophisticated enough to serve as an “eye opener” to interested
recipients. On the other, it is not too complicated for them to grasp without drowning in technical and
operational details. In fact, precisely those details invalidate this artificial construct, but
understanding the details requires a professional background and allegiance to objectivity.
In particular, the details relate to forward-based Aegis and Aegis Ashore US missile defense deployments. Common sense would
suggest that those deployments are particularly threatening, being an element of NATO expansion eastward toward the Russian
border during the last 20 years. It requires special knowledge of ballistics , command and control specifics, and
interceptor acceleration rates and homing sensors to understand that Aegis anti-missiles are
simply not suited for boost-phase intercept . Hence, deploying them close to Russian western
borders poses no threat to Russian ICBMs , which would be out of Aegis interception range in
boost-phase and continue their flight over the northern polar circle on the way to the U nited St ates
(Dvorkin and Pyriev 2013, 183–203). Top Russian leaders hardly have this kind of technical knowledge
and would mistrust such analysis coming from elsewhere, deferring to their military and civilian
assistants.
Putin described the basis for Moscow’s concern over new weapon systems in 2014: “Today, many types of high-precision weaponry
are already close to massdestruction weapons in terms of their capabilities, and in the event of full renunciation of nuclear weapons
or a radical reduction in nuclear potential, nations that are leaders in creating and producing high-precision systems will have a clear
military advantage. Strategic parity will be disrupted, and this is likely to bring destabilization. The use of a so-called first global
disarming strike may become tempting. In short, the risks do not decrease, but intensify.” 7 Vice-prime minister Dmitry Rogozin
declared (referring to an unpublicized Pentagon war game) that 3,000 to 4,000 US highprecision weapons could during six hours
destroy 80 to 90 percent of Russia’s strategic forces “and deprive it of any resistance capability.” 8
Allegedly, the American high-precision capability is supplemented by impressive ballistic missile defenses, which Putin described in
detail in his March 2018 statement: “Despite our numerous objections and appeals, the American machine was put in motion, the
work is going on. The BMD system in Alaska and California is functioning; as a result of NATO extension to the east two BMD areas
have appeared in Eastern Europe: One was already created in Rumania, another is close to final deployment in Poland. The 230 A.
ARBATOV range of employed anti-missiles will grow; there are plans of deployment in Japan and South Korea. The global BMD
system comprises sea-based units – five cruisers and 30 destroyers, deployed, as far as we know, in the areas in immediate
proximity to Russia’s territory. I am not exaggerating anything – the work is going full steam.” 9
Active-duty military and technical specialists in official or consultative jobs would feel obliged to
adjust their estimates to what they assume are the visceral feelings of the political leadership.
Very few would risk their careers by presenting dissenting views , in particular when those
views might look similar to the official US position .
Collisions of political and strategic thinking are reflected in controversial official statements.
For example, in June 2015 Putin declared: “During this year more than 40 new intercontinental ballistic missiles will be added
to nuclear forces, which will be able to overcome even most technically sophisticated antiballistic missile systems.” 10 Nonetheless,
in his Statement to the Federal Assembly in March 2018, he said: “In
the course of implementation of the plans of
building the global BMD system, which are continuing now, all agreements in the context of
START III are gradually getting devalued, since as the delivery vehicles and warheads are
being reduced, one side, in particular the USA, at the same time and in an uncontrolled way is
increasing the number of anti-missiles, improving their qualitative characteristics, creating new
deployment areas, which eventually, if we do nothing, will lead to complete devaluation of
Russian nuclear potential. It will just be all intercepted – that’s all .” 11
Russia has directly asked for military–technical guarantees that involve

verification and technical limits on US BMD location and speed
Sankaran 13 [Jaganath Sankaran is currently a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University’s
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He obtained his doctorate in public policy at
the University of Maryland School of Public Policy. The research for this article was done while
serving as a Stanton nuclear security postdoctoral fellow at the RAND Corporation. "Missile
Defense Against Iran Without Threatening Russia." https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013-
11/missile-defense-against-iran-without-threatening-russia#bio]
Russia has asked for legally binding “military-technical” guarantees from the U nited S tates and
NATO that the missile defenses that they are deploying in Europe will not be aimed against
Moscow’s strategic nuclear forces.[5] The only publicly available explanation of what constitutes
military-technical guarantees describes them as making certain changes to the algorithms of
the operation of missile defense radars , refraining from bringing Aegis-equipped ships into
areas that are in direct proximity to the potential trajectories of Russian ICBMs and submarine-
launched ballistic missiles, stationing Russian observers at U.S. and NATO missile defense
installations, and formulating a mechanism to monitor the implementation of such
measures.[6]
Russian President Vladimir Putin has stated that his government would contemplate further bilateral nuclear arms reductions
only if the United States addressed concerns about the evolving ballistic missile system. “Russia
is open to new joint
initiatives” in arms control, Putin said in an August 2012 statement. “At the same time, their realization is clearly possible
only on a fair mutual basis and if all factors affecting international security and strategic stability are taken into account.” Among
the factors, according to Putin, is the “unilateral and totally unlimited deployment of a g lobal U.S.
m issile d efense system.”[7]
Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s president from 2008 to 2012, had expressed similar views. Speaking at the 2011 summit of the Group of
Eight industrialized countries, Medvedev said, “If we do not reach an agreement by 2020, a new arms race will begin.”[8] He further
suggested that “a European missile defense system can only be genuinely effective and viable if Russia participates in an equal
way.” Initially, the Kremlin had demanded that Europe be divided into two sectors, with NATO taking responsibility for providing
missile defenses for one and Russia for the other. Under this arrangement, the two sides would have equal authority in decision-
making for interceptor launches.[9] The United States and other NATO countries did not agree to Russia’s proposals for such
sectoral missile defense. Citing Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which says that an attack on any member “shall be considered
an attack against them all” and that each member “will assist” the attacked country, they claimed that NATO alone bears
responsibility for defending the alliance from ballistic missile threats.[10]
The constant U.S. response to Russian claims of vulnerability has been that the interceptors
to be deployed under the phased adaptive approach would not pose a threat to Russian
missile forces. Responding to such concerns in late 2011, Rose Gottemoeller, acting undersecretary of state for arms control
and international security, said, “We have worked at the highest level of the U nited S tates government to
be transparent about our missile defense plans and capabilities and to explain that our
planned missile defense programs do not threaten Russia or its security.”[11]
The U nited S tates has declined to engage in negotiations on any formal agreement with Russia
on the phased adaptive approach. In March 2012, Ellen Tauscher, U.S. special envoy for strategic stability and
missile defense, said Russia was seeking a “legal guarantee ” with a set of military-technical
criteria that would limit the ability of the United States to deploy future missile defense
systems. Tauscher said Russia also was asking for data on when U.S. Aegis-equipped ships
entered certain waters and when an interceptor achieved a certain velocity . The United States “will
not accept limitations on the capabilities and numbers of our missile defense system” or on where it deploys the Aegis-equipped
ships, she said. Those vessels are “multi-mission ships that are used for a variety of missions around the world, not just for missile
defense,” she said.[12]
Nevertheless, the U.S. government has expressed a willingness to accept a political agreement affirming that U.S. missile defenses
are not aimed at Russia. Tauscher explained that any such statement would be politically but not legally binding and would publicly
proclaim Washington’s intent to work with Moscow in charting a course for cooperation on missile defense.[13]
Russia has continued to insist on a legally binding agreement with limits on U.S. missile
defense operations. Such a legally binding agreement seems very difficult to achieve given the strong Republican animosity
to it in Congress. The Senate resolution supporting ratification of New START, for example, specifically stated that the Senate would
not accept any limitations on missile defense.
Advantage – Space
Refusal of the US to accept limits on BMD causes space weaponization
Jackson 18 [Nicole J. Jackson is an international relations and security studies scholar
specializing in Russia and the former Soviet Union. She is Associate Professor at the School for
International Studies at Simon Fraser University. She has published on Russian foreign and
security policy, regional security governance and trafficking in Central Asia. "Outer Space in
Russia’s Security Strategy."
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/40e4/d8ee5c172d547fdc4c047ff01b444b69136e.pdf]
Russia’s official perceptions today are not very different from those of the Soviet period. Outer
space has long been significant to Russia, and now it again has the resources to be a
major contender . Under Putin, as in Soviet times, Russia seeks global strategic parity with the
US and securitises the US threat to its nuclear deterrence. Russia perceives a US first strike against its
nuclear forces from space-based weapons as the key security threat from space. Its 2010 and 2014 Military Doctrines
classify both the deployment of strategic missile defences (the intention to place weapons in space) and
the deployment of strategic conventional precision weapons as key military dangers to
Russia . Other threats listed include: impeding state command and control and disruption of strategic nuclear forces, missile
early warning systems, and systems for monitoring outer space. Both these doctrines and the 2016 Foreign
Policy Concept highlight the US and NATO as potential enemies at a time of ‘ increased global
competition’ and conclude that Russia needs to focus on the credibility of its nuclear
deterrent but also on conventional and nonconventional elements in a complex toolkit of
responses (Russian Security Council, 2010 and 2014; Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).
Russia has also adamantly opposed US plans for ballistic missile defence ( BMD ), which it perceives
as opening a door towards space-based weapons integrated into BMD architecture , and in
turn threatening Russia’s strategic missiles forces. The 2002 US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty paved the
way for deployment of intercept missiles, and Russians interpreted this move as undermining the consensus on the strictly peaceful
use of space. In this context, in 2015 Russia threatened that ‘Any action undermining strategic stability will inevitably result in
counter measures’ (Russian Government, 2015). Russia’s
key security preoccupation has been the prospect
of space-based interceptors and the US refusal to accept constraints on BMD. It continues
to denounce the US withdrawal from the ABM treaty and argues that the development of US
ground and sea-based missile defence have increased tensions and led to increased missile
proliferation which Russia directly links to space-based threats.
The Russian (and Chinese) governments also believe that their missiles and satellites are targeted by US anti-missiles.4 Russia
perceives anti-satellite weapons tests (ASATs) by China (2007) and US (2008) to be precursors to the
weaponisation of space. ASAT capabilities are those that target an adversary’s satellites with
the intention of disabling their function – communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ( ISR ),
navigation, positioning – through interference or damaging/destroying the satellite entirely. The
latter has a second-order effect of creating space debris that threatens other space assets
and activities in that region of space.
The Russian government argues that these

multiple developments are leading to a new arms race that
disrupts broader arms control and disarmament processes and requires Russia’s huge
expenses for its space program. (Luzin, 2015). In March 2018 Putin announced the development of some 300 new
‘strategic weapons’ which he said was a response to US missile defence capabilities, and then unveiled several at the annual
Victory Day military parade (RFE/RL, March 1, 2018).5 Such
showmanship was not new, but Putin’s hyperbole
and critique of the West has intensified, and Western concern about Russia’s intentions and its
growing, if overblown, capabilities is likely to continue.
The threat alone of striking a high-altitude nuclear launch detection

satellites causes escalation by removing firebreaks and encouraging worst
case scenario crisis planning
Miller & Fontaine 17 [Jim Miller is President of Adaptive Strategies, LLC, which provides
consulting to private sector clients on strategy development and implementation, international
engagement, and technology issues. He serves on the Board of Directors for the Atlantic
Council, and on the Board of Advisors for Endgame, Inc. He is a member of the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Defense Science Board. Richard Fontaine is the Chief
Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). He served as President of
CNAS from 2012 to 2019 and as a Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow from 2009-2012. Prior to
CNAS, he was foreign policy advisor to Senator John McCain for more than five years. He has
also worked at the State Department, the National Security Council and on the staff of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 9/19. "A New Era in U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability."
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/a-new-era-in-u-s-russian-strategic-stability]
Space systems are intimately connected to strategic stability given their relevance to
nuclear operations, particularly for the U nited S tates. The U nited S tates relies on satellites for missile
early warning, particularly via the SBIRS constellation , and for secure communications with
nuclear forces (advanced extremely high frequency). Attacks on systems in space therefore could
implicate important and potentially crucial nuclear-related systems, for instance by shortening
decision or warning times or by reducing confidence in or interrupting the ability to
communicate with nuclear forces.
Although it is challenging to assess the impact of counter-space capabilities on the strategic nuclear balance, there are no
it appears today that both the U nited
unclassified reports of deployed dedicated ASAT systems on either side, and so
S tates and Russia today may have relatively limited ASAT capabilities (although it both sides might be able
to use ballistic missile defense interceptors to attack satellites in low earth orbit). It therefore appears highly unlikely that either side
could have confidence that it could negate the other side’s early warning or secure communications satellite constellations, let alone
do so rapidly, under current conditions. Moreover, even if it were able to disrupt or destroy key elements of the other side’s space
architecture, each
side has ground-based radars to support early warning and substantial terrestrial
and/or airborne communications to support secure communications. Therefore, at least for the
present there seems little prospect that either side could substantially impact the other side’s
second-strike capabilities through counter-space attacks – whether alone or in combination with nuclear and
non-nuclear strike systems
That said, any attack on space assets could have severe escalatory potential . And both
counter-space capabilities and risks are likely to grow in the future. First, future ballistic missile
defense systems may have significant anti-satellite capabilities ; of particular concern would be
space-based interceptors or directed energy (e.g., laser) systems that could be both highly
capable ASATs and attractive targets for the other side.
Second, in the absence of any agreed framework for stability in space, either side may decide
in the future to deploy dedicated ASAT capabilities, terrestrial and/ or in outer space. Moreover,
because of the possibility of clandestine development and deployment of some types of
counter-space systems, each side may fear the worst from the other side , and pursue not
only defensive capabilities but offensive systems as a result. Considering also the potential for
China to pursue ASAT capabilities, the coming decades hold a real possibility for an
aggressive if largely clandestine and highly uncertain arms competition in outer space.
Poorly disaggregated infrastructure makes the domain unstable – even

limited attacks cause miscalc and use it or lose it
Miller & Fontaine 17 [Jim Miller is President of Adaptive Strategies, LLC, which provides
consulting to private sector clients on strategy development and implementation, international
engagement, and technology issues. He serves on the Board of Directors for the Atlantic
Council, and on the Board of Advisors for Endgame, Inc. He is a member of the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Defense Science Board. Richard Fontaine is the Chief
Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). He served as President of
CNAS from 2012 to 2019 and as a Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow from 2009-2012. Prior to
CNAS, he was foreign policy advisor to Senator John McCain for more than five years. He has
also worked at the State Department, the National Security Council and on the staff of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 9/19. "A New Era in U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability."
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/a-new-era-in-u-s-russian-strategic-stability]
Both theU nited S tates and Russia have inherent anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities in their ballistic
missile defense interceptors . The United States demonstrated these capabilities in Operation Burnt Frost in 2008, when
it used an SM-3 theater missile interceptor to destroy a satellite carrying over 1,000 pounds of a hazardous propellant, which was in
a decaying orbit.57 Russia reportedly conducted a non-destructive ASAT test in December 2016, using the PL-19 Nudol strategic
missile defense interceptor in a fly-by demonstration shot.58
Space has long been a domain used by militaries . In recent years, however, the U nited S tates has
considerably deepened its reliance on space for the full range of military activities. Russia has
taken note and has begun developing more substantial counter-space capabilities of varying
types.59 As U.S. defense leaders have made clear, the United States will need to continue to leverage space for its warfighting and
intelligence purposes, just as it becomes a far more contested domain in light of Russian (and others’) counter-space capabilities.
Particularly important in this context is the fact that space may be a classically unstable
domain in that it appears highly offense-dominant under current technological and deployment
conditions. Given U.S. reliance on space , Russia may have strong incentives to strike early in
a conflict – or even during a deep crisis – in order to disable or weaken U.S. space
contributions to effective power projection , before the United States can take steps to defend against such
capabilities. This is particularly important because the U nited S tates relies on its space architecture
for crucial nuclear command , control , and communications ; missile early warning; and other
strategic-related functions. Such functions are not necessarily clearly disaggregated from
conventional warfighting functions in the U.S. space architecture. There is therefore a high
potential for rapid escalation to the strategic level should war carry into space, as it appears
likely it would in the event of U.S.-Russian conflict.
Escalation Scenarios
Five specific new dynamics could lead to rapid and unintended escalation . First, each side
would have strong incentive to go early and extensively in cyber and space attacks on military
assets. Second, attacks in cyberspace and/or outer space intended to be limited to military
systems could cascade to affect critical civilian infrastructure (e.g., electricity grids). Third, attacks
intended to target non-nuclear systems (including but not limited to cyber and space attacks) could
inadvertently impinge on nuclear systems, and be misread as a much more escalatory
move . Fourth, understanding these dynamics, one side could feel “use or lose” pressures so that it must
use its cyber and space capabilities preemptively. And fifth, there could be inadvertent escalation
due either to misattributed attack or a third-party false flag operation. Each of these dynamics
and related scenarios are discussed below.
That causes nuclear war – an expert consensus confirms arms control are
key to prevent a multi-domain arms race
Mecklin 19 [John Mecklin is the editor in chief of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Masters
in Government @ Harvard. "Why Star Wars should remain a cinematic fantasy."
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019.1630101]
I asked six top experts to weigh in on disparate aspects of the current state of global military competition in
space. Perhaps not so remarkably, five of them – Russian researcher Alexey Arbatov, longtime US defense analyst Lawrence
Korb, Joan Johnson-Freese and David Burbach of the US Naval War College, and UN space security fellow Daniel Porras – found
not for “warfighting capability ,” but for arms control that
their assignments leading them to advocate
might short-circuit the dangerous and destabilizing outer space-oriented arms race that
already has begun. The sixth author, longtime science writer Jeff Hecht, wrote about the current state of laser technology,
finding that it has improved over the three decades since the initial proposal for a space-based “Star Wars” missile defense
program, but still is not ready for prime time: “The new enthusiasm for lasers in space is not exactly a sequel. Usually the characters
in a sequel have learned something from their experience in the earlier films. So far it looks more like a remake, in which different
actors in an updated setting repeat the mistakes of the original characters with more modern equipment.”
As Arbatov points out in “Arms control in outer space: The Russian angle, and a possible way forward,” space has been
used for military purposes – for trials of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile interceptors, for tests of nuclear
explosives, for deployment of military satellites and anti-satellite systems, and more – for seven decades. In recent years,
however, the United States, Russia, China, and India have started down the more dangerous path of space weaponization, by,
among other things, testing missiles that can shoot down satellites in low-level orbits. Weapons
capable of targeting the
early warning satellites that circle Earth at much higher orbits – these are the satellites that
warn nations of ballistic missile attack – would be extraordinarily destabilizing and make
nuclear war distinctly more likely . There is no reason to think weapons that can target
early warning satellites won’t be fielded , unless the major nuclear nations agree to undertake
negotiations on new arms control measures aimed at limiting space related weaponry .
As the major powers of the world race to build military services dedicated to operating in space, it would be well to remember that,
outside the movies, space war will involve little swashbuckling . If (as the Trump administration has so incautiously
put it) significant “warfighting” occurs in space, Luke Skywalker won’t zoom to the rescue, and the results –
the kind of high-tech, worldwide, conventional and nuclear “air-space warfare” that Arbatov
describes – will be a show no sane person wants to watch .
Arms control caps escalatory hybrid war – hotlines fail BUT sustained coop
solves nuclear flashpoints in Korea, Syria, and Ukraine
Trenin 19 [Dmitri Trenin is a historian, policy analyst, and director of the Carnegie Moscow
Center—a think tank and regional affiliate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
He also chairs the center’s research council and its Foreign and Security Policy Program. He
was a senior research fellow at the Institute of Europe in Moscow and at the NATO Defense
College in Rome. He served in the Soviet and Russian armed forces from 1972 until his
retirement in 1993, including experience as a liaison officer in the external relations branch of
the Group of Soviet Forces (stationed in Potsdam) and as a staff member of the delegation to
the USSoviet nuclear arms talks in Geneva from 1985 to 1991. He also taught at the War
Studies Department of the Military Institute from 1986 to 1993. He has a PhD in history from the
Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences. “Russian views of
US nuclear modernization.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1555991]
The military dimension of the US-Russian hybrid war is becoming increasingly prominent. In the
absence of trust , and with the demise of arms control , both Russia and the United States are coming to rely
almost exclusively on their own military assets . Arms races in a number of fields – nuclear and
advanced nonnuclear weapons, strategic offense and defense systems, space , cyber space, artificial intelligence,
robotics , and others – are becoming more intense.
collision
The US and Russian governments have realized the dangers of this confrontation, and they understand that a kinetic
between their militaries is most likely to occur as a result of incidents, miscalc ulations, or third-party
provocations that are allowed to escalate . In addition to the direct line linking the Kremlin to the
White House, the top military commanders – the Chief of the Russian General Staff and the Chairman of the US
Joint Chiefs of Staff – have direct contacts , as do the two countries’ ministers of defense , national
security advisers , and intelligence chiefs ; their inferiors stay in touch 24/7 in an effort termed
de-confliction . Communication is key, and it is being maintained, even though substantive and sustained political dialogue
still remains out of reach.
Communication, however, is not enough . Much has been said and written about the unlikely
scenario of a Russia-NATO war in the Baltics, but a much more plausible scenario – in which
the lingering conflict in the Donbass region might escalate to the level of a fullblown war
between Russia and Ukraine – is getting less attention. The United States promises to stand by its allies and friends, but
the five-day war between Georgia and Russia in 2008 suggests that the U nited S tates does not always control its
friends, whose actions may precipitate a massive expansion of a localized conflict .
Even more evidently, Russia does not control some of the allies it protects. For example, Syria’s president
Bashar al- Assad has no intention of sharing power with anyone, much less relinquishing it.
Provoking a military collision between US and Russian forces in Syria could help guarantee his regime’s
political survival – at least for a few more years. North Korea is another region where a military conflict,
with nuclear overtones, could put Russia and the U nited S tates within striking distance of each
other. In each of these scenarios, a serious dialogue on regional security issues – at least with the aim of avoiding a US-Russian
clash, if not producing a diplomatic solution – is an absolute must.
Unlike in the Cold War, the threat of a US Russian nuclear war is not at the front and center of the current hybrid war confrontation.
To most people in both countries, the threat remains very remote, or appears to have vanished altogether. Certainly, neither
the highly fluid and
America nor Russia intends to annihilate the other in a massive nuclear first strike. However,
essentially borderless nature of the hybrid war – in a globalized environment where the US-
Russian relationship is no longer the dominant one – allows for multiple conflicts and no
overriding authority to stop or mitigate them . In this environment, a US-Russian military
collision might not be deterred by the paralyzing fear of a nuclear Armageddon , as it was after the
Cuban Missile Crisis. Once such a collision happens and is allowed to escalate , however, a first use
of nuclear weapons may become a reality .
That process of integration is key to building a broader rules–based

system for balancing competition
Gallagher 15 [Nancy Gallagher is the director at the Center for International and Security
Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and a research professor at the University of Maryland. "Re-
thinking the Unthinkable: Arms Control in the Twenty-First Century." NONPROLIFERATION
REVIEW, 2015 VOL. 22, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10736700.2016.1149279]
sustainable cooperation required rules that

Bull differed from many American arms control experts in arguing that
were not only mutually beneficial , but also equitable and consensually agreed. If the terms of
cooperation were imposed through coercive diplomacy , if rules were not applied in an even-
handed way, or if the distribution of benefits was grossly unfair , then disadvantaged states
would become resentful and alienated from international society, and would try to evade , avoid , or
overturn the rules when they could. For this reason, Bull would not have been surprised by the
backlash against the bilateral arms control agreements associated with the end of the Cold
War that has developed among those Russians who believe that the U nited S tates took advantage
of their weakness to get unfair treaty terms, nor by the disappointment among Russians who
hoped that making disproportionate cuts to those Soviet military capabilities that the West found
most threatening would be the first step toward a fundamentally new global security system.
Bull made a similar argument for taking an equitable and inclusive approach to nuclear proliferation. He warned that discriminatory
export controls and treaty provisions would not prevent additional states from acquiring nuclear weapons or the ability to make them.
Instead, they would make it harder to manage the spread of advanced technologies in ways that minimized the potential for disorder
and destruction. In a passage written in 1965 about China and India that holds equally true for Iran today, Bull wrote, “it is difficult to
see how great and proud nations with the will and the resources to acquire nuclear weapons can be prevented from having their
way except by measures which while achieving no more than a postponement of the expansion of the nuclear club make the
aspirant more determined than ever to join it and alarming members of [that club] more when [the aspirants] ultimately do.” 54
With no world government to make and enforce rules, Bull believed that order in international society rested on five general
institutions that states can use to increase the effect of agreed rules on state behavior: the balance of power, law, diplomacy, war,
and management by the great powers. Whereas
strategic stability theory evaluates arms control
primarily in terms of its implications for the balance of power, and for the probability and
consequences of war, Bull was also concerned about arms control’s potential contributions to
the development of international law , diplomacy , and the willingness of the great powers to
pursue policies that strengthen, rather than undermine, order and justice in international
society.
2AC
2AC – AT: T Arms Control
C/I -- An agreement restricting development, production, stockpiling,
proliferation, distribution, or usage of weapons
Kolodkin 19 [Barry Kolodkin is a business consultant, writer, and expert on U.S. relations in
Eastern Europe. What Is Arms Control? May 25, 2019. https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-
arms-control-3310297]
Arms control is when a country or countries restrict the development , production , stockpiling ,
proliferation , distribution or usage of weapons. Arms control may refer to small arms,
conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction ( WMD ) and is usually associated with bilateral or
multilateral treaties and agreements.
Don’t vote negative unless debating the aff is impossible – anything else incentivizes topicality
which crowds out substance
“Space weapon” includes midcourse BMD

Zhang & Podvig 8 [Hui Zhang is a Research Associate in the Project on Managing the Atom in the
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of
Government. He received his Ph.D. in nuclear physics from Beijing University. "Chapter 2: Chinese
Perspectives on Space Weapons." https://www.amacad.org/publication/russian-and-chinese-responses-
us-military-plans-space/section/4]
To fully define space weapons, one also needs to define the boundary of outer space. There
is currently no internationally accepted definition of the outer space boundary. China has defined the
boundary of outer space as the Earth’s atmosphere, i.e., all space beyond 100 km above the
sea level of the Earth. Most scientists and experts generally support the definition of
the boundary between 100 to 110 km.166 The difference between 100 km and 110 km is not a
significant concern, because all space-based weapons or “objects in space” discussed below are at
much higher altitudes than 110 km.
A broad space weapons ban. An examination of missile defense systems illustrates the importance
to any treaty negotiation of unambiguously defining the term “objects of outer space.” In the case
of a ban on space weapons defined broadly, all potential space-based missile defense systems,
including space-based, boost-phase systems, would be banned. These space-based missile defense
weapons would be typically deployed in polar or nearpolar orbits much higher than 100 km. For
example, the envisioned SBL weapons would orbit at around 1000 km or higher. Spacebased KEWs
would orbit at an altitude of about 300–500 km.167
The GMD system that is currently deployed would not be permitted under a broad definition, as
the intercept altitude of ballistic missile defense is between about 200 km and 2000 km (a typical
intercept altitude for a ICBM at range of 10,000 km is between about 1000 and 1500 km). It is reported
that the actual national missile defense system will intercept at an approximate altitude of
1100 km and that the minimum intercept altitude of BMD is 130 km. Both would exceed the 100
km limit set by a broad interpretation of space weapons.168 In addition, theater missile defense
systems, such as THAAD and sea-based midcourse defense systems, are designed
for exoatmospheric intercept.169
2AC – Unilat
No follow on, diplomacy is key to limiting modernization and asats
Koplow 18 [Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. "The Fault Is Not in Our
Stars: Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer Space." Georgetown University Law Center. Volume 59,
Number 2, Summer 2018.
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3101&context=facpub]
This Article emphatically does not advocate simple unilateral self-restraint by the United States.
The three ideas assessed here are not based on passivity and a na¨ıve hope for enlightened
reciprocity by others. Instead, the call is for aggressive diplomacy , seizing the occasion to exercise
international leadership in attempting to forge a more satisfactory and complete space law regime. The
U nited S tates cannot concoct global arms control on its own, but a strong American influence
and sustained engagement are essential to build international consensus and generate
concerted action.225
To emphasize, this is not “arms control for the sake of arms control,” nor are the three proposals designed simply to be more
conducive to the misty goal of preserving space as a mythically special place. Instead, the
objective is to pursue global
stability and U.S. national security by retarding the incipient slide toward a space arms race
that would be distinctly disadvantageous. Unless decisive action is undertaken soon, the
retrograde erosion of the freedom and usability of space will likely accelerate , with the United
States having the most to lose.
The world has repeatedly alternated between arms racing and mutual restraint in ASAT
testing and development; exploration of modalities for space control and negation seems to
come in erratic waves, punctuated by moments of moderation. Now is the time to entrench the
self-discipline, establishing effective, durable international discipline .
Unilateral cuts make deals less likely by removing leverage

Costlow 17 [Matthew R. Costlow is an analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy and a
PhD student in Political Science at George Mason University. 8/30. "Arms Controllers Against
Arms Control." http://www.nipp.org/2017/08/30/costlow-matthew-arms-controllers-against-arms-
control/]
If armscontrol proponents wish not to be dismissed in their approach to global nuclear disarmament they must first
recognize the hard truth that power politics in international relations is not going away any time
soon. Countries are still pursuing their own perceived national interests and negotiations still
require leverage . If mutual coop eration and amity were enough to bring about complete nuclear
disarmament, then those agreements would be reached by now. Instead, in order to obtain
negotiated cuts with other nations the U nited S tates will require substantial leverage, leverage that
would be thrown away by unilateral cuts. As then-Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Scher recently testified,
the United States structures its nuclear forces in part so that it “retains leverage for future arms control agreements,”[14] a prudent
nod to international reality. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Paul Selva echoed this assessment stating, “The
places we’ve had success in negotiating types and classes of weapons out of adversary
nuclear arsenals in our strategic arms reductions talks has been when we possess a similar
capability that poses a tactical, operational, and strategic problem for our adversaries .” U.S.
unilateral reductions would, according to Selva, put the United States “at a strategic disadvantage
over a length of time.”[15]
Seemingly well-intentioned
unilateral U.S. nuclear reductions would surely fail to bring Russia
and China to the negotiating table, much less induce parallel unilateral cuts . Instead of
projecting leadership, the U nited S tates would be left on the sidelines with reduced leverage
and the prospect of negotiated nuclear reductions ever more distant.
NSP PIC
Perm do the aff through the process of the CP – NSP can be many different
methods for establishing space activities – previous presidents have
created new processes like the CP to establish NSP
Weeden 17 [Dr. Brian Weeden is the Director of Program Planning for Secure World
Foundation, and former U.S. military officer. Why National Space Policy Matters. March 31,
2017. https://www.orfonline.org/research/space-alert-volume-v-issue-2/]
National space policy is an increasingly popular topic, yet one that can still be mysterious even within the
space world. The term “policy” in the space world often gets defined as “everything that’s not engineering or law,” but public
policy is actually a well-defined field in and of itself. This short article provides an overview of the importance of public
policy and space, the value formal and declared space policy can have, and why the increasing number of countries establishing
national space policy is an overall positive trend for the world. To understand why space policy is important, we must first
understand why public policy itself matters. In the context of government, public policy can be broadly defined as why, how, and to
what effect governments pursue particular courses of action or inaction in dealing with important issues. Public policy decisions
often involve weighing the potential positive and negative impacts of multiple competing options. The decision-making process is
further complicated by the participation of many different interest groups and political actors who have competing perspectives in the
decision-making process. And it can often be difficult to enumerate explicit costs and benefits of various policy options, which limits
Public policy on space can be established through many
the ability to make a purely rational decision.
different methods , several of which may be interacting at the same time . One way of
establishing policy is through the international, bilateral, and multilateral treaties and agreements by which
a country is bound. National policy can be established explicitly through formal decision-making
processes such as intra-governmental committees or legislation , and may or may not be disclosed
publicly. Policy can also be established implicitly through a choice to not pursue a particular path, and can be manifested through
cultural or ideological contexts that impact decision-making and choices. In countries with a separation between executive and
legislative powers, policy may not be consistent, and may even be contradictory. Developing a formal national space policy can
have several benefits. First, it can serve to define the rationale and objectives for why a country is conducting space activities, which
could boost internal political support for funding and resources, and also provide a signal to other countries. Second, national space
policy can also define the principles by which a country will conduct its space activities, which can reaffirm or demonstrate a
country’s adherence to international agreements and treaties. Third, national space policy can be used to
delineate roles, responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms between federal agencies and departments to
implement a country’s national obligations under international law, such as radiofrequency spectrum licensing. Fourth, national
space policy can link space activities and programs to broader national policy goals, such as foreign
policy, economic and trade policy, or science, technology and innovation (STI) policy. The United States has the
longest track record for creating declared public policy on space. The first U.S. national space policy was issued by
the Eisenhower Administration in 1959, and established many of the principles and positions that continue to influence U.S.
space policy today. Most of the following presidential administrations have issued either their own
national space policy, or policy directives on specific issues or sectors, such as anti-satellite weapons or commercial space.
In most cases, the presidential policy decisions were made as the output of a months-long, formal interagency process between the
various agencies and departments that have an interest in space. Thus, the details of “presidential” space policy often reflect the
Each presidential
interests and priorities of the bureaucracy more than the personal interests or policies of the president.
admin istration has also made their own adjustments to the process , with some opting to establish
a separate decision-making body or process specific to space, and others choosing to use
existing national security processes for space policy.
Congress is key to a credible space arms control deal
Beard 17 [Jack M. Beard, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law,
Space, Cyber & Telecommunications Law Program; former Associate Deputy General Counsel
(International Affairs), Department of Defense. SOFT LAW’S FAILURE ON THE HORIZON:
THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES. 2017.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1936&context=jil]
The executive leader of a state may also choose to utilize the legislative consent process in
making an international commitment in order to send a more credible signal about that
leader's degree of commitment to the treaty.150 Because legislatures have the ability to prevent the implementation of
agreements through the democratic process, other states may have doubts about the ability of the executive branch to actually fulfill
Just as indeterminacy undermines credible
a commitment without legislative approval or acquiescence.151
commitments with costs paid in legitimacy, the advantages of non-legal arrangements (easier
and quicker negotiation, etc.) come with costs paid in "a reduction of the information and commitment
benefits that flow from legislative participation . .. ,"152
For their part, the

legislatures of liberal democracies may view some matters as so serious and
involving such high stakes that they see legislative participation as necessary to convey the
most formal, legally binding and credible commitment to foreign states (with the expectation of
receiving a similar, formal, reciprocal commitment from that foreign state). Arms control
matters clearly raise such concerns in the U nited S tates. For example, Congress enacted a law in 1961 which
continues to provide that "[n]o action shall be taken pursuant to this chapter or any other Act that would obligate the United States to
reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a militarily significant manner, except pursuant to the treaty-
making power of the President set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution or unless authorized by the enactment of
further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States."
ACDA strikes down the CP – it’s illegal

Randall 90 (Kenneth C. Randall, Vice Dean and Professor of Law, University of Alabama.
J.S.D. 1988, Columbia University School of Law; LL.M. 1985 (Fellowship), Columbia University
School of Law; LL.M. 1982 (Fellowship), Yale Law School; J.D. 1981, Hofstra University School
of Law; Associate 1982-84, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, New York City., 1990. “The Treaty
Power*.” Ohio State Law Journal, Volume 51, Number 5.
https://kb.osu.edu/bitstream/handle/1811/64108/OSLJ_V51N5_1089.pdf)
A federal statute requires the President to make either treaties or congressional-executive

agreements [CEAs] on the topic of disarmament; the statute bars sole executive
agreements on that topic . The Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961 (" Disarmament
Act "), 187 which established the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as part of the executive branch,
provides as follows: " [N]o action shall be taken . ..that will obligate the U nited S tates to disarm or to
reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments . . . , except pursuant to the treaty-making
power of the President under the Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative
legislation by the Congress .... ."88 Although no court has ever examined that provision's constitutionality, the
Disarmament Act is valid . Article II of the Constitution does not give the President exclusive
jurisdiction over arms limitation . The President arguably has some authority over that topic, as the army and navy's
commander in chief.'89 Article I, however, empowers the Congress to raise, support, and arm an army
and a navy. 90 Since the President, at best, shares, the disarmament authority with the
Congress, the Disarmament Act constitutionally precludes the executive branch from creating
disarmament accords without legislative participation . The Constitution and the Disarmament Act say
nothing explicit about the President's ability to reinterpret and terminate disarmament accords. But if the President does not have
independent article II authority to make agreements disarming the nation, the executive branch does not logically have any
constitutional or statutory right to remake or break those agreements.
Iran DA
SM3 doesn’t solve because of countermeasures but destroys global arms
control and causes wildfire diversification and nuke mod
Grego 19 [Laura Grego is a senior scientist in the Union of Concerned Scientists Global
Security Program. "The SM-3 Block IIA Interceptor." Union of Concerned Scientists.
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2019/08/SM-3%2520IIA.pdf]
Planned upgrades to the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ( BMD ) system are likely to have serious effects on
the world’s strategic nuclear balance . While currently a regional defense, new SM-3 Block IIA
interceptors could make the system theoretically capable of engaging strategic (i.e., intercontinental-
range) nuclear missiles . Plans call for deploying hundreds of the new interceptors on mobile,
globally deployable Aegis BMD ships. The system’s actual strategic defensive capability is severely
limited by its vulnerability to decoys and other countermeasures against which it has not yet been
tested. Nonetheless, the dramatic expansion of the system will have a devastating effect on
prospects for extending existing nuclear arms control agreements and negotiating those that
might follow . It will also likely motivate Russia and China to diversify and grow their nuclear
weapons arsenals.
Decoys and modernization mean testing never keeps up, but conventional
deterrence solves, so we turn every BMD good argument
Greenwood 19 [Matthew Greenwood works for the Government of Ontario and has 17 years
of experience in public sector communications. He has a master’s degree in Environmental
Studies from York University. 4/30. "Missile Defense: Does It Really Work?"
https://www.engineering.com/DesignerEdge/DesignerEdgeArticles/ArticleID/18971/Missile-
Defense-Does-It-Really-Work.aspx]
U nion of C oncerned S cientists doesn’t think the system

But the GMD system also has its critics—in fact, the
actually works : “though the idea of a missile shield may sound attractive, today’s homeland system is hugely
expensive , ineffective , and offers no proven capability to protect the United States—and no credible
path forward for achieving success.”
The organization’s main concern is that the GMD system can’t handle countermeasures deployed by an enemy.
An ICBM could launch decoys during the midcourse phase to distract the interceptor: those
lightweight decoys would follow the same trajectory as the real ICBM in space, making it hard for the interceptor to
determine which is the real warhead. This could force the GMD system to use up its
interceptors—there are currently only 44—before the real threats are launched.
ICBM could be equipped with a “cooled shroud ,” which lowers the temperature
Additionally, the
of the warhead . Since interceptors rely on infrared sensors to track their targets, it would take them
longer to home in on the ICBM—that is, if they see it at all .
Both of these countermeasures are within reach of countries like Russia , Iran and North Korea , which
are building ICBMs. But the Pentagon has still invested over $40 billion in missile defense.
Also, while
the military points to the two-shot salvo test as proof that the GMD system works, others are
more skeptical about the test results.
“The simulated attacking missile’s trajectory , its exact coordinates, had to be programmed into the
intercepting missile’s guidance system —an entirely unrealistic way to track an evasive drop
of rain in a ballistic hurricane ,” said Doug Vaughan, a defense reporter who has covered missile defense since SDI.
“And for all that, they still failed more often than not .”
The test was performed on a “threat-representative ICBM”—not a real one. The U.S. military isn’t about to launch a ballistic missile
at itself to test the system, so there’s no way to really tell if the system will perform successfully until someone launches an ICBM at
the U.S. homeland.
While missile defense technology may have progressed since the Reagan era, its effectiveness is still in doubt—especially when
conventional deterrence is doing a much more effective job at keeping the U.S. safe.
In fact, theGMD system may just be pushing U.S. adversaries to develop tech nologies to counter it—
potentially making the system obsolete before it even gets used. Russia and China are already
working on new strategic weapons to counter the interceptor. One example is hypersonic weapons
technology—missiles that could move too fast for U.S. missile defense systems to intercept.
But the lack of evidence of the system’s effectiveness doesn’t seem to be slowing down the Department of Defense. The existing
arsenal of 44 GMD interceptors could soon be increased, as the Pentagon has requested funding for 20 more.
“What the Pentagon is now hyping is a plan to throw ‘salvos’ of more, better, faster, smarter rocks
at enemy rockets and, at best, knock down maybe 10 percent of the incoming missiles ,” said
Vaughan. “The other 90 percent—or even 1 percent —that get through will kill millions.”
BMD doesn’t solve – it’s not secure enough and causes modernization –
reject the last move fallacy
Grego 18 [Laura senior scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned
Scientists, June 2018, “US Ground-based midcourse missile defense: Expensive and
unreliable,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 74, No. 4, p. 220-226]
Where dissuasion is concerned, many factors inform a country’s decision making about whether to develop ICBM technology, and
at what cost. But a strategic missile
defense system would have to be very effective to alter an
adversary’s cost-to-benefit calculation. A marginally effective missile defense system, or a system
of unknown effectiveness, may well create an incentive to build more, or more sophisticated,
missiles than states would otherwise build.
No evidence suggests that building or improving the GMD system has had or will have any
appreciable effect on potential adversaries’ decisions to develop long-range missiles. The dramatic
increase in tempo in North Korea’s missile testing program happened after the GMD’s nominal
deployment and development. Similarly, Iran has continued to develop its long-range missile technology, launching four small
satellites into orbit between 2009 and 2015 and developing its more capable Simorgh booster.
What about deterrence? The primary way a missile

defense system helps deter an attack is by creating
uncertainty in the adversary’s mind about whether that attack would succeed in achieving its goals.
Under Cold War thinking, if a peer adversary such as the Soviet Union (or Russia) contemplated a carefully planned strike against
hardened US military targets, and
if effective missile defenses existed, the adversary might be uncertain
how much of the US retaliatory force would remain intact after the attack. According to this logic, missile
defense would help deter an adversary’s nuclear first strike.
The same logic does not apply to an attack that a country such as North Korea, Iran, or even
China might consider. These countries’ missile arsenals are too small and inaccurate to mount an
effective counterforce strike on hardened US military targets; they would necessarily target cities and
civilian infrastructure. Central in deterring North Korea from launching nuclear weapons against the United
States is the certainty of a devastating US response. The presence or absence of US missile
defense has no meaningful effect on the deterrence already afforded by US offensive nuclear and
conventional forces.
Foreign Affairs DA
No spillover
Nzelibe 11 [Jide Nzelibe, Professor of Law, Northwestern University Law School. PARTISAN
CONFLICTS OVER PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY. WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW, Vol.
53:389. 2011]
This Essay argues that politicians may sometimes strategically manipulate the contours of the
President’s constitutional authority in order to achieve partisan objectives . At first glance, the
notion that societal groups may ever stake out conflicting visions of presidential authority seems puzzling. After all, it is difficult
to envision how any view of presidential authority can systematically confer one-sided benefits
on any partisan or interest group, because presumably each group will sometimes lose and gain from any particular constraint on
presidential authority. Thus, given the implicit veil of ignorance that underpins the separation of powers, one may think that the
incentives of judges and elected officials to embrace visions of presidential authority that advance the specific objectives of any
political party will be blunted. Unsurprisingly, much of the contemporary
scholarship on presidential power has
ignored partisan factors and has instead focused on how incentives inherent in the
institutional nature of the various branches of government shape preferences for expansive presidential
authority.2
This Essay suggests a contrary view : if certain conditions hold, partisan power holders can often
calculate how an expansive or narrow view of presidential authority over discrete issues is
likely to affect their electoral and ideological objectives. More specifically, staking out partisan
positions on the allocation of presidential authority is likely to be rational when such authority
can be unbundled on an issue-by-issue basis .3 Under these conditions, parties are likely to favor a
vision of presidential authority that will enable them to carry out those issues in which
they have an electoral advantage over the opposition, but that make it more difficult for the
opposition to carry out its favored issues . For instance, when the presidential authority to negotiate
human rights treaties can be effectively unbundled from the war -making power, Republicans
may prefer more constraints on the President’s treatymaking authority in human rights, but less on his war-
making authority.4 By contrast, Democrats or left-leaning constituencies will likely adopt the opposite set of preferences regarding
presidential authority on war and human rights. Similarly, Democratic administrations may be more willing to indulge a greater role
for courts in adjudicating human rights controversies even at the expense of the President’s interpretive discretion over international
law, whereas Republican administrations are more likely to view such adjudications as interfering with the President’s flexibility to
conduct foreign affairs.5
1. Russia – TWICE
Alter 18 [Benjamin, J.D. candidate at Yale Law School. In 2014–15, he was a special adviser
to the Treasury undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence. Lawfare. 3/27. "Sanctions
Are Congress’s Path Back to Foreign Policy Relevance,"
https://www.lawfareblog.com/sanctions-are-congresss-path-back-foreign-policy-relevance]
But any power that Congress may give, it may also take away. And in recent years—skeptical
first of the Obama
administration’s approach to Iran and then of the Trump administration’s approach to Russia — Congress has
begun taking back the reins of sanctions policy. It has done so by mandating that specific
sanctions be imposed and by limiting the executive branch’s ability to lift existing sanctions.
Natural pandemics won’t cause human extinction
Sebastian Farquhar 17, director at Oxford's Global Priorities Project, Owen Cotton-Barratt, a
Lecturer in Mathematics at St Hugh’s College, Oxford, John Halstead, Stefan Schubert, Haydn
Belfield, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, "Existential Risk Diplomacy and Governance", GLOBAL
PRIORITIES PROJECT 2017, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-
2017-01-23.pdf
1.1.3 Engineered pandemics For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37
However, there are some reasons to believe thatnatural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human
extinction . Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the
833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31
species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this
list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to
their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally
dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off
by a natural pandemic . One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their
hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens
not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather
than kill all possible hosts.39
Trump causes miscalc, leadership collapse, alliance breakdown, and

makes everything unsustainable
Brands 11-20 [Hal Brands is the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins
University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and senior fellow at the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, America’s Secret Weapon Against China: Democracy,
2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-11-20/america-s-secret-weapon-
against-china-democracy]
Tocqueville got a lot of things right, he probably got this one wrong. It is easy to be wowed by the apparent near-term efficiency and
democracy brings its own powerful — and longer-term —advantages
purpose of authoritarian regimes, but
to the conduct of foreign affairs.
One of these advantages, counterintuitively enough, is better decision-making. Checks and balances and
raucous public debate make democratic decision-making slow and messy. But they also promote
reasoned deliberation and the ability to correct course when necessary. Centralization of
power and the dominance of a small elite allow authoritarian regimes to move faster, but they can
lend themselves to big mistakes.
In 2014, for instance, Vladimir Putin reportedly made the decision to invade Ukraine by himself, with virtually no advance diplomatic
planning. Doing so ensured maximum operational surprise, but it seems clear that Putin underestimated the economic, diplomatic
and military blowback Russia would face from the West as a result of his decision. China, too, has fallen prey to this pathology: One
doubts the leadership in Beijing understood precisely how much international ill will the ongoing brutal repression of its Uighur
population would bring.
Second, democracies have traditionally been better at generating long-term economic
power, because democratic rule fosters the free exchange of information, stable legal
frameworks and individual rights that unleash innovation and growth. “It is no accident,” the
great economist Mancur Olson wrote, “that the countries that have reached the highest level of economic
performance across generations are all stable democracies.”
To be sure, China’s rapid growth has been testing this historical law in recent decades. Yet corruption, patronage and the power of
entrenched interests are all impeding the liberalizing reforms needed to sustain that growth over time. More recently, the turn toward
greater authoritarianism and ideological conformity under Xi Jinping seems likely to inhibit innovation in the long run.
Third, democracies are usually better at winning friends and influencing people on the global
stage. During the Cold War, a democratic U.S. proved far more effective than a totalitarian Soviet Union at establishing and
maintaining alliances, precisely because the characteristics of totalitarian rule — coercion, intolerance of dissent, lack of respect for
minority rights—tended to repulse other countries rather than attract them. America’s traditions of compromise, tolerance, and
respect for minority rights, by contrast, conduced to genuine partnerships characterized by deep cooperation and mutual respect.
The parallels are clearly evident today. According to an estimate from the Economist, 100 of the world’s 150 largest states lean
toward America, with only 21 leaning against it. Russia and China have few allies or genuine partners, and those that they have
tend to be relatively weak and isolated authoritarian regimes.
Finally, there is the imbalance of soft power. Much has been made — with good reason — of the way the Trump administration has
been debasing U.S. soft power, through abrasive policies and offensive rhetoric. But American soft power has traditionally proved
resilient, because it derives more from what the country is — an inclusive democracy dedicated to the dignity of the individual —
than from the actions of any single leader. And although China’s rapid growth has won it respect in many developing countries,
the resulting soft
power is tenuous and inherently limited by the fact that relatively few people around the world
wish to emulate a Chinese police state that assiduously restricts individual freedoms.
Global opinion polling bears this out. A survey conducted in 2016 revealed overwhelming majorities in nearly every country
surveyed had a negative view of Beijing’s approach to individual freedoms. And last month, the populations of all but two nations
surveyed (Argentina and Tunisia) preferred the U.S. over China as a global leader.
Democracy is not destiny, of course: Nowhere is it written that the U.S. will always outperform its
authoritarian rivals in the end. Today, the Trump administration is often acting in ways that seem
almost calculated to dissipate America’s democratic advantages — by alienating and
coercing allies, depleting U.S. prestige, and causing many international observers to worry
about whether Washington’s leadership is becoming less benign . It is a sad commentary on the state of
American policy that while the country’s soft power appears resilient, Trump is viewed less positively around the globe than Vladimir
Putin or Xi Jinping.
As Pence argued in New Guinea, democracy may well prove to be a competitive asset for the U.S. in its competitions against
Russia and China. But America will only get the most out of that asset if it remains true to its own
best traditions.
2AC – AT: Removal Good DA
The plan would take time to negotiate – occurs after DA and approved by
Congress, which flips the link
Impossible to predict how the impeachment process will go OTHER THAN
there’s zero chance the Senate convicts and removes Trump
Pergram 12/30/19 (Chad, Fox News, "In 2020, DC will be mostly about politics, not
legislation," https://www.foxnews.com/politics/in-2020-dc-will-be-mostly-about-politics-not-
legislation)
No votes are scheduled in the Senate until January 6. Nothing in the House until January 7. However, the prospects of a
Senate trial – and any potential negotiations between Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and
Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) loom. And no one has any clue exactly what House
Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) is up to , clinging to the articles of impeachment adopted earlier this month by the House .
The House has to vote to send the articles over to the Senate. If and when the Speaker will
ever send the articles to the Senate remains unclear . So everyone in Washington is focused on a Senate
trial and if there will ever be a Senate trial. How long it goes. Who testifies. If there are ever any GOP defectors. At this stage,
there’s still no chance the Senate convicts and removes President Trump.
Zero chance of impeachment even with damning revelations – Dems have

no leverage and the public lost interest
Tumulty 1-2 [Karen Tumulty, journalist at The Washington Post, January 2,
2019. “Democrats are the ones who stand to suffer by delaying the Senate
impeachment trial.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/democrats-are-
the-ones-who-stand-to-suffer-by-delaying-the-senate-impeachment-
trial/2020/01/02/8e58f01e-2d78-11ea-9b60-817cc18cf173_story.html]
Democrats are giving themselves very little time or maneuvering
A collision is coming, one that
room to avert. On Friday, the Republican-led Senate returns to Washington and resumes its
standoff with the House over the terms and timing of President Trump’s impeachment trial. On the
very same day, the one-month countdown to the first presidential contest in Iowa begins. After Iowa, the primary season
will accelerate quickly . On March 3, Super Tuesday, states representing more than one-third of the U.S. population are
set to vote. By the end of March, chances are that one of the 14 Democratic candidates now in the race will be close to nailing down
Democrats
the nomination, or the party will be headed toward a contested convention. We have reached the point at which
are going to have to make a choice: Do they want to squander precious days and weeks tilting against
an impregnable Republican wall in the Senate , or do they want to make their strongest case for
removing Trump from office to the people who might actually do it — the voters? Until now, those
impulses within the party were not working at cross-purposes. Two weeks ago, the House did its constitutional duty and, for the third
time in U.S. history, impeached a president. Along the way, the House Intelligence Committee uncovered a significant amount of
evidence that the president had abused the power of his office by pressing Ukraine’s president to manufacture ammunition that
Trump could use against a political opponent. Trump himself assured a second impeachment article, for obstruction of Congress, by
this is as far as the process is likely to go , given the
stonewalling a legitimate inquiry into his actions. But
political reality in the Senate. The Democrats have no leverage to force Majority Leader
Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) — who has already declared that he will not act impartially in the upcoming
trial — tocompel the testimony of witnesses the White House refused to provide to the House.
Democrats are left clinging to a thin hope that moderate Republican senators such as Lisa Murkowski (Alaska) and
Susan Collins (Maine), who have both expressed reservations about the process, might put pressure on their leader. Or an even
thinner one that Republicans might be jolted by new revelations at the margins of the
scandal. As it has since the proceedings began, Trump’s acquittal by the Senate appears certain . The
impeachment drama has been all-consuming for the media and for Washington politicians, stoked constantly by the president’s
rage-filled tweets. But average Americans are losing interest in a movie where they already know
the ending . Support for not only impeaching Trump but also for removing him from office grew significantly in the fall, after
the first revelations of his July 25 phone call to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. But it has not budged much since
then, despite the witnesses who testified in the weeks leading up to the House’s historic vote. The public remains pretty much
evenly divided on the subject, and Democratic presidential candidates say they rarely hear it brought up as they travel across the
early primary states. What people still want to know more about, however, is how the result of the next election could change their
lives. Multicandidate events in Iowa have been drawing large crowds of political window shoppers. Five Democratic contenders
have already qualified for the next big one, a Jan. 14 debate in Des Moines. But it is well within the realm of possibility that the three
senators among them — Elizabeth Warren (Mass.), Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) and Amy Klobuchar (Minn.) — will be back in Washington
that day, sitting silently in the Senate chamber in their roles as impeachment jurors. That would leave the stage, as things stand so
far, to former vice president Joe Biden and Pete Buttigieg, the now-former mayor of South Bend, Ind. It’s fair to ask whether that
matters, given there have already been a half-dozen Democratic debates. But the weeks before the Iowa caucuses have a history of
being fluid ones, and Sanders’s recent surge — including his eye-popping $34.5 million fundraising haul in the fourth quarter of 2019
— shows that Democratic voters are nowhere close to settled in their choices. A number of the other Democratic candidates,
including Biden, saw significant upticks in their totals as well. But Trump, by casting himself as the victim of his impeachment,
fattened his campaign bank account by $46 million in the last quarter. The
impeachment imperative now, both on
practical and substantive grounds, is for Democrats to move on . They are the ones who stand to
suffer by delaying the inevitable .
Flips don’t happen because of tight primaries

Litvan 12/30 [Laura Litvan. Reporter @ Bloomberg. “Trump Impeachment Trial Tests
Vulnerable Senate Incumbents”. 12/30/19. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-
30/trump-impeachment-trial-tests-incumbents-key-to-senate-control]
Trump is all but certain to be acquitted on two articles of impeachment since the Constitution
requires 67 votes to convict. But for just over half a dozen senators locked in the closest races, and a few others whose
contests could tip competitive, their votes on whether to remove him from office will trigger inevitable political fallout. Senators Cory
Gardner of Colorado and Susan Collins of Maine, two of the most at-risk Republican
incumbents, are particularly boxed in. Both represent Democratic-leaning states where a vote to acquit Trump could
spark a voter backlash in the fall. But a vote to convict would be bait for a GOP primary challenge that
could damage or end their re-election campaigns. Democratic Senator Doug Jones, who hails from deep red
Alabama, confronts the opposite dilemma.
Perception is either inevitable or impossible because of McConnel

Obeidallah 12-15 [Dean Obeidallah, columnist for the Daily Beast writing on
CNN, former attorney, December 15, 2019. “Trump is just 67 votes away from
being an ex-President and it's freaking him out.”
https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/15/opinions/trump-votes-impeachment-
obeidallah/index.html]
Even the most secure of US presidents would be unnerved at the prospect that their political
demise is only 67 votes away. And while Trump has been called a lot of things, "secure" is
not one of them . This is the same Trump who just days ago took to Twitter to despicably mock 16-year-old climate change
activist Greta Thunberg, likely because she beat him out for the title of Time magazine's "Person of the Year." Any doubt that
Trump is running this math through his head over and over , trying to figure out if he mocked
or angered enough Republican senators that could spell his political doom ? Of course, what gives
Trump protection is that his GOP base backs him solidly, and any Republican senators who vote to remove Trump could expect to receive their wrath. And while the Trump
campaign publicly claims that impeachment will help Trump win in 2020 by firing up his base, Trump's own Twitter is a glimpse of a
President in full panic mode
. On Thursday, Trump unleashed a barrage of 123 tweets during the House Judiciary Committee debate on the articles of impeachment, many commenting on the hearings,
including one instance where he accused two Democratic members of the House of lying. That set a record for the most tweets by Trump in a single day, eclipsing his record of
105 tweets set just days before, on Sunday, where he also took aim at the impeachment process numbers. For example, one of Trump's tweets Sunday expressed his approval
of a conservative activist who had written, "The Constitutional framers would be appalled by the way impeachment is being wielded as a political weapon against President
Trump." By the following Friday, after the House Judiciary Committee voted to approve articles of impeachment, Trump again took to Twitter to express how upset he was: "It's
not fair that I'm being Impeached when I've done absolutely nothing wrong!" Even President Bill Clinton was apparently concerned at the possibility of being removed from office
as evidenced by his apology to the country shortly after being impeached by the House in 1998, stating, "What I want the American people to know, what I want the Congress to
know, is that I am profoundly sorry for all I have done wrong in words and deeds." Clinton offered those words despite having an approval rating of over 60% at the time, which
notably peaked at 73 percent just days after the House voted to impeach him. What a contrast to Trump, who per FiveThirtyEight.com, currently has the lowest approval rating
of any president these many days into his first term at 42%. Trump now even trails Presidents Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush at the same point in their respective first
Trump should be worried . Anything can happen in a trial . All it will

terms, and both of them lost re-election.
take is just 20 Republican senators to join the Democrats in saying they had enough of his
antics , and Trump will have earned himself a place in history -- and in every school text book — as the first president in the
history of the republic removed by the Senate. And that thought is clearly causing Trump to panic .
No Iran war or escalation

Meirerding 9/18/19 [Emily Meierding is an assistant professor of national security affairs at
the Naval Postgraduate School and the author of The Oil Wars Myth: Petroleum and the
Causes of International Conflict, forthcoming from Cornell University Press. The views
expressed here do not represent the perspectives of the U.S. Navy or Department of Defense.
"The Real Reason Trump Won’t Attack Iran." https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/18/the-real-
reason-trump-wont-attack-iran-saudi/]
This would be a serious mischaracterization, however. In this case, oil interests are far more likely to prevent war
than provoke it . A war in the Persian Gulf would profoundly destabilize the global oil system. If the Trump administration
strikes Iran, unilaterally or in conjunction with Saudi Arabia, and targets the state’s oil facilities, these attacks will take more
resources offline. Although Iran’s oil output has declined significantly since the United States reimposed sanctions in 2018, the
country still produces more than 2 million barrels of oil per day and exports about half a million barrels per day of petroleum products
and liquefied petroleum gas to a variety of resource consumers. Airstrikes would remove these supplies for the market, while other
oil producers are struggling to compensate for the loss of Saudi resources. Tehran has also threatened to retaliate for
U.S. or Saudi military action. If the Iranians targets Saudi oil installations, it could incapacitate additional facilities or interrupt repairs at
Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khurais facilities. The initial attacks on these installations caused far more damage than many industry analyses
anticipated, striking core processing facilities, including stabilization towers and storage tanks, with pinpoint accuracy. Even if Tehran was not directly
responsible for these attacks, Saudi officials have that the aggressors employed Iranian weapons. If these claims are accurate, Tehran has the
capacity to inflict substantial further damage on the Saudi oil industry. Although Saudi Arabia has presumably reinforced its air defense system after
this weekend’s attacks, the kingdom’s ability to protect critical oil facilities from drones and low-flying missiles is now uncertain. Iran
could also
respond to U.S. and Saudi strikes by attempting to interrupt oil transportation. The Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps navy has demonstrated its willingness to seize foreign tankers in the Persian Gulf, as it did on Monday and this July. The corps
could also disable oil tankers with mines and other explosives, mimicking the attacks that
occurred earlier this year. Finally, Iran could attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz . The state has
been threatening to block the waterway for months. And, while Iran’s naval forces may not be able to halt traffic entirely or
maintain a closure over the long term, the attempt alone would roil global oil markets. Insurance rates for oil tankers transiting the strait have already
increased tenfold between May and September. Any effort to block the waterway would provoke another drastic hike. Oil prices would also
soar in response to the heightened geopolitical risk. An escalating conflict in the Persian Gulf would jeopardize
many states’ energy interests. Saudi Arabia would be hit on multiple fronts from an intensified Gulf conflict. Its oil installations would
incur additional physical damage, and the state would lose more resource revenue from suspended oil sales. More importantly,
state oil company Saudi Aramco’s reputation as a reliable oil supplier would take another severe hit. Saudi officials have already
been scrambling to restore confidence in the national oil company after this weekend’s attacks. Saudi Aramco’s CEO, Amin Nasser,
announced on Tuesday that Abqaiq’s output will be restored by the end of the month and that the company’s long-anticipated initial
public offering (IPO) will proceed as planned. However, skepticism is rampant, and any additional disruptions will wreak havoc on
the company’s valuation, as well as on Saudi leader Mohammed bin Salman’s plans to use IPO proceeds to finance his country’s
economic diversification. Fear of further instability limits Riyadh’s room for maneuver. As Robin Mills of Qamar Energy observed, “It
will be all but impossible to proceed with the IPO if there are ongoing attacks.” Conflict escalation in the Persian Gulf would also
threaten Chinese and European energy security. Saudi Arabia is currently China’s top oil supplier, providing approximately 17
percent of the state’s crude imports. Chinese consumers also continue to purchase small amounts of Iranian crude, as well as
petroleum products, despite U.S. sanctions. European countries have halted purchases from Iran and are less dependent on Saudi
oil. However, EU member states still import more than 13 percent of their resources from Gulf oil producers. An intensifying regional
conflict would threaten Europeans’ access to these supplies, force them to pay higher prices, and undermine their ongoing
diplomatic efforts to return Iranian crude to the global oil market. Unsurprisingly, Chinese and European officials have
adopted a cautious attitude toward the crisis . Although China’s foreign ministry condemned the attack, spokesperson
Hua Chunying advised the parties “to avoid taking actions that bring about an escalation in regional tensions.” She also refrained from
attributing responsibility for the strikes to a specific actor. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and British Prime Minister
Boris Johnson pushed for an international response to the attacks. However, they also emphasized the “importance of
avoiding the further escalation of tensions in the region.” Given this reticence, if the United States
wants to strike Iran, it will have to go it alone. However, the Trump administration also has strong
incentives to avoid conflict escalation. Although the United States is now the world’s leading oil producer, as President
Donald Trump recently observed, the country is not immune to instability. The oil market is global , so even if the
United States becomes a net oil exporter, it will still be affected by rising oil prices. U.S. refineries will pay more for crude, regardless of where it
originates. And when
they pass this price hike on to their customers, Americans pay more at the
pump. Rising gasoline prices are never popular . However, they are especially dangerous in an election year. The hit to
American pocketbooks could immediately undermine support for Trump’s reelection. Persistently elevated oil prices could push the country into
recession, further harming his prospects.
R&C DA
That alliance is inevitable and the whole DA is wrong

Carafano 19 [James Jay Carafano is Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy at the
Heritage Foundation, 8-5-2019, "Why the China-Russia Alliance Won't Last," National
Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-china-russia-alliance-wont-last-71556]
Fears of an allied China and Russia running amok around the world are overblown . Indeed, there
is so much friction between these “friends,” any attempt to team up would likely give both
countries heat rash.
Siren’s Cat Call
Here’s the lame narrative that’s animating the Bismarck wannabes: The United States is
pushing back against Moscow and pressing Beijing. This is driving Moscow and Beijing closer
together. Beijing and Moscow will then gang-up on the United States. To prevent this, the
United States should make nice with Moscow (undermining the incipient Sino-Russian détente)
and then focus on beating back against China.
This is an idea that should be dumped into the dustbin before it has any history. Yes, China and Russia are going to work together
to some degree. They have important things in common. For example, both are unaccountable authoritarian regimes that share the
Eurasian continent. Other indicators of compatibility: they like doing business with each other, and both like to make up their own
rules. Heck, they don’t even have to pretend the liberal world order is a speed-bump in their joint ventures. Both happily engage with
the world’s most odious regimes, from Syria to Venezuela. And, of course, neither has any compunction about playing dirty when it
serves their interests.
They already play off of each other to frustrate foreign-policy initiatives from Washington. For
example, if the United States pressures Russia to vote a certain way on a measure before the UN Security Council, Russia will often
don the white hat and vote as we desire, knowing that Beijing will veto the measure for them. Similarly, if the United States leans on
Beijing stop giving North Korea some form of aid and comfort, Beijing can go along with the request, knowing that Moscow will pick
up the baton for them.
What the neo-Bismarcks need to ask themselves is: Why

would Russia or China ever consider giving up
these practices? Why would they make the ongoing great power competition easier for the
United States? That makes no sense. That is not in their self-interest.
Any notion that the United States could somehow seduce Russian president Vladimir Putin
from playing house with Beijing is fanciful. Putin doesn’t do something for nothing; his price would
be quite high. He could demand a free hand in Ukraine, or lifting sanctions, or squelching opposition to Nordstream II, or giving
Russia free rein in the Middle East. Any of these “deals” would greatly compromise American interests. Why would we do that? And
What leverage does Russia have on Beijing? The answer
what, exactly, is Putin going to deliver in return?
is not near enough to justify any of these concessions.
On the other hand, what

leverage would a Russia-China alliance have on the United States? They
wouldn’t jointly threaten Washington with military action . A central element of both their strategies is that they
want to win against the United States “without fighting.”
Moscow might be happy if the United States got distracted in a military mix-up with China. Conversely, Beijing could okay with the
Americans have an armed confrontation with the Russians. But , neither of them will be volunteering to go first
anytime soon.
Even if they linked arms to threaten the United States in tandem, the pain would not be worth
the gain. As long as America maintains a credible global and strategic deterrent, a Sino-
Russian military one-two punch is pretty much checkmated .
Peace through strength really works.
If direct military confrontation is out of bounds, then what can Beijing and Moscow do using economic, political, and diplomatic
power or tools of hybrid warfare? The answer to that question is easy: exactly what they are already doing.
We have plenty of evidence of on-going political warfare aimed at the United States, its friends, allies, and interests. Some of these
activities are conducted in tandem; some are instances of copy-catism; and some are independent and original.
The political warfare takes many forms—ranging from corrosive economic behavior to aggressive diplomacy to military
expansionism and more.
All these malicious efforts are a problem. What they don’t add up to is an existential threat to
vital U.S. interests. In other words, we can handle this without sucking up to Putin and undermining our own
interests. In fact, we already have a national-security strategy that adequately addresses these concerns.
power is largely asymmetrical. They have

One more thing inhibiting a Sino-Russian hookup. Russian and Chinese
very different strengths and weaknesses. In coordinating their malicious activities against the
United States, they don’t line out very well. China, for example, can’t really do anything
substantive to help Russia in Syria. Putin doesn’t have much to offer in the South China Seas
or in brokering a U.S.-China trade agreement.
Strategic Friction
their global
There are also limits to the Sino-Russia era of good feelings. Other than trying to take America down a notch,
goals are not well aligned. Indeed, the more they try to cooperate, the more their disparate
interests will grate on the relationship .
For example, China is meddling more in Central Asia and the Arctic—spaces where Russia was dominant.
Moscow has to ask itself: Why is Beijing elbowing in? There is an argument that rather than looking for a strategic partnership,
China is just biding its time till Russia implodes, and Beijing steps in and sweeps up the choice pieces.
it is becoming more apparent to

And, as much as Putin likes to tweak Trump about Moscow’s ties with Beijing,
Washington that Russia is ever more the junior partner . Can Putin really continue to play Robin to a
Chinese Batman? As for China, they have to ask: What does Robin really bring to the dynamic-
duo?
1AR
T
Their interp
This book is a summary of many different definitions – then it says the
goldilocks definition includes BMD – justified by new card from the same
book
Krepon & Clary 3 (Michael Krepon served as the president and CEO of the Henry L.
Stimson Center from 1989 to 2000. He is the author of Strategic Stalemate, Nuclear Weapons
and Arms Control in American Politics (1984), Arms Control in the Reagan Administration
(1989), and co-editor of Verification and Compliance, A Problem-Solving Approach (1988),
Commercial Observation Satellites and International Security (1990), The Politics of Arms
Control Treaty Ratification (1991), Open Skies, Arms Control and Cooperative Security (1992),
Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building, and Reconciliation in South Asia (1995), and Global
Confidence-Building: New Tools for Troubled Regions (2000). His newest book, Cooperative
Threat Reduction, Missile Defense, and the Nuclear Future, was published in January 2003 by
Palgrave. Christopher Clary works as a Research Assistant for the Weaponization of Space
Project at the Stimson Center. He graduated from Wichita State University in May 2001,
receiving the William J. Swett Prize for having the highest grade point average of any
graduating senior. He holds two bachelor's degrees, in International Studies and History, with
additional minors in Political Science and Economics. “Space Assurance or Space
Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space,” The Henry L. Stimson Center. DOA:
7/18/19. https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/spacebook_1.pdf)
This typology can be condensed further into three fairly distinct categories:
1. Activities that involve the direct application of force either from space, within space, or directed
against objects in space from the earth’s surface or atmosphere. Space force application and much of space control fall into this
category.
2. Activities that clearly involve no use of force, primarily space support activities.
3. Activities that do not involve the direct application of force but that can support and enhance other activities that destroy or
disable an adversary’s capabilities in space, on the earth’s surface, or in the atmosphere.
Clearly, category 1 activities involving space force application would constitute the
weaponization of space . Additionally, space control activities resulting in the denial or negation of an adversary’s
spacecraft would also constitute weaponization. Included in this definition of weaponization are dedicated ASAT weapons,
“defensive” weapons carried on satellites or other space objects that could be used for offensive purposes, and attacks against
terrestrial-based targets carried out by military weapon systems operating in or from space. Excluded in this definition are military
and civilian capabilities such as long-range ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, and the space shuttle, which could be used as
ASATs but which have clearly been designed to carry out other missions. Also excluded from this definition are category 2 and 3
activities listed above.
This construct of space weaponization falls between overly broad definitions that are unhelpful
and overly narrow definitions that are insufficient. Several nations now have the capability to
do significant damage to satellites in orbit, perhaps by utilizing ocean-spanning ballistic missiles, or long-range
missile defense interceptors , or space-launch vehicles to detonate nuclear weapons above the earth’s atmosphere.
Space assets face other threats. The U.S. space shuttle was designed to repair and refurbish satellites, not to purposefully damage
them. But it has this inherent capability. Commercially available communications equipment can be used to jam satellite uplinks and
downlinks. The U.S. Air Force’s Space Aggressor Squadron, which “red teams” the possible behavior of potential adversaries,
assembled a satellite jamming device for $7,500 using readily available equipment. Space warfare need not take place in space,
since satellite ground-control stations are susceptible to hacking and to direct attacks by air power, ground forces, and commando
operations.13
AT: Mod
No modification required
Mark Gubrud 14, March 2014, comment on “Through a glass, darkly: Chinese, American, and
Russian anti-satellite testing in space,”
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2473/1#IDComment806730763
One major flaw is the uncritical perpetuation of the "software change" myth in the USA-193
intercept, for which the reference given is a set of USG public talking points which are patently
dishonest in a number of other respects as well. I heard Gen. Cartwright tell a press conference
after the shot that the only modifications to the missile were for telemetry purposes, not to
enable the intercept.
From a technical point of view, there is absolutely no reason to believe any hardware or
software modification to the missiles would have been necessary in order to enable
engagement of an object falling within the narrow band of ballistic parameters corresponding to
low orbit, given that it has the capability to engage all adjacent regions of the parameter space. I
suppose there might be a software module designed to block satellite intercepts, but that seems
unlikely, and in any case, disabling it would be a 1-line code mod.
There was a modification to the launch control system which enabled it to be cued by data from
remote sensor systems instead of the ship's onboard radar. This "launch on remote" capability
has since been incorporated as a permanent feature of the Aegis BMD system.
Similarly, there is no basis at all for any speculation that the GMD system would need a
"software change" in order to be sent after a satellite target. All it would need is an interceptor
that actually works.
The problem with perpetuating the "software change" myth is that it allows the US to maintain a
pretense of innocence in denouncing ASAT development by China or any other nation. It must
be understood that US BMD systems, both SM-3 and GMD, are operationally ready, as-
deployed, to engage whatever satellites are within the reach of the interceptors. That's
arguably not a very significant capability for SM-3 Block 1 but for Block 2 and the GMD, it is.
Limits
We add 1 aff
George Lewis 17, Visiting Scholar at the Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies
at Cornell University, 2017, “Ballistic missile defense effectiveness,”
https://aip.scitation.org/doi/pdf/10.1063/1.5009222
A ballistic missile’s trajectory is typically divided into three phases. First, the boost phase,
when the missile is under powered flight using its rocket booster. Second, the midcourse
phase, in which the missile or its warhead coasts on a ballistic trajectory through the
vacuum of outer space (assuming the missile’s range is long enough that it leaves the
atmosphere). Third, the terminal phase, in which the missile or warhead re-enters the
atmosphere and falls towards its target. Each phase presents different opportunities and
problems for ballistic missile defenses. Although the main focus of this chapter is on midcourse
defenses, it is useful as background to first briefly discuss terminal and boost-phase defenses.
More of our cards
We meet under any reasonable standard---BMD has an essential element
based in space
Sean Kay 6, Robson Professor of Politics and Government at Ohio Wesleyan University, 2006,
Global Security in the Twenty-first Century: The Quest for Power and the Search for Peace, p.
184
Space weapons are means of causing harm that are based in space or that have an essential
clement based in space. Such weapons include directed- energy weapons that can propagate
destructive energy at very high speeds, and mass-to-target weapons that deliver a hard device,
such as an explosive, to a target in space or on Earth.62 Space-applicable weapons can also
include metal projectiles called “Hypervelocity Rod Bundles” for hitting ground targets from
space.63 These bundles were often referred to in debates over space weapons as “rods from
God.” Missile defense or antisatellite systems can be based on Earth to be used in space.
There are three basic kinds of space-applicable weapons. The first includes ground, sea, and
air-based missile defense interceptors which use low-Earth orbital space to destroy ballistic
missiles—this kind of system is being simultaneously researched and deployed by the United
States. The second area of space-based weapons is under consideration for future
development and testing including kinetic kill interceptors designed to destroy missiles by
collision and space-based lasers that send high-powered beams at rising missiles to destroy
them. The third development is in the area of antisatellite systems, which could include
missiles launched into space or space-based systems that would enter the same orbit as
deployed satellites to launch or explode some form of conventional explosives.64
Absolutely a space weapon

Steve Lambakis 14, national security and international affairs analyst specializing in space
power and policy studies at the National Institute for Public Policy, October 2014, “The Future of
Homeland Missile Defenses,” http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Future-of-
Homeland-Missile-Defenses.pdf
BMDS = ballistic missile defense system; GBIs = ground-based interceptors
Space operations are vital to the performance of key strategic systems, especially global integrated systems like the
BMDS. The United States simply could not perform the missile defense mission without space, and there is good reason to
believe that if it were to make greater investments in space elements that it could improve the overall effectiveness of the system.
The engagement sequence, or kill chain from detection to engagement, to defend against a possible
attack against this country involves interceptors and sensors, and a command, control, and battle
management network spread across the globe. Our missile defense system today relies on early warning Defense
Support Program and SBIRS High satellites, communications and Global Positioning System satellites, and other space sensor
assets.
From the moment the United States launched warheads through space and assigned military purposes to satellites, space became
a battle arena. Indeed, “weaponization” aptly characterizes many of the activities countries have undertaken in space over the past
half century. With growing financial and political support within the U.S. government over the past two decades (and no international
backlash as a result), the
U nited S tates has already deployed a sensor-propulsion package called the
Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle to counter long-range ballistic missiles. It deploys the EKV on
the GBIs currently on alert at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. EKV, with roots extending
back to the technology development programs of the 1980s, matured within the old Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (Bush-
Quayle) and National Missile Defense (Clinton-Gore) programs, and became operational under the Bush-Cheney Administration.
The EKV is also currently being upgraded (Capability Enhancement II) to be even more effective, and will undergo a
complete redesign in the coming years. The upgraded EKV had its first successful intercept in June 2014. Though never
talked about as such, this is a “space weapon” that spends most of its time on the ground.
When performing the missile defense mission, it launches into space, where it is “based” for
seconds or minutes and operates semi-autonomously to put itself onto a collision path with a hostile
warhead. Similarly, the Standard Missile-3 variants deployed on Aegis BMD ships and planned for
deployment at Aegis Ashore sites (with the first operational site in Romania in 2015) are midcourse interceptors , i.e.,
they are designed to kill their targets in space.
The above decisions to expand the military uses of orbits were not taken for the purpose of “weaponizing” space. This is similar to
characterizing previous decisions to deploy mine sweepers and battleships or U-2s and bombers as decisions to “weaponize” the
sea or air. Policy, strategy, defense requirements, and economics constitute the rationale for deployment of all weapons, whether
they are based on platforms that circle the earth at 300 miles altitude, fly through the air, or ply the vast ocean waters.
National indecision over how to regard the space environment has paralyzed successive administrations over what to do in space.
The U nited S tates has conducted research and development in the space weapon arena for more
than 60 years. As progress in this area continues, U.S. leaders still find it challenging just to talk
about the issue of space weapons in a public forum. This attitude must change, however, as the
consequences of not protecting the American people from (nuclear) ballistic missile attack using the most efficient systems possible
are too great.
Predictability
Brian Weeden 9, technical consultant on space issues at the Secure World Foundation,
4/17/9, “Alternatives to a space weapons treaty,” https://thebulletin.org/2009/04/alternatives-to-
a-space-weapons-treaty/
Today, no accepted definition of a space weapon exists. Case in point: Recently, Space.com
quoted a senior Pentagon official as saying, “There are no space weapons programs being
funded by the U.S. Air Force.” This statement was immediately criticized by many within the
space arms control community as hypocritical and false. They cited the ongoing
development of ground-based missile defense assets as evidence, along with dual-use
space programs such as XSS-11 and MiTex and doctrinal statements of the importance of
“space dominance.”
Iran DA
prolif
Global prolif outweighs because it’s not bipolar
Waltz 81 [Kenneth Waltz, smart person. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better.
1981. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm]
Fourth, while
some worry about nuclear states coming in hostile pairs, others worry that the
bipolar pattern will not be reproduced regionally in a world populated by larger numbers of
nuclear states . The simplicity of relations that obtains when one party has to concentrate its
worry on only one other, and the ease of calculating forces and estimating the dangers they pose, may be lost . The
struc-ture of international politics, however, will remain bipolar so long as no third state is able to compete militarily with the great
powers. Whatever the structure, the relations of states run in various directions. This applied to rela-tions of deterrence as soon as
Britain gained nuclear capabilities. It has not weakened deter-rence at the centre and need not do so region-ally. The Soviet Union
now has to worry lest a move made in Europe cause France and Brit-ain to retaliate, thus possibly setting off Ameri-can forces. She
also has to worry about China's forces. Such worries at once complicate cal-culations and strengthen deterrence.
AT: Allies
We reassure mid east allies when we withdraw – empirics prove
Cebul 18 [Daniel Cebul is an editorial fellow and general assignments writer for Defense
News, C4ISRNET, Fifth Domain and Federal Times. US to remove several missile defense
systems from the Middle East. September 26, 2018.
https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/09/26/us-to-remove-several-missile-defense-systems-
from-the-middle-east/]
WASHINGTON — Next month the U nited S tates will remove several Patriot air and missile defense batteries
from four countries in the Middle East, according to the Wall Street Journal, citing multiple U.S. military officials.
The Defense Department will remove two batteries from Kuwait , and one each from Bahrain and Jordan , as
the U.S. military shifts its focus to adversaries like Russia and China, as well as Iran. The batteries will be taken offline and returned
to the U.S. to be refurbished and upgraded before being relocated. According to an official, there are no plans to replace the
systems.
Despite this realignment , the U.S. military says it is maintaining its commitment to
allies
in the region.
“U.S.Central Command is strongly committed to working with our allies and partners to promote
and provide regional security and stability,” said Capt. Bill Urban, a spokesman for the command. “ U.S. forces
remain postured to conduct operations throughout the region and to respond to any
contingency.”

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1AC

interception capabilities against advanced systems could have an impact

For more than a decade now, one

For the same reasons, an

In short, these plans

Poseidon is an underwater drone weapon, armed with a 2-megaton nuclear or conventional

A single use causes extinction

Advanced US BMD capability causes hypersonic prolif and arms racing –

Russia war causes extinction – regional nuclear wars don’t

According to one model 9 , an

Falling dominoes The evidence

Unlike the Cold War version, the

Nuclear prolif guarantees war

terrorists would have to overcome in order to acquire nuclear weapons.58 Nevertheless , as

Nuclear terrorism causes extinction – 1 detonation is enough

An illustration of a possible deal:

Russia says yes – threat of American modernization, improved defense,

Regional BMD is operationally useless but plays an outsized role in

Russia has directly asked for military–technical guarantees that involve

The Russian government argues that these

The threat alone of striking a high-altitude nuclear launch detection

Poorly disaggregated infrastructure makes the domain unstable – even

That process of integration is key to building a broader rules–based

sustainable cooperation required rules that

“Space weapon” includes midcourse BMD

Unilateral cuts make deals less likely by removing leverage

For their part, the

ACDA strikes down the CP – it’s illegal

A federal statute requires the President to make either treaties or congressional-executive

U nion of C oncerned S cientists doesn’t think the system

What about deterrence? The primary way a missile

Trump causes miscalc, leadership collapse, alliance breakdown, and

Zero chance of impeachment even with damning revelations – Dems have

Flips don’t happen because of tight primaries

Perception is either inevitable or impossible because of McConnel

Trump should be worried . Anything can happen in a trial . All it will

No Iran war or escalation

That alliance is inevitable and the whole DA is wrong

What the neo-Bismarcks need to ask themselves is: Why

On the other hand, what

power is largely asymmetrical. They have

it is becoming more apparent to

Absolutely a space weapon

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