(24518921 - Russian Politics) What Russia Can Teach Us About Power and Influence in World Politics

russian politics 4 (2019) 137-167
brill.com/rupo
What Russia Can Teach Us about Power and

Influence in World Politics
Andrei Melville
National Research University Higher School of Economics
andreymelville@gmail.com
Andrei Akhremenko
aakhremenko@hse.ru
Mikhail Mironyuk
mmironyuk@gmail.com
Abstract
There is a striking opposition within the current discourse on Russia’s position in the
world. On the one hand, there are well-known arguments about Russia’s “weak hand”
(relatively small and stagnating economy, vulnerability to sanctions, technological
backwardness, deteriorating demography, corruption, bad institutions, etc.). On the
other hand, Russia is accused of “global revisionism”, attempts to reshape and under-
mine the liberal world order, and Western democracy itself. There seems to be a para-
dox: Russia with a perceived decline of major resources of national power, exercises
dramatically increased international influence. This paradox of power and/or influ-
ence is further explored. This paper introduces a new complex Index of national pow-
er. On the basis of ratings of countries authors compare the dynamics of distribution
of power in the world with a focus on Russia’s national power in world politics since
1995. The analysis brings evidence that the cumulative resources of Russia’s power in
international affairs did not increase during the last two decades. However, Russia’s
influence in world politics has significantly increased as demonstrated by assertive
foreign policy in different parts of the world and its perception by the international
political community and the public. Russia remains a major power in today’s world, al-
though some of its power resources are stagnating or decreasing in comparison to the
US and rising China. To compensate for weaknesses Russia is using both traditional
and nontraditional capabilities of international influence.
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/2451-8921-00402001

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via University of Oxford
138 Melville, Akhremenko and Mironyuk
Keywords
Russia – world politics – power – influence – soft power – resources – great powers –
index – rating
1 Introduction
Current discourse on Russia’s role in the world during the last decade pres-
ents us with a striking opposition of alternative views – on the one hand, wide-
spread arguments about Russia’s “weak hand” (weak economy, technological
backwardness, deteriorating demography, corruption, bad institutions, etc.)
and decline of national power as compared to the Soviet days; on the other –
warnings and fears about its global “revisionism”, attempts to reshape and un-
dermine the liberal world order and Western democracy itself.1 How come: a
declining power “on the way to global irrelevance”,2 with an economy and mili-
tary spending more than ten times smaller than the US needs to be contained
in the emerging “Cold War 2.0”?
Western pundits, policy-makers and the media sound alarms pointing at
Russia’s radically increased influence in the international arena, its assertive
and aggressive policies in world affairs (Crimea, Donbass, Syria, Venezuela,
etc.). Public opinion in the West demonstrates similar perceptions and trends:
according to Pew Research Center in October 2018, 65% of respondents in
Israel and in Greece, 52% in the US, 51% in France and 48% in UK (42% as the
25-country median) agree that “Russia plays a more important role in the world
compared to 10 years ago.”3 US News and World Report presents the following
rating of the “most influential countries”: US-1, Russia-2, China-3, Germany-4,
1 National Research University Higher School of Economics. This research is supported by

the Russian Science Foundation under grant no.17-18-01651, National Research University
Higher School of Economics. For valuable critical suggestions we are grateful to Thomas
Volgy, William Thompson, Graeme Gill, Lucan Way, Andrej Krikovich, Mikhail Ilyin, Fuad
Aleskerov, Yuri Polunin, Ilya Lokshin, Ilya Gorelski, Kirill Toloknev, Artem Maltsev, Evgeny
Nikolaev and other colleagues.
2 Niall, Ferguson, “In Decline, Putin’s Russia is on its Way to Global Irrelevance”, Newsweek,
2011. https://www.newsweek.com/decline-putins-russia-its-way-global-irrelevance-65847
(Accessed, April 14, 2019.
3 Pew Research Center, “Trump’s International Ratings Remain Low, Especially Among Key Al-
lies”, October 2018: 40. https://www.pewglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/10/Pew
-Research-Center_U-S-Image-Report_UPDATED_2018-10-01.pdf (Accessed 14 April, 2019).
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What Russia Can Teach Us about Power 139
UK-5.4 Recognition of growing influence does not mean approval – negative

views of Russia prevail: 79% in Sweden, 69% in Poland, 67% in UK, 64% in the
US, 60% in Canada.5
In Russia, as well, the dominant political rhetoric proclaims that the nation
is “getting up from its knees” after the humiliating “times of trouble” in the
1990s. And of course allegations about aggressive international behavior up to
meddling in domestic affairs of the US and other Western countries are re-
futed and Russian national interests are reasserted.
There seems to be a paradox: a nation with a perceived decline of major
resources of national power, exercises dramatically increased international in-
fluence. This paradox of power and/or influence is of significant political and
theoretical importance and deserves serious attention. The structure of this
paper is as follows. After the introduction, in the first section we discuss some
theoretical and methodological problems of conceptualization and measure-
ment (quantitative and qualitative) of power and influence in international
relations. In the second section we examine existing analytical approaches
and various indices of national power and argue in favor of the development
of a new complex index. We discuss its composition, components, available
empirical databases, modes of aggregation, etc. The third section provides our
preliminary empirical findings and comparative analysis of the dynamics of
distribution of power among the leading nations of the world with a special
focus on Russia’s national power in world politics since 1995, with a few ref-
erences to an earlier period. In the conclusion, on the basis of our empirical
finding, we return to the discussion of the “Russian paradox” and directions of
further research.
2 Problems of Conceptualization and Measurement
2.1 Theory
Conceptualization of power and influence is not a self-evident enterprise. There
are quite a few problems and research dilemmas hidden in the complexity of
4 US News and World Report Best Countries 2019: Global Rankings, International News and
Data Insights. Accessed 14 April 2019: https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/
power-rankings.
5 Pew Research Center, “Image of Putin, Russia Suffers Internationally”, December 2018: 4.
https://www.pewglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/12/Pew-Research-Center
_Views-of-Russia-Report_2018-12-6.pdf (Accessed 14 April, 2019).
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the object itself and observer’s point of view.6 Do power and influence cor-
relate? How to differentiate between power and influence? What is the rela-
tionship between resources of power and its effects? What are the sources of
influence and (or) power? Can influence be exercised without (with missing
or inadequate) resources of power? How do we know what is “adequate”?
How durable can influence be with “inadequate” resources of power? To what
extent can leadership, strategies, political will, national consensus, national
unity, other nonmaterial phenomena compensate for inadequate material re-
sources of power? What are the domestic sources of international power and
influence? What is the relationship between power and state capacity? How
does power relate to status? To what extent does power involve the setting of
international norms and regimes? Indeed, there is a multitude of questions
related to conceptualization of power in social sciences in general, and politi-
cal science and international studies in particular. We will touch upon some
of them, with no ambition to engage in theoretical debates on power in social
sciences and IR for their own sake, as we have Russia on our minds.
Social sciences (following Max Weber and Robert Dahl) often treat power as
the ability of A over B to make B do something it would not do otherwise. How-
ever, this is a crucially important but only one dimension of power as a mul-
tifaceted phenomenon. Important conceptual underpinning of our research
design has to do with the differentiated approach to various dimensions and
manifestations of power. In the political science literature there are a number
of approaches focusing on various conceptualizations of power sometimes re-
ferred to as “faces of power”– from the famous notion of “A has power over B”7
to a variety of understandings of power, as the ability not only to influence
behavior but to achieve goals, to formulate political agendas, to shape prefer-
ences, etc. without outright coercion.
The neorealist tradition in IR stipulates that national power derives pri-
marily from material capacities and resources.8 The neoliberal approach
adds to the material resources of power, the potential of influence through
6 As Pierson notes, “Power is like an iceberg; at any moment in time most of it lies below the
waterline, built into core institutional and organizational structure of societies”, Paul P
ierson,
“Power and Path Dependence”, in Mahoney, James and Kathleen Thelen (Eds.), Advances in
Comparative-Historical Analysis. (New York: Cambridge University Press):124.
7 Steven Lukes, Steven, Power: A Radical View (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1974).
8 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1959).
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international institutions and factors of “soft/smart” power.9 Constructivists

tend to treat power in terms of communication and discourse.10
Classical realist and neorealist evaluations of the elements of national
power, since Morgenthau, include geography (territory), population, national
resources, industrial capacity, military capacity, quality of government and di-
plomacy, as well as national character and the national morale.11 In various
forms this approach is widely used today. According to Robert Art, power as-
sets of a state “include population – the size, educational level, and skills of
its citizenry; geography – the size, location, and natural resource endowment
of the state; governance – the effectiveness of its political system; values – the
norms a state lives by and stands for, the nature of its ideology, and the extent
of its appeal to foreigners; wealth – the level, sources, and nature of its produc-
tive economy; leadership – the political skill of its leaders and the number of
skillful leaders it has; and military power – the nature, size, and composition
of its military forces”.12
In our understanding of major components of national power, we follow
both neorealist and neoliberal traditions.13 According to the first paradigm we
consider states pursuing their interests through power politics in the basic sit-
uation of international anarchy and inequality. At the same time, while legally,
equal states constitute major units of the international order, non-governmental
actors do play their role as well. Besides, states as major players are not alike –
they differ in most respects and belong to different “families”; they are not
uniform “billiard balls” and their international behavior in many important
respects depends on specific domestic factors and features. States as basic
units of the international order exhibit fundamental variations, not only in
their potentials of power and influence and international behavior, but also in
their internal conditions, interests and capacities, strategies and opportunities.
9 Joseph, Nye Jr., The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).
10 Stefano Guzzini, Power, Realism and Constructivism (London and New York: Routledge,
2013).
11 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1948).
12 Robert J. Art, “The Fungibility of Force”, in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, International
Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues (Pearson Education: New York 2005):
2015–16.
13 On theoretical and methodological binding of the neorealist and neoliberal (institution-
al) approaches see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the
World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984): x–xiii.

In the nutshell, the structure of the world order is heterogeneous; it includes

different types and layers of state-units and their interactions.
Our background theory develops some of the basic suppositions of our pre-
vious research project, “Political Atlas of the Modern World”, and rests on sev-
eral assumptions.14 We adopt a multivariate approach to states’ power in world
politics – and in a variety of respects. First, states’ power may relate and appear
in different spheres/dimensions – economic, military, technological, cultural,
etc. Hence, research may concentrate on separate types of power – economic,
military, institutional, “soft”, etc. These types of power may merge and accumu-
late in a composite phenomenon which usually is regarded as an aggregated
national power but in specific cases need to be treated separately. Second,
each type and dimension of power, due to its general evolutionary nature, is
not static but also evolves in a complex process of accumulation of inherit-
able features and traditional components, and also the new ones. Thus, each
dimension of power, as well as aggregated national power itself, represents a
multilayered structure of evolving components. In the course of evolution of
states and their power potentials, “older” components are being transformed
without disappearing altogether, and the “newer” ones may acquire promi-
nence. For example, theoretically speaking, territory and population, while
remaining important resources of national power, may gradually give way to
such new power components as technological innovations, R&D, etc. However,
this remains to be proved empirically.
The abovementioned “faces of power” general approach may provide use-
ful international relations interpretations. David Baldwin, for example, distin-
guishes several types of power in world politics: (a) attempts to influence the
actual foreign policies of the counterpart; (b) external pressures on a particu-
lar foreign policy agenda; (c) non-coercive (“soft”) impact on other countries’
foreign policy preferences.15 In the current IR discourse there are attempts to
distinguish (a) “hard”; (b) “soft”; (c) “smart” and (d) “sharp” power.16 We are
building on such a multidimensional understanding of power and influence,
14 Andrei Melville with Yuri Polunin, Mikhail Ilyin, Mikhail Mironyuk, Elena Meleshkina,
and Yan Vaslavsky, Political Atlas of the Modern World. An Experiment in Multidimensional
Statistical Analysis of the Political Systems of Modern States (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell,
2010).
15 David Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, in: Walter Carlsnaes, Tomas Risse
and Beth A. Simmons (Eds.), Handbook of International Relations (Los Angeles: sage,
2013).
16 Christopher Walker, “What is Sharp Power?”, Journal of Democracy 29, no. 3 (2018): 9–23.
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and in this paper, attempt to apply it to Russia’s current standing in the world
politics.
Military power is one of the major “hard” factors which determine foreign
policy and a country’s role in the world: “Military power remains important
because it structures world politics.”17 Military force is also widely considered
as the most “fungible” component of national power.18 Economic potential is
another “hard” component of a nation’s ability to pursue its interests and goals
in international affairs, which, along with the military capabilities, is present in
almost all assessments of national power. The Institutional component, strictly
speaking, does not belong to the realm of “hard” power. A state’s power depends
not only on its material resources and capabilities but also on its position and
role in major international institutions (like UN, World Bank, imf, etc.). Differ-
ent states, depending on their status, administrative resources, historical lega-
cies, etc., have different capacities in global and regional i nstitutions – and this
constitutes an important ingredient of national power in world politics. Yet
another – “soft” – component of power (“power of attraction’) was introduced
in the pioneering works of Nye.19 Since then the “soft” power approach has
become very popular in political analysis and academic literature, and pro-
duced various examples of empirical research. Finally, one needs to mention
the most traditional components of national power – “raw” resources, like ter-
ritory, population and natural resources, which, as we have seen above, are
included in many typologies of the components of national power.
Conceptualization of national power presents us with important dilemmas.
The existing literature not infrequently treats power and influence almost as
synonyms.20 Of course, theoretically speaking and in specific situations, on the
one hand, influence may not necessarily result from actual power, while on
the other – power may exist without the act of influence. Another approach in
the literature treats power and influence as distinct phenomena: “Power is the
capacity of actors (persons, groups or institutions) to fix or to change (com-
pletely or partly) a set of action alternatives or choice alternatives for other
17 Joseph, Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic
Books, 1990.
18 Robert Art, “The Fungibility of Force”, in, Robert J. Art, and Robert Jervis, International
Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues (Pearson Education: New York 2005).
19 Joseph, Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic
Books, 1990); Joseph, Nye, “Is Military Power Becoming Obsolete?”, https://www.project
-syndicate.org/commentary/is-military-power-becoming-obsolete.
20 As Duncan, Jancar-Webster and Swilky stress, “Power is first and foremost an act of influ-
ence”. W. Raymond Duncan, Barbara Jancar-Webster and Bob Switky, World Politics in the
21st Century (Pearson, 2002: 109).

actors. Influence is the capacity of actors to determine (partly) the actions or

choice of other actors within a set of action or choice alternatives available to
those actors.”21
Some authors treat the relationship between influence and power in terms
of a means and an end.22 In any case, influence in different forms is understood
as the most vivid manifestation of power. In fact, all the three of the above-
mentioned “faces of power” – compliance, agenda-setting and d eception –
imply this or that exercise of specific influence. However, in particular research
cases we may want to explore power and influence as separate dependent and
independent variables.
Power as resources and/or effects is another issue waiting for adequate con-
ceptualization and to a large extent depending on the angle of observation
and the research question. The basic problem here is that resources do not
necessarily and directly translate into actual deeds and actions. Sometimes,
nonetheless, resources which are not used, may produce influence of a specific
(nonmaterial) type.
Another general observation may be appropriate in this context: while deal-
ing with the problem of resources and effects we need to also take into ac-
count, the actor/structure dimension – in particular, the fact that strategies of
actors involved in power relationships may produce effects well beyond exist-
ing resources and capabilities. This important aspect of the problem should be
taken into account, particularly when a state/regime successfully uses political
will, mobilization and propaganda to increase its international status and to
compensate for its lack of adequate material resources of power and influence.
Conceptually, power may be understood and interpreted in two ways – as
an attribute and/or a relationship. From the perspective of an attribute, power
definitely belongs to its holder and this sense research may focus on its various
components (economic, military, technological, diplomatic, political, cultural,
etc.). In different combinations these components may be intrinsic to differ-
ent states at different evolutionary phases. In this respect we can also observe
and explore some basic correlations between state power and state capacity,23
which is an important and promising area of comparative research.
21 Robert Mokken and Frans Stokman, “Power and Influence as Political Phenomenon”, in
Brian, Brian (Ed.). Power and Political Theory: Some European Perspectives (London: Wiley,
1976).
22 See, Kalevi J. Holsti, “The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations”, Back-
ground 7, no. 4 (1964); 179–194; Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (Cam-
bridge, New York, N.Y., usa: Cambridge University Press 1996).
23 In a variety of research cases components of state power and state capacity seem to be
almost identical. See Sumit Ganguly and William R. Thompson, Ascending India and
Its State Capacity: Extraction, Violence, and Legitimacy (New Haven and London: Yale
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At the same time from another perspective, power should be understood as

a relationship of specific types between different states and groups of states in
the world arena.24 Besides, influence by definition is a relationship of a special
kind, and this leads us back to the basic understanding of power as the abil-
ity to affect the behavior (and also – motivations, perceptions, etc.) of various
counterparts in international relations. This conceptual approach to power as
a specific relationship underlines the institutional perspective, i.e. the role of
particular states within existing global and regional international institutions.
This involves a variety of aspects and factors – from formal membership to
actual voting power (for example, in the imf).25
This relational aspect is of significant importance when discussing inter-
national influence. Indeed, speaking of influence we are talking about a rela-
tionship, which may go both ways. One country may exercise influence over
another – depending both on its resources, capabilities, including political
will and strategy, domestic and international support, etc. But on the other
hand, the effects of influence would depend on the political ability and do-
mestic resources of a country under external influence to respond to incoming
impacts.
Within the multilateral and multifaceted relationship of influence one
needs, as well, to take into account the factor of uncertainty and unpredict-
ability. International actors involved in the influence relationship may dem-
onstrate their creativity and agility, which could eventually change the effects
of this relationship not entirely depending on the available material resources
of power.26
Another important dimension of power and influence within the existing
and changing world order has to do with international norms and regimes.
Authority, legitimacy and reputation form some basic requirements for inter-
national power and influence in the modern world and involve a normative
niversity Press, 2017); Antonia Savoia and Kunal Sen, “Measurement, Evolution, Deter-
U
minants, and Consequences of State Capacity: A Review of Recent Research”, Journal of
Economic Surveys 29, no, 3 (2015), 441–458.
24 David Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, in Walter Carlsnaes, Tomas Risse and
Beth A. Simmons (Eds.), Handbook of International Relations (Los Angeles: sage, 2013).
25 It is important to mention that the actual parameters of states’ voting power in major
international organizations does not necessarily reflect their economic and other re-
sources – in many cases, it is a result of political decisions of major stakeholders in these
organizations.
26 Peter J. Katzenstein and Lucia A. Seybert (Eds.), Protean Power. Exploring the Uncertain
and Unexpected in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

dimension.27 In the global setting “Great (Major) Powers” are those who de-
cide on the normative parameters of the world order and punish the violators.
“Regional Powers”, in turn, are the major stakeholders within regional interna-
tional institutions and organizations – not without guidance of global players.
One of the crucial features of power and influence of a state or a group of
states is norms-setting, the ability to formulate and enforce a particular system
of international norms and sustaining international regimes. This necessarily
brings to the fore the issue of violation and/or change of exiting international
norms. Conditionally, “violators” may be different – some may disregard exist-
ing norms and rules but at the same time expect to continue to misbehave
within the existing general framework. However, other “violators” may have
very different motivations and goals – they may be planning strategically to
change the existing world order, at least it’s some important features.
The historical and evolutionist paradigm, is another important theoretical
framework of our approach to power and influence in general, and Russian –
in particular. It translates into our understanding of states, their features and
capacities as beings of historical nature. Thus, states’ power and influence are
subject to complex transformations and evolution, including the inheritance
and the layup of traditional attributes as well as acquisition of new compo-
nents. To understand and gauge the actual state of power and influence one
needs to adopt a historical perspective, to conceive them as products of evo-
lution. States and state systems evolve as well as their power and influence,
assimilating and transforming earlier acquisitions and appropriating the new
ones.
Finally, both global and regional perspectives are crucially important for our
comparative research of new and traditional components of power and influ-
ence. Problems under consideration should be necessarily treated within the
dominant global framework, however, power and influence acquire extremely
important and relatively independent (especially after the end of the Cold
war) regional dimensions. Patterns of power and influence within the world’s
regions may reflect basic global trends and correlations but at the same time
in quite a few cases they have their own features, logic and causality. Regional
power architecture may be the projection of major powers’ interests and influ-
ence (China in Eastern Asia and South-Eastern Asia; US in Europe, Middle East
and Latin America; Russia in the “near abroad” and in the Middle East, etc.)
and at the same time may reflect specific power and influence configurations
which transcend global trends and regularities.
27 Robert Axelrod, “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms”, American Political Science Review
80, no. 4 (1986): 1095–1111.
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The conjoining of global and regional perspectives is an important theoreti-

cal and methodological requisite for better understanding of the distribution
of power and influence in the modern world. In the first place, this distribu-
tion has always been and remains today highly unequal. Indeed, states are not
alike – they differ fundamentally in available resources, capabilities, ambi-
tions and influence. In fact, very few states in the past and in the present were
able and willing to change and mold the whole course of world politics. The
narrow “privileged club” of great power and influence is characterized by ele-
ments of change and continuity, but it’s members were and remain, in major
respects antithetical to all other states without these extraordinary capacities
and willingness to rewrite history and change the world map. “Great powers”
are fundamentally different from all other states – in their ability to project
military capabilities, in their interests, in their behavior and in the way they
are perceived by others.
The global/regional perspective may provide the basis for a tentative typol-
ogy of modern states regarding their power and influence. Very few “Great”
(“Major”) Powers have global interests and global reach. Regional Powers are
crucially important players within particular regions, they exercise substan-
tial impact on the overall regional architecture and distribution of power and
influence at the regional level. Other Powers in the Regions are largely “sub-
jects” without independent roles and impact. Since the end of the Cold war
and the waning of the superpower axis regional power politics acquire even
more prominence.
The abovementioned background theoretical assumptions – the realist/
neorealist framework, differentiation of types and dimensions of states’ power
in world politics, institutional approach, historical/evolutionist paradigm and
global/regional focus – present a necessary general conceptual foundation for
the empirical study of traditional and new components of states’ power and
influence within the changing world order. However, we need to mention also
several important problems of operationalization and measurement.
2.2 Operationalization and Measurement

Conceptualization is basically undertaken prior to measurement as it sets most
important general parameters for observation and evaluation of the phenom-
ena under research.28 One should take into account that any measurement
28 According to Baldwin, “Before one can measure power, one must first have a concept of
power”, see David Baldwin, Power and International Relations, in: Walter Carlsnaes, T
omas
Risse and Beth A. Simmons (Eds.). Handbook of International Relations, (Los Angeles:
sage, 2013): 279.

is, strictly speaking, conditional simplification of the complex reality and

rests on a specific set of assumptions. Accordingly, there is always a huge in-
built potential of possible distortions and mistakes in operationalization and
measurement.
There are quite a few problems of operationalization and measurement
of power and influence which need to be addressed at the start of empirical
research. How to connect methodologically conceptualization and measure-
ment? What are the proper criteria for the choice of adequate empirical in-
dicators? What do we do about latent and observable variables? How should
we approach the fundamental problem of the missing data? How should we
aggregate available variables and construct composite indices? We shall briefly
discuss some of these issues.
Indeed, measurement results from conceptualization – but there still re-
main many questions about the selection of indicators relative to chosen con-
ceptualization. In certain cases expert assessments are used as their basis. For
example, this is the approach of a well-known US intelligence and forecast-
ing company “Stratfor Forecasting Inc.”29 There are some other questionable
experiments of developing expert ratings of states’ national power using quali-
tative evaluations of quantitative data.30 However, despite the risks of subjec-
tivity expert evaluations and even public opinion data may be useful.
Quantitative indicators may seem to be more reliable, but they in turn in-
volve another set of methodological problems and problems of interpreta-
tion. For example, in planning a research design, one needs to decide what the
chosen indicators determine – causes/factors or results/effects (or both). This
situation may be complicated by a high degree of mutual correlation between
chosen indictors, and this creates additional measurement problems.
Practically any effort to work with quantitative indicators of power and in-
fluence encounters another set of serious measurement difficulties related to
missing data. Most of the existing data bases and available statistical sources
which can be used for the creation of new data bases have at least some – and
sometimes very important for the particular research design – country/year
omissions. Existing technologies of data imputation do not always produce ac-
ceptable results, so the available alternative is expert judgment which involves
other limitations. This problem is of particular importance when dealing with
29 https://www.stratfor.com/.
30 See, for example, Mohammad Reza Hafeznia, Seyed Hadi Zarghani, Zahra Ahmadipor
and Abdelreza Rokhoddin Eftekhart, “Presentation of a New Model to Measure National
Power of the Countries”, Journal of Applied Sciences 8, no. 2 (2008): 230–240.
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global samples (for example, of all 194 countries of today’s world) and extend-
ed time series.
In many, if not in most of the cases, indicators which derive from a particular
conceptualization of power and influence may not be empirically available –
so the available option is to choose among possible proxy variables. The choice
of these proxies, however, needs to be based on solid conceptual arguments
and understanding of inevitable limitations.
Finally, dealing with problems of measurement we need also to take into
account serious difficulties in choosing the methods of aggregating various
indicators, within a composite index. There are various approaches based on
different methods of aggregation – from factor analysis and principal compo-
nents method to discriminant analysis and Bayesian analysis. Obviously, there
is no ideal method of such aggregation but it is important to realize the oppor-
tunities and limitations of any chosen one.
Measuring influence, apart from measuring power, is an independent and
very non-trivial problem. Influence is associated with the actual, de facto im-
pact of a country upon processes in the international arena, in contrast to the
potential of power, which is largely determined by the resources available to
the state. What could be the empirical indicators of influence? Vetoes imposed
and resolutions passed within the international decision making process?
Presence on the world media agenda? Corrections made by a state to its coun-
terparty’s policy? Unfortunately, this problem is payed almost no attention in
the existing literature. Some exceptions are the attempts to use network meth-
odologies for analyzing international relations, when special quantitative indi-
cators – like the centrality of a country’s position in interaction networks (for
example, centrality), serve as indicators of influence.31 However, this kind of
research is still rare, and the results seem to be mixed.
3 Towards a New Index of National Power
3.1 Existing Approaches

In the existing academic literature and applied political analysis there are
various attempts to measure and compare national power of the states of the
world. Strictly speaking, the majority of existing approaches try to measure,
31 P. Baxter, J. Jordan, J., and L. Rubin, “How Small States Acquire Status: a Social Network
Analysis”, International Area Studies Review 21, no. 3 (2012): 191–213; R. Corbetta and K.A.
Grant, “Intervention in Conflicts from a Network Perspective”, Conflict Management and
Peace Science 29, no. 3, (2012): 314–340.

not the actual international influence of particular states, but rather the po-
tential of national power in world politics, the cumulative resources (primarily
material) available to them. Two caveats are appropriate here: first, the nonma-
terial resources of national power are extremely difficult to gauge and measure
quantitatively. This, for example, refers to the phenomenon of “soft” power,32
but even more so – to political will, national character, strategy, etc. Second,
available material resources constitute only the potential of national power
which can be employed and used in different ways – or may not be realized at
all for different reasons.
In some cases single variable indices are proposed but rarely tested. Among
the suggested proxies for national power one can mention, for example, mili-
tary expenditures33 or gdp.34 George Modelski and William Thompson con-
sider the size of naval force as a proxy to gauge and compare the powers of the
states.35 However, due to serious methodological doubts about the validity of a
single variable option as a reliable proxy, approaches, existing in the academic
literature and political analysis, rely much more on experiments with different
composite indices.
Among them one needs to be mentioned in the first place – a famous model
of the Index of National Power by Ray Cline: Pp = (C + E + M) (S + W).36 In
this model Pp is perceived national power; C is critical mass (population and
territory); E – economic capacity (income, energy, nonfuel minerals, manu-
facturing, food and trade); M – military capacity (strategic balance, combat
capabilities plus a bonus for effort); S – national strategy coefficient, and W –
national will. Major problems, however, in this and similar cases, have to do
with the conceptualization of power components, choice of variables and
their weights (especially hardly quantifiable – like strategy and will) and their
aggregation.
32 However, there are noteworthy attempts to create composite indices of “soft” power using
a variety of primarily quantitative indicators – see, for example, the ongoing project “The
Soft Power 30” (https://softpower30.com/).
33 Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
1968).
34 Charles Hitch, and Roland McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).
35 George Modelski and William Thompson, Seapower in Global Politics, 1494–1993 (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 1988).
36 Ray Cline, World Power Assessment 1977: A Calculus of Strategic Drift (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1977).
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Even before Cline’s model a similar attempt was explored by F. Clifford

erman with his index of world power:37 P = N (L + P + I + M), where P is
G
power; L – territory; P – workforce; I – resources; M – military personnel; and
N – nuclear capability (if any). Again, the problem of the variable’s weights is
treated arbitrarily (relying basically on intuition) – which the author of the
index confirmed himself.
Another well-known effort is the Composite Index of National Capabili-
ties developed within the Correlates of War project, which includes various
military, some economic and demographic indicators: military expenditures,
military personnel, iron and steel production, primary energy consumption,
total population and urban population.38 In spite of the fact that this index
is still used in comparative research, one may question the composition of its
variables.
Weights of the chosen variables remain a serious problem, indeed. For ex-
ample, the National Power index39 absolutely arbitrarily assigns 25% of value
to economic capabilities; 25% – to military potential; 15% – to population;
15% – to technological capacity; 10% – to energy security; and 10% – to foreign
policy resources. Another example of dubious measurement is presented by
the experiment with World Power Index.40
Existing indices of national power in world politics represent different aca-
demically and practically important efforts, different methodologies and dif-
ferent results.41 However, one is bound to admit at least several flaws of these
experiments. First, in some cases attempts to quantify national power end up
in general formulas without sufficient empirical verification. Second, when it
finally comes to empirics, one can often observe some combinations of statis-
tical data and expert assessments, with the inevitable subjectivity of the lat-
ter and not always a reasonable and grounded proportion of statistical and
expert information. Third, in purely quantitative research, the weights of the
components in the final indices are assigned either arbitrarily or do not e xist
37 Clifford F. German, “A Tentative Evaluation of World Power”, Journal of Conflict Resolution

4, no. 1 (1960): 138–144.
38 Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer and John Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty,
and Major Power War, 1820–1965”, in Bruce Russet (ed.), Peace, War, and Numbers (Beverly
Hills: Sage Publications, 1972).
39 http://www.nationalpower.info/.
40 https://www.academia.edu/28266556/World_Power_Index.
41 Possibly promising new methodological approach may be the resort to the use of network
analysis in developing alternative and complimentary national power’ indices. See, for
example, Hyung Min Kim, “Comparing Measures of National Power”, International Politi-
cal Science Review 31, no. 4 (2010): 405–427.

at all (presuming in fact that all the power determinants are equal in their sig-
nificance, which does not seem to be a reliable assumption). Fourth, we are
not aware of convincing attempts to create an index suitable for analyzing the
dynamics of the countries’ national power over time.
3.2 Data and Methods

The abovementioned problematic aspects of existing comparative research
on states’ power in international affairs motivate us to undertake an effort to
develop a new analytical instrument and to suggest and empirically test a new
Index of National Power. On the basis of our theoretical assumptions, discussed
above, we distinguish five major components: (1) military power; (2) economic
power; (3) institutional power; (4) “soft” power and (5) “raw” resources. To repeat:
all these components represent not the actual international influence but only
the potential of national power which may be practically implemented in dif-
ferent forms and ways.
Each component consists of several proxy variables which have been cho-
sen with taking into account existing limitations of available empirical data.
Almost all variables are rescaled into “world shares” (% of world total). This
reflects the underlying assumption that the overall “amount” of power in the
world remains constant in time (100%), and we focus upon the proportions
of this “unity” controlled by each country,42 along with the changes in these
proportions over time (see Table 1).
At this stage, we limit our data collection to three points in time: 1995, 2005
and 2015. For the great majority of variables characterized above we got values
for 193 countries in 1995 and 194 countries in both 2005 and 2015. One excep-
tion is R&D: even special efforts to fill in the missing data gaps did not give us
more than 169 countries in 1995, 179 countries in 2005 and 180 in 2015. Another
exception is the Universities variable: it is physically impossible to get any in-
formation for 1995 since no worldwide ratings existed at that time.
To construct the cumulative index of national power we use the method of
factor analysis; it is also our basic technique to investigate the data structure.
More precisely, we apply principal component analysis (pca), a dimension-
reduction statistical tool widely used to identify underlying hidden patterns
in multivariate data.43 The basic premise of pca is that a compact number
42 The only exception from this rule is nuclear weapons’ possession. We consider it a very
special military resource, which gives a new quality to the military might of a nation. We
discuss a special scale applied for measuring this variable in detail below.
43 See, Edward J. Jackson, A User’s Guide to Principal Components (New York: Wiley, 1991); I.T.
Jolliffe, Principal Component Analysis (New York: Springer, 2002).
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Table 1 Components and variables
Components Variables Sources
Military power Military expenditures sipri, cia World

(Mil_exp) Factbook, Global
Firepower, iiss Military
Balance
Military personnel (Army) iiss Military Balance,
cia World Factbook
Nuclear weapons and iiss Military Balance,
advanced means of delivery Bulletin of Atomic
(Nuclear) Scientists, media
information
Advanced military aircraft (Avia) iiss Military Balance
Economic power gdp (gdp) World Bank, imf
Trade exports (Export) World Bank, cia World
Factbook
R&D (R&D) World Bank, oecd Data
Institutional power Years of membership in UN official website
unsc (unsc)
Voting power in imf (imf) imf official website
“Soft” power National universities in top 500 Academic Ranking of
of the Shanghai rating (University) World Universities
Nobel prize winners (Nobel) Nobel Prize official
website
Patents of non-residents (Patents) World Intellectual
Property Organization
“Raw” resources Territory (Territory) World Bank
Population (Population) World Bank
Oil/gas reserves (OilGas) US Energy Information
Administration
of uncorrelated vectors can explain most of the variation present in a data-

set. These vectors (eigenvectors of a correlation matrix in our case) are called
principal components (PCs). Principal components are ranked based on their
“explanatory power” (eigenvalue) – the portion of the overall variance cap-
tured by the corresponding PC. PC 1 makes the largest contribution to the total

variance, PC n – the smallest one (n stands for the number of variables in the
original dataset). This gives us an opportunity to reduce the dimensionality of
the initial data by dropping out the last few PCs, not containing much infor-
mation on its variation. The interpretation of PCs left in the model is possible
via factor loadings – correlations between obtained principal components and
the original variables.
In line with the widely accepted approaches, we use Varimax factor rotation –
a technique that simplifies the interpretation of the underlying component
structure. Simply put, after a rotation each original variable tends to be associ-
ated with one (or a small number) of PCs, and each PC represents only a small
number of variables. In other words, Varimax maximizes the variance of factor
loadings and minimizes the number of variables with high factor loadings.
Following Gupta44 (2008), we use eigenvalues (i.e. explanatory power indi-
cators) to measure the weight of each PC in the final Index. The formula for
Index construction is shown below:
Index = w1PC1 + w2PC2 + …+ wmPCm,
where m is the number of principal components sufficient (in aggregate) to

save 90% of initial data variance, wi denotes corresponding eigenvalues. The
m
sum of eigenvalues is normalized to unity: ∑  i=1   wi  = 1.
Since PC values (and, therefore, Index values) are standard normal distribu-
tion points (z-scores), it is worth transforming them into a more comprehen-
sible format. We do it via the following linear scaling procedure:
Index ils  = (Index i − Index min) ⁄ (Index max − Index min) × 10
Thus, all the final estimates of a country’s power and influence, which we use
in this article, take values in the interval [0, 10].
In order to achieve compatibility of the Index values over time, pca was
performed on the entire data set (1995, 2005, and 2015). E.g., Russia-1995,
Russia-2005 and Russia-2015 are different observations in the same dataset.
We apply two alternative strategies to check the validity of the final esti-
mations. The first one is based on the use of training samples, generated by
experts in international relations. Training samples include two groups of
countries: on the one hand, those that are consistently perceived by experts as
having substantial power on a global scene, on the other – countries that are
44 E. Gupta, “Oil Vulnerability Index of Oil-importing Countries”, Energy Policy 36, no 3

(2008): 1195–1211.
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conventionally regarded as not influential in world politics. To keep the groups

at least relatively homogenous, we excluded clearly atypical cases from the
samples; for this reason, the usa was not included in the “leaders” group, and
the microstates of Europe or Oceania were not included in the “outsiders” one.
Then we performed binomial logistic regression with sample values as a de-
pendent variable and our Index values as an independent one. This was done
in order to understand, to what extent the proposed Index is able to predict
a country’s group membership; in other words, to estimate its classification
power. The results appeared to be quite satisfactory: 100% of correctly classi-
fied countries in 2005 and 2015, 95% in 1995.
The second strategy was to compare the Index with the evaluations derived
from the same data using a fundamentally different approach – aggregation.
To obtain the lists of countries, ranked by their power potential, we applied
a number of different aggregation methods: Copeland’s, Borda’s (direct and
inverse), Hare’s, Black’s, and Nanson’s.45 Then, the rank correlation coefficients
(Spearman) between the Index values and the aggregation grades46 were eval-
uated. In no case, the coefficient was below 0.92; in the best case – Copeland’s
aggregation rule47 stood above 0.96 with p-value < 0.001.
Thus, the validity of the Index proposed in this study is supported by its very
good accordance with both the expert estimates and the results of aggregation.
3.3 Empirical Results

A model with satisfactory explanatory power – 91% of initial variance, derived
by pca from the dataset, includes four principal components (Table 2). From
this table (rotated solution) we immediately get the weights of PCs to calculate
Index values:
w i = var i⁄ 100 × 1 ⁄ ∑var i ,
45 For details, see Robert Axelrod, “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms”, American Political
Science Review, vol. 80, no. 4, 1986, 1095–1111; F, T. Aleskerov F.T., D. Bouyssou and B. Mon-
jardet, Utility Maximization, Choice and Preference (Berlin; New York: Springer, 2007).
46 One question that might arise here is why not to use aggregation as a major estimation
technique. The answer is that all aggregation rules give us rankings (grades), which sig-
nificantly reduces the information available for further analysis. In particular, it makes
the evaluation of countries’ power dynamics very problematic.
47 Formally speaking, Copeland’s rule is a function u(x), which is equal to the difference of
cardinalities of lower and upper contour sets of alternatives x in a majority relation μ, i.e.,
u(x) = cord(L(x)) – cord (D(x)). Then the choice is defined by maximization of u, that is
→
    ⇔ [∀ y ∈ A, u(x) ≥ u(y)] .
x ∈ C(P) 

Table 2 Explanatory power of principal components
Principal Unrotated solution Rotated solution (Varimax)

components
Eigenvalue % of Cumulat Eigenvalue % of Cumulat
variance ive % of variance ive % of
variance variance
PC1 9.164 65.455 65.455 6.914 49.386 49.386

PC2 1.914 13.674 79.129 2.276 16.260 65.646
PC3 1.060 7.568 86.698 1.783 12.733 78.379
PC4 0.582 4.160 90.858 1.747 12.479 90.858
where vari denotes % of variance (highlighted column in Table 2) explained

by the corresponding principal component. The weights are 0.54, 0.18, 0.14 and
0.13 for PCs 1–4.
Before switching to Index values, let’s examine the latent data structure
detected by pca. The clue to its interpretation are factor loadings in Table 3,
which show the links between original variables and PCs. To make the table
more comprehensible, we highlight large (more than ≈ 0.7) loadings.
The first remarkable thing about Table 3 is that the convolution of variables
into the principal components does not reproduce completely their division
into “thematic” blocks, which we devised when defining the structure of the
dataset (Table 1). The first PC is associated with all three economic variables
(Exports, gdp, R&D), one – also economically driven – the institutional vari-
able (imf), two – once again economically dependent – military power indica-
tors (Mil_exp, Avia), and both soft power variables (Nobel and Patents). Note
that the Universities variable, which we include in the analysis only in special
cases, since we have no data for 1995, is also strongly correlated with the 1st
PC (0.88). Thus, the first and most significant PC (49%) could be interpreted
in terms of a large modern economy with advanced military, internationally
connected and reinforced by soft power. It should be noted that “soft power”
variables are important, but not crucial, as they do not form a separate dimen-
sion. To put it briefly, we call PC-1 a “clever, advanced and rich power”.
While the first PC reflects a rather “qualitative” dimension of power, the sec-
ond is almost purely “quantitative”. It is strongly linked to the population and
army size, and is generally about “being big makes you strong” – a completely
traditional, but still an important (16.3%) component of international power.
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Table 3 Factor loadings (rotated solution)
1 2 3 4
unsc 0.436 0.228 0.262 0.799

imf 0.887 0.147 0.149 0.336
Mil_exp 0.935 0.153 0.144 0.177
Army 0.326 0.824 0.269 0.222
Nuclear 0.417 0.385 0.326 0.676
Avia 0.849 0.216 0.271 0.226
Exports 0.769 0.274 0.045 0.338
gdp 0.932 0.227 0.070 0.192
R&D 0.954 0.144 0.041 0.130
Territory 0.266 0.401 0.706 0.254
OilGas 0.032 0.034 0.939 0.126
Population 0.129 0.951 0.050 0.132
Nobel 0.884 0.024 0.053 0.371
Patents 0.908 0.302 0.155 0.056
The third PC is also of a “quantitative” property. It is formed by two types of

“raw’ resources: the size of the territory and the reserves of oil and gas. Without
being advanced assets, they still matter (12.7%). As well as another “classical”
combination matters: the nuclear potential together with the role in the UN
Security Council, which form the fourth principal component (12.5%).
The PC’s explanatory power is given by their eigenvalues, but there is no
such a direct measure for the original blocks of variables. Since there is no
one-to-one correspondence between these blocks and the PCs, we need some
special approach to evaluate the relative importance of the former. In other
words, we want to know how military, economic, institutional, “soft” power
and “raw” resources separately affect a country’s position in the final Index. To
achieve this goal, we alternately drop the corresponding blocks of variables out
of the Index calculation and estimate the extent to which a country’ position
changes. To simplify this task, we look at one particular indicator – a distance
to the leader. More precisely, we measure the distances (Euclidian metrics)
between a given country and the leader (usa) in the basic Index, which in-
cludes all variables, and the indices calculated with the exclusion of each of
the blocks of variables. In this paper, we limit ourselves to Russian case, which
is the focus of our study.

8.5
distance to the leader
7.5
6.5
6
All variables without without without without "raw without
military economic "soft" resources" institutional
1995 2005 2015

Figure 1 Distances between Russia and usa in different index compositions in 1995, 2005,
2015
Figure 1 shows the distances between Russia and the US in different Index
compositions (1995, 200 and 2015).
It can be easily seen that the “raw” resource block is of a special importance
for Russia’s position in the Index: when it is withdrawn, the distance to the
leader noticeably increases. The removal of economic and “soft” power, in con-
trast, leads to an increase in Russia’s position in the Index compared to the ba-
sic one (the distance to the leader decreases). Dropping out institutional and
military variables leads to lesser changes, yet it works in the same direction:
Russia’s lagging behind the United States grows. Thus, only the possession of
“raw” resources brings Russia closer to the United States; all the other compo-
nents play against it.
4 Preliminary Results and Discussion
As was mentioned earlier, this section contains description and explanation

of some of our preliminary empirical findings. We will compare the dynamics
of distribution of power among the leading nations of the world with a special
focus on Russia’s national power in world politics since 1995 with a few refer-
ences to an earlier period.
4.1 Leaders of the Rating: US on Top, the Rise of China and the Relative
Decline of Europe
Graphic presentation of the countries’ rankings in 1995, 2005 and 2015 ac-
cording to the Index of national power allows to visually grasp the unequal
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d istribution of power in world politics on a grand scale and the dynamics of

countries’ trajectories (Figure 2).
The US is clearly the most powerful nation in the world in many respects
and has been the most powerful nation (the sole superpower) for decades after
the collapse of the ussr. The US primacy is sustained by outstanding or very
good performance on all five groups of variables reflecting different aspects of
international power and influence. The US has the biggest economy (24.5%
of world gdp in 2015) and is very strong in innovations with a share of 35.3%
of world’s R&D expenditures in 2015. The US is in the club of rule-making na-
tions in the UN Security Council and in the imf. This list of manifestations of
primacy is extensive and includes the “hard” power component (the biggest
military expenditures accounting for almost 35% of world’s military expendi-
tures in 2015, the massive and highly advances airpower and complex nuclear
inventory) with a few exceptions of simply good performance on the shares
of world’s population (4.37%), land (approximately 7%), gas and oil reserves
(3.86%). However, these indicators of the “raw” resources group exceed the re-
sources controlled by any other developed nation. To put it figuratively, the US
Figure 2 Leaders of the index of international power, 1995, 2005, 2015

is not simply a “giant”, but a relatively “well-proportioned” one with a capacity

to sustain major components of power.
Back in the 1990s very few would have disagreed with, for example, the late
Charles Krauthammer’s ode to “the unipolar moment” (and unipolarity as
such) with “the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its
Western allies” as the “center of the world”, which would last for decades (Krau-
thammer 1991). Twelve years later he claimed that American primacy and uni-
polarity, understood as an opportunity to “not allow oneself to be hostage to
others” had become more pronounced (Krauthammer 2002). Around the same
time a book by Joseph S. Nye Jr. was published with an ode to multilateralism.
Its subtitle demonstrated a different understanding of power and its risks cre-
ating limits – “Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone.”48 There
may be serious analytical and ideological differences on how the primacy
should be preserved. Anyway, in the post-Cold War era the US has been strong
and powerful enough to choose between “going it alone” or engaging in and
leading multilateral efforts.
However, the “unipolar moment” is over, and by 2015 there was one more
leader on top, though strongly behind the US – China. China is clearly a steadi-
ly rising power which has gained a lot from four decades of intensive internal
economic reforms, globalization and above the average economic growth. This
country has become a global manufacturing hub and the leading exporter of
fabricated goods, including hi-tech, complicated machinery, etc. Yet, the power
of China is not as “well-proportioned” as that of the US. The Chinese econ-
omy accounts for almost 15% of the world gdp (2nd place behind the US),
but this country has become the leading global exporter (11.89%). The Chinese
economy is becoming increasingly innovative, though far behind the US with
16.1% of world’s R&D expenditures and 16.56% of patent applications from
non-residents in 2015. China is investing heavily in its “hard” power (12.64% of
world’s military expenditures in 2015) and has one of the largest armies (11.8%
of world’s military personnel in 2015), but the nation still lacks important ele-
ments of coercive power (limited nuclear capability, though impressive quan-
titatively, but less so qualitatively airpower). China falls behind the West on
the “soft” power component. There are not many Chinese universities in inter-
national rankings – 9.19% of the top-500 universities in 2015 according to the
Academic Ranking of World Universities (arwu). As for the “raw” resources
group China is leading on its share of world’s population, relatively high on the
48 Joseph, Nye Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’ Only Superpower Can’t Go
It Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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land indicator (7.12%) and poor on oil and gas reserves indicator (this is one of
the reasons why China is a very important oil and gas importer).
The rise of China seems to coincide with a slight “decline” of the US. We are
not joining the ranks of those commentators who lament the “declining US he-
gemony”. We believe that a more nuanced explanation is needed. In the best-
selling “The Lexus and the Olive Tree” Thomas L. Friedman offers a symbolic
difference between the Cold War and the era of globalization as we witness it.
The ultimate measure of power during the Cold War was the payload of mis-
siles capable of nuclear obliteration, while currently it is speed of commerce,
transportation, communication, innovation.49 We may extend this image to
the rise of China. This nation has been successful in modernization endeavor,
has become an integral part of global economy, i.e. it is an important part of
the interconnected world. Unlike the ussr, China has become with a few im-
portant exceptions equally good in all sorts of “speed” and “missile payload”.
However, the US has remained much better in “speed” and “missile load” on a
grand scale than the rest for decades.
Two extra heavyweights of the global economy and leaders of the Index
clearly outshine other actors. Indeed, the Index at this stage of the project priv-
ileges the US and China over other nations. Yet, there is an interesting dynamic
outside the G2 group.
In 1995 on the eve of the rise of China the distribution of economic power
was very different. The US was followed by Japan accounting for almost 17.8%
of the world gdp. Leading European economies were racing behind the giants
with Germany at 8.46%, France at 5.26%, UK at 4.36% and Italy at 3.82% of the
United States
10.50
10.00
9.50
9.00
8.50
8.00
Score 1995 Score 2005 Score 2015
United States 9.69 10.00 9.49
Figure 3 The US: Still on top of the world
49 Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2000).

world gdp. After the Maastricht treaty, there were expectations for the united
Europe to economically and even politically outperform the leaders. There
were strong reasons to take this scenario seriously. The UK and France have
belonged the club of rule-making nations in the UN Security Council since the
foundation of the UN. These two great nations have been nuclear for decades,
though with relatively limited capabilities and have relied on security arrange-
ments of the nato. Germany (5.57% of world military expenditures), France
(6.46%) and the UK (4.63%) have relied on the US-led nato but back in 1995
were valuable and credible military assets, both quantitatively (Germany ac-
counted for 1.52% of world’s military personnel, France – for 1.82%, and the
UK – for 1.06%) and qualitatively.
The changes of the past two decades were dramatic and swift. By 2015 the
gdp (current international dollar) of the world almost tripled since 1990.
Former number 2 – Japan – follows the leaders with 5.93% of world’s gdp.
Germany is still the leading economy in the EU with 4.56%. It is followed by
the UK (3.9%), France (3.29%) and Italy (2.48). The economy of India is catch-
ing up with its former colonial master (2.83%), as does the ambitions of this
nation, developing its economy and military potential in an increasingly com-
petitive region. Unlike many great powers the European ones have cut down
2.7
2.2
1.7
1.2
0.7
0.2
–0.3
UK 2.55 2.42 1.99
France 2.52 2.13 1.81
Germany 2.28 1.97 1.68
Italy 0.83 0.76 0.57
Netherlands 0.49 0.42 0.27
Spain 0.29 0.33 0.25
Belgium 0.29 0.2 0.13
Switzerland 0.17 0.1 0.11
Sweden 0.18 0.18 0.1
Norway 0.07 0.06 0.01
Figure 4 The “Decline” of Europe?
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“hard” power components. Shrinking military expenditures led to reductions

in manpower and materiel and gravely limited the capability of European
great powers to be autonomous strategically.
To sum up, we need to make an important observation: within a quarter of
century the global economic dynamic propelled China to one of the leading
positions worldwide, leaving former leaders (prior to 1995) well behind. This is
not to say, that Germans or Americans have become on the average poorer or
their nations are now economically and politically weaker. We can state that
global economic growth was distributed unequally and allowed certain na-
tions to acquire economic muscles. Their economies became larger relative
to former leaders and middle economic powers. We may also conclude that
economically there are two superpowers of unprecedented scale with other
nations struggling to preserve or acquire economic great or middle power sta-
tuses. This phenomenon fits in the “rise of the rest” thesis,50 vis-à-vis the for-
mer leaders with the exception of the US.
4.2 “Russian Paradox”

What can our findings tell us about Russia? Since our Index is constructed for
the post-Cold War period, we are not comparing Russia with the ussr. Even
if we did, we may, for example, compare in a relatively reliable way the Soviet
and Russian inventories of specific weapon systems to conclude that Russia is
hardly a peer to the ussr in military terms. Yet, using the ussr as a point of
reference for Russia may be another way to understand the “Russian paradox”.
In the full swing of the Cold War the ussr was a continent-size nuclear-armed
superpower capable of completely wiping its enemies with equally devastat-
ing consequences to itself. The ussr was also an embodiment of an ideologi-
cal alternative with much attraction around the world. For decades it was an
existential threat to the global West. Simultaneously, the ussr was also one of
the pillars of the international order built on balance of power. The ussr was
politically and militarily restrained by the West while restraining the West.
After the collapse of the ussr Russia inherited some Soviet-era achieve-
ments. Despite losing the sphere of influence in Europe and the former ussr,
Russia has remained a continent-size country with the biggest territory (above
12.7% of land) and valuable resources. For example, in 1995 Russia controlled
over 19.5% of world’s oil and gas reserves (14.56% in 2015). It inherited a mas-
sive army (6.8% of world’s military personnel in 1995) with an extensive,
though aging arsenal of Soviet-made weapons, including nuclear weapons,
impressive airpower, etc. A dire shortage of funds to maintain the Soviet-era
50 Fareed Zakaria, The post-American World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2009).

ilitary h
m eritage led to deep personnel and materiel cuts and resulted in a
general degradation of the “hard” power component, which became painfully
evident during the conflict in Chechnya.
Russia has also inherited the institutional dimension of the Soviet heritage,
namely the permanent membership in the UN Security Council, though the
Russian leadership preferred for almost a decade to side with the West in many
instances of taking important decisions. The country’s participation in major
economic and financial organizations has been a reflection of its economic
conditions with little capacity to influence the global economic trends.
Back in 1990 when Russia was still one of the republics within the already
agonizing ussr its gdp (current international dollar) accounted for 2.29% of
the world’s gdp. The Russian economy was lagging behind the gigantic econo-
mies of the US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the UK, but was well ahead the
economies of China (approximately 1.6%) and India (approximately 1.4%).
Within 5 years Russia’s share of the world gdp fell to 1.29%, and by the decade’s
end it shrunk further.
Economic recovery and growth in the 2000s stopped the downward trend.
Russia accounted for 1.62% and 1.85% of world’s gdp in 2005 and 2015 respec-
tively. Frequently, they have been attributed to the rising oil and gas prices.
Growing budget revenues allowed the Russian authorities to finance projects
and coherent policies in various areas, including the military reform and in-
crease procurements of new weapons. Russia’s share of the world’s growing
military expenditures more than doubled in 1995–2015 and reached approxi-
mately 3.92%. The military reform enacted after somewhat poor performance
of the Russian army during the conflict with Georgia in 2008 and the 19 trillion
ruble State Armament Program for 2011–2020 (later transformed into the State
Armament Program for 2018–2027 due to the inability to spend the allocat-
ed resources), and the changing political and economic conditions, allowed
Russia
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
Russia 3.35 2.97 2.74
Figure 5 The “Russian paradox”: Declining resources of national power and the growing
global influence?
russianDownloaded
politics 4 (2019) 137-167
it to literally resurrect the “hard” power component typical of a superpower.

While the succeeding State Armament Programs helped to jump-start and
partially restore the military-industrial complex capable to produce up-to-date
weaponry, the reform produced a smaller and more balanced army designed
to react quickly to sudden threats and capable of confronting even stronger
adversaries in conventional conflicts, despite a lag in certain high-tech areas of
combat. The Russian army once again conducts large-scale strategic exercises
and runs snap readiness tests on a regular basis. Russian leaders have been sig-
naling that the resurrected military power is one of the major instruments to
achieve foreign policy goals and provide security by making public statements
and demonstrating new weapons, including a strategic hypersonic glider, tac-
tical hypersonic missiles, nuclear-powered undersea drone and a cruise mis-
sile, etc. The modernized military was tested during a rather effective military
intervention in the Syrian civil war on the side of the Assad regime by com-
pact expeditionary forces and supplies of military hardware,51 and, as is widely
claimed, during the “hybrid war against Ukraine”.
Russia is short of very important resources of national power in their com-
mon understanding (“weak hand” thesis). The country is low on the “soft pow-
er” despite various efforts to capitalize on the legacy of the past or to play the
“soft power” playbook. The 2014 Sochi Olympic Games were tarnished by the
subsequent doping scandal. In 2015, Russian universities occupied only 0.38%
of the Top-500 world universities and are squeezed between outdated govern-
ment regulations and the increasing international competition. The Russian
economy suffers from low productivity, underinvestment in R&D (in 2015,
Russia accounted for 1.1% of global R&D expenditures), corruption, etc. The
relative share of Russia in the world’s population is shrinking (from 2.6% in
1995 down to 1.96% in 2015). The list of Russia’s ailments and their causes is
much longer, and any expert on Russia can easily extend it in accordance with
the area of specialization and idiosyncrasies.
To admit that Russia is a superpower or to totally write it off is a folly. Rus-
sia has been “going it alone” on many occasions at least since 2008, despite
the rising costs of the decisions of its leaders. The country has been consis-
tently irritating the West by pursuing “sovereign policy”. There is clearly a para-
dox: a nation with an economy and military spending more than ten times
smaller than the US economy and military spending, is allegedly “challenging
the liberal world order” and is asserting itself internationally in a great power
51 Dmitri Trenin, “Putin’s Plan for Syria: How Russia Wants to End the War”, Foreign Affairs,
13 December 2017: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-12-13/putins-plan
-syria (accessed 14 April 2019).

manner as a peer to the leading nations. When blaming Russian authorities

for aggressiveness and revisionism of this decade, pundits and policy-makers
focus on Russia’s “weak hand” (economy, demography, bad institutions, etc.),
“relative backwardness” and its standing as a “relatively weak great power,”52
and point to discrepancy between its ambitions and declining capabilities. Yet,
the time has come “to contain” Russia, and the US “must dig in for a long and
difficult confrontation with Putin and his regime.”53 It may be tempting to use
the D avid and Goliath metaphor: Russia in the world today is simultaneously
playing David (a relatively weak in some areas opponent to the West, but capa-
ble of hurting painfully and enduring punishment in underdog situations) and
Goliath (still rich in “raw” resources and militarily strong, but especially when
securitized abroad as a dangerous adversary to the West capable of “hack-
ing” and “trolling” democracies to amplify polarization, conducting influence
operations, etc.).
5 Conclusion and Further Research
On the basis of our theoretical assumptions related to complex problems of

power and influence in world politics and suggested conceptualization and
measurement of major components of national power we have undertaken
an empirical analysis of global power dynamics using our Pnew Index of Na-
tional power. Our primary focus was Russia within a comparative context, es-
pecially its power resources. Our analysis brings evidence that the cumulative
resources of Russia’s power in international affairs did not increase during the
last two decades. However, Russia’s influence in world politics has significantly
increased as demonstrated by extremely assertive foreign policy in different
parts of the world (from Crimea and Syria to Venezuela and Africa) and its
perception by the international political community and the public.
Hence, we return to the “Russian paradox” of growing international influ-
ence without many important resources of power.
The metaphor of “David and Goliath” may be tempting in this regard but is
largely misleading. Russia remains a major power in today’s world, although some
of its power resources are stagnating or even decreasing in comparison to the
US and rising nations like China. Russia is rather successfully using t raditional
52 Stephen Kotkin, “Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics: Putin Returns to Historical Patterns”, For-
eign Affairs 95, no 3 (May/June 2016): 2–9.
53 Michael McFaul, “Russia as It Is: A Grand Strategy for Confronting Putin”, Foreign Affairs
97, no 4 (July/August 2018): 82–91.
russianDownloaded
politics 4 (2019) 137-167
and nontraditional capabilities of international influence – significant mili-

tary buildup, extremely assertive and expanding foreign policy, determined
anti-Western strategy, based on an overall consensus within the Russian
political class and the public, as well as mass media and domestic and inter-
national propaganda. Russia’s opponents would add to this list, the so called
“active measures”, including attempts to influence domestic developments in
foreign countries (which, in truth, are not uncommon in our Realpolitik world).
At this particular moment this paradox does not seem to have a satisfactory
solution, although it is of extreme political and theoretical importance. From
the global political perspective, it leaves us with a lot of unanswered questions
about the future of the world order, and Russia’s domestic and foreign policy
trajectories. From the theoretical point of view it poses many fundamental
and also yet unanswered problems: the correlation between power resources
and international influence; the role of nonmaterial factors (in the first place,
strategy, political will, domestic support and mobilization, etc.) in exercising
international influence; asymmetrical and “hybrid” responses to international
developments; the prospects and sustainability of confrontational strategy of
a nation not in synch with many global trends, etc.
Further fundamental and applied research is needed to respond to these
and many other problems of power and influence in today’s world politics. We
believe there are many prospective and perspective research directions. For ex-
ample, one may need to investigate in more depth important issues related to
conceptualization of national power and choice of measurements of appropri-
ate variable. Alternative methods of multivariate statistical analysis of the rich
collected data are quite possible and need to be explored. Additional theoretical
and empirical research of the ways to measure actual international influence of
the states in international relations is pending. Similar problems need to be ad-
dressed regarding nonmaterial resources of power and influence in world poli-
tics. Finally, taking into account the highly unequal distribution of power and
influence in world politics and the very clear differentiation between a minor-
ity of really global powers, leading regional players and “all the rest” one may be
tempted to at least question the very possibility of a universal and global rating
of states according to their national potentials and capabilities.
However, despite these and other remaining theoretical and empirical prob-
lems we believe that our attempts to bring scholarly attention to the issues of
power and influence in international affairs related to important aspects of
Russian politics and policies, as well as our experiment with the new index of
national power, will contribute to academic discussions about world politics.
To be continued…


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russian politics 4 (2019) 137-167

What Russia Can Teach Us about Power and

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/2451-8921-00402001

1 National Research University Higher School of Economics. This research is supported by

UK-5.4 Recognition of growing influence does not mean approval – negative

2 Problems of Conceptualization and Measurement

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i­nternational institutions and factors of “soft/smart” power.9 Constructivists

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In the nutshell, the structure of the world order is heterogeneous; it includes

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actors. Influence is the capacity of actors to determine (partly) the actions or

At the same time from another perspective, power should be understood as

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The conjoining of global and regional perspectives is an important theoreti-

2.2 Operationalization and Measurement

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is, strictly speaking, conditional simplification of the complex reality and

3 Towards a New Index of National Power

3.1 Existing Approaches

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Even before Cline’s model a similar attempt was explored by F. Clifford

37 Clifford F. German, “A Tentative Evaluation of World Power”, Journal of Conflict Resolution

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3.2 Data and Methods

Table 1 Components and variables

Components Variables Sources

Military power Military expenditures sipri, cia World

of ­uncorrelated vectors can explain most of the variation present in a data-

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Index = w1PC1 + w2PC2 + …+ wmPCm,

where m is the number of principal components sufficient (in aggregate) to

​​Index​ ils​ ​ = ​​(Index​ i​​ − Index​ min​​)​ ⁄​ (Index​ max​​ − Index​ min​​)​​ × 10​

44 E. Gupta, “Oil Vulnerability Index of Oil-importing Countries”, Energy Policy 36, no 3

conventionally regarded as not influential in world politics. To keep the groups

3.3 Empirical Results

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Table 2 Explanatory power of principal components

Principal Unrotated solution Rotated solution (Varimax)

PC1 9.164 65.455 65.455 6.914 49.386 49.386

where vari denotes % of variance (highlighted column in Table 2) explained

Table 3 Factor loadings (rotated solution)

unsc 0.436 0.228 0.262 0.799

The third PC is also of a “quantitative” property. It is formed by two types of

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1995 2005 2015

4 Preliminary Results and Discussion

As was mentioned earlier, this section contains description and explanation

d­ istribution of power in world politics on a grand scale and the dynamics of

Figure 2 Leaders of the index of international power, 1995, 2005, 2015

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is not simply a “giant”, but a relatively “well-proportioned” one with a capacity

Figure 3 The US: Still on top of the world

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Figure 4 The “Decline” of Europe?

“hard” power components. Shrinking military expenditures led to reductions

4.2 “Russian Paradox”

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it to literally resurrect the “hard” power component typical of a superpower.

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manner as a peer to the leading nations. When blaming Russian authorities

5 Conclusion and Further Research

On the basis of our theoretical assumptions related to complex problems of

international institutions and factors of “soft/smart” power.9 Constructivists

of uncorrelated vectors can explain most of the variation present in a data-

Index ils  = (Index i − Index min) ⁄ (Index max − Index min) × 10

d istribution of power in world politics on a grand scale and the dynamics of