IN RE IPB 1973

FACTS:

[T]he Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report with the “earnest recommendation” — on the
basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 of the Court, and
“consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission’s] Board of Consultants, as
well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar” — that “(the) Honorable
(Supreme) Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption
and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule.” The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the
Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible
and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations.

ISSUES:

(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

HELD:

YES. On all issues.

RATIO:

[T]he Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article
VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, “to promulgate rules concerning x x x the admission to the practice of
law.”

The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in
Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
“perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable,” within the context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.

[T]he Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, ordained
the integration of the Bar of the Philippines effective January 16, 1973.

IN RE: CUNANAN

FACTS OF THE CASE:

In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino
Cunanan et. al petitioners.
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A. 972
popularly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he
obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the
past few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar
examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 – 75%).

Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C.,
and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages
of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951
Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not
overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions
of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953

Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law
is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for
the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the administration of
justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.
 An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that should be
developed constantly and maintained firmly.
 The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring, and
reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
 The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning
the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution
recognizes continue to reside in this court.
 Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to “cure” are not the rules set in place
by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not included in the
power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.
 Reasons for UNCONSTITUTIONALITY:
1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter
them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission
to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated
are considered the bare minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation
5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and
being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.

HELD:

Under the authority of the court:

1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of
the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect.
2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955) is
valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952
are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o
getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have filed
petitions for admissions or not.)
16 07 2010

Cayetano vs. Monsod

201 SCRA 210
September 1991

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The
1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However,
a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law
means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the
position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO, PETITIONER.

(CASE DIGEST)

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO, PETITIONER. (DIGEST)
B.M. No. 2540

September 24, 2013

TOPIC:

Admission to the Bar, Unauthorized Practice of Law, Canon 9, Signing of the Roll of Attorneys

FACTS:

Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979. On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s
Oath at the PICC. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but failed to do so
allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. Several years later, while
rummaging through his things, he found said Notice. He then realized that he had not signed in the roll,
and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.

He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as
important. The matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys was subsequently forgotten.

In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required to provide his roll number for his
MCLE compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide
his roll number.

About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in
the Roll of Attorneys. Medado justifies this lapse by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor
intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross
negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit, saying that petitioner could offer no valid
justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a
penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate
penalty of disbarment, a penalty reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions. In this case, said
action is not warranted.

The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith in filing the petition himself, albeit after
the passage of more than 30 years; that he has shown that he possesses the character required to be a
member of the Philippine Bar; and that he appears to have been a competent and able legal
practitioner, having held various positions at different firms and companies.

However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of inaction.

A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the
law and its consequences.

Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had
signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the
moment he realized that what he had signed was just an attendance record, he could no longer claim an
honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, he should have known that he was not a full-
fledged member of the Philippine Bar, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so.
When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. At the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized
practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of
the Bar, they are bound to conduct themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal
profession.

Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer. However, the Court imposed upon
him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after
receipt of the Resolution. He was also made to pay a fine of P32,000. Also, during the one-year period,
petitioner was not allowed to engage in the practice of law.

ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR.
in his capacity as Permanent Representative of the
Philippines to the United Nations, Respondents.
G.R. No. 176278
June 25, 2010
EN BANC

FACTS:
 Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for
the writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s nomination of respondent
former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative to
the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the
Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davide’s age at that
time of his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner
grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all
officers and employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65. Petitioner theorizes
that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA employees, career or non-career; thus,
respondent Davide’s entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against the rest of the DFA officials
and employees.

ISSUE:

Petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue and mootness.

Ruling:

An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioner’s

suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing "any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience."Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal
protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse
Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.
A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for moot.
Respondent Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO

v. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ

A.C. No. 244

March 29, 1963

FACTS:

Two years following his admission to the Philippine Bar, lawyer Telesforo A. Diao was charged by private
complainant Severino G. Martinez for allegedly falsifying his application to take the Bar Examinations
specifically his scholastic qualifications. The Solicitor General, having established in the course of its
investigation that at the time Diao filed his application to take the Bar Examinations did not complete
the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, recommended the
omission of his name from the roll of attorneys. Diao averred that he had entered military service, took
and passed the General Classification Test which is equivalent to a high school diploma, and that he
completed his Associate in Arts degree at the Arellano University in 1949 and due to confusion, was
erroneously certified in his school records as a graduate of Quisumbing College.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Telesforo A. Diao should be disbarred from the practice of law.

HELD:

Yes, Atty. Telesforo A. Diao should be disbarred from the practice of law. His application
disclosed that he began his law studies six months before he obtained his pre-law degree thereby
disqualifying him from taking the bar tests under the rules, but with the aid of false pretenses, was
allowed to take it, passed it and thereafter admitted to the bar. The fact that he hurdled the bar
examinations is immaterial. The High Tribunal, through Chief Justice Bengzon, enunciated that passing
such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Taking the prescribed
courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.