Participant Code- N16

IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF GAUL

WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THECONSTITUTION OF INDIA

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 312 OF 2018

ANTICLIMAX PRODUCTIONS AND ORS……….......................................PETITIONER

v.

STATE OF BELGICA AND ORS....................................................................RESPONDENT

CLUBBED WITH

WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 213 OF 2018

ANTICLIMAX PRODUCTIONS AND ORS……….......................................PETITIONER

v.

STATE OF BELGICA AND ORS....................................................................RESPONDENT

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

GOVERNMENT OF GAUL

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................................. 2

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ 4

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................................... 6

ISSUES RAISED ........................................................................................................................... 7

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS ........................................................................................ 8

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ..................................................................................................... 10

1.The ban on the film ‘le sacrifice de la femme’ is violative of article 19(1) of the constitution

of Gaul. ......................................................................................................................................... 10

1.1 The ban on the film is not reasonable and is violative of article 19(1)(a) of the constitution

of Gaul. ......................................................................................................................................... 10

1.2 The constitution of Gaul has not defined obscenity. .......................................................... 12

1.3 The ban on the film limits the freedoms provided in article 19(1) of the constitution of

Gaul. ............................................................................................................................................. 13

1.4 It Passes the Test of Reasonableness as Enshrined in the Papnasam Judgement. .......... 14

2. Section 377 of the Gaulish penal code is unconstitutional and it violates part III of the

Constitution of Gaul .................................................................................................................... 15

2.1 Section 377 is Violative of Article 19. .................................................................................. 15

2.2 Section 377 Violates Right to Equality Under Article 14 of the Constitution. ................ 16

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2.3 Section 377 Violates Right to Equality Under Article 15 of the Constitution. ................ 18

2.4 Section 377 Violates Right to Life Under Article 21 of the Constitution. ........................ 19

PRAYER ...................................................................................................................................... 20

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 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Anuj Garg v Hotel Association of India AIR 2008 SC 663. ..............................................................15

Aveek Sarkar & Anr v State Of West Bengal & Anr [2014] 4 SCC 257 ............................................12

Bennet Coleman & Co v Union of India 1973 AIR 106. ...................................................................14

Chandrakant Kalyadas Kakodar v The State of Maharashtra AIR 1970 SC 1390. ...........................12

Devidas Ramachandra Tuljapurkar v State of Maharashtra (2015) 6 SCC. ....................................13

John Vallamatom v Union of India AIR 2003 SC 2902 ....................................................................15

K A Abbas v Union Of India AIR 1971 SC 48 ...................................................................................12

K Thimmappa v Chairman Central Board of Directors AIR 2001 SC 467.......................................15

Maneka Gandhi v Union of India 1978 AIR 597. ..............................................................................18

Maneka Gandhi v Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597 (1978) 1 SCC 248.............................................9

Manohar Lal Sharma v Sanjay Leela Bhansali (2018) 1 SCC 770. ..................................................12

Naz Foundation v Government of NCT of Delhi 2010 Cri LJ 94.......................................................16

Rangarajan v P Jagivan Ram (1989) 2 SCC 574. .............................................................................10

Ranjit d Udeshi v State of Maharashtra AIR1965 SC 881.................................................................11

Report of the second press comm., Vol 1, 34-35. ................................................................................9

S Khushboo v Kanniammal (2010) 5 SCC 600. .................................................................................10

Samaresh Bose & Anr v AmalMitra & Anr AIR 1986 SC 967. ........................................................11

State of Madras v VG row AIR 1952 SC 196. .....................................................................................9

Suresh Kumar Koushal v Naz Foundation (2014) 1 SCC 1...............................................................16

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The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v The Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6. .....17

Toonen v Australia CCPR/C/WG/44/D/488/1992. ............................................................................17

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 STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. The Democratic Republic of Gaul was a peaceful country. The Gaulish capital Lutetia, a modern city,

was starkly different from the rest of Gaul which was still grappling with conservative ideologies. In March

2016, a famous director-producer Anticlimax decided to recreate the story of King Androgynix and his

virtuous wife, Queen Daffiris. This was a sanctified tale repeated through the centuries and it narrated how

the Queen, who is considered no less than a goddess, jumped into a pit of fire killing herself because she

refused to be wife to the evil emperor Magnus. Anticlimax chose the best three actors – Angela Marvela,

Photogenix, Tragicomix for his work. Gaulish media magnate Whosmoralsarelastix, the owner of Gaulish

Times, hired an undercover reporter Agent Dubbelosix to find the controversy in Anticlimax’s plot. Agent

Dubbelosix came back with sensational information that Anticlimax was exploring the theme of

homosexuality in his work. In November 2017, the first poster of the movie ‘Trigonometrix D’ Amour’

was released, depicting Angela Marvela as an icon of beauty and a kissing scene between Angela and

Tragicomix. This infuriated the conservatives of Belgica as it indecently represented their Goddess because

of which the Gaulish Conservative Society started a campaign against Anticlimax and his movie.

2. In December 2017, a trailer of the movie showed a snippet where Magnus Dubious presents a rose to

Androgynix. This coupled with a dialogue hinting at a romantic angle between the two kings resulted in

intense protests. Another burning debate in the Democratic Republic of Gaul pertaining to Sec. 377 of
GPC resurfaced. This section criminalized “carnal intercourse against the order of the nature.” In 2009, the

HC of Lutetia had repealed Sec. 377 of GPC. However, a division bench of the SC overturned the HC

judgement and reinstated Sec. 377. Due to the intense protests and repeated attempts to ban the film, an

expert committee cleared the film for release after certain changes including name. But in light of the law

and order situation the Govt. of Belgica after consulting a High Level Committee which had seen the film,

issued an order banning the public exhibition of the movie.

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 ISSUES RAISED

A. Whether the ban on exhibition of the film ‘Le Sacrifice de la Femme’ in the State of
Belgica is violative of Article 19(1) of the Constitution of Gaul?

B. Whether Section 377 of the Gaulish Penal Code is unconstitutional and violative of
Part III of the Constitution of Gaul, and thus, ought to be struck down?

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 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

1. The ban on the exhibition of the film “Le sacrifice de la Femme” is violative of article 19(1)

of the Constitution.

The right provided in Article 19(1)(a) is integral as it is not merely a right of speech and expression

but a right to freedom to freedom of speech and expression. This freedom of speech and expression

is regarded as the first conditions of liberty. It has been truly said that it is the mother of all other

liberties. The ban on the film is not reasonable as it does not come under the domain of reasonable

restrictions as enshrined in Article 19(2) to 19(6). Moreover, the film did not even claim historical

authenticity. In this particular case the film ‘Le Sacrifice De La Femme’ was inspired by a story

which was folklore and thus considered a work of fiction. Thus the State of Belgica’s action was not

in accordance with due process of law. The movie is not violative of section 4 and 5-A of

Cinematograph Act of, 1952 which states that if the GBFC has given approval for any movie than it

is the final decision because it is the statutory body dealing with giving certificate and thus the action

of state was arbitrary as in the present case a committee is established by GBFC has given the

recommendations and the Anticlimax has also approved them too thus the State’s action is not

justifiable. The government cannot plead for banning the exhibition of the film on the ground that

otherwise there might arise a serious law and order situation in the state.

2. Section 377 of the Gaulish penal code is unconstitutional and does violate part III of the

Constitution of Gaul

Section 377 is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of Gaul any law interfering with personal

liberty of a person must satisfy a triple test: (i) it must prescribe a procedure; (ii) the procedure must
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withstand a test of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred under Article 19 which may be

applicable in a given situation; and (iii) it must also be liable to be tested with reference to Article 14.

As the test propounded by Article 14 pervades Article 21 as well, the law and procedure authorizing

interference with the personal liberty must also be right and just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or

oppressive. If the procedure prescribed does no satisfy the requirement of Article 14, it would be not

procedure at all within the meaning of Article 21. The Court thus expanded the scope and ambit of

the right to life and personal liberty enshrined in Article 21 and sowed the seed for future development

of the law enlarging this most fundamental of the fundamental rights. Thus section 377 of Gaulish

penal code is in violation of the part III of the Constitution of Gaul. It is contended that Section 377’s

legislative objective of penalizing “unnatural sexual offences” has no rational nexus to the

classification created. It was based on a conception of sexual morality specific to Victorian era

drawing on notions of carnality and sinfulness. The stated object of Section 377 IPC is to ‘protect

women and children, prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS and enforce societal morality against

homosexuality. Article 15 prohibits discrimination on several enumerated grounds, which include

‘sex’. It is contended that the expression “sex” as used in Article 15 cannot be read restrictive to

gender but also includes “sexual orientation” and thus equality on the basis of sexual orientation is

implied in the said fundamental right against discrimination. Thus, it is contended sexual orientation

is a ground analogous to ‘sex’ mentioned in Section 15 of the Constitution and discrimination on the

basis of sexual orientation is not permitted under article 15. It is contended that criminalization of

Section 377 impacts homosexual men at a deep level and restricts their right to dignity, personhood

and identity, privacy and equality by criminalizing all forms of sexual intercourse homosexual men

can indulge in. While the privacy of heterosexual relations, especially marriage is clothed in

legitimacy, homosexual relations are subjected to societal disapproval and scrutiny.

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 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1.The ban on the film ‘le sacrifice de la femme’ is violative of article 19(1) of the constitution of

Gaul.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that the film le sacrifice de

la femme’ is violative of the constitution of Gaul. Article 19(1) guarantees the citizen of India 6

freedoms which are not absolute and certain reasonable restrictions can be levied upon them. This

film does not come under the purview of those restrictions.

1.1 The ban on the film is not reasonable and is violative of article 19(1)(a) of the constitution

of Gaul.

Freedom of speech is the bulwark of the democratic government. This freedom is essential for the

proper functioning of the democratic process and is also regarded as the first condition of liberty. It

has been truly said that it is the mother of all liberties1. In a democracy freedom of speech and

expression opens up channels of free discussions of issues.

In Maneka Gandhi v Union of India2, J. Bhagwati has emphasized on the significance of the freedom

of speech and expression in these words,

"Democracy is based essentially on free debate and open discussion, for that is the only corrective

of government action in a democratic set up. If democracy means govt. of the people by the people,

it is obvious that every citizen must be entitled to participate in the democratic process and in order

1
Report of the second press commission Vol 1 34-35.
2
Maneka Gandhi v Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597 (1978) 1 SCC 248.
3
State of Madras v VG row AIR 1952 SC 196.
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to enable him to intelligently exercise his right of making a choice, free and general discussion of

public matters is absolutely essential."

Also, it has been stated by the supreme court in State of Madras v. VG row3 that

‘The test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute

impugned, and no abstract standard or general pattern, of reasonableness can be laid down as

applicable to all cases.’

Here the banning of the film ‘le sacrifice de la femme’ was not reasonable as the film

never claimed any historical authenticity and it was a work of fiction.

The council would also like to submit the case of Rangarajan v. P Jagjivan Ram4, in which the

supreme court, emphasizing on upon the concept of freedom of speech and expression has stated

that,

‘In democracy it is not necessary that everyone should sing the same song. Freedom of expression is

the rule and it is generally taken for granted. Everyone has a fundamental right to form his

own opinion any issue of general concern. He can form and inform by any legitimate means.

The democracy is the government by the people via open discussions.’

The banning of the film was also not justified as here only the conservative Gauls of the state of

Belgica and the members of GCS were aggrieved. The other majority of Gauls were expectantly

waiting for the movie and had no problem with it.

In the case of S. Khushboo vs Kanniammal5 it has been held that

4
Rangarajan v P Jagivan Ram (1989) 2 SCC 574.
5
S Khushboo v Kanniammal (2010) 5 SCC 600.
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“The standard to be applied by the Board or courts for judging the film should be that of an ordinary

man of common sense and prudence and not that of an out of the ordinary or hypersensitive man. The

different views are allowed to be expressed by proponents and opponents not because they are correct,

or valid but because there is freedom in this country for expressing even differing views on any

issue. Freedom of expression which is legitimate and constitutionally protected, cannot be held to

ransom by an intolerant group of people. The fundamental freedom under Article 19(1)(a) can be

reasonably restricted only for the purposes mentioned in Article 19(2) and the restriction must be

justified on the anvil of necessity and not the quicksand of convenience or expediency. Open criticism

of government policies and operations is not a ground for restricting expression. We must practice

tolerance of the views of others. Intolerance is as much dangerous to democracy as to the person

himself."

The court has accepted that movies doubtless enjoy the guarantee under Article 19(1)(a).

1.2 The constitution of Gaul has not defined obscenity.

The counsel submits that in Ranjit d. Udeshi,6 the court observed that where obscenity and art are

mixed, art must so preponderate as to throw the obscenity into a shadow or the obscenity must be so

trivial and insignificant that it can have no effect and may be overlooked. In other words, treatment

of sex in a manner offensive to public decency and, judged by our national standards, considered

likely to pander to lascivious, prurient or sexually precocious minds, must determine the result.

The counsel further submits that in the case of Samaresh Bose and Another v Amal Mitra and

Another,7 it was held that an overall view of the obscene matter in the setting of the whole work

would, of course be necessary, but the obscene matter must be considered by itself and separately to

6
Ranjit Udeshi v State of Maharashtra AIR1965 SC 881.
7
Samaresh Bose & Anr v AmalMitra & Anr AIR 1986 SC 967.
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find out whether it is so gross and its obscenity so decided that it is likely to deprave and corrupt those

whom read it and that a reference of kissing description of the body and the figures of the female

characters in the book and suggestions of acts of sex by themselves may not have the effect of

depraving, debasing and encouraging the readers of any age to lasciviousness and the novel on these

counts, may not be considered to be obscene.

In the case of Aveek Sarkar8 the court held that the picture has been viewed in background as whether

it was shown, and the message it has to convey to public at large.

In the case of K.A Abbas v Union of India9, it was held that the artistic appeal or presentation of an

episode robs it of its vulgarity and harm and also what may be socially good and useful and what may

not.

It can be said that section 292 does not defines obscenity clearly and what seems to be obscene to one

may not seem to other and as it was held in Chandrakant Kalyadas Kakodar v The State of

Maharashtra10 “the standard of contemporary society in India are also fast changing”.

In the move ‘le sacrifice de la femme’, kissing of the queen and the king was not obscene. As

specified in above cases, obscenity has no specific definition.

1.3 The ban on the film limits the freedoms provided in article 19(1) of the constitution of Gaul.

Freedom of speech has been at variously described as a “basic human right”, “a natural right”, and

the like. It is regarded as the first condition of liberty. It embraces within its scope the freedom of

propagation and interchange of ideas, dissemination of information which would help formation of

one’s opinion and viewpoints and debates on matters of public concern.

8
Aveek Sarkar & Anr v State Of West Bengal & Anr [2014] 4 SCC 257.
9
K A Abbas v Union Of India AIR 1971 SC 48.
10
Chandrakant Kalyadas Kakodar v The State of Maharashtra AIR 1970 SC 1390.
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Another aspect needs to be highlighted. It has been stated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case

of Manohar Lal Sharma v. Sanjay Leela Bhansali11 that

“A story told on celluloid or a play enacted on a stage or a novel articulated in a broad and large

canvas or epic spoken with eloquence or a poem sung with passion or recited with rhythm has many

a layer of freedom of expression of thought that requires innovation, skill, craftsmanship and, above

all, individual originality founded on the gift of imagination or reality transformed into imagination

or vice versa. The platform can be different and that is why, the creative instinct is respected and has

the inherent protective right from within which is called artistic license.”

In this regard, we may profitably reproduce a passage from Devidas

Ramachandra Tuljapurkar v. State of Maharashtra 12

“As far as the words “poetic license”, are concerned, it can never remotely mean a license as used or

understood in the language of law. There is no authority who gives a license to a poet. These are

words from the realm of literature. The poet assumes his own freedom which is allowed to him by

the fundamental concept of poetry.

1.4 It Passes the Test of Reasonableness as Enshrined in the Papnasam Judgement.

The Supreme Court has stated that in the following principles and the guidelines should be kept in

view while considering the constitutionality of a statutory provision imposing restriction of a

fundamental right.

1. The restriction must be reasonable and must not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature.

11
Manohar Lal Sharma v Sanjay Leela Bhansali (2018) 1 SCC 770.
12
Devidas Ramachandra Tuljapurkar v State of Maharashtra (2015) 6 SCC.
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2. In appreciating such problems the judicial approach must necessarily be dynamic, pragmatic and

elastic.

Moreover in Bennett Coleman13, the Supreme Court dealt that whether Effect is more important than

the Subject matter and The Supreme Court held that the subject should be taken into the consideration

while imposing reasonable restriction. In this case the content of the film is based upon the folklore

which was a work of fiction and it did not even claim historical authenticity. Thus the restrictions

imposed here are not reasonable.

2. Section 377 of the Gaulish penal code is unconstitutional and it violates part III of the

Constitution of Gaul

2.1 Section 377 is Violative of Article 19.

For our present case, we shall focus more on Article 19(1)(a) as Section 377 implicitly targets the

homosexuals and a class of individuals who engage in sexual activities as ‘as against the order

of nature’. According to this section, the fundamental right to express one’s sexual orientation is

curtailed. If such an expression is made, the individual may be made subject to harassment and

torment by the general public or the authorities who implement Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code.

For a medical test to be carried for the purpose of checking for sexually transmitted diseases, one

needs to disclose his or her sexual behavior. This freedom to disclose is curtailed due to the fear of

punishment as a result of which the freedom to express this leads to this particular community to go

13
Bennet Coleman & Co v Union of India 1973 AIR 106.
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unseen or require any medical intervention. Article 21 does impose a restriction on this freedom of

speech and expression on the grounds of ‘public order’, ‘decency’, or ‘morality’. However, the

greater good is supposed to be given importance and it is obvious that the health of the citizens is

more important than the majority ideals. however, the Courts and the legislature have been reluctant

to enforce the rights of the concerned citizens.

2.2 Section 377 Violates Right to Equality Under Article 14 of the Constitution.

In the celebrated case of Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India14, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of

Gaul held that there is no ‘presumption of constitutionality of a colonial legislation’. The judgement

in John Vallamatom v. Union of India15 further propagates the idea that the constitutionality of a

provision will have to be judged keeping in mind the interpretative changes of the statute affected by

the passage of time. The law, although may be constitutional when enacted, but with passage of time

the same may be held to be unconstitutional in view of the changed situation. Having brought Section

377 under the scrutiny of Article 14, it is contended that Section 377 violates Article 14 of the

Constitution. Though Article 14 allows permissible classification, it is imperative that two conditions

must be fulfilled in such a situation, namely: the classification must be founded on an intelligible

differentia and the differentia must have a rational nexus to the objective sought to be achieved by

the statute. It is humbly contended that the classification made via Section 377 does not satisfy either

conditions and hence Section 377 violates Article 14 since:

A) The Classification Has Not Been Founded On an Intelligible Differentia - “Intelligible

differentia” means difference that is capable of being understood. The Supreme Court has observed

14
Anuj Garg v Hotel Association of India AIR 2008 SC 663.
15
John Vallamatom v Union of India AIR 2003 SC 2902
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recently in K. Thimmappa v. Chairman, Central Board of Directors16 that mere differentiation does

not per se amount to discrimination and to attract the operation of the equal protection clause, it is

necessary to show that the selection is unreasonable or arbitrary. Section 377 classifies acts based on

whether they are in consonance with or against the order of nature. It is contended that Section 377

is based upon traditional Jeudo-Christian moral and ethical standards, which conceive of sex in purely

functional terms i.e., for the purpose of procreation and thus creates a classification between

procreative and non-procreative sex. Considering any non-procreative sexual activity as being

“against the order of nature” is outdated, has no place in the modern society and most importantly,

has no scientific basis.17 Thus, the classification based on procreative and non-procreative sex has no

intelligible differentia.

B) There Is No Rational Nexus Between Classification and Objective Sought. - It is contended

that Section 377’s legislative objective of penalizing “unnatural sexual offences” has no rational

nexus to the classification created. It was based on a conception of sexual morality specific to

Victorian era drawing on notions of carnality and sinfulness. The stated object of Section 377 IPC is

to ‘protect women and children, prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS and enforce societal morality

against homosexuality.18 It is contended that firstly, the legislative object of protecting women and

children has no bearing in regard to consensual sexual acts between adults in private. The second

legislative of purporting public health by preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS is in contrast to the

results and Section 377 in fact hampers HIV/AIDS prevention efforts. Lastly, it is not within the

constitutional competence of the State to invade the privacy of citizens or regulate conduct solely on

the basis of public moral disapproval when there is no harm to cause any hurt. The criminalization of

16
K Thimmappa v Chairman Central Board of Directors AIR 2001 SC 467.
17
Naz Foundation v Government of NCT of Delhi 2010 Cri LJ 94.
18
Suresh Kumar Koushal v Naz Foundation (2014) 1 SCC 1.
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private sexual relations between consenting adults without any evidence of serious harm deems the

provision’s objective both arbitrary and unreasonable. It is thus contended that there is no rational

nexus between classification and objective sought in the case of Section 377.

2.3 Section 377 Violates Right to Equality Under Article 15 of the Constitution.

Article 15 prohibits discrimination on several enumerated grounds, which include ‘sex’. It is

contended that the expression “sex” as used in Article 15 cannot be read restrictive to gender but also

includes “sexual orientation” and thus equality on the basis of sexual orientation is implied in the said

fundamental right against discrimination. In Toonen v. Australia19, the Human Rights Committee

held that the reference to ‘sex’ under article 2 is to be taken as including ‘sexual orientation’. Further,

the Canadian Supreme Court has held that sexual orientation is a ground analogous to those listed in

Section 15(1) such as race, colour, religion, sex, etc. and on the basis of historical, social, political

and economic disadvantage suffered by homosexuals, sexual orientation must be seen as one of these

grounds. Thus, it is contended sexual orientation is a ground analogous to ‘sex’ mentioned in Section

15 of the Constitution and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is not permitted under

article 15. It is contended that Section 377, by criminalizing consensual same-sex acts between two

males, is indirectly discriminatory against a particular section of the society i.e., men who have sex

with men(MSM). Although it might seem facially neutral and it apparently targets certain sexual acts

instead of sexual identity of a person, but in its operation it does end up unfairly targeting a particular

community since these sexual acts which are criminalized are associated more closely with one class

19
Toonen v Australia CCPR/C/WG/44/D/488/1992.
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of persons, namely, the homosexuals.20 Hence, it is contended that Section 377, by virtue of its

discriminatory effect, marks the whole gay and lesbian community with deviance and perversity.

2.4 Section 377 Violates Right to Life Under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the expression “personal liberty” in Article 21 is of the

widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights. Any law interfering with personal liberty of a

person must satisfy a triple test:21

i) it must prescribe a procedure;

ii) the procedure must withstand a test of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred under

article 19 which may be applicable in a given situation; and

iii) it must also be liable to be tested with reference to Article 14

It is contended that Section 377, on being violative of Articles 14 and 15 as has been submitted in the

preceding sections as well as Article 19, violates the Right to personal liberty of an individual. Along

with serving as the weapon for police abuse, detaining and questioning, extortion, harassment, forced

sex, payment of hush money, Section 377 perpetuates negative and discriminatory beliefs towards

the same-sex relations and sexuality minorities by viewing all gay men as criminals. The result is that

a significant group of the population is, because of its sexual nonconformity, persecuted, marginalized

and turned in on itself. It is hence contended that Section 377 does not satisfy the test of substantive

due process and is violative of one’s Right to life and personal liberty.

20
The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v The Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6.
21
Maneka Gandhi v Union of India 1978 AIR 597.
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 PRAYER

Therefore, in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, this Hon’ble

Supreme Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare that:

In the case of Anticlimax Productions Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. V. State of Belgica & Ors:

The notification dated 01.03.2018 issued by the Government of Belgica violates the Right to

Freedom of Speech and Expression guaranteed under Art 19(1)(a) of the Gaulish Constitution

and the decision of imposing a ban on the film in the State of Belgica is not justified.

In the case of Anticlimax vs. Union of Gaul:

The Sec 377 of the Gaulish Penal Code shall be declared unconstitutional since it is violative

of the part III of the Constitution of Gaul.

AND/OR

Pass any other order that this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the interests of justice, equity

and good conscience.

And for this the Petitioners, as is duty bound shall forever humbly pray.

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 Sd/-

(Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner)

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